Vindiciæ fundamenti: or A threefold defence of the doctrine of original sin

About this Item

Title
Vindiciæ fundamenti: or A threefold defence of the doctrine of original sin
Author
Stephens, Nathaniel, 1606?-1678.
Publication
London :: printed by T.R. and E.M. for Edmund Paxton in Pauls Chain, right over against the Castle-Tavern, near Doctors Commons,
1658.
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Subject terms
Theology, Doctrinal
Salvation
Sin, Original
Taylor, Jeremy, -- 1613-1667. -- Unum necessarium.
Everard, Robert, -- fl. 1664. -- Creation and the fall of man.
Cite this Item
"Vindiciæ fundamenti: or A threefold defence of the doctrine of original sin." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A93868.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 6, 2024.

Pages

SECT. 4. Of the causes of the universal wickednesse of mankind.

In the beginning he doth take upon him to propound an ob∣jection. If there were not some common principle of evil introdu∣ced by the sinne of our parents upon all his posterity, how should all men be so naturally inclined to be vicious. To this he endeavours to frame many answers.

First (saith he) if we will suppose that there must be a cause in our nature determining us to sinne, by an unresistible necessity, I de∣sire to know why such a principle should be more necessary to us, than it was to Adam?

Repl. As I have said before, Adam had onely a possibility to

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sinne, he did sinne so, that he had liberty, and freedome not to sin; But as the case now standeth, we can do nothing else but sin. It is true in the particular, every man is free in the committing of this, or that particular sin, though it be true in the General, an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit. It is possible that an healthy man, by disorder, may fall into great sicknesses, but a man of frail, and infirme constitution, is wholly enclined to sick¦nesses and diseases. As great, nay, a farre greater difference, was between that liberty that Adam had before his fall, and what we now have. He had a freedome to choose the good, and to re∣fuse the evil; so have not we now. But to take away the force of this answer, he further argueth.

That we can choose the good, and as naturally love good as evil, and in some instances more. A man cannot natu∣rally hate God, if he knowes any thing of him; a man natu∣rally loves his parents, he naturally hateth some sorts of un∣cleannesse.

Repl. We do not deny, but (by the general concurrence and assistance of God) man since the fall, hath some ability to choose, and love the good: But what kind of good? that which is ethical and moral, but not that which is spiritual. In the very best actions that a natural man doth, when he gives alms, when he observes promises, when he doth performe any good, he sins in the manner; because his actions do not proceed from sincere love, neither are they directed to a right end. The end of the commandment is love out of a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith unfaigned, 1 Tim. 1.5.

Because a natural man wants these principles, his best actions are stained with sinne. As strange as this doctrine seemes to be, there is none of us all, but may finde a truth of it in our own ex∣perience. For let us heare, reade, pray, meditate, give alms, dispute for the truth, reforme errours and abuses, and do much good for the Church; yet we can have no comfort if our con∣science once tell us, that we do not these things for God, but for our selves. This is the very case of every natural man besides the sinisterity of ends, his actions do not proceed from right principles. And whereas he argueth, that a man cannot naturally hate God if he knowes any thing of him. If he speak of the excellen∣cy

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of God, and his holinesse? In such a sense if men did know him they could not hate him. For that they love him, fear him, obey him, trust in him, do all for him, leave all for his sake, this is grounded upon the right knowledge of that excellency, and goodnesse that is in himself. And therefore since the fall, the blindnesse of minde is the cause of a great part of the mischief. The will is perverse in her choice; the affections are out of order, because the judgment is not rightly informed. In a lower sense we do acknowledge, that men may know some things of God, and their knowledge may be the ground of their hatred of God. It may be with some wicked men, as with the Devils, they be∣leeve there is one God, and tremble. But as to the choice of spiritual good, he further saith.

Neither was Adams case better than ours in this particu∣lar. For that his nature could not carry him to heaven, or indeed to please God in order to it seems to be confessed by them who have therefore affirmed him to have a supernatural righ∣teousnesse.

Repl. If the collation be between state and state Adam had a power to understand that good which is spiritual, tolove & choose it more than we now have since the fall. The wise man saith, God made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions, Eccles. 7. ult. He must needs speak of a spiritual uprightnesse contrary to the deceits that are to be found amongst thousands of men and women. And whereas he saith that Adams nature could not carry him to heaven. If this be so, God provided worse for him than for the rest of the creatures. The rest of the creatures were made with such natures sutable to their ends. If therefore God did not make Adam in a state someway fit for heaven, why did he create him with an immortal soule? This state plainly sheweth that had he stood or eaten of the tree of life, he should have lived for ever. But falling, he did runne the hazard of the losse of that life that might have been had. Lastly, if Adam coald not have gone to heaven in that nature that God had made him, the falling short of eternal life could not have been any fault of his own; and the blame would have laid on the creation. Were it rational for God to require Adam to go to heaven, and yet no way to make him sutable or fit for such a con∣dition.

