An examination of the political part of Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan.: By George Lawson, rector of More in the county of Salop.

CAP. XIII. Of the Second Part. And the twenty ninth of the Book. Of those things which weaken, and tend to the dissolution of a Common-wealth.

ALL bodies Politick are truly mortal, as the Author saith, though not so mortal as the in∣dividual persons whereof they are constituted be. For by reason of succession of these singular and several persons, they are of longer continuance: and therefore said to be immortal; the proper meaning whereof is, that they are not so mortal. Many States are constituted by degrees, not in a moment, or any short time: and in the like manner, they decay by little and little, until they utterly vanish in a total dissolution. And though both constitution and dis∣solution seem sometimes to be fortuitous, yet they are not so: for its God who in his mercy plants and builds: and in his just judgement plucks up, and pulls down. This is the place assigned by Authors to the head of Politicks, which delivers the causes of the alteration, corruption and subversion of States. Al∣terations of the forms of Government are sometimes for the better, and so they are a blessing; sometimes for the worse, and so they are the same with corru∣ption. Corruption is from man; subversion from God, as the supreme and universal Judge. Corrupti∣on goes before, subversion follows. And this corrupti∣on is from the sins and crimes of the Governors, or

governed, or both. The crimes of Governors are either Personal or Political: Personal are many times the same with the offences of the people: sins of them as men: Political are such as make them guilty as they are Governors, as ignorance, imprudence, negligence, in justice Political; and these not only in assuming and acquiring power, but in the administra∣tion of the same. The sins of the people as subjects, are impatiency, when they will not endure the seve∣rity of just Governors, good Laws, and impartial Judgement, a desire of innovation and alteration of Government, without just and necessary causes, open rebellion, secret treachery and conspiracy, sedition and such like. The sins of both, which are personal, are impiety against God; injustice and unmerciful∣ness towards man, the abuse of peace and plenty to bravery, drunkenness, gluttony, lewdness, and such like Vices. And when in these they become impu∣dent, incorrigible, and universally delinquent, their ruine is fatal and unavoidable: the harvest is ripe, and the sickle of Gods vengeance will cut them off.

The Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans, cap. 13. gives a perfect model of the best and most lasting States.

• 1. The higher powers must so ascend the Throne, as that it may be truly said, they were or∣dained of God, and advanced not only and meerly by his permission, but Commission and Command.
• 2. They must have a sword, and a sufficient coactive power.
• 3. They must use the same according to just judgement and wholsom Laws, for the protection of the good, and the punishment of the bad.
• 4. The people must be subject not only out of fear, but

• conscience.
• 5. They must obey their good and wholsom Laws.
• 6. They must give them such al∣lowance as shall be sufficient to maintain and make good their just power.
• 7. They must love one ano∣ther.
• 8. They must not live in rioting and drunken∣ness, chambering and wantonness, nor in strife and envying. In a word, they must be sober in themselves, just towards man, devout towards God.

But when Prince, Priest and people refuse to follow these Laws, they draw Gods judgements from heaven upon the Common-wealth. Idle, filthy, and abominable So∣dom must be destroyed: Gold-thirsty and blood∣thirsty Babylon cannot stand: Idolatrous and Apo∣state Israel and Judah must be wasted with sword, famine, pestilence, their Countrey made desolate, and the remnant carried captives and dispersed in remote parts, and in the midst of their enemies. But let us examine the causes of the weakening and dissolution of States determined by the Author.

T. H.

The 1, is when a man to obtain a Kingdom, is content sometimes with a less power, then to the peace and defence of the Common-wealth is necessarily required.

