Numb. 31.

T. H.

SEventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause to which nothing is wanting that is needfull to the producing of the effect. The same is also a ne∣cessary cause, for if it be possible, that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanted somewhat which was needfull to the pro∣ducing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient. But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should Page  217 not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause, (for that is said to produce an ef∣fect necessarily, that cannot but produce it) Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily, for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or els it had not been. And therefore also voluntary acti∣ons are necessitated.

J. D.

THis section containes a third Argument to proove that all effects are necessary, for clea∣ring whereof it is needfull to consider how a cause may be said to be sufficient or insufficient.

First, severall causes singly considered may be insufficient, and the same taken conjointly be sufficient to produce an effect. As two horses jointly are sufficient to draw a Coach, which ei∣ther of them singly is insufficient to do. Now to make the effect, that is the drawing of the Coach necessary, it is not onely required, that the two horses be sufficient to draw it, but also that their conjunction be necessary, and their habitude such as they may draw it. If the owner of one of these horses will not suffer him to draw, If the Smith have shod the other in the quick, and la∣med him; If the horse have cast a shoe, or be a resty jade, and will not draw but when he list, then the effect is not necessarily produced, but contingently more or less, as the concurrence of the causes is more or less contingent.

Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it produceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man, or els, Page  218 because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as in the generation of a Monster. The former is properly called a sufficient cause, the later a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the debility of the cause be not necessary, but contingent, then the effect is not necessary, but contingent. It is a rule in Logick, that the con∣clusion alwayes followes the weaker part. If the premises be but probable, the conclusion cannot be demonstrative. It holds as well in causes as in propositions. No effect can exceed the ver∣tue of its cause. If the ability or debility, of the causes be contingent, the effect cannot be neces∣sary.

Thirdly, that which concernes this question of Liberty from necessity most neerely is. That a cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act. The concurrence of the will is needfull to the production of a free effect. But the cause may be sufficient, though the will do not concur. As God is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds, but it doth not follow from thence, ei∣ther that he hath produced them, or that he will produce them. The blood of Christ is a sufficient ransome for all mankind, but it doth not follow therefore, that all mankind shall be actually sa∣ved by vertue of his Blood. A man may be a suf∣ficient Tutour, though he will not teach every Scholler, and a sufficient Physitian, though he will not administer to every patient. Foras∣much therefore as the concurrence of the will is needfull to the production of every free effect, Page  219 and yet the cause may be sufficient, in sensu di∣viso, although the will do not concur. It fol∣lowes evidently, that the cause may be suf∣ficient, and yet something, which is needfull to the production of the effect, may be wanting, and that every sufficient cause is not a necessa∣ry cause.

Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle a∣gainst so clear light, and say, that though the free Agent be sufficient in sensu diviso, yet, he is not sufficient, in sensu composito, to produce the effect without the concurrence of the will, he saith true, but first, he bewrayes the weak∣ness and the fallacy of the former argument, which is a meer trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense, and sufficiency in a compoun∣ded sense. And seeing the concurrence of the will is not predetermined, there is no antece∣dent necessity before it do concur, and when it hath concurred, the necessity is but hypotheti∣call, which may consist with liberty.