The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.

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Title
The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.
Author
Richardson, Alexander, of Queen's College, Cambridge.
Publication
London :: Printed by Gartrude Dawson, and are to be sold by Sam. Thomson at the White-Horse in Paul's Church-yard,
1657.
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Subject terms
Logic
Ramus, Petrus, -- 1515-1572
Talon, Omer, -- ca. 1510-1562
Cite this Item
"The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A91783.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 6, 2024.

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Propositio est prima pars antecedentis qua questionis faltem consequens cum argumento disponitur.

We have heard of a question, and an argument, which is a third in respect of the two in the question; but he cals it not a third before, because in a compo∣site it is disposed with the whole question, not with the parts, then the dispositio of the argument cum quaestione is not at random, but so as there will be an antecedent and a consequent, which antecedent be∣ing put, the consequent will follow of necessity; that is, the inference of the conclusion will follow of ne∣cessity, so that necessity here follows upon the infe∣rence of the conclusion, not upon the conclusion. Now the parts of the antecedent are the proposition and assumption, for so it is requisite, that every syl∣logism

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stand of three parts, because they play at three hands: and there must be two parts of the antece∣dent, because the argument being but one can play but twice, namely, with the two parts of the question, and therefore if it should play the third time, it must play with it self, and thence it is, that it never comes into the conclusion: now in a composite syllogism there is silently contained the antecedent part of the question in the assumption, though it be not exprest. Now the common Logicians call the proposition the major propositio, and the assumption the minor proposi∣tio, and the reason of it is this, because the majus ex∣tremum, namely, the consequent part of the question was put in proposition, and the minus extremum in the assumption: for as touching a composite syllo∣gism, Aristotle did not teach one word of it. Now Ramus keeps these terms propositio, and assumptio, and he had reason, for use hath taken up these words in good Authors for these things, as in Tully, Cornelius Agricola, and other Logicians that follow the more pure latine, and there is reason for it, for that which they call propositio there, is a thing propounded to him with whom we dispute, and then the former being granted, I do assume as it were out of the bowels of the proposition, the assumption: so the Greeks call propositio, Prothesis, and assumptio, Hypothesis: though I find some of them that call the proposition thesis, whereas the question is the thesis. Now propositio is that which is propounded, and carrieth a shew of truth with it, ergo, we seldom deny the proposition, but rather the assumption, or else distinguish of it, ergo, our chiefest care must be of the assumption, to discern truth and falshood in that.

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