A discourse of the knowledg of beasts,: wherein all that hath been said for, and against their ratiocination, is examined. / By Monsieur de la Chambre, counsellor to the King of France in his counsels, and his physitian in ordinary. Translated into English by a person of quality.

The second Difference which is betwixt the Ʋn∣derstanding and the Imagination.

The second difference which we have found be∣twixt the Understanding and the Imagination, is, That this forms no universal Notion, so that con∣sequently I can none but particular Ratiocinations: Instead that the Understanding hath the liberty to form general notions of all things, and when it pleaseth to draw from thence universal or particular consequences.

I had here given a fair field to M.C. td have ex∣ercised his spirit, and I did beleeve in the humour he was in to contradict whatever he incountred, he would not have let pass so important a Proposi∣tion without disputing it.

Yet I perceive that notwithstanding it hath great Philosophers for its enemies, and several

presumptions repugnant unto it, yet it hath esca∣ped his hands and hath received no touch of his Criticks. Certainly instead of amusing himself to mince upon words as he doth in this Chapter, and to puzzle the truth by petty School tricks, as he hath done every where else, he should have ex∣amined whether it is a necessity, That because a power is material, it cannot make universal notions, principally not going out of the resort or precinct of material things. In effect, when the sense hath known an obj••ct, doth there not remain in the soul a general notion, which makes it know all the rest which are of the same nature? And ••s the great Scaliger saith, The Chick, hath it not a universal image of the Kite, whereby it knows every Kite which comes to sight? And what? If the Imagination hath the faculty to judge, as we beleeve, can it not judge through all the extent of its object? and since it can know all the parts of the whole, may it not form a proposition which may comprehend all the objects it hath the knowledge of? For example, can it not judge that all what is sweet is good, or at least, That all the sweet things it knows are good? And when a Sheep shall see divers Wolves together, will it not judge that all the Beasts it sees are Wolves and enemies to attempt its life? Now these are universal propositions, and yet the Imagination how material soever she be, is capable to form general Notions.

But all these Reasons are weak in comparison of those which establish the contrary opinion, and which shew that a material Faculty can never form any universal Notion; for its certain, That we can∣not

conceive an universal thing, but by taking from it the singularity it hath; otherwise it would not be universal; now its singularity cannot be taken away but by separating it from those things which render it singular, as from the particular subject its in, and from the other conditions which deter∣mine it. Now there is no material faculty which can separate the forms from the matter, nor from their subject, because the Act and the Power must be of the same gender, and that the Power which is material and composed, must have an Action which terminates in somewhat which is material and composed, as we have shewed in the first Part; And consequently the Imagination which is of that order, can form no universal Notion, since it cannot separate the forms from their subjects. Be∣sides, an universal notion supposeth an universal power, and an universal power is nor determined, at least in respect of particular things over which its universality extends. Now so it is, that all what is material, is absolutely determined, because its of the Maliciousness of the matter, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Aristotle says, to restrain all things which partici∣pate of it to its nature. And therefore the matter being absolutely singular and determined, there is no material power which can raise it self above sin∣gularity, or produce any notions which are not absolutely singular and determined

What shall we then say of those Images which represent so many several objects? Certainly they are not properly universal; for of three kind of things which are called so, to wit the causes which produce several effects, the signs which represent

divers things, and the Natures which are in several particulars, there are onely these latter which are essentially universal, because they are in no way singular, and that the unity which they have, hin∣ders them not from being in effect in many parti∣culars. Instead that the others are effectually sin∣gular, and altogether exterior to the things in re∣spect of which they are called universal; So that the image of the Kite which is in the Imagination of the Chick, and all the rest of that gender are one∣ly universal, as signs, or as examples, which may re∣present several objects, but not as Idea's of a com∣mon nature, which the Imagination conceives to be in divers particulars. Because there is but one universal faculty such as the Understanding is which can tan take away the singularity of things, and conceive in them at once both unity and plurality. And to speak to the truth, the images which are in the imagination are no more universal then a name would be which were given to several persons, or then a character in cypher which may serve to mark several numbers of the same species.

As for the Propositions she makes, neither are they properly universal; for to make them such, they must contain some notion which must be uni∣versal; now as this surpasseth the strength of the Imagination for the reasons before said, it follows, that it cannot also form any of these Propositions. And if it form any which seem to be of this na∣ture, we may say according to the language of the Schools, that they are universal onely materially and not formally. For its true, she may judge that all the objects she knows are good or ill, and

this judgment contains the matter of an universal proposition, but the form is wanting thereto, to wit, the totality and the union of all these objects: For the Imagination must know a whole difference from all it parts, and consequently must make an abstract thereof, which is beyond its power. These kind of Propositions are nothing but a mass of as many different judgments as there are objects. And when we assure that the Imagination makes them, its as much as to say, that she judgeth this ob∣ject to be good, that this also is so, and the other it is also &c. Yet without forming any general notion of all these objects, nor of the goodness she knows in them. And without doubt in these encounters she doth as when she knows a multitude, for she very well sees the first, the second, the third; in a word, all the parts which compose it, are by the senses known unto it. But she cannot form the no∣tion of a number which contains them all. Not that she knows not the number all entire, but it is but as we have said materially.

These are the illustrations which it was obliged to give, a Truth which I had so often presupposed, and which served as a Basis to the most important conclusions of my Discourse, I doubt not but it hath tired M. C. But he must think that I do not write this for his satisfaction, and that he is like to find far less in those things in which I shall not be of his opinion, then in these wherein we agree.