A discourse concerning the Messias, in three chapters the first concerning the preparatories to his appearance in the types and prophesies of the Old Testament : the second demonstrating that it was typically and prophetically necessary that he should be born of a virgin : the third, that he is God as well as man : to which is prefixed a large preface ... : and an appendix is subjoyned concerning the divine extension ... / by John Turner ...

SECT. IV. The CARTESIAN Argument from the IDEA Refuted.

I Have laid down in the former Section, as plain and candid a Representation, as I am able to make, of that famous Argu∣ment for the Existence of a God, which is drawn from the Idaea, or from the Notion of a God implanted in the minds of Men,

including necessary existence in it; from whence the Philosopher is pleased to infer, that thing or Being which is represented by it, must of necessity be.

But against this profound way of Rea∣soning, that hath drawn so many eminent Disciples after it, there are these follow∣ing Objections to be made.

First, that if we would go the Cartesian way to work, yet this Proposition, I think therefore I am, cannot possibly be the first Proposition, of which I must be certain, but there must of necessity be three other Propositions, of whose Truth I must be well assured before I can be certain of this, and these Propositions are evidently these,

First, Nihili nulla sunt Attributa, that which is not hath no attributes or affections belonging to it.

Secondly, cogitatio est attributum, cogi∣tation or thinking is an attribute or affection of some substance. And then,

Thirdly, from this I infer, quod cogitat, est, that which thinks must be, which in the last place I apply to my self, ego cogito, ergo

sum, I think therefore I am, so that it is manifestly impossible for a Man to doubt of all things besides his own Exi∣stence, since it is so plain and demonstra∣bly certain, that there must be three o∣ther Propositions of which he must be sure, before he can be sure of that.

Secondly, Suppose a Man to be never so sure of his own existence, yet in this scep∣tical way of Reasoning, when I am once at a doubt of the existence of all other things, besides my self; it is utterly impossible, that ever I should get rid of this scruple by any means whatsoever; for though I do find the Idea or Notion of a Being necessa∣rily existent, impressed upon my mind; yet if I understand this of any thing without, and besides, my self, how can I tell, but I may be deceived in this Idaea, as well as in any other. It is true indeed there must be somewhat necessarily existent, or else nothing could be; for out of nothing comes nothing, but how can I tell, but I my self am that self-originated, that self-existent Being: For, because I cannot look back for any long space of time, it does by no means follow from thence, that there was any time when I was not; for I may possibly have forgot my self, as those that

assert the pre-existence of the Soul, do say, that she had a Being in the Regions above, before she was thrust down into this dun∣geon of the Earth; notwithstanding that neither they, nor we, have any the least Sense or Memory of any such thing; and (upon supposition that any thing may be forgotten) when we come to doubt of all things, this is a very unexceptionable way of Reasoning in the case proposed, and so on the other side, though I am not sure I shall exist the next moment, yet it does not follow but I may exist to all Eternity; for I was not sure a minute ago, that I should live till now, and yet for all that it still remains to this very moment, and may do to the next, and so on, a very true Propo∣sition, cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am.

Neither are those frailties or infirmities which I seem to my self to be sensible of, those decays and weaknesses which I seem to feel in my body, any argument at all, that I am indeed that frail and dependent Crea∣ture, which I seem to my self to be, for all these are only matters of sence, in which I may possibly be deceived, and after all the complaints which I am perpetually making of Aches in this part, and Sickness in the other; it may still be true accord∣ing

to Dez Cartez, that all this is nothing but a meer delusion, and that I have no bo∣dy, and consequently no pain or sickness a∣bout me.

Neither can I make any better inference from the sickness or infirmity, or death of others, that I my self am of a mortal and a fading Nature; for all this, for ought I know, is nothing but a dream, and per∣haps there is no Creature, nor any substance in the World besides my self.

Lastly, the narrowness of my sphere of Knowledge or of Power, are not any ar∣guments that I am not indeed that necessa∣rily Existent being, whose Idaea or notion I have in my mind, for if there be nothing but I, and I know my self, I know as much as can be known, and again, if there be nothing but I, and consequently no Pow∣er but what I have, I can do as much as can be done, and by consequence I am endu∣ed with those two attributes of Power and Wisdom, in their very utmost latitude and extent, or which is all one, I am a Being endued with all possible perfection, which is all that is meant by God.

So that according to this new method of Philosophysing, it is impossible for a Man, when he is got so far as to call all things

into question, ever, to get rid of those in∣curable scruples, it is impossible for him to be sure of the Existence of any Substance whatsoever but his own, and though it be never so certain, that there must be some∣thing which doth exist of it self, otherwise nothing could ever be, yet since I can have no certainty of the Existence of any thing besides my own Person and Substance, I have more reason to conclude, that I my self am that self-originated and self-existent Being, then that there is any other besides me, and thus hath Des Cartez very fairly banished a God out of the World, and the World out of it self, and left himself alone, to contemplate and admire his own self-exi∣stent and solitary being; and if this be not fine Philosophy and profound reasoning, such as deserves that admiration which it hath met with in the World; let his admirers and Champions themselves be Judges.

