A political catechism, or, Certain questions concerning the government of this land,: answered in His Majesties own words, taken out of his answer to the 19 propositions, Pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. of the first edition; with some brief observations thereupon. Published for the more compleat setling of consciences, particularly of those that have made the late protestation, to maintain the power and priviledges of Parliament, when they shall herein see the Kings own interpretation what that power and priviledges are. It is this twentieth day of May, Anno Dom. 1643. ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament concerning printing, that this book entituled, A Political catechism, be printed. John White.

A Political Catechism; Serving to instruct those that have made the Protestation concerning the power and priviledges of Parliament; taken out of His Majesties Answer to the 19 Propositions.

Question.

HOW many simple kinds are there of Civil Govern∣ment of States, and Common-wealths?

Answer, There are three kinds of Govern∣ment among men; Absolute Monarchy, Ari∣stocracy, and Democracy, page, 17.

Qu. 2. Are there any of these simple Forms perfect?

Ans. All these have their particular Convenicuces and Inconvenieuces, page 17.

Observ. 1. Experience hath taught men every where to acknowledge this, and accordingly there never was long (if at all) continued any of these Forms exactly Simple; though some have more seemed such then others. Also in all mixtures there is commonly some one of these Forms more conspieuous then the rest, from whence such a particular Go∣verntment hath its denomination.

Quest. 3. Is the State of England governed by any one of these kinds simply?

A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath moulded this [Government] out of a mixture of these. p. 18.

Quest. 4. What a kind of Government then is that of the State of England.

Ans. Regulated Monarchy. page 18.

Observ. 1. If this Government be a mixture of all these, and a Regulated Monarchy; then it is a ••ond thing with us to talk of an Absolute Monarchy, and what an Absolute

Monarch is, or may do. And it is only the language of Flattery that holds such Discourses.

2. It needed not to be counted Solecism (as some would perswade us to speak of Free Subjects in a Monarchy, such a Monarchy as ours is.

3. If this Government be a mixture of all three, then the House of Commons, the Representative Body of the people, must needs be allowed a share in Government (some at least) which yet is denyed page 19.

4. If this Government be a mixture, then is not the Go∣vernment according to th••se Laws, solely trusted to the King, as seems to be affirmed, page 18.

5. If the Government be regulated, why do men tell us that the King is above all Law? for it is by Laws that he is Regulated.

6. If the King be Regulated by the Law, then is the King accountable to the Law, and not to God only, as men would make us believe.

7. If the Monarchy or Regal Authority it self be regu∣lated, then whatsoever is done by the King, undeniably without and beyond the limits of that Regulation, is not Regal Authority. And therefore,

8. To resist the Notorious Transgressions of that Regula∣tion, is no Resisting of Regal Authority. And,

9. It is so far from being a Resisting of the Ordinance of God, that it is not so much as Resisting the Ordinance of man.

Quest. 5. By whom was this government framed in this sort? or who is to be accounted the Immediate Efficient of the Consti∣tution thereof?

A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this, page 18.

Observ. 1. If our Ancestors were the moulders of this Government, then the King hath not his power, solely, or immediately, by Divine Right.

2. Much less hath he his Power or Authority by Right of Conquest.

3. But the Immediate Original of it was from the people. And if so, Then—

4. In questioned cases, the King is to Produce his Grant

(for he hath no more then what was granted) and not the People to shew a Reservation; For all is presumed to be Reserved, which cannot be proved to be granted away.

Quest. 6. Is this Regulated and mixt Monarchy, as good as an Absolute Monarchy, or better, or worse?

A. This Excellent Constitution of this Kingdom, (the Ancient, Equal, Happy, Well-poysed, and never enough Commended Constitution of the Government of this King∣dom. page 17.) hath mad•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Nation so many years both Famous and Happy, and to •• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Degree of Envy, pag. 20.

Quest. 7. How comes it to pays that this Constitution is so Ex∣cellent.

