An examination of the political part of Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan.: By George Lawson, rector of More in the county of Salop.

CAP. II. Of the Second Part, and the Eighteenth of the Book: Of the Rights of Soveraigns by Institution.

THis Chapter informs us, what the rights of So∣veraigns once constituted are. In every Com∣mon-wealth there must be a supreme Power fixed in some certain Subject; this is essential to it: yet though this be a principal thing to be done, yet it is not all, neither being done, doth it make a com∣pleat Common-wealth. His Covenant of every one with every one for to design a Soveraign, is but an Utopian fancy. For by the best Histories we may understand that many States have attained to a set∣led form of Regular Government by degrees in a long tract of time, and that by several alterations intervening; so that the Laws of their constitution are rather customs then any written Charter. Some Communities come under a form of Govern∣ment more suddenly, and by a way fortuitous unto man, though not so to God. And in this point the practise of former times, not the fancies and specu∣lations of men must instruct us.

T. H.

The first of the twelve Rights of the Soveraign, is, That Subjects cannot change the form of Govern∣ment.

G. L.

That Community which hath Power and Liberty to alter the form of Government to the better, do not their duty, or are not wise, if they do it not. And it were wisdom in any people to reserve the Power to the whole body, to be used as occasion, op∣portunity and necessity shall require. As they are bound to reform the State when it is corrupted, so they are bound to alter the form, when without an alteration reformation cannot be obtained.

That the Subjects have no power to alter the form of Government may be granted: for Subjects as Subjects, must submit unto the Power established, not take upon them the highest and most transcen∣dent Prerogative of all others: yet this is no right of the Soveraign, nor to be reckoned inter Jura Majesta∣tis. For the Soveraign himself hath no right of him∣self to change the fundamental constitution: Before this can be done, the People must return unto the original State of Liberty, and to a Community, which in England is not a Parliament, but the fourty Counties. Upon this ground some have said that a Parliament cannot alter the Government; what men may do upon a Dissolution, and in a case of real, not pretended necessity, is another matter. But let us hear his reasons.

T. H.

The first upon supposition of no former Obligation, is, That it is a breach of that Covenant whereby they

made themselves authours of every act the soveraign doth, or shall judge fit to be done.

• 2. If they depose the Soveraign, that which is his own, and they had formerly given him, they take away unjustly.
• 3. If any attempting to depose his Soveraign, be kil∣led or punished, he is Author of his own punishment.
• 4. A new Covenant pretended to be made with God, cannot free them from offence and injustice in their dis∣obedience unto their Soveraign; because they can make no Covenant with God, without his Leiutenant, which is the Prince.

G. L.

1. I grant as formerly, that a Subject as such, cannot act to change the Government, or depose his lawful Soveraign.

2. They who set up a Soveraign, and by Covenant advance him to the Throne, must and ought to be free from all former superiour obligations, which cannot stand with this. But what is this to pur∣pose? The question is, whether Subjects cannot change the form of Government in any case, and whether the Subjects may not be freed, and that lawfully from their allegiance, and cease to be in the State of Subjects? That it many times fals out so to be, is evident: For by civil wars, by forraign in∣vasions, transmigrations, and other wayes it comes to pass, that Subjects are free from their Soveraigns, who cannot protect them; and in such cases, if God give them Power, they may alter the form of Govern∣ment, if it may be for the best.

But to come more close unto his first reason, let us suppose as he affirmeth, That a people by Cove∣nant have set up a particular person to be a Monarch, and so made themselves authors of all his acts, whe∣ther is it lawful for you by a new Covenant to obey another, or cast off Monarchy, or transfer his person upon another without injustice? He saith ye cannot without breach of Covenant do it.