G. L.

This may prove to be a cause, yet very rarely. Princes and Monarchs (for of them he speaks) of∣fend usually on the other hand. If they can, they will assume and challenge far more power then either God will, or man can give them; for they desire to be absolute Lords. Few of them are of brave Theo∣pompus his mind, who willingly made his power less, that it might be more lasting. To be Dukes of Venice can in no wise satisfie their vast ambitious desires: The Lacedemiun Ephori are terrible to them: The Justitia Arragoniae cannot be endured; Legislative and judicial Parliaments do too much restrain and li∣mit their power 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with them its treason to affirm that there be any lawful means to reduce them into order, when they apparently transgress the Laws of nature, which are the Laws of God. The people in∣deed must be kept in awe and order, and this cannot be without power. But, what is here understood by power? Its not potestas, but potentia, strength and force; which may be great in a Leviathan, yet with∣out wisdom and justice can never long keep the peo∣ple in subjection. His examples of the Roman and Athenian free-States, are not fully applyed, neither do the applyed come home unto the point. Rome was strong enough to subdue a great part of the world, before she became imperial: and Athens in that Law concerning Salamis had power enough, but wanted wisdom, and therefore were reformed by the wise folly of Solon. That which is here spoken of the power of Kings, is not to derogate the least from

that power which is due unto them by the constitu∣tion of the State wherein they raign. Some have more, some have less. Yet none should have less then is sufficient for the full discharge of their place: And it is to be wished every one of them would keep the bounds determined by God and the Consti∣tution.

T H.

A second cause of weakning and dissolving a State, are certain Doctrines. The first, That every private man is Judge of good and evil actions.

G. L.

Judgement is publick or private; publick no pri∣vate man can pass; private he may; and that both of his own actions, and others too. The acts of others are private or publick: of both these he may Judge. Publick acts of the Governors are Laws, Judgements, Execution. Even of Laws he may, he must within himself, so far as they are a rule and bind him, enquire, examine and determine, whether good or evil. Otherwise, he can perform but only a blind obedience to the best: and if he conform unto the unjust, he in obeying man, disobeys God, which no good man will do. In other acts which are ap∣parently just, we may judge of them truly as they are, and no otherwise. Yet this must not be done to palliate our disobedience to that which is just, or raise sedition, or rebel; but we may complain to God, and by our humble prayers seek redress.

T. H.

A second Doctrine, That whatsoever a man doth against conscience is sin. The conscience may be errone∣ous; and he that is subject to no Civil Law, sins in all he acts against his conscience. Yet to him that is in a Common-wealth, the Law is the publick conscience, by which he hath undertaken to be guided.

G. L.

Conscience is a mans knowledge of his own acts, as agreeable or disagreeable to the Law of God. Its not a faculty, but an act of the soul: and an act, not of the will, but understanding, and the same as practical. The proper act is knowledge; the object is his own acts, and these acts not any way, but as agreeable or disagreeable to the Law of God. For as Aquinas saith, there must be applicatio facti ad legem: Otherwise a mans understanding cannot judge of it as conformable or not unto the Law of God. These acts may be considered as to be done, or done. In the former respect conscience binds as a Law, though it be not the Law, but presupposeth or includeth the knowledge of the Law. In the latter respect it judgeth, and is a kind of judge of himself in some sort as superiour to himself. But before the tribunal of God it is a witness, and doth accuse or ex∣cuse. The great Question so much vexed by the Casuists, is whether an erroneous conscience doth bind. But let them determine what they please; an erroneous conscience in proper sense is no consci∣ence.

For an errour is no knowledge, but a defect of knowledge, or rather a plain want of knowledge, and also an act contrary to knowledge. Conscience is a knowledge in proper sense, and knowledge is true and certain: and its a knowledge of a mans own act or acts as agreeable to the Law of God; this an erroneous conscience cannot be. That con∣science is such a knowledge, is made evident by the Apostle, saying, That when the Gentiles not having the Law, do the things contained in the Law, they having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves, who shew the work of the Law written in their heart by their conscience witnessing, &c. Rom. 12.14, 15. Where we may observe,

• 1. That the conscience could not witness, accuse or excuse, except there were something to be accused or excused.
• 2. The thing accused as evil, or excused as good, must be something conformable, or contrary to the Law of God.
• 3. The conscience could not accuse or excuse any thing as good or evil, without knowledge both of the Law, and of the act that was contrary or consentaneous to that Law.
• 4. Therefore the Apostle before he makes mention of the conscience, affirmeth,
  • 1. That they did the things contained in the Law.
  • 2. They were a Law unto themselves.
  • 3. That they did by their conscience witnessing, prove or demonstrate the work of the Law, (that is the work which the Law did command) written in their heart.

