A Short history of the kings of England shewing, what right every king had to the crown, and the manner of their wearing of it, especially from William the Conqueror, to James the Second, that abdicated his three kingdoms : wherein is made appear there hath been no direct succession in the line to create an hereditary right, for six or seven hundred years / faithfully collected out of our best histories.

That the Reader may the better discern how the Answers here applied do agree with the Words of His Majesties Answer to the Nineteen Pro∣positions, I have here transcribed so much of it as concerns this Particular.

Pag. 17. WE call God to witness, that as for our Subjects Sake these Rights are vested in Us, so for their Sakes (as well as for our own) we are resolved not to quit them, nor to subvert though in a Parliamentary way the ancient, equal, happy, wel∣poised, and never-enough commended Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom.

There being thrée kinds of Government amongst Men, Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and all these having their Particular Conveniences and In∣conveniences.

Pag. 18. The Experience and Wisdom of your An∣cestors hath so moulded this out of a Mixture of these, as to give to this Kingdom as far as humane Prudence can provide) the Conveniences of all thrée, without the In∣conveniences of any one, as long as the Ballance hangs even betwéen the thrée Estates, and they run joyntly on in their proper Channel ••e getting Verdure and Fertility in the Meadows on both sides) and the overflowing of ei∣ther on either side, raise no Deluge or Inundation. The Ill of Adsolute Monarchy is Tiranny: The ill of Aristo∣cracy is Faction and Division: The Ills of Democracy are Tumults, Violence, and Licentiousness. The Good of Monarchy is the uniting a Nation under one Head, to resist Invasion from abroad, and Insurrection at Home: The Good of Aristocracy, is the Conjunction of Councel

in the ablest Persons of a State for the publick Benefit: The Good of Democracy, is Liberty, and the Courage and Industry which Liberty begets.

In this Kingdom the Laws are joyntly made by a King, by a House of Péers, and by a House of Commons chosen by the People, all having frée Votes and particular Pri∣viledges. The Government, according to these Laws, is trusted to the King, Power of Treaties of War and Peace, of making Péers, of choosing Officers and Coun∣sellors for State, Iudges for Law, Commanders for Forts and Castles, giving Commissions for raising Men to make War abroad, or to prevent and provide against Invasions or Insurrections at home, Benefit of Con∣fiscations, Power of Pardoning, and some more of the like kind are placed in the King—Again, Pag. 19. That the Prince may not make use of this high and perpetual Power to the Hurt of those for whose Good he hath it, and make use of the Name of Public Necessity for the Gain of his private Favorites and Followers to the Detriment of his People; the House of Commons, an excellent Conserver of Liberty, but never intended for any share in Government, or the chusing of them that should govern) is solely intrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Levies of Moneys (which is the Sinews as well of Peace as War) and the impeaching of those, who for their own Ends, though countenanced by any surreptiti∣ously gotten Command of the King, have violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knows it to protect, and to the Protection of which they were bound to advise him, at least not to serve him to the contrary: and the Lords being trusted with a Iudicatory Power, are an ex∣cessent Scréen and Bank betwéen the Prince and People, to assist each against any Incroachments of the other, and by just Iudgments to preserve that Law which ought to be the Rule of every one of the thrée—

Pag. 20. Since therefore the Power legally placed in both Houses is more than sufficient to prevent and restrain the Power of Tiranny:—since this would be a total Subversign of the Fundamental Laws, and that excel∣lent

Constitution of this Kingdom, which hath made this Nation so many years both famous and happy, to a great degrée of Envy; ūce to the Power of PunisHing which is already in your Hands according to Law) if—since the Encroaching of one of these Estates upon the Power of the other is unhappy in the Effects both to them and all the rest—Pag. 22. Our Answer is, Nolumns Leges Angliae mutari. But this we promise, that we will be as careful of preserving the Laws in what is supposed to con∣cern wholly our Subjects, as in what most concerns Our self: For indéed We profess to believe that the Preserva∣tion of every Law concerns Us, those of Obedience be∣ing not secure, when those of Protection are violated.

FINIS.