But

• 1. He here presupposeth his former Utopian fancy of a Covenant of every man with every man; whereas its plain, few States of the world now in power, were thus constituted.
• 2. Soveraigns are of two sorts;
  • 1. Such as in whom the supreme power doth constantly and immediately abide.
  • 2. Such as are such only for execution and administration. To these latter, the subjects bind themselves to be faith∣ful, so far as they shall be faithful to the Kingdom and the Crown, which is theirs, not [jurc dominii] by absolute right, with a power to alienate them, or de∣stroy them. For every subject is first bound to be faithful to their Countrey, then unto their King, who swears to maintain the Laws, Liberty and Religion by Law established. These cannot bind us to do any thing against the Laws of God, of Nature, nor against our Countrey. But with this Author every Monarch is absolute, and in particular the Kings of England amongst the rest.
• 3. Suppose a Covenant with a Soveraign, absolute or limited, be against the Laws of God either moral or positive in force, may not the subjects break this Covenant without in∣justice? Nay is it not injustice for to keep it, seeing [Nullum juramentum ligat ad illicitum.]
• 4. If the Soveraigns Acts be directly contray to ju∣stice,

• equity, and the fear of God, must the subjects who gave him no such power, be Authors of these horrid acts, as murther, incest, adultery, blasphemy, as also of his unjust commands and perverse judge∣ments?
• 5. To be obedient to another, to transfer his power, to depose him, is not to change the form of government, but to pull down one, and set up another, the form remaining the same.
• 6. Subjects or rather they who are subjects, as subjects, cannot make any such Covenant, as to make one who was no Soveraign to be their Soveraign; If they can make a Soveraign, they must be equal, and equally free in making that Covenant where∣by a supreme Governour is constituted.
• 7. If they, who were [aequà liberi] before, and in the time of making this Covenant, and after it is concluded, be∣come subjects, afterwards rebel, they cease to be sub∣jects, and become [hostes] enemies, and are so to be dealt withall: And what reason can be given why the Soveraign, if he prove a Tyrant in the ad∣ministration, and challenge more power then was given him, or could by the Laws of God or Nature be conferred upon him, should not cease to be a So∣veraign, and the subjects free from their allegiance to him, seeing he hath violated the essential part of the Covenant, and perverted the main end of all Government? Why should it be otherwise in this then in all other pacts and contracts? This question is the more difficult to be answered by this Author, be∣cause he allows the people a power to make a Sove∣raign: and if he be such as is one onely for admi∣nistration, its unanswerable. This point might have been more clearly determined, if he had instanced in any particulars.

In all this I desire to be understood aright. For,

• 1. That power which the Bishop of Rome doth chal∣lenge, and hath sometimes exercised in the excommu∣nication and deposition of Princes , and absolving their subjects from allegiance, I detest.
• 2. I desire all Covenants, that are just and justly made, whilest they are in force, to be kept, especially by all sub∣jects to their lawful Soveraigns. For no subjects are to be perswaded or encouraged to Treason or Re∣bellion.
• 3. I would advise all people to beware how they rise against, or resist the highest powers, though the cause may be just: and because the remedy may prove worse then the disease, and often proves so: and the confusions which follow such commotions, are more mischievous then the former oppressions, and a Tyrannie is better then an Anarchy.

His second reason is, because they had given him the right of Soveraignty, which the cannot take away. Where,

• 1. He grants, That the people give the Soveraign his right; and if so, then they gave it him not as subjects; and when they return to the same occasion again, they may give the power to another.
• 2. I deny that subjects do give any such right.
• 3. Neither can he prove that there is any such Covenant of every man with every man in the constitution of civil States. His third reason is not worth an answer.

But in the end of this paragraph, he seems to take away the pretence and allegation of some new Cove∣nanters with God. What Covenant he means, is not here expressed: If he understand the National Co∣venant, as its very likely he doth, then let those who pretend it answer for themselves. For that Covenant

could not give the least power either to Eng∣land, or Scotland, or any in either Nation, entering into it: and in the same they only engaged to use lawful means, to accomplish what they had promised. Yet with him this and all other Covenants are void, if made with God without his Vicegerent, who is their Soveraign. Yet if this were true, then the Co∣venant made in Baptism, by the converted Christians under the heathen Emperours cannot be valid. This is evidently false, because every man may voluntari∣ly bind himself to God in those things wherein the Laws of God and man have left him free, without the consent or express permission of his civil Sove∣raign.

