The chariot of truth wherein are contained I. a declaration against sacriledge ..., II. the grand rebellion, or, a looking-glass for rebels ..., III. the discovery of mysteries ..., IV. the rights of kings ..., V. the great vanity of every man ... / by Gryffith Williams.

CHAP. VIII.

Sheweth, that our Parliament hath no power to make warre against our King: Two main Objections answered: The original of Parliaments: The power of the King to call a Parliament, to deny what he will, and to dissolve it when he will. Why our King suffereth.

BUt, when all that hath been spoken cannot satisfie their indignation against true obedience, and allay▪ the heat of their rebellious spirits, they come to their ultimum refugium, best strength, and strongest fort; that although all others should want sufficient right to crosse the commands, and resist the violence of an unjust and tyrannical Prince; yet the Parliament, that is the representative body of all his Kingdom, and are intrusted with the goods, estates, and lives of all his people, may lawfully resist, and when necessity requireth, take arms, and subdue their most lawful King; and this they labour to confirm by many arguments.

I answer, that for the Parliament of England it is beyond my sphere,

and I being a transmarine member of this Parliament of Ireland, I will on∣ly direct my speech to that whereof I am a Peer; and I hope I may the more boldly speak my mind to them, whereof I am a member; and I dare maintain it, that it shall be a benefit, and no prejudice, both to King and Kingdome, that the Spiritual Lords have their Votes in this our Parliament.

For, besides the equity of our sitting in Parliament, and our indubita∣ble right to vote therein; (and his Majesty, (as I conceive, under favour be it spoken) is obliged by the very first act in Magna Charta, to preserve that right unto us) when as in the Summons of Edw. 1. it is inserted in the Writ, that, Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbari, or tractari debet whatsoever affair is of publique concernment, ought to receive publique approbation; and therefore with what equity can so considerable a party of this Kingdom, as are the Clergy, (who certainly cannot deserve to for∣feit the priviledge of the meanest subjects, and of Common men, because they are more immediately the servants of the living God) be denied the benefit of that, which in all mens judgements is so reasonable a law, and they onely be excluded from that interest, which is common unto all, I cannot ••ee: yet I say, that besides this our right, while we sit in Parlia∣••••nt, this fruit shall alwayes follow, that our knowledge and conscience shall never suffer us to vote such things against the truth, as to allow that power or priviledge to our Parliament, as to make Orders and Ordinan∣ces without the consent, and contrary to the will of our King, much lesse to leav•••• moneys, and raise armes against our King: for I conceive the Privi∣ledges of Parliament to be Privatae leges Parliament, a proceeding ac∣c••••ding to certain rules, and private customes and lawes of Parliament, which no member of the Houses ought to transcend; whereas the other is Privatio legum, a proceeding without Law, contrary to all rules, as if our Parliament had an omnipotent power, and were more infallible than the Pope, to make all their Votes just, and their sayings truth.

I, but to make this assertion good, that the Parliament in some cases may justly take arms, and make warre upon their justest King, if they conceive him to be unjust: it is alledged, that although the King be Singulis major, greater then any one, yet he is Ʋniversis minor, lesse then all; therefore all may oppose him, if he refuse to consent unto them.

I answer, that the weaknesse of this argument, is singularly well shewed in the Answer to the Observations upon some of his Majesties late Answers and Expresses; and I will briefly contract the Answer, to say, the King is better than any one, doth not prove him to be better then two; and if his Supremacy be no more, then many others may challenge as much: for the Prince is Singulis major, a Lord above all Knights, and a Knight above all Esquires; hs is singulis major, though universis minor; And if the King be universis minor, then the people have placed a King, not over, but under them: And Saint Peter doth much mistake, in calling the King Supreme, and they do ill to petition, when they might command: and I am confident, that no re∣cords (except of such Parliaments as have most unjustly deposed their Kings) can shew us one example, that the Parliament should have a power, which must of necessity over-rule the King, or make their Votes Law, with∣out, and against the will of the King; for if their Votes be Law without his consent, what need they seek and sollicit his consent?

