The necessity of the absolute power of all kings

THE NECESSITY OF The Absolute Power of all KINGS: AND In particular, of the KING of ENGLAND.

TO Majesty or Soveraignty belongeth an Abso∣lute Power not subject to any Law. It behoveth him that is a Soveraign, not to be in any sort subject to the command of another; whose of∣fice is to give Lawes unto his subjects, to abro∣gate Lawes unprofitable, and in their stead to establish other, which he cannot do, that is him∣selfe subject to Lawes; or to others which have command over him: And that is it for which the Law saith, that The Prince is acquitted from the Power of the Lawes.

The Lawes, Ordinances, Letters Patents, Priviledges, and Grants of Princes, have no force but during their life; if they be

not ratified by the expresse consent, or at least by sufferance of the Prince following, who had knowledge thereof.

If the Soveraigne Prince be exempted from the Lawes of his Predecessours, much lesse shall he be bound unto the Lawes he maketh himselfe; for a man may wel receive a Law from another man, but impossible it is in Nature for to give a Law unto him∣selfe, no more then it is to command a mans selfe in a matter de∣pending of his own will; There can be no Obligation which taketh State from the meer will of him that promiseth the same; which is a necessary reason to prove evidently that a King cannot bind his own hands, albeit that he would: We see also in the end of all Laws these words, Because it hath so pleased us. To give us to un∣derstand, that the Lawes of a Soveraign Prince although they be grounded upon reason, yet depend upon nothing but his meer & frank good will. But as for the Lawes of God, all Princes and people are unto them subject; neither is it in their power to im∣pugne them, if they wil not be guilty of High Treason against God; under the greatnesse of whom, all Monarchs of the world ought to bow their heads in all feare and Reverence.

Question may be, Whether a Prince be subject to the Lawes of his Countrey that he hath sworn to keep or not? If a Soveraign Prince promise by Oath to his subjects to keep the Lawes, he is bound to keep them; not for that a Prince is bound to keep his Lawes, or by his Predecessours, but to the just Conventions and promi∣ses which he hath made; be it by Oath, or without any Oath at all, as should a private man be; and for the same causes that a private man may be relieved from his unjust and unreasonable promise, as for that it was so grievous, or for that he was by de∣ceit or fraud circumvented, or induced thereunto by error, or force, or just feare, or by some great hurt: Even for the same causes the Prince may be restored in that which toucheth the di∣minishing of his Majesty: And so our Maxime resteth, that the Prince is not subject to his Lawes, nor to the Lawes of his Predeces∣sours, but well to his owne just and reasonable Conventions.

The Soveraigne Prince may derogate unto the Lawes that he hath promised and sworne to keep, if the equity thereof cease, and that of himselfe, without consent of his subjects; which his

subjects cannot do among themselves, if they be not by the Prince relieved.

The forraign Princes wel advised, will never take Oath to keep the Lawes of their Predecessours, for otherwise they are not Soveraignes.

Notwithstanding all Oaths, the Prince may derogate from the Lawes, or frustrate or disanul the same, the Reason and equity of them ceasing.

There is not any bond for the Soveraign Prince to keep the Lawes, more then so farre as Right and Justice requireth.

Neither is it to be found that the Ancient Kings of the He∣brewes tooke any Oathes, no not they which were anointed by Samuel, Elias, and others.

As for General and particular, which concerne the Right of men in private, they have not used to be otherwise changed, but after General assembly of the three estates in France; not for that it is necessary for the King to rest on their advice, or that he may not do the contrary to that they demand, if naturall Reason and Justice so require. And in that the greatnesse and Majesty of a true Soveraigne Prince is to be known, when the estates of all the people assembled together in all humility, present their requests and supplications to their Prince, without having any Power in any thing to command, or determine, or to give voice, but that that which it pleaseth the King to like or dislike, to command or forbid, is holden for Law. Wherein they which have written of the duty of Magistrates, have deceived themselves, in maintain∣ing that the Power of the people is greater then the Prince; a thing which oft times causeth the true Subjects to revolt from the obedience which they owe unto their Soveraign Prince, and ministreth matter of great troubles in Common-wealths; of which their opinion, there is neither reason nor ground.