If this Philosophy were true, Men might e'en shut up their Shops, and sow up their Mouths, and trouble themselves no farther about the things of this Life; for why should any Man concern himself about things that are not, but only seem to be, and when it is utterly impossible for him to get rid of his doubts, I can hardly un∣derstand;

how it is possible for such a Man to act with that steadiness and gravity, and constant purpose of mind, as if he were well satisfied in the truth of his senses.

It is true indeed, that it does by no means become a Philosopher, to take things upon trust, without examining into their truth himself; but yet to doubt of all things, is notwithstanding every whit as Ʋnphi∣losophical as to examine into nothing; for a Philisopher, if he be any thing at all, is a Man that pretends to know somewhat more then his Neighbours, but at this rate of Philosophising he will know less, or at least it will be impossible that they should know less then he, for no man can know less than nothing; and this is the highest pitch to which a Cartesian Philosopher can attain.

But thirdly, I affirm that we have no no∣tion of a being necessarily existent, imprin∣ted upon us by Nature, but it is only the effect of our reasoning with our selves and with one another, we find our selves by expe∣rience to be frail and imperfect Creatures, we are sensible that we come into the world, not by any power or vertue of our own, and that this was the case of our Parents before us, and of theirs before them, we

remember that we were once Infants, in∣firm and helpless things, that we grew up by slow and insensible proportions, to the strength and stature and maturity of a Man; we find our selves all the while subject to a thousand casualties and diseases, assaulted by infirmities from within, and by enemies from without, that we are liable to hunger and thirst and cold, that we are unable to subsist by our selves, without being mutu∣ally kind and helpful to one another, that we stand in need of Houses and Garments and Weapons to defend us against the wea∣ther, the wild beasts, and one another, of Food, to recruit the sensible evacuations and the insensible perspirations of Nature, and of Physick to repair its defects, and supply what it wants of sufficiency to preserve it self, that notwithstanding this, our very plea∣sures and enjoyments do by degrees impair us, and bring a satiety and loathsomeness upon themselves, that that very food which was intended by nature for the support of Life, does sometimes in the most temperate, prove the occasion of sickness and diseases, that the very Ayr, without which we can∣not live or breath, does by degrees con∣sume us, and prey upon us in the nature of a menstruum, till, at last old age give a

period to all the satisfactions and enjoy∣ments of Youth, and Death put an end to the complaints and miseries of Old Age.

And by this means being made sensible of our own imperfection, that we are born with∣out our own consent, and that we die whe∣ther we will or no, that we cannot subsist without perpetual recruits, and that those recruits themselves do by degrees, impair and weaken that Nature which they were intended to preserve, we are forced to ac∣knowledg our selves to be a sort of obnoxi∣ous and dependent Creatures, and that we owe our being, which we see so plainly, it was impossible for us to bestow upon our selves, or to preserve it for any length of time, after it was bestowed, to something more perfect, and more noble then our selves, which if it be a dependent and created Na∣ture, notwithstanding that it is of greater excellence and perfection, then is to be found in our selves, we must still run higher in the chain of causes, till we come to some cause that hath a self-existence, and a nature which it did not receive or borrow from any other, and this is indeed a Being necessarily Exi∣stent, to the knowledge of which we arrive, not by any Idaea or notion, implanted up∣on our natures, but by a gradual and pain∣ful ratiocination.

Neither indeed were there ever any be∣fore Des Cartez, who did assert any such innate Idaeas or inbred Notions, implanted upon the minds of Men, antecedently to their converse with the objects that are a∣bout them, and the reasoning which they make within themselves, by comparing and collating things with one another, but the antient Platonists, and those that have received it from them, Men of a Kid∣ney far different from Des Cartez and his Disciples, who did it upon this account, that they supposed us to have lived in times past, in a Superiour State, in the Re∣gion of Angels and immortal Spirits, cloath∣ed all about with bodies of an Aethereal and Heavenly contexture, but that for our Transgressions in that blessed State, we were cast down from thence by the just Judg∣ment of God into this lowest Region of the World, which is the very sink and sediment of nature, which was not only intended as a punishment, but as an act of goodness, to make a new experiment upon us, whe∣ther we would reform our selves, and, ha∣ving obtained a perfect Conquest over our lusts and passions, return again into that blessed place, from whence, by our sins and enormities we had departed, and from

hence they supposed that as in a Shipwreck, though the far greatest part of the Vessel and her freight be irrecoverably lost, yet some part of both will frequently swim to shoar, so after this great Shipwreck of our selves, being cast away from the Divine presence, and from the Company of Angels and immaculate Spirits, yet there were still as it were some planks, some broken remain∣ders and fragments of Knowledge, that were preserved, and therefore that all our Know∣ledge here was nothing else but reminiscen∣cy, or a calling to mind those notions with which our Souls were replenished in the o∣ther world, and which, though mightily defaced and blemished, made a hard shift to swim along with us, and to preserve some footsteps of themselves in our minds, in, and after, our passage into this.

