The grand prerogative of humane nature: namely, the souls naturall or native immortality, and freedome from corruption, shewed by many arguments, and also defended against the rash and rude conceptions of a late presumptuous authour, who hath adventured to impugne it. By G.H. Gent.

A Peripatetick Disquisition touching the Rationall Soul's Immortality, whether it be Natu∣turall to it, or no.

THis intellectuall substance, the Soul, which is our Intelligencer for all things abroad, being shut up here in an obscure prison of a corruptible body, doth not without great difficulty know it self, and learn out what kinde of entity it is, corporeall or spirituall, corruptible or free from corruption. Hence arose so many varieties of opinions, and even amongst those who asserted immortality, so many degrees thereof. Dicaearchus, a Peri∣patetick Philosopher of Sicily, was of opinion that men had no souls at all; but notwithstanding this, the soul being a∣shamed to be so grossely ignorant, as to deny it self, this man was left alone and had no followers. Epicurus, Lucretius, and Pliny granted man a soul but denied the immortality of it, condemning it to a death perpetuall: which impious asser∣tion hath been refuted by all the best Philosophers, of Plato's, Pythagora's, Zeno's, and Aristotle's School also, excepting Alexander, and some very few of no note. Amongst those that admitted a perpetuity to the soul, some did it with an in∣termission, as namely, the Hereticks called Arabici, who, as Georgius Syncellus in his Chronicle now newly published, anno Christi 237, testifieth, did, im∣piously hold the soul in the hour of death to pe∣rish with the body, and again, both of them to be revived at the resurrection; concerning which point a famous Synod was assembled. The same errour is largely shewed of them by Abraham Ecchellensis in his Historiae Orientalis sup∣plemento, where he describeth the customes and doctrines of the Arabians. Now it is manifest that during the interim between death and the resurrection, the soul is in being, is alive and also awake, by those reasons that do prove the im∣mortality,

simplicity and immateriality of it; as also by ap∣paritions of them, of which the Christian Histories are full; and it is justified by Eustratius, a Priest of S. Sophia, in his Tract remembred by Photius in his Bibliothecae, wherein he affirms that souls do appear really, and not good or evil An∣gels in their places; and lastly, the same is confirmed even by Ethnick Histories, as for example, by that which Phlegon Trallianus, in his Book de mirabilibus & longaevis, relates, first, of Polycrates, & after of Philinion; by the appearing of Apollonius Tyanaeus after his death to his scholars, assuring them of the souls incorruptibility, about which they had been doubtfull and disputing, if we may believe Philostratus, who writ his life; by the apparition of a Ghost to Athenodorus, recorded by Pliny in his Epistles; and last of all, by Plu∣tarch, out of whom Georgius Monachus Syncellus relateth this notable following History, Chronogr. anno Christi 37. & Caligulae 3.

Caius Caligula, saith he, also slew Julius Canus the Stoick Philosopher, of whom the Greeks relate a fiction beyond all credit, namely, that he being led to dy, is reported to have foretold to one Antiochus, a Seleucian who followed him, with a minde undi∣sturbed, that the night following he would be with him, and deal about a question worth the discussing, and more∣over that Rectus, another of his fellowes, should be slain by Caius within three dayes, all which the event proved to be true, he being slain within that space; Antiochus relating what he had seen by night, and that he had beheld Canus, who had disputed with him concerning the immortality of the soul, and the passage of it after death unto a purer light.

