An explication of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments, with reference to the catechism of the Church of England to which are premised by way of introduction several general discourses concerning God's both natural and positive laws / by Gabriel Towerson ...

THE EIGHTH COMMANDMENT.

THE EIGHTH COMMANDMENT.

Thou shalt not steal.

PART I.

The Contents.

The Explication begins with a discourse concerning Property, which this Commandment both supposeth and professeth to maintain. That defined to be such a Right or Title, by which the thing enquired af∣ter doth so become one either Person's or Societies as to its use or emolument, as not to be common to them with others: And is ei∣ther with a power of Alienation, as all plenary Properties are, or without, as the possessions of Ʋsufructuaries properly so called. En∣quiry is next made what foundation it hath in Nature, which is shewn so far to enforce it as to perswade the introducing where it is not, and the confirming and cherishing it where it is: As is made appear both as to those things which are immediately instrumental to our support, and those which are only mediately, and by virtue of what they do produce; the former being wholly useless, where they are not impropriated, as the latter not likely to have their due cultivation otherwise, or be peaceably enjoy'd. Property more truly resolv'd into the Divine Institution, and particularly into that grant of Domini∣on which was made to Adam first, and then to Noah and his Sons. The Properties of Men as they now stand resolv'd into those original Grants, The disposition of the Divine Providence, and, where they have been before fill'd, into the will also of the precedent Possessour. An Answer to such Objections as are made, either against the being of Property, or our way of establishing it. As to the former where∣of is shewn, that the Community which was in the Primitive Church was neither of Divine Institution as to it, nor induceth any Obli∣gation upon the present: As to the latter, that Dominion is not founded either in Power or Grace. That Dominion is not founded in Power is evidenc'd from its supposing Men at liberty to seize upon what they please, without consideration of those who have the same Interest: Which is both contrary to that love which Men ought to have for one another, and destructive of that Community which it supposeth. That Hypothesis which founds Dominion in Grace evi∣denced to be alike unsound, from the dishonour it doth to God who

professeth himself to be kind to the unthankful and the evil; to our Religion, which is thereby made to serve to evil and covetous pur∣poses; and (because Grace is a thing not easily to be known, or made out) to uncertainty, contention, and confusion; in fine, from Gods subjecting the believing Servant to the unbelieving Master, the be∣lieving Subject to the unbelieving Prince, yea, obliging him to pay Tribute to him out of his own. An Inquiry whether the Properties of Men are limited, and what those Limitations are. That they are li∣mited by God, is made appear, from that Original Grant of Domi∣nion which God made to Adam and Noah, and the Laws he hath since made concerning the Ʋse and Disposition of them: such as are those which enjoyn Sobriety, the honouring of God and his Priests with our Substance, and the being charitable to the Necessitous. The Properties of Men alike limitable by those that are in Authority, so far as their own Necessities, and those of the Publick do require; but not so by private Persons, without their own consent.

THOUGH I am well aware I shall find work enough in explicating the Nature, and investi∣gating the Species of those Sins which are forbidden in this Commandment; yet I fore∣see it necessary, even to the right stating of those, to premise something concerning Pro∣perty, which the Interdict of Stealing doth suppose. For, Stealing being nothing else but the clancular taking away of that which is another Mans, neither can we suppose such a Sin as Stealing, unless there be such a thing as Property; nor judge of the Quality of the Theft, without respect had to that Property which it is an interversion of. Taking it there∣fore for granted, that to the due knowledge of the Nature of Steal∣ing, it is necessary to have a competent one of Dominion or Proper∣ty, I will allot this Discourse to the Investigation of it, and accord∣ingly inquire,

• 1. What Property is.
• 2. What Foundation it hath in Nature.
• 3. By what means it was at first introduc'd.
• 4. By what ways Men do now come to attain it. To which I shall subjoyn, in the
• 5. Fifth place, The Examination of those things which have been alledg'd either against the Being of Property, or for the establishing it upon other Principles.
• 6. And lastly, inquire, Whether the Properties of Men are sub∣ject to Limitations, and what those Limitations are.

1. Of the Nature of Property much need not be said, at least as to that sense wherein we are to take it in this whole Discourse: It may suffice therefore to define it to be such a Right or Title, by vertue whereof, the thing inquir'd after doth so become one, either Persons, or Societies, as to its Use or Emolument, as not to be common to them with others; and is either with a Power of Alienation, as all plenary Dominions or Properties are; or without it, as the Possessions of Usufructuaries,

properly so called, and other such like imperfect Properties. The one∣ly difficulty will be, as to the Foundation it hath in Nature, its Ori∣ginal, and the Means of acquiring of it, with other the things before propos'd.

2. For the resolution of the first whereof, we must distinguish of such things as are immediately instrumental to our Support, and such as are onely mediately, and by vertue of those things which they pro∣duce or maintain. If the Question be concerning the former, of which sort are Food, and Raiment; and the like; so, no doubt, Rea∣son and Nature do so far enforce a Propertyin them, as the Necessi∣ties of Nature do require. For, the Life of Man being not to be supported, without such an Application of them to our selves, as makes them perfectly useless to others; there will arise a necessity of appropriating such a Portion of them to every Person, as may suffice to the support of him. And though I will not affirm as much con∣cerning those things by which the former are produc'd or maintain'd, of which nature are Trees to the Fruit, and the Earth to those and all other the Supports of Humane Nature; yet I shall not stick to main∣tain, that the same Nature dictates the expediency of a Property, and perswades to the observation of it: Partly, because if Men had not di∣stinct proportion in the Earth, from whence all the Supports of Hu∣mane Lise receive either their Being or Subsistence, they would not be over-forward to give it that Cultivation which it requires, as fearing lest what they had so cultivated should be reap'd by others; and part∣ly, because Mens Necessities and Desires being in general the same, there would otherwise, especially since the Peopling of the World, have arisen among Men perpetual and irreconcileable Discords, con∣cerning the enjoying of those Benefits which it affords. But other Foundations in Nature, as it will be hard to find, so I think it ex∣tremely vain to seek; because (as I shall by and by shew) Property had its Orignal from Divine Institution, and because those Princi∣ples which I have alledg'd from Nature, may suffice to perswade those to whom the Divine Institution is unknown, to introduce it where it is not already, and to confirm and cherish it where it is.

3. It being thus evident what Foundation Property hath in Nature, proceed we to inquire, how it was at first introduc'd. For the reso∣lution whereof, though it be commonly alledg'd out of the Ancient Heathen, and particularly the Poets, that all things at first were com∣mon unto all, and continu'd so to be, till either the Prevalence of some had appropriated what they pleas'd to themselves, or the gene∣ral Consent of Mankind, led thereto by the former Considerations, put them upon a distribution of them: yet, as† Lactantius hath well

observ'd, that possibly nothing else was meant by that ancient Com∣munity, than that the Men of elder Times were so liberal, as to ad∣mit the Poorer sort to a participation of their Possessions and Labours, all Expressions of Poets being not strictly to be understood; so, that there was such a thing as Property from the beginning, even by the Institution of the Divine Majesty, I doubt not to make appear from that first Grant of Dominion, from which it may seem more ratio∣nal to infer a Community. 'Tis in Genesis 1.28. and the Words these. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and mul∣tiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth, as well as over the Earth it self. For, beside that Man and Woman are by the Institution of the Di∣vine Majesty but as one Person, and therefore that Dominion which God gave to Adam and Eve to be look'd upon rather as a Property, than a Community, (whence it is, that in the repetition of this Grant to Noah and his Sons, there is not the least mention either of Noah's Wife, or of theirs; which in all probability there would have been, if they had had an equal Interest in it with their Husbands, or were to be look'd upon as distinct Persons from them) beside this, I say, the Wo∣man being by the condition of her Sex subjected to the Man, makes her rather an Usufructuary, than a Proprietary strictly so called, or as an inferiour Proprietary under a Chief, by means whereof there is not so much a Community, as distinct but subordinate Properties. Now, as that Property wherewith our first Parents, or rather the one of them, was invested, gave them Authority, under God, to dispose of it to their Children, according as they themselves should judge expedient; so, that they did accordingly dispose of it, and that too in distinct Properties, the Story of Cain and Abel shews; the former whereof, as the Book of Genesis informs us, had Cattel and Mea∣dows for his Property; the latter, Tillage and Corn. For, that these were not onely their Employments under their Father, but their Properties, appears by their bringing of each for an Offering, and passing them away, as well as having an inspection of them. Now, though what hath been said concerning Adam, sufficiently shews what the Original of Property was, and by whom and after what manner it was at first introduc'd; yet because Humane Kind had as it were a second Beginning in Noah, all but him and his Family being destroy'd by the Flood, I think it not amiss to shew the same to have been the Original of Property, amidst this second Race of Mankind. To the evidencing whereof, though that of Genesis may seem very repugnant, where renewing the forementioned Charter of Dominion, God di∣recteth it to Noah and his Sons, Gen. 9.1, 2. whereby this lower World may seem to have been given to them in common; yet as it is not easie to suppose God would make Noah and his Sons equal, be∣cause that would have taken off from that Reverence which was due unto the Father; so, that Noah did not look upon himself as such, the Blessing which he pronounc'd upon Japhet shews, Gen. 9.27. For, the Blessings of Fathers being anciently with Authority, and confer∣ring those Advantages which they pronounc'd, Noah blessing Japhet with the enlarging of this Borders, shews him not to have been with∣out Authority of enlarging or confining them. Whence it is, that

though in the Old Testament there be no mention of Noah's interessing himself in that Division of the Earth which was made between Noah's Sons, in the tenth Chapter of Genesis; yet a Tradition hath prevail'd, (as Mr. Selden observes out of Eusebius and Cedrenus) that Noah, by direction from the Almighty, was the Author of it, and consign'd it to them by his last Will and Testament; admonishing them more∣over, that no one should invade his Brothers Territories, nor do any injury to him. Which is the more probable, because otherwise Dis∣sentions might have risen among them, which it is not to be suppos'd but so good a Father as Noah would provide against; and much less is it to be suppos'd, but the God of Peace and Order would. This onely would be added, though more than once before insinuated, that though God made those two Heads of Mankind the Proprietors of this sublunary World, yet not so as to licence them to confine it wholly to themselves whilst alive, or to make any other distribution of it af∣ter their Deaths, than the Laws of God and Reason should allow. For, beside that this Charter of Dominion is by God directed to Noah and his Sons, which cannot by any means be salv'd, unless they had a Title in him; both in that and the former Grant, premising the Ad∣monition of Increase and multiply, and replenish the earth, to that Charter of Dominion which he gave them over it, he thereby plain∣ly intimated an Obligation in those two great Heads of Mankind, to impart of that Dominion to their Posterity, and a Right in that Po∣sterity to enjoy it: As indeed without them neither could they have subdu'd the Earth, nor exercis'd that Dominion over it which they had. The Result of which Observation is, that all the Descendents of Adam and Noah have a natural Right in it, as being given not one∣ly to them, but in and by them to their Descendents, or (as the Psal∣mist hath expressed it, Psal. 115.16.) to the children of men.

4. But because whatsoever Distribution was made in those elder Times, it is certain that the Bounds of Mens Possessions have been of∣ten and greatly confounded, by that Avarice and Injustice which have since overspread the whole Earth; but however, there are no Records extant of Donations and Successions, whereby Men might be assur'd of the Legitimateness of their several Acquisitions: therefore it will be necessary to inquire, in order to our own particular satisfactions, by what means Men do now come to have a Property in their several Estates. For the discovery whereof, not to tell you, because that is sufficiently apparent, that God being the Great Landlord of the World, Mens Proprieties, and the Modifications thereof, must receive their Being from his Will; as neither, because that is alike evident from the Premises, that the distinction of Properties is of his own blessed Institution: I shall chuse rather to inquire, how this Will of his may appear, as to the several Properties we either do or may enjoy. In order whereunto, I will inquire, 1. Concerning such Lands or Goods as are without any present Possessor; or, 2. Such as are already occu∣pied. If the Question be concerning such Lands or Goods as are without any present Possessor, so the common Consent of Mankind hath attributed the Right to those who should first possess themselves of them: And not without reason, if we remember, that such Impropri∣ations are not onely not displeasing to the Divine Majesty, but of his own Blessed Institution. For, being so, it is but reasonable to think

it to be the Will of God, that those should have the Property of it, to whom he by his Providence hath both made the first Discovery, and given the opportunity of possessing themselves of them. Whence it is, that things left, or thrown away, do by the same general Con∣sent of Mankind become the Property of the Finder; as in like man∣ner things casually lost; unless either the Owner thereof doth ap∣pear, in which case it doth not, because (as the Lawyers speak) there was in the Owner a Purpose of retaining it, which is by the same Law of Nations a kind of Possession; or it be otherwise deter∣mined by the Laws of the Place we live in, by which, as I shall af∣terwards shew, Mens several Properties are tempered and bounded. But because the World is already so fully Peopled, that there is little room for such kind of Acquisitions, especially in that Part of the World in which we inhabite; therefore it may not be amiss to inquire rather concerning Property in those things which are already possess'd, both as to those that do possess them, or desire the possession of them. Concerning the former whereof, as much need not be said, after I have already shewn you, that the seising upon any thing that is free, becomes the Property of him that seiseth it; so, much less of such Possessions as are by the Lawyers call'd Bonae fidei, or such as do not appear to have been acquired by any evil Arts: It being to be pre∣sum'd to be the Will of God, that those should have the Property of any thing, who are not onely without any evil Arts, but by the course of his Providence put into the Possession of it. And though the same be not to be said of such Possessions as are acquir'd by evil Arts, because, though the Providence of God may pass for a Decla∣ration of his Will and Approbation, where it is not contradicted; yet it cannot be look'd upon as such, where it crosseth his Revelations, because those are both the Primary and most direct Interpretations of it: yet there are two things which may and must be said, as to the evidencing of that Property which we have said to arise from them. 1. That Possession, of what sort soever, is to be esteem'd good against him that is not able to shew a better; and consequently, that the evil Arts whereby any Man hath attain'd it, cannot excuse him from Sin who shall either fraudulently, or violently, endeavour to take it from him. 2. That Possessions which they call of Evil faith, if corrobora∣ted by the continuance of some Ages, (but how many, must be left to the Laws of the Place, or the Law of Nations, to determine) may give the Possessor a Right or Property in them: As because other∣wise there would be little Security to the Consciences of Possessors, considering the great and violent Alterations that have hapned in all States and Kingdoms; (For,

Majorum primus quisquis fuit ille tuorum, Aut pastor fuit, aut illud quod dicere nolo.)

so also because there would otherwise arise endless Controversies about Possessions: both which Inconveniences it is to be suppos'd the God of Peace and Order hath provided against. To all which we may adde, That as it is God who sets up one and pulleth down ano∣ther, so it is in reason to be presum'd to be his Will to keep both the one and the other in their several Conditions, when he gives him

whom he hath advanc'd so long a continuance in his Station, and suf∣fers not the other in all that while to be able to remove him from it.

From the Possessor of any thing, pass we to the Expectant of it, and inquire by what means he may come to have the Property of it. In order whereunto, I say, first, That it must be ordinarily by the Act of the present Possessor of it. For, the Possessor of any Estate acquiring thereby a Property in it, that is to say, a Right whereby the thing possess'd is so his, as not to be common to him with others; it is ne∣cessary to its becoming the Right and Property of another, that he who hath the present Property, transfer that Property of his unto the other, whether it be by Gift, as all Deeds and Legacies; or by Con∣tract, whether explicit or implicit; the former whereof is, when Men either sell or mortgage their Property for a Valuable Consideration; the latter, when they oblige themselves to an Act, as for example, to the Payment of a certain Sum of Money, which is not to be attain'd without the Alienation of the other, either in whole or in part: he who so obligeth himself, because otherwise the Obligation would be null, tacitely contracting to part with so much of his Property as will satisfie the Obligation he hath taken upon him. Ordinarily there∣fore no Man can acquire the Right and Property of another, without the Act of the Possessor of it. But, as it may sometime happen, that the Party may pass out of this World, without making any such Act, in which case it doth not onely cease to be his, but naturally falls to the next of Kin, it being to be presum'd, that it was the will of the Per∣son dying to have it so, as being most oblig'd to gratifie them; so it may also happen (as I shall afterwards shew) that the Party may by some Misdemeanour forfeit that Property of his to the State, of which he is both a Member and a Subject. In which Case, though without, yea against his present will, the Property of the Delinquent may ac∣crue to the State, and by it be either preserv'd in its own power, or pass'd over to another. This onely would be added, That even such a Translation cannot be said to be altogether without the will of the Person that offends: For, every Man, either expresly or tacitely, bind∣ing himself to submit to the Penalty of the Laws of that State of which he professeth himself to be a Subject, doth, eo nomine, where the Penalty is the Forfeiture of his Property, consent to the transfer∣ring of it, and consequently makes it the Property of another.

5. Having thus shewn as well that there is such a thing as Property, as by what means it was at first Instituted, or comes now to be acquir'd; I think it not amiss, for the clearing both of the one and the other, to examine those things which have been alledg'd against the Being of Property, at least under the Times of the Gospel, or for the establish∣ing it upon other Principles.

There are who supersicially considering that place in the Acts of the Apostles, where it's said, that the multitude of those that believ'd were not onely of one heart, but had all things common, have from thence made bold to conclude, That the Law of Christianity obligeth all Be∣lievers to have all things common among themselves. In answer to which, not to tell you, that Example is no Law, and consequently, that the Practice of those first Believers doth not induce an Obligati∣on; as neither (though I might) that what may be of force in a Soci∣ety, which is but yet in its beginning, ought not to be drawn into

example in a setled one: I shall chuse rather to alledge a Passage in the same place, which shews this Community of theirs to have been the Result of their own free will, and not of necessary Obligation: That, I mean, which was uttered by St. Peter to Ananias, who sold his Possessions upon a pretence to make them common to other Be∣lievers. For St. Peter demanding, Acts 4.5. Whilst it remained, was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power? plainly shews, that Christianity did not oblige them to re∣nounce their Properties, but that they might, if they had so pleas'd, for any thing in Christianity to the contrary, have kept their Lands as they were; or, after they had sold them, kept the Prices of them.

But because that Dust which hath been rais'd in this Argument, doth not arise so much from the questioning of a Property, as from the proper Bases upon which it ought to be established; I will, with∣out more ado, apply my self to consider of two Hypotheses, which have been set up in opposition to my own; whereof the former founds Dominion in Power, the latter in Grace and Piety. As to the former of these, much need not be said, because it doth not onely proceed upon the supposition of such a Community as never was, but doth farther suppose Men at liberty to seise upon what they please, with∣out consideration had of those that have the same Interest: Which is not onely contrary to that Love and Affection which the Sons of Men ought to have for one another, as the Product of the same Common Stock; but destructive of that very Community which it supposes. For, if all Men have an equal Right to all Things, they are in reason to take such a course for the accommodation of Affairs between them, that all Men may have their due proportion; which must be by per∣mitting the Determination to the Judgment of the major part, or to the more impartial Arbitrement of a Lot. Otherwise, they do not onely challenge an equal Right with other Men, but suppose their own to be the best, which destroys that Community which they suppose. And though it should so happen, as in such a Community no doubt it may, that a Man should be constrain'd by force to assert his own Pro∣portion; yet as Reason and Nature forbids the use of such a Remedy, till it do appear that more mild ones will not succeed; so it ought not to be employ'd to the vindicating of any thing which is above the Proportion of him that useth it. For, if all Men have an equal Right to every Thing, every Thing is to continue in its Community; or, if that cannot be done without prejudice to every one, they are of ne∣cessity to agree upon a Distribution, but however not to challenge above their Proportion in it. But because this Hypothesis is so wild and extravagant, that a Man must throw off his Reason, as well as his Religion, before he can assent to it; I will proceed forthwith to the consideration of the other, which founds Dominion in Grace and Piety.