To have the work of the Law written in their heart, is to have a certain true knowledge of it, not an erroneous mis∣take. But to return to the Author, Conscience in proper sense doth bind, yet not as it is knowledge, nor as knowledge of a mans proper act, nor as know∣ledge

of the Law in general, but by vertue of the Law known as a rule of his particular act. For man being subject unto God, and under his Laws, cannot bind himself, and be his own Law-giver: but the Law of God, not an errour, truly understood by him doth bind him. But let the erroneous judgement of the practical understanding be called conscience, as by a Trope it may, because there may be something of conscience in it; yet whether can it bind or no? I answer, it cannot bind: for an errour of the un∣derstanding, cannot be a binding rule to command the will of man; neither can it be a rule at all. Again, an erroneous judgement, especially practical, is a sin, and against the Law of God; therefore it can no waies bind; only thus far most Casuists do grant, that by it a man is so far bound, as not to act against it; yet this it doth only per accidens, (for per se; he is bound to act otherwise then it doth dictate.) For because God hath made a mans reason his guide, he must needs be much depraved in his will, that will act contrary unto his reason. And he that will not seruple to act against his erroneous judge∣ment, will be bold to act against his judgement right∣ly informed. But the full debate of this, I refer to another occasion. And these things premised, I re∣turn unto Mr. Hobbs that of the Apostle, Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin: and therefore whosoever acts againt saith and conscience, properly so taken, sin∣neth: and for him to affirm that the true Doctrine of God revealed in the Scripture, should be either false, or destructive of eivil States and Governments, is no waies tolerable. Whereas he alledgeth, that the Law of the Common-wealth is the publick consci∣ence

by which the subject hath bound himself to be guided, its too loose and fallacious, if examined. For,

• 1. The Law is not the publick conscience, but the publick rule of conscience in matters civil.
• 2. Its a rule of the subjects obedience, not as its a Law of the Common-wealth, but as it is agreeable and not con∣trary to an higher Law, the Law of God. For the Laws civil do not immediately bind the conscience and immortal soul, as the civil Soveraign hath no power to punish it; for his sword cannot reach that spiritual substance; Secondarily and by consequence they may oblige the soul.
• 3. No subject may or ought to make the Law of the State his absolute guide. For the Law may be against the Law of God; and then, how can the subject undertake to obey it, and make it his rule, and not offend God?
• 4. Every subject is first bound and subject unto God, before he be subjected to civil powers: and is first bound to obey God more then man; and as his subjection unto man is but conditional and subordinate to his subjection to God, so his obedience to man is limited, and only to be performed in such things as his su∣preme and absolute Lord doth allow him.

And though man may suffer for his disobedience to hu∣mane Laws, yet he had better suffer a temporal then an eternal penalty; and offend man rather then God. Neither doth this doctrine any waies prejudice the civil power, nor encourage any man to disobe∣dience and violation of civil Laws, if they be just and good, as they ought to be: and the subject hath not only liberty, but a command to examine the Laws of his Soveraign, and judge within himself, and for himself, whether they be not contrary to the Laws of his God.

T. H.

The third Doctrine, That faith and sanctity are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernatural inspiration and infusion.

G. L.

That divine faith wherby we believe on Jesus Christ, and obtain eternal life in him, and that sancti∣ty of life whereby we please God, and are accepted of him, are no doubt both merited by Christ, and inspi∣red and wrought in us supernaturally by the power of the Holy-Ghost. And there can be no doubt of this to such as believe the Scripture to be the Word of God written, wherein we read, That except a man be born again of water and the spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God, John 3.5. And no man can come unto me except the Father draw him, cap. 6.44. And to believe that Jesus was the Son of the living God, was not from flesh and blood, but by re∣velation of his heavenly Father, Christ himself teach∣eth us, Mat. 16.17. This revelation was an inspira∣tion or infusion, except we will quarrel with words; and it was not natural; for then it might have been by and from flesh and blood; but it was supernatural and from God revealing, not only outwardly, but inwardly too. It is also further taught us in Scripture, That no man can say, that Jesus Christ is the Lord but by the Spirit, 1 Cor. 12.3. Yet this faith and sancti∣ty are so wrought in us, as that ordinarily God makes use of the Scriptures taught, explained, applyed unto