If the King should be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people, he should neither be King nor Soveraign, and the Common-wealth neither Realme nor Monarchy; but a meer A∣ristocracie of many Lords in Power equal, where the greater part commandeth the lesse; and whereon the Lawes are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth, but in the name and

Authority of the estates, as in an Aristocraticall Seignory; where he that is chiefe hath no Power, but oweth obeisance to the Seig∣nory; unto whom yet they every one of them feign themselves to owe their Faith and obedience, which are all things so absurd, as hard it is which is furthest from Reason.

When Charles 8, the French King, then but fourteen yeers old, held a Parliament at Towrs, although the Power of the Parlia∣ment was never before nor after so great as in those times; yet Relli then the Speaker for the People turning himselfe to the King, thus beginneth: Most High, most Mighty, and most Christi∣an King; our Naturall and onely Lord: We poor, humble, and obe∣dient Subjects, &c. which are come hither by your Command, in all Humility, Reverence, and Subjection; present our selves before you, &c. And have given me in charge from all this Noble Assembly to declare unto You, the good will and hearty desire they have, with a most fervent resolution, to serve, obey, and aide You in all Your af∣faires, Commandments, and pleasures: All this speech is nothing else but a Declaration of their good will towards the King, and of their humble Obedience and Loyalty.

The like speech was used in the Parliament at Oreans to Charles 9. when he was scarce eleven yeers old.

Neither are the Parliaments in Spaine otherwise holden, but that even a greater Obedience of all the people is given to the King, as is to be seen in the Acts of the Parliament at Toledo by King Philip, 1552. when he yet was scarce twenty five yeers old: The answers also of the King of Spaine unto the Requests and humble Supplications of his people, are given in these words; We will, or else, We Decree or Ordaine; yea, the Subsidies that the Sub∣jects pay unto the King of Spaine, they call Service.

In the Parliaments of England, which have commonly been holden every third yeer, the estates seem to have a great liberty, (as the Northern people almost all breath thereafter) yet so it is, that in effect they proceed not but by way of supplications and requests to the King. As in the Parliament holden in Octob: 1566. when the States by a common Consent had resolved (as they gave the Queene to understand) not to entreat of any thing, un∣til She had first appointed who should succeed Her in the Crown;

She gave them no other answer, but that they were not to make her grave before She were dead: All whose resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking, neither did She in that, any thing that they required.

Albeit by the sufferance of the King of England, Controversies between the King and His people are sometimes determined by the High Court of Parliament; yet all the estates remain in full subjection to the King, who is no way bound to follow their ad∣vice, neither to consent to their Requests.

The estates of England are never otherwise assembled, no more then they are in France or Spaine, then by Parliament writs and expresse commandements proceeding from the King: which sheweth very well that the estates have no Power of themselves to Determine, Command, or Decree any thing, seeing they can∣not so much as assemble themselves, neither being assembled de∣part without expresse Commandement from the King.

Yet this may seem one speciall thing, that the Lawes made by the King of England, at the request of the Estates, cannot be a∣gaine repealed, but by calling a Parliament; which is much used and done as I have understood by Mr Dale the English Ambassa∣dour, an honourable Gentleman, and a man of good understan∣ding, who yet assured me the King received or rejected the Law, as seemed best to Himselfe; and stuck not to dispose thereof at His Pleasure, and contrary to the will of the Estates, as we see Hen. 8. to have alwaies used his Soveraign Power, and with his onely word, to have disanulled the Decrees of Parliament.

We conclude the Majesty of a Prince to be nothing altered or diminished by the calling together or presence of the Estates: But to the contrary, His Majesty thereby to be much the greater and the more Honourable, seeing all His people to acknowledge Him for their Soveraign.

We see the Principal point of Soveraign Majesty and absolute Power to consist principally in giving Lawes unto the Subjects without their consent: It behoveth that the Soveraigne Prince should have the Lawes in his Power, to change and amend them according as the case shal require.

In a Monarchy every one in particular must sweare to the Ob∣servation

of the Lawes, and their Allegiance to one Soveraigne Monarch; who, next unto God, (of whom he holds his Scepter and Power) is bound to no man: For an Oath carrieth alwaies with it Reverence unto whom, and in whose name it is made, as still given to a Superior, and therefore the vassal giveth such Oath unto his Lord, but receiveth none from him againe, though they be mutually bound, the one of them to the other.

