IT happened that the Romane Oratour, after the words he had heard from the Idiot concerning wisedome, was exceedingly stricken with admiration, and went unto him, whom when he had found lurking about the Temple of E∣ternity, he thus spake unto him.

O man most desired and looked for, help my weaknesse, that I may with some ease feed upon those difficulties which transcend my mind, and understanding: otherwise, it will Page  32little avail me to have heard from thee so ma∣ny high Speculations.

There is no difficultie more easie than to contemplate divine things, where the delight coincides with the difficul∣tie. But tell me, what is it thou desirest?

That thou wouldest tell me how (see∣ing God is greater than can be conceived) I ought to frame my conception of him?

As thou wouldst do of concep∣tion.

Explain thy self.

Thou hast heard how in every conception he that is unconceivable is conceived: there comes therefore a con∣ception from a conception, to him that is unconceivable.

How shall I then make a more pre∣cise conception?

Conceive precision; for God is ab∣solute precison it self.

What is then to be done by me, when I purpose to frame a right a conception of God?

Turn thy self unto rectitude or rightnesse.

And when I labour to frame a true conception of God, what must I then do?

Then bend thy mind upon Truth it self.

What if I mean to make a just con∣ception?

Turn thy self to justice.

And when I seek to make a good con∣ception, what must I then do?

Lift up the eyes of thy mind unto Goodnesse

I wonder whither it it that thou sendest me in all these cases?

See how easie the difficultie is in divine things, that it always offers it self to the seeker, in the same manner that it is sought for.

Without doubt there is nothing more wonderfull.

Every question concerning God, presupposeth the thing questioned; and that must be answered, which in every question concerning God, the question presupposeth: for God, although he be unsignifiable, is signified in every signi∣fication of terms.

Declare thy self more at large I pray thee; for I am so transported with wonders, that I can scarce hear what thou sayest.

Doth not the question, whether a thing be or no, presupprose the Entitie?

Yes.

Therefore when it is demanded of thee, whether God be, (or whether there be a God?) answer that which is presup∣posed, namely that he is; because that is the Entitie presupposed in the question. So, if any man shall ask thee, what is God? considering that this questi∣on presupposeth a quidditie to be; thou shalt answer, that God is absolute quid∣dity it self. And so of all things. Nor need there be any hesitation or doubt in this; for God is the absolute presuppo∣sition it self, of all things, which (after what manner soever) are presupposed, as in every effect the cause is presupposed. See therefore, Oratour, how easie Theo∣logicall difficulty is.

Certainly, this is a very, grrat and yet a stupendious facility.

Nay, I say unto thee, that God is infinite facility it self and it doth not a∣gree to God that he should be infinite difficulty; for it must needs be (as thou shalt hear anon of crooked and straight) that difficulty passe into facility, if it ought to agree to the infinite God.

If that which in every question is presupposed, be in divine matters an answerPage  35unto the question: then of God there can be no proper question, because the answer coincides with it.

It is a very good inference; and add unto it, that God being infinite straight∣nesse, and absolute necessity, a doubtfull question reacheth not him, but all doubt is in him certainty; whence we also in∣fer, that any answer unto any question concerning God, is not a proper and precise answer; for precision is not more than one and infinite, which is God: for every answer partakes of the absolute answer, which is infinitely precise. But what I said unto thee, how that in The∣ological questions, the presupposed is the answer, must be understood in the same manner that the question is made, and so taking it, this is sufficiencie; be∣cause whereas in God, neither the que∣stion, nor the answer to the question, can reach precision: therefore after the manner wherein the question approach∣eth to precision, in the same manner the answer presupposeth.

And this is our sufficiencie which we have of God, knowing that precision in∣attingible, cannot by us be reached, butPage  36after some manner that partakes the manner of absolute precision. Among the which, being divers and manifold, that partake the onely manner of preci∣sion, the foresaid manner comes near∣est unto absolute facility, and is our suffi∣ciency, because we cannot reach any o∣ther which is easier and truer.

Who would not be amazed at the hearing of these things? For whereas God is absolute incomprehensibility, thou sayest that comprehension comes so much the nearer unto him, by how much the manner thereof doth more partake of facility.

He that doth with me behold how absolute facility coincides with absolute incomprehensibility, cannot choose but say as I do. Whereupon I do constantly affirm, that by how much the universal manner to all questions formable of God shall be more easie, by so much more true, and more convenient it is, as position (or affirmation) agrees to God.

Make this somewhat more plain.

That is, as we admit some things may be spoken of God affirmatively: for in that Divinity which denies all things of God, we must speak otherwise; be∣causePage  37there the truer answer is to every question, a negation: yet by that means or manner, we are not led to the know∣ledge what God is, but what God is not.

