Vindiciæ contra tyrannos

The whole body of the people is above the King.

Now seeing that the people chuse and establish their Kings, it followeth that the whole body of the people is above the King; for it is a thing most e∣vident that he which is established by another is accounted under him that hath established him, & he which receives his authority from an other is lesse then he from whom he denies his power. Potiphar the Egyptian setteth Ioseph over all his House, Nebuchadoezzar Danniel over the Province of Babylon, Darius the sixscore governors over the kingdom. It is cōmonly said that Mrs. establish their servants, Kings their officers: In like manner also the people e∣stablish the King as administrator of the Cōmon-wealth. G••od kings have not disdained this title; yea, he had ones themselvs have affected it: insomuch, as for the space of divers Ages no Roman Emperor (if it were not some absolute tyrant, as Nero, Domitian, Caligula) would suffer himself to be called Lord; Furthermore, it must neces∣sarily be that Kings were instituted for the peoples sake, neither can it be, that for the pleasure of some hundred of men, and without doubt more foolish and worse then many of the other, all the rest were made, but much rather that th••se hundred were made for the us•• and service of all the other, And reason requires that he be preferred above the other, who was made only to and for his occasion: so it is, that for the ships sa••e, the owner appoints a py∣lot over her, who sits at the he••m, and looks that she keeps her course, nor run nor upon any dangerous sheilf: the pylot doing his duty is obeyed by the Mariners; yea, & of him himself that is owner of the vessel, notwithstanding, the p••lot is a servant as well as the

least in the ship from whom he only differs in this that he servs in better place then they do. In a Common-wea••th common••y compared to a ship the King holds the p••nce of py∣lot, the people in general are owners of the vessel, obeying the pylot whilest he is ••a••e••ull of the publique good a••though this pylot neither is nor ought to be esteemed other then servant to the publique, as a Judge or General in war differs little from other officers, but that he is bound to bear greater burdens, & expose himse••f to more dangers. By the same reason also which t••e King gains by acquist of arms, be 〈…〉〈…〉 possesseth himself of Frontier places in warring on the enemy, or that which he gets b•• esch••ats or consis∣tations, he gets it to the Kingdom & not to himself; to wit, to the people, of whom the Kingdom is composed; no more, nor less, then the servane doth for his master, neither may one contract or ob••iege themse••vs to him, but by & with reference to the authority derived from the people. Furthermore, there is an infinite sort of people which ••ive with out a King; but we cannot imagine a King without p••ople, And those which have bin rai∣sed to the Royal dignity, were not advanced because they excel••ed other men in beauty & come••iness, nor in some excellency of nature to govern them as shepheards doe their flocks, but rather being made out of the same masse with the rest of the people, they should acknowledge that for them, they as it were borrow their power & authority, The ancient custome of the French represents that exceeding wel••, for they used to lift up on a buckler, & sa••ute him King whom they had chosen. And wherefore is it said, I pray you that kings h••ve an infinite number of eyes, a million of ears, with extream long hands, and feet exceeding swift? is it because they are like to Argos, Gerion, Midas, & divers others ••o celebrated by the Poets? No truly, but it is said in regard of all the people, whom the busines principal••y concerns, who lend to the king for the good of the Common-wealth, their eye••, their ears, their means their facu••ties. Let the people forsake the king, he pre∣sently fals to the ground, although befo••e his hearing & sight seemed most excellent, & that he was strong & in the best disposition that might be, yea that he seemed to triumph in all magnificence, yet in an instant he wi••l become mo••t vi••e & contemptible, to bee brief, instead of those divine honours wherewith all men adored him, he shalbe compe••ed to become a Pedant, & whip children in the schoo•• at Corinth. Take away but the basis, to this Giant, & l••••e the Rodian Colosse he p••esently tumbles on the ground, & fals into pieces. Seeing th••n that the King is estab••ished in this degree by the people & for their sake, & that he cannot subsist without them, who can think it strange then for us to con∣clude, that the peop••e are aboue the King. Now that which we speak of al•• the people u∣niversally, ought also to be understood as hath been delivered in the 2. question, of those which in every Kingdom or town do ••••••wfully represent the body of the people, & which ordinarily (or at lest should be) ca••ed the officers of the Kingdom, or of the crown, & not of the King; For the officers of the ••ing it is he which placeth & displaceth them at his pleasure, yea, after his death they have no more power, & are accounted as dead. On the contrary, the officers of the Kingdom receive their authority from the people in the general Assembly of the states (or at the least wer•• accustomed so anciently to have done) & cannot be disauthorised but by them, so then the one depends of the King, the other of the Kingdom, those of t••e soveraign officer of the ••ingdom which is the King himself, these of the sove∣raignty it self, that is of the people, of which soveraignty both the King, all his officers, and all his officers of the ••ingdom, ought to depend, the charge of the one hath proper relation to the care of the ••ings person: that of the other to look that the common-wealth receive no da∣mage, the first ought to serve and assist the King, as all domestique servants are bound to doe to their masters the other to preserve the rights & priviledges of the people, & to carefully hinder the Prince that he neither omit the things that may advantage the state, nor commit any thing that may endammage the publique.