Trajan swore to keep the Lawes, although he in the name of a Soveraign Prince were exempted; but never any of the Empe∣rours before him so sware; therefore Pliny the younger in a Pa∣nagyricall Oration speaking of the Oath of Trojan, giveth out a great novelty, saith he, and never before heard of, He sweareth by whom we sweare.

Of two things, the one must be, to wit, the Prince that swear∣eth to keep the Lawes of his Country, must either not have the Soveraignty, or else become a perjur'd man, if he should but abro∣gate but one Law contrary to his Oath, whereas it is not onely ptofitable that a Prince should sometimes abrogate some such Laws, but also necessary for him to alter or correct them, as the infinite variety of places, times and Persons, shal require: Or if we shal say the Prince to be stil a Soveraign, & yet neverthelesse with such condition as that he can make no Law without the advice of his Councel or people; he must also be dispenced with by his sub∣jects for the Oath which he hath made for the observation of the Lawes, and the subjects againe which are obliged to the Lawes, have also need to be dispensed with all by their Prince, for fear they should be perjur'd: So shall it come to passe, that the Maje∣sty of the Common-weale enclining now to this side, now to that side; sometimes the Prince, sometimes the People bearing sway, shall have no certainty to rest upon, which are notable ab∣surdities, and altogether incompatible with the Majesty of ab∣solute Soveraignty, and contrary both to Law and Reason: And yet we see many men that think they see more in the matter then others, wil maintaine it to be most necessary that Princes should be bound by Oath to keep the Lawes and Customes of their Countryes; In which doing, they weaken and overthrow all the Rights of Soveraign Majesty, which ought to be most Sacred and

Holy, and confound the Soveraignty of one Soveraign Monarch with an Aristocracy or Democracie.

Publication or Approbation of Lawes, in the Assembly of the Estates or Parliament, is with us of great importance for the keeping of the Lawes, not that the Prince is bound to any such approbation, or cannot of himselfe make a Law, without the consent of the Estates or people; yet it is a curteous part to do it by the good liking of the Senate.

What if a Prince by Law, forbid to kil or steal, is he not bound to obey his own Lawes? I say, that this Law is not his, but the Law of God, whereunto all Princes are more straitly bound then their Subjects; God taketh a stricter account of Princes then others, as Solomon a King hath said, whereto agreeth Mar∣cus Aurelius, saying, The Magistrates are Judges over private men, Princes judge the Magistrates, and God the Princes.

It is not onely a Law of Nature, but also oftentimes repeated among the Lawes of God, that we should be obedient unto the Lawes of such Princes as it hath pleased God to set to Rule and Reign over us; if their Lawes be not directly repugnant unto the Lawes of God, whereunto all Princes are as wel bound as their subjects: For as the Vassal oweth his Oath of fidelity unto his Lord, towards, and against all men, except his Soveraign Prince: So the subject oweth his Obedience to his Soveraign Prince, to∣wards, and against all, the Majesty of God excepted, who is the absolute Soveraigne of all the Princes in the world.

To confound the state of Monarchy, with the Popular or A∣ristocraticall estate, is a thing impossible, and in effect incompa∣tible, and such as cannot be imagined: For Soveraignty being of it selfe indivisible, how can it at one and the same time be divi∣ded betwixt one Prince, the Nobility, and the people in com∣mon? The first mark of Soveraign Majesty is, to be of Power to give Lawes, and to command over them unto the subjects; and who should those subjects be that should yeeld their obedience to the Law, if they should have also Power to make the Lawes? who should he be that could give the Law, being himselfe con∣strained to receive it of them, unto whom he himselfe gave it? so that of necessity we must conclude, that as no one in particular

hath the Power to make the Law in such a state, that there the state must needs be popular.

Never any Common-wealth hath been made of an Aristocracy and Popular Estate, much lesse of the three Estates of a Com∣mon-wealth.

Such States wherein the Right of Soveraignty are divided, are not rightly to be called Common-weales, but rather the cor∣ruption of Common-weales; as Herodotus hath most briefly, but truly written.

Common-weales which change their State, the Soveraigne Right and Power of them being divided, find no rest from Civill warres.