Thus Syncellus: which relation I see no reason why he should hold to be a fiction. Averroës (as we use to call him) grants a soul that is spirituall and immortall, yet grants but one, and that one to be common unto all mankind. This phantasie of his is generally exploded as absurd, and convinced for such by Albertus Magnus in his Summe, and S. Thomas in his

other Summe contra Gent. as also by divers others, and there∣fore needs not to be considered anew. The generall Tenet of all classicall Philosophers and the better sort of Christians is, that the soul is spirituall, immortall, and incorruptible, and that there be as many individualls thereof as there be men, yea and besides, that this incorruptibility thereof is not of meer grace, and bestowed on it after the creation, but contra∣riwise of nature, and involved within the principles of consti∣tution. Sennertus in his Paralip. holds it to be a perfection added to the nature merely out of favour, and in favour of his opinion cites Damascen. l. 2. c. 3. but cites the greek text lamely; and Stapulensis is mistaken wholly in his translation; for Damascen doth not say there, as they impose upon him, that Angels be incorruptible, not by nature but by grace, but rather the quite contrary, namely, That they by grace or fa∣vour have a nature that is immortall, for so the Greek Text hath it. By which words he teacheth us, that they have their nature, not by right, or of themselves, but by grace, as all other creatures have, and their immortality from nature, as all other creatures have not: according to which account Angels are immortall by nature, that is to say, by a favour antecedent to their naturall being, and not subsequent unto it. For the better clearing of which verity, let us consider what is properly meant or signified by this terme incorruptible, or immortall.

I note then that of this terme there are three different ac∣ceptions; one proper, but not ordinary; a second both proper and ordinary; a third neither proper nor ordinary. Immortality in the first sense is supereminent, that is to say, such a one as hath so firm principles of constitution as be su∣periour to any agency, and therefore whatsoever is thus im∣mortall can neither be dissolved, nor annihilated. And this kinde of superexcellent immortality is proper unto God a∣lone, and no created entity can lay any claim unto it; and therefore 1 Tim. 6. he is called Solus immortalis &c. and of

this we are not in this place to entreat. In the second sense an entity is called immortall, when as the principles, though they be not proof against the power that can annihilate, yet are not subject to dissolution or corruption, & therefore being once produced are to remain ever, there being no reason why the cause that preserves them should at any time withdraw his sovereign influence, nor any second can do them harm, and so they are safe on both sides, whatsoever Arriaga imagineth to the contrary. Immortality taken in this sense is properly so, and this is the usuall signification of the word, and again in this sense it is to be understood, except some other terme or some circumstance do shew the contrary. The third & last ac∣ception is when it is ascribed to such things which, although according to the naturall principles they ly exposed to destru∣ction, either by annihilation or corruption, yet are continu∣ed by the favour of some externall preservatour. This im∣proper kind of immortality our bodies should have enjoyed before the fall of Adam, and shall after the resurrection; and it is rather a contingent perpetuity than any naturall immu∣nity from mortality and corruption, so that a body in that state is still corruptible, though not corrumpendum. This difference of acception of the terme being noted, I observe that our businesse here is not to inquire in the first, or third sense about the souls incorruptibility, but in the second onely, as namely, whether it be incorruptible according to the exi∣gence and virtue of the naturall principles of constitution, without recourse to externall courtesie or favour. The que∣stion being stated on this sort, it appeares thereby that we are not to dispute point-black the souls immortality, but, presup∣posing it to be immortall some way or other, whether that same immortality be an endowment that is naturall.

Pomponatius and Sennertus will not grant it to be natu∣rall; and now lately one Mr. Hobbes, in a prodigious vo∣lume of his, called by him as prodigiously Leviathan, is of opinion that no other immortality of the soul can be pro∣ved

out of Scripture, if any at all can, besides that one of the lowest classe, which is of grace and favour merely.