T. H.

The second right of a Soveraign is, he cannot forfeit, the reasons are,

• 1. There is no Covenant made on his part either with them all joyntly or severally: not with them joynt∣ly, because they cannot be one person before they subject unto him: Not with them severally, for they Covenant one with another, not with him, and if any one pretend freedom from subjection, there can be no judge of the controversie.
• 2. Words, as all Covenants are, be of no force with∣out a sword publick.

G. L.

This is the substance, though not all the words to prove that Soveraigns cannot forfeit. His 1. Reason

takes that for granted, which is false, and cannot be proved. For a community is one person moral by si∣ction of Law, as they use to speak, or as the Civilians express themselves [persona conjuncta] opposed to [singularis] For a community is the immediate subject of a Common-wealth, and must be associate before they can be capable of a form of Govern∣ment; and without union and communion too, it cannot be civitas, societas, populus. As thus united, it may act and covenant by their Deputies, who may be many, or by a Deputy, which may be one: and here they may in the name of the whole, Covenant with the person whom they like for Soveraign, and upon conditions just and reasonable. Thus Israel, a meer community, makes Moses their Deputy and Mediator, to Covenant with God in their behalf. Thus the ten Tribes by some of their principal men capitulate with Jeroboam. Thus the Gileadites by their Messengers offer to contract with Jephtah, and some of the Tribes make the same offer unto Gideon. Thus a free people may invest one man or more ei∣ther with original power, or trust him and them only with the administration. And they may put conditions upon them, either to give them an un∣limited or limited power, as the wisest men amongst them shall think fit. And there is great reason so to do: For,

• 1. They are free.
• 2. He with whom they purpose to contract, hath no right to command them, no power over them before he be made Sove∣raign: He is but a private person, and they are mad men if they will subject themselves upon unreason∣able conditions: They are very unwise, who will make a Butcher their Shepherd, or set a Woolf over

• their Flocks.

And surely its no point of wisdom in any free-people, to trust any one man, or assembly of men, with an absolute unlimited power. If an enemy come in by conquest, they must be content with what conditions he pleaseth, not with such as they desire. For they are not free, because their estates, liberty, lives are in his power; As for the Covenant of every one with every one, its a meer Chimera: there was never any such thing, neither can he give any instance of it, and therefore all that he builds upon it must needs fall.

As for his second reason, wherein he affirms Cove∣nants to be but words, and words are but breath and of no force, without a publike sword, its no waies tolerable. By these words he may be proved to be an Atheist, whatsoever he pretends, and to deny the immortality of the soul, all Religion and fear of the Deity, and his providence over the world, and I should be very unwilling to trust his promise upon oath, for any thing I could not recover by Law. The principal force of a Covenant depends upon the will and consent of the immortal soul, which fears a Deity, and believes a supreme Judge of the world, who will render to every man according to their works; yet because Covenants are but words and breath, therefore he inferrs

T. H.

That a Soveraign cannot be made or receive his power by Covenant or upon condition, for so to think is is ignorance.

G. L.

Its true, that we are ignorant fools, if we think, when a Monarch is made such upon condition to which he is sworn, that he will part with his power, though he hath forfeited his right unto it: if he have a long sword, and a broad conscience, he will be pos∣sessor as long as he can. And by this passage he seems to affirm, that few Monarchs have any consci∣ence or fear of God: For though they lose their right, yet they will not part with their possession, though their own conscience, Laws of God, and the dictates of nature perswade them to keep their Co∣venants, and not violate their Oaths. In a word, though Soveraigns be made by Covenant and Oath yet the Obligation is in vain, because the people can∣not force them to the observation thereof: for they have parted with their power, and delivered the sword unto their Governors; Yet they never gave them the sword to maintain their injustice, but to protect the just and punish the unjust. Yet in a po∣pular State this seems to be clear; That the Sove∣raign cannot be made upon condition; for thus he writes,

T. H.

No man is so dull as to say, for example, The people of Rome made a Covenant with the Romans to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions, which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That men see not the reason to be

alike in a Monarchy and a Popular Government, pro∣ceedeth from the ambition of some, &c.