Now though this Hypothesis looks more demurely than the other, because clad in the Habit of that which of all others doth most deserve our Respect; yet as it hath little countenance from that Religion which it dissembles, so it is equally pernicious to it with the former, and par∣ticularly to the Christian one. For the evidencing whereof, I will alledge, first, the dishonour it doth to its Author, upon whose Honour the Reputation of Religion doth depend. For, whereas there is no∣thing

which God more challengeth to himself, or is indeed more wor∣thy of him, than the being kind to the unthankful and to the evil, causing his Sun to shine upon the evil and the good, and sending his Rain upon the just and the unjust; that Hypothesis which founds Do∣minion in Grace, confines this Love of his to the Good and Just, and consequently spoils him of that Noble Prerogative of his Nature, in being kind to the unthankful and rebellious. But neither is it less dishonourable to that Religion which we profess, if we consider ei∣ther the Spirituality of its Motives, or the Peaceableness of its Prin∣ciples. For, whereas our Religion professeth to allure Men, not by the Bait of Earthly Pleasures, but by the more noble Pleasures of the Mind, and that Spiritual Happiness which consists in the Sight and En∣joyment of God; thereby removing all suspicion from it self, of seek∣ing to promote it self by mean Arts, or standing in need of them: that Hypothesis which founds Dominion in Grace, subjects the Purity of Religion to the mean Enjoyments of the World, and makes it look more like a Design upon Mens Estates, than upon their Souls. Again, Whereas our Religion professeth nothing more than the procuring of Peace, as well of the Professors thereof with one another, as with those that are Strangers or Enemies to it; that Hypothesis which founds Dominion in Grace, is so far from contributing to it, that it hardly leaves place for Peace even within our own Bosoms. For, true Peace being so secret a thing, that we cannot certainly understand it in ano∣ther, and not without difficulty in our selves; if (as a Learned Pre∣late doth well argue) Grace should give every one that pretends to it an Interest in that which is another Mans lawful Possession, no Mans Title could be certain to another, scarcely to himself: From whence must necessarily follow an incredible Confusion, and an inevitable Perturbation in all Estates. To all which, if we add, that God hath expresly subjected the believing Subject to an unbelieving Prince, and the believing Servant to the unbelieving Master; that he hath more∣over enjoyn'd the former to pay Tribute to his unbelieving Prince, as an Acknowledgment of that Authority which God hath given him over him: so we shall not onely be fully convinc'd, that Dominion is not founded in Grace; but that somewhat else was intended in that, and such like Texts, which assure us that the meek shall inherit the earth, which are the most plausible Grounds of that Hypothesis. And indeed, as such like Promises are necessarily to be understood with subordination to God's Glory, and the eternal Welfare of our Souls, (both which are oftentimes more promoted by Poverty and Afflictions, than by the affluence of Temporal Benefits) partly, because otherwise they would be rather a Curse than a Blessing, and partly, because, in the strict understanding of them, they are but rarely fulfill'd to the Meek; which would undoubtedly not have hapned, if God, that cannot lie, had meant them in the literal notion of the Words: so, whatever be the sense of them, they rather shew what the meek Per∣son may promise himself from God's Providence, than any Right in him to challenge it from the World, and much less possess himself of by force. Such Actions as those being very inconsistent with that Meekness to which the Inheritance of the Earth is promised.

6. But not to insist any longer on the subversion of an Hypothesis, which will find little credit among any other than the Indigent and

Discontented; as neither among them, any longer than till those In∣digences and Discontents be remov'd; I will chuse rather, following the Method before laid down, to inquire whether the Properties of Men are subject to Limitations, and what those Limitations are.

It is a common Opinion, at least amongst the Vulgar sort, that when they have acquir'd a Property in any thing, it becomes so intirely theirs, that they cannot at all be abridg'd in it without injury. Now, though I am willing to believe, that those who are so perswaded, un∣derstand this Absoluteness of theirs with reference onely to Men; yet I think it not amiss, and so much the rather, because all just Limitati∣ons of Mens Properties are originally from God, to shew, first, that they are limited by God, and how they are limited by him.

That they are limited by God, needs no other Proof than that Ori∣ginal Grant of Dominion which God made to Adam and Noah, and those Laws which he hath since given concerning the use or disposition of them. For, inasmuch as that Original Grant was not to the Per∣sons of Adam and Noah onely, but to all that descended from their Loyns, as appears from the preceding Discourse; it will follow (as was there also shewn) that all the Sons of Men have a natural Right to a Portion of it, and consequently, that particular Properties are limited by the Necessities of those of the same Stock; whether it be by obliging the Owners to impart of them to those their needy Bre∣thren, or, as I shall afterwards shew, by warranting the Necessitous, in the faileur of all other Means, to extort so much from the other, as may serve to the Support of them. But neither is it less clear from the Laws which God hath since given, that Mens Properties are limi∣ted by the Almighty. For, a Law, where it is impos'd, retrenching Mens Liberty, as to that particular which it enjoyns; if God hath pre∣scrib'd Laws concerning the use or disposition of them, our Property will be so far limited, as the Laws which are imposed do direct. All therefore that will be requisite to do, will be to instance in those Laws, which will at the same time acquaint us how they are limited by him. Of this nature is, first, that Law which enjoyns Sobriety; a Law which is no less written in the Hearts of Men, than in the Divine Scriptures. For, Sobriety being nothing else than a Moderation in our Enjoyment of those Good Things which he hath given us, he who prescribes such a Moderation, doth consequently so far retrench our Property, which consists in a Right to use and enjoy them. Of the same nature are those Laws which require the honouring of God with our Substance; whether as in the Old Law, by offering part of it in Sacrifice; or as in the new, by imparting of them to those who mi∣nister about Holy things: He who prescribes such a Law, so far im∣pairing Mens Properties, as the Service of Religion doth require. Lastly, Forasmuch as the same Law of God doth enjoyn ministring to the Poor out of them, that Right which we have to use and enjoy them, must be so far retrench'd, as the Law of Charity doth exact.

But because, how unwilling soever Men may be to have their Pro∣perties limited by the Divine Majesty, yet they will be ashamed to speak it out; therefore proceed we to inquire, whether or no, and how they may be limited by Men; which is a Confinement Man can less patiently endure. In order whereunto, I will entreat first of all of Princes, and then of less Publick Persons.

Of the Authority of Princes in this Affair, no doubt can be made; as because that Law of God which constitutes them, empowers them to lay a Tribute upon their Subjects; so because every Man doth, either expresly or tacitely, stipulate to contribute toward the Support of that State whereof he professeth himself to be a Member: by means of which, though their Properties come to be limited, yet it is in effect by themselves. Again, Forasmuch as the Publick Weal, as well as Charity, requires the Support of those who have not wherewithal to maintain themselves, hence it comes to pass, that it is in the power of those to whom the Care of the Publick weal is committed, so far to abridge the Properties of Private Persons, as the Necessities of those distressed ones shall require, whether it be by permitting the loose Ears of Corn to the gathering of the Poor, as the Custom of all Chri∣stian Nations doth prescribe; or by exacting a Contribution from their Purses, by means of which such a part of their Properties passeth over to the Poor, and the Proprietary himself, and not they, becomes a Thief for detaining it. In fine, Wheresoever the Publick Good cannot be either procur'd or maintain'd as it ought, but by setting Limits to, or serving it self of the Properties of particular Persons, there, no doubt, it shall be lawful for those who have care of it, both to set Bounds to, and serve themselves so far forth of them: He who prescribes any End, consequently warranting the use of such Means as shall be found to be conducing to it. Which said, nothing remains to be inquir'd into, but whether the Properties of Men may receive a Limitation from more Private Persons. To the Affirmative whereof, as no Man hath or can pretend, save where he who conferr'd them hath affix'd a Limitation, or the Proprictary himself hath consented to it; so, in each of those Cases no doubt a Limitation by Private Persons is not onely possible, but reasonable: It being but just (be∣cause the natural Consequent of Property) that he who invests ano∣ther Person with it, should have the modelling of his own Grant; as, on the other side, that they who consent to any such, should be bound up by it: He who consents to any Limitation, making it his own Act, and consequently receiving no Injury by it.

PART II.

Of the Negative Part of the Commandment, which is shewn to import the not usurping upon, or any way diminishing of our Neighbour's Property. This evidenced, not from the force of the Word Steal, which is acknowledg'd to signifie onely the clancular taking away of that which is anothers; but from the general Design of the Deca∣logue, the Comprehensiveness of the two foregoing Precepts, and the Fundamental Reason of the Prohibition of Theft. An Address to a Declaration of the Crimes that are included in it; which are such as are distinguish'd from each other, either by the manner of their commission, or by those Objects about which they are conversant. Of the former sort is, 1. The Theft of the Heart, or that Covetousness whereby it is inclin'd to commit it; as is made appear, both by God's having a principal regard to the Heart, and the Analogie of the two for∣mer Commandments. 2. That Ʋsurpation which the Tongue is instru∣mental to, whether by its Silence in the concealing of Defects (where is shewn, what Defects may, or may not be conceal'd) or by its Ex∣pressions; such as are those who put too fair a Gloss upon our own, or cast a Disparagement upon the Commodities of others. 3. The Theft of the outward Work, which again is made to consist in the taking away, or detaining, or corrupting the Properties of our Neighbour. Ʋnder the first of these are ranked, all open and violent Rapines, the using unequal or deceitful Measures, the making use of false Lights, or other such like Artifices; the wearying a Man out of his own with unjust Vexations, the exacting or taking of immoderate Ʋse; where is shewn withal, that all Ʋse is not unlawful: and, in fine, the monopolizing of Commodities. The detaining or corrupt∣ing the Properties of our Neighbour, shewn to be, in like manner, Thefts; and the several Species thereof enumerated.

HAVING entreated at large in my last concerning Property, which this Commandment both supposeth, and (as I shall by and by shew) professeth to maintain; it remains that we inquire, what it prescribes concerning it: which may be reduc'd to two Heads.

• 1. The former whereof imports the not usurping upon, or any way diminishing the Property of our Neighbour; which is the Negative part of the Commandment.
• 2. The latter, (which is the Affirmative)
  • 1. The using of all due Means for the procuring and maintaining of our own; and,
  • 2. The contributing, what in us lies, to the procuring, defending, or enlarging the Property of our Neigh∣bour.

I. I begin with the former of these, even the Negative part of the Commandment, affirm'd by us to be the not usurping upon, or any way diminishing of our Neighbour's Property: Where again these five things would be inquir'd into.

• 1. How it doth appear that the Negative part, or Prohibition,

• comprehends in it all usurping upon, or any way diminish∣ing of our Neighbour's Property.
• 2. What particular Crimes are included in it.
• 3. What Actions are to be look'd upon as exempted.
• 4. Wherein the Criminalness of those things which are inclu∣ded in it doth consist. And,
• 5. And lastly, What Punishments may be inflicted on them by the Civil Magistrate.

I. There being nothing more prejudicial to the strength of any As∣sertion, than to suffer it to rest at all upon weak or fallacious Princi∣ples; I shall not onely wave the arguing the generality of the Prohi∣bition from the Latitude wherein the Word Stealing is sometimes ta∣ken, but profess my self to agree with those who understand no other by Stealing, than the clancular taking away of that which is another Mans; that being the proper signification of the Word, and so under∣stood by all the Translators of the Decalogue. And indeed, as I shall by and by shew, that there is no necessity at all of understanding it in a more general sense; so, that we ought to take it in a more re∣strained one, the Stile of the Declalogue, and particularly of the two foregoing Precepts, shews. For, making use of Murther and Adul∣tery, which are onely particular Species of Injuriousness and Unclean∣ness, to denote all those which are of the same Genus; it is but reaso∣nable to think (especially when the Hebrew phrase inclines us to it) that the Commandment we are now upon, made use of one particu∣lar Crime in the matter of Injustice, to express all those that are of the same nature with it. Which Observation, as it establisheth the proper Notion of the Word Steal, for which it was primarily pro∣duc'd; so withal affords no contemptible Argument of Gods intention to forbid in it all Ʋsurpations whatsoever, or diminutions of the Pro∣perties of our Neighbours; especially if we add thereto the general Design of the Precepts of the Decalogue, and the Agreement of others with that which is here expresly forbidden. For, with what shadow of Reason can any Man think God intended no other Injustice than that which is expressed in the Commandment, when (beside the gene∣ral Design of the Decalogue, which I have shewn to have been intend∣ed as an Abstract of the whole Duty of Man, and the Comprehensive∣ness of the two foregoing Prohibitions) those Injustices which are not mentioned are alike Usurpations upon, or Diminutions of Mens Pro∣perties, which is the Fundamental Reason of the Prohibition. I will conclude this Particular with that of Philo , in his Tract De Decalogo, where he makes this short Remarque upon the present Precept. The Third Commandment, saith he, (for so it is, in his account, of those of the Second Ta∣ble) is of not stealing, under which is to be rank'd what∣soever hath the estimate of defrauding of Creditors, or denying those things that have been deposited with us; of medling with those things which belong to the Publick, and which consequently ought not to be shar'd between Private Men; as also of shameless Rapines; in fine, of such Covetousnesses whereby Men are induc'd, either openly or privily, to withdraw those things which belong to others.

II. Now though what hath been said, may give us a competent un∣derstanding

of those things which are forbidden by the Command∣ment; it appearing from the Premises, that all such are, whereby the Properties of our Neighbours are any way impair'd: yet because Men are seldom so wise as to apply any general Direction to their own particular Concernments, or at least are not over faithful in the doing of it, I think it not amiss to draw it down to particular Instances, and shew the several Crimes which are here included: For my more order∣ly enumeration whereof, I will represent, first of all, such Usurpati∣ons or Diminutions of the Properties of Men, as are distinguish'd from each other by the manner of their commission; and after that, pro∣ceed to those which receive their denomination and distinction from those Objects about which they are conversant.

And here, in

1. The first place, I shall not doubt to reckon, as included in the Prohibition, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Covetousness, whereby (as Philo speaks) the Heart of Man is inclin'd to usurp upon the Property of his Neigh∣bour. For, though the bare coveting of that which is another Mans be the Subject of another Commandment, and shall accordingly be there considered by us; yet when it includes in it a Desire or Reso∣lution to get from another that which is his, by any fraudulent, op∣pressive, or any other unjust Proceeding, it is in reason to be rec∣kon'd to that Commandment which we are now upon; as because the Heart is that which God principally looks after, and which strikes the greatest stroke in absolving or condemning our outward Actions; so because our Saviour hath reckon'd to the Prohibitions of Murther and Adultery, those injurious or unclean Purposes that are in it. For, by the same reason that a Man of malicious or unclean Desires is to be look'd upon as a Murtherer or an Adulterer; he who hath either a desire, or purpose, to defraud his Neighbour, is to be look'd upon as a Thief, and consequently within the compass of the Command∣ment. But so that they who were Strangers, yea Enemies to the Christian Faith, were also perswaded, is evident from a Saying of Julian's, which is recorded by Grotius in his First Book de jure Belli ac Pacis. The second Law (saith he) and which is no less Divine than that which enjoyns the acknowledging and worshipping of a God, is that which commands wholly to abstain from the Properties of other Men, and permits not to confound them either in Word, or Work, or in the secret Operations of the Heart. Words worthy of a better Mouth than that from which they proceeded; but however not rendred unworthy of our regard by that blasphemous one from which they came: there being nothing which the best of Religions, even our own, stands more commended for, than the re∣straining of the Heart of Man from all irregular Purposes or De∣sires.

2. But because (as Julian intimates in the place before-quoted) there is a Theft or Usurpation which the Tongue is an Instrument in, therefore it may not be amiss to shew by what ways and means this little Member prejudiceth the Properties of its Neighbour. For the more distinct explication whereof, I shall consider,

• 1. First of all, of its Silence; and then,
• 2. Of its Words or Expressions.

1. There is a famous Question in Tully's Book de Officiis, a Book indeed read by Boys, but worthy, if we may believe the Learned, of the consideration of the wisest Men, yea of the gravest Theologues, as being stil'd‖ by Monsieur le Fevre, Master to the late King of France, His Casuist; and by Monsieur de Hayes, and eminent Advocate of that Kingdom, The Gospel of the Law of Nature: But there, I say, there is a Question whether a Man be bound to reveal the Faults of the thing he sells. On the one side, there is Profit, and some shew of Reason also: For what (saith the same Tully) can be so absurd, as for the Master of any House to make a publick Proclamation by the Cryer, that he sells an infected one? On the other side, there is a greater appear∣ance of Ingenuity, and Clearness, and Simplicity, which are things not to be wanting in him that pretends to Justice and Honesty, but however not to be wanting in those who pretend to the Profession of Christianity. Where the Truth lies, is not possible to determine all at once, because Circumstances may alter the Case; and therefore I shall proceed to it by degrees, offering, first of all, as an undeniable Maxim of Justice, That it is not lawful for any Person by his con∣cealment to screw more out of the Person he sells to, than the thing is really worth; he who so does, undoubtedly stealing from him so much as the things he sells are over-rated. But neither, secondly, can it be deny'd, that it is equally unlawful to conceal such Defects as make the thing sold of little use to him that buys it; because such a thing is really little worth to him, and consequently the Buyer in a manner defrauded of the Money he paid. Upon which account, if a Man should sell a Horse to him who buys him for this or that particular use, whether of Saddle or otherwise, for which he knows him to be unapt; in such a case I no way doubt the Seller is a Thief, because taking the Buy∣ers Money for that which is unuseful to him, and con∣sequently not worth to him what he gives for it. But as where the Defect neither makes the Thing worth less in it self than it was sold for, nor unuseful to the Party that buys, I see not what Obligation can lie upon the Seller to reveal the defects of his Com∣modities; partly, because there are few things that have not some defect or other, which makes it but reasonable that the Buyer should bear a share with him; and partly because a revelation of all Defects would, by the Scruples which it is apt to raise in the minds of Men, be an impediment to Commerce, especially with conscientious Men; which it is for the interest of the general Weal to keep up. This one∣ly would be added, That though it may be lawful to conceal some Defects, yet it is not such to deny any; this being an injury to Truth, as well as to our Neighbour; which (as I shall afterwards shew) ought to be preserv'd inviolable.

2. And here a fair opportunity is ministred to me, to enter upon those Usurpations or Thefts which are made by the mediation of the Expressions of the Tongue. Whereof, the first that I shall as∣sign is, when Men by their Tongues set a fairer gloss upon a thing, than it has real worth to deserve. An Illustrious Instance hereof we have in the fore-quoted Tully, which it may not be amiss to transcribe. One C. Canius, a Roman Knight, having for his pleasure retir'd to

Syracuse, gave out that he would buy some Gardens, where he might recreate himself with his Friends. Pythius, a Banker of that Place, hearing of it, sent him word, that he had no Gardens to sell, but that those he had were at Canius his service, if he pleas'd to make use of them; and accordingly the next day invited him to Supper. Which Invitation as soon as he understood to have been accepted, he appointed the Fishermen of that Town to fish the next day before his Gardens. Canius comes at the time appointed, and is nobly entertain'd: The Fishermen also come with their Boats, and lay down what they had caught at Pythius his Feet. To him Canius; What, I pray, meaneth this, so many Fish about this place, and so many Boats? And what wonder, reply'd Pythius? hereabouts are most of the Fish that are in the River of Syracuse, this Place the Fishermen cannot be without. Canius being taken with the suppos'd Commodity of the Place, impor∣tunes Pythius to sell it. He at first seems unwilling, but at length sells it him at his own Rate. The next day Canius invites his Friends, comes early himself to his Gardens, but sees no Fisher-boat. He in∣quires of his next Neighbour, whether it were any Holyday, that he saw no Fishermen there? Not, reply'd he, that I know of: but here none are wont to fish, and therefore yesterday I wondred at what hapned. Now who sees not, that Pythius was as very a Thief with his Tongue, as those who with their Hands take away their Neighbour's Goods? That Commendation which he gave to his Gardens, drawing that Mo∣ney from Canius, which he would not otherwise have given, (Which what is it, in truth, but a Theft?) and that too, in all probability, which was above the real Value of the Thing. Again, For that of St. James is in nothing more true than in this, that the Tongue is a World of Iniquity; as the Tongue may play the Thief by putting too fair a Gloss upon a Man's own Commodities, so it may do also by casting a disparagement upon those of other Mens. A thing too usual among the Men of Trade, but which cannot certainly escape the Censure of this Commandment: He who disparageth his Neighbour's Commodities, hindring him in the sale of them; which is in truth no better than a Theft, because depriving him of that Advantage which he might make of them, in the Right whereunto Mens Propriety consisteth. What should I tell you of raising false Accusations against Men, where∣by their Properties come to be forfeited; of giving false Testimonies in Judgment; and, which is of the same force, and is employ'd to sup∣ply the place of the Tongue, the forging of Deeds and Wills, or be∣ing by our Subscriptions instrumental to the authorising of them? For, who sees not, that these are not onely Thefts, because depriving the true owners of their Properties; but generally of the foulest na∣ture, because stealing away whole Estates at once?

3. From the Usurpation or Theft of the Heart or Tongue, pass we to that of the outward Work, as which is the onely thing expres∣sed in the Commandment: Where again these three Species of Thefts offer themselves to our consideration; such as consist in the taking away, or detaining, or corrupting the Properties of our Neighbours. Under the first of these Species I reckon,

1. First, That Prejudice which is done to the Properties of Men by open and violent Rapines. For, though this be not Theft in the proper Notion of the Word, yet it agrees with it in that Injury which

is offered to the Property of our Neighbour, and hath over and above the imputation of Impudence and Violence, which serves so much the more to enhance it. But neither,

2. Secondly, shall I stick to reckon, as included, that Theft which is made by unequal or deceitful Weights and Measures; as because it is not onely a withdrawing of so much as those Weights and Measures fall-short of their due Proportion, but also a clancular one; so because such Courses as these are represented as abominable in the Eyes of that God with whom we have to do: Witness for the former that of Prov. 20.10. That divers weights and divers Measures are an abomi∣nation to the Lord; meaning thereby, as Moses himself hath inter∣preted it, a bigger and a less; and (as a Learned† Man hath farther observ'd) a bigger to buy by, and a less to sell by. By means of which, as there is not that equality in our Commerce, which that most excellent Rule of Doing as we would be done by, enjoyns; so there is, if not a prejudice to both Parties with whom we deal, yet at least to him of whom we purchase; the bigger to be sure being greater than the just Standard, and consequently taking more from him, than either Justice or our own Contract doth allow. The same is much more to be said of deceitful Weights and Measures, that is to say, of those which are less than their due proportion: as because they do manifestly withdraw as much from the Buyer, as the Weight or Measure which it wants amounts to; so because the Scripture doth frequently and earnestly express its detestations of such Practices: For beside those Places in the Proverbs, which though simply, yet roundly affirm, that a false Balance is an abomination to the Lord, we find God expressing a more than ordinary displeasure against his own People, for such like Injustices in their Dealings: For, Hear this (saith God, Amos 8.4.) O ye that swallow up the needy, even to make the poor of the land to fail; saying, When will the New-moon be gone, that we may sell corn? and the Sabbath, that we may set forth wheat? making the Ephah small, and the Shekel great, falsifying the Balances by deceit. The Lord hath sworn by the excellency of Jacob, Surely I will never forget any of their works. Agreeable hereunto is that of Micah, and cuts off from such Persons all pretences of Purity, which yet many of them have the hardiness to lay claim to, chap. 6.10. and so on. Are there yet the treasures of wickedness in the house of the wicked, and the scant Measure, which is abominable? Shall I count them pure with the wicked Balances, and with the bag of deceitful Weights?—Therefore also will I make thee sick in smiting thee, in making thee desolate because of thy sins. Add hereunto,

3. Thirdly, for the affinity it hath with the former, the making use of false Lights, or other such like Artifices, to disguise the thing they sell; they who do so, picking the Pockets of those they deal with, because taking Money of them for such Commodities as, were it not for their Disguises, they would not have bought at all, or at least not have paid such Rates as they demand, as being no way recom∣penc'd by their Purchases.