mans heart, of hearing, study and meditation, which are acts of reason, and such acts as man may natural∣ly perform, and also so neglect them, as to give God just cause to deny the inspiration of his Spirit for to make the word taught, heard, meditated effectual upon his heart. This Doctrine hath been believed and professed in the most peaceable Common-wealths of the world, and did strengthen, not weaken, much less dissolve the same. If he understand by the pro∣fessors of this Doctrine, the phanatick Enthusiasts of these times, who pretend so much that Spirit which God never gave them, and upon this pretence boast themselves to be spiritual men, judging all, and to be judged of none, as they use to abuse the Scri∣pture, then its true that these are enemies to all Go∣vernment, and their Doctrine tends to the dissoluti∣on of all order, Ecclesiastical and Civil, and is to be rooted out of all Common-wealths.

T. H.

A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a Com∣mon-wealth is this, That he that hath the Soveraign power, is subject to the Civil Laws.

G. L.

There is no doubt but this is destructive of Go∣vernment, and contrary to the very nature and es∣sence of a Common-wealth; the essential parts whereof are, imperans & subditus, the Soveraign and the subject: take this difference away, you con∣found all, and turn the Common-wealth into a Com∣munity;

yet though Soveraigns are above their own Laws, (how otherwise could they dispense with them and repeal them?) wise men have given advice to Princes for to observe their own Laws, and that for example unto others, and good Princes have follow∣ed this advice Soveraigns are to govern by Laws, not to be subject unto them, or as Subjects obey them, or be punished by them. But what this man means by Soveraign, in the hypothesis, is hard to know. For he presupposeth all Soveraigns absolute, and all Kings of England such Soveraigns; and so in general it may be granted, that all Soveraigns are above the Laws civil; yet the application of this rule to particular Princes of limited power, may be false and no waies tolerable. The question is not so much concerning the superiority of the Soveraign over the Laws; but whether a Soveraign by Law for Administration, who is not sole Legislator, is not in divers respects inferiour to the Law; or whether an an absolute Soveraign may not cease to be such, and ex obligatione criminis, ex superiore fieri inferior.

T. H.

A fifth Doctrine which tendeth to the dissolution of a Common-wealth is, That every man hath an absolute propriety in his goods, such as excludeth the right of the Soveraign. Every man hath indeed a propriety, that excludes the right of the subject which is derived from the Soveraign, without whose protection every man should have equal right to the same.

G. L.

• 1. If the subject have propriety, as the Author grants, it must needs be absolute, and must needs ex∣clude not only the right of the fellow-subject, but of the Soveraign too. For propriety in proper sense is an independent right of total alienation, without any license of a Superiour or any other.
• 2. This pro∣priety is not derived from the Soveraign, except he be despotical; and such indeed the Author affirmeth all Soveraigns to be: and in that respect the subjects can neither have propriety nor liberty; therefore he contradicts himself, when he saith in many places, that the Soveraign is absolute, and here, that the sub∣ject hath propriety.
• 3. Its to be granted, that even in a free-State, the subjects proprity cannot free from the publick charges: for as a Member of the whole body, he is bound to contribute to the mainte∣nance of the State, without the preservation where∣of he cannot so well preserve his own private right.
• 4. Propriety is by the Law of Nature and Nations at least agreeable unto both. And when men agree to constitute a Common-wealth, they retain their proper right, which they had unto their goods be∣fore the Constitution, which doth not destroy, but preserve propriety, if well ordered.