G. L.

Men are not so dull as to believe that the reason of not forfeiting the supreme power is alike in a Monar∣chy and a Popular State; For we know that in such a Common-wealth, the Community and the Sove∣raign are the same, though in some respect different; but in a Monarchy or Aristocraty its far otherwise. In the State of Rome, after that Tarquin was depo∣sed, and that Government reduced unto a Repub∣lick, every one severally, though never so great, was a subject: and all joyntly was their Soveraign: for in that form [singuli subduntur universis, & universi praesunt singulis] yet the universality of the people, as a Community, could not act and exercise the Soveraignty, and therefore Consuls and other Officers were trusted with great power, but not with the supreme: and these might forfeit and be deposed by the people. In all States we must distin∣guish between the constitution and the administrati∣on, or as others use to express themselves [Inter Statum & exercitium.] They who are trusted on∣ly with the administration, as such, are not su∣preme, though they will endeavour to usurp and possess that power. Therefore the Authoreither is ve∣ry ignorant, or else goes about to delude his ignorant Reader.

The question therefore is, whether a Soveraign may forfeit? That he cannot, is not at all, by so much as a probable argument yet evinced.

• 1. That he

• may forfeit unto God there is no doubt.
• 2. That if any forfeit, God will in his due time take the forfeit, pass Judgement upon the party forfeiting, and exe∣cute the same, either by himself, or by Angels, or by forrein forces, or by civil wars, or some other way; and in all this God is just, though men may be un∣just.
• 3. Monarchs and Princes only trusted with the power of Execution and Administration, may for∣feit, and justly be restrained, or reduced, or deposed.
• 4. Absolute Princes may forfeit their right unto the Soveraignty, when they pervert all Laws of God and man, oppress, murther, raise war unjustly against their own subjects, to butcher them as so many wild beasts, violate their Oaths and Covenants without any fear of God or man. For such, as such, are hostes humani generis, rebels against God, and agents for the Devil. All powers are ordained of God, and from him they receive Commssion to pro∣tect their subjects, not destroy them, and to punish the bad, not to protect them and advance them, and use them for the destruction of the good. If any man dare plead for these, let him; I dare not.
• 5. If the Author had stated the question, and informed us of the several titles of Soveraigns, which are many, or had instanced in particulars, and informed us of their particular titles, it had been easie to determine the controversie; Princes acquire their power many waies, as by Election, Succession, Marriage, the Sword, and by that, either justly, or unjustly, usurp∣ing the power which is not due; and that out of re∣venge, or covetousness, or ambition, with a desire to be great, not do good.

The question is not, whe∣ther a Soveraign according to the Apostles definiti∣on,

Rom. 13. can forfeit to his subjects, as his subjects; for so he cannot do: but it is this, whe∣ther a Soveraign may not cease to be a Soveraign, and the subjects cease to be his subjects: and to this the Author hath said nothing.

T. H.

No man can without injustice protest against the in∣stitution of the Soveraign, declared by the major part.

G. L.

• 1. There are very few Soveraigns thus instituted; and if this be the only way, what title have the greatest part of Soveraigns in the world?
• 2. If they be not thus instituted, whether is it lawful to protest against them or no? of this the Author saith no∣thing.
• 3. Suppose the major part be a faction, and institute one of their own party Soveraign, not for publick good so much as for private interest, whe∣ther may not the dissenters protest?
• 4. In all As∣semblies and Societies, which proceed by way of suf∣frage, the major part concludes and determines for the whole, to avoid confusion and dissention, and to preserve unity and order. Yet so that the major part may err; because they are not infallible: and one good reason being evident, should prevail against ten millions of votes; We find that most men in their suffrages, follow the example of some eminent per∣son or persons, or their own affection; few are de∣termined by reason. And in doubtful matters, men