A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this, out of a mixture of these, as to give to this Kingdom (as far as Humane Prudence can provide) the Conveniences of all three, without the Inconvenience of any one, page 18.

Observ. 1. Then those that would place in the King, an Absolute and Arbitrary Power to do what he List, are De∣structive to the Nations Happiness, and Enemies to the Kingdom.

2. If this mixture cause this happiness, then it is not the greatness of the Kings Power over his People but the Re∣straint of that Power that hath made this Kingdom famous and Happy; for other Kings have Power as large, but not so much restrained; which largeness of their Power hath raised those Kings indeed, (but not their Kingdoms) to a great degree of Envy.

3. Hence we discern, that it is possible for Kings to envy their Peoples Happiness, because the largeness of the Peoples Happiness depends much upon the Restraint of the Kings Ex∣orbitant Power.

4. If this mixture and well-poised Constitution have raised this Kingdom to so great a Degree of Envy, no mar∣vell if Jesuitical Councells be Active to overthrow this Happy Constitution.

Q. 8. What is the Conveniency or Good of Monarchy?

A. The Uniting of a Nation under one Head, to Resist Invasion from abroad, and Insurrection at home, page 18.

Observ. 1. What Pernicious Councellors are they then to a Monarch that advise him to bring in from abroad German Horse, or an Irish Army, or a Fleet of Danes to invade this Kingdom; or to imploy Dunkirk Ships to seaze upon his Merchants, which is so formally contrary to the proper Good and End of Monarchy it self?

2. Or are they better or worse that Advise him to Au∣thorize, or even permit any in his Name to Plunder, Rob, Spoil, Imprison any of his Subjects, whom they have found peaceably in their houses, or at work in the Fields, and have not disobeyed any Legal Command of his?

Quest. 9. What is the Ill of Absolute Monarchy? or the In∣convenience to which it is Lyable?

A. The Ill of Absolute Monarchy, is Tyranny, page 18.

Observ. 1. Therefore the more Absolute a Monarch is, the more prone to be a Tyrant.

2. Therefore also it is safer to Restrain the King of some Power to do us good, then to grant him too much oppor∣tunity to do us hurt; and the Danger is greater to the People in Enlarging the Kings Power, then in restraining it some what.

Q. 10. What is the good or Conveniency of Aristocracy?

A. The good of Aristocracy is the Conjunction of Coun∣cells in the Ablest persons of a State for publick Benefit, page 18.

Observ. Then surely it is for the Publick Benefit of the State, that this Conjunction of Councells in Parliament should be made use of more then once in thirteen or fourteen years; and the Law for a Triennial Parliament (if there were not others before for the holding of a Parliament yearly) was a most necessary Law, as also that it should not be dissolved for fifty dayes.

2. It was not then Intended in the Constitution of this Go∣vernment, that the King in the greatest matters of Impor∣tance for publick benefit, should only hear what they say, and then follow it, or reject it, meerly at his own Pleasure; for this may be as well done in an Absolute Monarchy.

3. Neither is it agreeable to the Constitution of this King∣dom, to withdraw the King from affording his presence to

his Great Councel of State, that so the private Counsels of Private men may be preferred before those whom the Law and the Constitution of the Kingdom counts the Ablest to judge of publick benefit.

Q. 11. What is the Ill of Aristocracy, or the Inconvenience to which it is lyable?

A. The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Division. p▪ 18

Obs. What shall we say then to those Private Councellors that have abused the King, by perswading him first to with∣draw himself from his Parliament, and then to call away the Members of both Houses, when yet without the Consent of both Houses this Parliament cannot be Adjourned to ano∣ther place, much less Dissolved? Yet if all would have come away at call, had it not been Dissolved for want of Legal Numbers Remaining? And what greater Faction or Divi∣sion can there be, then such as Divide between King and Parliament, and between the House and their Members? Are not they most Pernicious Instruments, that make Mo∣narchy it self, (whose end is to unite as was said before) thus far guilty of Faction and Division?