For eviction of the contrary both out of reason and Scripture, I note first, that the soul of man is an entity or substance intellectuall; and secondly, that every such entity is capable of a true felicity, and is unquiet untill it do attain thereunto; and thirdly, that every such sublimer entity is made in a manner for it self, that is to say, as Adam Godham judgeth, 1. Sent. q. 2. some way or other to enjoy its own being, and to be settled in a full possession of it self, reserving alwayes the subordination to the supremest entity, and a con∣tinuall dependence thereupon. This appears plainly, because the whole species of man, that is to say, all mankinde, doth earnestly desire felicity & the fruition of a good so great as may give it a full content & satisfaction, after a subordinate way, for the pleasing and rejoicing of it self. In this limited sense the doctrine of Eudoxus Gnidius and of Epicurus, subscribed lately and explained by Gassendus, seems to draw very near the truth, namely, that mans felicity did consist in some high and refined pleasure, not corporeal, but such as is intellectuall and pure: from which opinion Aristotle and Albertus in their Ethicks seem not to dissent, and Aureolus is of the same mind with them. In relation to this same contenting of our selves, Aristotle describes humane felicity in generall terms, without including God in any other terms then those of the sublimest entitie. And though in reality it be God that is our Summum bonum, and is that goodnesse onely which can make us happy, and moreover, that we stand bound to love him above our selves, to observe and please him, yea, even although we were to reap no benefit thereby; yet never∣thelesse, such a transcendent relation we have unto felicity and content, under that very title, as that abstracting from whether there were a God or no, we should as earnestly de∣fire to be happy and to enjoy our selves as we now do: and again, as we desire to please God in all we do and suffer and

are, so also we do desire felicity for the pleasing of our selves, yea even independently upon any other consideration, and so, although we were principally made for God, yet secon∣datily and subordinately we were made for our selves, and therefore for our selves, because we were made intel∣lectuall.

I argue then from hence as followeth. Every entity fra∣med for the enjoying of it self, and so for it self, is to be per∣petuall, according to the exigence of nature. But such is the reasonable soul, and every nature intellectuall. Ergo, the rationall soul and every nature intellectuall are to be per∣petuall according to the exigence of nature. I say, according to the exigence of nature, and not according to any act of grace, because if we were not so, then had not the efficient wrought consequently to himself and to his own ends. Wherefore seeing the skilful architect of Nature knows how to work conformably to the rules of reason, and to proportion his work unto the end for which he made it, it followes hence, that every rationall soul, or substance intellectuall, is by the order of nature made up immortall and incorruptible.

And this consequence is therefore good, because it is essen∣tiall to felicity to be perpetuall, and to be an endlesse state of everlasting joy, and therefore the subject in which this joy is to reside cannot be otherwise then naturally perpetuall. Morcover, seeing it is our soul which is directly & per sc pro∣portioned to felicity, and capable thereof, and our bodies onely indirectly and as it were by accident, therefore immor∣tality belongeth primarily to the soul, and to the body onely by a sequel. And so we argue here in conformity to that we should in other cases not unlike to this; as for example, upon a supposall made that the sun was created to enlighten the earth perpetually, we should conclude from thence that is was framed of a nature and body incorruptible.

Now further, that perpetuity is of the very essence of felicity, or, at the least, an inseparable companion thereof,

Reason it self doth teach us, & our Divines do shew it plainly, as by name, Aquinas, 1. p.q. 44. a. 3. and 1.2. q. 5. a. 4. & l. 3. cont. Gent. c. 62. Albertus, seu Aegidius, in compend. l. 2. Va∣lentia tom. 2. d. 1. q. 5. p. 6. Lessins l. 3. de summ. bono c. ult. E∣stius 4. d. 49. &, as I perswade my self, Paravicinus l. de Bono, and all the rest: forasmuch as, of a certain, true felicity ought to be devoid of care & sorrow, & then, seeing that which we possesse with delight, we cannot relinquish without sorrow, & again, what we love we cannot enjoy contentedly without our being assured not to lose it, forasmuch as the onely dread or suspicion of being deprived thereof causes sorrow, and is afflictive to the heart, even as well, though not as much, as the losse it self. And for this there is great reason, because we do not desire alone that good which is felicity, but besides to have it alwayes, and to be assured of it, and therefore we are unsatisfied and in pain unlesse we be really happy, and with∣all assured so to continue. Of so large a capacity is the spirit of man, as that it resteth not in that alone which is present to it, but besides, with swift-wing'd thoughts and flying affe∣ctions overtakes the future, and thereafter as that same is ap∣prehended to be, good or bad, pleasing or unpleasant, draws from it either comfort or affliction.