There is moreover a consideration of God, as neither position, nor ablation (that is neither affirmation nor negati∣on) agrees unto him, but as he is above all position and ablation; and then the answer is, to deny affirmation, negation and copulation. As in case it should be demanded, Whether God be? according to the way of position, it must be an∣swered out of that which is presupposed, to wit, that he is, and that the very abso∣lute presupposed Entity: Bat accord∣ing to the way of ablation (or negati∣on) it must be answered, that he is not: when by that way, none of all those things that may be spoken, can agree to him that is unspeakable. But by the way, which is above all position and ablati∣on, it must be answered, that he is nei∣ther, to wit, absolute Entity; nor that he is not, nor both together (namely that he is and is not) but that he is above all. And now I think thou understand∣est what I mean.

I understand now that thou would∣est say, that in words using divinity, where we admit speeches of God, and the power of lan∣guage is not utterly excluded, there thou hast brought the sufficiency of difficult things, into the facility of the manner of forming truer Propositions concerning God.

Thou hast well apprehended it; for if I would lay open unto thee, the con∣ception which I have of God, my speech, if it must stand thee in stead, must needs be such as hath significative words, that so in the power of the word, which is alike known unto us both, I may lead thee to that which is sought; and that which is now sought, is God. And there∣fore this is Sermocinal, or word-using Divinity, whereby I endeavour, by the power of language to lead thee to God, the easiest: and truest way that I can.

Let us now, I pray thee, return to those things that were formerly premised by thee, and explain thou them in order. In the first place thou saidest, that the conception of conception (seeing God is the conception of con∣ception) is the conception of God. Now, is it not the mind which conceiveth?

Without the mind there is no con∣ception.

Seeing then to conceive belongs to the mind, certainly, to conceive an absolute conception, is nothing else but to conceive the Art of the absolute mind.

Go on, for thou art in the way.

But the art of the absolute mind, is no other thing then the form of all things for∣mable; So I see how the conception of concep∣tion is nothing else but the conception of the Idea of divine Art. If I say the truth, tell me so.

Thou speakest exceeding well; for absolute conception can be nothing else but the Ideal form of all things which can be conceived, which is the equality of all things formable.

This conception, as I think, is cal∣led the word of God, or the reason (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.)

Howsoever it be called by learned men, in that conception are all things. As we say, that those things which with∣out reason foregoing, come not into be∣ing, are formerly in reason; and all things which we conceive to be, have a reason of their being, that they may be after the manner in which they are, and no otherwise. Therefore he that looks with a profound mind, into the simpli∣cityPage  40of absolute reason, which by way of priortity, complicates all things in it self, he makes a conception of concepti∣on by it self, or absolute conception: and this was the first thing that I premi∣sed.

Enough of this: now go on to shew how the conception of absolute precision, it a more precise conception of God.

I am not now at leisure to repeat the same thing in every particular: nei∣ther do I see it to be so seasonable for thee, considering that by one, the way is opened for thee to all.

But take it notwithstanding, very brief∣ly Precision, straightnesse, truth, justice & goodnesse (of which thou hast heard) are the same thing: Yet do not beleeve that I mean, as all divinity is circular, one of the attributes verified of another; as we say, that from the necessity of Gods infinite simplicity, the greatnesse of God is his power, and back again, his power is his greatnesse: and so of all those things that are by us attributed to the essence of God. But these things of which I now speak, we find by experience, do coincide in our ordinary talk. ForPage  41when we hear any body expresse a thing as it is indeed, presently one sayes that the expresser did it precisely, another rightly, another truly, another justly, another well. And thus we find it true in our dayly speech. Neither doth he who said he did it precisely and rightly, mean any other thing, then he that said he expressed it truly, justly, and well. And this thou grantest in thy self to be true, when thou markest how he that said neither more nor lesse than he ought to have said, hath reached and at∣tained to all those; for precisenesse is no more to say than that which is nei∣ther more nor lesse. In the same manner neither right, nor true, nor just, nor good, admit either more or lesse; for how can that be precise, right, true, just, or good, that is lesse than precise, right, true, just, and good? And if that which is lesse than precise, be not pre∣cise, and lesse than right, be not right, and lesse than true, be not true, and lesse than just, be not just, and lesse than good, be not good; it is manifest, as well that which admitteth more, is none of these: for precision which admitteth more, toPage  42wit, which can be more precise, is not absolute precision. And so of right, true, just, and good.

In those things then, that admit more or lesse, there is no conception to be form'd concerning God.

Thou inferrest very well; for see∣ing God is infinite, those things that ad∣mit of more or lesse, are not like unto him. Wherefore in those things, one cannot ascend or descend into infinity, as we find by experience in number, and the division of a continued quantity.