But the clause in the Law made 2. Hen 5. cited by his Majesty, that it is of the Kings regality to grant or deny such of their Petitions as pleaseth himself, and the power which the Law gives the King to dissolve the Parlia∣ment; and especially the words in the Preface of cap. 12. Vices to Hen. 8. where the Kings Supremacy, not over single persons, but over all the body politique is clearly delivered, doth sufficiently shew the simplicity of this

Sophistry, and prove that the King being invested with all the power of the people, which is due to him as their King, he is the onely fountain of all power and justice; so that now they can justly claim no power, but what is derived from him; and therefore it is the more intolerable, that any man should usurp the power of the King, to destroy the King.

2. They will say, that Salus populi est suprema lex, The good of the people is the chiefest thing that is aymed at in all government; and the Parlia∣ment is the representative body of all the people; therefore if any thing be intended contrary to the good of the people, they may and ought lawfully to resist the same.

I answer, and confesse, that there is no wise King, but will carefully pro∣vide for the safety of his people, because his honour is included therein, and his ruine is involved in their destruction; but it is certain, that this princi∣ple hath been used as one of our Irish mantles, to hide the rebellion of many Traytors, and so abused to the confusion of many Nations; for there is not scarce any thing more facile, then to perswade a people that they are not well governed; as you may see in the example of Absolon, who by abusing this very Axiome, hath stollen away the hearts of many of his fathers sub∣j••cts: for, as Lipsius saith, Proprium est aegri, nihil diu pati, It is incident to sick men, and so to distempered minds, to indure nothing long, but follish∣ly to think every change to be a remedy; therefore the people that are soon perswaded to believe the lightest burthen to be too heavie, are easily led away by every seducing Absolon, who promise them deliverance from all their evils, so they may have their assistance to effect their ends; and then the people, swelled up with hopes, cry up those men as the reformers of the State; and so the craft and subtilty of the one, prevailing over the weak∣nesse and simplicity of the other, every Peer and Officer that they like not, must with Teramines be condemned, and themselves must have all pre∣ferments, or the King and Kingdom must be lyable to be ruined.

But you will say, the whole Parliament cannot be thought to be thus en∣vious against the Officers of State; or thus carelesse of the common good, as, for any sinister end, to destroy the happinesse of the whole.

I answer, that Parliaments are not alwayes guided by an unerring spirit, [Sol.] but as Generall Councels, so whole Parliaments have been repealed and de∣clared null by succeeding Parliaments, as 21. Rich. 2. c. 12. all the Statutes made 11 Rich. 2. are disanulled: and this in the 21 Rich 2. is totally repea∣led in 1 Hen. 4. c. 3. And 39 Hen. 6. we find a total repeal of a Parliament held at Coventry the year before, and the like: and the reason is, because many times by the hypocritical craft of some Faction, working upon the weaknesse of some, and the discontent of others, the worse part procu∣ring most unto their party, prevaileth against the better.

Besides all this, I conceive the Original of Parliaments was, as it is ex∣pressed in the Kings Writ, to consult with the King, De quibusdam arduis, & urgentibus negotiis regni; they being collected from all the parts of the Kingdom, can best inform His Majesty, what grievances are sprung, and what reparations may be made, and what other things may be concluded for the good of His Subjects in every part: and His Majesty to inform them of his occasions and necessities which by their free and voluntary Subsi∣dies, they are to supply both for his honour, and their own defence. In all this they have no power to command their King, no power to make Lawes with∣out their King, no right to meet without his Writ, no liberty to stay any longer then he gives leave; how then can you meet, as you do now, in my Episcopal See at Kilkenny, and continue your Parliament there, to make warre against your lawful King? What colour of reason have you to do the same? you cannot pretend to be above your King; you have with lyes and falshoods most wickedly seduced the whole Kingdom, and involved the same

in a most unnatural civil warre: you are the actives, the King is passive; you make the offensive, He the defensive warre; for you began, and when He, like a Gracious King, still cryed for peace, you still made ready for battel.