4. Of the same nature is, fourthly, though little consider'd by those that practise it, The wearying a Man out of his own with unjust Vexati∣ons. For, inasmuch as Theft, considered in its due Latitude, is no∣thing else than the taking away of that which is anothers, without

his will or consent; he that shall by any vexation put a Man upon a necessity of parting with that which is really his, is as verily a Thief, as he who sliely nims any thing out of his House; yea though (as Ahab was) he should be dispos'd to give him a Valuable Considera∣tion for it, which yet few such Persons are inclin'd to do: The taking of one thing for another, being then onely a lawful Contract, when it is with the free consent of the Party from whom we take it; which is not to be suppos'd there, where a Man is compell'd to it by force and violence. But so also is,

5. Fifthly, The exacting or taking of immoderate Ʋse for Money lent: For, I say not the same of taking Use in it self, howsoever here∣tofore Men have been otherwise perswaded. For, beside that there is no more real Injustice in taking Money for the Use of Money, than there is in taking it for the Use of a Man's House or Land, during the time wherein another enjoys it; Money, though it perish not in the Use, as House and Land does, yet, for so long time as it is out of the Owners hands, perishing to him, who might otherwise have made an advantage of it: Beside, secondly, that there appears not any the least shadow of forbidding it in the Books of the New Testament, no not in those Places where Avarice, and the like Crimes are censured: He that shall consult the Law of Moses, where Usury is forbidden, and by the notion whereof we ought in reason to judge of the nature of it in other places, will find no other Usury forbidden, than that which is taken of a poor man, and whom a Man ought therefore rather to give to, than take any thing from: as is evident from Exod. 22.25. and Lev. 25.36. For, as for that place in Deut. ch. 23.19. where it is simply and plainly affirm'd, Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy bro∣ther; it is in reason, being onely a Repetition of the former Laws, as that whole Book of Deuteronomy is, to be limited by the former, and consequently the Poor to be understood: He who repeats a thing, for the most part contenting himself with a rude and imperfect Account, as supposing such an one enough to recall the thing into Mens minds; but however leaving no place for doubt, but that that which he mo∣dels his Repetition by, especially if more full, is to be the Interpreter of his Words. To say nothing at all at present, though it might be reasonably enough insisted on, that our Case is not the same with that of the Jews, who were forbidden all Commerce with other Nations, which we are not onely no way forbidden, but in a manner under a necessity of. For, such a Commerce being not to be maintain'd with∣out a proportionable Purse, which that of professed Merchants can∣not be supposed to be; there is a kind of necessity toward the car∣rying of it on, that they should borrow of other Men; and of equity too, because advantaging themselves with their Money, to make them a reasonable Compensation for it. But as immoderate Ʋse (which what it is, the Law of the Place is the best Judge) hath no such thing to plead for it self; so I doubt not to reckon it among those Thefts which are forbidden by this Commandment: That Usury which is above the due proportion, being the proper Right of the Borrower, and consequently not to be taken by the Lender, without infringing of his Property, or, that I may speak more intelligibly, without ta∣king that which is another Mans. Add hereunto,

6. Sixthly, The engrossing all the Commodities we can find of one

kind, that so we may have the peculiar Privilege of selling them; he who so doth, not onely intending to rob all that have occasion of them, but actually robbing those of his own Profession, of that Ad∣vantage which the Laws of the Land, and their common Profession, give them an equal Interest in with himself. More, I doubt not, might be added; but these, I suppose, may suffice to judge even of the residue by: and therefore, in stead of heaping up any more, I shall content my self with a place or two in St. Paul, where the Doctrine of this Commandment is clearly enough delivered. The former whereof admonisheth him that stole to steal no more, but rather to work with his hands, to procure the Supply of his own Necessi∣ties; which shews all kind of encroaching upon other Mens Possessi∣ons to be forbidden: the latter†, that we should not go beyond or defraud our brother in any matter, those secret, and therefore less understood Thefts; adding moreover, that God is the avenger of all such, as he himself, when he was with them, had forewarned them and testified.

We have insisted hitherto upon such Thefts as are most visible, in the taking away of that which is another Mans: it follows that we inquire, whether there may not be a Theft in detaining, and what the several sorts of such kind of Thefts are. For the resolution of the former whereof, we shall need onely to have recourse to the fun∣damental Reason of the Prohibition of Theft, properly so called. For, that which makes Theft, properly so called, Criminal, being nothing else but the infringing the Properties of other Men; if that may be done by detaining, as well as taking away, there is no doubt it ought to be reckon'd to it, or at least as equally condemned with it. Now, that so it may, will appear, if we consider the several Species of them, the second thing propos'd to be discours'd of. For, doth not he in∣fringe the Property of another, who keeps that away from the Own∣er, which was by him onely deposited for a time, and till he should ei∣ther call for, or satisfie that Obligation for which he deposited it? Doth not he do the like, who detains in his Hands the Wages of the Hireling; and which the Promise of the Detainer, as well as the Labour of the Hireling, hath given him a Title to? Doth not he do so in part, who detains that, or any other Debt, beyond the time wherein it ought to be paid; when it is a Maxim of Reason, as well as of the Civil Law, That he pays less than he ought, who pays not at his Day? Lastly, Doth not he do so more apparently, who having taken away any thing from his Neighbour, either by fraud or vio∣lence, refuseth to make Restitution? But if so, to be sure they are to be accounted of as Thefts, or at least of near affinity with, and un∣der the like guilt and condemnation. And indeed, as the generality of Casuists have look'd upon this Theft as so Criminal, that it is be∣come a Maxim among them, That the Theft is not remitted, unless the Thing taken away be restor'd; as God hath moreover set a more than ordinary Brand upon it, by punishing those Detainers who came to it onely by the Injustice of their Predecessors: so, if it be duely considered, there is no wonder at all in the Dispensation of God, or yet in the Resolution of the Learned: He who restores not, when he can, continuing in and approving the former Theft, and consequent∣ly making himself unmeet for the Divine Grace, which requires at least the disallowing of our former Wickednesses.

One onely Species of the former Thefts remains, which consists in the destroying or any way prejudicing the Things of our Neighbour; as when Men, out of malice or envy, set fire to their Neighbours Hou∣ses or Corn, maim their Cattel, or, by not observing due Seasons, wear out those Grounds they hire. For, that this hath the nature of Theft, and that too not of the lowest nature, needs no other evi∣dence than the consequence of our own Actions, as by means of which the Proprietary is either depriv'd of his Goods altogether, or of that Use and Advantage which might accrue to him, in the Right where∣to (as hath been often said) the Nature of Propriety doth consist: It mattering not at all, toward the constituting a Man a Thief, whe∣ther he himself be benefited by those things he steals; but whether he deprives his Neighbour of it. Otherwise St. Augustine had been no Thief, who, when a Boy, robb'd his Neighbour's Orchard; because he threw away those Apples which he stole.

PART III.

An enumeration of such Thefts as are distinguish'd from each other by their Objects; where is shewn, 1. Both from the Fundamental Rea∣son of the Prohibition, and the Consequences of such kind of Ʋsur∣pations, That there may be a Theft of things immovable, as Lands and Houses, as well as of those that may be clancularly carried away. 2. Of Publick Goods, as well as of Private; the several sorts whereof are also reckoned up. 3. Of Persons, as well as of Things. 4. Of that which is not in our Neighbour's Possession, as well as of that which is; as again, of the Ʋse of a thing, as well as of the thing it self. Inquiry is next made, what Actions are to be look'd upon as exempt from the present Prohibition; in which number are reckoned, the Israelites spoiling the Egyptians, those Thefts which were permitted by the Lacedemonians to their Youths, and those which extreme necessity prompts Men to; the due Limita∣tions whereof are also carefully described. An Account of the Cri∣minalness of the Things here forbidden; which is shewn to consist, first, in their contrariety to the first Institution of Property, and the present Dispensations of the Divine Providence: Secondly, in their being prejudicial to Humane Society: And, thirdly, in the discouragement they give to Virtue and Industry. The Negative part of the Commandment concluded with an Inquiry concerning the proper Punishment of Theft; where is shewn at large, That Capi∣tal Punishment is neither unjust nor inconvenient.

THERE being nothing wanting to a just enumeration of the several Thefts that are here forbidden, but to reckon up those which receive their denomination from, and are distinguish'd from each other, by those Objects about which they are conversant; I pur∣pose to begin this Discourse with the Investigation of them, and both shew that they do, and how they come within the compass of this Com∣mandment.

In order whereunto, I observe,

1. That Theft may be as well of Things immoveable, as Lands or Houses; as of those which, as Gellius speaks, may be clancularly car∣ried away and withdrawn. For, though Theft, in the vulgar Noti∣on of it, extend onely to such things as may be clancularly carried away and withdrawn; though that also be the Notion of Theft in the Civil Law (as we now have it) as is evident from the Law Verum est, in the Title De Furtis: yet as there wanted not Men of Note, even in that Faculty, who had another Notion of it, as is evident from Sabinus‖ in Gellius; so, that in the Natural and Theological sense there may be a Theft of immoveable as well as movea∣ble Things, will be evident to any Man, who shall con∣sider either the formal Reason of this Sin, or the conse∣quence of Mens usurping upon Things immoveable. For that which makes any Theft, properly so called, a Crime before God, being the Invasion of anothers Property; it were extremity of Madness to think him a Thief, who should rob a Man either of his Fruit, or Houshold Goods; and not him who should possess himself of that Ground from whence the Fruit ariseth, or of that House wherein the other are deposited. Again, Forasmuch as he who spoils a Man of his Land or House, doth consequently spoil him of the Fruit of the one, which is confessedly a thing moveable; and of the Use of the other, which, even in the Notion of the Ci∣vil Law, may be the Object of Theft: he who doth so, must for that reason also be look'd upon as a Thief, and consequently within the compass of the Command∣ment. Upon which account, as the late Learned Dr.‖ Stuart doth not undeservedly deride that famous Lawyer, who at the same time he owned the taking away a Communion-Cup to be Sacrilege, did yet deny it to be such to take away the Lands of the Church, because they are not things moveable; so I know not with what better to silence such frivolous Exceptions, than with the Instance which the same Learned Man makes in Ahab's seising on Naboth's Vineyard. For, by the same way of ar∣guing, we might have concluded Ahab to have been a Thief, if he had robb'd Naboth of his Grapes; but Elijah was too harsh to that good King, for passing so severe a Censure on him, because he onely took away his Vineyard.

2. Of the Theft of things moveable and immoveable, what hath been said may suffice; and consequently of the two first Species there∣of: Proceed we therefore to consider another pair, which are diffe∣renc'd from each other by the publickness or privateness of the Things taken away. For, inasmuch as the Publick is capable of a Property, as well as Private Persons; inasmuch as it is not onely capable of a Property, but cannot subsist without it: hence it comes to pass, that there may be a Theft of Publick Goods, as well as of Private; and consequently, that, as well as the other, to be concluded within the force of the Prohibition. But from hence it will follow, that we are to reckon as such the denying of just Tribute, or converting that which is already gather'd to our own private Ʋses; the taking away of those Lands which were given for the Maintenance of Societies,

clipping, or any other way impairing the Publick Money: these being Entrenchments upon the Goods of the Publick, and consequently proper Thefts of them. And though it be true, that all Thieves of this nature do not reap the due Reward of their Desert; but, on the contrary, some of them bear themselves high, even against that Pub∣lick upon which they do usurp, (it being an ancient Complaint of Cato, That whilst the Thieves of private Mens Goods spend their days in Chains and Fetters, the Publick Thieves pass away theirs in Gold and Purple:) yet as the Mischief which ariseth from Publick Thefts, is much greater than that of Private ones, and consequently renders them much more criminal; so they who found lower Punishments for other Thefts, look'd upon this as so hainous, as to pronounce‖ Ca∣pital Punishment upon its Authors or Abettors, if those Authors were Judges; but if not, Deportation. I reckon not under this Head, though so reckon'd by the Civil Law†, as neither within any other of this Commandment, that Theft which is made of Sacred Things; partly because the Property thereof is vested in God, and consequent∣ly He, and not Man, robbed in it, as God himself complains Mal. 3.8. and partly, because St. Paul, Rom. 2.22. couples Sacrilege with Idola∣try, which shews it to be a Crime of a higher nature, as being an Usurpation upon the Rights of the Divine Majesty.

3. From those second sort of Thefts, pass we to another, because the Injustice of Men hath done so; that, I mean, which brancheth it self into a Theft of Persons and Things. The former so much the Concernment of this Commandment, that many of the Hebrews (as Munster tells us) have reckon'd it to be the onely Intendment of it. Wherein though I can by no means concur with them, because the Tenth Commandment, to which they refer the Theft of our Neigh∣bour's Goods, is not to be understood of Theft; or, if it were, were to be extended also to the Theft of Persons, because God for∣bids alike the coveting of our Neighbour's Servants and Goods: yet I think it but reasonable to reckon it among those Thefts which are forbidden in this Commandment; partly, because God, in the very next Chapter to that which is the Subject of my present Theme, for∣bids the stealing of a Man, and that too under no less Penalty than that of Death, Exod. 21.16. and partly, because the Persons of Men are no less a part of the Owners Property, than either his Lands or Goods; as both yielding him the same Advantage which Goods do, and among the Jews themselves, when a Man became insolvent, li∣able to a Sale, to satisfie that Debt which he had contracted. Now forasmuch as Men, no less than Things, may become a part of a Mans Property; forasmuch as by those, no less than by Things, Men may attain that Ʋsusfructus, in the Right whereto Propriety consisteth: it followeth, that the stealing of Mens either Children or Servants is to be look'd upon as one of those Thefts which are by God forbid∣den in this Commandment. All which I say, not onely to obviate the evil Trade of those Men, who by Toys, and other Artifices, train Mens Children and Servants into Ships, and, when they have done so, sell them for Slaves in Foreign Parts; but their Practice also, who by fair Words and Promises tempt Men from their Masters, to be∣come in the same Condition to themselves. For, what other is this, than to rob a Man of his Servant, and it may be too, if that Servant

be an useful one, of one of the best parts of his possessions. Add here∣unto, because differing from the former only in circumstance, the Ser∣vants withdrawing from his Master, whilst he is with him, that labour and service to which his own Contract and the Masters Wages bind him; he who doth so, becoming a kind of Thief of himself, because robbing his Master of that advantage which he might and ought to have by him.

4. Lastly (which I shall only name, because I have prevented my self in them, and shewn them both to be Thefts, and such as are forbidden in this Commandment) there may be a Theft of a thing which is not in our Neighbours possession, as well as of that which is, as again of the use of a thing, as well as of the thing it self: Upon the account of the former whereof, he is a Thief, who detains any thing in his hands which was either committed to him to keep, or is otherwise due to his Neighbour from him; as upon the account of the latter, he who makes the goods of his Neighbour unserviceable to him, or deprives him of the use of them, whether it be by detaining them some time in his hands, or hindring him from making use of them. All which having before at large exemplified, I shall content my self with subjoining this one general Remarque, which will serve as a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to judge of these and all other Thefts by; to wit, That all that is to be looked up∣on as such, which doth any way impair the property of our Neigh∣bour, where it is truly such, and not abridged by some of those limi∣tations which were before reckoned up by us: The properties of men, as to those particulars wherein they are limited, being rather equivo∣cally than properly such, and consequently the entrenchments on them not within the compass of this Commandment.

III. Now though that general Note might serve us for an answer to that third question, which we before proposed to discourse of, that is to say, What actions are to be looked upon as exempted from the prohi∣bition now before us; yet I think it not amiss to instance in two or three of that nature, because there may seem to be some difficulty in exempting them from the imputation of Thievery. I begin with that which is the most obvious to all, because recorded in the Scripture, that I mean which the Israelites are found to have done, even by the com∣mand of God himself: For what other can we make of the Children of Israel's borrowing of the Egyptians those Jewels, which they did not only not restore, for ought as we can learn, but are by that act of theirs said to have spoiled or robbed the Egyptians? Exod. 12.36. But neither will this action of theirs be found to be a Theft, if we un∣derstand thereby, as we ought to do, an usurpation upon anothers pro∣perty, where it is free from any limitation or alienation: Because though those Jewels, which they borrowed, were the property of the Egyptians, both before and at the time of the Israelites borrowing them; yet were they, by the Command of God, to whom all mens pro∣perties are subject, passed over to the Israelites, and consequently their detaining of them, though in semblance a Theft (for which cause it is called a spoiling by Moses) yet really and formally none. Next to this act of the Israelites, consider we another of the Lacedemonians, approved and encouraged by their Laws; it being recorded of them by Gellius out of Authors, neither few nor inconsiderable, that their young men were allowed to steal certain things, and particularly, the

Fruit of their Orchards, and the Messes of their Feasts: Not, as the aforesaid Author admonisheth, to encourage them to the desire of filthy lucre, but to make them crafty and watchful, and thereby the more apt to serve them in their Wars, which was, upon the matter, that Com∣mon-wealths whole profession. Now though for my own part I can∣not approve of such practices, as by which unwary Youths may be tempted to stealths of a more criminal nature, yet I am of opinion with the learned Selden, that where such practices are countenanced by Law, the perpetrators of them cannot in reason be charged with Theft properly so called, or usurping upon the properties of their Neighbors; for the properties of particular men being limitable by the publick Laws, and more particularly by such to which each Proprietor consents, if the publick Laws make it lawful to withdraw certain things from the owners, those things are so far common to those that can withdraw them, and consequently their withdrawing of them not so much an usurpation upon the property of the owners, as a just and lawful acqui∣sition. And it seems to me not altogether unlike the gleaning of Corn in a field, the property whereof, as of the Fruit that ariseth of it, though invested in a particular person, yet is not so entirely his, but that the loose Corns which fall from the Reaper become the property of him that shall first seize upon them. But because however such kind of Thefts might be countenanced by the Laws of the Lacedemonians, yet they are not, that I know of, received in any Christian Nation, nor it may be at present in any unconverted one, therefore, quitting the prosecution of that, I shall enquire into the nature of that Stealth which extreme necessity prompts men to. In order whereunto, I will put the case of a man travelling in a foreign Land, and there reduced to extre∣mity of hunger; for the providing against which, though he hath not failed to use earnest entreaties, nor yet to make a tender of his labour and service, yet he hath not for all that been able to procure himself so much repast, as might satisfie the necessities of Nature. This sup∣posed, I demand whether the taking away of so much, as may serve for the purposes before specified, be to be looked upon as a Theft, and consequently unlawful. Now though it be not to be doubted, but such an act looks very like one, because differing nothing in the mat∣ter from that which is really such, yet that it is not formally such, is evident from what was heretofore said concerning Gods giving the Earth to Adam and Noah, and in them, to all the Children of men; for this general Grant of the Almighty being antecedent to any parti∣cular property, which any of the sons of men is now possessed of, it is in reason so far to prevail above the present properties of particular men, as to make it lawful to the extremely necessitous, to withdraw so much from them, as may serve to satisfie these necessities. This only would be added, That as those extremely necessitous ought to premise both entreaties, and the tender of their service, partly because the pre∣sent properties of men stand by the divine Grant, and are not lightly therefore to be derogated from; and partly because God obligeth men for the prevention of it, to work with their own hands the thing that is good, that they may have wherewithall to support themselves, as well as to give to others: so the case before remembred cannot lightly be supposed in any Christian Nation, and much less in that wherein we live. As because of the multitude of charitable persons wherewith the

Land abounds, so because the Laws of our Nation have made provisi∣on for those, who are not able by their own endeavours to support themselves: They enjoining the Officers of the place, where they shall be found to be, to relieve them and send them back to the place of their last abode, as those, who are within the Precincts of it, to con∣tribute to the maintaining of them. Where therefore there is such a provision as this, there cannot lightly be any place for such a necessity as we speak of, and consequently neither for the serving of our selves, without the violation of the Divine Command. And indeed, as those necessities, which we sometimes fall under, do mostly arise from sloth and idleness, or a living above that condition wherein God hath pla∣ced us; so, that bare necessity can be no warrant to us to invade our Neighbours Goods, the Prayer of Agur doth abundantly declare, Give me (saith he) neither poverty nor riches: feed me with food convenient for me, lest I be full and deny thee, and say, who is the Lord? or lest I be poor and steal, and take the name of my God in vain; for ground∣ing his request against poverty, upon the fear he had lest he should thereby be tempted to steal, and take the name of God in vain, he thereby sufficiently intimated, that simple poverty doth no more pri∣viledge a man to steal, than the same poverty can to take Gods name in vain, or swear falsly, when examined upon Oath concerning the fact; or fulness, to deny him, and say, Who is the Lord?