Q. 12: What is the Good, or Convenience of Democracy?

A. The good of Democracy is Liberty, and the courage and Industry which Liberty begets, page 18.

Observ. 1. Then the more Liberties are Encroached upon, the more the people will be rendred Cowardly and Poor, as may be plain enough seen by comparing the Valour and Riches of this Nation in Q. Elizabeths days, with what hath been of Late Days.

2. The King himself, when once his Subjects by having lost their Liberties, shall lose withall their Courages, will prove the greatest Looser; for then his Kingdom will be an easie Prey to any Forraign Invader, or even to a home∣bred Usurper, that could gather any sudden Strength, and would promise more Liberty.

Q. What is the Ill of Democracy, or the Inconvenience to which it is lyable?

A. The Ills of Democracy are Tumults, Violence, and Licentiousness, page 18.

Observ. If these be the Evils for which the Peoples Liber∣ty

ought to be Restrained by the Mixture in this Govern∣ment, then the Restraint of the Liberty should be measured according to the Exigency of these Evils, and so much Li∣berty should be measured according to the Exigency of these Evils, and so much Liberty need only be Restrained as is suf∣ficient for the prevention of these Evils.

Q. 14. What is the mixture of this Kingdom, which gives it the Conveniences of all the three forementioned kinds of Govern∣ment without the Inconveniences of any one.

A. In this Kingdom the Laws are Joyntly made by a King, by a house of Peeres, and by a house of Commons chosen by the people: All having free Votes, and particular priviledges, page 18.

Observ. Whereas there hath been great Question made by many what is meant by the Power and Priviledges of Par∣liament, mentioned in the Protestation, which hath been so generally made throughout the Kingdom? There is no rea∣son to doubt but those things which the King grants after∣ward, to be the particular Priviledges of each House, and of both, are their certain Priviledges according to Law, and the Constitution of the Kingdom; and to the maintaining of them every one that hath made the Protestation is most strictly bound, without peradventure or shift.

2. That the Priviledges which the King challenges to Him∣self, are to be yeilded to, only so far forth as they are con∣sistent with the acknowledged Priviledges of the two Houses; because the Monarchy being acknowledged to be a regulated Monarchy, and the Government mixt of Aristo∣cracy and Democracy, as well as Monarchy; it is the Privi∣ledges of the two Houses of Parliament that makes the mix∣ture, and so they must Regulate and Interpret the Privi∣ledges of the King, and not the Priviledges of the King Re∣gulate or Interpret theirs, save only to the maintaining still the Regal Dignity, and the Succession according to Laws.

Q. 15. What Priviledges doth the King challenge to himself?

A. The Government according to these Laws is trusted to the King: Power of Treaties of War and Peace, of making Peers, of choosing Officers, and Councellors for State, Judges for Law, Commanders for Forts and

Castles; giving Commissions for raising men to make War abroad, or to prevent or provide against Invasions and Insurrections at home, Benefit of Confiscations, power of pardoning, and some other of like kind are placed in the King, page 18.

Observ. 1. That all these are ordinarily in the King, Ex∣perience and Custom Teaches, even those that know not the Law by reading; but by what hath been noted before, and follows after, it is to be understood only so, as not to pre∣judice the Priviledges of the Houses of Parliament, especially in cases of Necessity, (of which hereafter.) Also—

2. It is acknowledged here, that the Government, Tru∣sted, is to be according to the Laws, and so all these Things are not absolutely in the King; as for instance, Pardons, the Law denies power of Pardoning wilful Murther; And Benefit of some Confiscations belongs to some private Lords of Mannours.

3. If Government only according to Law be trusted to the King then to resist Notorious Illegal Violences is not to resist the Kings Authority.

Q 16. For what end is this Authority trusted to the King, and placed in him?

A. For our Subjects sake these rights are vested in us, page 17. The Prince may not make use of this high and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it, page 19.

