The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.

Artificiale est quod ex sese arguit.

Now here is that affection, that is in this kind of arguments, that glue that was before, is here quod ex se: so that this makes that more special, which before was more general: so that we shall still see what our eye of reason sees: we heard before that we see the thing, as it is an argument; here we see it, as it is af∣fectioned to argue ex se. Ex se, what is that? as if he should say, look into the artificium of the thing, there shall you see his artificial arguing, ex se, that is it argues natura, or it is causa natura of its arguing: so that these arguments concurre for the being of the thing. So wood is affected to argue a chest ex se, that is, it is in the artificio of wood to argue a chest made of wood ex se: so then this artificial argument ariseth from nature, from a vis ingenita, that is, in ar∣tificio rei: so the efficient argues ex se, as if I should say, if there were not that cunning in the efficient of a chest to make it, it would not be one. So that it is thus defined, quodex sese arguit. Argumentum was the next genus, and he doth not express it, but under∣stand it here, because we heard of it so lately before: then again he hath it here, but after another manner, because he could not deliver the form of it, without

the genus: for arguit is not here taken for act, but for potentia: as we say animal vidit, though he doth not actually see, but have the faculty of it: so we say, Does he eat or drink: meaning, can he eat or drink. For if it were taken for the act of arguing, then it should not be no where but in judgement: so that quod arguit, is as much as argumentum, and ex se is the form: if he had said artificiale est argumentum ex sese, he had said the same that ex sese arguit: but it had not been so plain to a young Schollar, and he had also newly done with argumentum before: so that this is the second thing that our eye of reason is to look at, namely, an artificial argument, which can ex sese arguere. Now fallaces may be in every rule. In the first, as if any abuse it to deceive and abuse reason: for the second, if any go about to judge be∣fore he see the invention, it is a fallace, and a prepo∣sterous course. So argumentum is artificiale, or in∣artificiale; they break this rule that will give testi∣mony of a thing, whose artificial arguments they have not seen: so do the Papists in their implicite faith, when they beleive as the Church beleives, not know∣ing what the Church beleiveth. So Schollers that take any thing that their Authors deliver them, with∣out any examination at all of the things they read. Kiekerman saith, an inartificial argument may be re∣ceived before an artificial. I do not deny it, but yet you must examine it afterward: Gods testimonies onely are undeniable, because he cannot lye; but no mans.