A disquisition about the final causes of natural things wherein it is inquir'd, whether, and (if at all) with what cautions, a naturalist should admit them? By T.H. R.B. Fellow of the Royal Society. To which are subjoyn'd, by way of appendix some uncommon observations about vitiated sight. By the same author.

SECT. I.

TO begin with the first Questi∣on; Those that would ex∣clude Final Causes from the consi∣deration of the Naturalist, are wont to do it (for ought I have observ'd) upon one of these two Accounts: Either, that with Epicurus they think the world was the Production of Atoms and Chance, without any intervention of a Deity; and that consequently 'tis improper and in vain to seek for Final Causes in the effects of Chance: Or, that they judge with Des Cartes, that God being an Omniscient Agent, 'tis rash and presumptuous for men to

think, that they know, or can in∣vestigate, what Ends he propos'd to himself in his Actings about his Creatures. The Ground on which the Epicureans have rejected Final Causes, has been disallow'd by the Philosophers of almost all other Sects; and some have written suffi∣cient Confutations of it, which therefore I shall here forbear to in∣sist on; though somethings I shall upon occasion observe, that may help, if not suffice, to discredit so unreasonable an Opinion. But the Cartesian Argument has been so pre∣valent among many Learned and Ingenious men, that it will be worth while (if it be but to excite better Pens) to spend some time in the Consideration of it.

Perhaps one thing that alienated that excellent Philosopher, from allowing the Consideration of Final Causes in Physicks, was, that the School-Philosophers, and many other Learned men, are wont to

propose it too unwarily, as if there were no Creature in the world that was not solely, or at least chiefly, de∣sign'd for the Service or Benefit of Man: Insomuch that I remember I have seen a Body of Divinity, pub∣lish'd by a famous Writer, wherein, to prove the opinion he favours, of those that would have the world annihilated after the day of Judge∣ment, he urgeth this Argument; That since the World was made for the sake of Man in his travelling Condition (homini viatoris causa,) when once Man is possess'd of his Everlasting State of Happiness or Misery, there will be no further use of the World. The opinion, that gives rise to such presumptu∣ous and unwarrantable Expressions, did, as I guess by his objection, more choque Des Cartes, than I won∣der that it should displease him. But the indicretion of men ought not to prejudice Truth; which must not be cast away, with the un∣warrantable

Conceits that some men have pinn'd upon it.

Wherefore, since I cannot entire∣ly close, either with the opinion of the Epicureans, or of the Cartesians, I shall leave each party to maintain its own opinion, and proceed to pro∣pose mine: For the clearing of which, and indeed of the Disqui∣sition of Final Causes, I shall beg leave to premise a Distinction, which, though novel, I shall ven∣ture to employ, because it comprises and distinguishes some things, which I think, ought neither to be overlook'd nor confounded.

I conceive then, that when we speak of the Ends which Nature, or rather the Author of Nature, is said to have in things Corporeal, One of these four things may be signi∣fy'd, or, if you like that expression better, the End design'd by Nature may be fourfold:

First, there may be some grand and General Ends of the whole World, such as the Exercising and Displaying the Creators immense Power and admirable Wisdom, the Communication of his Goodness, and the Admiration and Thanks due to him from his Intelligent Creatures, for these his divine Ex∣cellencies, whose Productions ma∣nifest his Glory. And these Ends, because they regard the Creation of the whole Universe, I call the Ʋni∣versal Ends of God or Nature.

Secondly, in a somewhat more restrain'd sense, there may be Ends design'd in the number, fabrick, placing, and wayes of moving the great Masses of Matter, that, for their Bulks or Qualities, are con∣siderable parts of the World; since 'tis very probable, that these bodies, such as the Sun, Moon, and fixed Stars, and the Terraqueous Globe, and perhaps each of its two chief

parts, the Earth and the Sea, were so fram'd and plac'd, as not only to be capable of persevering in their own present state, but also as was most conducive to the Universal Ends of the Creation, and the good of the whole World, whereof they are notable parts. Upon which account these Ends, may, for distinctions sake, be call'd Cos∣mical or Systematical, as regarding the Symmetry of the great System of the world.