But why is it that a man cannot be happy for a season, as well as miserable for a season? Jo. Pontius, a late Philoso∣pher and follower of Scotus, is of opinion that he may; for so he determineth q. 6. Ethic. con. 3. n. 28. to whom I can by no means assent, because as Cicero and Boetius do define, Felicity is such a state and such a good as fully satiates, and i•• replenished with all that is justly desirable. It is, saith Cice∣ro, l. 3. Tuscul. Secretis malis omnibus cumulata bonorum complexio: And Boetius, l. 3. consol. pros. 2. Status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Wherefore it must consist either in all severall goods together, or else in some one that conteins and countervails them all. Wherefore though a man who is miserable now may be happy afterwards, yet

he who is happy now can never be miserable afterwards, be∣cause happinesse that is in being now excludes misery both present and future; but, contrariwise, misery that is now in being, although it excludes a present happinesse, yet not a happinesse to come. The reason of which disparity is, because a true and perfect happinesse includes essentially, as we shewed before, all good things, of which number a se∣cured perpetuity is one, as on the contrary side every state of misery does not of necessity include all evill things, or all the causes of infelicity, and therefore not any perpetuity of them; and for this reason it is that there is no repugnance why it may not have an end, forasmuch as S. Dionysius de∣fineth, Bonum est ex integra causa, malum ex quocunque de∣fectu; seeing that more is required to the constitution of fe∣licity then to the destruction or abolition of it, more to an efficiency then to a deficiency: and so consequently, although felicity cannot subsist without a perpetuity, yet infelicity may, contrarily to that which Pontius imagined. And al∣though felicity be the same for a day that it is for a yeare, or for ever, considering only the Physicall entity thereof; yet considering the whole value and morall estimation there∣of, it is not so, because an endlesse duration accruing to the possession of any good thing doth raise the value of it and the just esteem; as contrariwise, the same duration ac∣cruing to an evill doth make it infinitly worse and more af∣flictive: for which cause a good which is perpetual & known for such, may satiate, when being but for a time it cannot.

As for brute beasts, whatsoever M^r. Hobbes conceives unto the contrary, they have neither sense nor capacity of a pre∣sent happinesse, nor knowledge of a future. And no other in former ages, that I have heard of, besides the false Pro∣phet Mahomet, ever asserted any happinesse to beasts; whereas, on the contrary part, according to good Philo∣sophy, beasts neither have any happinesse, nor do desire it. Ignoti nulla cupido. No Animal, saith Aristotle l. 10.

Eth. c. 8. & apnd Andronicum, 10. devoid of reason can be partaker of felicity, because wholly destitute of the faculty contemplative. The life of God is happy alto∣gether, and of man also, so farre forth as he resembles him and participates of his vigorousnesse. No other Animal is happy, because not communicating of the hability to con∣template. Such as be able to contemplate be capable of se∣licity, and the more able to contemplate, the more happy they may be; and felicity extends it self as farre as that and this, not by accident, but per se.

Thus he. The true reason then why beasts can have no happinesse is, because they cannot possesse nor enjoy themselves, for want of an understanding spirit within them; and so properly speaking, though they can be or not be, yet can they not have any thing at all, nor, contrariwise, lose any thing, and so neither be rich nor poore, happy nor miserable.

I argue again to the same intent. Such as the operations of the soul be, such is the nature of it; and therefore all the proofs for immortality drawn from the natural operations do prove the soul to be immortall naturally, if they prove any thing at all, as most wise Philosophers do conceive they do.