For men may advance a Soveraign without any aliena∣tion of their estates. No man hath any propriety from God, but so as to be bound to give unto the poor, relieve the distressed, and maintain the Sove∣raign in his just Government; yet this doth not take away, but prove propriety, because every one

gives, even unto the Common-wealth, that which is his own, not another mans, nor his Soveraigns, who may justly in necessary cases, for the preservation of the State, impose a just rate upon the subject.

But if the Reader seriously consider the Authors discourse in other parts of his Book, he may easily know whereat he aims. For,

• 1. He makes all Sove∣raigns absolute.
• 2. The Kings of England to be So∣veraigns. And
• 3. in that respect to have a power to raise subsidies, and moneys without a Parliament. And
• 4. hath made that a mortal disease of our State, which is a great preservative of our liberty. For the people alwaies bear the purse, and could not by the King be charged with the least, without their con∣sent by their Representative in the Parliament.

This did poise and limit the regal power, prevented much riot and excess in the Court, made the Prince frugal, and hindred unnecessary wars. Yet good Princes, and frugal, never wanted money, were freely sup∣plyed by their subjects, whilest they required in their need any thing extraordinary above the publick re∣venue, in a right way by Parliament.

T. H.

There is a sixth Doctrine plainly and directly against the essence of a Common-wealth, and its this, That the Soveraign power may be divided.

G. L.

The supreme power, as supreme, must needs be one, and cannot be divided. For as in a Natural, so in a Political body, there must be of necessity one on∣ly principle of motion. One supreme will directed by one judgement, and strengthened with one force of the sword, must command, judge, execute: Other∣wise there can be no order or regular motion. Yet this supreme power may be in many persons, several and distinct physically, but morally reduced to one by the major part agreeing in one suffrage. That some have made in this State of England three Co∣ordinate powers, with their several Negatives, and their several distinct rights of Soveraign power, can very hardly be made good by any reason, as I have hinted before. Yet even these do place all the jura Majestatis, in all joyntly. Our form of Govern∣ment is confounded by the different opinions of com∣mon Lawyers. Civilians and Divines, who neither agree one with another, nor amongst themselves. It hath been declared, That the fundamental Govern∣ment of this Kingdom hath been by King, Peers and Commons; yet this can satisfie no man, because there is no certainty what the power of Commons, what the power of Lords, what the power of the King is: Neither whether the house of Commons and of Lords, be two distinct houses or no: Or if they be distinct, wherein they are so distinct. For some affirm, that in Legislation they ought to be but one, though in Judicial acts two. Yet suppose the Lords to have the Judicial power alone, nevertheless

its a question what kind of Lords and Barons these should be. We read first of the forty Lords of the forty Counties in the Saxons time: after the Con∣quest we find three sorts of Barons in the higher house: and they were Feudarii, rescriptitii, diplo∣matici; Barons by Tenure, by Writ, by Patent. Lords by tenure were the first; but afterwards when any were called by the Kings Writ to Parliament, they by that very Writ were made Barons with suf∣frage amongst the former; the last were Lords by Patent, and such were most, yea almost all our Lords in latter times. And to multiply the last, was a poli∣cy in the King. For by that means, after the supre∣macy of the Pope was cast off, the Bishops did whol∣ly depend upon the King, and the Barons by Patent were his creatures, and by them he might carry any cause, or at least hinder and cross the desires of the Knights and Burgesses. And herein few of our ordi∣nary Histories can help us; because they relate only unto us matter of fact, how sometimes the King, sometimes the Barons, sometimes the Commons were ascendant and predominant, as now they all seem to be descendant. Yet for all this, a free Parliament, of just, wise and good men, might rectifie all this, and unite the supreme power so miserably divided to the hazard of the State.

T. H.

And as false Doctrine, so also often-times the ex∣ample of different Government in a neighbouring Na∣tion, disposeth men to alteration of the sorm already setled.