There is a Third sort of Ends, that do more peculiarly concern the Parts of Animals (and probably Plants too) which are those, that the particular parts of Animals are destinated to, and for the welfare of the whole Animal himself, as he is an entire and distinct System of or∣ganiz'd parts, destinated to pre∣serve himself and propagate his Species, upon such a Theatre (as the Land, Water or Air) as his Structure and Circumstances de∣termine

him to act his part on. And these Ends, to discriminate them from others, may be call'd Animal Ends.

Fourthly, and lastly, there is an∣other sort of Ends, which, because they relate particularly to Man, may, for brevity's sake, be call'd Human Ends, which are those that are aim'd at by Nature, where she is said to frame Animals and Vege∣tables, and other of her producti∣ons, for the use of Man. And these Ends themselves may be distin∣guish'd into Mental, that relate to His Mind, and Corporeal, that re∣late to His Body, not only as He is an Animal fram'd like other Ani∣mals, for his own Preservation, and the propagation of his Species (Mankind;) but also as He is fram'd for Dominion over other Animals and works of Nature, and fitted to make them subservi∣ent to the Destinations, that one may suppose to have been made

of them to His service and benefit.

This Distinction of Final Causes, which I hope will not prove alto∣gether useless, being premis'd; I shall begin my intended Discourse, by owning a dissent from both the opposite Opinions; Theirs, that, with the vulgar of Learned Men, will take no notice of Final Causes but those we have stiled Human ones; and theirs, that (as they think, with Descartes) reject Fi∣nal Causes altogether; since, tho' I judge it erroneous to say in the strictest sense, that every thing in the Visible World, was made for the Use of Man; yet I think 'tis more erroneous to deny, that any thing was made for ends Investi∣gable by Man.

'Tis a known Principle of the Cartesian Philosophy, That there is always just the same quantity of Motion in the World at one time, that there is at another: Of which

Assertion this Reason is given; That there is no Cause, why God, who is Immutable, should at the beginning of things, when he first put Matter into Motion, have gi∣ven it such a quantity of Motion, as would need to be afterwards augumented or lessen'd. But I see not, how by this Negative way of Arguing, those that imploy it, do not (implicitly at least) take upon them to judge of the Ends, that God may have propos'd to himself in Natural things. For, without a Supposition, that they know what God design'd in set∣ting Matter a-moving, 'tis hard for them to shew, that His Design could not be such, as might be best accomplish'd by sometimes adding to, and sometimes taking from, the Quantity of Motion he communi∣cated to Matter at first. And I think it may be worth consider∣ing, Whether by this Doctrine of theirs, the Cartesians do not more take upon them than other Philo∣sophers,

to judge of God's De∣signs. For, if a Man be known to be very Wise, and have vari∣ous ways of compassing his seve∣ral Ends, He that, seeing some of those ways have a direct tenden∣cy to some Rational End, shall conclude That End to be one of those that is intended, does there∣by less presume, and express more respect to that Wise Man, than he that should conclude, that those cannot be his Ends, and that He can have no other Design knowa∣ble by us, except a certain Gene∣ral one nam'd by the Assertor. And indeed, it seems more easie to know, that this or that particular thing, for which an Engine is pro∣per, may be among others, intend∣ed by the Artificer, tho' never so Skilful, than to know Negatively, that he can have no other than such or such an End.

And how will a Cartesian assure me, that among the many Ends,

that he grants that God may have propos'd to himself in the Produ∣ction of his Mundane Creatures; one may not be, That We, whom he has vouchsaf'd to make Intelli∣gent Beings, and capable of Admi∣ring and Praising him, should find just cause to do so, for the Wisdom and Goodness he has display'd in the World? which Attributes we could not well discern or celebrate, unless we knew as well, that the Creatures were made for such Uses, as that they are exceedingly well fitted for them. I know God's Im∣mutability is alledged, to prove that the Quantity of Motion is ne∣ver vary'd: But to me 'tis not evi∣dent, why God's having particular Ends, tho' some of them seem to require a Change in his way of Acting in Natural Things, must be more inconsistent with his Im∣mutability, than his Causing many things to be brought to pass, which tho' abaeterno he decreed to do, are yet not actually done, unless in

