A discourse of the knowledg of beasts,: wherein all that hath been said for, and against their ratiocination, is examined. / By Monsieur de la Chambre, counsellor to the King of France in his counsels, and his physitian in ordinary. Translated into English by a person of quality.

That Reason in general is not the specifick differ∣ence of Man.

From these two differences which we have dis∣covered betwixt the Understanding and the Imagi∣nation, we have concluded, that speaking generally, Reason is not the specifick difference of Man, but such a species of Reason, to wit universal Reason, which is the most perfect, and which for its excel∣lency is called simply Reason.

M. C. produceth many Reasons to destroy this consequence.

The first is, That were there to be found a greater perfection in human Ratiocination, it would not mark an essential difference in the faculty, because more or less changes not the species, and that the faculties change not their nature, and do not become specifick in a subject, to perform in it more perfect actions then in another.

One word will answer all this. There are two kinds of perfection, the one is essential, the other is ac∣cidental; this makes not really an essential differ∣ence, but the other makes, or at least supposeth it. When we say that the Angels are more noble and perfect then Man, or that Man is more perfect then Beasts, this perfection doth it not mark an essenti∣al difference betwixt them? M. C. who grounds himself on the maxim of the Schools, that more and less causeth no change in the species of things, should have taken heed to the restrictions given him; for its certain there are encounters in which this proposion is false. When Aristotle says that

the first substances are more substances then the second, and that Form is more so then the Matter; when the Platonick Philosophy teacheth us that there is more or less of essence in things, and that the abundance of being is a cause why some are more perfect then others; M C beleeves not that this more and this less makes an essen••ial differ∣ence: And if he doth beleeve it, as he is obliged to do, the more or less perfection which there is to be found in the reasonings of Men and of Beasts, may it not make the same difference? After all let him remember himself of what we have said before, that the essential difference which distinguisheth the faculty of the Understandings reasoning with that of the Imagination, consists not in more or less, but that its thereby made known; and its the reason for which we said, That if more or less do not make this difference, yet at least they sup∣pose it.

The second is, That were there a greater per∣fection then Ratiocination which were capable to esta∣blish a specifick difference, it would not be the know∣ledge of universal things, because general notions are the most confused and most imperfect of our concepti∣ons.

I send back M.C. with this Article to our Logi∣citians, who will teach him that universals are to be considered two ways. First, as simple Natures separate from all particulars. Secondly, As Na∣tures which comprehend all particulars. This im∣ports confusion, because it distinguisheth nothing, and represents the universal as a whole which con∣tains severall parts; But the other is clear and di∣stinct,

and makes things known more clearly, and more perfectly, because it proposeth universal Na∣tures, as degrees and parts whereof the essence of things is composed. So when we conceive the A∣nimal as a gender, which embraceth all the species of Animals, this knowledge is in some manner confused, and like that which we have of the whole, without distinguishing the parts; But when we consider the Animal in Man, or in some other species, we conceive it as a degree and a part of his essence, and consequently the knowledge is more clear and exact then if we considered the species in gross. Certainly I cannot beleeve that M C. could be ignorant of a distinction so common in the Schools; But I wonder also that he did not foresee that I made use of it to destroy the reason which he produced; and if he did foresee it, its yet a greater cause of astonishment that he should make use of things he knew were useless for his de∣sign.

But, says he, those Men which reason best, and know things most perfectly, make fewer universal Notions, then grosser spirits which confusedly judge of all things.

He deceives himself; he would without doubt say that they stay less on universal notions because they go to the particular difference of things, so that grosser spirits which cannot penetrate so far are forced to stop at universal Notions. But in∣deed a Man had need of less spirit to know commu∣nalties and resemblances, then to discern differences. I confess it, if a man know not the differences, but he must also confess that he had need of more spirit

to know communities with the differences, then if the communities were unknown. Now the differ∣ences cannot be known unless we know the com∣munities.

He adds besides, That every time that our rea∣son makes a progress from a particular knowledge to an universal conclusion: The conclusion is more con∣fused and more imperfect then the knowledge whence its drawn:

Here is a new rule of Logick which M. C. will introduce, which never any thought before; for 'tis an unknown thing in a Syllogism to draw an u∣niversal conclusion from a particular knowledge; and without doubt before he establish this Maxim, he must ruin that which teacheth that the conclu∣sion ever follows the nature of the most imperfect of the antecedent propositions; and if there be any of these particular or negative, the conclusion ought to be so too. I know a Man may make En∣thymema's where the antecedent shall be particu∣lar, and the conclusion universal. But besides that, this form is condemned as vitious; there is ever an universal proposition or an induction, which main∣tains the universality of the conclusion. Thus to say Peter is reasonable, Then every man is reason∣able, this consequence must be grounded on the Induction which was made. That Peter, John, James, &c. are reasonable. Now this induction hath the force of an universal proposition, and there∣fore we need not wonder if the consequence is uni∣versal.