Origen against Celsus translated from the original into English by James Bellamy ...

About this Item

Title
Origen against Celsus translated from the original into English by James Bellamy ...
Author
Origen.
Publication
London :: Printed by B. Mills and sold by J. Robinson ...,
[1660?]
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Subject terms
Celsus, -- Platonic philosopher, -- fl. 180.
Apologetics -- Early works to 1800.
Apologetics -- History -- Early church, ca. 30-600.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A70747.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Origen against Celsus translated from the original into English by James Bellamy ..." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A70747.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 30, 2024.

Pages

CHAP. XIX.

THEN he says, That a Company of Men, that look'd after Sheep, and Goats, being left to the Conduct of Moses, were so grosly deceiv'd by him, that he made 'em believe, there was no other God but one.

Let him show therefore, since he thinks they did, without just Cause, oppose the Worship of a Plurality of Gods, I say, let him show, whether,

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on rational Grounds, he can establish the Polytheism both of the Greeks and Barbarians. Let him show the Sub∣stance and Essence of Mnemosyne, on whom Jupiter begat the Muses, or of Themis, on whom he begat the Hours, Let him show the Subsistence of the Graces, which are always represented Naked.

But I'm confident, he'll never be able to prove from the Things themselves, that the Gods of the Greeks, which have Bodies attributed to 'em, do de∣serve the Name of Deitys. For what Reason can be given, why we shou'd believe, that the Fables of the Greeks concerning their pretended Deities, have any more Truth or Sence contain'd in 'em, than those of the Egyptians, For Instance, whose Language is un∣acquainted with Mnemosyne, the Mo∣ther of the Muses, or Themis, the Mo∣ther of the Hours, or Eurynome, the Mother of the Graces, and the like?

What is there in all these empty Ficti∣ons, that deserves to be compar'd with the Evidence, and Weight, which that one Argument, drawn from the entire Harmony of the seemingly-clashing Parts of the spacious Universe, do's carry with it, to prove the perfect Ʋnity of God.

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For 'tis impossible in the Nature of the Thing, that a Piece of such Divine Architecture, all the Parts of which (how numerous soever, and how distant, and different soever from each other they may be) have so ad∣mirable an Agreement, and so mani∣fest, direct, and constant a Subserviency to the Advantage and Ornament of the whole, shou'd be made by several Hands, as 'tis not rational to think, that the Motions of the Heavenly Bodies are caus'd by several Souls, since there's no Need of any more than one, which making the vast Ex∣pansam to move from East to West, con∣tains within it self all those lower Things, which, tho' they are not in themselves compleat, do nevertheless conduce to the wonderful Harmony, and by Consequence the surprizing Perfection of the Universe. For every Thing which is circumscrib'd by the World is a Part belonging to it, but God is not properly a Part of any whole, of what Kind soever it may be. For Absolute Perfection is insepar∣able from the Nature of God, whereas all the Parts of the Universe, how agreably soever they may strike upon our wondering Senses, and entertain ev'n our Nobler Powers, are naturally, evidently, and in a comparative Sense,

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very grosly imperfect, and if we carry our Speculations a little farther, per∣haps we shall find, that as God is not a part of the Universe: so neither in Propriety, and Strictness of Speech, can he be call'd a whole, since we must unavoidably suppose a whole to be compos'd of Parts; and at least, 'tis most highly irrational to think, that the great God has Parts, any one of which has not an equal Virtue, and Dignity with the rest.

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