process of Time. And particular∣ly it seems not clear, why God may not as well be Immutable, tho' he should sometimes vary the Quantity of Motion that he has put into the World, as He is, tho', according to the Opinion of most of the Cartesians themselves, he does daily create multitudes of Ra∣tional Souls, to unite them to Hu∣man Bodies: Especially consider∣ing, that these newly created sub∣stances, are, according to Des-Cartes, endow'd with a power, to determine and regulate the moti∣ons of the Spirits and the Conari∣on; which are things clearly Cor∣poreal, I say not this, as if I ab∣solutely rejected the Cartesian Do∣ctrine, about the continuance of the same Quantity of Motion in the whole Mass of Matter. For, whe∣ther or no it be a Truth; I think 'tis no unuseful nor improbable Hypothesis: And I have not so much argued against it, as upon the Grounds, on which they argue for it.

Wherefore, to come now to the thing it self, whereas Monsieur Des-Cartes objects, that 'tis a Pre∣sumption for Man, to pretend to be able to investigate the Ends, that the Omniscient God propos'd to himself in the making of his Creatures; I consider by way of Answer, That there are two very differing ways, wherein a Man may pretend to know the Ends of God in his visible Works: For, he may either pretend to know only some of God's Ends, in some of his Works; or, he may pretend to know all his Ends. He that arro∣gates to himself, to discover God's Ends in this latter sense, will scarce be excus'd from a high Presump∣tion, and no less a Folly, from the reason lately intimated in the Car∣tesian Objection. But to pretend to know God's Ends in the former sense, is not a Presumption, but rather, to take notice of them is a Duty. For, there are some things in Nature so curiously contrived,

and so exquisitly fitted for certain Operations and Uses, that it seems little less than Blindness in Him, that acknowledges with the Carte∣sians a most wise Author of things, not to conclude, that, tho' they may have been design'd for other, and perhaps higher Uses; yet they were design'd for this Use. As he that sees the Admirable Fabric of the Coats, Humors, and Muscles of the Eyes, and how excellently all the parts are adapted to the making up of an Organ of Vision, can scarce forbear to believe, that the Author of Nature intended It should serve the Animal, to which it belongs, to See with. The Epi∣cureans indeed, that believe the World to have been produc'd but by the casual concourse of Atoms, without the intervention of any In∣telligent Being, may have a kind of excuse, whereof other Philoso∣phers are destitute, that acknow∣ledge a Deity, if not also a Provi∣dence. For the very Supposition,

for instance, that a mans Eyes were made by Chance, argues, that they need have no relation to a design∣ing Agent; and the use that a man makes of them, may be either casual too, or at least may be an effect of His knowledge, not of Na∣ture's. But when, upon the Ana∣tomical Dissection, and the Optical Consideration, of a Human Eye, we see 'tis as exquisitly fitted to be an organ of Sight, as the best Artificer in the world could have fram'd a little Engine, purposely and mainly design'd for the use of seeing; 'tis very harsh and incongruous to say, that an Artificer, who is too intel∣ligent either to do things by chance, or to make a curious piece of work∣manship without knowing what uses 'tis fit for, should not design it for an use to which 'tis most fit.

'Tis not to be deny'd that he may have more uses for it than one, and perhaps such uses as we cannot di∣vine; but this hinders not, but that,

among its several uses, this, to which we see it so admirably a∣dapted, should be thought one. And I see not, how it does magni∣fie Gods wisdom, or express our Veneration of it, to exclude out of the number of his Ends in framing Human Eyes, that most obvious and ready use which we are sure is made of them, and which they could not be better fitted for. This may perhaps be not unfitly illustra∣ted by the following Comparison, whereof the application were su∣perfluous: Suppose that a Coun∣try Man, being in a clear day brought into the Garden of some famous Mathematician, should see there, one of those curious Gno∣monick Instruments, that show at once, the place of the Sun in the Zodiack, his Declination from the Aequator, the Day of the Month, the Length of the Day, &c. It would indeed be presumption in him, be∣ing unacquainted both with the Mathematical Disciplines, and the