Briefly, the one are Servants and domestiques of the Kings, and recei∣ved into their places to obey his person: the other, on the contrary, are as Associates to the King in the administration of justice, participating of the Royal power and authority, being bound to the utmost of their power, to be assisting in the managing of the affairs of State, as well as the King who is as it were President amongst them, and principall onely in order and degree.

Therefore, as all the whole People is above the King, and likewise ta∣ken in one entire body are in authority before him; yet being conside∣red one by one they are all of them under the King. It is easie to know how far the power of the first Kings extended, in that Ephron King of the Hittites could not grant Abraham the Sepulchre, but in the presence and with the consent of the People: neither could Hemor the Hevite King of Sichem contract an alliance with Iacob, without the Peoples assent, and confirmation thereof; because it was then the custome to refer the most important affairs to be dispensed and resolved in the ge∣nerall Assemblies of the People. This might easily be practised in those kingdomes, which were then almost confined within the circuit of one towne.

But since that Kings began to extend their limits, and that it was im∣possible for the People to assemble together all into one place because of their great numbers, which would have occasioned confusion the Officers of the kingdome were established, which should ordinarily preserve the rights of the People, in such sort notwithstanding, as when extraordina∣ry occasion required the People might be assembled, or at the least such an abridgement as might by the principallest Members be a Represen∣tation of the whole Body. We see this order established in the kingdome of Israel, which (in the judgment of the wisest Politicians) was excel∣lently ordered. The King had his Cupbearers his Carvers, his Chamber∣lains and Stewards. The kingdome had her Officers, to wit, the 71. El∣ders, and the heads and chief chosen out of all the Tribes, which had the care of the Publique Faith in Peace and War.

Furthermore, the kingdome had in every town Magistrates, which had the particular government of them, as the former were for the whole kingdome. At such times as affairs of consequence were to be treated of, they assembled together, but nothing that concerned the publike state could receive any solid determination. David assembled the Officers of his kingdome when he desired to invest his Son Solomon with the Royal Dignity; when he would have examined and approved that manner of policy, and managing of affairs, that he had revived and restored, and when there was question of removing the Ark of the Covenant.

And because they represented the whole people, it is said in the Hi∣story, that all the people assembled. These were the same Officers that de∣livered Ionathan from death, condemned by the sentence of the King, by which it appeares, that there might be an appeale from the King to the People.

After that the kingdome was divided through the pride of Reoboam, the Councel at Ierusalem composed of 71. Ancients, seems to have such authority, that they might judge the King, as well as the King might judge every one of them in particular.

In this Councel was President the Duke of the house of Iuda, to wit, some principall man chosen out of that Tribe; as also, in the City of Ie∣rusalem there was a Governour chosen out of the Tribe of Benjamin re∣siding there. This will appear more manifest by examples, Ieremy sent by God to denounce to the Jewes the destruction of Ierusalem, was there∣fore condemned first by the Priests and Prophets, in whose hands was the Ecclesiasticall jurisdiction afterwards by all the people of the City; that is, by the ordinary Iudges of Ierusalem, to wit, the Milleniers, and the Centurions: Finally, the matter being brought before the Princes of Iuda, who were the 71. Elders assembled, and set neere to the new Gate of the Temple, he was by them acquitted.

In this very Assembly, they did discreetly condemn, in expresse terms, the wicked and cruell act of the King Ichoiakin, who a little before had caused the Prophet Vriah to be slain, who also fore-told the destruction of Ierusalem.

