The hinge of faith and religion: or, a proof of the deity against atheists and profane persons, by reason, and the testimony of Holy Scripture: the divinity of which is demonstrated, / by L. Cappel, Doctour and Professour in Divinity ; translated out of French by Philip Marinel, M.A. and fellow of Pembroke-College in Oxford.

CHAP. XII. The ninth Argument, drawn from the Universal Consent of the World, That there is a Deity.

THe second kind of Reasoning against the Atheists is from Authority, or Record: which is two-fold, Divine or Humane. I call that Divine Testimony, which is drawn from the holy Writ: I call that Humane, but yet unquestionable, Testimony, the Consent of all the men in the world; all of which do naturally acknowledge, that there is a Deity and Provi∣dence. And here we must take notice, First, that the most ancient Philosophers, and the most eminent and illustrious persons in Learning and Virtue, of whom any mention is made in History, have acknowledged a Divine Provi∣dence, which seeth, knoweth, and rules all things, rewards the one, and punisheth the o∣ther. Secondly, all the People, and Nations of the Earth, which are; or ever have been, have acknowledged this same truth? Which is evident, because there was never any, that hath not professed some Religion, or instead

of it an open and manifest communion, and a familiar conversation with evill spirits; as these savage and brutish Nations have, viz. the Toupinambous, Margajas, Caribes, Can∣nibales, Patagons, and the like, and those Septentrional Nations, which are neerer to our Arctick Pole, in Europe, Asia, and the New world, as it appears by the Relations of them, which at this day are common and vulgar.

Now we have proved heretofore, that, if there are Devils, there is a Deity; and con∣sequently those Nations, acknowledging that there are Daemons, by that commerce which they have with them, do also tacitely ac∣knowledge, and are forced to grant, that there is a Deity. Every Religion also doth imply, that there is a Deity: For it is wholly imployed in the service and adoration of it, and to make it propitious, and mercifull to men, and to obtain from it, either the fruiti∣on of those things that are desired, or an im∣munity from those evils that are feared, or suffered either in this life, or in the other: and this is done either by Prayers, Invoca∣tions, Acknowledgements, Thanksgivings; or by Sacrifices, and other Ceremonies. This is the end of all Religions.

Since therefore, that there hath been no People, or Nation, whether civilized, (as in old

time, the Heathen Romans, and Graecians, the Chaldaeans, Babylonians, Assyrians, and Persians, Syrians, Phaenicians, Aegr∣ptians) or barbarous, (as the Scythians, A∣fricans, and infinite others) that hath not had, and professed some Religion; it's evi∣dent, that all have with one consent acknow∣ledged a Divine Providence.

As to the strength and validity of this Ar∣gument, it is (as hath been said) not to be doubted of, especially, if it may be shown, that there is no just Cause or Reason to doubt of this Testimony. Let's then see, whether any may justly doubt of it. One may be indu∣ced to believe a false opinion three manner of waies:

First, By affection, and desire, that we have it should be so.

Secondly, By Authority.

Thirdly, By specious and deceiving Argu∣ments. But none of these waies can agree with that, which is now in question.

As to the first, There is such a Connexion between the Intellect and the Will, that as the Will alwaies follows the Dictates of the Understanding, so it doth desire that which the Intellect judges to be good. So also we easily perswade our selves that, which we desire with Passion: man being inclined by this desire to seek all the Reasons that may be to perswade

himselfe of the truth and goodness of that which he desireth, and giving weight unto them by this strong and vehement affection.

But here it cannot be said, that men per∣swade themselves that there is a God, because they do desire it; but contrariwise the most part of men would, that there were none, because they fear him as a Judge. There is therefore much more Reason to suspect, that the opinion of the Atheists is false, and justly to object against them, that they perswade themselves there is none, because they so ardently wish that it were so; and that this their so vehement desire makes them to receive the most weak Reasons for good and solid de∣monstrations.