IV. Having thus shewn the Prohibition now before us to compre∣hend in it all usurping upon, or any way diminishing of our Neighbours property; having moreover shewn what particular Crimes are included in it, and what actions are to be looked upon as exempted; we are in the next place to enquire, wherein the criminalness of those things which are included in it, doth consist, which will cost no great pains to resolve. For, inasmuch as the Crime here forbidden is nothing else than an interversion of property, which I have shewn to stand both by the Divine Institution at first, and the disposition of the Divine Provi∣dence; he, who shall go about so to intervert it, must be thought to fight against God, by whose appointment it was both instituted and continued. And indeed, as there is no sin against man, which is not in some sense against God, because forbidden by his Laws; so the sin we have now before us, is more peculiarly such, because, over and above the violation of his Laws, destroying that order which he ap∣pointed from the beginning in the world, and hath approved ever since by the disposition of his Divine Providence. But beside the con∣trariety which this sin of Theft carries in it to the institution and dis∣position of the Almighty, it is no less prejudicial to humane Society, which next to the Divine Majesty ought to be accounted sacred; part∣ly because it is an interversion of those properties, for the preserving whereof it is that men have been so willing to enter into Societies; and partly because it prompts the injured party to endeavour a recove∣ry by force and violence, which puts all into confusion and disorder: The injurious, no less than the injured party, being not like to want partners in his quarrel, 'till at length the whole Society be of a flame. And though it may be some unjust persons would not be of so exorbi∣tant appetites, as to endeavour to attain a soveraignty over the posses∣sions of all their fellows, and much less over their persons, yet inas∣much as the desire of this worlds goods encreaseth with the acquisition

of them, as (because that acquisition is not otherwise to be maintain∣ed) a desire of power also, it is not easie to be imagin'd, but that they who indulge themselves in the invading of this or that particular mans property, would in fine, if they had ability, invade the goods of all, and make even the Common-wealth their own; injustice, where it hath acquired a proportionable strength, easily passing into tyranny, which is the bane of those Societies which it invades. Lastly, for that also would be considered, where there is any respect for virtue and in∣dustry; if either secret or open usurpations were permitted, men would for the most part leave off to do virtuously, because without hope of enjoying the rewards of it.

V. Now as every thing that is criminal doth by its own nature, and the Decree of God, bind over the Author to punishment, and that too in this world, if it be prejudicial to humane society, which I have shewn the Sin of Theft sufficiently to be: so it may not be amiss to en∣quire, and the rather because it hath been a matter of controversie, what punishments may be inflicted on it by the Civil Magistrate. For the resolution whereof, because there are different sorts of Thefts, I will proceed by degrees, and consider first of all of that Theft which is of Children or Men. Now though I know it be questionable, whe∣ther other Thefts may be punished by death, and the rather, because God in the old Law prescribed a more easie punishment; yet as to this whereof we speak, no doubt at all can be made, but it may be censured with death, because God, who observes exact justice, commanded such an one to be put to death, Exod. 21.16. for he that stealeth a man (saith God) and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death. And not without reason, as because of the great value of the thing stoln, as being no other than the Image of God, so because of that slavery and hardship, which he, who steals a man, intends, which, as it is often managed, is not inferiour to death it self. From the Theft of Persons pass we to that of Things, as which is most confessedly intended. Where again we are to distinguish of such things or goods as belong to the Publick, or such as belong to Private persons. If the question be concerning the former, especially in any eminent instances, so I should not doubt to affirm, that it may be justly sentenced with death; as because the Roman Law, which draws nearest to that of Reason and Nature, inflicted capital punishment up∣on Judges that should be found to do so, and upon all that were in∣strumental to them in it; so because the publick weal, wherein all private mens is concerned, depends much upon the stock it hath to maintain it. The great matter of controversie is concerning the steal∣ing of the goods of private persons, which therefore I shall address my self to resolve. And here indeed hath been great variety, according to the inclinations or exigences of those States wherein they have been committed, the quality of the Theft, or the condition of the persons; some punishing Theft with restitution of the thing stoln, and an over∣plus, as the Law of Moses, and that of Solon; some with stripes and servitude; and some, in fine, with death, as Draco did all Thefts what∣soever; which made Demades afterwards say, that Draco wrote his Laws not with Ink, but with Blood. My purpose is not at this time to give an exact account of that variety, which whosoever list to be satisfied in, may read an excellent Chapter in Aulus Gellius; as neither

to scan the propriety of those several punishments, and the proportion they bore to the Crime of Theft, because all of them may be reasona∣ble enough; according to the different exigences of circumstances: the only thing which I pretend to enquire into, as which indeed is the prin∣cipal controversie, is, whether Theft may be punished with death. For the resolution whereof, we will consider of such Thefts, as are openly and violently committed, best known among us by the name of Rob∣beries; and then of clancular ones, or Thefts properly so called. If the question be concerning the former, so I know not what any reasonable man can oppose against the punishing them with death, as because of the boldness of the fact, which requires a more than ordinary severity to repress it, so because those Thefts, by the violence wherewith they are attended, strike no less at mens lives than fortunes, which it is but reasonable to secure by the death of the Offendor. All the difficulty, to my seeming, is concerning clancular Thefts; where again we are to distinguish of nocturnal and diurnal ones; that is to say, of those that are committed in the night, or those that are committed in the day. That the former of these, even such Thefts as are committed by night, may be punished with death, will appear not to be unreasonable, if we consider with our selves, the leave that was given by the Law of God first, and afterwards by that of the 12 Tables‖, to kill the Thief in the very act; for how should not that be much more lawful to the Ma∣gistrate, upon a mature consideration of the fact, than to the injured person in his heat? Neither will it avail to say, that that leave was gi∣ven to the party robbed, upon presumption of the Thiefs adding vio∣lence to his Theft, and the likelihood of-securing himself and pur∣chase by the death of the injured party, which therefore where it is past all danger, the nocturnal Theft ought in reason to be otherwise chastised; for inasmuch as in punishment consideration ought to be had of what may probably happen hereafter by such kind of Thieve∣ries; if there be a just presumption of such persons adding Murther to Theft, it is but reasonable, for the security of innocent persons lives, to put those to death, who are likely to take away the lives of other men. Which said, I will proceed to the consideration of diurnal Thefts, or such as are committed in the day: Now though simply con∣sidered a fourfold restitution may seem to be a proportionable punish∣ment, because laid upon it by the Law of God, who best understands the proportion of things; though, if that will not do, the bringing in of servitude possibly may; the abolition whereof (as I have elsewhere shewn) hath not been much for the conveniency of the world: yet I doubt not there may be instances wherein it may be both lawful and necessary to punish such Offendors with death; as for example, when such Thefts are frequently committed, and cannot lightly be restrain∣ed with milder punishments: The quality of a Theft being not to be judged of meerly by the prejudice it doth to the injured party, but by the harm it doth to humane society; which it is both the Magistrates interest and duty to secure. Now forasmuch as it may sometime hap∣pen, that Humane Society cannot be maintained without inflicting a punishment, which is above the measure of the offence, if considered only as to that prejudice which it doth to the immediate object of it; in such a case I see no reason why the Magistrate may not inflict it, and particularly the extreme punishment of death; that I say not also, that

I cannot see how he can avoid it, without a greater injury to that So∣ciety which he is appointed to defend. Upon which account as it is but reasonable to judge favourably of our own Laws, by which death is so often made the punishment of Theft, respect and charity both ob∣liging us to suppose, that the Makers of those Laws, together with those that have succeeded them in their Office, have found by experi∣ence, that a lesser punishment will not serve the turn; so there is this farther inducement to make that supposition, that even that severity which they have used hath not deterred men from the commission of it. But be that as it will (for such things as these must be left to the de∣termination of Publick Persons, and not to Private ones, who are ra∣ther to submit than dispute) most certain it is, that the matter of Theft is so criminal before God, that the committers of it are by S. Paul rec∣koned among those persons, who shall not inherit the Kingdom of God.

PART IV.

Of the Affirmative part of the Commandment, which is declared to be, First, The using all due means for the procuring and conserving to our selves a Property: Secondly, The contributing what in us lies to the procuring, defending, or inlarging the Properties of others. The for∣mer of these resumed, and evidenced to be a part of the Command∣ment, from the necessity the omission thereof puts us upon of invading the Propertie of our Neighbour. An address to a more particular consideration of it, in an enumeration of the means we are to use to procure or conserve to our selves a Property. Labour assigned the prin∣cipal place among them, and upon occasion thereof enquiry made I. From whence our obligation thereto ariseth, which is shewn to be that Command which God laid upon Adam, to dress that Garden in∣to which he was first put, more especially that both Curse and Com∣mand, which was laid upon him after his fall, of eating his bread in the sweat of his brows, and the necessity there is generally of it to∣ward the procuring of a subsistence. II. To what Persons the obliga∣tion of Labour doth extend; where is shewn from the former grounds, that it extends to all that are not unapt for it, and particularly to those of the Female Sex. III. Whether the labour of the body be in∣cumbent upon all, which is answered in the Negative, and evidenced both from Reason and Scripture. IV. About what things this la∣bour of ours is to be conversant; which are shewn in the general to be such as have no moral obliquity in them, nor are any way instru∣mental to those that have; as moreover such as are some way or other useful to our selves or others; where the Trade of Fidlers, and other such like Persons, is considered: In particular, such things to which we have a call from the Almighty, where both the necessity of such a call, and the means of knowing it, is also declared.

II. OF the Negative part of the Precept what hath been said may suffice, proceed we now to the consideration of the Affirma∣tive, which I have said to consist in these two things:

• 1. The using all due Means for the procuring and conserving to our selves a Property.
• 2. The contributing, what in us lies, to the procuring, de∣fending, or enlarging the Property of our Neighbour.

I. Touching the former of these, no doubt can be made of its be∣ing included in this Commandment; because, without that, it would be morally impossible to keep Men from stealing, which the Com∣mandment doth expresly forbid: he who useth not all means requisite for the procuring or conserving to himself a Property, being under a necessity of invading that of others. The onely thing worth our in∣quiry is, what those due Means are: which accordingly I come now to investigate.

1. I begin with Labour, because laid upon all Mankind for this very end and purpose, and because expresly prescrib'd by St. Paul, to procure to our selves a Subsistence, and so keep us from the Sin here forbidden: At the same time he exhorts him that stole to steal no more, exhorting rather to labour, and to work with his hands the thing that is good, Ephes. 4.28. For what reason, think we, but that (as Grotius hath well explain'd it) he may have wherewithal to live himself, as well as to give to him that needeth? that being ill to be done, but however with little effect, as to the keeping of Men from stealing, where they themselves are not first in some measure provided for. Now concerning Labour, I will inquire,

• 1. From whence our Obligation thereto ariseth.
• 2. Whether the Obligation to it extend to all Persons what∣soever.
• 3. Whether the Labour of the Body be incumbent upon all.
• 4. About what this Labour of ours is to be conversant.
• 5. And lastly, Whether it admit of a Relaxation, and after what manner and proportion.

1. Now though in investigating the Grounds of this Obligation, it might suffice to look no farther back, than that both Curse and Com∣mand which was laid upon fallen Adam, of eating his bread in the sweat of his brows, Gen. 3.19. because, as I have before shewn, that both Curse and Command is to be look'd upon, as of Universal con∣cernment; yet I think it not amiss (to make the Obligation appear so much the straiter) to look as far back as the time of Man's Inno∣cency, and when neither any Curse, nor any thing that could deserve it, can be suppos'd. For, as it is evident from that short Account we have of it, that that State of Pleasure and Innocence was not with∣out an admixture of Labour, he who put Adam into the Garden of Eden, obliging him to the dressing of it, Gen. 2.15. so it is no less evi∣dent, that, if that State had continu'd, all that descended from his Loyns would have been under the same Tie; partly, because Adam was the Representative of all Mankind; and partly, because such a Cultivation would have been necessary for the preservation of those Fruits which were given to Adam and his Posterity for their Support. But because that Labour, whatsoever it was, would undoubtedly have been without that Toil which the present Condition of Mankind doth require; therefore quitting that first Ground of our Obligation to labour, we will seek out such an one as is proportionable to that Labour which is establish'd on it. Now for this we shall need look no

farther than that Saying of God to fallen Adam, Gen. 3.19. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground. For, that Saying (as I have before shewn) being no less a Precept than a Curse, and such a Precept too as comprehended in it Adam's Posterity, as well as himself; we are in reason to deduce from thence that obligation to Labour, which we have said to be incumbent upon Mankind. Lastly, Forasmuch as Labour is more or less necessary to the procuring or conserving to our selves the Means of our Support, hence there ariseth another Tie, proportionable to that Supply which Mens respective Necessities do require.

2. It being thus evident what the Grounds of Mens Obligation to Labour are, inquire we, in the next place, to what Persons the Obliga∣tion doth extend: A Question which will receive an easie Solution, after the Solution of the former. For, it appearing from thence, that that Obligation hath no other Grounds, than either the common Ne∣cessities of Humane Nature, or such Positive Laws of God as were laid upon Adam and his Posterity; it is of necessity to be look'd up∣on as of equal extent, and consequently no Child of Adam to be ex∣empted from it. Onely because it doth not appear how the Female Sex comes to be concern'd, as having another and no less heavy Bur∣then laid upon it, I think it not amiss, before I proceed to any new Matter, both to shew how it comes to oblige them, and add farther Proofs for the confirmation of it. For, be it that those of the Fe∣male Sex had another, and no less heavy Burthen bound upon them, for the Transgression of her that was the Original of their Sex; yet will it not thence follow, that they are therefore to be exempted from that Burthen which was laid upon the other: partly, because that Sex, both in its Original and Descendents, had its Being in part from the Man; and partly, because the Transgression of her, who was the Original of it, was greater than that of the Mans, as being both the first, and the Occasioner of the others. Upon which account, as it is not to be wondred that God should add that Burthen of Labour to the other, as being but proportionable to their own Extraction, and the Guilt of the Foundress of their Sex; so, much less, if we consi∣der, that this Burthen of Labour had not onely nothing in it peculiar to the Man (as that which was laid upon the Female Sex had) but is of equal necessity to the Support of both. And though they that shall but superficially consider the Character that Solomon gives of a Virtuous Woman, Prov. 31.10. and so on, where, among other things, he describeth her as one that seeketh wooll and flax, and worketh willingly with her hands; though they (I say) that shall but super∣ficially consider these and the like Passages, may imagine they hear that grave King reading a Lecture of Oeconomicks, and rather ad∣monishing what may make for their Husbands Profit, than for the Interest of Religion, and the Peace of their own Souls: yet as that Imagination will be in part remov'd, by considering, that the Book of Proverbs is no less a part of Scripture than any other; so also by adverting, that he pretends not to describe a Thrifty, but a Virtuous Person, and, as it is in the thirtieth Verse, a woman that feareth the Lord. For, if so, such Works as those must be Works of Duty and Religion, and concern the Consciences, as well as the Profits of those to whom they do belong. And indeed, so far is the Industriousness

of that Sex from being a part of Oeconomicks onely, that St. Paul, who certainly never dream'd of any thing of that nature, insists upon the same thing, calling upon those whose Age gave them Ability for it, to intend their Houshold Affairs; and reproving such as were idle and negligent in it, 1 Tim. 5.13, 14 Which with what reason he could do so earnestly as he does, if it were not of Divine Obligati∣on, I am not able to conjecture, and I suppose better Wits cannot. You will pardon me, you of the Female Sex, if I have, beside my wont, thus seem'd to trespass on your Affairs: For, as I knew not how to avoid it, without giving countenance to the Practice of those Women, who, amidst all their Pretensions to Religion, seem to have little consideration of this Affair; so I have insisted the rather on it, to encourage the Diligence, and establish the Consciences of those who are more industrious in it. For, if St. Paul may be believ'd, it is not the idle, and busie-body, and wanderer from house to house that is the Religious Person; but she that diligently guides her own: and though there be other more immediate Acts of Religion, yet they serve God in these also, if they do them with respect to the Divine Command, and shall no doubt receive a Reward for them. This onely would be added, because understood in all Laws, That the Ob∣ligation to Labour reacheth no farther to either Sex, than where there is an Ability to discharge it: Upon which account, all sick, and impotent, and aged Persons are to be look'd upon as exempted so far as their respective Indispositions make them unapt for it. Which last Restriction I do therefore subjoyn, because even those, though not apt for the severer sorts of Labour, are yet oftentimes well enough qualified for casier ones. And I cannot but upon this occasion call to mind a Story which Busbequius tells us of a certain Spaniard, who had been a Commander among those of his own Nation, and was by himself redeem'd from a Turkish Master, to whom he was a Slave. For though, by reason of the Wounds he had receiv'd, he was mi∣serably impotent in all his Limbs, and one who therefore seem'd more proper for an Hospital than an Employment; yet his Turkish Master found a way to set him on work, and receiv'd a considerable Emolu∣ment by him. For, passing him over into Asia, where great Flocks of Geese are kept, he made use of him (as the same Busbequius tells us) for the feeding of them, and receiv'd no contemptible Benefit by it. But be that as it will, because I hasten to other Matter, and such as will more deserve our consideration: as other Persons than those before remembred, it will be hard, or rather impossible to find, who can plead an Exemption from the common condition of Man∣kind; so the search will be look'd upon as unprofitable by those who consider that of St. Paul, that if any man would not labour, nei∣ther should he eat, 2 Thess. 3.10.