several Intentions of the Artist, to pretend or think himself able, to discover all the Ends, for which so Curious and Elaborate a Piece was framed. But when he sees it furnished with a Stile, with Ho∣rary Lines and Numbers, and in short, with all the Requisites of a Sun Dial, and manifestly perceives the Shadow to mark from time time, the Hour of the Day; 'twould be no more a Presumpti∣on than an Error in him to con∣clude, that (whatever other Uses the Instrument is fit, or was de∣sign'd for) it is a Sun-Dial, that was meant to shew the Hour of the Day.

And here I shall demand of those, that will not allow us to think, that any Natural Things are directed to Ends knowable by Men; whether, if the Divine Au∣thor of them had really design'd them for such Ends, the things themselves are not so Fram'd and

directed, as in that case they should be? And whether the Fabrick and Management of Natural Things, do really countenance or contradict our Supposition?

For my part, after what has been already discours'd, I scruple not to confess, that I see not why it should be reputed a Disparage∣ment to the Wisdom of any Agent whatsoever, to think, that his Pro∣ductions were design'd for such Ends, among others, as they are excellently fram'd and fitted for; unless it did appear, that those Ends were unworthy to be De∣sign'd by the Wise Agent. But that cannot be justly said in our present Case; since 'tis not injuri∣ous to the Divine Author of things, to believe that some of the Ends, to which he destinated divers of his Corporeal Works, were; To exert and communicate His Exu∣berant Goodness, and to receive from his intelligent Creatures, such

as Men, an ardent Love, a high Admiration, and an obsequious Gratitude, for having display'd so much Wisdom and Beneficence, in exquisitly qualifying his Works to be wonderfully serviceable to one another, and a great number of them to be particularly subser∣vient to the Necessities and Utili∣ties of Man.

And indeed I can by no means assent to that Assertion of Mr. Des-Cartes, That it can∣not be said, that some of Gods Ends (in his Corporeal Works) are more manifest than o∣thers; but that all of them lie equally hid in the Abyss of the Divine Wis∣dom: since there are many of his Creatures, some of whose Uses are so manifest and obvious, that the generality of Mankind, both

Philosophers and Plebeians, have in all Ages, and almost in all Coun∣tries, taken Notice of, and Ac∣knowledg'd them. And as to what he adds, (by which he seems to intimate the motive that led him to make the foremention'd Asser∣tion,) That in Physicks, all things ought to be made out by certain and solid Reasons; to this I an∣swer, First, That I see not why the admitting, that the Author of Things design'd some of his Works for these or those Uses, amongst others, may not consist with the Physical Accounts of making of those things; as a Man may give a Mechanical Reason of the Stru∣cture of every Wheel and other part of a Watch, and of their way of acting upon one another when they are rightly put toge∣ther, and in short, of the Contri∣vance and Phoenomena of the little Machine; tho' he suppose, that the Artificer design'd it to show the hours of the day, and tho' he

have that intended use in his Eye, whilst he Explicates the Fabrick and Operations of the Watch. I answer, Secondly, That I rea∣dily admit, that in Physicks we should indeed ground all things upon as solid Reasons as may be had; But I see no necessity, that those Reasons should be always precisely Physical: Especially if we be treating, not of any parti∣cular Phaenomenon, that is produc'd according to the course of Nature establish'd in the World, already constituted as this of ours is: but of the first and general Causes of the World it self; from which Causes, I see not why the Final Causes, or Uses, that appear ma∣nifestly enough to have been de∣sign'd, should be excluded. And to me 'tis not very material, whe∣ther or no, in Physicks or any o∣ther Discipline, a thing be prov'd by the peculiar Principles of that Science or Discipline; provided it be firmly proved by the common

