Uniformity in humane doctrinall ceremonies ungrounded on 1 Cor. 14.40. or, a reply unto Dr. Hammonds vindication of his grounds of uniformity from the 1 Cor. 14.40. By Henry Jeanes, minister of Gods word at Chedzoy:

Jeanes.

This is a modall Syllogisme, framed exactly according to the rules of Logick touching modall Syllogismes; as for that Syllogisme which you parallel unto it, it hath no alliance with it; for both the premises of mine are true, and the Minor of yours is grosly and palpably false; for unjust lawes are not, in propriety of speech, lawes, but are so termed only equivocally, as a painted, a dead man, is said to be a man: turpe praeceptum non est lex, sed in••quitas, for obligation is essentiall unto a law; now every law obligeth in the name of God, by authority derived from him, and the glorious name of God cannot oblige unto any thing that is unjust: the Fathers, Schoolmen and ancient Philosophers are all so unanimous in assert∣ing of this, and have for this their assertion such pregnant and convincing reasons, as that I cannot but wonder, that a man of your learning should be of an other opinion; but in your next we shall hear what arguments you have for your dissent: In the mean while, I shall desire the Reader to take notice of the wit∣nesses, and reasons produced, amongst many others, by Suarez, and Gregory de Valentia, for what I affirme,

1. Suarez de legib. lib. 1. cap. 9. De ratione, & essentia legis, est, inquit, ut praecipiat justa: Assertio est non solum certa secundum fidem, sed etiam clara secundum naturalem rationem. Et ita eam tradunt non solum Theologi, & Patres inferius alle∣gandi, sed etiam passim Philosophi &c. Verum tamen haec ipsa conditio dupliciter ex∣plicari potest, scilicet vel negative, ut scilicet quod praecipitur, nec injustum, nec turpe sit; vel positive, ut sit justum & honestum.

Conditio ergo hae•• praecipue intelligitur priori modo, & sic est evidens, alia vero rati∣one invenitur in legibus divinis, & aliter in humanis. In divinis enim ratio est recti∣••udo per essentiam divinae voluntatis. Est enim Deus summe bonus, & ideo non potest a∣liquid pravum praecipere. &c.

De legibus autem humanis, hoc fundatur in alio principio. Nam legislator humanus men habet voluntatem perfect••m, sicut Deus, & ideo quantum est ex se, & quoad factum, potest interdum iniqua praecipere, ut constat: non tamen habet potestatem ad obligandum per iniquas leges, & ideo licet iniqua praecipiat, tale praeceptum non est lex, quia vim, aut valorem ad obligandum non habet. &c.

Et ita est clara ratio assertion is, tum quia illa potestas, scilicet obligandi, est a Deo, quae tem a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt: Ergo est data in honum, & in aedificationem, non in ma∣lum, se•• in destructionem: Tum etiam quia nullus inferior potest obligare contra legem, & veluntatem superioris; sed lex praecipiens pravum actum est contra legem Dei prohibentis illum: Ergo non potest obligare, quia impossibile est, homines simul obligari ad agendum, & non agendum aliquid: s•• autem opus pravam est prohibitum lege d••vina, non potest lex inferioris tollere illam superioris obligationem: Ergo nee potest inducere saam: Ergo e∣jus lex tali opere non potest esse valida. Et de hac justitia legis loquebatur August, lib. 1. de libero arbit. cap. 5. cum dixit, mihi lex esse non videtur, quae justa non fuerit. Et de eadem intelligi potest, quod dicit lib. de vera relig. cap. 31. Conditor le∣gum temporalium, si vir bonus est & sapiens, legem consulit aeternam, ut secundum ejus in∣commutabiles regulas, quid sit pro tempore vitandum, jubendumque discernat. Vnde si∣cut lex aeterna solum justa praecipit, quia est i••sa justitia per essentiam, ita vero lex humanae esse debet participatio ejus, & ideo non potest valide praecipere, nis•• justa, & ho∣mesta, juxta illud Prov. 8. Per me Reges regnant, & legum conditores justa decernunt.