3. From the Persons therefore that are under this Obligation, pass we to the Kinds of Labour to which they are oblig'd; or rather to inquire, whether that of the Body be incumbent upon all. A Questi∣on which is not of so easie a resolution as the former, if we consi∣der either the several States and Degrees of Men, or the Tenor of those Precepts by which Labour is bound upon us. For, as on the one hand, to oblige all Men to the Labour of the Body, would overthrow those several Orders which God hath set in the World,

and, which is more, take off the better sort from intending the La∣bours of the Mind, which are of no less necessity to the Support of Humane Society; so, on the other, to exempt any from it, seems equally repugnant to that Primitive Law, by which we have said La∣bour to be bound upon us, and the several Precepts of St. Paul: The former importing, the eating of our bread in the sweat of our face; the latter, working with our own hands for it. But as it would be consider'd, that it is no way unreasonable for a Law to be ex∣press'd in such Terms as have a more peculiar Aspect upon the major part (the major part as it is most to be consider'd, so standing in need of a more particular direction); so the Law of Labour, as it is worded both by God and St. Paul, though not holding in all Parti∣culars, is yet accommodable to the greater part of Humane Kind: The common Supports of Nature being not to be procur'd, where the greater part of those that are concern'd do not contribute to it with the Work of their own Hands. From whence as it will fol∣low, that there is no necessity of understanding the Laws before∣mentioned in that strictness of sense wherein they seem to be deli∣vered, so especially, if either Reason or Scripture do perswade an Enlargement of it. Which that they do, will appear, if we consi∣der them apart; and first of all, that which Reason offers to us. For, inasmuch as all are not qualified by Nature for Bodily Labour, or at least not so much as for the Labour of the Mind; and they who are, are not yet at leisure to intend it, by means of much more impor∣tant Concerns: inasmuch as the Labour of the Mind is no less ne∣cessary to the Support of Humane Society, nor less an Instance of that Travel which God hath laid as a Burthen upon Humane Na∣ture: it seems but reasonable to infer, That the Command of God is no less satisfied with that kind of Labour, than it is by the sweat of our face, or working with our hands. Forasmuch, secondly, as even by God's appointment there are Men of High Degree, as well as Low, and such whose Education and Birth seems not well to correspond to those meaner Labours to which the greater part of Mankind are oblig'd; it seems but reasonable to allot them such a Labour as is suitable to that better State in which the Almighty hath plac'd them. Lastly, Forasmuch as though both the Curse and Precept of Labour be laid upon all Mankind, yet it is in the power of God to release it; forasmuch as those Persons to whom God hath given more liberal Fortunes, are in reason to be look'd upon as in part releas'd, because without those Necessities for the redress where∣of Labour was principally enjoyn'd: it seems but reasonable to infer, that they are neither oblig'd to the same degree of Labour with Persons of meaner Fortune, nor to the same Species or Kind. And more than this, if those whom the old Saxon Tongue stiles ydle∣men, but our present Dialect by a Name more suitable to their Quality, did not challenge, I know not what any reasonable Man could oppose against their way of living, or endeavour to reduce them to the Condition of meaner Persons; consideration being al∣ways to be had of the Condition of the Persons, in order to the adjustment of the Obligations that lie upon them. It is a known Observation, and therefore I shall not fear to have the truth of it call'd in Question, That among the Turks Persons of the Noblest

Quality, and most ingenuous Education, are yet brought up to some Manual Art, in which they ever after employ some portion of their Time; the Great Turk himself, amidst his most important Affairs, yet allotting some portion of his Time to the intending of it. I do not pretend to lay this Burthen upon any ingenious Person, and much less to represent him as unuseful in the World, who should not think fit to follow their example; but certainly it must be a great reproach to those who are far better instructed, so far to forget either the De∣sign of their Being, or Descent from Adam, as to think themselves privileg'd to live in ease, and spend that Patrimony in Sloth and Luxury, which their Renowned Ancestors acquir'd either by their Wits or by their Swords. It may be enough to such, that they are freed from all servile Labours, that they have an Education and Parts answerable to those glorious Heroes, from whom they derive both their Fortunes and their Blood. And certainly, where they are well employ'd, as they will be no less useful to the World, so neither less acceptable to God, than the sweat of the others brows. But because Scripture, no less than Reason, would be inquir'd into there, where the Obligation, whose Relaxation we seek, hath its principal Foundation in it; therefore it may not be amiss, that I say not in some measure necessary, to inquire whether the Scripture affords any ground for the qualifying of that severer Precept which God laid upon Mankind for its disobedience. Now that it doth, will sufficiently appear from that Question which St. Paul put con∣cerning himself and Barnabas, 1 Cor. 9.6. For, demanding, as he does, whether he and Barnabas onely had not power to forbear work∣ing, as well as other Apostles, and as the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas, (for so the Word onely, and the connexion of that Demand with the former Words oblige us to supply it) he both supposeth that other of the Apostles, and the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas, abstain'd from Manual Labours; and that it was alike in his power to do so, if he pleas'd to make use of it, that so he might the bet∣ter intend that more noble Work of the Conversion of Souls. And indeed, as the Labour of the Brain, whereby that is to be done, is no less useful to Humane Society, nor (which makes it approach near∣er to that Curse upon which it is founded) less wearisom to the flesh, if we may give credit to Solomon, who was more than ordinarily exercis'd in it; so they who would reduce us to that toilsom estate of St. Paul, and others, who stuck not to addict themselves even to the meanest Artifices, must also bring back again into the World those miraculous Gifts and Graces whereby St. Paul, and other such like Persons, were enabled to discharge their several Provinces; the Work of converting Souls (as it is now to be managed) requi∣ring all that Labour and Industry which the Necessities of the World will suffer us to afford it. The same is to be said, and upon the strength of the forementioned Demand, concerning all those whose Brains are employ'd in the management of State-affairs, or are any other way useful to the conservation of Mens Persons or Estates. For, St. Paul pleading his Exemption from Bodily Labour, from his diligence in his Apostleship, and the good he thereby did to those Persons who were under his inspection, to which he thought it but just that at least a Maintenance should be allow'd; insinuating moreover, in

the ninth and tenth Verses, by his comparing his Labour to the oxes treading out the corn, and to plowing and reaping, that it was not unfitly stil'd a Labour, and such a Labour which privileg'd him to partake of carnal Things, no less than that which is attended with Sweat and Toil: he thereby gave us sufficiently to understand, that as the Labours of the Mind are no less properly such, than those which are exercised by the Hands; so, where they are conducible to the Benefit of Humane Kind, they give a Man the same Privilege to the enjoyment of this Worlds Goods, and consequently satisfie the in∣tent of the Commandment.

4. Being now, according to my proposed Method, to inquire about what things this Labour of ours is to be conversant, I shall propose, first, such Directions as concern the Labours of Men in general, and then those which relate to the Labours of particular Persons.

As to the former of these, we shall need no other Instruction than that which St. Paul gives in the fore-quoted place to the Ephesians, to wit, that it be about those things that are good. By which I mean, first, such things as have no moral obliquity in them, nor are instru∣mental to them. Of the former sort, in particular, is the Trade of Harlots, who prostitute their Bodies to furnish themselves with a Sup∣port; the Arts of Witches and Wizzards, who inquire into things secret, and such as are not onely knowable to God alone, but chal∣leng'd to himself: Of the latter, all those which are instrumental to Uncleanness, or to any other Sin whatsoever; such as are to the for∣mer, the Trade of Bauds and Panders; to Drunkenness, the keeping of Houses not for the covenience of Travellers, or the moderate refresh∣ment of others, but to invite and cherish intemperance; in fine, to Idolatry, the making of those Images which are to be the Object of it. Whence it is, that the Fathers inveigh so much against it, and (as I have before shewn†) reckon it little inferiour to that it ministers to. But beside that those things about which our Labour is to be con∣versant, ought to be free from all Vice, or from being instrumental to it; I shall not doubt to reckon, in the second place, that they ought to be some way or other useful to our selves or others; partly, because this is the lowest Notion the Word Good, in the proper acception of it, is capable of; and partly, because we find Labour instituted for the Support of our selves and others. Among these I reckon first, be∣cause undoubtedly Good, such Labours or Arts as conduce to the wel∣fare of Mens Souls, or Bodies, or Estates: such as are the Labour of the Brain, or Tongue, or Pen, in converting or building Men up in Piety; the cure of their Bodies when distemper'd, or the defending of their Properties; as, in like manner, those which conduce to the pro∣ducing of Food and Raiment, the protecting Men from Hunger, or the injury of the Weather; in fine, all such as are any way instru∣mental to them, or employ'd about the producing of them; and that too, not onely in such Instances whereby the Necessities of Nature may be serv'd, but the distinction of Degrees preserv'd and main∣tain'd. The onely difficulty, in my opinion, is concerning such Arts or Labours as are conversant about Matters of Delight and Recreation; such as are, the making of Cards or Dice, the Trade of Fidlers, Tum∣blers, Stage-players, and other such like Persons, whose Life consists wholly in gratifying the Eyes and Ears of other Men. Concerning

which, though I shall not be forward to pronounce of them as devoid of all usefulness, because Recreation, to which they serve, is no less needful to Humane Nature, than Labour; yet I cannot forbear to say, that Men of such Professions, of all others, ought both to avoid the committing of any Sin in the Exercise of their several Trades, and endeavour, what in them lies, and so far as their own Necessities will permit, the doing of such things also as are more useful to themselves and others; because, as if that about which their Labour is conver∣sant be good, it is in the lowest proportion such; so they are very rarely managed without prejudice to their own Souls, or to theirs whom they are intended to procure the gratification of.

Having thus shewn, in the general, about what the Labours of Men are to be conversant; inquire we, in the next place, about what the Labours of particular Men are, and what choice they are to make to themselves out of the former Heap. For the resolution whereof, as it is necessary to premise, that that, and that onely, is to be look'd upon as the proper Subject of our Labour, to which the Divine Ma∣jesty shall be pleas'd to call us; partly, because St. Paul, in the seventh Chapter of his first Epistle to the Corinthians, presupposeth such a call of God to every Man; and partly, because it is not to be thought, that God, who superintends over the World, and particularly over Men, will be wanting in directing them to such Courses as may make most for their good, and his own Glory: so a compendious way is thereby opened for Men to judge of that Subject about which their Labour is to be conversant: All that is left for Men to do (suppo∣sing a Call of God to every one) being no other than to inquire, which way the Divine Majesty calleth them. For the investigation whereof, forasmuch as extraordinary Inspirations are now ceas'd, but however are not lightly to be expected in Matters of this nature, and where, for the most part, if not always, lower Methods will serve the turn; recourse must be had to what his Word, and our own Reason, (which is the Candle of the Lord) shall dictate to us. Which if we do, we shall find (as a† Learned Man hath largely prov'd) that the best way to judge of the Divine Calling, and consequently of the proper Subject of our Labour, is by our Education, Abilities, and Propension; especially when we find them all to concur. For, as we are to presume in reason, that he who commands us to honour our Parents, doth thereby oblige us to the making that the Subject of our Labour, which they, out of their Prudence and Care, have train'd us up for (the detrecting of their Choice, being a questioning of their Wisdom, but to be sure a derogation to their Authority); so we can much less think that Choice any other than the Call of God, where a Man's own Inclination and Abilities do concur, because both of them the Results of his Providence, and, where his Revelations do not contravene, the Interpreters of his Will. Whatsoever difficulty there is in this Affair, is undoubtedly where there is a contrariety between them, and where Men are train'd up to those Courses to which they have not onely a natural averseness, but it may be too, little aptitude or ability. The resolution of which, though I had much rather Men should fetch from the fore-quoted‖ Learned Person, in whom it is distinct and full; yet I shall contribute so far toward it, by affirming, That as the first place ought in reason to be given to our Education,

because the Act of those whom God hath commanded us to obey; and next to that, (because Parents may sometime command things unfitting) to our Parts and Abilities, because pointing out, as it were with the Finger, what Employments God designs us for: so that consideration ought to be had, in some measure, of Mens Inclinations and Propensions, because both the Effects of the Creator's Power where they are purely Natural; and, where they are also strong, dif∣ficult to be overcome: I do not say, so far as to yield a perfect compli∣ance with them, where our Abilities and Education run counter to them; but a partial one, and such as may make the Task impos'd more easie to be born. Thus, for example, if a Man's Abilities and Education should prompt him to the Study of Sacred Things, at the same time his own Inclinations lead him to Humane Literature; if those Inclinations cannot be overcome, though there is no doubt they often may, the most prudent course, as well as most acceptable to God, would be undoubtedly to apply a Man's self to the study of the Civil Law, which is a rare Contexture of both. And more than this, as I shall not need to say concerning the choice of that Subject about which our Labour is to be conversant; so I shall conclude with an Ex∣hortation, to be more than ordinarily diligent in it; but so, as nei∣ther to suffer our diligence about the Meat that perisheth, to transport us into any Injustice, or thrust out our Endeavours after that Meat which endureth for ever. For, though it be not to be imagin'd, that an ordinary diligence can satisfie that Precept which requires the moulding our Bread with the Sweat of our own Brows; yet much less can it be suppos'd, that that diligence of ours can license us in any Injustice, or the neglect of our Eternal Welfare: Because, as La∣bour was impos'd to procure to our selves a Property, and thereby take away all temptation from entrenching upon the Properties of others, which a diligence that is attended with Injustice doth very ill comport with; so Reason, as well as Scripture, adviseth the postpo∣sing of those Commands which enjoyn the pursuit of Earthly Blessings, to those which are infinitely above them.

PART V.

The last question concerning Labour is, whether it admit of a relaxati∣on, and in what manner, and proportion. That it admits of a re∣laxation is made appear from the necessity there is of it, both to the support of Humane Nature, and to dispose men the better to continue it; as also, from the countenance that hath been given to it by Gods both Dispensations and Laws. That it admits of such relaxations as have the name of Recreations, is in like manner evidenced from the little refreshment that accrues from a meer rest from labour, & from the both leave and approbation God hath given to the other: From thence the Explication descends to entreat more particularly concern∣ing the due manner, and proportion of our relaxation. In order whereunto, enquiry is made concerning such Recreations as are con∣versant about Lots, as Cards and Dice, the motion of the body, as Dancing, and particularly that which they call mix'd; and the imi∣tation of other mens gestures and speeches, as Stage-Plays. Touch∣ing the first whereof is shewn, that there is not that sacredness in a Lot as is commonly deemed, and an answer returned to that of So∣lomon, Prov. 16.33. Touching the second, That Dancing hath both the leave and approbation of the Almighty; and that that which they call mix'd may not only be used inoffensively by sober persons, but that there is more danger from the converse of young persons out of it, than in it: Touching the third, That Stage-Plays are but a kind of Picture of Mens behaviour and speeches, and therefore no more un∣lawful than the depicting of their Faces. Consideration is next had of the Time that may be employed in them, and of the Money that may be bestowed upon them. In order to the former whereof is shewn, 1. That they ought to have no more of our Time, than may serve for a relief after labour, or to quicken us to future ones. 2. That they ought not to intrench upon that Time which the Duties of Religion, or those of our Employments, call for. 3. That ordinarily they ought not to have the Morning at all, where they may be as well used at other times. As to the latter is made appear, that more Money ought not to be either expended or hazarded about them, than can well be spared from more important occasions, such as are those of Charity, and the sustentation of our selves and Families; and that it is much less lawful to acquire, or design to acquire, a livelihood by them. The whole concluded with an Admonition, not to play at such Games, or for such Sums of Money, under which men cannot ordinarily contain themselves from heats of passion.

5. OF the Questions before proposed concerning Labour (which how it appertains to this Commandment, needs not again be told you) the last, and only one remaining to be resolved, is, whether it admit of a relaxation, and in what manner and proportion. For the clearing whereof (how slight soever the matter of it may appear to be) yet I think my self obliged to use as much care and circumspection, as in matters of greater moment; Superstition on the one hand having en∣deavoured

to abridge men of their lawful liberty, as Profaneness on the other hand to convert it into licentiousness.

Now that our obligation to labour admits of a relaxation, (which is the first thing in order to be discussed) will appear, if we consider the necessity there is of it, or the countenance which hath been given to it by him, by whom the Obligation was imposed: For it being evident from Experience, that neither mens brains, nor bodies, are of ability to undergo an uninterrupted travel, there will arise from thence a ne∣cessity of remitting of our labour, as well as of intending and prose∣cuting it; he who acts beyond his ability offering an injury to his na∣ture, and consequently, whilst he endeavours to keep one Command∣ment, engaging himself in the violation of a much more important one. But neither is there a less necessity of remitting some time of our labour, if we consider it only with reference to that labour which is bound upon us; for the due performance of that depending upon the hability and promptness of him that laboureth, as that hability and promptness upon his giving himself, at due times, rest and ease; he who would labour as he ought, must sometime remit of it, and slacken his Bow as well as bend it. And it calls to my mind the fact of Aesop, who, when twitted with playing among Children, contented himself for his defence, to lay before him that did so, an unbended Bow. Of which, whilst he and the spectators laboured to find the meaning, Aesop himself gave this rational account, as we learn from the most in∣genious Phaedrus; that as a Bow if it be always kept bent will be quickly broken, but if sometime slackened, will be more useful to him that useth it; so, he that sometimes gives recreation to his mind, will find it afterwards bet∣ter disposed to exercise those operations, which it is by God and Nature both fitted and intended for. And well then may Labour, though imposed upon man by the straitest obligati∣ons, admit of a relaxation, if it rather gain than lose ought by afford∣ing it. It being thus evident, that there is a necessity of a relaxation, as well as labour, yea to the undergoing of that labour which we are required to intend; proceed we to shew what countenance it hath from him, by whom Labour was imposed. For the evidencing whereof, I will alledge in the first place, that relaxation which sleep gives: for sleep being manifestly the work of God and Nature, because naturally flowing from that weariness which the exercise of our natural faculties produceth, and including moreover in it a relaxation from labour, be∣cause binding up those faculties by which it is to be intended; he who makes sleep a necessary adjunct of Humane Nature, must consequently be thought to give countenance to that relaxation, which is the natu∣ral and necessary effect of it. But neither hath the Divine Majesty gi∣ven less countenance to it by his Laws, as will appear from that known one of the observation of the Sabbath; for that day (as was before shewn) being appointed for the rest of the body, as well as for the intending of the more important actions of Religion; he, who gave leave to, yea imposed such a rest, shews it to be no less acceptable to himself, than those days of labour which he required. I conclude therefore with the Author to the Hebrews, though in another sense, that there remaineth a rest to the People of God, yea to all who have no other title to that name, than their original from him, upon whom the burthen of Labour was imposed.

But because the question is not so much, even amongst the most scru∣pulous, Whether our obligation to labour admit of a relaxation; as whether it admit of such relaxations, as are best known by the names of Recreations or Plays: therefore I think it not amiss (before I pro∣ceed any further) to shew these to have the same Authority with those other relaxations before spoken of. In the doing whereof, I will make use of the same Topicks, by which I before evinced the lawful∣ness of the other. To begin with Nature, because that, which we speak of, is but a refreshment of it; where who is there that sees not an equal necessity of Recreation, with those other relaxations before spoken of? For, to say nothing at all of Sleep, because what refresh∣ment soever it may give, yet it is perceived rather by its Effects, than by it self; a meer Rest from Labour being not without its tediousness, considering the natural propension there is in men to be always exer∣cising their respective Faculties: were not Humane Nature sometime indulged the use of more busie refreshments, it is impossible to think but they would apply themselves to their Labours with less vigour and chearfulness, than is requisite to the due performance of them. And indeed, however some more scrupulous than wise, yea even in those sacred things, to the knowledge whereof they most pretend, though such (I say) have by their practice and advice recommended a simple Rest, before those Refreshments which Recreations give; yet hath that recommendation of theirs proved as little to the advantage of Religion, as to the encouragement of those Labours which it was principally designed to promote: both themselves, and others who follow their Example, employing the most part of their time of Rest in uncharitable censures of other men, which are certainly more repug∣nant to Religion, than any Recreation whatsoever. Beside, whilst he, who is busied about some innocent Recreation or other, hath his thoughts as well as hands employed, and consequently is not obnoxi∣ous to those evil suggestions, which the Devil is apt to instil into idle minds; he who contents himself with a simple Rest, makes himself a prey to all those evil thoughts, which the advantage of a mind not employed gives him the temptation to suggest. Thus whilst men, out of a vain fear of those inconveniences which do sometime attend up∣on innocent Recreations, avoid wholly the use of them, they do not infrequently run into another, and a worse extreme. With how little countenance from Scripture as well as Nature, that of Solomon in Ec∣clesiastes, as well as another of the Prophet Zachary shews: The lat∣ter whereof represents it as the consequence of Gods intended restau∣ration of Jerusalem, that the streets of the City should be full of young persons, of either Sex, playing in the streets thereof, Zach. 8.5. The former, that as there is a season for more sad and serious purposes, so there is a time to laugh and dance; and consequently, that such like Recreations, where they are separated from the abuses thereof, are not without the leave, yea countenance of him, by whom times and sea∣sons are appointed.

Having thus returned an Answer to the first part of the Demand, and shewn our Obligation to Labour, not only to admit of a relaxa∣tion, but of such relaxations in particular, as have the name of Re∣creations; we are in the next place to enquire, in what manner and proportion it admits of them, which will shew the several limitations

thereof. In order whereunto, I will first of all consider of the matter of them, as without the due qualification of which they cannot by any means be accounted lawful.

Now though, if question had not been made about the lawfulness of some Recreations that are much in use, it might suffice for the resolu∣tion of the conscience, to propose only some general Rules, such as are, that they be conversant about such things, by which the mind or body or both may be better disposed to Labour, and neither the one nor the other corrupted; he who keeps within these bounds being out of danger of offending, as to the matter of his Recreations: yet in regard of the weakness of some, and the peevishness of others, I will proceed to more particular considerations, and enquire what is to be thought of such Games as are conversant about Lots, as Cards or Dice; the motion of the body, as Dancing, and particularly that which they call mix'd, and the imitation of other mens gestures and speeches, as Stage-Plays: Intending afterwards (because it is not to be denyed that all these both may and are often abused) to subjoin such necessary Cautions, as may preserve men from the several abuses thereof.

Of all the Recreations, wherewith the minds or bodies of men have been exercised, I know of none which scrupulous persons have both more avoided, and impugned, than those which are conversant about Lots, as conceiving that there is something so sacred in a Lot, as not to be a proper matter of merriment. What ground they have so to opine shall be afterwards examined, when I come to consider that Text on which they chiefly bottom their perswasion; give me leave only, before I proceed to that, to shew you the nature and use of a Lot, as which will conduce not a little to shew it a lawful matter of Re∣creation. Now a Lot (as Mr. Gataker hath shewn at large) is no∣thing else but a casual event applyed to the deciding of a doubt, and hath place‖ not in things of moment (for such undoubtedly ought not to be put to that hazard, save where there is an express command of God for it) but in things indifferent, and concerning which it mat∣ters not, whether they be done one way or another. But what is there in all this, that can hinder a Lot from being made matter of disport, and consequently from becoming an ingredient of those Games to which it is commonly applyed? Is it the casualty of the event? But who (as the same Mr. Gataker reasons) is so excessively austere, or so extremely superstitious, as to deny, but that a man may make sport with such casual events as do usually occur? May not one lawfully take pleasure in seeing a man shoot, or catch, at ought blindfold? Or may we not please our selves with our own or others tripping on the way, when no hurt ensueth, or in their treading in some unclean thing unawares? Lastly, Is it not equally warrantable to make Game of a Hare that casually crosseth us, as of one that we advisedly light up∣on? If with these and other the like Casualties then we may lawful∣ly sport our selves, why not as well (as the same worthy person goes on) with the shuffting of Arrows, or the drawing of Tickets, the dealing of Cards, or the fall of a Dye? There being as much of casu∣alty in the one as the other, and therefore either both to be condemn∣ed, or neither. But it may be, the Crime lyes in applying of this casual∣ty to the deciding of a doubt; as for Example, who shall play or stay

out, who begin or follow, or what Cards each person shall have to make advantage of. But neither in this can any the least Crime be supposed, if it be duly adverted to: For Christian liberty imply∣ing a free use of all Gods Creatures, to employ them unto such pur∣poses as they are by natural power enabled to; what should hinder men, upon consent, to employ a Lot to the determining of a doubt, which that Lot, by the consent of men, is enabled to determine? espe∣cially when, as it afterwards follows in the account before given of a Lot, the use of it is only in matters of indifferency, which are the proper subject of Recreation. All therefore that can in Reason be ob∣jected against the use of Lots in sports, is that of Solomon, Prov. 16.33. The Lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing, or (as it is in the Hebrew) every judgment of it is of the Lord. From whence though some have endeavoured to infer, that there is an immediate providence in every Lot, and consequently, that he, who makes use of it in trifling matters, puts God upon exerting such an immediate providence in them; yet, as all that can be necessarily inferred from thence is, that there is a Providence of God in all things, even in the least, in the most casual things, and among the rest by name in a Lot, (what is here said concerning a Lot, being elsewhere affirmed of all mens thoughts, and ways, and words, and works, in all which certainly no man will affirm an immediate Providence to interpose) so, that we cannot with reason infer an immediate Providence in every Lot, is evident, partly‖ in that the lighting of the Lots in this or that manner ordinarily cometh im∣mediately from the act of the Creature, whose motion determineth it to that manner after which it happeneth; and partly, that if there were any such immediate Providence in them, it should be in the natural power of the Creature, because in his natural power to cast Lots at pleasure, to put God upon the exerting of an immediate Providence, which it were little less than blasphemy to affirm. Against such Games therefore as are conversant about Lots no just exception can be made, unless where they are abused, which it is not only none of my design to defend, but, as I shall afterwards shew, to detect and condemn.