I prove the same out of holy Scripture against the asser∣tion of Leviathan. It is confest the Scripture saith the soul of man is immortall & doth live after death, not adding any where that this same immortality is out of grace of favour; therefore, in effect, it sayes every where, when it speaks of that point, that it is immortall naturally. The Antecedent is certain by the survey of those severall places cited by Va∣lentia, the Conimbricenses & Nic. Baius. The consequence I prove to be a good one therefore, because words are ever to be understood in their usuall and proper signification, except some adjoyning words or circumstances of the speaker do imply the contrary. But in the Scripture, wheresoever it teaches the immortality of the soul, there is no such word or circumstance. Ergo, they are to be understood of such an in∣corruptibility

as is naturall, because that onely is the usuall meaning of such words as signifie an immortality: as the term man uttered without limitation simply, is to be under∣stood for a reall and naturall man, and not for a painted one or metaphoricall.

To this I adde, that the verity of the soul's immortall na∣ture is not attested singly and simply, but besides as a cer∣tainty and a verity not to be called into question, even ab∣stracting from those Philosophicall arguments commonly brought to prove it be demonstrative or no; certainly their form, at least, is demonstrative, because drawn ab effectis. Thus much is in substance asserted by Aureolus, 2. dist. 19.

That the soul, saith he, is immortall, is a doctrine of saith to be held most firmely, and is also the common conception of our understanding, and a verity that is evident, although it be not so easy to finde out a reason for it: divers of those which are brought be not concluding.

Thus pronounceth he concerning the certainty of this doctrine, even in case the arguments for it should not be thought convincing. And that it may be so, stands with great reason, because we are very sure of many naturall verities, for which, neverthelesse, we are not able to render any such reason as is compelling or de∣monstrative; for we do not learn all we know by the force of formall arguments or syllogismes, but rather by vir∣tual proofs, and a secret intelligence settled by nature betwixt our mindes and truth. Yet this I do not say as if I did not judge the reasons for immortality to be efficacious, but only to prevent evasions, and in particular that one of Pontius, who in the place before cited ventures to affirme that the immor∣tality of the soul is not known for a certainty by the force of naturall reason, therefore because he holds that the arguments brought in favour of it do not convince: which assertion of his is not onely a disparagement of so noble and fundamen∣tall a truth, but besides seems very false, and gives no small offense: because, admitting the arguments for it were as not∣convincing

as he himself pretends, yet neverthelesse the truth it self may be very certain, even by naturall reason, as Au∣reolus, a very great Master, before hath signified; and if it had not been so, how could all nations have conspired about it? And that they have done so, we may finde both by the perusall of the Ethnick writers, as also by the collections of Eugubinus l. 9. de Perenni Philosophia, & Menasse Ben Israel l. de Resurrectione c. 8. Moreover, as infirme as Pon∣tius judges the Arguments to be, yet was not he able to give them any good Solutions, although he endeavoured to do it, and besides, did not put them home, as may be perceived by any indifferent survey. The reasons however disparaged will be able to justify themselves, and the easier, because such as do undervalue and impugne them are driven into such streits, as they are enforced to call in question sundry fun∣damental Truths which are acknowledged generally for cer∣tain and evident; as for example, That there is one Rectour of mankinde, who, according to justice, will reward and punish; secondly, That the generall conceptions of humane understanding are true; thirdly, That the universal appe∣tite of humane nature is rational, and also possible to be satis∣fied. These and such like, although they doe not deny them to be true, yet they will not grant them to be evident. A∣gainst such dangerous rocks as these are they driven who will not yield that the reasons brought to prove the immortality be concluding; from which inconvenience the other side of clas∣sical Doctours are very safe and free. As for Holkot in Say. cap. 2. lect. 14. although he does not magnify those rea∣sons which are usually urged for this immortality, affirming of them that they do not presse more then those other doe which are commonly produced against the possible eternity of the world; yet he himself confesses them to be good, though not demonstrative, adding three arguments of his own, and also acknowledging that this same immortalitie is a doctrine delivered by the chiefest of the Philosophets, maintained by

the Catholick writers, and proved for a truth by miracles in∣numerable. Now, admitting these arguments to be no lesse efficacious then those other against the eternity, this cannot prejudice them much, because many men of great learning and judgement are of opinion that these against the eternity be not onely good, but also demonstrations. Moreover, al∣lowing these for immortality be not, in rigour, demonstra∣tions, yet all particulars being cast up, we shall finde that men generally do give a constant assent to sundry naturall verities upon lesse evidence then these.

