A discourse of natural and moral impotency by Joseph Truman, B.D., late minister near Nottingham.

An APPENDIX to the Discourse of Na∣tural and Moral Impotency.

BEcause in the Discourse of Natural and Moral Impotency I said nothing con∣cerning the manner of the traduction of Sin, and that designedly as resolving to Speak only of things that I thought I could Speak Satisfactorily about, and knowing I should Speak less Satisfactorily concerning that as both opposite parties seem to do, and espe∣cially knowing that it would be no way helpful to clear the great controversies there spoken to; because, one sort of Impotency, come which way it will, doth excuse, and the other not; and so the difference of them lieth not at all (whatever hath been preten∣ded to the contrary) in one sort coming one way, and the other another, but in the essen∣tial difference of their Natures; now because of this supposed neglect, some that have no∣thing else to object (so far as I can under∣stand) pretend as if nothing was said except. I speak of this thing wherein both differs a∣mongst themselves, and which I never yet saw fully clear'd to my mind, and wherein I can puzzle my self. I shall here only mind such of those things that I have thence made more fully apparent.

1. I have made this, or nothing, apparent, viz. That that sort of Impotency which be∣ing upon a man would excuse from the fu∣ture obedience that he hath the Impotency

to, if he did not bring it upon himself, I say, that sort of Impotency would excuse equally from such future obedience if a man did bring it upon himself, as Lameness, Mad∣ness, want of an object, yea, all natural Impotency as I have explained it.

Yet take notice, that when I speak of na∣tural Impotency excusing though a man bring it upon himself, I only say it excuseth from future Obedience. For I grant that by bringing it upon himself, he may be said in∣terpretatively to be guilty of all the conse∣quent failings of Service and Obedience that follow upon making himself so Impo∣tent. As an Apprentice or Servant that voluntarily† Lameth himself, or maketh himself drunk, and so disena∣bleth himself for his masters Service, is not only formal∣ly guilty of wounding him∣self, or drunkenness (as he would be was he sui juris, and not Servant to any man,) but is also in so doing interpretatively guilty of the following neglect of his Masters service and commands, that he by so doing renders him∣self Impotent to perform. Only I mean he is so far made excusable in his following neglects, that we cannot say he is guilty of a new fault in not serving his Master when he cannot, and it would be irrational in his Master to be angry at him or punish him,

only for his former fault in making himself so Impotent, but also for his not serving him when he knows he cannot. For the whole malitia or culpability of such after disser∣vice is to be ascribed only to the former dis∣inabling himself, because he did or might probably foresee that such loss to his Master would follow. I said probably; For I scarce think that such interpretative guilt reacheth all possibilities that are very remote or improbable. I do not think that if a man being ignorant whose he was, or of his Masters affection, had Stolne Lipsius's darling Dog† Saphirus, he would have been Interpre∣tatively guilty of Murder, though Lipsius had dyed with grief for the Loss.

Now if this be true, that that sort of Im∣potency which would excuse from Obedi∣ence if a man did not bring it upon himself, would also excuse equally if a man did bring it upon himself; then he must be very stu∣pid that cannot hence see, that the determi∣ning which way one of these Impotencies came, and which the other, will neither help nor hinder in the putting an end to the great Controversies of this Day, nor can be any account why one excuses, and the other not. Though yet I grant that both the Natural Impotency which will excuse, and the Moral which will not, came on us from Adams sin and our own, and so no Reason can be fet∣ched

hence from this concession of one ex∣cusing, and the other not.

2ly. I have also made apparent, that the moral Impotency, or the culpable impoten∣cy which the Scripture speaks of, come which way it will, doth not excuse from fu∣ture Obedience; and that this is no Reason why it doth not excuse, because of its com∣ing one way or an other, for it is essentially culpable and inexcusable, but the Reason is because not-withstanding this Impotency, a man hath the natural faculty and power to do what he hath this moral Impotency to.

And indeed let any man consider it, and he will be as sure as he can be of any thing. That whatsoever divine command a man hath the natural Power to obey (I mean that the man is no Child, or Fool, that hath not the faculty or ability to know, and chuse the good, and refuse the Evil,) so that he is no way hindered but by his own wickedness (or by that which we call a vitious habit of the Will, be it what it will)) I say such a man is bound to obey such command, so that his wickedness though never so great will not excuse him; And this every man is sure of, however some can make a shift to puzle themselves with the undistinguished words of can or cannot.