Observ. 1. Then the Good of the Subjects is ever to be preferred before the Monarchial Greatness of the King (the End is ever more considerable then the Means) Salus Po∣puli is suprema Lex.

2. Whosoever counsels the King to any Thing against the good of his Subjects, is the Kings Enemy as well as the Com∣mon wealths, by attempting to turn him from that which is the end of his Authority.

Q. 17. To what purpose especially are the priviledges of the house of Commons and the house of Peers?

A. That the Prince may not make use of this High and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it: and make use of the name of publick necessity for

the gain of his private Favorites and Followers, &c. page. 19.

Observ. 1. The Law then supposes, that such Cases fall out, though it then Charge the Blame upon those Favorites and Followers, and not upon the King (as we shall see by and by.)

2. We need not wonder then why Private Frivorites and Followers are such Enemies to Parliaments and their Privi∣ledges which are on purpose to hinder their gains: Of which also more anon.

3. The two Houses are by the Law it seems, to be Trusted; when they declare, that Power is made use of for the hurt of the People; and the Name of publick necessity made use of for the Gain of Private Favorites and Followers. and the like.

Quest. 18. What are the special priviledges of the House of Commons towards this?

A. The House of Commons, an Excellent conserver of Liberty—is solely intrusted with the first propositi∣ons concerning the Leavies of Moneys which is the Sin∣news as welt of Peace as of War, &c. page 19.

Observ. 1. It seems then the House of Commons is presum∣ed to be more careful for the Subjects Liberties, then either the King, or the House of Peers.

2. Then it must needs be strange for any to conceive (as the Kings Declarations would perswade) that the House of Commons would Fight against and Subvert the Liberty and Propriety of the Subject, and the Kings Favorites and Followers Fight for them, and protect them.

3. Then no Moneys may be Levyed neither for Peace nor War, no not under Pretence of Publick Necessity, (as Ship∣money and Monopolies were) without the House of Com∣mons first propound and grant it.

4. If the House of Commons be an Excellent Conserver of Liberty, it must needs have some Power in some Cases to Levy Money even without the Kings consent; or else it will be utterly unpossible to conserve Liberty at all, Of which likewise more anon.

Q. 19. But if the Kings Private Favorites and Followers have actually perswaded him to any Thing against the Laws and Liberties of the Subject with what further Power and Privi∣ledge is the House of Commons Intrusted toward the Conserving of Liberty?

A. With the Impeaching of those, who for their own Ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King, have violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knows it) to protect; and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him, at least not to serve him in the contrary, page 19.

Observ. 1. Then it is no excuse to any that Violate the Laws, that they serve the King in it.

2. The Law counts all Commands from the King, which are any way contrary to the Law, Surreptitiously Gotten.

3. Then the Parliament speaks according to the Law, when they constantly lay the blame of all violations upon the Kings Favorites and Followers, and their getting Sur∣reptitiously Commands from him, and not upon the King himself.

4. No Command of the King is to hinder the Commons from Impeaching such as have violated the Law.

5. The King is bound not to Protect any of his Followers and Favorites against the Commons Impeachment of them; because he knows and affirms, that he is bound to Protect the Laws, and that this is the Law, that the Commons are to Impeach such.

Quest. 20. What is the special Priviledge of the House of Peers in the former Case of such Favorites and Followers of the Kings as are Impeached by the Commons? and so to decide all Matters in Questions between the King and the People.

A. The Lords being trusted with a Judicatory power are an Excellent Screen and Bank between the Prince and the people, to assist each against any Encroachments of the o∣ther, and by just Judgments to preserve that Law which uoght to be the Rule of every one of the three, page 19.

Quest. 21. But have the two Houses Power to put their judg∣ments

into Execution, as well as to Impeach and Judge?

A. The power of punishment is already in your hands according to Law, page 20.

Observ. 1. Then again it is no wonder that the Kings Favorites and Followers hate Parliaments, (who not only hinder their Gain, but have Power to punish them) when they have violated the Laws.