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This were to require the whole tale of bricks, and to give no straw. And for that Tenet of the Romish Doctors, I wonder that he should stand upon it that Adam was endued with supernatural righteousnesse in that sense, at least, as they under∣stand it, for look what righteousnesse Adam had, it was by crea∣tion. The had stood he had propagated it to posterity. The reliques of the image of God do plainly shew in what state he was made in the beginning. In the creation of man it is said, he made all things very good, Hearbs, Trees, Birds, Beasts, Fishes, all these may be good in their kinde, though they were not made in a state fit to go to heaven. But it is impossible that Adam could be made in a state very good, but he must be some way fit for union with God, in which all spiritual and eternal good doth consist.

Now he comes to the main objection, and here he tells us that it is certain there is not only one, but many common principles from which sin derives it self into the manners of all men. This he undertakes to prove in opposition to our assertion, who hold that the pravity and corruption of nature doth flow from the disobedience of the first man. But let us heare him speak in his own words.

The first great cause (saith he) of an universal implety, is, that at first God had made no promises of heaven, he had not propounded a∣ny glorious rewards to be as an argument to support the superiour fa∣culty against the inferiour, that is, to make the will to choose the best & to leave the worst, and to be as a reward for suffring contradiction, And going on, he further addeth this to be the reason of the ge∣neral corruption of the old world; Because (saith he) there was no such thing in that period of the world, therefore almost all flesh corrupted themselves, excepting Abel, Seth, Enos, and E∣noch, we finde not one good man from Adam to Noah; and therefore the Apostle calls that world 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the world of the ungodly. It was not so much wonder, that when Adam had no promises made to en∣able him to contest his natural concupiscence, he should strive to make his conditions by the Devils Promi∣ses.

Reply It is true the Apostle calleth the old world 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the world of ungodly, but that there were no spiritual promises in

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those times, this we utterly deny.

What shall we make of that promise, the seed of the woman shall breake the Serpents head? What shall we make of the sacrifices? were they not all figures of the blood of Christ to come? Saint Peter also plainly tells us, That the spirits of the fathers were dis∣obedient in the times of the old world. In what sense then doth he call them disobedient? Their disobedience must be expounded in reference to the teachings, convictions that they had by and through the Spirit of Christ, whether in Noahs Ministry or other∣wise. Many more reasons might be alledged to prove that the fathers were not altogether destitute of spiritual promises. If our Author will prove it, let him shew how they were too blame for their disobedience.

But he is as strange in assigning that which he tearmes the se∣cond cause of the general impiety.

A second cause (saith he) of the general iniquity of the world is, because our nature is so hard put to it in many instances. Not be∣cause nature is originally corrupted, but because Gods laws command such things which are a restraint to the indifferent, and otherwise law∣ful inclinations of nature. And then going on, he doth in the same page explain himself more fully. Our unwillingnesse and averse∣nesse came by occasion of the Law coming crosse upon our nature: not because our nature is contrary unto God, but because God was pleased to super-induce some commandments contrary to our nature For if God had commanded us to eate the best meats and to drink the richest wines as long as they could please us, and were to be had, I sup∣pose it will not be thought that original sinne would hinder us from obedience. But because we are forbidden to do somethings which na∣turally we desire to do, and love, therefore our nature is hard put to it, and this is the cause of the difficulty. So farre he, page 413. 414, 415, 416.

Reply. From these and such like speeches of his, I would entreat him (that is so apt to condemne others) to observe the rigour and the severity of his own principles.

First, he tells us that there was no proposal of spiritual promi∣ses to the old world, and then Secondly, God laid such com∣mands upon them, that were altogether above their natural a∣bilities, and from the position of these two, he sheweth us that

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the world did so generally overflow with all kind of wickednesse. These things are so extreame hard, that I do not finde their pa∣rallel in any of our writers. They do indeed say that God giveth commands farre above natural abilities, but not farre above that natural ability that Adam was furnished withall in the begin∣ning, neither above that gracious ability which God hath enga∣ged himself to bestow in the Word of promise. But to amplifie commands upon feeble flesh, and to make no spiritual promises answerable to the command, is plainly to make the Lord himself extreamely severe to the sons of men. None of our Authours ever would allow such a severity.