Take the wickedst man in the World, that is most accustomed to do evil, and hath the greatest aversation of will to good, and so one that cannot in the moral Sense explai∣ned

do well, nor obtain of him-self to leave his evil ways without wonderful help from Heaven, yet we are sure he is bound to leave off his wickedness and turn from his sins, and is blameable in not turning from them this day, that he hath this moral Im∣potency, though God do not such wonderful things for him; And is not only blameable interpretatively, because he made himself thus morally Impotent, and brought this wicked aversation of will upon himself, but is blameable formally this day in not o∣beying and turning to God, because he hath this day the natural Faculty and Power of obeying such commands: For if he had not, but was made by his sins (as I suppose some have been) a natural Fool, so that he had not the natural Power to understand and chuse the good and refuse the evil, it would not then be his duty this day so to obey and turn.

3ly. I have also shewed that one sort of Impotency, the greater it is, the greater is the Fault; and the less it is, the less is the Fault; in not doing what a man hath the impotency to do; And that the other sort of Impotency the greater it is, the less is the Fault; and the less it is, the greater is the Fault; which manifesteth these two kinds of Impotency to be quite different in their own Natures, and that the difference of one excusing, & the other not, cannot arise from one coming one way, and the other another.

4ly. To make this further apparent, if such a thing can be made more apparent, consider that (which I have also in part spo∣ken of) Christ's humane Nature had such an abundant effusion of the Holy Spirit as cau∣sed in him a morally insuperable Holy Rectitude of Will; And we are yet sure notwithstanding this, that his doing good and eschewing evil, was morally laudable, because this Holiness of will did not take a∣way his natural Power and Faculty of doing sinfully, no more than mens morally insu∣perable wickedness and eversation of will to good, taketh away their natural Power and Faculty of doing Well. Now we may with as much Reason deny the one as the o∣ther, viz. deny that Christ's Obedience was laudable bcause of the Spirits causing this Ho∣liness, though he had the natural Power to do otherwise, as deny that a man is culpable in not obeying god that hath the natural Power to obey, because of his morally insu∣perable wickedness, come this wickedness which way it will. Yea, let intelligent men consider, and they will see that if some mani∣chaean malum principium should make a man wicked, just as the most wicked man now is, though he can give Reasons why God would not permit this to be, and however not without some great Provocation of man∣kind, yet such a man though he would not be to blame formally to be so made, yet he would be to blame to continue wicked as he

is, and it would be his fault not to obey God; while he hath, notwithstanding this wickedness, the natural Power to put off such wickedness and to obey God; that is, while he is not a natural Fool, that hath not the faculty to know and chuse the good, and refuse the evil.

Now to conclude, though a man that will not distinguish, may puzle and confound his own Notions, and may be puzled by o∣thers by the words Can, and Cannot; as in such Speeches as these, viz. Can a man o∣bey without Grace? Can he actually o∣bey without Grace? Can he actually with∣out Grace obey spiritually or acceptably? Can he without Grace actually find in his heart to obey? Which Questions are to be answered affirmatively while by the word Can is meant the natural Power and Facul∣ty; else it would not be men's duty so to obey: But such questions are to be answered negatively when the meaning is, hath he not such a wicked aversation of will as will cer∣tainly hinder him, except Grace overcome it. Now, I say, though such a man as resolves to be in the dark by not distinguishing, may thus be puzled, yet I think no man of com∣petent abilities can easily be puzled, so as to be dubious about the substance of what I have spoken concerning one impotency ex∣cusing, and the other not, would he but con∣sider when the words Can or Cannot, are objected before him, whether the opposers

mean by those words, the want of the very natural Faculty and Power or necessary ob∣ject, or only a Cannot in respect of his being hindred by his wickedness or vitious habits.

Thus you see that what I have spoken in the Discourse of Natural and Moral Impo∣tency, can (as I there said) stand on its own Legs, though I should not know how to speak a wise word concerning the propaga∣tion of the Soul and sin; And though I in∣cline to the Souls coming ex traduce as seeming to me the way most agreeable to Scripture, and the best to answer difficulties by; and I can almost as easily puzle my self about the Soul of Beasts being ex traduce as mens; yet my design is especially till things I have spoken, be better considered, not to speak such things as may occasion differences, when my design is to put an end to them. Nor to give occasion to any that have a mind to reflect on what I have spoken, to run from the question and things well intelligible, to things less intelligible, and no way helpfull to decide the important controversies of free Will, Election, and special Grace.

Finished

Notes

• †

  Like the murci or Murcenarij, the Italian Souldiers that Anntian, Marcel. Lib. 15. Speaks of, that Cut off their Thumbs, that they might be freed from material Service, called, as he faith, Joculariter Murci.
• †

  Which he makes Verses on. Lipsy Epist. Page. 104. & 294.