From such Recreations therefore as are conversant about Lots, pass we to those that are conversant about the motion of the body, and particularly that of Dancing. A Recreation, which, however some zeal∣ous people have inveighed against, yet if used with sobriety cannot in the least be faulted; for beside that it doth not appear, how it should be more unlawful to Dance than Sing, Dancing being but a harmony in the motion of the Body, as Singing is in that of the Tongue; beside that he, who affirms there is a time for every serious purpose, hath not stuck in like manner to affirm, that there is a time for sporting ones, and particularly for that whereof we speak, (which how he could rea∣sonably do, if Dancing were unlawful in it self, will be found not easie to determine?) With what face can any man condemn that as unlaw∣ful, which is not only foretold by God as the joyful effect of his re∣deeming Israel, Jer. 31.13. (for then, saith he, shall the Virgin rejoice in the Dance, both young men and old together) but is affirmed by the Scripture to have been the expression of Davids joy, at the bringing up the Ark to Jerusalem; and (which is more) Psal. 149.3. is recom∣mended by the same David to others, to express the praises of God by? And though it be true, that all Dancing is not equally innocent,

and those which they call mix'd Dances, may administer matter of tem∣ptation, where they, who are lewdly disposed, are join'd together: yet as I doubt not there is a far greater danger of temptation from the converse of young persons out of it, as having nothing else but one anothers persons to take up their thoughts, whilst the others are di∣verted by intending of those measures they are to tread; so neither can I imagine but where persons of sober education are mix'd, they may use it with the same innocency, wherewith they may do other Recre∣ations which are less condemn'd.

One only Recreation remains, of those which we before instanc'd in, to wit the Recreation of Stage-plays; concerning the unlawfulness whereof in themselves, as I could never yet see any convincing Ar∣gument, with what clamour soever they have been decry'd, (for why should it not be as lawful to represent the actions of men in our own, or behold them when represented by others, as it is to depict their Faces upon a Tablet, or please our selves with looking upon them when they are?) so I could heartily wish the enemies of Stage-plays had forborn the arguing against them from men or womens putting on the apparel of the other sex; partly, because if it have any weight in it self, it is accidental to them, and partly, because it may have in part occasion'd the bringing of Women upon the Stage, which our own lamentable experience hath shewn to be rather for the worse than for the better. If there be any thing offensive adhering to some par∣ticular Plays (as it is too too apparent there are) that is nothing to the Recreation it self, and perswades only, as a Learned Man hath well observ'd, that the Master of the Revels (who according to the ancient constitution ought to see that nothing be spoken but what is fit to be heard) expunge out of them whatsoever is offensive, and that, till that is done, all sober persons would forbear the sight of such, there being no doubt but in that and all other Recreations, men ought not only to take care that those they use be innocent for their kind, but lawful for the particular, and such as are free from that immo∣desty, and profaneness, and scurrility, wherewith they say the compo∣sitions of this latter age abound.

But beside that to make our Recreations lawful, they ought to be conversant about such things, by which, either the Body, or Mind, or both, may be less indispos'd to labour, but neither corrupted or de∣prav'd; we are to take care that we use them as Recreations, because otherwise we convert them to another use than what they were de∣sign'd to by God. The only thing of difficulty is, what it is to use them as Recreations, which may be comprehended in this general Aphorisme. For then, and then only, do we use Recreations as such, when we use them as things on the by, and not as the main business of our life, for a moderate refreshment, and not as the means of our sup∣port, and much less to overthrow it. For Recreations (as was before shewn) having no other end than to relieve us after Labour, or dis∣pose us for it, they must consequently be look'd upon, and according∣ly used, as things on the by, and not as the main; to procure to us a Refreshment, and not a Livelihood (which God hath appointed La∣bour for) and much less to destroy it. The result of which observa∣tion will serve us for a direction both as to the Time which may be al∣lotted to them, and the Money which may be either expended or ac∣quir'd

at them. I begin with the former of these, even the Time which may be allotted to them; concerning which, these Three things are easie to be observ'd, because naturally flowing from the former observa∣tion.

• 1. That our Recreations are not to have either the greatest, or an equal share of our time with those Employments to which we are design'd; yea, on the contrary, that they ought to have no more of it, than may serve us for a relief after labour, or to quicken us to our future ones. A caution which I would to God I had no occasion to mention, amongst the other necessary ones which this debauched age calls for. But as it is too appa∣rent that some mens lives are in a manner one continued Recre∣ation, or if mix'd with any thing of business, yet as but a Par∣ergon to the other; so those who are not so vain, nor it may be can afford to be so, yet spend whole days and nights in it; by that means converting that into their repast, which was in∣tended only as Physick, or (if you had rather I should so ex∣press it, because Recreations were no doubt intended for a mo∣derate delight) converting that into meat which was intend∣ed but as sauce to it. Which as it is apparently contrary to the design of Recreation, and consequently not without a great degree of guilt, yet hath this farther mischief attending it, that it engageth us in a second. He who hath thus wearied himself with Recreations, (for even these, if continu'd in, are not without a burden to those that use them) being of ne∣cessity to refresh himself by ease or sleep, before he can betake himself to his employments. And though I will not deny but sometimes one or more whole days may be borrowed from our employments, the general consent of Nations having indulg'd such a liberty, and the pains of the laborious person seeming not without reason to require it, (for what satisfaction could it be to men in perpetual travail to have Recreations only by snatches and in smaller portions?) yet I think it but a just con∣sequent of the former observation, that ordinarily our Recre∣ations should be meted by smaller portions; as because a less portion of time may generally suffice for the refreshment of Na∣ture, so because it is but a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and therefore rather to have a share in so large a portion, than to devour it all.
• 2. It is to be observed Secondly, that as we are not to spend more of our time in Recreation than may serve for a relief after la∣bour, or to quicken us to the following one; so neither to give way to our Recreations at any time, when either the duties of Religion, or those of our several Employments, call upon us to intend them; that which is but on the by being in reason to give place to the main, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to that which is Business and Employment. Upon which account, as all those must be look'd upon as Criminals, who can so easily suffer their Recreations to trespass upon the time of their devotions; so next to them such who can intend them, when the care of their several Families, or the business of their Employments call for their regard.
• 3. I observe Thirdly, and more than that I shall not need to ob∣serve

• as to the Time, that our Recreations, where they may be as well used at another part of the day, ought not ordinarily to have the morning of it; partly, because the rest of the foregoing night supersedes the use of them, and partly, because that part of the day, through the Agility which the foregoing Rest gives, is the most opportune for business, which is in rea∣son to be preferr'd before the other.

From the matter of Time proceed we to that of Money, where again these two useful Cautions present themselves: The former whereof respects the expence or hazard of it; the latter, the acquiring or designing it. For though I see no more reason to proscribe all Play for Money, than for Glory and Reputation, which he must be an ex∣traordinary person who should be able perfectly to separate from it; yet I cannot forbear to say, upon the strength of the grounds before laid down, that it is utterly unlawful either to expend or hazard more Money about it, than can well be spared from more important occasi∣ons, such as are those of Charity, or the relief of our selves or families: Partly, because that which is only a thing on the by ought to yield to more important occasions, and partly, because such expence or ha∣zard engageth Men in that sin which this Commandment expresly forbids; he who thus entrencheth upon the occasions before remem∣bred, robbing the Poor of that charity which is due from him to them, as himself and family of that support, which is no less incum∣bent on him, even by the force of this Commandment: He who for∣bids to steal, commanding also to take care that we may have where∣withal to minister to our own necessities and those of others. Upon which account, as it will be necessary to look upon all those as offen∣ders, who play away Manors, Estates, yea and their own Liberty, being not unlike herein to those Ancient Germans, whom Tacitus speaks of, who, after they had play'd away all they had, were wont to stake their own persons to become slaves to them they play'd with, if they should happen to be overcome: So we are to look upon such also as offenders, who either hazard, or tempt others to hazard such sums of Money, as by the loss whereof they may be either straitned in their own or families support, or disabled in any measure from ministring to the necessities of the Poor. Again, as it is utterly unlawful either to expend or hazard more Money about our Recreations, than can well be spared from more important occasions; so it is no less unlawful either to acquire or design to acquire a lively∣hood or any part thereof by it, as because by so doing we shall but en∣trench upon the Properties of others which this Commandment doth expresly forbid; so because God hath no less expresly commanded the working with our hand the thing that is good, that we may have wherewithal to support our selves. Whence it is‖ that Holy Men have not only represented such acquisitions as unlawful to be de∣tain'd, but some Nations also confiscated them to the publick. I will conclude this Affair and my Discourse with an admonition not to play at such Games, or for such sums of Money, under which we can∣not ordinarily contain our selves from heats of Passion and those in∣temperances of Language which do for the most part attend them. For as that, which is never so lawful in it self, may yet become un∣lawful

to us, if it prove to us an occasion of falling, and particu∣larly into contention and reproachful language; so there is no doubt such recreations ought to be forborn by us, where, through the pee∣vishness of our own nature, we cannot so far command our own passi∣ons, as to preserve us from them. For though recreation be not only lawful, but in some sort necessary, yet this or that particular one is not, and therefore in reason to be discarded, where we find upon ob∣servation that we cannot intend them with that indifferency and dispas∣sionateness, which the levity thereof requireth.

PART VI.

Frugality or Good-husbandry as necessary for the conserving of our Proper∣ties, as Labour is towards acquiring them, for which cause it is as∣signed a place here. That considered, either as to our own use of those good things we are possessed of, or as to the imparting of them unto others. In the former of which senses it requires the bounding of our expences ordinarily by our yearly income, the keeping in some good proportion within it, the reasons of both which are declared; and in fine, the using of our several Properties with moderation and care. In the latter, the using of a moderation even in our Charity, the reasons whereof are also assigned. An exhortation to the practice both of the one and the other Frugality from religious considerations. A transition to the consideration of such means, as are necessary to the defending or retrieving of our Properties, when either taken away or attempted, or to the supplying thereof when perished and come to nought. In order to the former whereof is represented, the ap∣pealing to the Magistrate by a Suit, and such appeals both manifested to be lawful from Gods constituting of Magistrates for the redressing of injuries, and an answer returned to those sayings of our Saviour and St. Paul, which seem to forbid Suits at Law altogether, but do indeed proscribe only scandalous, vexatious, and trifling ones. As to the latter is recommended and enjoined the using of entreaties to those who are in a capacity to supply us.

2. SINCE one and the same thing, under divers considerations, may become the subject matter of different Sciences (for thus Hea∣ven it self, though the proper concernment of the Divine, as it is the Seat of the Blessed, and the Hope of the Religious, may yet be the Pro∣vince of the Astronomer, as to the Revolution of it, and of those Lu∣cid Bodies which it contains) I hope it will not be thought strange, if I, who am a Preacher of Religion, and profess now to explain it, re∣present that Good Husbandry, which worldly wisdom teacheth, as a part also of Heavenly one, yea of that Commandment which I have now chosen to illustrate. For inasmuch as he who forbids the invading of others Properties, must be supposed also to command the intending and conserving of our own, as without which we shall be under a ne∣cessity of invading those of others; inasmuch as Good Husbandry is

no less necessary to the conserving of our several Properties, than that Labour, which we before insisted on, is to the procuring of them; he who is acknowledged to oblige to the one, must be confessed to oblige us to the other, and consequently to look upon it as a duty that is hereby enjoined. Here only is the difference between our considerati∣on of Good Husbandry, and that of the worldly man, that whilst the latter intends it only for the securing to himself this worlds happiness, we on the other side, recommend it as a duty laid upon us by the Al∣mighty, and as a means to preserve us from the temptation of inva∣ding others Properties; which the prodigal spending of that which is his own, doth not infrequently put the unwary Spendthrift on.

Now though wherein Frugality or Good Husbandry consisteth were not difficult for men to learn, if they would apply themselves to the consideration of it; yet because men are slow of understanding, in all things of duty, and particularly in this whereof we speak, I think it not amiss, especially having shewn it to be enjoined by this Command∣ment, to spend some time in the investigation of it. For my more or∣derly effecting whereof, I will consider Frugality or Good Hus∣bandry,

• 1. As to our own use of those good things we are pos∣sessed of: And,
• 2. As to the imparting of them to others.

1. And here not to propose to you those strict measures whereby our Ancestors proceeded, partly because the recalling of them is ra∣ther to be wished than hoped for, and partly because they are not of absolute necessity to be observed, I shall represent,

1. First, as a necessary part of it, the bounding our Expences ordinarily by that yearly income, which our several Properties do af∣ford us; he who exceeds those limits, not only diminishing his Pro∣perty, instead of conserving it, but treasuring up an arrear of debt, which will make him afterwards less able to support himself. Upon which, as there will necessarily ensue a substraction in some measure of our Charity, which I have shewn heretofore, and shall more hereaf∣ter, to have the nature of a Theft; so also a temptation to supply our selves with invading the Properties of others, which is the very for∣mality of one. It is true indeed (for, for that very reason I subjoin∣ed the word ordinarily, when I represented it as a necessary part of mens Frugality, not to exceed the bounds of their yearly income,) it is true, I say, the so doing is not always possible, nor yet where it is, of absolute necessity to be observed, because there may be a just ex∣pectation of an addition to our several Properties, the intuition whereof may make it reasonable to exceed the present one. But as there is no repugnancy between affirming that there may be instan∣ces where the like measures either cannot or need not be observed, and that ordinarily they ought to be; so that ordinarily they ought to be so, the forementioned arguments sufficiently evince, and the experience of the world doth abundantly confirm; it being rare to see any, who exceed those bounds, not to make havock of their Estates, and at length to end in want and beggery. Lastly, For though that be extrinsecal to the matter of Frugality, yet it hath the astipulation of that which is of greater necessity to be regarded; he who suffers his Expences ordinarily to exceed the bounds of his yearly income,

shews a dissatisfaction with that portion which the Divine Majesty hath allotted him; which though no violation of the Precept of Frugali∣ty, yet is of a more important one, even of that which enjoins submis∣sion to the Divine Will.

2. But let us rise yet higher (for so, as I shall by and by shew, the Vertue we have now before us doth oblige) and enquire whether frugality do not as well tye us to keep in some good proportion within the bounds of our yearly income, as not to exceed or surpass them. For the evidencing the affirmative whereof, I shall desire you to consider the necessities that may happen to every man, whether it be by casu∣alties, which no man how fortunate soever is wholly exempt from, or by changing his condition from single life to marriage, which most persons ei∣ther chuse or find themselves necessitated to, or by the infirmities of old age, which are in a manner an inevitable evil: For inasmuch as all these bring their necessities along with them, and such as that state to which they appertain wants either strength or revenue to provide sufficiently against; it must be looked upon as a necessary piece of Frugality ordi∣narily to provide our selves before-hand, as without which neither our Properties, nor we our selves can well be conserved. Upon which account, as all those single persons must be looked upon as violators of it, who, however they design to enter into the state of marriage, yet make not the least provision against those necessities which it brings (for which cause, if they succeed ill, as generally such persons do, they ought to thank their own want of Frugality, and not the disposition of the Divine Providence:) So those also are to be reckoned to the num∣ber, especially if persons of meaner fortune, who in the strength and vigour of their years lay by nothing in store to support them under the infirmities of old age, as if it were a rare thing for men to fall under such infirmities, or God were obliged to support them by an immediate Providence. And indeed (for what should hinder us from making profession of a truth, which every days experience gives so clear an at∣testation to?) from hence for the most part proceeds that scantness of Fortune, which is such a burthen to the needy person, and all that live near him: It rarely hapning that men, who are so frugal of their present Properties, as to keep in a good proportion within them, are reduced to that necessity in any ordinary condition of life, as not to find a competent means to support themselves under it. But of all the necessities which it is incumbent upon men to provide against, there is certainly none which doth more require the not living up to the height of our income, than that which Children bring; for inasmuch as these do not only require a present subsistence but a foundation for their future support, it will be little less than impossible for us to pro∣vide for them as we ought, where we do not only not exceed the bounds of our yearly income, but not keep at a good distance from them. The only difficulty is, what distance we are to keep; which must be left, in a great measure, to the judgment of every particular man to determine. This only would be said, That as that distance we are to keep is to be proportioned by those necessities we have cause to ap∣prehend; so the greater the distance the better, especially where the ne∣cessities are like to be pressing. Provided first, that that which invites us to it be the command of God, and not any base covetousness; and, secondly, that our way of living be answerable to that of sober

persons, which are of the same condition and fortune with our selves. Lastly,

3. And more than that I shall not need to say, as to that fru∣gality which respects our own use of those good things which God hath bestowed upon us, it is a necessary part of Frugality to use them with moderation and care, and neither spoil them by intemperance or neg∣lect; he who so doth, destroying instead of conserving his Property, and consequently making himself less able to support himself, if he should fall into any distress, or minister to the necessities of others.

2. From that Frugality which respects our own use of the good things we are possessed of, pass we to that which respects the imparting of them to others, and which is equally necessary to the conservation of them. Where who is there that sees not how conducible it is to the observation of this Commandment; whether we respect that charity which it does, though covertly, enjoin; or that stealth which it mani∣festly forbids? For as by immoderate largesses men do not only destroy their several Properties, but put themselves out of a capacity of long continuing that beneficence in which they seem to take so much con∣tent, than which (as Tully speaks) what is there that can be more absurd; so they put themselves upon a temptation, shall I say, or rather inevitable necessity of invading the Properties of others. For, when (as the same Tully speaks) they begin to want by giving, they are compelled, for the supply of those wants, to lay hands on the goods of others, and shew themselves as greedy of theirs, as they were before prodigal of their own. All that I can observe to require any thing of a discussion, is, what kind of largesses the Frugality here spoken of ex∣tendeth to, and by what measures it is to be conducted. Neither the one nor other of which will be difficult to be solved by him who shall attentively consider them. For though Frugality be mostly con∣strued with relation to such Largesses, as are the fruits rather of hu∣mour than beneficence, and consequently rarely applyed to those of Charity; yet that it extends to the moderation of those also, needs no other Argument, than that prohibition we have now before us. For how is he any other than a Thief, who substracts from the necessary support of himself and Family (for which all Properties were primari∣ly bestowed) to minister to the necessities of others? And though it be true that there are few such kind of Thieves (for which cause that caution may seem the less necessary to have been inserted) yet inasmuch as vain-glory doth sometime mix it self with mens Charity, and tempt them to be profuse, in giving above what the necessities of themselves or Families will well permit, I thought it not amiss to admonish, that Frugality ought to have the inspection and moderation of them, as well as of those Largesses which have no other Fountain, than either humour, or some other the like worldly motive. The only thing of which there can be any doubt, is, by what measures that Frugality is to proceed, which the grounds before laid will afford an easie solution of. For inasmuch as the end of Frugality is the conservation of mens Pro∣perties, as the end of those Properties primarily the ministring to our own and Families necessities; our Frugality in giving is to guide it self by those necessities of ours, for the supplying whereof mens several

Properties were primarily intended. Otherwise we become prodigal, rather than charitable, and in stead of being benevolent to others, prove unjust to our selves and ours. But because it is not impossible, when I come to entreat of the Measures of our Charity, I may have occasion to bring this Argument again before you, because suggesting a Limitation of it; therefore contenting my self at present with what hath been already said concerning it, I will employ the residue of my Discourse in exhorting you to the Practice both of the one and the other Frugality.

