or at leastwise Logick, otherwise let them tell me any thing in Logick, that is not in Dialectica, ac∣cording to our Authors definition of it. For Ra∣mus will not deny but Dialectica and Logica are ta∣ken specially in Aristotle, as ratio is sometimes used for argumentum, but that is by a Synecdoche, for he wanting special names cals things by general words: as an exhalation he cals a fume, whereas a vapour is also a fume, and often he useth it in his Politicks, Eodemque sensu, &c. that is, Logick is so defined, ars bene disserendi, even as Dialectica is, and whatso∣ever other conceits men have had concerning Dia∣lectica, they are out of the way, for if they will say there is a necessary, a probable, and a sophistical ar∣gument, as many do speak, that belongs to an axiome, not to an argument, and whereas they say syllogismus is necessarius, that is Apodicticus, contingens and so∣phisticus, if we look at a necessary syllogisme in Bar∣bara, why there may be a contingent syllogisme, that is a syllogisme consisting of contingent axioms, for so they mean, nay I will make a false syllogisme in Barbara, that shall be true and good, as omnis homo est lapis, omnis afinus est homo, ergo omnis asinus est lapis: and a demonstrative syllogisme, as omne animal ratio∣nale est visible, omnis homo est animal rationale, ergo omnis homo est visibilis: so that these lie not in the syllogisme, for then a dialectical syllogisme would not be an apodictical, or sophistical, aut contra, but these lie in the axiome: for why? whatsoever is ne∣cessary is true, and a contingent axiome doth pro∣nunciare aliquid esse verum, though it may be false, ergo whither truth belongs, thither they belong; now truth and falsehood follow upon affirmation, and negation, and they arise from an axiom, neither doth