Atque hinc ulterius concluditur, hanc conditionem, etiam positive intellectam esse de ••••tione legis.; quamvis non uno & eodem modo singulis applicanda sit, &c.

Ex h••c assertione sic declarata duo inferre possumus. Vnum est ad illam maxime perti∣nere primam conditionem positam ab Isidoro, ••cilicet, ut lex sit honesta, quod ex ipsa vocis proprietate▪ satis pate••. &c.

Secundo infertur ex dictis, legem non habentem hanc justitiam, seu honestatem, non esse legem, neque obligare, ve••um etiam nec servari posse &c.

Unto this of Suarez I shall adde what Gregory de Valentia hath to the same pur∣pose, tom. 2. disp. 7. quaest. 1 punct. 3. Nomen legis mag•• prop••re significat rectam a∣liquam regulam praescribentem communitati alicui perfectae modum necessarium ad bonum ejusdem communitatis &c.

Atque hoe mod•• accipit D. Thomas legem, cum infra quaest. 96. art. 4, inquit leges iniquas magis esse violentias, quam leges. Item quaest. 90. art. 2 & 3. Vbi defin••t, le∣gem ad bonum commune ordinari, & ab eo, qui curam gerit communitatis ferri.

Sic etiam D. Augustinus lib. 1. de libero arbitrio cap. 5. leg••m accepit, cum dixit, legem non videri, quae justa non sit. In quam sententiam lib, 19. de civitate Dei, cap. 21. inquit etiam, non esse jura dicenda, vel putanda, iniqua hominum constituta, Atque etiam legem esse regulam aliquam rectam censuit Clemens Alexandrinus, lib. 1. Stro∣matum, cum dixit: legem esse opinionens bonam, & regulam justorum, & injustorum. I∣tem Plato in Dialogo primo de legibus, & in Epinome, ubi asseruit, finem legis esse De∣um & cultum ejus. Item Philosophus lib. 5. Ethi••or. cap. 1. inquiens, legalia justa esse factiva & conservativa falicitatis, omnium{que} elarissime Cicero lib. 2. de legitus: Constat, inquit, profecto adsalutem civium ••ivitatum{que} incolumitatem, vitamque quie∣tam, & beatam, conditas esse leges. Et post, cum dixisset eos, qui pernicio••a, & injusta populis jara descripsissent, quidvis aliud potius tulisse, quam leges, concludit, perspicuum esse in ipso no mine leges interpretando, inesse vim, atque sententiam justi, & juris co∣lendi.

By this you may see, that in your Syllogisme there are four termes, for lawes in the Minor are taken improperly and equ••vocally, in the conclusion properly and uni∣vocally; But custome in my Syllogisme, both in Minor and Conclusion, is taken properly and univocally, for custome is predicated univocally of the most undecent customes.

For farther justification of my Syllogisme I shall reduce it in like manner that Logicians reduce Syllogismes made in Baroco and Bocardo, to wit, with that re∣duction which is ad impossibile or per deductionem ad absurdum: I suppose, that you will grant my premises, for the minor you confesse in terminis in the next Section; And the Major cannot be denyed with any colour of reason; for the rule of decency is, in some so••t, an exemplary cause of decency, and it is impo∣ssible for the exemplary cause of decency to be undecent. Well then, I suppose, that you grant the premises, and only deny, that the inference of the conclusion from these premises is legitimate; if you grant the premises to be true, then you grant the Propositions, that are contradictory unto them, to be false, and hereupon it will follow, that if I take the contradictory of my Conclusion, and can thence, joyned with one of my premises conclude, that one of the premises which I sup∣pose, you grant, is false, hereby I shall convince you, that the principall conclusion, which is contradictory unto this, was true: The contradictory of my conclusion is, custome is the only rule of decency (I take contradictory largely, as some opposite propositions are said by Logicians, to be contradictory de lege) Now this I take and sub∣joyn unto my Major, and here hence I inferre the contradictory of my Minor, all which will make up this following Syllogisme.