grounds of Reason. And on this occasion let me observe, that the Fundamental Tenents of Mr. Des-Cartes's own Philosophy, are not by himself prov'd by Arguments strictly Physical; but either by Metaphysical ones, or the more Catholick Dictates of Reason, or the particular testimonies of Ex∣perience. For when, for instance, he truly ascribes to God, all the Mo∣tion that is found in Matter; and consequently, all the variety of Phoenomenae that occur in the World; he proves not by an Ar∣gument precisely Physical, that God, who is an Immaterial Agent, is the efficient cause of Motion in Matter; but only by this, That since Motion does not belong to the Essence and nature of Matter, Matter must owe the Motion it has to some other Being: And then 'tis most agreeable to common Rea∣son, to infer, that, since Matter cannot move it self, but it must be mov'd by some other Being, that

Being must be Immaterial, since otherwise some Matter must be able to move it self contrary to the Hypothesis. And when Des-Cartes goes to demonstrate, that there is always in the Universe, the self-same quantity of Motion, (that is, just as much at any one time, as at any other) and con∣sequently, that as much motion as one Body communicates to ano∣ther, it looses it self; he proves it, by the Immutability of God, which is not a Physical Argument strictly so call'd, but rather a Metaphysical One; as he formerly prov'd, God's being the Cause of all Motion in Matter, not by Principles peculiar to Physicks, but by the common grounds of Reason.

Tho' Monsieur Des-Cartes does, as I have formerly shown, speak very Dogmatically and Universally, against

Mens endeavouring or pretending to know any Final Causes in Natural things; for which Reason I have, as well as the genera∣lity of his other Readers, and even his Disciples, look'd upon the Sense of those positive Ex∣pressions as con∣taining his Opini∣on; yet, since I writ the foregoing part of this Treatise, I lighted on a Passage of his, wherein he seems to speak more cautiously or reser∣vedly, opposing His Reasoning to Their

Opinion who teach, that God hath no other End in making the World, but that of being prais'd by Men. But in that short Discourse where∣of this Passage is a part, there are two or three other things wherein I cannot Acquiesce. As first, that 'tis Self-evident, that we cannot know the Ends of God, unless he Himself reveal them to us; (he must mean in a Supernatural way, if he will not speak impertinent∣ly:) For what he says to be evi∣dent of it self, is not at all so, to the generality of Mankind, and even of Philosophers; and there∣fore I think, it ought not to be barely pronounc'd, but (if it can be) should be prov'd. And next, he does not show how we are ob∣lig'd to praise God for his Works, if He had no intention to have us do so, or that we should discover any of the Ends for which He made them. If a judicious Man should see a great Book, written in some Indian Language, which he

is utterly a Stranger to, and should know nothing of it, but that 'twas made by a very Intelligent Physi∣cian: He might indeed conclude, that the Work was not made by chance, but would have no means to be convinc'd by the In∣spection of the Book it self, that it was compos'd with great Skill and Kindness, and deserv'd his Praise and Thanks: Since he could not know any of the particular Ends, to which the several Chap∣ters of it were destinated, nor con∣sequently discover how skilfully they were fitted to reach such Ends. What Des-Cartes says, that 'tis childish and absurd to think, that God had created the Sun, which is many times bigger than the Earth, only to afford Light to Man, who is but a very small part of It, is somewhat invidiously pro∣pos'd; there being few able Wri∣ters, that confine the Utility of the Sun directly to the affording Light to Man; and the littleness of his

Bulk, ought not to make it thought absurd, that God may have had an especial Eye to his Welfare, in fra∣ming that bright Globe; since not only, for ought appears to us, that most excellent Engine of Mans Body, is a more admirable thing than the Sun, but the rational and immortal Soul that resides in it, is incomparably more noble than a thousand Masses of brute Matter, and that not so much as Organiz'd, can be justly reputed, (as will be hereafter more fully declared.) And since in this very Discourse, the accute Author of it confesses, that we may know the ends of God's Corporeal Works, if He reveal them to us; a Christian Philoso∣pher may be allow'd, to think the Sun was made, among other pur∣poses, to inlighten the Earth, and for the use of Man, since the Scripture teaches us, that not only the Sun and Moon, but the Stars of the Firmament, which Des-Cartes not improbably thinks to be

