The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.

CHAP. XIII.

De disperatis. Opposita sunt dissentanea, que ratione, & re dissentiunt.

IN looking at things we first see the causes that give esse, then the complements, that give bene esse to the thing, then we see what it is not, and easily do by seeing them arguments that give esse: and first we are to see the diversity, which though they be con∣formable, yet they do divert somewhat one from ano∣ther, and they are first, because they give light to all the rest that follow. Now we come to see their opposition, that is, those things which have their causes, effects, subjects and adjuncts, are not onely dissenting in a logical respect, but are distinct reals. Opposita, gain sets, it cometh of ob and pono, as it were set against: ob is as it were a bolt to bar one thing from another: so that their nature is to be barred,

not onely ratione, but it is principally in their realty, and herein do diversa differ from opposites. Diversa are made to disagree in that wherein they might a∣gree, whereas opposites dissent in their nature.

Sunt dissentanea.

We heard they were called dissentanea by reason of their disagreeing, they do not sentire idem, but quot capita, tot sensus sunt among them, whereas consentanies are of the same judgement, and these names do well fit arguments, because they are as it were the senses of things. Dissentanea that is, such as think asunder, are severed, and distract our thoughts.

Que ratione, & re dissentiunt.

Ratione, that is, as diversa did, because they do not onely disagree quatenus argumenta, that is, as they have logical respect in them, but quatenus they are res, as black is not white, they are opposites, and there is a barre that black cannot be white, & con∣tra, which opposition is in their dissention, be∣ing clean of another judgement: so that there is dis∣sention betwixt them in sensu nostro in beholding of them.

Re.

As if we say black is not white, we say not one∣ly, that black is not the cause, not the effect, sub∣ject, or adjunct of white, but that they are divers things in nature, ergo, this must be observed, that the bar is not onely the bar of rational respect, but of reality.

Itaque eidem attribui secundum idem, & ad idem, &c.

Surely if they be bar'd from coming one at ano∣ther, and that in nature, then non possunt eidem attri∣bui.

As first when I say blackness is not whiteness: and again when as I say blackness and whiteness can∣not be given to the same subject: here the one dissen∣tion is in essence, the other is in accident, ergo this idem must be understood of the essence it self, and likewise the subject. Non possunt takes away all pos∣sibility of joyning in one, ergo, whatsoever make•• them consent, breaks this rule, for whereas this rule saith, sunt dissentanea, they make them consentanea, and again, whereas this rule saith, non possunt eidem attribui, they say, they may.

Attribui.

The attribute is alwayes the consequent part of the axiom: so that if we give them to subjects, they cannot be given to one and the same subject: they may be the consequent, but not the antecedent part: so that contraries must be attributed, for when I say homo est animal, aut brutum, I give them both to ani∣mal, but not eidem. Now antecedent contraries will have contrary consequents, est enim par ratio, now they do dissentire ratione, & re, ergo, cannot any wayes be consentanies, ergo, cannot be made by any means to agree.

Secundum idem.

According to the same, divers think this is put in in respect of relates, because of the example that fol∣lows, pater & filius ejusdem: but it hath a more ge∣neral respect of opposites in their whole nature: else it should have been taught more specially in the do∣ctrine of relates. Now two contraries may be given eidem, but not secundum idem, & adidem, & eodem tempore: eidem, that is, eidem genere, not eidem specie, as a man may be well, and a man may be sick, but not the same man: so that secundum idem hath respect

to the same individuality as it were, or species: so homo may be aeger and sanus, but not secundum idem, for that identity cannot be: now ratio is given homi∣ni secundum idem, for herein omnis homo est idem, & ad idem, still there is idem, for if we consider them not about idem, they are not opposites: then again there must be the same respect: and also ad idem, that is the very same point, for whiteness in the wall, and white∣ness in my hand, are neither attributed eidem, nor secundum idem; eodem tempore; for if they be diver∣sis temporibus, then they may both agree eidem, as ho∣mo nunc sedens potest deinceps ambulare: so all these respects came from being dissentanea ratione, & re: so that all these must be respected: so that black and white in general are not opposites, but as they are considered in their dissenting and opposite nature: so that this is the true nature of opposites. If ex indocto fit doctus, here is a difference of time, and by this rule we may answer almost all the fallations that are made: that fallation a divisione is from hence, therefore this is a consequution from the definition going before, and principally from the word re. Sic Socrates albus & ater eadem parte esse non potest.

Itaque ex altero affirmato alterum negatur, & e contra.