If the Prince be an absolute Soveraign, as are the true Mo∣narchs of France, of Spaine, of England, Scotland, Turkey, Mus∣covy, Tartary, Persia, Aethiopia, India, and almost of all the Kingdomes of Africk and Asia; where the Kings themselves have the Soveraignty without all doubt or question, not divided with their subjects: In this case it is not lawful for any one of the sub∣jects in particular, or all of them in generall, to attempt any thing either by way of fact or of justice, against the Honour, Life, or Dignity of the Soveraign; albeit he had comitted all the wic∣kednesse, impiety, and cruelty that could be spoke. For as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subject hath not such jurisdiction over his Soveraign Prince, of whom dependeth all Power to Command, and who may not onely revoke all the Power of his Magistrates; but even in whose presence the Power of all Magistrates, Corporations, Estates and Communities cease.

Now if it be not lawful for the Subject by the way of justice to proceed against a King, how should it then be lawful to pro∣ceed against him by way of fact or Force? for question is not here what men are able to do by strength and Force, but what they ought of Right to do; as not whether the subject have power and strength, but whether they have lawful power to condemne their Soveraign Prince.

The subject is not onely guilty of Treason in the highest De∣gree who hath slain his Soveraign Prince, but even he also which

hath attempted the same, who hath given Counsell or consent thereto; yea, if he have concealed the same, or but so much as thought it: Which fact the Lawes have in such detestation, as that when a man guilty of any offence or Crime, dyeth before he be condemned thereof, he is deemed to have dyed in whole and perfect Estate, except he have conspired against the Life and Dig∣nity of his Soveraign Prince: This onely thing they have thought to be such, as that for which he may worthily seeme to have been now already judged and condemned, yea even before he was thereof accused. And albeit the Lawes inflict no punishment up∣on the evill thoughts of men, but on those onely which by word or deed break out into some Enormity; yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the Violating of the Person of his Soveraign Prince, although he have attempted nothing, they have yet judged this same thought worthy of death; notwithstanding what repentance soever he have had thereof.

Lest any men should think [Kings or Princes] themselves to have been the Authors of these Lawes, so the more straitly to provide for their own safety and Honour, let us see the Laws and examples of holy Scripture.

Nabuchodonosor King of Assyria, with fire and sword destroyed all the Country of Palestina, besieged Jerusalem, took it, rob'd and rased it down to the ground, burnes the Temple, and defiles the Sanctuary of God, slew the King, with the greatest part of the people, carrying away the rest into Captivity into Babylon, caused the image of himselfe made in gold to be set up in publick place, commanding all men to adore and worship the same upon pain of being burnt alive, and caused them that refused so to do, to be cast into a burning Furnace. And yet for all that, the holy Prophets [Baruch 1. Jeremy 29.] directing their letters unto their brethren the Jewes, then in Captivity in Babylon, wil them to pray unto God for the good and happy life of Nabuchodono∣sor and his children, and that they might so long Rule and Reign over them as the Heavens should endure: Yea even God Him∣selfe doubted not to call Nabuchodonosor his servant, saying, that he would make him the most Mighty Prince of the world, and yet was there never a more detestable Tyrant then he; who not con∣tended

to be himselfe worshiped, but caused his Image also to be adored, and that upon pain of being burnt quick.

We have another rare example of Saul, who possessed with an evill Spirit, caused the Priests of the Lord to be without just cause sl••ine, for that one of them had received David flying from him, and did what in his power was to kill or cause to be kill'd the same David, a most innocent Prince; by whom he had got so ma∣ny victories, at which time he fell twice himselfe into Davids hands, who blamed of his Souldiers for that he would not suffer his so mortall Enemy then in his power to be slain; being in as∣sured hope to have enjoyed the Kingdome after his death, he de∣tested their Counsell, saying, God forbid that I should suffer the Per∣son of a King, the Lords Anointed to be violated. Yea, he himselfe defended the same King persecuting of him, whenas he comman∣ded the Souldiers of his guard overcome by wine and sleep to be wakened.

And at such time as Saul was slaine, and that a Souldier think∣ing to do David a pleasure, presented him with Saul's head, Da∣vid caused the same Souldier to be slaine which had brought him the head, saying, Go thou wicked, how durst thou lay thy impure hands upon the Lords Anointed? thou shalt surely die therefore.