G. L.

That this may be a cause of the alteration, and al∣so of ruine too, its very possible: and there seems to be some colour of reason in it, because we are bound to follow the best examples. And this may be powerful and prevalent with such as are given to Change and affect novelty. Yet with wise and under∣standing men its of no force, because they know full well, that some form of Government, which may be good to one, may prove not to be so to another; and that changes in this kind are dangerous. For to un∣settle that which is firm, for to introduce that where∣of we have had no experience, may prove the ruine of a State.

T. H.

And as to rebellion in particular against Monar∣chy; one of the most frequent causes is the reading of the Books of Policy and Histories of the antient Greeks and Romans, &c.

G. L.

This hath been formerly examined. The reading of these Books cannot do so much hurt, as this Le∣viathan may do: For it is far more dangerous and destructive of good government, then any of their Histories, which can do no hurt to any but such as are ignorant and ill-disposed. In those Books they may read of Kings and Emperours, and of Monar∣chies

as well as free-States; and few are so void of un∣derstanding, but that they well know they are bound to their own form of Government, and are not to covet every model they read of. Such men as he do shamefully debase free-States, as forms unlawful in themselves, and so flatter limited Princes, as though they were absolute Lords, and advance Monarchy so high, as though it were the only form of Govern∣ment, so instituted by God and commanded; that all Nations were bound unto it, and whosoever doth not bow unto it, is a rebel against God. Yet he never instituted immediately any Common-wealth but one, and that was a free-State; and when a King was de∣sired, he was offended, and under a regal govern∣ment it came to ruine. Whereas he thinks these Books do teach Regicide and killing of Kings, he is much mistaken. For subjects to murther their law∣ful Soveraigns, is an horrid crime, and so much the more to be detested, if done under the name of Ty∣rannicide. To plead for Tyrants really such as such, is to be abhorred. They pervert the very end of all government, abuse their power, act contrary to the Laws of God and men, to the ruine of the State, are enemies of mankind, the chiefest agents for the De∣vil. The Question is, Whether a people having power in their hands, may not restrain, or remove, or put to death such men, as being guilty of many crimes, which the Laws of God have made universally ca∣pital, so that no man in the world can plead exem∣ption? Some think that they are to be left to God, and subjects must seek deliverance by prayers and tears; and the truth is, Christians as Christians, have no other remedy: others conceive, they may be re∣strained,

and that by force, and their own subjects do it: Others give this power only unto Magistrates, or to such as share with them in the supreme power: Others are of a mind, that seeing they cease to be Kings or Soveraigns, they may be lawful∣ly tryed, and put to death, as well as private men; and that without any ordinary jurisdiction: Others determine this to be lawful in such States as that of Lacedemon in Grece, and Arragon in Spain. What the Doctrine of the Church of Rome is, cannot be unknown. For the Pope doth arrogate an universal Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, whereby he may excom∣municate any Christian King, that shall not obey his Canons and Edicts, and upon this sentence once gi∣ven, he may depose him, free his subjects from their allegiance, and command them as Catholicks to rise in rebellion against him; & some of them have taught, that its a meritorious art to poyson, stab, or any other way murther Kings for the promotion of the Catholick cause. This question after the terms there∣of clearly explicated, is of very great moment; and let men advise well how they do determine either in their own judgement privately, or before others.

T. H.

There be Doctors, that think, there may be more sorts (that is more Soveraigns) then one in a Com∣mon-wealth; and set up a Supremacy against the Sove∣raignty; Canons against Laws; and a Ghostly Au∣thority, against the Civil, &c.

G. L.

There cannot be any Soveraign but one, in one and the same Common-wealth: and to set up Supre∣macy against Soveraignty; Canons against Laws; Ghostly authority against Civil, must needs be a cause of division, confusion, dissolution. Yet this will not prove any inconsistency of an Ecclesiastical independent power with the Civil Soveraignty, in one and the same Community. And the distinction of the power of the keyes given by Christ unto the Church; and the power of the sword, trusted in the hands of the higher powers civil, is real, and sig∣nifies some things truly different one from another, though he either cannot or will not understand it. With Mr. Hobbs indeed this distinction can signisie nothing, because he hath given unto the civil Sove∣raign an infallible judgement, and an absolute power in all causes Ecclesiastical and Spiritual. His discourse may be good against those Ecclesiastical persons who have usurped civil power; otherwise its impertinent and irrational. And he must know, that it is alike difficult to prove, That the State hath the power of the keyes, as for to evince that the Church hath the power the sword. Its as great an offence for the State to encroach upon the Church, as for the Church to encroach upon the State; The Bishops of Rome have been highly guilty of the one, and many protestant Princes and States of the other. And though men will not see it, yet its clear enough, that one and the same Community is capable both of a Civil and Ecclesiastical Government at one and the