Now though I am not ignorant, I might furnish my self with Mo∣tives for that purpose, from that Love which all Men naturally have for the conservation of their own Being and Happiness; yet I shall chuse rather, especially being so amply furnish'd from the foregoing Discourse, to recommend it to you upon the score of that Religion which my Profession, as well as present Task, obligeth me to display. For, is it not a part of Religion, yea an important one, to acquiesce in the disposition of the Divine Providence, and content our selves with such a portion of this Worlds Goods as he is pleas'd to allot us? And if so, is it not of like importance to bound our Enjoy∣ments by those Portions, which is one main part of that Frugality which we commend? Is it not a part of Religion, in like manner, to provide against future Necessities, and particularly those Necessities which Children bring? And must it not then be look'd upon as such, to keep in a good proportion within the Bounds of our present Pro∣perties, which the same Frugality, as well as the providing against those Necessities, doth command? Lastly, Is it not a part of Religi∣on, as well as Providence, to be temperate in all things, which the same Frugality, no less than the Precept of Sobriety, doth enjoyn? But what then can be look'd upon as a part of Religion, if this be not? or where shall we find any thing, of that nature at least, that hath a juster Foundation in it? Especially, if we add to the former Considerations, that without Frugality we cannot well either be just to our selves, or contain our selves from doing Injustice unto others: Prodigality, though at first blush it look like an excess of Indulgence to our selves, yet being Cruelty and Injustice, because both spoiling us for the future of the necessary Means of our Support, and, which is no less Injustice to our selves than others, putting us upon a ne∣cessity of invading the Properties of others, and so undoing our own Souls, as well as making havock of our Brothers Fortunes. From whence as it will unavoidably follow, that Frugality is a great part of Religion, because diffusing it self into so many and so important Duties of it; so it cannot at any time cease to be such, unless where it degenerates into Sordidness, which is rather Covetousness than Fru∣gality, or is taken up upon purely prudential Considerations.

3. Of Labour and Frugality I have entreated hitherto; and I have entreated so much the more largely of them, because they are the one∣ly ordinary Means of procuring or conserving our several Properties. But because it may so happen, that our several Properties may be ta∣ken away, or at least attempted by others, or by some sinister accident perish and come to nought; therefore it will be necessary for us to in∣quire, what other Means there are whereby the former may be either retriv'd or defended, and those which are perish'd may be supply'd.

Now though, if Magistrates had not been constituted, no doubt at all could be made, but we might even by forcible means defend or retrive our several Properties, no natural Reason forbidding the vin∣dicating to our selves what God by his Providence hath made our pro∣per Portion; yet the same is not to be said after the Constitution of Magistrates, and that Power wherewith they are invested, of doing Right to the Injur'd Party: partly, because he who constitutes such a Power, must be suppos'd also, because it would be otherwise in vain, to oblige private Persons to seek their Remedy there; and partly, because Force could not be lawful, were there no Magistrate to de∣fend us, if more peaceable Means could be able to protect us. From whence, as it will follow, that we are not ordinarily to right our selves, and much less to do it by force of Arms; so, that it may be both lawful and necessary (because necessary sometimes to the con∣serving of our several Properties) to appeal for redress to the Magistrate, and sue the injurious Person at his Tribunal. For, if (as I have heretofore shewn, and shall hereafter more largely) Magistrates were appointed by God for the redress of Injuries, what should hin∣der the injur'd Party to appeal to the Magistrate for it, especially when there is no other way left to compass it? Which said, I shall the more confidently apply my self to the consideration of what the Go∣spel teacheth, as which is the onely Objection against this way of defending or retriving our several Properties. For, inasmuch as the same Gospel doth both approve and assert those Powers which claim to themselves the power of Redress; it is impossible to think it should proscribe all Appeals to them, and enjoyn Men rather to suffer any thing, than to do it: A power of Redress being in vain, where it is unlawful to be appeal'd to, by those who are most concern'd to seek it. Taking it therefore for granted, that such Appeals are both law∣ful, and sometimes necessary; I will make it my business to inquire, what our Saviour meant, when he said, If any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also: as also what St. Paul did, where he represents going to Law as a fault, and advises rather to suffer our selves to be defrauded: Both which Passa∣ges I will be so much the more particular in the consideration of, be∣cause they will discover to us the due Limitations of that which we have affirm'd to be lawful in it self. I begin with that of our Savi∣our, because no doubt the Foundation of the other, but however the most to be considered, for his sake from whom it fell; toward the explication whereof I shall offer, first, That his meaning possibly was, not that we should not seek a Redress of our Wrongs in any case, but that we should not seek it with a revengeful mind, and with a design more to punish others, than right our selves. Which Notion is so much the more probable, because it is urg'd as an Instance of our not resisting evil, after the same manner that the Jews are found to have done, when, by the permission of God, they requir'd an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth. For, such resisting of evil as is there spoken of, serving onely for the punishment of those from whom the evil proceeded, all that can justly be inferr'd from that Do∣ctrine which is oppos'd by our Saviour to it, is, that we are not ei∣ther to defend or retrive our several Properties with the same vindi∣ctive Mind which those Persons cherish'd, who requir'd such a Retali∣ation

as serv'd to punish the injurious Person, but not at all to afford redress to themselves. For, what advantage, save the satisfying of a vindictive Mind, could the plucking out another Mans Eye, or knock∣ing out another's Tooth, procure to him that had lost his own? But let us suppose, that this were no part of our Saviour's meaning, or at least that it were but the less principal one; yet it will not thence follow, that he forbad absolutely the defending or retriving our se∣veral Properties by a Suit of Law. For, his meaning possibly might be, yea undoubtedly was, that we should not take such a Course in trifling Instances, and when nothing but a Coat or Cloke is the foun∣dation of it. For, what Patience or Meekness (which Graces the New Testament doth infinitely commend) what Patience or Meekness (I say) can that be, which will have satisfaction made it for every the least Injury it sustains? But as it is one thing to condemn the going to Law for trifling Matters; and another, the so doing for the con∣servation of those things which are necessary to our own Families Support, or at least to the maintaining of us in that condition wherein he hath plac'd us: so, that it was not the intention of our Saviour to forbid the last, is sufficiently evident, from the obligation his Gospel lays upon us, to make provision for our own. For, being thereby oblig'd to make provision for our own, and that too under no less penalty than of being reputed worse than Infidels if we do not; it must consequently be thought lawful, where other means fail, to ap∣peal to that which is but his own Ordinance, for the defending of that which is to maintain them. Lastly, our Saviour might mean (for so largely oftentimes do the Penmen of the Scripture, and other Authors speak, when the thing which they condemn is not intended to be wholly banished) our Saviour (I say) might mean, that in regard of those heats and other inconveniences which do commonly attend Suits of Law, we should avoid them both as long and as much as is possi∣ble for us, chusing rather to suffer somewhat, than to take such a suspi∣cious course; but however resolving to try all other ways, before we betake our selves to that. Which Advice, as it is no wonder our Saviour should give to his Disciples, when we find Tul∣ly, who was an Advocate, advising to abstain from Suits of Law, as far as Men well can, or rather farther; so neither that he should express it with such Terms of dislike, as if he meant to banish all: that which is for the most part bad, looking so like that which is sim∣ply and universally such, that it may very well be ex∣press'd in the same generall Terms of dislike with the other. From that Passage of our Saviour concerning Suits of Law, pass we to another of St. Paul, in which yet we shall find far less difficulty than in the other. For, beside that that which he chiefly condemns, 1 Cor. 6.1. was their going to Law before Hea∣then Tribunals, by means whereof Christian Religion, pretending so much as it did to Peace, could not chuse but hear ill among those who were Enemies to it; he seems to me rather to approve than con∣demn going to Law, where that and other Inconveniences were separa∣ted from it. For, not onely questioning with them, in the first Verse, for going to Law before the unjust, and not before the Saints; but de∣manding of them, in the next Verse, whether those Saints should not

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judge the world, and if so, whether they were not worthy to judge the smallest matters, such as all Earthly matters are, in comparison of the other; he seems to me plainly to insinuate, that, provided the ground of the Suit be a matter of moment as to this World, and such the loss whereof could not well be born, an Appeal might lawfully enough be made to Christian Tribunals, for the redress of those Injuries we su∣stain. For, though there are, who have understood St. Paul to mean no other in this place, than the referring of their Debates to the Ar∣bitrations of Christians (which yet, that I may add that by the way, is not much different from going to Law before a Judge, a pious Judge (as Grotius hath well observ'd) especially if appeal'd to by the consent of the Parties at variance, differing little from an Arbitrator, but that he is chosen to that Office by Publick Authority) yet as that Interpretation of theirs is not without violence to the Text, which represents those suppos'd Arbitrators under the Title of Judges, and pleads their fitness for the Office, from those Thrones of Judicature whereupon they shall be hereafter plac'd; so, with much more vio∣lence to the Command of Christ‖, who, in case of difference between Man and Man, commands the telling of it the Church, and the pra∣ctice of the Church† upon it: Which, whilst the Emperours continued Heathen, decided Differences in matters of Estate, between those of their own Body; and after that, and when therefore there was not the like Reason of making the Church a Judge in matters of that na∣ture, continu'd so to do, in some measure, by the Indulgence of Chri∣stian Princes. All which things I have laid together, not to give countenance to Contentions, from which I know our Religion is most averse; but to shew, that as Suits of Law may be sometime necessary to the conserving of our Properties; so, where they are so in any great measure, they are no way contrary to the Doctrine of the Go∣spel, which however it may disallow of scandalous, vexatious, and trifling Suits, yet doth not disapprove inoffensive, charitable, and im∣portant ones.

4. But because the Properties of Men may not onely perish to the Owners, but in themselves, and consequently put Men upon a necessi∣ty of seeking a new Supply; therefore it may not be amiss to subjoyn the Means of effecting that also; which, where ordinary Means fail, is no other than that of Asking: our Saviour both supposing as much, when he requires us to give to them that ask; and that Order which God hath established in the World, confirming it. For, though (as I before observ'd) all Men have a Natural Right to such a Portion of this Worlds Goods as is necessary to their Support, by means of that Grant of them which was made to Adam and his Posterity; yet inasmuch as particular Properties stand by the same Divine Will by which that general Charter did which was made to Adam and his Po∣sterity, no Man is ordinarily to supply his Wants, but by making suit to those Persons into whose Hands God hath by his Providence put the possession of this Worlds Conveniences. But so that we are to proceed, the Scripture gives us sufficiently to understand, even where it doth most strongly assert the Right of the Poor to a Subsistence. For, though Solomon, where he requires the not withholding of good from the necessitous, as both the Septuagint Version, and the fol∣lowing Words oblige us to explain it; though he, I say, Prov. 3.27.

calls those necessitous ones such to whom that good is due, or, as it is in the Hebrew†, the Lords or Owners of it: yet advising afterwards, as he does, that we should not say to them, Go, and come again, and to morrow I will give, when thou hast it by thee, he plainly shews, that that Right of the necessitous is to be su'd out by Entreaties, and not either clancularly withdrawn, or extorted: That which is pro∣perly a Gift, depending upon the good will of him that is to bestow it, and consequently not to be attain'd without the use of such Means as may make that Will of his propitious to us.

PART VII.

Concerning the contributing, what in us lies, to the procuring, con∣serving, or enlarging our Neighbours Property, which is the Second Branch of the Affirmative part of the Commandment. The Means of effecting that, the Liberality of our Endeavours, or of our Purses: The former whereof is recommended upon the score of its both ge∣neral practicableness and use; the latter, for its immediate subser∣viency to the advantaging of our Neighbour. The Liberality of the Purse more particularly consider'd, and shewn to imply the remitting of what is due, or at least not exacting it with rigour; the giving of what we are actually possess'd, or lending; and, in fine, an Ho∣spitable Entertainment. Inquiry is next made, whether the use of the formentioned Means be to be extended unto all, and in what order, and manner, and proportion. For the resolution whereof, the Reader is in part remanded to the Affirmative part of the Sixth Commandment, and in part afforded Satisfaction here. In order thereunto, the several Liberalities before spoken of are resum'd, and such Remarques made upon each of them as were before omitted. Concerning the Liberality of Mens Endeavours, is noted, That in∣asmuch as it takes little from our own Properties, we ought to be the more free of it; but yet not so free, as for the sake of one, to offer any Injustice unto others. Concerning the remitting of what is due, which is the first Species of the other Liberality; That it cannot be omitted without a manifest resistance of the Divine Will, where the Person concern'd becomes insolvent by the sole disposition of his Providence; provided that the Remission be not prejudicial to others, nor draw after it any intolerable prejudice to our selves. The Explication more particular in the Liberality of Giving, as ob∣serving concerning the Objects of it, that they are such, and such onely, who are under any need of it, and are beside that in an in∣capacity to provide for themselves; by which means all wealthy or slothful Persons are excluded from any share of it: concerning the Order which it ought to observe, that though those of the Houshold of Faith ought, caeteris paribus, to be preferr'd before other Men; yet not before those of a Mans own Family and Kindred; as more∣over, that, where the necessitous Persons are many, the preference ought to be given to those whose Necessities are most pressing: con∣cerning the Proportion this Liberality is to observe, that it ought

to be according to Mens Ability, and that no one ought to value that at less than the Thirtieth part of his yearly Income; that where the Necessities of those that are about us cannot otherwise be provi∣ded for, we ought to give above our Ability, if we understand there∣by an Ability to provide for our selves according to that Condition wherein God hath placed us: concerning the Manner of our Giving, that it ought to be without superciliousness and contempt, as also with chearfulness, speed, and secrecie. A Transition to the Libera∣lity of Lending, and of Hospitality; concerning the former where∣of is observ'd, That though there be no necessity of lending gratis to such as borrow onely for the Improvement of their Fortunes; yet that we ought so to do, where those that borrow, borrow onely to procure or continue to themselves a bare Subsistence: Concerning the latter, That it ought to be extended to Strangers, as well as to those of our own Neighbourhood, yea to all whom we are in a capacity so to mi∣nister to; That, though it minister to Mens Necessities, yet it ought not to minister to their Intemperance: where also the means of re∣trenching that is described. The Conclusion of the whole, with the Promises that are made to the Charitable Man, and that his own Property is more likely to be improved, than any way diminished by his Liberality.

II. IT having been often said, and largely prov'd, that every Ne∣gative in the Decalogue includes an Affirmative, and that that Affirmative is Love; it is easie to infer, That the Negative we are now upon, forbidding the invading of others Properties, the Affirmative doth principally suggest the contributing what in us lies toward the procuring, conserving, or enlarging them. For then, and then onely, can we be said to love our Neighbour in the Instance that is now be∣fore us, when we do not onely abstain from the invading of his Property, but endeavour to procure him one if he wants, or to conserve and add to it, if he hath. Taking it therefore for granted, that so to do, is in part the Affirmative of this Commandment, I will make it my Business to inquire,

• 1. By what means it may and ought to be effected.
• 2. Whether our Endeavours of thus doing good to others, ought to extend to all sorts of Persons; and in what Or∣der, and Manner, and Proportion.

1. Now there are two ways (as Tully well observes) whereby Men may become useful to others, as to the procuring, or conserving, or en∣larging of their several Properties; the Assistance of their Endeavours, or of their Purses: Whereof, though the latter be most taken notice of, and so far as in a manner to appropriate to it self the Name of Liberality; yet the other doth no doubt alike deserve our conside∣ration and regard, that I say not also more importunately require it: As being, 1. in the power of the Poorer, as well as the Richer sort; of those whose Properties are as strait, as theirs whom they desire to enlarge or conserve. For, though, as St. Peter sometime spake con∣cerning himself, Gold and silver have they none; yet they are not of∣tentimes without an Ability of giving that Advice, and Encourage∣ment, and Assistance, which may be alike useful to the procuring,

improving, or conserving of others Properties: Solomon having told us of a poor man, who, however he was not afterwards regarded for it, yet by his wisdom delivered the City wherein he dwelt from the Power of a Great Monarch, who had us'd no contemptible means to make himself Master of it. But neither, 2. as was but now inti∣mated, is the Liberality of our Persons less to be considered, for the use it is of toward the forementioned purposes, as will appear, if we consider it with reference to Mens Labours, or the conciliating the Fa∣vours of other Persons towards them. For, Labour (as was before said) being not onely appointed by God for the procuring of this Worlds Happiness, but not without a natural aptitude to it; he must be look'd upon as no unuseful Person, who shall either direct Men in the management of it, (which in all Employments is of great weight) or encourage and assist them in the performance of it. In like man∣ner, when, as it often doth, the Properties of Men depend, either as to their being, or well-being, upon the Benevolence of others; it is easie to see, that he who is no Niggard of his Person and Endeavours, may by his Authority or Intercession procure the Favour of those who have the collation of Benefits, or by his Wisdom and Eloquence (if those Properties Men have be attempted by others) defend them from their Rapine, or recommend them to those by whom they may. All which Beneficences, as they are undoubtedly of great use toward the advantaging of our Brothers Properties; so they have this farther to commend them to us, that whilst the Liberalities of the Purse, as Tully speaks, exhaust the Fountain of it, and make Men less able to be liberal for the future, that Liberality which exerts it self in our Endeavours, doth not onely suffer no detriment by its being often us'd, but gains so much the more by it, because making Men both more apt for the exercise thereof, and more ready to intend it.

From the Liberality of our Persons and Endeavours, pass we to that of our Purses, as being more immediately subservient to the advanta∣ging of our Brothers Property, and therefore no doubt more especi∣ally requir'd. Now there are four ways whereby we may be thus li∣beral; by remitting of what is due, or at least not exacting it with rigour; by giving of what we are actually possess'd of, or lending; and lastly, by a Hospitable entertainment. Of the first of these much need not be said, whether we consider it as a Duty, or as a Means to procure or conserve our Neighbours Property. For, as the latter of these is so apparent, that it seems not to stand in need of any Proof, Men being often undone, where they who are their Creditors will neither remit ought of what is due to them, nor allow them a com∣petent time to discharge the Debt; so the latter needs no other proof than that Love and Benevolence wherein our Saviour hath summ'd up this and other the Precepts of the Second Table. For, though the exacting of what is due in its full proportion, be no way contrary to the Precept of Justice; yet it may be sufficiently repugnant to that of Love, especially as urg'd upon us by the Gospel: Love prompting Men to forgive, as well as give; to remit of what it may require, as well as to part with what it is possess'd of. And not without Rea∣son; he who forgives, giving away what he doth so, because it is in his power to exact it. To the Liberality of Remitting or Forgiving, subjoyn we that of giving; a Duty no less necessary to the foremen∣tioned

purposes, nor less necessary to be observed, whether we do re∣spect that subserviency of it to the advantaging of our Neighbour's Properties, or that right we have often said the necessitous person to have to such a portion of this worlds goods, as may afford him a sub∣sistence: for it being apparently the intention of God, and so declared in his first grant of Dominion, that each of the Sons of Men should have a share in them, it is of necessity to be looked upon as the duty of those, into whose hands God hath put the possession of them, to communicate them to such as shall be found to stand in need of them; he, who refuseth so to do, as much as in him lyes, defeating God of his intention, and men of that right which accrues to them by it. Whence it is no doubt that Almsgiving both‖ in the Old and New Testament hath so frequently the name of Righteousness; that being not improperly stiled Righteousness, which he, who is the Object of it, hath the original grant of Dominion to warrant his title to. Thirdly, as there is a liberality in forgiving and giving, so there may be a liberality in lending; that no less than either of the other tending to the advantaging of Mens Properties, and oftentimes much more to the welfare of their Souls: For whereas giving many times relieves Mens idleness as well as wants, and makes them careless in the discharge of the Duties of their several Callings; lending puts the necessitous person upon a necessity of being industrious, if it were that he might be in a capacity to repay that which he hath borrowed of us. Lastly, for though that be a species of giving, yet it deserves a particular mention for the commendation is given to it by the Scripture; There is a liberality in entertaining, as well as in giving, or lending, and par∣ticularly in the entertaining of Strangers. To the practice whereof, though there be other inducements, and such as are it may be of more affinity with that Commandment which I have now chosen to entreat of; yet it may suffice to mention that which is used by the Author to the Hebrews, that thereby some men have entertained Angels unawares: that being to be looked upon as no contemptible piece of Liberality, to which God hath sometime vouchsafed so excellent a reward.

2. It being thus evident what are the means of bringing that advan∣tage to our Neighbours Property, which I have affirmed to be incum∣bent upon us by the affirmative part of this Commandment; my propo∣sed method obligeth me to enquire, whether the use of those means be to be extended unto all, and in what order, and manner, and pro∣portion. But because in my account of the Affirmative part of the fixth Commandment, I have in a great measure prevented my self in most of the queries proposed, and particularly so far as the liberality of our persons or endeavours is concerned, I will only touch at such things in each of them as were there wholly omitted, or obscurely and imperfectly delivered. Now there are two things observable, beside what were before noted, concerning that Liberality which exerts it self in our endeavours: 1. That inasmuch as it takes little from our own Properties, that Liberality especially which consists in giving good advice, we ought to be the more free in bestowing it upon those that need it; it being a strange piece of niggardliness, that I say not of en∣vy and maliciousness, which will not impart of such boons, as bring lit∣tle or no prejudice to him that gives them. And though the reaso∣nableness

of that which follows, seemed so evident to the great Master of Morality, that he hardly thought fit to make it the matter of an admonition; yet inas∣much as men are often peccant in it, I thought it not amiss to observe, in the second place, that we should not so endeavour to promote some mens welfare, as to offer any the least in∣justice to others; he, who forbids the doing injury to any man, conse∣quently prescribing that Liberality, which cannot take effect without it. Upon which account, all those must be looked upon as Offenders, who, to promote the welfare of some one or more persons, by calumnies or other such like courses endeavour to obstruct their rise, who have the same pretensions with their Favourites.

