A dissection of all governments: or, An answer to a pamphlet, entituled, The priviledges of the people, or, Principles of common right and freedome, briefly laid open and asserted in two chapters, &c. By W.J.

CHAP. I.

THat Kings out of vanity and self-interest have frequently misapplyed that power intrusted to them by God and man, I shall not at all deny (though that is not to be applyed to our late renowned King neither) but if this be a rule for the abolishing of Monarchy, it will be as infallible for the dissolution of all Government, since that ambition, avarice, revenge, and all other imperfections in our natures, which may be assigned to Kings, as causes of misgovernment, are upon the same account to be expected from the naturall or accidentall corruption of every particular person in a number of Rulers, when they once come to the power of throwing off their disgui∣ses, and securely prosecuting their own interests. And if every private man be subject to the same corrupt will that a King is, what will this amount to in a multitude of Governours, when every one hath a distinct self-interest (as much as a King) to pro∣vide for, not only of his own Family, but of all others his friends and allies, whose fortunes must be made up out of the publique

stock, besides the prejudice (if not ruine) of those particular fa∣milies that shall happen to have any controversies with them or any of their dependents, from the highest to the lowest. And what a transcendent tyranny this must necessarily be, when every Member hath the power of a King, to delay the justice of the poor people (if not totally to obstruct it) I need go no further for an example then this present Parliament, which was a free e∣lection of as many supposed Patriots (as least enemies to Prero∣gative) as ever met together, and yet how soon, and to what an excesse of corruption, faction, and arbitrary power they grew (even in those things they had formerly complained of) is too evident to need any proof. There are too many wofull examples of people imprisoned without hearing for Delinquents, upon the least malicious suggestion or misinformation of their factious neighbours (from whom no quiet people can be free) that have not so much as in their language appeared for the King or his Party; Besides the tyring of the poorer sort with a chargeable attendance, to the losse of their rights, for want of money or friends, or else because they must not be heard against the well-effected, that is, those of their faction and kindred. And the fre∣quent bespeaking of Parliament-men for friends in businesses, be they right or wrong, who were quickly perswaded not only to do courtesies in that kind for their dependents, but for one a∣nother, and the active malice of one enemy to a poor Plaintife that can propose any thing to cause debates, and by consequence delay (which is the inseparable infirmity of all great Councells) shall (with the help of his faction) at any time hinder the course of Justice, if by an unjust sentence they do not rob men of their rights. To these naturall (and notorious known corruptions) both in this, and all other great Councells, bribery may very well be added, since I think it will not be denyed but the major part of mankind (if they be not positively dishonest) are to be obliquely led unto it by hope, fear or some error of judgement, and if so, what a fine game have the dishonester (who must ne∣cessarily be the craftier sort) to play, amongst a company of more plainde-aling, honest, foolish and cowardly people; we have found to our cost how well they can inrich themselves, and upon what really specious pretences, at least such as appear so to

the humours of those they have to deal withall. But it will be al∣ledged that (though a body once corrupt is not to be restored) as appears by the foulnesse of our present Parliament after so many purges; yet most of the foregoing inconveniences are to be prevented by due Elections and often changing of the Repre∣sentatives. To this I shall give a more satisfactory Answer in it's proper place in the following Chapter. But for the present I shall only say, that I am confident that there will never be a more free and impartiall Election of any Representative then was original∣ly of this Parliament, at least whilst there is any Army in the Kingdome; And yet we see how they have proved. And to say truth there is no Government in the world that is not subject to much depravation; but since the worst of Governments is a shelter from the storme of confusion, (that many headed tyran∣ny, that bears down all property before it,) we ought undoubt∣edly to chuse that least of evills which is freest from a generall oppression, and is the best established bay or protection from that universall inundation of ruine, called the liberty (though not the property) of the people, to do what they list, and be Judges not only of their own established Judges, upon the suddain moti∣on of any springing faction amongst them, but of all controver∣sies amongst themselves, according to the strength of their seve∣rall factions necessarily growing from the inconstancy, and varie∣ty of their particular opinions and interests.

But to conclude my Answer to this first Chapter, I think I need no farther inlarge my self; if it be granted that the avarice of one Family with its Councellors, allies and dependents of all kinds, may better be satisfied at the publique charge of a Kingdome, then of four hundred interests with the same apurtenances; and if it be as certain that ten men may resolve as wisely of any busi∣nesse as any number whatsoever, (especially in the administrati∣on of Justice according to known rules,) no doubt, for the ease of the Subject in their dispatch, the convenience is so great as al∣most to ballance all other discommodities; besides if they must be bribed, lesse money will serve, as we have shewed, and they will in time be glutted, and if it be no lesse clear in poli∣tique affairs that (for the secret and suddain dispatch of them) the number must be reduced to a few, as appears by the State

Committee at Darby-house, who have a greater trust reposed in them, and do daily act things of greater consequence to the King∣dome (without giving any account of them) then all the great Councell besides: and if the rule be the same for the Govern∣ment of an Army by a Generall, who is an absolute Monarch, with such of his Councell as he pleaseth only to call, and that the maintenance of all Lawes and Rights must depend upon this or some such like arbitrary power, as too sadly now appears; then I say we may clearly and safely conclude, that it holds throughout for a certain truth, that a perpetuall Monarchy though with the worst of Kings, is a more easie & commodious Government, then a perpetuall Parliament, or Representative, and by consequence elective and alterable, Kings are by the same measure to be pre∣ferred before a changeable Representative or Parliament. Now whether an hereditary or elective Monarchy be to be preferred, or a mixt Government, will properly be the subject of my Answer to the following Chapter, being the last, and intituled,