2. Then the Lords (and much more the two Houses to∣geaher) are supreme Judges of all matters in difference be∣tween the King and the People, and have power to prevent all the Kings Encroachments upon the people, as well as the Peoples upon him.

3. Then the King is bound not to Protect any whom the Lords upon the Impeachment of the Commons, have Judg∣ed Delinquents; For he hath granted that he is bound to Protect the Law, and that according to Law the Power of punishing (even of his Favorites and Followers, before spoken of) is in their hands, and they cannot punish them, so long as he Protects them.

4. Then the Law allows them as the Supreme Judicatory (even that which must be a Skreen between the King and the People, and Assist the People against the Kings Encroach∣ments and punish the Kings Favorites and Followers, though countenanced by Surreptitiously-Gotten Commands from the King) a Power to bring such as they have Judged, (or are to Judge) to Condign Punishment, which is granted to all Inferiour Judges in their Circuits and Jurisdictions.

5. Then if those Delinquents get the King to Protect them, or surreptitiously get Commands of him, to raise Arms to Shelter themselves against the Judgment of the two Houses; the two Houses have Power by the Law to raise not only the Posse Comitatus of those Counties where such De∣linquents are, to apprehend them, but also the Posse Regni, the Power of the whole Kingdom if need be: or else the Power of Punishment is not in their hands according to Law, and it would be safer contemning and scorning and opposing the highest Judicatory, the Parliament, then any Inferiour Court, a Judge of Assize, or the like: and they that could get Commands to Violate the Law before, would easi∣ly

get Protection against the Parliament when they are Questioned, if the Parliament had no Power to raise Arms to suppress them.

Quest. 22. But if there be an Attempt or Danger, that the Kings Favorites and Followers go about to change this Regula∣ted Monarchy into an Arbitrary Government, and so into a Ty∣ranny; is there Authority in the Houses sufficient, according to what was fore-mentioned to remedy this?

A. Power Legally Placed in both Houses is more then sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of Tyranny. page 20.

Observ. 1. Then at least what ever Power is necessary to prevent or restrain the Power of Tyranny is confessed to be Legally placed in both Houses; fot else there is not Power sufficient, much less, more then sufficient.

2. Then it is lawful for the two Houses to Raise Arms to defend themselves in case an Army be raised against them▪ for else they have not power sufficient to restrain the power of Tyranny: There is no greater attempt of Tyranny then to raise Arms against the Houses of Parliament, and there is no way to restrain this Tyranny, but by raising Arms in their own Defence: Less then this cannot be sufficient.

3. If a Legal Power be placed in them, not only to re∣strain but prevent the Power of Tyranny, then they are the Legal Judges, when there is danger of Tyranny; and they have Legal Power to Command their judgment to be obeyed, for Preventions as well as Res••••rint of Tyranny.

4. Then it is lawful for them to provide for their own and the Kingdoms safety, and they have Legal Power to com∣mand the People to this purpose; not only when Arms are actually raised against them, but when they Discern, and ac∣cordingly declare a Preparation made towards it. for if they let alone altogether the Exercise of their power. til Arms are Actually raised against them; they may in all likelihood find it too late, not only to Prevent, but even to Restrain the Power of Tyranny.

5. Then they have Legal Power in such Times of danger, to put into safe hands, such Forts, Ports, Magazines, Ships, and Power of the Militia, as are intended, or likely to be ••n∣tended,

to Introduce a Tyranny; for else they cannot have Power sufficient to Prevent or Restrain the Power of Tyranny.

6. Then they have, Legal Power to Levy Moneys, Arms, Horse, Ammunitions upon the Subjects, in such cases of Danger, even without or against the Kings Consent; for it cannot be imagined that in such cases when the Kings Fa∣vourites and Followers have gotten Commands from him, to protect them in their Delinquencies and Attempts to In∣troduce Tyranny, that ever he will consent to Levies of Mo∣neys against those Favorites and Followers of his, or to the raising Arms against them, especially he being still in their hands, and among them, and not with his Parliament; and without such Levies of Moneys, &c. it is not possible for the two Houses of Parliament to prevent or restrain suf∣ficiently the Power of Tyranny.