We read in another place that Ledechias held in such reverence the authority of this Councel, that he was so far from delivering of Ieremy from the dungeon, wherein to the 71. had cast him that he durst scant re∣move him into a lesse rigorous prison. They perswading him to give his consent to the putting to death the Prophet Ieremy, he answered, that he was in their hands, and that he might not oppose them in my thing. The same King fearing least they might make information against him, to bring him to an account for certain Speeches he had used to the Pro∣phet Ieremy, was glad to fe••gn an untrue excuse It appeares by this, that in the kingdome of Iuda this Councel was above the King, in this king∣dome, I say not fashioned or established by Plato or Arictotle, but by the Lord God, himself being Author of all their order, and supreame Mode∣rator in that Monarchy. Such were the seven Magi or Sages in the Persi∣an Empire, who had almost a paraleld dignity with the King, and were tearmed the ears and eyes of the King, who also never dissented from the judgment of those Sages.

In the kingdom of Sparta there was the Ephori, to whom an appeal

lay from the judgment of the King, and who, as Aristotle sayes, had au∣thority also to judge the Kings themselves.

In Egypt the people were accustomed to chuse and give officers to the King, to the end they might hinder and prevent any incroachment, or usurpt authority, contrary to the Laws. Now as Aristotle doth ordinari∣ly tearm those lawfull Kings, which have for their Assistants, such officers or Councellors: so also maketh he no difficulty to say, that where they be wanting, there can be no true Monarchy, but rather a tyranny, absolute∣ly barbarous, or at the least such a Dominion, as doth most neerly ap∣proach tyranny.

In the Romane Common-wealth, such were the Senators, and the Magistrates created by the people the tribune of those which were called Celerees, the Preter or Provost of the City, and others, insomuch as there lay an appeal from the King to the People, as Seneca declares by divers testimonies drawne from Ciceroes bookes of the Common-wealth, and the History of Oratius sufficiently shewes, who being condemned by the Iudges for killing his sister, was acquitted by the people.

In the times of the Emperours, there was the Senate the Consults, the Pretors, the great Provosts of the Empire, the Governours of Provinces, attributed to the Senate and the People, all which were called the Magi∣strates and Officers of the people of Rome. And therefore, when that by the decree of the Senate, the Emperour Maximinus was declared ene∣my of the Common-wealth, and that Maximus and Albinus were crea∣ted Emperours by the Senate, the men of war were sworn to be faithfull, and obedient to the people of Rome the Senate, and the Emperors. Now for the Empires and publike States of these times (except those of Tur∣quie, Muscovie, and such like, which are rather a rapsody of Robbers, and barbarous intruders, then any lawfull Empires) there is not one, which is not, or hath not heretofore been governed in the manner wee have de∣scribed. And if through the connivency and sloath of the principall Offi∣cers, the successors have found the businesse in a worse condition, those which have for the present the publike Authority in their hands, are not∣withstanding bound as much as in them lyeth to reduce things into their primary estate and condition.

In the Empire of Germany which is conferred by election, there is the Electors and the Princes both secular and Ecclesiasticall, the Countesse, Barons, and Deputies of the Imperial Cities, and as all these in their pro∣per places are Solicitors for the publike good likewise in the Diets doe they represent the Majesty of the Empire, being obliged to advise, and carefully fore-see, that neither by the Emperours, partiality, hate nor affe∣ction, the publike State do suffer, or be interressed. And for this reason, the

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Empire hath its Chancellour, as well as the Emperour his, both the one and the other have their peculiar Officers and Treasurers apart. And it is a thing so notorious, that the Empire is preferred before the Empe∣rour, that it is a common saying, That the Emperour does homage to the Empire.

In like manner, in the Kingdom of Polonia, there is for Officers of the Crown, the Bishops, the Palatins, the Castellains, the Nobility, the Depu∣ties of Towns and Provinces assembled extraordinarily, before whom; and with whose consent, and no where else, they make new Lawes, and determinations concerning wars. For the ordinary Government there, is the Councellours of the kingdom, the Chancellour of the State, &c. al∣though notwithstanding, the king have his Stewards, Chamberlains, Ser∣vants and Domestiques. Now if any man should demand in Polonia who were the greater, the King or all the people of the kingdom represented by the Lords and Magistrates; he should do as much, as if he asked at Veni••e, if the Duke were above the Seigniory. But what shall wee say of Kingdoms, which are said to go by hereditary succession? We may in∣deed conclude the very same. The kingdom of France heretofore prefer∣red before all other, both in regard of the excellency of their Lawes, and ma••esty of their Estate may passe with most as a ruling case. Now al∣though that those which have the publike commands in their hands, doe not discharge their duties as were to be desired, it followes not though, that they are not bound to do it. The King hath his high steward of his Houshold his Chamberlains, his Masters of his games, Cup-bearers, and others, whose o••••••ces were wont so to depend on the person of the King, that after the death of their Mast••r, the ro••••ces were void. And indeed at the Funerall of the King, the Lord high Steward in the presence of all the officers and servants of the house-hold, breakes his staffe of office, and sayes, Our Master is dead, let every one provide for himselfe. On the other side, the kingdom hath her officers, to wit, the Mayor of the Palace, which since hath been called the Constable, the Marshals, the Admirall, the Chancellour or great Referendary, the Secretaries, the Treasurers and o∣thers, which heretofore were created in the Assembly of the three E∣states the Clergy, the Nobility, and the People.