Therefore in this world there is no precision, nor rightnesse, nor truth, nor justice, nor goodnesse, being we prove by tryal, that one thing is more precise than another, as one picture is preciser than another. So of right∣nesse; for one thing is righter than another, and one thing is truer than another, and one thing juster than another, and one thing bet∣ter than another.

Thou conceivest me well; for those things as they are absolute, and free from more or lesse, are not of this world. For there is nothing to be found so precise, that it cannot be preciser: and nothing so straight, that cannot bePage  43straighter: or so true, that cannot be truer: or so just, that cannot be juster: or so good, that cannot be better. That pecision therefore, that rightnesse, truth, justice, or goodnesse, which are to be found in this world, are certain partici∣pations of such absolutes, and images, of which those others are the samplars: samplars, I say, in the plural number, whilest we refer them to the divers rea∣sons, and forms of divers things; but they are indeed but one samplar, because they coincide in that which is absolute.

I long extreamly to hear thee concern∣ing this point, how there it but one absolute samplar of so great varieties of all things.

He that is but little conversant in these Theological Speculations, think∣eth this to be exceeding difficult: but to me there seemeth nothing more easie and delightfull; for the absolute sam∣plar, which is nothing but absolute pre∣cision, rightnesse, truth, justice, or good∣ness, complicates al exemplifiable things of which there can be any precision, rightnsse, truth, justice, and goodnesse, much more perfectly then thy face com∣plicates all the formable images there∣of, Page  44of all which it is the precision, rightnesse, and truth; for all the ima∣ges of thy face, which may be painted, are so far forth precise, right, and true, as they partake and imitate the living image of thy face. And although it be not possible that one of them should be painted just like the other, in all respect, without any manner of difference, seeing precision is not of this world, and that which is another thing, must needs be after another manner: yet of all those truths there is but one samplar.

Thou speakest well, as to the unity of the samplar, but not to the equality: For my face, although it be the measure of the Truth of the picture, because the picture is judged by the beholding of my face, how much, or how little it fails in the likenesse; yet it is not true, that my face is the most adaequate measure of them all, by every manner of mea∣sure; because it is alwayes either great∣er or lesser.

Thou sayest true of thy face; be∣cause it hath quantity, and being capa∣ble of more or lesse, it cannot be precisi∣on, neither the adequate measure of ano∣ther thing. For in this world wanting Page  45precision, & adequate measure; & like∣nesse is impossible. But if thou conceive an absolute samplar, it is otherwise; for that is neither great nor small, for these things cannot be of the reason (or for∣mality) of a samplar: for a Pismire being to be painted, is a samplar as well as a mountain that is to be painted, and so back again: therefore an absolute samplar, that is not capable of more or lesse, being precision and truth, cannot be either greater or lesse, than the exem∣plified: for that which cannot be lesse, we call the least, and that is most little; and that which cannot be greater, we call the greatest, that is the most great. Absolve therefore or free maximity or greatestnesse from that which is most little, or most great, that thou mayest see maximity in it self, and not con∣tracted in small or great, and thou shalt so see absolute maximity, before great and little, so that it cannot be greater or lesse, but is the greatest, in which the least coincides. Wherefore such a greatest as it is the absolute sam∣plar, cannot be either greater or less than any exemplified thing possible to be gi∣ven;Page  46and that which is neither greater nor, lesse, we call equal. Therefore the absolute samplar is equality, precision, measure, or justice, which is the same thing, truth and goodnesse, which is the perfection of all exemplifiable things.

Yet further, I pray thee, instruct me, how infinity doth agree with absolute rect∣itude, or rightnesse?

Very willingly: Thou knowest that by how much greater any circle is, so much greater is the Diameter there∣of.

I confesse it.

Well then, though a circle, which is capable of more and lesse, cannot be simply the greatest, or infinite; yet let us suppose such a circle to be infinite, shall not then the Diameter thereof be an infinite line?

It must of necessity be so.

And the circumference being infi∣nite shall be the Diameter; for two infi∣nites cannot be, seeing each of them, by the addition of the other, may be great∣er. And the circumference it self could not be crooked, for it were impossible itPage  47should be neither greater nor lesse than the Diameter, if it were crooked; See∣ing there is one and the same habitude (or proportion) of the crooked circum∣ferences of all circles to the Diameter, which is a habitude more than triple or threefold. If therefore the circumfe∣rence be equal to the Diameter, it shall also be the Diameter it self and a right line. For this caus also thou seest, how the Arc of a great circle, is liker to a right line than the Arc of a little circle: And therefore by this reason, the cir∣cumference of an infinite circle, must needs be right or straight: whence it is manifest, that crookednesse which is ca∣pable of more or lesse, is not found in the infinite, but onely rightnesse or straightnesse.