so many Suns, were made to give Light to the Earth, and were divi∣ded to all the Nati∣ons that inhabit it. Perhaps it were not rash to add, that I see not why the Belief, that a Man may know some of God's Ends in things Corporeal, should more derogate from our Veneration of his Wisdom, than to think we know some of his Ends in other Matters, of which the Scrip∣ture furnishes us with a mul∣titude of Instances, as (particu∣larly) that of Job sacrificing for his Friends; and the declar'd Uses of the Ʋrim and Thumim: Since God may, if He pleases, declare Truths to Men, and instruct them, by his Creatures and his Actions, as well as by his Words: As when He taught Noah by the Rain-bow, and Jonah by a Gourd and a Worm, and regulated the Incamp∣ment of the Israelites, by the gui∣dance of a Cloud, and a fiery

Pillar. Lastly, whereas Monsieur Des-Cartes objects, that those he dissents from, talk as if they look'd upon God as a proud Man, who design'd his Works only to be prais'd for them; I know not, whether in this place he speaks so cautiously and reverently of God, as he ought, and elsewhere is wont to do. For as Humility, tho' it be a Vertue in Men, is extreamly remote from being any of Gods Perfections, so That may be pride in a Man, who is but a Creature, imperfect, dependent, and hath nothing that he has not receiv'd; which would be none at all in God, who is uncapable of Vice, and who may, if he please, justly propose to himself His own Glory for one of his Ends, and both require and delight to be prais'd by Men for his Works; since he is most wor∣thy of all praise, and 'tis their du∣ty and reasonable service, which he is graciously pleas'd to approve of, to pay it Him.

'Tis not without trouble, that I find my self oblig'd by the exigen∣cy of my design, so much to op∣pose, in several places of this pre∣sent Discourse, some Sentiments of Mr. Des-Cartes, for whom other∣wise I have a great esteem, and from whom I am not forward to dissent. And this I the rather de∣clare to you, because I am not at all of Their mind, that think Mr. Des-Cartes a favourer of Atheism, which, to my apprehension, would subvert the very foundation of those Tenents of Mechanical Phi∣losophy, that are particularly his. But judging that his Doctrine (at least as it is understood by several of his Followers, as well as his Ad∣versaries;) about the rejection of Final Causes from the consideration of Naturalists, tends much to wea∣ken, (as is elsewhere noted) if not quite to deprive us of, one of the best and most successful Argu∣ments, to convince Men, that there

is a God, and that they ought to Admire, Praise, and Thank him: I think it my duty to prefer an im∣portant truth, before my respect to any Man, how eminent soever, that opposes it; and to consider more the Glory of the great Au∣thor of Nature, than the Reputa∣tion of any one of Her Interpre∣ters.

And to strengthen what I have been saying, give me leave to mind you more expresly here, of what I have elsewhere Intimated, viz. That the excellent Contrivance of the great System of the World, and especially the curious Fabrick of the Bodies of Animals, and the Uses of their Sensories, and other parts, have been the great Mo∣tives, that in all Ages and Nati∣ons induc'd Philosophers to ac∣knowledge a Deity, as the Author of these admirable Structures; and that the Noblest and most Intelli∣gent Praises, that have been paid

Him by the Priests of Nature, have been occasion'd and indited by the Transcending Admiration, which the attentive Contemplation of the Fabrick of the Universe and of the curious Structures of Living Crea∣tures, justly produc'd in them. And therefore it seems injurious to God, as well as unwarrantable in it self, to banish from Natural Philosophy, the Consideration of Final Causes; from which chiefly, if not only, I cannot but think (tho' some Learned Men do other∣wise) that God must reap the Ho∣nour that is due to those glorious Attributes, his Wisdom, and his Goodness. And I confess, I some∣what wonder, that the Cartesians, who have generally, and some of them skilfully, maintain'd the Ex∣istence of a Deity, should endea∣vour to make Men throw away an Argument, which the Experience of all Ages shews to have been the most Successful, (and in some Cases the only prevalent one) to

