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T. H. LAstly, I hold that ordinary definition of a free Agent, namely that a free Agent is, that, which when all things are present, which are needfull to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it, Implies a contradiction, and is non∣sense, being as much as to say, the cause may be sufficient, that is necessary, and yet the effect not follow.
J. D. THis last point is but a Corollary, or an Infe∣rence from the former doctrine, that every sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily, which pillar being taken away the superstructure must needs fall to the ground, having nothing left to support it. Lastly, I hold (saith he) what he is able to proove is something. So much reason, so much trust, but what he holds concernes himself not others. But what holds he? I hold (saith he) that the ordinary definition of a free Agent implies a contradiction, and is non-sense. That which he calls the ordinary definition of liber∣ty is the very definition which is given by the much greater part of Philosophers & School∣men. And doth he think that all these spake non-sense? or had no more judgment than to contradict themselves in a definition? He might much better suspect himself, than censure so ma∣ny. Let us see the definition it self: A free A∣gent is that, which when all things are present, that are needfull to produce the effect, can never∣theless not produce it. I acknowledge the old definition of Liberty, with little variation. But I cannot see this non-sense, nor discover this contradiction. For in these words all things needfull, or all things requisite, the actuall de∣termination of the will is not included. But by all things needfull or requisite. All necessary power either operative or elective, all necessarie instruments and adjuments extrinsecall and in∣trinsecall, and all conditions are intended. As he that hath pen and ink, and paper, a table, a
desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his hand, hath all things requisite to write if he will, and yet he may forbear, if he will. Or as he that hath men and mony, and armes, and munition, and shipps, and a just cause, hath all things requisite for war, yet he may make peace, if he will. Or as the King proclaimed in the Gospell, Matth. 22.4. I have prepared my dinner, my oxen and my fatlings are killed, all things are ready, come unto the mar∣riage. According to T. H. his doctrine, the guests might have told him, that he said not tru∣ly, for their own wills were not ready. And in∣deed if the will were (as he conceives it is) ne∣cessitated extrinsecally to every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will, nor to will what it doth not will, then if the will were wanting, something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting. But now when Science and conscience, reason and Reli∣gion, our own and other mens experience doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will, or nill without extrinsecall necessitation. If the power to will be present in actu primo, determinable by our selves, then there is no necessary power wanting in this res∣pect to the producing of the effect.
Secondly, these words to act or not to act, to work or not to work, to produce or not to produce, have reference to the effect, not as a thing which is already done, or doing, but as a thing to be done. They imply not the actuall production but the producibility of the effect. But when
once the will hath actually concurred with all other causes and conditions, and circum∣stances, then the effect is no more possible, or producible, but it is in being, and actually pro∣duced. Thus he takes away the subject of the question. The question is whether effects producible be free from necessity. He shuffles out effects producible, and thrusts in their places effects produced, or which are in the act of pro∣duction. Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither non-sense nor contradiction to say, that a free A∣gent, when all things requisite to produce the effect are present, may nevertheless not produce it.