Prometheus Christianus, or, A treatise shewing the folly and vanity of atheism: and containing the solution of the main arguments of the Socinians, the Arrians, the deists, and other unitarians ... : whereunto is annex'd the refutation of some dogmatical points of a modern author relating to the trinity / by John Sauvage ...

SECT. VI. Certain Absolete Opinions of another Nove∣list are Propos'd and Solv'd.

A BOOK fell lately into my Hands, in the pe∣rusal whereof I found certain Paradoxical Opinions destitute of Reason, and back'd on∣ly by the single Authority of the Author, whereof one was, the description of the Essential Parts and Nature of an Individuum, which he defines to be nothing else but a Self-Consciousness, or an exact Cor∣respondence with it self; which he produceth no Rea∣son to prove, neither did I ever hear or read of any such definition of an Individuum; for, all Antiquity doth agree in this definition, That an Individuum is Indivisum in se & divisum à quolibet alio; that is, it is undivided in it self, and divided from any thing else: of which Definition this Author makes no men∣tion, and therefore doth not impugn it.

The first Refutation of this Author's new Opi∣nion is as followeth:

A Self-Consciousness of a thing with it self, ar∣gues relation of the thing to it self, which is

impossible, for a relation cannot subsist, except it mediates between two Extreams distinct from each other; the one is that whereon the relation is founded, the other is that to which it is terminated; but between a thing and its self there is no distin∣ction, for a thing and its self are the self-same nu∣merical Object, which cannot admit of any rela∣tion, and consequently is uncapable of any Self-Con∣sciousness.

The Second Refutation.

There can be no Self-Consciousness but by the Vi∣tal Acts produced by the Internal Faculties, which must have an exact Conformity with the Natural Inclination of the thing from whence they proceed; so that here can be no Self-Consciousness of any Ob∣ject to itself, but of the Acts to their Cause.

The Third Refutation.

This Self-Consciousness comes too late to constitute the Essential Notion of an Individuum; for, sepa∣rate this Self-Consciousness from the Origin whence it proceeds, and I demand, whether this Origin, as now divested of its Self-Consciousness, be not an In∣dividuum: if so, then you have the Individuum com∣pleatly constituted independent of this Self-Conscious∣ness; for, either you must constitute the whole Es∣sence of your Self-Consciousness in a certain col∣lection of Vital Acts, which are really distinguish'd from the Substance of the thing whose Self-Con∣sciousness it is, or else you must conceive it to be

really identified with its Subject whereon it is groun∣ded; if the first, you have the Ground and Subject remaining divested of its Self-Consciousness. Now, I demand, whether this Substance that remains sepa∣rated and divested from its Self-Consciousness be an Individuum or not? If it be, then you have the whole and adequate Essence of an Individuum, inde∣pendent and precedent to your Self-Consciousness: But if it be not an Individuum, then it must be a Plurality; which is against common sence, for it is a singular numerical Substance, undivided in itself, and divided from any thing else, and therefore an Individuum. But if you chuse the second by a real Identity with the Substance, which is the Ground and Foundation of it, then you must by a Metaphy∣sical Distinction prescind it, and slice it as a For∣mality from its Subject. And so, by your Under∣standing, consider that Substance as mentally sepa∣rated from its Self-Consciousness, and you will find a singular and numerical Substance, which is undivi∣ded in its self, and divided from any thing else: which is the essential Definition of an Individuum.

Here I might introduce other inanimate Crea∣tures, as, the Elements, Metals, Stones, and the like, which have no collection of Vital Acts, wherein to place your Self-Consciousness, and yet they are all In∣dividuums; as appears by the definition by me given.

Another Opinion I find in this Author, whereby he asserts, That a Horse is a Person; not regulating himself by any Definition or Description of a Per∣son, but goes on in a talking way, and still remains in the Praeliminaris of the Question in debate, without

ever penetrating into the Heart of the Difficulty, or touching the Sore: so that by this not arguing, but talking way of Writing, nothing can be substantial∣ly proved, nothing efficaciously impugned: Where∣fore this Author not having given any definition nor description of a Person, I have nothing here to re∣fute, but his Absolete Position of introducing unreaso∣nable Brute Beasts into the number of Persons, in or∣der to which, I must here give an essential definition of a Person, which is this: Rationalis naturae individua & completa Substantia; that is, A Compleat, Rational, and Individual Substance. By which definition all Ʋnreasonable Creatures are excluded from the notion of Persons; and only GOD, the Angels, and Men, are admitted.