The things thou speakest do much please we, because they do very easily lift me up to that which I seek: proceed, I pray thee, to shew, how infinite straightnesse or rightnesse is the samplar.

This thou clearly discernest by thy self, that infinit rightnesse hath it self so (or is of the same habitude) to all things; as an infinite line, if there werePage  48any such, hath it self to all figures; for if infinite rightnesse, which is necessarily absolute, were contracted to a line, be∣ing contracted, it must needs be found the complication, precision, rightnesse, truth, measure and perfection of all fi∣gurable figures. Therefore absolute rightnesse being considered absolutely, and uncontractedly to any line, or any other thing whatsoever, is likewise ab∣solutely the samplar, precision, truth, measure and perfection of all things.

These things are no wayes subject to doubt, onely shew how an infinite line is the precision of all figures; thou toldest me Yesterday, how an infinite circle is the sam∣plar of all figures, and I understood it not, and willing to be more clearly informed of it, I came unto thee again, and now thou sayest an infinite line is precision, which I lesse under∣stand.

Thou hast heard how an infinite line is a circle, so a triangle, quadran∣gle, Pentagone; so all infinite figures co∣incide with an infinie line. Hereupon, an infinite line is the samplar of all fi∣gures which can be made of lines; be∣cause an infinite line is an infinite act or Page  49form of all formable figures. And when thou lookest upon a triangle, and liftest thy self up to an infinite line, thou shalt find it the most adequate samplar of this triangle; after this maner consider an in∣finite triangle, this infinit triangle is nei∣ther greater nor lesse than the aforesaid triangle. For the sides of an infinite trian∣gle are infinite, and an infinite side being the greatest, in which the less coincides, is neither greater nor lesse than the given side. So then the sides of an infinite tri∣angle, are neither greater, nor lesse than the sides of the given triangle. So nei∣ther the whole triangle is greater or lesse than the given triangle; wherefore it must needs be, that an infinite triangle is the precision, and absolute form of a finite triangle. But the three sides of an infinite triangle, must of necessity be one infinite line; because there cannot be many infinite lines: So it would come to passe, that an infinite line is the most precise samplar of the given triangle: and as I have said of a triangle, so likewise of all figures.

O wonderfull facility of difficult things! I see now that all these things doPage  50most evidently follow the position (or granting) of an infinite line; namely, that it is the sam∣plar, precision, rectitude, truth, measure or justice, goodnesse or perfection of all figures, fi∣gurable by a line. And I see that in the sim∣plicity of its straightnesse, all things figurable, are complicitely, most truly, formally, and pre∣cisely, without all confusion, or defect, infinite∣ly more perfectly than be they can figured.

Blessed be God, who hath used me, a most ignorant man, as an instru∣ment, such as it is, to open the eyes of thy mind for the beholding him with admirable easinesse, after the manner that he hath made himself visible unto thee; for when thou transferrest thy self from straightnesse contracted to a line, to ab∣solute infinite straightnesse, then in that straightnesse thou shalt see complicated, every thing formable, and the kinds of all things, as I have said before of figures. And thou shalt further see, how straight∣nesse it self is the samplar, precision, truth, measure or justice, goodnesse or perfection of all things, which are or can be; and the precise and unconfoun∣ded actuality of all things that are, or are possible to be made; so that to what∣soeverPage  51kind or thing being, thou turnest thine eyes, if thou lift up thy mind to infinite straightnesse, thou shalt find it the most precise, and no way defective exemplar truth thereof. As put the case thou see a man, which is straight, and a true man, thou shalt see that he is no∣thing else but that straightnesse, truth, measure and perfection, So contracted and terminated is a man. And if thou consider his straightnesse which is finite, and lift up thy self unto infinite straight∣nesse, thou shalt straight see how infinite and absolute straightnesse can be neither greater nor lesse than that straightnesse contracted to a man, whereby the man is a straight and true man, but is the tru∣est, justest, and best precision thereof. So infinite truth is the precision of finite truth; and absolutely infinite, the pre∣cision, measure, truth and perfection of every thing finite. And as we have said of a man, so understand of all things else.

Thus now thou hast that which is granted us to contemplate in eternall Wisdome, that thou mayest behold all things in a most simple rectitude, mostPage  52truly, precisely, unconfusedly, and per∣fectly, though in an Aenigmatical mean, without which the vision of God can∣not be in this world, until he shall grant, that without any shadow, he shall be made visible unto us. And this is the fa∣cility of the difficult things of wisdome, which according to thy fervour and de∣votion, God vouchsafe to make every day more clear both to thee and me, un∣till he translate us into the glorious fru∣ition of the truth, there to remain eter∣nally. Amen.