• should first debate and throughly examine the thing debated, before they proceed to give their voices; and this is most properly and conveniently done, when after a diligent search, no preponderant reason can be found for either part of the proposition: Mens votes are inferiour to reason and superiour Laws, and are not good because votes, but because agreeable to reason. And whereas he alledgeth two reasons,
  • 1. That to protest against a major part is injustice.
  • 2. It puts the party protesting out of pro∣tection; the answer is easie:
    • 1. That a protestati∣on is not unjust, because it is against the major part, except it be against reason and right; and no man will be so mad as to assent unto a major against reason, which is above all votes.
    • 2. Its true, that the party protesting puts himself out of the protection of that Soveraign against whom he protests; but this may be a misery, but no injustice.

T. H.

The Soveraigns actions cannot be accused of inju∣stice by the subject; because he hath made himself Au∣thor of all his actions: And no man can do injustice to himself. The Soveraign may do iniquity, but not in∣justice.

G. L.

• 1. The Soveraigns actions are to punish the evil and protect the good: as a Soveraign, he can do no other actions, and these cannot be justly accused.
• 2. Neither can the consent of the people, nor doth a

• Commission of God give him any power to act con∣trary to these.
• 3. When he acts unjustly, (for so he may do, and all iniquity is injustice) neither God nor the people are authors of such actions; for he was set up by them to do justly, and no waies else.
• 4. Civil justice and injustice, as they consist in for∣malities, differ much from moral and essential justice and injustice. In this respect a Prince may be civilly just and morally unjust.
• 5. To accuse may be judi∣cial, or extra judicial. Judicially, a Prince as a Prince, cannot be accused by his subject, as such. Yet the subject may represent unto his soveraign his saults, and by way of humble petition, desire them to be reformed.

T H.

Whatsoever the Soveraign doth is unpunishable by the subject: because if the subject punish him, he pu∣nisheth another for his own actions.

G. L.

• 1. A Soveraign as a Soveraign, cannot be punish∣ed by his subject as his subject.
• 2. Yet he that is su∣preme only for administration, may be punished and put to death. Thus the Ephori might punish the Lacedaemonian Kings, and the Justice of Arragon the Kings of that Kingdom.
• 3. Absolute Princes may cease to be such, and then they differ not from other men. And it will be an hard task to prove that any consent of man or humane title, can free one from punishment with death, who is guilty of a

• crime which God hath determined to be capital, and commanded to be punished with death.
• 4. Why should it be lawful for a forrein Prince, warring and proving victorious upon a just quarrel, to put a wic∣ked Prince to death: and not for those who have been his subjects, when they have power to do it, and tends to the publick good, which cannot possibly without this act of justice, be preserved? Yet this cannot warrant any cursed Rebels, or Traytors, or the like, to murther Princes: though their pretences may be coloured with piety and justice.

The jura Majestatis, or rights of higher-powers following are truly such. Two things only I take notice of,

• 1. That the Prince is only Judge of Do∣ctrines taught, so far as either the matter of right, or manner of teaching may be prejudicial to the State, or beneficial to the same: as the Doctrine of the Gospel wisely taught, alwaies is a blessing.
• 2. Whereas he affirms that there is no propriety be∣fore a form of Government be established, its evi∣dently false; and civil Laws determine how every man may keep or recover that which is by justice his own.

According to his rules, the institution of a Soveraign takes away all propriety of the sub∣ject.

