§ 5. A Legislative Power may be also such as is limited by, and subordinated to the will of a superior Legislator; and therefore the power of such an one is not of himself and primitive, but de∣rived from some other: Neither is it bounded by his own Pleasure, but by that of another, to whom he is accountable; because he himself is liable to a Law, which Law he may transgress, in gi∣ving such Laws to his Subjects, which he is not commissionated by his Superior Law-giver to give; and Ergo must not make Laws Pro arbitrio sine limitibus, his arbitrium being received from another, and the bounds allotted it, as to all Jus agendi pro beneplacito; he may act indifferently this way, or that way, in such a compass; but if he pass the Line of his Circumference, he becomes a transgressing Ruler. He sins against his Superiour, and wrongs his Subject.
§ 6. Hence (this subordinate Legislator thus trangressing) the Subject being conscious and clearly convinced thereof, he is disobli∣ged from all active obedience unto any such usurping or transgres∣sing Laws. A Christian's first and greatest obligation being to the Supream and Soverain Power, as a Citizen in a Town-corporate is first bound in obedience to his Prince, before he is to the Mayor or Bayliff of the Town. An Officer substitute by the Prince, and re∣movable at his pleasure, (it's not so in natural and contracted Re∣lations) knowing his obedience to the King, will sufficiently justifie his non submission to the will of the Mayor.
§ 7. Again, the Subject is obliged to obey the Laws which the inferiour Law-giver makes lawfully, (i. e. according to his depu∣tation) not Simpliciter & gratiâ illius, but primarily and most pro∣perly for the sake of the supream Law-giver whose Substitute and Representative he is, Rom. 13.1, 4. 1 Pet. 2.13. and they are so far to be obeyed, but no farther to be owned as lawful Gover∣nours.
§ 8. Thus much of a Legislative Power in general. An Executive Power is a Power of putting in Execution a Law made, or the practical Application thereof according to the manifested will and intendment of the Law-giver. Therefore the power of Execu∣tion is always a secundary and derived Power, in respect of the Power of Legislation; because it supposeth a Law made, and the will of the Law-giver to put it in practice; which Will is the ground of Execution, but is not actually begun till the promulga∣tion, and a positive injunction binding unto practice: and is com∣pleated