Since that, the Parliament of Paris was made Sedentary, they are not thought to be established in their places, before they have beene first re∣ceived and approved by that course of Parliament, and may not be dis∣missed nor deposed, but by the authority and consent of the same. Now all these officers take their oath to the Kingdome, which is as much as to say, to the people in the first place, then to the King which is protector of he Kingdome, the which appears by the tenour of the oath. Above all, the

Constable, who receiving the Sword from the King, hath it girded unto him with this charge, That he maintain and defend the Common-wealth, as appears by the words that the King then pronounceth.

Besides, the kingdome of France hath the Peers (so called either for that they are the Kings companions, or because they are the Fathers of the Common-wealth) taking their denominations from the severall Provinces of the kingdome, in whose hands the King at his inauguration takes his oath, as if all the people of the kingdome were in them pre∣sent, which shews that these twelve Peers are above the King. They on the other side swear, That they will preserve not the King, but the Crown, that they will assist the Common-wealth with their councell, and therefore will be present with their best abilities to councell the Prince both in peace and war, as appears plainly in the Paitentee of their Peership.

And they therefore have the same right as the Peers of the Court, which according to the Law of the Lumbards, were not only associates to the Lord of the Fee in the judgment of cau••es, but also did take an ••c∣count, and judge the differences that happenod between the Lord and his vassall.

We may also know, that those Peers of France did often discusse suits and differences between the King and his Subjects: Insomuch, that when Charles the 6. would have given sentence against the Duke of Brittain they opposed it, alleadging that the discussing of that businesse belonged properly to the Peers, and not to the king, who might not in any 〈◊〉〈◊〉 derogate from their authority.

Therefore it is, that yet at this day the Parliament of Paris is called the Court of Peers, being in some sort constituted Judge between the king and the people; yea, between the king and every private person, and is bound and ought to maintain the meanest in the kingdome against the kings Attorney, if he undertake any thing contrary to law.

Furthermore, if the king ordain any thing in his Councell, if he treat any agreement with the Princes his neighbours, if he begin a Warre, or make peace, as lately with Charles the 5. the Emperour, the Parliament ought to interpose their authority, and all that which concerns the pub∣like State must be there inregistred; neither is there any thing firm and stable which the Parliament doth not first approve. And to the end, that the Councellours of that Parliament should not fear the king, formerly they attained not to that place, but by the nomination of the whole bo∣dy of the Court; neither could they be dismissed for any lawfull cause, but by the authority of the said Body.

Furthermore, if the Letters of the King be not subsigned by a Secreta∣ry of the Kingdom, at this day called a Secretary of State, and if the Let∣ters Pattents be not sealed by the Chancellour, who hath power also to cancell them, they are of no force or value. There is also Dukes, Marques∣ses, Earls. Vicounts, Barons, Seneschabs, and in the cities and good towns Mayors, Baylistes, Lieutenants, Capitols, Consuls, Sindiques, Sheriffs, and others which have speciall authority through the Circuit of some coun∣tries or towns to preserve the people of their jurisdiction. Time it is, that at this day some of these dignities ere become hereditary. Thus much concerning the ordinary Magistrates.

Notes

• Dionisius for his Ti∣••a••••ie dri∣ven o••t of C••cil••e was fo••s••d to ta••e that course of lif•• up••n h••m.
• Gen. 34.
• 1. Chron. 29. 1 1. Chron. 13. 1.
• •• Sam. ••••. 45.
• •• Chron. 1••. Neh. 11. 9.
• ••or. 16. 9 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 37. 38.
• Arist. in Pol. lib.••.c. 11. l. 3. c. 7.
• Arist. in pol. l. 5. c. 11.
• Herodi. •• 8.
• Specu∣lum sax∣onicum.
• Ai••oni. lib. 5. c. 26. in Carolo ••••lv••.
• S. Filius fam. in∣stit. quib. mod. jus patriae pot. solvi∣tur.
• Renatus ch••pinus' lib. 3.