That the rights of Soveraigns are indivisible and incommunicable, is true, if rightly understood. To this purpose Authors distinguish these royalties into the greater and the less, and say, the latter may, the former cannot be divided or communicated. Others affirm, That in a mixt State, they of necessity must; in a pure State, they must not be either divisible, or communicable. This point may be made more clear,

if we understand, 1. That these rights or jura, are but so many branches of one and the same power supreme civil, as it may act upon several objects. And all these branches are reducible to three; For supreme power civil is, Legislative, Judicial, Execu∣tive, as before; and because it extends to these three acts, therefore it may be said to be threefold. And all these rights reckoned up by him, which are such indeed, are contained under these three, though nei∣ther he nor other Authors have much observed it. Amongst these the Legislative is the principal, not only the first but the chiefest, yet the other are ne∣cessary, because without them its in vain; for what are Laws without Judgement and Execution? yet even the Laws regulate both. And to know who are Soveraign in any act, the only infallible way is by the Legislation. For in whomsoever the Legislative power originally is, he or they are supreme; for it is not the actual making of certain rules to order all things in a State, but the giving of a binding force unto them, which makes the Soveraign.

This power, not only as it is a power, but as su∣preme, cannot be divided. For if you take any es∣sential part from it, you destroy it, so that its indivi∣sible in it self. 2. In respect of the subject: For whether the subject be the Community, or the Opti∣mates, they must be considered as one person moral∣ly, though they be many physically: and the rea∣son is, they must go all together, otherwise there can be no first mover in a State; for it is one supreme power in it self, and must also be in one subject: yet for the administration it may be divided: be∣cause the Soveraign doth exercise this power, and

acts severally by several Officers, which are but in∣struments animated and acted by him. This power is also incommunicable within one and the same com∣munity and territory, except you will constitute more States then one.

T. H. pag. 93.

If there had not first been an opinion recieved of the greatest part of England, that these powers were di∣vided between the King, and the Lords and the Com∣mons, the people had never been devided, and fallen in∣to these civil wars.

G. L.

The cause moral of these wars, was our sins: the Political cause was the male-administration; yet so, that all sides have offended through want of wisdom, and many other waies. The ignorance of Politicks in general, and of our own constitution in particu∣lar, cannot be excused or excepted; What the an∣cient constitution was, we know not certainly, though some reliques of the same continued till our times: but the whole frame was strangely altered and corrupted. Many different opinions there be concerning our Government; yet three amongst the rest are most remarkable: For one party con∣ceives the King to be an absolute Monarch: A se∣cond determines, the King, Peers, and Commons to be three co-ordinate powers, yet so that some of them grant three Negatives, some only two: A third party give distinct rights unto these three: yet

in this they are sub-divided, and they would be thought to be more rational, who give the Legisla∣tive Power unto the Lords and Commons in one house; the judicial, to the Lords in a distinct house, and the executive to the King, who was therefore trusted with the Sword both of War and Justice: None of these can give satisfaction. There is ano∣ther opinion, which puts the supreme power radical∣ly in the 40. Counties, to be exercised by King, Peers and Commons, according to certain rules, which by Antiquaries in Law, together with some experienced States-men of this Nation, might be found out, but are not. The seeds of this division were sown and begun to appear before the wars; and the opinion, that all these were only in one man, that is the King absolutely, some say, was the greatest cause, not only of the last, but also of other civil wars in former times: And it hath been observed, that every man liked that opinion best, which was most suitable to his own interest. Our several opi∣nions in Religion have heightened our differences, and hindered our settlement; yet Religion is but pretended; for every party aims at civil power, not spiritual liberty from sin. And the power to settle us thus wofully distracted, is only in God; and if he ever will be thus merciful unto us, the way whereby he will effect it, will be by giving the greatest power to men of greatest wisdom and integrity, not by re∣ducing us unto one opinion, that all the powers civil must be in one, as the Author doth fondly fancy: Let the form be the best in the world, yet without good Governors its in vain.

The subject of this Chapter is [Majestas] [&

jura Majestatis] the Rights of Soveraigns, which this Author hath handled very poorly; and if he had but translated that which others had more excellent∣ly written in this particular before him, he might have informed us better, given his Reader more sa∣tisfaction, reduced them to a better method, and neither have made such to be Rights which are none, nor omitted those which truly are such, as he hath done.