But not to concern our selves about this Doctrine of Praeexistence, a Doctrine which hath exercised the Wits and Pens of so many learned Men; It is plain that this Platonick fancy of innate or inbred notions, ought by no means to find entertainment in the Creed of wise and understanding Men, not only because it is precarious, but also because it is needless; for it may be evi∣dently shewn, by a particular induction,

that there is no notion which the mind of Man is capable of receiving, which he may not derive from the information of his senses, by conversing with external objects, by comparing them together, and affirm∣ing or denying them, (according to the congruities or disagreements, which by ex∣perience we find in them) of one ano∣ther.

By conversing with objects singly and by themselves, there arise so many several sin∣gle Idaeas or Pictures drawn and painted upon our Imagination, by affirming or de∣nying them one of another, we frame pro∣positions, and by tying several of these propositions, by those natural connexions which we find in them together, there a∣riseth that which we call Syllogism or dis∣course or ratiocination.

And if you ask how by the mediation of our Senses we come to have any Knowledg of an immaterial Nature, that is of an Object which neither does nor can affect our Senses, to this I answer, that after ha∣ving conversed with several sensible Objects and compared them together, having se∣parated those things, which God and Na∣ture have separated from one another, and joyned those things and notions which

ought to be put together, it is then natu∣ral for us to begin to enquire, what it is that makes this reflexion upon the things without us, that disputes and argues pro and con within it self upon the Objects, that come within it's Observation; and this, it is easie to perceive, that it cannot be meer matter, which is a dull, stupid and insensi∣ble thing, without any Life, Activity, or Power; but it needs must be something which is not matter, of whose nature, be∣cause it is difficult for us to have so clear a Perception from the Information of our Sen∣ses, which cannot immediately convey any thing but sensible and material things; therefore we express it by a negative Term, and call it an immaterial Being, which does not tell us positively what it is, but only ne∣gatively what it is not, and yet because we have a positive notion of cogitation, with∣out which we cannot reflect upon any thing whatsoever, nor have any the least Sense of any the most common Object, that falls under our view and apprehension; therefore to the negative conception of im∣material, we add the positive of cogitant, and because we cannot possibly conceive any substance whatsoever, which is not somewhere, and by consequence which is

not extended; therefore this makes up the compleat Idea, which we have of our own minds or souls, that they are immaterial, cogitant and extended Beings; and because Wisdom and thought wherever they are found are an Argument in other Substances of an immaterial Nature, as well as they are in us, therefore when we see the admirable wisdom and contrivance, wherewith all things in the World without us are mana∣ged and disposed; this brings us to a firm and infallible assurance, that there is one great and universal mind presiding over all things, and appointing to all the several Parts of which either the inanimate, or the sensitive and animated World are made up, all their respective Faculties and Pow∣ers, their Offices and Employments, their se∣veral Posts and Stations and Places of a∣bode, for the better preservation of them∣selves, and for the greater harmony, beau∣ty and security of the whole, and this is that which, without the help of a Plato∣nic or a Cartesian Idea imprinted antece∣dently to this ratiocination upon our minds, we are used to call a God.

Besides, that since it is so plain and e∣vident, that we have no Notion or Idea in our minds, which we may not derive

from the information of our Senses, and if over and above we will needs have re∣course to the Platonic Ideas, or inbred No∣tions in the mind of Man, then either these Ideas do agree and jump with the Informa∣tion of our Senses, or they do not, if the lat∣ter, if they do not agree, then either we must renounce the Testimony of our Senses, which we cannot do without making Ship∣wreck of Life it self, or of these supposed Platonical Ideas, which is much the more safe and reasonable of the two; especially, if we consider, after all the noise that hath been raised about them, that we are not conscious to our selves of any such things, and that without them, we can give a suf∣ficient Account of all that Knowledg to which human Nature is capable of arri∣ving.

But in the second Place, if these two, the Ideas of Plato, and the Testimony of Sense do agree and jump with one another, then the Rule holds good, Natura nihil facit frustra, Nature does nothing in vain, if the Ideas be sufficient, what needs the confir∣mation of sense, or what signifie those I∣deas which cannot be believed till a fur∣ther confirmation be given from without, but if the testimony of sense be at last the

true touch-stone by which we must measure the truth of our Ideas, then how vain and fruitless are those Ideas themselves? and this I take to be a sufficient confutation of the innate Ideas, of Plato and Des Cartez.

