A discourse of the knowledg of beasts,: wherein all that hath been said for, and against their ratiocination, is examined. / By Monsieur de la Chambre, counsellor to the King of France in his counsels, and his physitian in ordinary. Translated into English by a person of quality.

Whether general Knowledges are more confused then the particular?

But put the case that we may draw these kind of consequences, is it true that they are more confu∣sed and more imperfect then the particular Know∣ledges whence they are drawn? First, as for con∣fusion, the distinction is here to be used, which we at first proposed, and we must say, That if we con∣ceive in an universal conclusion the universality as a Degree of essence, which makes part of the Na∣ture of particular things, it's so far from rendring the knowledge more confused, it renders it more precise and distinct. That if we conceive it as a whole, I confess that in respect of the parts it com∣prehends, its more confused, but in respect of the particular thing whence it was drawn, I deny it to be confused, since it contains all the distinction and evidence which this can have. As for imper∣fection, I never heard say that a demonstration whose conclusion is ever universal, should be less perfect then a Topick Syllogism, whose conclusion is particular. Yes, but its more confused. Were it true, the confusion that accompanies the extent of the knowledge, imports more perfection then the distinction which is restrained to a particular knowledge. Yes, but the conclusion is but the effect of precedent knowledges. What matters it? There are effects whose nature is as imperfect as that of their cause, and the evidence of a conclusion ought to be as perfect as that of its antecedents; other∣wise Science would not be placed in the conclusion

where its commonly placed. After all, I will have this conclusion less perfect, the particular conclu∣sion which is drawn from general propositions must be less perfect then they are. In this case M C. would be deficient, and I should even have an ad∣vantage over him for the particular conclusions which he makes upon me on universal ones. How∣ever it be, I leave the rest of this dispute to be de∣cided betwixt our Divines and M.C. and would ad∣vise him to think seriously what he will answer them on the propositions they make, That Angels have Ideas and species more universal, according as their nature is more perfect, and that they are of a more elevated order. For as for what concerns Philoso∣phers, which hold that universal knowledges are more excellent, more evident in themselves, and more conformable to the Understanding, and it is to prophane them as Plato saith, to bring them down to particular things; I know that M. C. will not beleeve in them.

The third Reason imports, That its impossible to reason without making use of general terms, and without forming universal Notions; and that there∣fore our reason hath no advantage over that of Beasts, and that in that point there could not be ob∣served any essential difference.

There is no proposition in all this Discourse but is false, as I have made it appear in the 99, 123, &c. pages, where I have shewed that general terms lose their generality when they are accompanied with a Pronoun demonstrative, or with some such like restriction; and that when Logick requires u∣niversal notions or propositions to discours••, its

intellectual Logick, and not that which is proper to the Imagination which hath its rules apart, which can form Syllogisms without imploying any uni∣versal Notions, and which consequently may draw assured Knowledges from particular Proposi∣tions.

And without doubt, had M. C. foreseen the truths which I demonstrated in these places, he would not have so lightly hazarded to have said here That my Mind was diverted when I wrote that a man might draw an assured knowledge of proposi∣tions which are not particular; That the maxims of Logick teach the nullity of these consequences, and that I would have said singulars, by reason of cer∣tain Syllogisms, which the Schools calls Expositories which from singular propositions infer a singular con∣clusion. Let him therefore know that I have most se∣riously thought on what I said of these propositions, and that I called them particulars in the sense they ought, and as they are commonly taken in the Schools; for when we oppose these propositions to those which are universal, we under that word comprehend all propositions which are not uni∣versal, whether particular or singular.

In effect, Were this Syllogism proposed to M.C.

Some Man is just. Peter is a Man. Then Peter is just.

With reason a man might say, it were to blame, because its all composed of particular propositions, whence legitimately nothing can be concluded; yet at his reckoning it would be found, the first is only

particular; the second being singular, it must also be that when we say, That to form an Argument in such a manner, such a proposition must be parti∣cular, it were not such as it ought to be, were sin∣gular, terms used, and that so this Syllogism would not be regular.

Every Man is reasonable. Peter is a Man. Then Peter is reasonable.

Because therein are no particular propositions as M.C. says; I shall therefore advise him to take a review of his Logick, to learn not onely that this word of particular ought often to be taken for sin∣gular, but a so that the expositive Syllogism is more useful, and more easie to make then he ima∣gines; for its so necessary that it hath served for a model to Aristotle to form his third figure, That it's the first of all the reasonings which Nature teacheth us, and the onely one which the Imagina∣tion useth. And thence it's easie to judge, that it is not so difficult to perform, as M. C imagineth; and that the Logicians are not so troubled, as he says, when they are questioned to produce examples the••eof, since of themselves they have reckoned to the number of 1200 ways to make this kind of Syllo∣gism.