And I doubt not but your selves know all this to be true, for you know, that all Parliament men must have their elections warranted by the Kings especial Writ. You will say, that so you were; well, and you were chosen but by subjects, and intrusted by them to represent the affections, and to act the duties of subjects; and subjects cannot impose a rule upon their Soveraign, nor make any ordinance against their King; and therefore, if the represen∣tative body of subjects transcend the limits of their trust; and do in the name of the subjects, that which all subjects cannot do; and assume that power which the subjects neither have, nor can conferre upon them: I see no reason that any subject in the world should any wayes approve of their actions. For, how can your priviledge of being Parliament men, priviledge you from being Murderers, Thieves, or Traytors, if you do those things that the Law adjudgeth to be murders, thefts, and treasons? Your electi∣ons cannot quit you, and your places cannot excuse you; because he that is intrusted, cannot do more then all they that do intrust him; and there∣fore all subjects should desert them, that exceed the conditions, and falsifie the trust which their fellow subjects have reposed in them.

Besides, you know the King must needs be reputed part of every Par∣liament, when as the selected company of Knights and Burgesses, together with the Spiritual and Temporal Peers, are the representative body, and the King is the real head of the whole Kingdom; and therefore if the body separates it self from the head, it can be but an uselesse trunk, that can pro∣duce no act, which pertaineth to the good of the body: because the spirits that gave life and motion to the whole body, are all derived from the head, as the Philosopher teacheth.

And further, you do all know, that as the King hath a power to call, so he hath a power to dissolve all Parliaments; and having a power of dissolving it when he will, he must needs have a power of denying what he please; be∣cause the other is farre greater then this. And therefore, all these premises well considered, it is apparent that your sitting in Kilkenny without your King, (or his Lievtenant, which is to the same purpose;) and your Votes without his assent, are all invalid to exact obedience from any subject; and for my part I deem them fooles that will obey them, and rebels that will take arms against their King at your commands; and if you persist in this your rebellious obstinacy, I wish your judgements may light onely upon your own heads: and that those, which like the followers of Absolon, are simply led by you, may have the mist taken from their eyes, that they may be able to discern the duty they owe unto their King, that they be not in∣volved, and so perish in your sin.

For, though you be never so many, and think that all the Kingdom, Towns, and Cities be for you; yet take heed lest you imagine such a mis∣chievous device, which you are not able to perform; for the involving of well∣meaning men into your bad businesses, as Jehosaphat was mis led to war a∣gainst Ramoth Gilead, doth not only bring a punishment upon them that are seduced, but a far greater plague upon you that do seduce them: and God, who hath at all times so exceeding graciously defended His Majesty, and contrary to your hopes and expectation, from almost nothing in the begin∣ning of this rebellion, hath increased his power, to I hope an invincible Ar∣my, will be a rock of defence unto his annointed; because it is well known to all the world, that whatsoever this good King hath suffered at the hands of his subjects, it is for the preservation of the true Protestant Religion, of the established Lawes of his Kingdomes, and of those Reverend Bishops,

Grave Doctors, and all the rest of the Learned and Religious Clergy, that have ever maintained, and will, to the spilling of the last drop of their blood, defend this truth against all Papists, and other Anabaptistical Brow∣nists and Sectaries whatsoever.