establish among Philosophers the Belief and Veneration of God. I know the Cartesians say, That their Master has demonstrated the Ex∣istence of a God, by the Innate Idea that Men have of a Being in∣finitely perfect; who left it upon the mind of Man, as the mark of an Artist imprest upon his Work: And also that they ascribe to God, the having made Matter out of nothing, and alone put it into Mo∣tion; which sufficiently argue the Immensity of his Power. But, tho' I would by no means weaken the Argument, drawn from the Inbred Notion of God, since I know, that divers Learned Men have Acquiesc'd in it; yet, on the other side, I see not, why we may not reasonably think, that God, who, as themselves confess, has been pleas'd to take care, Men should acknowledge Him, may also have provided for the securing of a Truth of so great Consequence, by stamping Characters, or lea∣ving

Impresses, that Men may know his Wisdom and Goodness by, as well without, upon the World, as within, upon the Mind. The bare Speculation of the Fa∣brick of the World, without con∣sidering any part of it as destinated to certain (or determinate) Uses, may still leave Men unconvinc'd, that there is any Intelligent, Wise, and Provident Author and Disposer of Things: Since we see generally the Aristotelians (before some of them were better Instructed by the Christian Religion) did, notwith∣standing the Extent, Symmetry, and Beauty of the World, believe it to have been Eternal. And tho' They, whatever their Master thought, did not believe it to have been Created by God; yet, be∣cause they asserted that Animals, Plants, &c. act for Ends, they were oblig'd to acknowledge a Provident and Powerful Being, that maintain'd and govern'd the Uni∣verse, which they call'd Nature:

Tho' they too often dangerously mistook, by sometimes confound∣ing this Being with God himself; and at other times, speaking of it as Co-ordinate with him, as in that famous Axiom of Aristotle, Deus & Natura nihil faciunt frusta. I acknowledge therefore, that, as I set a just value upon the Cartesian Proof of God's Existence, so I see no reason, why we should disfur∣nish our selves of any other strong Argument to prove so noble and important a Truth; especially, since the Cartesian way of consider∣ing the World, is very proper in∣deed to shew the Greatness of God's Power, but not, like the way I plead for, to manifest that of his Wisdom and Beneficence. For, whereas a Cartesian does but shew, that God is admirably Wise, upon the supposition of his Exi∣stence; in our way, the same thing is manifested by the Effect of a Wisdom, as well as Power, that cannot reasonably be ascribed to

any other, than a most intelligent and potent Being: So that by This way, Men may be brought, upon the same account, both to acknow∣ledge God, to admire Him, and to thank Him.

Notes

• Nec fingi potest, aliquos Dei Fines, magis quàm alios, in propatulo esse; omnes enim in im∣perscrutabili éjus sapientiae Abysso sunt eodem modo reconditi. Resp. Quart. ad Object. Gassendi.
• C'est une chose qui de soy est ma∣nifeste, que nous ne pouvons con∣noistre les fins de Dieu, si luy mes∣me ne nous les re∣vele. Et e••core qu'il soit vray en Morale, en egard à nous autres hommes, quetoutes choses ont este fai∣tes pour la gloire de Dieu, à cause que les hommes sont obligez de louer Dieu pour tous ses ouvrages; & qu'on puisse aussi dire, que le soleil à este fait pour nous eclairer, pour ce que nous experimentons que le soleil en effet nous eclaire: ce seroit toutes fois une chose puerile & absurde, d'assu∣rer en Metaphy∣sique, que Dieu, à la facon d'un hom∣me superbe, n'au∣roit point eu d'au∣tre fin en bastis∣sant le Monde, que celle destre louè par les hommes; & qu'il n'auroit creè le soleil, qui est plusieurs fois plus grand que la Terre, à autre dessein que d'eclai∣rer l'homme, qui n'en occupe qu'une tres-pe∣tite partie.
• Deut. 4.19.