Yet I well perceive what made him fall into this error, is that he beleeved that the medium of this Syllogism which ought to be singular, could be so but after one manner, although it may be so di∣vers ways; for it is not only so by the names which are proper to the things, but by those also which are

common, so as they be restrained by the demon∣strative pronouns, or other the like particles. So when we say this Man, this Thing, &c. they are terms which are as much singular as if they called them by their proper names. And some beleeve that the propositions which are composed of these terms are more exactly called singulars then the rest, because they carry with them a manifest sign of their sigularity, and that the proper name is used but for the deficiency of that mark, in the same manner as propositions which have the signs of uni∣versality are more properly called universals then the rest which want it, although in effect they e∣qually are so to the sense; for when we say Man is reasonable, its an universal proposition, and yet in the rigor of the Laws of Logick it's not so regular as if we should say, Every Man is reasonable, be∣cause the word all which is the mark of the univer∣sality is not expressed. We cannot say so much of singular propositions. But I leave this to the de∣cision of Masters of Arts. I would onely by the way advise M.C. That the Syllogisms in question are not called Expository, because they onely ex∣plicate a thing in other terms, but rather because they expose to our eyes the naked truth, and leave no doubt, designing and pointing out the things which might be contested, and in this case they ought to be more useful then M. C. sup∣posed.

But he says, To speak properly, they are not Ra∣tiocinations, since there is wanting to them what is essential. Because the foundation of all true Ratioci∣nation is that two things which agree amongst them∣selves

ought to agree in a third; and that those which have nothing common amongst them cannot a∣gree.

I have made him to see pag. 99. that this prin∣ciple takes place in particular Ratiocinations as well as in universals, and that particular propositions hinder not this agreement, as may be judged by the expositive Syllogism: But from thence to infer, as he doth, That in every Syllogism there must be an universal thing which must be drawn from all what is contained in it: I am not of his opinion, and I hold that this illation cannot be maintained but in intellectual Ratiocinations, as I have shewed in the third part, where he may again see page 123. after what manner those terms which enter into particu∣lar Syllogisms may be common.

His Fourth Reason is, That since we have no o∣ther faculty to know universalities but the same by which we reason, it must needs be that this faculty to know universalities is proper to Man, that of rea∣soning must be so also, since it's the same thing.

So as M. C. would add to the word Reason∣ing that of Universality, I shall grant all what he says; for the faculty of reasoning universally is the same by which we know universalities, That it's proper and particular to Man, and that it's in∣communicable to Beasts; but without that one word all his Ratiocination is false; and speaking absolutely of the faculty of reasoning, is not the same by which we know Universalities, since Ima∣gination reasons which cannot know them.

He adds, That the Ʋnderstanding ought to have some action proper unto it; it must therefore needs be that of the three operations it hath the third at least, which is most excellent, must be particular unto it, and that it cannot communicate it self to the Imagina∣tion.

I should here have made the same Answer which I have so often made, to wit, that universal Rati∣ocination is the proper action of the Understand∣ing; but he prevented me in saying, That this can∣not be, because he hath shewen that the conception of universality is the most imperfect of all the actions of the Ʋnderstanding, and that all Ratiocination sup∣poseth an universal knowledge. I know very well he hath labored to shew it; but his success hath very ill answered it, as himself may judge, by what we have said here before; So that I have nothing to add to this point, but that he deceives himself when he thinks, That Ʋniversalities form them∣selves by simple conceptions, and by the first ope∣ration of the Ʋnderstanding. For it's impossible to form an universal Notion without considering the communities, without separating from them singular conditions, without conceiving unity and plurality in the same nature; finally without comparing one thing with another, and consequently with∣out reasoning. I know very well that all this progress terminates at a simple notion of univer∣sal nature; but it's the effect of discourse, after the same manner as Science is the effect of demonstra∣tion; for as we cannot say that Science is acquired by the second operation onely of the Understand∣ing, although it consist in a simple notion, I durst

even say, and that the proposition wherein Sci∣ence consists, and that the universal notion shut up in them the Ratiocination by which they were formed. For the Understanding is so prompt, it sees and doth so many things at once, that its Ideas which appear to us simple are commonly com∣posed. But this is no place to fathom this matter; we must expect till M. C. hath explained himself thereupon, as he hath promised. It's enough for him now to know, that the Universal forms not it self by the first operation of the Understanding.

The Fifth and last Reason he brings against the difference proposed p. 127. is, That the Imagination can no ways form discourse because it's a corporal faculty which depends absolutely on its organ, and that all Reasoning whatever it be requires a free and independent faculty, forasmuch as there is no Rati∣ocination without Deliberation, nor Deliberation without Liberty: 2. Because there is no Reasoning without some universal Notion, which supposeth an universal Power. 3. Because that in all Reasoning there is always something new done which is different from what is represented by the Fantasms. And that therefore that Faculty which reasons, must be independent of its organ; otherwise it can onely know what is represented to it.

We need not use many words to answer this long Reason, forasmuch as the principal proof it contains shall be fully confuted by the following Article, where we shall make it appear that there are many Ratiocinations which are made without

deliberation, and that the other two have been examined here before, we having shewed that we may Reason without making use of any uni∣versal Notion; and that the Imagination although it knows nothing without Phantasms, yet it forms Phantasms which are not expressed in those Images which the exterior Senses furnish it with∣al, such as is the Union or the Division, and those species which the Schools call non sensatas, as to be good or ill, friend or enemy, and other such like. For from thence it follows, That that fa∣culty which reasons, doth always something anew by uniting or separating terms and things which she knew not before in that condition. Neither for all this can any infer, that the Imagination which doth all those things, is independent from it's or∣gan. Otherwise we must say that she knows neither what is good or ill, friend or foe; And that she judgeth not of things, if it be true that those actions are marked with independency.