But Fourthly, it is still further to be ob∣served, in opposition to this trifling argu∣ment of Des Cartez, that it is a meer Cir∣cle, as the Logicians use to call it, that is, it is such a sort of Sophistical argumentati∣on, wherein two things are proved by one another, for if you ask this great Philoso∣pher, as some that are very little ones, are pleased to esteem him, how he can tell, that there is indeed a being necessarily existent, notwithstanding that we find such an Idea implanted upon our natures, in which we may possibly be deceived, he tells you that this depends upon the truth of our intelle∣ctual faculties, and if you ask him again, how he can tell that our intellectual facul∣ties are true, he proves this by supposing a being necessarily existent, which is endu∣ed with such goodness, that it would not deceive us, and so this is no more then mulus mulum scabit, one good turn requires another, or it is the same thing in disputati∣on, as if in a Court of Judicature, you should bring two Persons, whose innocence is

the matter in question, to purge and vin∣dicate one another by their Testimony, which they will be sure to do for their mu∣tual advantage and safety, but are for that reason look'd upon in Law, as incompetent Witnesses, and such whose Testimony ought by no means to be taken.

Fifthly, we are so far from having an I∣dea of God implanted upon our Natures, immediately by God himself, that in truth we have no such Idea of God at all, either one way or the other, it is true, a very small pro∣portion of reason will assure us, that there is such a being as God, but what he is we know not, and we have only negative Conceptions of his nature, we say he is immaterial, and he is infinite, he is immortal and incorrupti∣ble, but of these things we have no clear and positive conception, and consequently nothing that can be properly called an I∣dea.

All that is meant by immateriality, is, that it includes a negation of matter, and all that is meant by infinite is, that it is not finite, but for us that are poor finite Crea∣tures, to have a true and proper notion of that which is infinite, is impossible; for us that have seen so small and inconsiderable a proportion of time passing by us, for us

that in the compass of a few years, must molder away and crumble into dust; for us to have a true and adequate notion of im∣mortality and incorruptibility, is a thing that can never enter into the mind of Man to believe; all our knowledge of God is ina∣dequate and imperfect, we say he is a be∣ing of infinite Wisdom, and infinite Good∣ness, and infinite Power, but all that we do truly understand by these words, is, that he hath all that Wisdom and Power and Goodness, which we have or can discern in other Creatures, and all that we want, but how much, or what Wisdom that is which we want, we know not, for that very rea∣son, because we want it, and because we come infinitely short of it, so that after all, it appears plainly from whence we have that notion of God, which we find dwelling up∣on our minds, we receive it from our selves and from the objects about us, by ascribing to God all the perfection which belongs to the Creatures, and so much more as they want, and by excluding or praescinding, as the Schools term it, all their imperfection, and the case is the same, as when I say such a Man is an excellent Mathematician, ano∣ther an excellent Orator or Poet or Musiti∣an, that is, they have all that skill in these

arts which I have, and a great deal more, which I have not, and of which for that reason I can have no apprehension, which Idea is manifestly raised by my self after a confused manner, not imprinted by the Artist himself, upon my mind, any other∣wise then as his works and performances in the several kinds, give me some rude conception and inadequate Idea of him, but it is certain, if he himself had been to leave his own impression upon me, he would have made it like himself, and by conse∣quence I should have had the same skill in these faculties whch he hath attained.

Just so it is with God, an inadequate I∣dea or notion of him may be formed by our selves, from the works of the Creation, without having recourse to any supernatu∣ral impression, but an adaequate Idea I can∣not have without being a God my self, for no one can have a true and perfect notion of infinite goodness, wisdom or power, but he that is the possessor of them, and he with∣out question can be no less then God.

Sixthly and lastly, by this it appears how frivolous this argument of Des Cartez drawn from the Idea, is, that after all, according to him, it is but the Idea of an unextended substance, that is, in plain English of a ne∣cessary

nothing, and it appears likewise, that God never imprinted this Idea upon any Mans mind, for this would be but to deceive and abuse us, and to make our intellectual fa∣culties, which can have no notion of any thing, which is not extended, to contra∣dict his impressions, and consequently leave us in a doubt and perplexity, never to be resolved, what notion or Idea we are to en∣tertain concerning him.

And thus I have considered more large∣ly, then ever any Writer hath hitherto done before me, the manifest inconclusiveness of the Cartesian argument, drawn from the Idea, and that being substituted in the stead of that which was used formerly to be ta∣ken from the admirable structure and con∣trivance of the World, it seems rather to have been done with a design to introduce Atheism, then with an intention to settle and confirm the belief of a Deity among Men.