same time: and that the Church and State are two distinct Common-wealths, the one spiritual, and the other temporal, though they consist of the same persons. And these persons, as Christians, consider∣ed in a spiritual capacity, make up the Commu∣nity and Common-wealth Christian, which is the Church: as they are men, having temporal estates, bodily life and liberty, they are members of the civil Community and Common-wealth. The Power, Form of Government, Administration, Laws, Jurisdicti∣on, Officers of the Church are distinct and different from those of the State. The sentence of the Church is, Let him be an Heathen, or a Publican, and the exe∣cution is expected from heaven according to the promise, Whatsoever you bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and this sentence doth take away some spiritual, but no temporal or civil right of the person judged, though the judgement be passed and made valid, both in foro interiore & exteriore. The sentence of the civil State is, Let him be fined, imprisoned, stigmatized, banished, put to death; and its execu∣ted by the sword. The several members of a Church National, and the whole Church joyntly, is subject to the civil power; and the civil Soveraign, if a Christian, is subject to the Church, because as a Chri∣stian, he is subject to Christ, and bonnd by his Laws. And as a civil Soveraign, he is bound to protect the Church, and he may by civil Laws ratifie the Ecclesi∣astical Canons, and then they bind not only under a spiritual, but a civil penalty too. If Church-assem∣blies give cause of jealousie to the Civil powers, they may regulate them, and order their proceedings; if they offend, they may punish them. Their persons,

lives, estates, are under the sword; and if this be ta∣ken from them, because they will not obey them to disobey Christ, they ought to suffer it patiently for Christs sake. In this case the Church may pray and weep, resist and rebel they may not; for Christians as Christians, have no power of the sword against any man, not their own members, much less against the civil Soveraign; whom if they resist, they must do it under another notion, or else they transgress, and can have no excuse. And here it is to be observed,

• 1. That Christ gathered Disciples, instituted Church∣discipline, made Laws, and the Apostles executed them in making Officers, Acts cap. 1. & 16. made Laws, cap. 15. passed sentence and executed the same, 1 Cor. 5. and all this without any Commission from any civil Soveraign. Therefore its not true which some learned Divines have affirmed, That the State and Church are one body, endued with two powers or faculties; for they are two distinct bodies Politick. Its true, that if, as some conceive, there were no power but coactive of the sword, then they must needs be one body. But there is another power, as you heard before.
• 2. If a King become Christian, by this he acquires no power, not the least, more then he had before: and if he be Heathen or Mahome∣tan, and all his subjects become Christian, he loseth not one jot of his former civil power, which they are bound to submit unto by the very Laws of Christi∣anity. If he command any thing contrary to the Laws of Christ, they may and must disobey, but de∣ny his power, they may not, they must not. In this case a Christian may be perplexed between the Devil and a Goaler, as some of Scotland were said to be,

• when if they obeyed the Parliament, and joyned with Duke Hamilton to invade England, the Kirk ex∣communicate them, and deliver them up to Satan; if they obeyed the Church prohibiting them, they were cast in prison by the State. The cause of this perplexity is not from this, that the Church and State are two distinct Common-wealths, but because the commands of the one or both may be unjust.

T. H.

Some make the power of levying money depend upon a general assembly; of conduct and command upon one man; of making Laws upon the accidental consent of three. Such government is no government, but a divi∣sion of the Common-wealth into three independent fa∣ctions, &c.