As to Authority, one sometimes may be∣lieve a thing upon the meer Respect, that he hath to the persons that say it, and that, either because such persons are sufficient and able, and that he believes them to be so, or because of that eminent power and Authority in which they are, which hath only place in those things, which one cares not much whether they be true or not, and where he sees no Reasons to the contrary.

It cannot be said, that men have been in∣duced to believe a Deity and Providence by the bare Authority and Respect that some per∣sons had, which had no ground or Reason for

what they said For who is he, that hathso uni∣versally been known to be of such Sufficiency, Knowledge, and Ability, as to perswade men, only by the bare Respect they had of him, to believe a thing so great, and that doth so much concern them? For, besides that Ari∣stotle, or Plato, who is acknowledged to have been the greatest and learnedst Philoso∣pher that ever was, is not so much as known by name to the thousandst part of the World, it is certain, that none that believes there is a Deity will confess, that he be∣lieves it, because such a one said it; but only because he hath an inward perswasion of this Truth by some Reasons, which he knowes and understands well himselfe; al∣though very often times he cannot express them.

And as for Eminency and Dignity, there was never yet any, that hath ruled over all the World, and who might have had the power to command or perswade men to believe a Deity. Besides, that the Belief, which proceeds this way, ought to be of things, which we care not much, whether they be true or not; which cannot be said of the Deity and Providence, there being nothing more important, or that doth more highly concern men.

But perhaps it may be objected, That this

opinion hath spread it self by Tradition from Fathers to Children, &c. and so is come to us. Now it's very true, that the first man, A∣dam, hath taught this truth to his Children, and they to theirs, &c. and by these means this Truth hath been believ'd over all the World.

But first, although he hath so taught his posterity, we may not therefore conclude, that all have believed him: for there have al∣waies been wicked ones, that have not cared for their Fathers admonitions, and those also have not taken pains to make their Children to believe it; so that this pretended Tradition hath been in many places interrupted, and neg∣lected. So that we must confess, that this uni∣versal belief of a Deity hath another cause then Tradition, or meer Institution. Add to it, that this thing is of too much concernment to be believed upon the bare word of our Fathers: which indeed may give an occasion to seek af∣ter this truth, and incline our minds to believe it; but cannot be the only true ground of so firmly-inherent a belief.

Secondly, As to those, against whom we dispute, which hold the Eternity of the world; how can they, (keeping still to this proposi∣tion, viz, That the world is Eternal) Object, That this opinion hath its Rise from meer Tra∣dition. For I will ask them, Whether they think

that this Opinion is Eternal, as well as the world? or whether it hath had some beginning again? If this opinion is Eternal, I will ask, Whether it was generally received among all men, or received of some only? If they say, That it hath alwaies been Universal, it follows, that it is natural, and therefore a true opi∣nion, and theirs consequently false. If this Opinion hath not been Universal, but yet was from all Eternity received among some, it follows that it is at least as true an opinion as theirs is; since it hath had followers, and hath been received from all Eternity as well as theirs.

But these two Opinions being contrary one to another, they cannot both be equal∣ly true, nor consequently equally Eternal: and so necessarily the one is true, and the other false; the one Prior, the other Posterior: truth being alwaies before falshood, which is a disguising of Truth and an aberration from it.

Here then will they say, that their Opi∣nion is the first, and Eternal, the other ha∣ving followed long time after. If this is true, then it follows, that all men Universally, in an infinite number of Ages, have con∣stantly held this opinion, That there is no God: how then is it come into the minds of men to hold the contrary to that, which they had alwaies held and believed? And how could any

one imagine that he could perswade this to a∣ny one? Yea, how is it possible, that men should now hold a contrary opinion, but that they have acknowledged by strong Reasons, that the other opinion was false?

So then we cannot conclude, neither accor∣ding to their Hypothesis, nor accoding to ours, that this universal belief of the Deity is a meer Tradition and proceeds from Institution; but it must necessarily be concluded, that it proceeds from that men have unanswerable Arguments for it, upon which both it and its evidence is grounded.