Of all the Ancients, Augustine is the Authour that seems to be most rigorous in the points of original sinne, and the natural ser∣vitude of the will, yet if we consider the whole scope of his do∣ctrine, he doth not come near to the severity of the position a∣bove mentioned; when some did reason with him, If there be no free-will, to what purpose exhortations and commands? I answe, this, he purposely wrote his book de correptione & gratia, the effect of which is to this purpose, In commands know what thou oughtest to do, in reproof know what thou hast not done through thine own default, in prayer know whence thou mayst receive what thou wouldst have. And when the Pelagians did vehemently inculcate that which our Authour doth so much stand upon; Peccatum voluntatis an necessitatis est? si necessitatis est peccatum non est: si voluntatis vitari potest. Sinne (say they) is either of the will, or of necessity,) If it be of necessity, it is no sinne, if it be of the will, it may be avoided. To this he hath a double answer. First, (saith he) Ʋt sanemur, in vccamus eum cui dicitur in Psalmo de necessi∣tatibus educ me. That we may be healed, we call upon him to whom it is said in the Psalme, bring me out of my necessities. His second answer is, vitari posse peccatum si natura vitiata sanetur gratiâ Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum. Sinne may be avoid∣ed in case our corrupt nature may be healed by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. There would be no end if we should cite all the passages that he hath to this purpose. In which he doth acknowledge that we lie under a natural necessity of sinning, but yet that necessity is not absolute and irrecoverable where there is a want of ability to keep the command, there he

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doth referre us to the ability to be had from the word of pro∣mise. Of all our Authours in these latter times, Luther in his treatise de servo arbitrio, seemeth to speak most hard, yet for all this in the case of commands above natural abilities he alwayes incourages men to go to free grace. He alwayes testifies that the Law is to be preached to kill and undo a sinner, to put him under the curse and under wrath, that so he may come to Christ. To let passe all ensamples, we will come to that one instance in the beginning of the book, when Erasmus did argue in this wise. What profit or necessity is there to divulge such things, seeing from thence so many evils may seem to arise. To this he hath a double answer. Prima est humiliatio nostrae super•••••••••••• cognitio gratiae Dei, alteraipsa fides Christiana, &c. The first is the humiliation of our Pride, and the knowledge of the grace of God, the other is the Christian faith it self. First, God certainly hath promised his grace to the humble, that is, to those that are cast down, and are without hope. Now a man cannot be throughly humbled, untill he know as wholly out of his own abilities, councels, studies, wills, workes: so his salvation altogether to depend upon the disposal, councell, will, work of another that is of God alone. For as long as he is per∣swaded that he can do the least for his salvation, he doth remaine in the trust of himself, neither doth he wholly dispaire of himself. Therefore is not humbled before God, but presumeth upon place, time, or some work for himself either doth hope or at least wish for that by which he may come to salvation. He therefore that doubteth not wholly to depend upon the will of God, altogether dispaires of himself chooses nothing, but expecteth God to work it in him, and for him, he is nearest to salvation. More he hath to the same purpose, Concerning the second reason, he hath these words, therefore saith he, that there maybe some place found for faith, it is needful that all things which are believed may be hidden out of sight, and they cannot be further hidden than under the contrary object, sense, experience. So God when he quickneth, he doth it by killing, when he justifieth, he doth that thing by convincing men of the guilt of sin, when he lifteth up to heaven, he doth it by bringing down to hell, and much more to that purpose. All this is but a specimen, or handsel of the doctrine of Luther, though he doth every where teach that there is no ability in man to obey the command, yet

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all ability is to he had in the word of promise. He doth abun∣dantly shew that the use of the Law properly is to bring men to despair, that despairing in themselves, they may be driven to Christ. He doth marvellously expresse the doctrine of Saint Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans and elsewhere. Now on the contrary, Doctor Jeremy Taylor tells us a contrary tale, that the Lord did encrease his commands above the ability of men in the times of the old world; and gave no spiritual promises in answer to the commands given in those dayes, and this he doth avouch to be the true cause why iniquity did abound in that age. Now how he can make Religion intelligible by the position of such principles, for my part I cannot understand. I think never any of our Divines was ever found to come to such a high pitch of se∣verity.

Now we go to his next Section.

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