G. L.

Here again he hath made the Parliament, which is the bulwark of, and best remedy for to preserve our liberty, a disease; and hath turned the King, Peers and Commons into three independent factions; and this Government, he saith, some call a mixt Mo∣narchy. Whether there can be a mixt State, is a que∣stion in Politicks; yet if we understand what mixture is, and could determine, whether this mixture be in the supreme power as fixed in the Constitution, or exercised in the Administration, we might more ea∣sily satisfie our selves. But this hath not been exactly done. For its probable, that in the exercise of the supreme power, in the three acts of Legislation,

Judgement, Execution, there might be a mixture, and these brought to a just and regular temperament. But a mixt Monarchy in proper sense there cannot be. Yet a limited and well-poised Monarch there may be. To place the power Legislative, which in∣cludes all the rest, in three co-ordinate parties, grant∣ing to every one of them severally a negative, to me seems irrational; for it may easily turn them who should be one, into three factions, as here it is affirm∣ed: at least it will retard all businesses, which for for dispatch, require secrecy and expedition. But to place the universal power originally in the general assembly without any negative; the judicial in the Lords, and the executive in the King, seems to be far more agreeable to the rules of reason. This some think was our untient Constitution, and the same ex∣cellent.

Difficulty of raising moneys necessary for the de∣fence and preservation of the State, monopolies, popu∣larity in a subject, are diseases which much weaken a State; there is no doubt of this. That one City should in gross the wealth and strength of a Nation, and be so rich and populous as to be able to set forth a potent Army, and maintain it, may be judged very dangerous to a Common-wealth, as Mr. Hobbs in∣forms us. By this City in particular, he means Lon∣don, which, as some tell us, furnished the Parliament with men and moneys, whereby the King was van∣quished and over-thrown. Yet they seldom did assist the Parliament but upon high terms, and advantagi∣ous to themselves; in so much as their Petitions were Commands unto the Parliament, which did depend more upon the City, then the City upon them, by

which means they might in time engross the whole power, and so rule the Nation. Yet an army of their own did break their strength, and reduce them unto their own terms: and its clear, that City depends much upon the River, both for fuel, merchandize and provision, and by a wise provident counsel may be ea∣sily kept in order. And this might the more easily be done, because the Citizens have so many several inte∣rests, and the same inconsistent amongst themselves, as that they can hardly be united.

After all these diseases from within, which weaken and may dissolve a Government, he informs of a destructive cause, and that is a forreign or intestine war, wherein the enemy obtains a final victory, so that the Soveraign cannot protect his subjects in their loyalty. This indeed may cut off a line, change the Governors, and alter the form of Government. Yet in all this, the Community may continue, and never be like a subject matter without any form, but the Government may be the same, and the Gover∣nors only altered; nay the Constitution may stand firm, and the Administration only varied: or if the the form be changed, yet the privation of the form∣er is an introduction of the latter. Here its confes∣sed, that when the power of protection faileth in the Soveraign, obligation in the subject is taken away. But he starts a question, though with him no que∣stion, whether the right of a Soveraign Monarch can be extinguished by the act of another? He saith it cannot. Yet experience tells us, it may. For a con∣quered Monarch, fallen into the power of another, ceaseth to be a Soveraign, and this is by the act of another. And again, if God by another take away

his sword, though his person escape, and be at liberty, he hath but the name, and not the thing or real title. If his subjects freed from obligation, because he can give no protection, do submit themselves un∣to another, his right is lost. If his life be taken away, and his line cut off, all right is extinct, and in all these cases by the act of another; yet he thinks, that if the power of an assembly be suppressed, their right is extinct. The assembly in an Aristocracy, or De∣mocracy, for such he means, may be extraordinary, or ordinary; and the same the immediate subject of the supreme power, or only trusted for a time with the administration and exercise thereof: and the power of an assembly may be suppressed for a time, and so only suspended, the assembly remaining still. Except he let us know what kind of assembly he un∣derstands, and what kind of suppression of power he means, he doth nothing. An assembly whose power depends upon a certain place, time, number, may lose their right, if once they be scattered or de∣fective in that circumstance.