Concerning Pomponatius, we are to understand that he was troubled in conscience for what he formerly had writ∣ten in prejudice of immortality, and therefore, like a good Christian, did not onely relinquish that errour of his, but besides made sute by a letter to Javellus, a person of emi∣nent learning, that he would be pleased to give the world which he had abused a satisfaction for him, which at his request was done accordingly, as appeares by the said Ja∣vellus his learned work now exant, De indeficientia animae, in which tract remaines inserted a copie of the letter which Pomponatius wrote unto him for that end.

For the compleating of this businesse in hand, I note, that the Philosophers who lived before Christ had much greater difficulty for their embracing this capitall Truth of immortality, then those other who flourished after, by rea∣son that they were destitute of all other light then what blind Gentilisme had left them, and therefore might not easily perceive but that, as it was ordinarily voiced, Mors ultima linea rerum; which saying was erected like the pillars of Hercules, with this solemn inscription engraven upon them, Nil ultra, as if beyond those there was no region habi∣table: and besides, it was hard to believe, as Pliny speaketh l. 7. c. 55. Iterari vitam à morte, insomuch as they ought to have been arguments well steeled that should be of power sufficient to force theirway through the brazen wall of

death, and to rear up a huge pile or fabrick of another life after corruption and rottennesse, of which life they could per∣ceive few or no signes appearing in the world. Wherefore, although the arguments for immortality were very weighty, yet they having such a strong barre laid to crosse their way, no marvell if sundry of those Ancients should be brought unto a stand, and the arguments, as forcible as they were, be∣nummed, and though not killed, yet cast into a slumber. For, indeed, because men then knew not how to dispose of souls after their separation from the body, therefore they might have license granted them to speak doubtfully, not knowing what to determine, or to say nothing at all, either pro or contra. Some few we finde did contradict, as by name Epicurus and Lucretius: yet notwithstanding this maine obstacle, the generall sense of the world was for the immortality, and much more then when the other hemi∣sphere of life came creditably to be discovered by the Mes∣sias, for at that time those old reasons for immortality awaked, and recovered their naturall vigour and vivacity; and no wonder, because this truth of immortality and that other of a life to come are mutuall inductives one unto the other, and conspire so friendly, as whosoever denies either of them, doth disparage and weaken the other; and again, they give so great aides to each other, as that the notice of an∣other life made ready way for the entertainment of immor∣tality, and contrariwise, the doctrine of immortality added reputation to the doctrine of the other life. Moreover, The incorruptible nature of the reasonable soul; The state of felicity or infelicity in a life to come; That God is the high Rectour of the Universe, extends his providence over all, and is a just and bountifull rewarder; be all of them symbolizing verities and of a strict confederacy both offensive and defensive, and so can hardly be over∣thrown.

I conclude this small labour as Pythagoras and Philolaus

concluded their golden verses, wherein the ancient doctrine is declared plainly,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Sic ubi, deposito jam corpore, libera coeli Templa penetrâris, Deus immortalis, & omni Spretus ab illuvie terrarum, eris integer avi.

And having once laid down our dust, Through spacious aiery Lawnes we must, And free in those large circles move, Immortall, like the Gods above.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Hie∣rocles the Commentatour, limiting and qualifying the higher expression of the verse, by admonishing his reader, that albeit Gods we must be, yet not simply and absolutely, as the words do sound, but onely so farre forth as it is possi∣ble for a separated soul to be.

FINIS.

Notes

• Parisii•• 1652. ex typographia Regia.