7. They that have made the Protestation, to maintain and defend the Power and Priviledges of Parliament, may see in all these Things (acknowledged by the King, and clearly Fol∣lowing from his acknowledgeenents) what is that Power, and what are Priviledges of Parliament, which they have so solemly in the presence of Almighty God Vowed, Promised and Protested to maintain, &c.

8. And finally, since the two Houses of Parliament have so often and fully declared their Intentions in settling the Militia, securing Hull and the Magazine there, and the Navy at Sea, with Ports and Forts, and afterward in Raising Arms under the Commanp of the Earl of Essex, and last of all, Levy∣ing Moneys by voluntary Contributions and Assessments; they have only used that Legal Power which is in them for the Punishment of Delinquents, and for the Prevention and Restraint of the power of Tyranny, of all which they are the Legal Judges; and all the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by the Laws to obey them herein, and those doubly bound that have made the late Protestation.

That the Reader may the better discern how the An∣swers here applyed do agree with the words of his Majesties answer the to 19 Propositions, I have here transcribed so much of it as concerns this particular.

Page 17. We call God to witness, that as for our subjects sake these Rights are vested in Us, [so for their sakes as well as for our own) we are resolved not to quit them nor to sub∣vert (though in a parliamentary way) the ancient, equal, happy well-poysed, and uever-enough-commended Consti∣tution of the Government of this Kingdom.

There being three kinds of Government amoust men, Absolute Monarchy, Aristoceacy, and Democracy, and all these having their particular conveniences and inconve∣niences.

page 18. The experience and wisdom of your Aucestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these, as to give to this Kingdom (as far as humane prudence can provide) the conveniences of all three, without the inconveniences of any one, as long as the Ballance bangs even between the three Estates, and they run joyntly on in their proper channel (be∣getting Uerdure a Fertility in the meadows on both sides) and the over-flowing of either on either side, raise no Deluge or Inunda••ion. The ill of Absolute Monarchy is Tyranny, The ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Divi••ion, The Ills of Democracy are Tumuls, Violence, and Licentiousness: The good of Monarhy is the Vniting a Nation under one Head, to Resist Invasion from abroad, and Insurrection at home: The good of Aristocracy is the conjunction of Councel in the Ablest persons of a State for the publick benefit: The good of Democracy is Liberty, and the courage and industry which Liberty begets.

In this Kingdom the Laws are Joyntly made by a King, by a house of Peeres, and by a house of Commons chosen by the people, all having free Votes, and particular priviledges. The Government according to these Laws is trusted to the King: Power of Treaties of War and Peace, of making Peers, of choosing Officers, and Councellors for State Judges

for Law, Commanders for Forts and Castles; giving Co••∣missions for raising men to make War abroad, or to pro∣vent and provide against Invasions or Insurrections at hom••; benefit of Confiscations, power of pardoning, & some more of the like kind are placed in the King.—Again. page 19. that the Prince may not make use of this ••igh and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it, and make use of the name of publick necessity for the gain of his privats Favorites & Followers to the dotriment of his people; the house of Commons an excellent conserver of Liberty, (but never intended for any share in Government, or the chusing of them that should govern) is solely intrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Levies of Moneys (which is the sinews as well of peace as war,) and the impeaching of those who for their own ends, though countenanced by any surrep∣titiously-gotten command of the King, have violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knows it) to protect, and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him, at least not to serve him to the contrary: and the Lords being trusted with a Judicatory power, are an excellent screen & bank be∣tween the Prince & people, to assist each against any incroach∣ments of the other, & by just judgments to preserve that Law which ought to be the Rule of every one of the three.—