From the Liberality of our Persons or Endeavours, pass we to that of the Purse, and consider the several species of them before set down. Where who is there that sees not first, I do not say how necessary it is to remit sometimes of our own right, but to remit of it especially there, where the person concerned in it becomes unable for the satisfy∣ing of it, by the sole disposition of the Divine Providence? Extremi∣ty in such cases arguing as little regard of God, as consideration of the calamities of our Brethren: For inasmuch as inability puts a man out of a capacity of discharging that debt which he hath contracted; where the inability proceeds meerly from God, it must be a kind of resistance of his Will to be over rigid in exacting it. I will not add, though per∣tinent enough, that how incumbent soever it may sometime be to re∣mit of our own right, yet it is to be understood where such a remissi∣on is not prejudicial to others, nor draws after it any intolerable pre∣judice to our selves: as because, though we may part with our own right, yet we cannot do so with those of others; so the parting with our own right is ever to be understood with subordination to our own necessities, to which, as I have before shewn, the Law of Reason as well as Charity obligeth us to have the first regard. Setting aside there∣fore that Liberality which consists in remitting of that which is our due, I will proceed to that of giving, as being more apparently subser∣vient to the welfare of other men. And here not to tell you, because sufficiently evident from the forequoted discourse, that no qualificati∣on whatsoever can exclude those from our Charity, whose condition makes them proper objects of it; it shall content me to observe, be∣cause not before noted, that the condition of those and of those only is such, who are under any need of it, and are beside that in an inca∣pacity to provide against it: by the former whereof are excluded all persons of better or equal fortunes with our selves; by the latter, all idle or slothful ones. For as Reason and Charity both oblige us to give the first place to our selves, and consequently not to part with that to others, which we are under a like necessity our selves; so the Command of God, and the Precept of S. Paul, debars those of any re∣lief, who will not contribute ought to their own subsistence. Upon which account as our Laws have spoken the same thing, and, which is more, made it penal to relieve them; so, that they are at any time re∣lieved by considerate persons, is only imputable to their importunity, and the neglect of those in Authority who suffer them to use it. Which neglect is so much the more criminal, in that it doth not only encou∣rage those idle persons in their sloth, and many other wickednesses,

which slothfulness draws after it, but makes the charitable person less able to minister to those necessitous ones, who are either wholly inca∣pacitated for labour, or cannot by all their labour compass a tolerable subsistence. But because, even of those who are fit objects of Charity, all cannot be relieved by all, by means of the shortness of our Fortunes; therefore I proposed also to enquire in what order we are to relieve them, and which of the many necessitous ones ought to be preferred. Which demand, though I have in part satisfied already, in the place so often referred to by me, yet there are two things of moment which were not there observed, and will therefore be fit to be taken notice of here: 1. That though those of the Houshold of Faith ought, caete∣ris paribus, to have the precedency of other men, yet not when the necessitous ones are of our own Family or Kindred, Justice as well as Charity obliging us to give to these, and consequently to prefer them before such, who, however better deserving otherwise, yet have no∣thing but the Law of Charity to oblige us to the relief of them. Again, though all necessitous ones are fit objects of Charity, and consequent∣ly, where our faculties will permit, to be relieved by us; yet Reason as well as Charity oblige that, where our Faculties will not permit the extending of it to all, we give the preference to those persons whose necessities are the most pressing: For, if the necessities of men make them fit Objects of Charity, those persons must be looked upon as the fittest Objects, and consequently they to be preferred, who labour un∣der the most pressing ones. And more than this, as I shall not need to say concerning that order which is to be observed by the charitable person in giving, so I shall therefore proceed to enquire after what man∣ner and proportion we are to do it, the next things in order to be consi∣dered. For the resolution of the latter whereof, as being the most important Query; the first thing I shall offer, is, That it be generally according to our ability, and not either above or below it; not only Tully so advising, where he requires the referring of our bounty to our Faculties, but he, whose judgment is more considerable, even S. Paul, he enjoining the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 16.2. that every one should lay by him in store for the supply of the necessitous, according as God had pro∣spered him. By virtue of which Rule, as the Charity of wealthier per∣sons must be concluded to be in a greater proportion than those of mea∣ner ones; so, that the Charity of both the one and the other ought not either to fall below or exceed it: he who offends in the defect being unjust to the necessitous, to whom, as I have before shewn, God hath made our Charity due, as he who offends in the excess, unto himself. But because, through that self-love which prevails in the most of us, men will be apt enough to think they give according to their ability, when in truth they do nothing less, I will propose to your considera∣tion, in the second place, what measures God prescribed the Jews in the exercise of this great Duty of Charity; which was, that beside the Tithe payable every year to the Priest, as you may see, Deut. 14.22. they should every third year, as it is in the 29. v. of that Chapter, set apart another Tithe for the poor, which being resolved into a yearly rate will amount to the Thirtieth part of our yearly income: For though this Law do induce no direct Obligation upon us, as being a part of the Jewish Polity; yet inasmuch as Charity is no less required of us than of the Jews, and our Saviour professeth not to have come to destroy,

but rather to fulfil the Law and the Prophets, we cannot in reason deem our selves obliged to set apart less for the poor than the Thirtieth part of our yearly income. Lastly, as consideration ought generally to be had of our ability, and of those measures which God hath given us to judge both of that and our own duty by; so I see not how we can sometime avoid the giving even beyond our ability, if we mean there∣by an ability to provide for our selves according to that state and con∣dition wherein God hath placed us, and not an ability to serve our own necessities. For as we find that S. Paul, who doth generally re∣fer men to their ability, yet mentions it with commendation that the Corinthians, whom he wrote to, gave not only according to their abi∣lity, but above it, 2 Cor. 8.3. so I see not how we can avoid the abating of our own enjoyments, where the necessities of those that are about us cannot be otherwise in any tolerable measure supplyed: he, who gave the Earth for the support of all, consequently obliging those who are possessed of it, to communicate thereof to the necessitous; and therefore also, where the support of those is not otherwise to be pro∣cur'd, to abate of those Enjoyments, which the place we hold in the World might otherwise warrant the enjoyment of. One only thing remains, relating to the liberality of giving, and that is the manner af∣ter which we are to do it; concerning which I say, first, That it ought not to be with that superciliousness and contempt of the poor, where∣with it is too often attended: Not only their descent from the same common Parent forbidding it, but the particular regard which God professeth to have to all necessitous persons, and that relation wherein our Saviour hath own'd them. For, what place can there be for super∣ciliousness, where those, to whom we give, are not only of our own blood, and the same common stock, but under the particular care of and relation to God and Christ, and that too in such a proportion, that what is done or not done unto them, he interpreteth as either done or not done unto himself? But neither, secondly, are we to give with grudging and repining, as it is but too frequent with those who are not otherwise peccant; as because God, to whom we are obliged for being in a capacity of giving, professeth to love a chearful giver, and should not therefore be so ill requited, as to find a grudging one; so because (as hath been often said, but can never be too much repeated) that Charity is no more than is due to the poor from us. For, what place can there be for grudging, where that, which we are to give, is but the right of those to whom we are required to impart it? Thirdly, as we ought to discard from our giving all superciliousness and grudging, so also all slowness in the doing of it, not only Solomon so requiring, where he forbids us to say to the necessitous person, Go, and come again, and to morrow I will give, when we have it by us, but also the design and end of Charity; the deferring of a benefit making it of little use to him that craves it, and sometimes also of none at all. I will con∣clude this head, and my discourse concerning the Liberality of giving, with admonishing, in the fourth place, that it be done secretly, and so (as our Saviour speaks) that the left hand may not know what our right hand doth; lest that, which was intended for a benefit to our Neigh∣bour, prove an exprobration to him, either of his necessities or obli∣gation to us, and to our selves a temptation to pride and vanity. Which as it is enough to sowre the most excellent Charity, and make

it disgustful both to God and Man; so hath this farther inconvenience attending it, that whilst it seeks the praise of Men, it debars the cha∣ritable person of the praise and reward of God; he who forbids us to do our Alms before men to be seen of them, assigning for the Reason of it, that so doing, we shall have no reward of our Father which is in Hea∣ven. And indeed, as to give secretly hath Reason as well as the Precept of our Saviour to oblige us to the observation of it; so there wanted not among the Heathen, who saw the reasonableness of it, and incul∣cated it almost in the same terms; Marcus Antoninus not only insinuating the so giving, that we our selves may not know what we our selves have done, but resembling the benesicent person, among other things, to a Vine, which is neither sensible of its own fruitfulness, nor makes any noise of it, chusing rather to superadd in their proper season new clusters to its former, and to continue its truitfulness, than to be esteemed for it.

Of the Liberality of giving, what hath been said may suffice; proceed we to that of lending, a Liberality which I have already shewn to be no less necessary in its self than the other, and might also be no less incumbent upon us, by the Precept of our great Master Christ; in the very same breath wherein he commands the giving to every one that asks, forbidding to turn away from him that would borrow of us. Now there are two things observable concerning this Liberality, proportionably to the twosorts of persons with whom we have to do: For either they may be such who want it for the improving of their Fortunes, or such as borrow it of us to procure or continue to themselves a bare subsistence. Now though I doubt not (as hath been before declared) but that he who lends to the former persons, may require what he does so with a valua∣ble Consideration for it, especially where the money lent is needful enough to a Man's self: yet as such persons may sometime prove un∣fortunate in the management of it, in which case it may be but requi∣site to remit somewhat of our own demands; so it cannot at all be ac∣counted lawful, where we our selves can possibly be without it, to take the like Use of those who borrow what they do, meerly to pro∣cure themselves a subsistence, not only the Law of Moses forbidding so to lend to a poor Brother, but the Law of Nature and Christ: He who lends to such a person upon Use, being so far commonly from advan∣taging him, which is the end of Charity, that he only helps to plunge him so much the deeper in necessity and calamity. The same is to be said of the taking of Gifts of such persons, or making any other ad∣vantages of them; it mattering not at all, under what notion it comes, so a Consideration be paid, which changeth it from Liberality into a Contract, and, in the present case, an unmerciful one.

I am now arrived at the last species of Liberality, best known by the name of Hospitality; concerning which, as the Scripture hath not been wanting in furnishing us with Examples, so neither in inculcating the Fractice thereof upon us: S. Paul in his Exhortations joining Hospita∣lity with distributing to the Necessities of the Saints, Rom. 12.13. as S. Peter† with that Charity which covers a multitude of sins. And not without Reason, if we consider, I do not say how much it immediate∣ly conduceth to the conserving of the Properties of meaner persons,

but to the encouraging of them to undergo that labour and travel which God hath been pleased to lay upon them. Now though even here that Caution is to have place, which refers the Benevolence of Men to the measure of their several abilities; yet I cannot forbear to say, that, provided it keeps within those bounds, it ought not to con∣tent it self with extending to a few, or indeed to those of its own Neighbourhood; as because the word, which we render Hospitality, imports the entertaining of Strangers, so because it is a Vertue of those whom God hath blessed with more liberal Fortunes, and from whom therefore he expects a more than ordinarily comprehensive Cha∣rity. And I cannot but upon this occasion call to mind the Story of Henry Wardlow, sometime Archbishop of S. Andrews in Scotland, who, agreeably to his own Function, and the Precept of the Apostle, em∣ployed that Revenue, which God had given him, in the entertainment of other persons: For, being prevailed with for the ease of his Ser∣vants, to make a Bill of Houshold, that they might know who were to be served by them; when he was asked whom he would first name, he answered Fise and Angus, which are two large Countries in Scotland, containing many millions of People. By which answer of his, as he wisely freed himself from their importunity, who would for their own ease have retrenched that good Man's Hospitality; so he gave an evi∣dent testimony of a truly Christian and generous mind; and such as it will concern those of the richer sort, but especially of the Clergy, to shew themselves diligent imitators of: That and no other being truly Christian Charity, which, so far as in it lyes, extends it self to all, I do not say that are the Children of the holy Jesus, though that be a large Family, but the Descendants of our common Parent Adam. Care on∣ly would be taken (as being in a manner the only blemish which ad∣heres to this most excellent Vertue) that that which is intended by the hospitable person for the refreshment of Strangers and others, be not converted into luxury and intemperance; that, as it often happens, not only proving no Charity to their Bodies, but the destruction of their Soulls, which is the greatest cruelty we can be guilty of. And indeed, as those times which were most famous for Hospitality, found a way both to prevent and retrench all such intemperances; so if we could live to see the simplicity and plainness of those ancient days recalled, there is no doubt we might live to see their Hospitality also recalled, without any of those inconveniences which do now attend it; they arising for the most part from that, which hath been also the bane of Hospitality, even a desire of gratifying our Palates with curious and costly Entertainments. For as those things which are most plain are also procured at the easiest rates, by which means men may be better fitted to be liberal towards other men; so, at the same time they grati∣fie the appetite, they do also satiate it, and not like the curiosities of latter time produce a thirst which is equal to the other, and which no∣thing but intemperance can aslake.

Such are the means whereby we may contribute to the subsistence of others, and to the procuring or conserving or improving of those Properties from which they derive it: in which as I have often said, and I hope sufficiently proved, that the Affirmative part of the Com∣mandment doth consist; so they have this farther to commend them

to our consideration and use, that they would if duly observed, not only not abridge our own Properties, but preserve us from the tem∣ptation of invading those of others, which the Negative part of the Commandment doth forbid. It being not to be thought, especially after such glorious Promises as are made to the charitable man, that he should be under any necessity of invading the Properties of others, who, in obedience to the Divine Command, hath been so liberal of his own.

Notes

• Justinus hi∣storicus, li. 43. statim ab ini∣tio. Italiae cultores primi Aborigines fu∣ere, quorum Rex Saturnus tantae justitiae fuisse traditur, ut neque servierit sub illo quisquam, neque quicquam privatae rei habu∣erit, sed omnia communia & indivisa omnibus fuerint, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium esset. Cicero de Officiis, lib. 1. Sunt autem privata nulla naturâ: sed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt: aut of∣ctoriâ, ut qui bello potiti sunt: aut lege, aut pactione, conditione, sorte. Virgilius Georgicorum lib. 1.

  Ante Jovem nulli subigebant arva coloni, Nec signare quidem aut partiri limite campum Fas erat; in medium quaerebant— De eodem saeculo Seneca, in Octavia. Act. 2. —Pervium cunctis iter, Communis usus omnium rerum fuit.
• †

  Instit. Divin. li. 5. c. 5 Quod Poetae dictum [illud nempe prius citatum ex Virgilio] sic accipi oportet, non ut exi∣stimemus nihil omnino tum fuisse privati; sed more Poetico figuratum, ut intelligamus tam liberales fuisse homines, ut natas sibi fruges non includerent; nec soli absconditis incubarent, sed pauperes ad communionem proprii laboris ad∣mitterent.
• Ch. 4.2. &c. & Seld. Mare Claus. l. 1. c. 4.
• Mar. Claus. l. 1. c. 4.
• Bramhall's Vindication of himself and Episcopal Clergy, from Mr. B's Charge of Popery, c. 1.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 prope finem.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Grot. d. l. Annot. ad c. 1.
• Lib. 3.
• ‖

  Le Journal des Scavans, vol. 1. p. 249.
• Tull. de Offic. lib. 3. Neque enim id est celare, quicquid reti∣ceas; sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causa ve∣lis eos, quorum intersit id scire. Hoc autem celandi genus quale sit, & cujus hominis, quis non videt! Certe non aperti, non sim∣plicis est, non ingenui, non justi, non viri boni: versuti potius, ob∣scuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris, vafri.
• Deut. 25.13.14. Thou shalt not have in thy bag divers weights, a great and a small. Thou shalt not have in thine house divers mea∣sures, a great and a small. But thou, &c.
• †

  Baynus in Prov. 20.10.
• Ephes. 4.28.
• †

  1 Thes. 4.6.
• Instit. lib. 4. tit. 6. de Act∣onibus. Qua enim ratione qui tardius solvit quàm solvere deberet minus solvere intelligitur, &c.
• Dig. de Furtis, leg. Verum est, quod pleri{que} probant, fundi furti agi non posse.
• ‖

  In quo [nempe Sabini libro, cui titulus est, De Furtis] id quoquê scriptum est, quod vulgo inopinatum est, non hominum tantùm neque rerum moventium, quae efferri oc∣culte & surripi possunt, sed fundi quoque & aedium fieri furtum. A. Gell. Noct. Attic. lib. 11. cap 18.
• Dig. de Furtis, leg. Furtum à Furvo, paragr. 3. Furtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi gratiâ, vel ipsius rei. vel etiam usus ejus, &c.
• ‖

  Answer to Fountain's Letter.
• Fures priva∣tòrum furtorum in nervo atque in compedibus aetatem agunt: fures publici in auro atque in purpura. A. Gell. loco pr. citato.
• ‖

  Instit. de publ. Judiciis, leg. Item lex Julia pecula∣tus.
• †

  Instit. ibid.
• In Exod. 20.15.
• See Exod. 22.3. 2 Kings 4.1. Mat. 18.25.
• A. Gell. ubi supra, cum no∣tis Ant. Thysii J. C.
• De jure Na∣tur. & Gent. l. 6. c. 2.
• Grot. in Decal.
• Exod. 22.2, 3.
• ‖

  Vide A. Gell. l. 11. c. 18.
• Explication of the Fifth Command∣ment, Part. 1••.
• 1 Cor. 6.10.
• See the Di∣scourse con∣cerning the Positive Laws of God.
• Turcic. Epist. 8.
• Busbeq. Tur∣sic. Epist.
• Eccl. 12.12.
• See Deut. 29.29.
• †

  Explicat. of the Second Commandm. Part.
• See ver. 20. of that chap. as also ver. 24. with the Ser∣mon of Dr. Sanderson up∣on the latter.
• †

  Sanderson ibid.
• ‖

  Sanders. ibid.
• Lib. 3. fab. 14. Cite rumpes arcum, semper si tensum habueris. At si laxâris, cum voles, erit utilis. Sic lusus animo debet aliquando dari, Ad cogitandum melior ut redeat tibi.
• See Explic. of the Fourth Com. Part.
• Eccl. 3.4.
• Of the na∣tural use of Lots. ch. 1.
• ‖

  Ibid. c. 5. pag. 125, &c.
• Ibid. ch. 6. pag. 170.
• See Gatak. of the nature, &c. of a lot. chap. 6. Sect 8
• Prov. 16.1.9.19.21.20.24.21.30, 31.
• ‖

  Gatak. ibid. ch. 7. Sect. 4.
• Gatak ibid.
• De moribus German. Aleam, quod mirere, sobrii inter seria ex∣ercent, tantd lucrandi per dendive temeritate ut cum omnia defece∣runt, extremo ac novissimo jactu de libertate & de corpore conten∣dunt. Victus voluntariam servitu∣tem adit.
• ‖

  See Jer. Tayl. Ductor Dubit. li. 4. c. 1. p. 477.
• De Officiis li. 2. Nonnunquam tamen est largiendum, &c. Sed diligenter at{que} moderaté. Multi enim patrimoniae effuderunt in∣consultè largiendo. Quid autem est stultius, quàm, quod libenter facias, curare ut id diutiùs face∣re non possis? At{que} etiam sequun∣tur largitionem rapinae. Cum enim dando egere coeperint, alie∣nis bonis manus afferre coguntur.
• De Officiis li. 2. Nonnunquam tamen est largiendum, &c. Sed diligenter at{que} moderaté. Multi enim patrimoniae effuderunt in∣consultè largiendo. Quid autem est stultius, quàm, quod libenter facias, curare ut id diutiùs face∣re non possis? At{que} etiam sequun∣tur largitionem rapinae. Cum enim dando egere coeperint, alie∣nis bonis manus afferre coguntur.
• De Officiis lib. 2. Convenit au∣tem tum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum: in omnique re con∣trahendâ, &c. aequum & faci∣lem, multa multis de jure suo concedentem: à litibus vero, quantum liceat, & nescio an pan∣lo plus etiam, quàm liceat, ab∣horrentem.
• Annot. in Mat. 5.40.
• ‖

  Mat. 18.15.
• †

  Thorndike of the Right of the Church in a Christian State, cap. 1. pag. 37. &c.
• See Explic. of this Com∣mandment, Part 1.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—
• †

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• De Officiis, l. 2.
• Eccl. 9.14, 15.
• De Officiis, lib. 2.
• ‖

  See for the Old, Deut. 24.13. Where the Septuagint render the word righteousness by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as also, Psal. 112.9.

  For the New, Mat. 6.1. ac∣cording to some Greek Copies.
• Heb. 13.2.
• Tull. de Officiis ••. 2. Jam illud non sunt admonendi (est enim in promptu) ut animad∣vertant, cum alios javari ve∣lint, ne quos offendant.
• De Officiis lib. 2.
• See Ham∣mond's Serm. on Deut. 26.12, 13. and Seldens Histo∣ry of Tithes, c. 2. sect. 3.
• 2 Cor. 9.7.
• Mat. 6.1.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. li. 5. sect. 6. —〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• Mat. 5.42.
• Gen. 18.3. Gen. 19.2. Judg. 19 20.
• †

  1 Pet. 4.9.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• Spotiswood's History of the Ch. of Scotl. l. 2. p. 57.
• See Prov. 11.25. Prov. 19.17. Prov. 28.27.