A discourse concerning the Messias, in three chapters the first concerning the preparatories to his appearance in the types and prophesies of the Old Testament : the second demonstrating that it was typically and prophetically necessary that he should be born of a virgin : the third, that he is God as well as man : to which is prefixed a large preface ... : and an appendix is subjoyned concerning the divine extension ... / by John Turner ...

SECTION III. Des Cartez an Atheist, his Argument from the Idaea represented. (Book 3)

BUt I am firmly of opinion, whatever the Philosophers are pleased to say, who whether they be more conceited of themselves, or of their Master Des Cartez is hard to determine, that Des Cartez was as rank an Atheist, and a far more dange∣rous one: than either Diagoras or Theodo∣rus, or any of those whom Antiquity hath branded with that Name, and that he had a Design of introducing Atheism, and a Belief of nothing, but Body, into the World.

For though indeed he does very rightly affirm the Notions of extension and cogita∣tion to be, as they are, very different from

one another, yet when he makes extension to be the very Essence and constitutive Na∣ture of matter, and takes upon him to as∣sert not only, that all matter is extended, but also that nothing is extended but what is matter, the consequence of this is, when I come afterwards to consider, that I can have no notion of Substance without exten∣sion, and I have already granted extension and matter to be the same, that cogitation shall be only a certain mode or disposition of the infinitely diversifyed, and variously complicated Parts of this extension.

Again, his rejecting those arguments for the existence of a God, which have been used all along to be taken from the Fabrick and contrivance of the World, as indeed it was necessary for him to do, who had contrived such a giddy Ʋniverse of his own, and substituting in the stead of it, that Bul∣rush of an Idea, unable to withstand the least puff of disputation (which instead of defending the existence of a God, is mani∣fectly to betray the cause of God and of Re∣ligion) does but too plainly discover what thoughts we are to entertain of him, by whom so fallacious and inconclusive an argument was substituted in the stead of that, which is so strong in it self, and hath

been so successful in all ages, to preserve the belief and worship of a God among Men. To be sure David and this Philosopher were not of a mind, for he tells us very honestly, for want of this new Philosophy wherewith after ages have been blessed, The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy work, day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night shew∣eth knowledge, there is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard; Their line is gone out through all the Earth, and their words to the end of the World.

And that we may see the better how weak and inconclusive his argument drawn from the Idea is, I will explain as clearly as I can, what it is that he understands by it, he tells us therefore what is very true, that we are all of us born Infants, and that we come into the world without any know∣ledge or experience of the things about us, from whence it so falls out, that in some things we pass a wrong Judgment our selves, and in others we are deceived by taking things upon trust, from those that are them∣selves mistaken, that having once embra∣ced an errour and espoused it for a long time, it is very hard, as indeed it is for us to undeceive our selves, or to believe o∣therwise

of it, then as of a most certain and undoubted truth, he saith, that our sen∣ses do in many things delude us, and im∣pose upon us, as a stick in the water shall appear crooked, tho' it be indeed straight, and a square Tower or Building shall at a distance have the appearance of round, and a Marble touch'd by two fingers cros∣sing one another shall affect one with a Sense, as if it were two, though it be in∣deed but one, he tells us that in our dreams things do appear to us to be as real, as when we are never so wide awake, and that there is no certain way to distinguish betwixt the realities of the day, and the de∣lusions of the night, since the one doth al∣ways appear as real as the other, and at that time when they strike our Imagination, we do as really believe them to be true, there are many, saith he, that argue from a false Principle, and then it is impossible, but all the Conclusions, that are built upon it, must either be false or uncertain, there are others that let their Principle be never so right, yet they do not argue rightly from it, and on both sides it happens that those things are taken for certain Demonstrations, which are indeed nothing better, than very foul and palpable Mistakes; and upon such considerations

as these he exhorts his Disciple, as the best way to discover the Truth, to doubt of all things, the truth of his Faculties, the evidence of his Senses, the certainty even of direct and Mathematical Demonstrations; but yet at the same time, saith he, it is impossible, I should believe otherwise, but that I that doubt must be; For I can never give my Assent to this Proposition, That that which is not can ei∣ther doubt or think; therefore he lays down this as the first proposition of which we can be certain; I doubt therefore I am, or I think therefore I am, that is, I am as yet un∣certain of the Existence of my body, which being only an Object of my Senses, I may be de∣ceived in it, as well as in any other sensible Object whatsoever, but yet still notwithstand∣ing it is most certainly true; I doubt therefore I am, that is, that thing or nature whatever it is, which doubts or thinks or disputes with it self about all other things, must of necessity, have a real and undoubted Existence of its own, and though I be deceived in all the Judg∣ments, which I make upon the things about me, or that appear to me, as if they had a Being, yet thus much is still unquestionably true, I am deceived therefore I am; for that which is not cannot be deceived.

Wherefore being certain of the Truth of this first Proposition, that is, so certain, that it is impossible for me to doubt of it any longer, I doubt, or I think, or I am deceived, therefore I am; his next Enquiry is into the nature of this Being that thus pronounces of it self, and from it's thinking infers it's Exi∣stence; and, saith he, when I look into my self, I find the Sphere of my knowledg to be very short, and all that I pretend to know ve∣ry doubtful and uncertain, when I look back, I cannot recollect that I have been long in Be∣ing, and when I look forward I have no cer∣tainty that I shall exist the next moment; from whence he infers of himself, That he is an imperfect and dependent Creature, that could not give Being to its self; for then he should always have been; and cannot preserve it self in Being: For then he should be sure of his Existence for ever after, and compa∣ring the Idea's or Notions, which he finds within himself, he discovers some of them to be the Ideas or Representatiosn of sensible Objects, in which he cannot tell but he may be deluded and imposed upon, and others, though they appear to be of greater certainty, yet men have been deceived even in Mathematical Conclusions of which they thought themselves as certain as the most certain Evidence, and

the most unquestionable Demonstration could make them, but at last after a great deal of Rummaging and Tumbling over the Ideas of his mind, he finds one Idea or Notion of a Being necessarily existent, and this he tells us cannot chuse but be; because it hath neces∣sary Existence included in it's Nature, and this is that which he calls God.