Page 20. Since therefore the Power Legally placed in both Houses is more then sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of Tyrauny:—since this would be a total Subversion of the Fundamental Laws, and that excellent constitution of this Kingdom, which hath made this Nation so many years both Famous and Happy to a great degree of envy, since to the power of punishing (which is already your hands accor∣ding to Law) if—since the encroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other is unhappy in the effects both to them and all the rest.—Page 22. Our answer is, Nolumus Leges Angliæ mu••ari. But this we promi••e, that we will be as careful of preserving the Laws in what is sup∣posed to concern wholly our Subjects, as in what most con∣cerns our self: For indeed we profels to believe that the pre∣servation of every Law concerns Vs, those of obedience be∣ing not secure; when those of protection are violated,

FINIS.

Notes

• Three kinds of Govern∣ment amongst men.
• Never any of these kinds of Govern∣ment continu∣ed long, exact∣ly simple.
• The Govern∣ment of Eng∣land moulded out of a mix∣ture of Monar∣chy, Aristo∣cracy and De∣mocracy.
• If England be governed by a regula∣ted Monarchy, then it is vain and meer flat∣tery to talk of an absolute Monarchy▪
• Free Subjects.
• The House of Commons hath a share in this Govern∣ment.
• The Govern∣ment not to be trusted in the King.
• The King not above Law.
• The King ac∣countable to Law.
• Whatsoever is done by the King beyond the limits of Law is not re∣gal Authority.
• No resistance of the Ordi∣nance of God.
• This Go∣vernment was moulded by the wisdom of your Ance∣stors.
• The King hath not his power solely and immedi∣atly by Divine Right, much less by right of Conquest.
• The King to produce his grant if his power be que∣stioned.
• This excel∣lent constitu∣tion of Go∣vernment hath made this Nation famous and happy.
• This king∣dom hath the conveniences of all three kinds of Go∣vernment.
• Absolute Ar∣bitrary Power destructive to the Kingdom.
• It is not the greatness of the Kings power over his people, but the restraint of that power, that hath made this Kingdom hap∣py.
• Whereon the largeness of peoples hap∣ness depends.
• No marvel if Jesuitical Councels be active to over∣throw the hap∣piness of this Constitution.
• The good of Monarchy.
• Pernicious Councellors to a Monarch who Councel to bring in stran∣gers, &c.
• That advise him to autho∣rize and per∣mit to plun∣der, rob, spoil and imprison, &c. in his name.
• The ill of ab∣solute Monar∣chy proness to Tyranny.
• Safer for the Subject to re∣strain the King of some power then to grant him too much.
• The good of Aristocracy.
• Good for the publick bene∣fit of the State that conjucti∣on of Coun∣cells in Parlia∣ment should be made use of more then once in 13 or 14 years.
• The intenti∣on in the con∣stitution of this Govern∣ment.
• Not agreeable to the Consti∣tution of this Government, to withdraw the King from his great Coun∣cel and to pre∣fer private Councels.
• The ill of Aristocracy.
• The mis∣chief of evil Councel in withdrawing the King from his Parliament and to call a∣way the Mem∣bers of both houses, to the end to dissolve the Parliament
• The good of Democracy.
• The more Li∣berties are in∣croached upon the more co∣wardly and poor it ren∣ders the Nati∣on.
• In the loss of liberty the King himself shall be the greatest looser
• The ills of Democracy.
• Restraint of liberties should be measured according to the exigency evils.
• The Laws of this Kingdom made by King, Peers & Com∣mons, gives it the co••veni∣ency of all three kinds of Government.
• The Privi∣ledges of Par∣liament, are their certain Priviledges ac∣cording to Law and the Con∣stitution of the Kingdom.
• The Privi∣ledges that the King challeng∣eth are so far to be yielded unto, as they are consistent with the ac∣knowledged priviledges of both Houses.
• The Govern∣ment trusted to the King by the Law of the Kingdom, and challenged by the King.
• The Privi∣ledges above mentioned are only so far tru∣sted, as that they be not prejudicial to the privi∣ledges of Par∣liament in cases of neces∣sity.