And afterwards, without all dissimulation mourned himselfe for the dead King: All which is worth good consideration, for David was by Saul prosecuted to death, and yet wanted not Power to have revenged himselfe, being become stronger then the King; besides, he was the chosen of God, and anointed by Samuel to be King, and had married the Kings Daughter: And yet for all that, he abhorred to take upon him the title of a King; and much more to attempt any thing against the Life or Honour of Saul, or to Rebell against him; but chose rather to banish himselfe out of the Realme, then in any sort so seek the Kings destruction.

We doubt not, but David a King and a Prophet, led by the Spirit of God, had alwayes before his eyes the Law of God, Ex. 22.28. Thou shalt not speake evill of thy Prince, nor detract the Magistrate; neither is there any thing more Common in Ho∣ly Scripture, then the forbidding not only to kill or attempt the

Life or Honour of a Prince, but even for the very Magistrates, although saith the Scripture, they be wicked and naught.

The Protestant Princes of Germany, before they entred into Arms against Charls the Emperour, demanded of Martin Luther if it were lawful for them so to do or not; who frankly told them, that it were not Lawfull whatsoever Tyranny or impiety were pretended, yet was he not therein by them believed; so there∣of ensued a deadly and most lamentable warre, the end where∣of was most miserable; drawing with it, the Ruine of many great and noble houses of Germany, with exceeding slaughter of the Subjects.

The Prince, whom you may justly call the Father of the Country, ought to be to every man dearer and more Reve∣rend then any Father, as one Ordained and sent unto us by God. The subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against the Prince, how naughty and cruel soever he be; lawful it is, not to obey him in things contrary to the Lawes of God, to flie and hide our selves from him, but yet to suffer stripes, yea, and death also, rather then to attempt any thing against his life and Honour. O how many Tyrants should there be, if it should be Lawfull for subjects to kill Tyrants? How many good and inno∣cent Princes should as Tyrants perish by the Conspiracy of their subjects against them? he that should of his subjects but exact subsidies, should be then, as the vulgar people esteeme him, a Ty∣rant: He that should rule and command contrary to the good liking of the people, should be a Tyrant: He that should keep strong guards and Garrisons for the safety of his Person, should be a Tyrant: He that should put to death Traitors and Conspi∣rators against his State, should be also counted a Tyrant. How should good Princes be assured of their lives, if under colour of Tyranny they might be slaine by their subjects, by whom they ought to be defended?

In a well ordered State, the Soveraigne Power must remaine in one onely, without communicating any part thereof unto the State, (for in that case it should be a popular Government, & no Monarchy) wise Polititians, Philosophers, Divines, and Historiogra∣phers, have highly commended a Monarchy above all other Com∣mon-weales,

it is not to please the Prince, that they hold this o∣pinion; but for the safety and happynesse of the subjects. And contrarywise, when as they shall limit and restrain the Soveraign Power of a Monarch, to subject him to the generall Estates, or to the Councell; the Soveraignty hath no firm Foundation, but they frame a popular confusion, or a miserable Anarchy, which is the Plague of all Estates and Common-weales: The which must be duly considered, not giving credit to their goodly discourses, which perswade subjects that it is necessary to subject Monarchs, and to prescribe their Prince a Law; for that is not onely the Ru∣ine of the Monarch, but also of the subjects. It is yet more strange that many hold opinion, that the Prince is subject to his Lawes, that is to say, subject to his wil, whereon the Lawes which he hath made depend, a thing unpossible in Nature. And under this colour, and ill digested opinion, they make a mixture and confu∣sion of Civil Lawes, with the Lawes of Nature and of Cod.

A pure absolute Monarchy is the surest Common-weal, and without Comparison, the best of all. Wherein many are abused, which maintaine that an Optimacy is the best kind of Govern∣ment, for that many Commanders have more Judgement, Wis∣dome, and Councell then one alone. But there is a great diffe∣rence betwixt Councell and Commandment.

The Councel of many wise men, may be better then of one; but to Resolve, Determine, and to Command, one will alwaies performe it better then many: He which hath advisedly digested all their opinions, will soon resolve without contention; the which many cannot easily performe: it is necessary to have a So∣veraign Prince, which may have Power to Resolve and Deter∣mine of the opinions of his Councell.

The End.