But the Atheists would willingly reply, that those arguments are but captious and weak, & have no solidity in them. But there is no reason to think so. For, how is it possible, that a meer Phantasm or shadow, without any real soli∣dity, should have deceived all the men in the whole world: and that so constantly, since so many ages; that there hath been none found among so many men, that hath demonstrated as yet the pretended vanity and weakness of these Arguments?

Is it possible, that none hath been found among so many wonderfully-learned men, of which History makes mention; that hath evi∣denced the pretended falshood of this opinion, and demonstrated how weak and vain those Arguments are, on which this our opinion is

grounded; and by these meanes free the World from the checks and terrours, which the con∣science of their crimes causes in them, when they consider and perceive that there is a Divine Providence? This doubtless would have found place enough in the belief of men.

But, it may be, it will be said, that Epicu∣rus, and his followers, and some others afore him, have done this, teaching Atheism, and the Reasons that may perswade to it.

Now, those Persons have indeed had wit e∣nough, and very good Reasons, to jear at all the vain superstitions, foolish and extravagant opi∣nions of the Religion of the Heathen, at the im∣pertinent and fabulous Stories, that they made of their Gods, of the multitude of them, and at the false imagination they had of the state of the dead in Hell, or in the Elysian fields.

But it will not be found, nor confessed, that they have strong and solid Reasons, to prove, that there is no Providence. And those prophane ones of our dayes, who think they have refined Atheism to the height, will be found as short in their Arguments, if they are examined by the rules of right Reason: and it will be found, that the Reason, why they are estecmed and counted excellent Wits, is not so much because of the strength of their

Arguments, as because nothing is either too hot or too cold for them, and that there is no absurdity, though it be never so great, which they do not easily swallow, like to the strong stomachs of Ostriches, which do digest any thing that is given them.

And here we should enter upon the exami∣nation of their pretended Reasons, and com∣pare theirs and ours, which we have brought against them; that there might be a Judgement given, which are the most solid and firm: but this would engage us to another Treatise, whereupon we have not now a design to enter; but will examine some of them towards the end of this book. That, which hath been said hi∣therto against them, being well weighed and considered, will be found so agreeable to right Reason, that, if their opinion is true, they must dispute otherwise then by Reason, and must be farr above it, and so consequently must be much more then men.

But, albeit their Reasons were of equal weight with ours, (which is not so) yet have we much advantage on our side.

1. Because, besides these Reasons, we have this universal consent, which they have not.

2. Because, though there were no God, yet there is no danger, and little or no loss to be∣lieve and serve one: but, if there is one, the A∣theists,

for not believing and serving him, are in great danger to have Hell for their portion.

One thing may be objected against this Uni∣versal Consent of all Nations, viz. That there are errours and false opinions, which yet ne∣vertheless have been believed, and received by most, or all the Nations of the Earth: as for example; Idolatry, Multiplicity of the Gods of the Heathen, and in the most civiliz'd Nations, and People, (as among the Graecians and Ro∣mans,) Whoredom, and the sin against Nature, have scarce been accounted vices; & there have been whole Nations, and People, where Rob∣bery, and Theft, especially if it was committed upon those of another Nation, was not looked upon as crime or sin.

But, The answer to this is not difficult:

For First, these errours, though very general, have not been so constant and universal, as the belief of a Deity. For Christianism hath abolish∣ed the Paganism in a very considerable part of the World, and was once more universal then it is now. And the Mahometan, Jenish and Chri∣stian Religions, all of which hold, there is one only God, compared with the rest of the World, which yet remains plunged in Hea∣thenish Idolatry, do almost, or, it may be, altogether comprehend the half of those men, which are upon the face of the Earth. Now, the opinion of one only God, so as the Chri∣stians,

Mahometans, and Jews do hold, it is farr more contrary to Atheism, then the Pa∣gan Idolatry. How is it then, if Atheistical opinions be true, that the opinion of the Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, hath so much prevailed over that of the Heathen, which comes much nearer to Atheism? Especially, since the Christian Religion, which hath pre∣ceded that of the Mahometans, was propaga∣ted only by the patience and sufferings of the Professours of it, which every where have been exposed and abandoned to the rage, fury, and persecution of the Heathen.