• The Govern∣ment trusted to be accor∣ding to the Laws.
• To resist no∣torious illegal violences is not to resist Kings Autho∣rity.
• For the Sub∣jects sake their Rights are vested in the King.
• The good of the Subject is to be prefer∣red.
• Whosoever councells the King against the good of Subject, is an enemy to King and Common∣wealth.
• The purpose and intention of the privi∣ledges of both Houses.
• The Law pre∣supposes, such cases to fallout and on whom the blame is imposed.
• No wonder if Favorites be such Enemies to Parliaments & priviledges.
• The trust to be reposed in the two houses by Law.
• The special priviledges of the house of Commons
• The House of Commons more caareful for the Sub∣jects then the King, &c.
• Strange that the house of Commons should fight against liberty and propriety of the Subject.
• No moneys may be levyed either for Peace or War or under pre∣tence of pub∣lick necessity, without the Commons first propound it.
• If the house of Commons be a Conserver of Liberty, it must have power in some cases to leavy Money, &c.
• The House of Commons is intrusted with power to im∣peach such as have actually perswaded the King to any thing against the Laws and Liberty of the Subject, &c.
• No excuse to any that vio∣late the Laws, to say they serve the King in so doing.
• What ac∣count the Law makes of all commands surreptitiously gotten from the King.
• The Parlia∣ment do legal∣ly lay the blame of all violation of Law upon the Kings Favorites that obtain unlawful commands.
• No command of the Kings is to hinder the Impeachment of such.
• The King is bound not to protect any of his Followers or Favorites against Im∣peachments.
• Judicature power is the special privi∣ledge of the Lords house, which is an excellent Screen and Bank between the King and People.
• The houses have power to put their Judg∣ments in exe∣cution.
• No wonder that the Kings Favorites hate Parliaments.
• The two Houses are su∣pream Judges of all matters in difference between King and people.
• The King is bo••nd not to protect De∣linquents.
• The Law al∣lows the upper house to be the supream Judicatory, & to be a Skreen between the King and Peo∣ple, &c.
• The Power of both Houses is by Law to raise Arms if need be, for the ap∣prehending of Delinquents.
• A power le∣gally placed in both houses is more then suf∣ficient to pre∣vent Tyranny.
• Lawful for both houses to raise an Army to defend themselves a∣gainst any power raised against them.
• The Parlia∣ment are legal Judges in dan∣ger of Tyran∣ny, and have power to com∣mand their judgment to be obeyed, &c▪ Lawful for the Parliament to provide for their own and the Kingdoms safety, and to command the people to this purpose, both when arms are actually raised and when they discern a Pre∣paration there unto.
• Legal power in times of danger to put into safe hands, Forts, Ports, Magazines, ships, &c.
• Legal power to leavy mo∣neys, Arms, Horse Ammu∣nition of the subjection such cases of dan∣ger, without or against the consent of the King, &c.
• In all these things ac∣knowledged by the King, & clearly fol∣lowing from his acknow∣ledgments, all men may see the power and priviledges of Parliment.
• That since the two houses have so often declared their intentions in settling the Militia, s••••u∣ing of Hull, &c.
• All men may see that they have only us∣ed that legal power which is in them▪ for punishing delinquents, prevention and restraining of Ty∣ranny, &c.
• Conceening the Govern∣ment of the Kingdom.
• Three kinds of Govern∣ment amongst men.
• The provi∣dence of our Ancestors hath so moul∣ded the Go∣vernment of this Kingdom, as by a mix∣ture of all three kinds to give the con∣v••••iences of them all, &c.
• How the Laws of this Kingdom are made.
• Trust. ••epo∣sed in the King.
• Concerning the extent of the Princes li∣berty.
• The Trust reposed in the house of Com∣mons.
• The Trust of the Lords
• The suffici∣ency of the power placed in both houses
• Incroachment of Power.
• Careful to preseeve Laws