It is impossible for the only rule of Decency to be undecent.

But Custome is the only rule of Decency.

Therefore it is impossible that any custome should be undecent.

But the conclusion is false, and, I suppose, that you grant the contradictory thereof. Now if ••he conclusion be false, one of the premises must needs be false; for, ex vero ••il nisi verum sequitur. Now 'tis not the Major, for I suppose, and that with very good reason, that it is granted by you, therefore '••••s the Minor: now the Minor is contradictory unto the conclusion which you deny, and there∣fore the conclusion, which you denyed, is true, viz. that Custome is not the on∣ly rule of decency: for of contradictory propositions both cannot be true, Con∣tradictio semper dividit verum à falso.

Thus you see my Syllogisme is demonstrated to be true, demonstratione ducente ad impossi••ile vel absurdum.

But for the fuller clearing of it, I shall propound and answer two objections, that I foresee may be made against it, by such as are not well skilled in Modal Syllogismes.

The first is, that the duo modi impossibile and possibile are repeated but once a peece in my Syllogisme, and in a good Syllogisme every term is to be put twice.

The answer unto this in breif is, that in a Modal Syllogisme, the modus is none of the terms, but onely a Syncategorematical word, so Vallius Introduct. Log. par. 3. cap. 12. In terminis, inquit, non numera tur modus sicut; enim in conversione propo∣sitionum modus non numeratur inter praedicata vel subjecta, sed est quid additum ill is, sie in Syllogismis modalibus, modus non numeratur inter terminos, unde etiam saepe in Syl∣logismo modali non potest inferri conclusio '••um modo, sed sine illo. The very same thing is taken notice of by Scheibl. concerning such Modal Syllogisms as consist of Modal compounded propofitions, Ihi enim inquit, quod modalis particula non habeat vel rationem subjecti, vel rationem praedicati; sed simpliciter habeat se ex parte copulae: inde clarum est, quod in istis modalibus Syllogismis, particula modalis ter poni potest, nempe in singulis taelium Syllogismorum partibus, veluti: Necesse est hominem esse animal. Necesse est Petrum esse hominem. Ergo necesse est Petrum esse animal. Hîc aio, particulam necesse, nec habere rationem praedicati, nec subjecti, sed esse ex parte copulae, quia in propositione, assumptione, & conclusione reperitur. At nullus terminus in Syllogismo ter poni••potest.

A second objection is, that in the Modal Syllogismes mentioned by Aristotle, this mixture or combination of impossibile and possibile is not at all mentioned.

For answer, Aristotle instanceth in Modal Syllogismes, wherein there is a mix∣ture of necesse and contingens, and Logicians generally hold that impossibile is re∣duced unto necessarium and possibile unto contingens. Let two speak for all.

1. The but now quoted Vallius in lib. 1. prior pag. 38. Impossibile. (inquit Phi∣lopenus) comprehenditur sub necessario, quia quod est necessarium, est impossibile ut non sit, sicut quia homo est necessario animal, impossibile est ut non sit animal: & eâdem ra∣tione quod est impossibile, est necessarium ut non sit. Similiter possibile comprehenditur sub contingenti, quod enim contingit esse, hoe fieri potest, ••eu est possibile, & quod potest non esse, contingit non esse: adeoque id, quod proprie vocatur possibile, concurrit cum contingenti. He quotes also for it, if my memory fail not, Burana affirming as much ex Alexandro.

The second Author is a late one read by every Fresh-man, Burgersdicius institut. Log. lib. 2. c. 14. Propositiones modi impossibile annumerantur propositionibus modi ne∣cesse; & propositiones modi possibile, iis quae sunt modi contingit.