The Heathenish Idolatry, and Superstition, is an opinion much more suitable to our car∣nal sense, and which corrupted man doth love, and cherish much more, then the apprehensi∣on, which the Christians and Mahometans have of one God. Therefore (as we have noted heretofore) its no wonder, that this er∣rour had spread it self very much: since we per∣swade our selves very willingly and easily of those things, which we earnestly desire, and wish for. But this same flesh is wholly repu∣gnant to the belief of a Deity, that judgeth and Governeth the World, and renders to every man according to what he had done. How comes it then to pass, that the opinion, which we have of one only God, hath prevailed a∣gainst the Heathenish Idolatry and Superstiti∣on,

and doth yet maintain it self against so many Atheists as are at this day: since that we arm and defend our selves, as much as we can, against those things, which we fear and dread?

Thirdly, The Heathenish Idolatry, and Su∣perstition, is an alteration and corruption of the opinion of a Deity, and doth ne∣cessarily presuppose it, as its ground, and basis. And this alteration (as I said just now) is wonderfully more accommodated to our fleshly and sensual corruptions, then the belief of an only God. It is therefore no wonder, if the opinion of a Deity, being so universally received, and so deeply root∣ed in the heart of man, the Heathenish I∣dolatry, and Superstition (which pleaseth the flesh) hath spread it self also so much as it hath. But the opinion of a Deity is not a corruption, or alteration of Atheism. It is quite contrary. And this belief of a Deity doth not please the flesh, as Atheism doth. Therefore the belief of a Deity could not have so universally won the spirits of men, but by its own proper strength and virtue, which consisteth in Truth, which is stronger then all things. And it's much to be wondered at, (and the Atheists, wi••l never give a pertinent Reason of it) why, if A∣theism be true, it hath not been so univer∣sally

received, as its contrary; but contra∣riwise, and almost every where, even a∣mong the Heathen, it hath been abhorred, and detested of all. As to those other e∣normities, of Whoredom, Thefts, and the sin against Nature, and the like; besides, that the most honest persons, in every Nation, have acknowledged in these actions a great deal of filthiness, and injustice, when they have spoken of them in good earnest (though the corrupted and base pleasures of the flesh, and the depraved sense of their lusts, had so blinded their understanding, that they let themselves loose to all these vices, without any great remorse) it is not of these errours, as of the belief of a Deity: for these vices please, and intice sensuality, and therefore men are easily perswaded to them; but the belief of a Deity is wholy repugnant to sen∣suality, which would perswade it self the contrary if it could: and neverthelesse this opinion hath forced mens understand∣ings to assent to it; which could not be done, but by the meer strength of truth it self.

From what hath been said before, it is plain and evident, that this so universal, and constant consent of all men, (who hold, and believe, even in spight of themselves, that there is a God, and a Providence) is

an indubitable Argument of this truth, and an evidence of the deprivation of man, by which he is fallen from his first Nature, and Prin∣ciples, by which he was joyned and united to God; unto whom he was conformable in Truth, Justice, and Holiness, as one cre∣ated to his own Image: and from which he is now separated, and alienated, through his Injustice, Pollution, and Perverseness, which doth incline him to deny this Provi∣dence, which he feareth as his Judg.

And in this Infidelity of Man, God would not leave himselfe without a Wit∣nesse; but hath lively engraved, and im∣printed himselfe in his Works: so that man, maugre himselfe, is forced in those things to acknowledge this Deity.

And this is to convince man of his errour, and to make good the Justice of his pro∣ceedings, and the righteousnesse of his Judg∣ments against their impiety.

And, from what hath been said, appears the strength of this Testimony, against which nothing, which is considerable, can be ob∣jected: as being a Testimony, not only Hu∣mane, or proceeding from the fancy, or will of man; but in effect a Divine one, as being the meer motion of Nature, and the dictate of Reason, and wherein this Proverb is verified; Vox Populi, Vox Dei.

But let us pass from this Humane Testi∣mony to that which is directly Divine.