And therefore if you that are his Parliament, should, like unthankeful va∣pours, that cloud the Sun which raised them; or like the Moon in her interpo∣sition, that obscures the glorious lamp which enlightens her, in the least man∣ner imploy that strength, which you have received from his Majesty, when he called you together, against His Majesty; it will be an ugly spot, and a foul blemish, both for your selves, and all your posterities: And if not sud∣denly prevented, you may raise such spirits, that your selves cannot lay down; and sow such seeds of discord and disconte••t between the King and his people, as may derive through the whole Race of all succeeding Kings, such a disaffection to Parliaments, as may prove a plague and poyson to the whole Kingdom. For, if the King out of his favour and grace call you to∣gether, and intrust you with a power either of continuing, concluding, or enacting such things, as may be for the good of the Common wealth; and you abuse that power against him that gave it you: I must needs confesse that I am of his mind, who saith, That the King were freed before God and man from all blame, though he should use all possible lawful means to with∣draw that power into his own hands; which being but lent them, hath been so misapplyed against him: for if my servant desireth to hold my sword, and when I intrust him with it, he seeks to thrust the same into my breast, Will not every man judge it lawful for me to gain my sword, if it be possi∣ble, out of his hand, and with that sword to cut off his head, that would have thrust it into my heart? or, as one saith, If I convey my estate in trust to any friend, to the use of me and mine, and the person intrusted falsifie the faith reposed in him, by conveying the profits of my estate to other ends, to the prejudice of me and mine, no man wi••l think it unlawful for me to an∣nihilate (if I can possibly do it) such a deed of trust.

And therefore, Noble Peers and Gentlemen of this ancient Kingdom of Ireland, that your Parliament may prove successeful to the benefit of the Common-wealth; let me, that have some interest and charge over all the In∣habitants and So journers of Kilkenny, perswade you to think your selves no Parliament without your King; and that your Votes and Ordinances, carrying with them the power, though not the name of Acts of Parliament, to oblige both King and Subjects to obey them, are the most absolute subversion of our Fundamental Lawes, the destructive invasion of our right∣ful Liberties; And that by an usurped power of an arbitrary rule, to dis∣pose of our estates, or any part thereof as you please, to make us Delin∣quents when you will, and to punish us as Malignants at your pleasure, and through your discontent to dispossesse your rightful King, though it were to set the Crown upon the head of your greatest One al; is such a priviledg, that never any Parliament hath yet claimed. Or if you still go on for the inlargement of your own usurped power, under the title of the priviledge of Parliament, to Vote diminution of the Kings just Prerogative, that your Progenitors never denied to any of his Ancestors, to exclude us Bishops out of your Assemblies, without whom your determinations can never be so well concluded in the fear of God, and to invade the Liberties of your fellow-subjects, under the pretences of religion, and the publique good: I will say no more, but turn my self to God, and put it in my Liturgi; From Pa∣rasites, Puritanes, Popes, and such Parliaments, Good Lord deliver us.

Notes

• And whatsoe∣ver I speak of Parliaments in all this Dis∣course, I mean of Parliaments disjoyned from their King, and understand only the pre∣valent faction that ingros∣seth and cap∣tiva••eth the Votes of many of the plain honest minded party, which hath been of∣ten seen both in general Councels, and the greatest Parliaments.
• Claus. 7. m. 3. dors.
• Priviledges of Parliament, what they are.
• Pag. 11. & 38, 39, 40.
• 2 Pet. 2. 13.
• As Edw. Car∣narvan, and Richard the second.
• That the King is universis ma∣jor▪ greater then all: pro∣ved.
• God having given, and the people having yielded their power to th••ir King: they can never chal∣lenge any power, but what they have deriv••d from their king. 2. Reason. Sol.
• 2 Sam 15. 4.
• How easie it is to perswade the people to rebell.
• Repl.
• How a Faction many times prevaileth to sway whole Councels and Parliaments.
• The original of Parlia∣ments: why they were at first ordained.
• See Jo. Bodin. de repub. l. 1. c. 8. pag 95 in English, and the place is w••rth the no∣ting.
• The letter sent from a Gen∣tleman to his friend.
• That men in∣trusted, should not go beyond their trust.
• The King must needs be a part of every Par∣liament.
• The power of dissolving the Parliament, greater then the power of denying any thing.
• Psal. 21. 11.
• 1 Reg. 22. 20.
• For what cau∣ses the King suffereth.
• What a shame it is to use the power we have received a∣gainst him that gave it us.
• That it is law∣ful to recall a power given, when it is a∣bused.