Et e contra follows from hence, for Ramus left it in his edition, and if econtra be not put in, the rule is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for if we have an example where ex altero negato alterum affirmatur, that hath otherwise no rule here, ergo we must say & e contra, for they that leave it out, as most have done since Ramus, here is their mistaking, because they think it is not a neces∣sary consequution, but contingent. Now Ramus

doth not teach us consequution that belongs to syllo∣gisms, but arguments use, & if it be but contingently true, yet it may belong to Logick, as well, as if it were necessary: and it is very common in speech to say, it is not this, or that, but another thing: again the mea∣ning of these two is this, ex altero affirmato alterum negatur, that is, they both cannot be affirmed, for he teacheth invention here, and not judgement, & e con∣tra, that is, they cannot be both denied. They may be both denied, as a stone is not vertuous or vitious, are these opposites? yes by our rule, if & e contra be left out, but here they are neither of them attributed: so that I do not mean negation in an axiom, but the not giving of them to a thing, if both arguments be denied, they may be paria, as when I say, if it be not Thomas, it is not William, as if I should say, it is as much reason it should not be Thomas, as not William: so also if both be affirmed they may be paria, as when I say it may be Thomas as well as William, for all is one for that, and thus we must look at all these con∣sectaries, because most fallaces are from hence, and they are very subtle.

Opposita sunt disparata, aut contraia.

They are of two sorts, that are barred disparates, that is unmatchable, or contraries such as are directly set one against the other, now the disparates are when the sides are not matching one another, for there is more against one, ne Hercules quidem con∣tra duos, ergo, here the fight is not so violent, but the duellio is more strong, so that according to this opposition of things in nature must our Logick proceed.

Disparata sunt opposita.

Disparata are first because they will give light to

the stronger dissention, as being contained in it: these destroy one another, but not with that violence and force that contraries do, they are called disparata, because here is impar congressus, and they are un∣matchable: but contraries are well matched striking down right blows, whereas disparates steal one be∣hind another. Sunt opposita, that is, dissenting re & ratione.

Quorum unum mult is pariter opponitur.

Here first unum opponitur multis, and then par oppo∣nitur to every one of them, and not unum uni: now that we may see it more throughly, this it is, whereas a thing is said not to be another thing, with the same reason that it may be said not to be a third, or a fourth, &c. that is, unum multis, and again opposed toge∣ther, and that we may see this more particularly, here is the reason disparates are alwayes under some more remote genus, whereas contraries will come un∣der one next head, be it genus or what it will be, and that is the reason why they are unum multis, and pariter.

Object. Why doth he say unum mult is rather than multa multis? for sometimes there are multa mul∣tis.

Answ. First, because when there are multa mul∣tis, there is one more especially opposed to all the rest, then any of the other, ergo, he saith unum multis: se∣condly, because where there are multa multis, there is unum multis: thirdly, because in use we find unum opposed multis more frequent than multa multis. Homo is opposed to brutum as unum uni, but to Leo, and equus, as unum multis; again, he is opposed to brutum as Leo, and equus, as unum multis, but not pa∣riter, Pariter alike, that is, there is not another kind of

argument, when homo is opposed to Leo, then when he is opposed to equus, and here we may see that if opposites be onely of two branches, then are they not disparates: then again, if they be of two sides onely then are they contraries, ergo, if there be any di∣stribution in Art where the parts are not opposed one to one, there will be a genus lost.

Ʋnum multis.

He doth not mean alwayes in use, as if one dispa∣rate might not argue another, but he meanes as they are in nature, ut viridum, cinereum, rubrum, &c. are disparates.

Quae singula extremis, & inter se disparata sunt.

For colour is simplex, aut mistus, simplex is white and black, mistus the other colours, so that these come not under the next genus, sic liberalitas, & avaritia inter se disparantur: because prodigality may be where these are not, habit is vertue, or vice, vertue is this, or that, or liberality: vice is avaritia, or pro∣digalitas, so that these are unum multis, that is, not having one next genus, but a more remote genus of opposites, and avaritia, and prodigalitas are opposite in vice to liberality, and here is many to one, and a like.

Virgilius 1. Aeneidos. O quam te memorem virgo: namque haud tibi vul∣tus, &c.

She is a Goddess, or a Virgin, she might have been a third, but he lookes not at that. Not a wo∣man, for she had not the countenance of a woman: again not a woman, for nec vox hominem sonat: ergo, Dea, and thus we see how one thing is not another.