Thirteen books of natural philosophy viz. I. Of the principles, and common adjuncts of all natural bodies. II. Of the heavens, the world, and elements. III. Of action, passion, generation, and corruption. IV. Of meteors. V. Of minerals and metals. VI. Of the soul in general, and of things vegetable. VII. Of animals or living creatures. VIII. Of man. Unto which is added five books more of natural philosophy in several discourses. IX. Discourses [illegible] principles of natural things. X. Dis. 2. Concerning the occult and hidden qualities. XI. Dis. 3. Of atomes and mixture. XII. Dis 4. Of the generation of live things. XIII. Dis. 5. Concerning the spontaneous generation of live things. Written in Latin and English. By Daniel Sennert, doctor of physick. Nicholas Culpeper, physitian and astrologer. Abdiah Cole, doctor of physick, and the liberal arts.

Chap. 4. VVhether Souls are drawn out of the aptitude of the Matter.

IN the first place therefore, amongst those who hold the seed to be inanimate, it is a com∣mon opinion, that all forms and consequently all Souls, except the rational soul of a man are drawn out of the aptitude of the matter. But who was the first Author of this Opinion, is not so certain. Most do indeed father it upon Aristotle; but I doubt whether it can be demonstrated from his works. Some, and amongst them Franciscus Bonamicus, do at∣tribute to Averroes this Opinion; and some such words are found in his Books; but it many times happens, that Expositors patch many things of their own upon Authors. But whether he held what is vulgarly taught is a great question. For it is apparent, as from other places, so from 7. Metaphys. text. 31. That he held the Cause of the Genera∣tion of living things, or rather of the formation of a living Body, to be the form lurking in the Seed. For seeing there Aristotle compares Artificial things with Natural, and tou∣ching the Seed which is the Efficient, he saies, It makes, Averrhoes adds; the Seed gene∣ates by a power it hath like to an Artificer; because the form of the thing generated is po∣••ntially in the Seed, and that of which the Seed is agrees in name and nature with that which is any waies made of the Seed. And a little after: In the matter of things generated the is an aptitude that out of it may be bred a like thing by the power which is in the See.

But most of the Schoolmen and their followers have fiercely maintained this Opinion of the education of Souls out of the aptitude of the matter, and have handed it over to posterity without any cleer sence, which a mind desirous of truth might conceive; so that most of them seem rather to have transcribed the words of their Masters, than to have understood the thing it self. And how indeed could they understand where there was nothing to be under∣stood?

But whoever was the Author of this Opinion, and whatever Patrons it hath; it must by al means be weighed and considered, since many contend for it as if their life lay at the stake, and use it as an infallible Principle to decide many Controversies. Now, two things these Authors do: First, they set down the reasons moving them thus to think, or rather they oppose the Opinions of others: and in the next place they endeavor to explain and declare their said Opinion.

And in the first place (truly) as appears out of Fonseca, Comment. in 5. Met. cap. 2. quaest. 4. Suarez, 12. Metaphys. disput. Sect. 1, 2. Bonamicus, Ruvius, in 1. Phys. tract. 2. quaest. 1. and others, they bring hardly any evident reasons for their own Opinion, but on∣ly endeavor to bring those that think otherwise into some absurdity; which is a very suspi∣cious way of dealing. For it is the part of a good and Ingenuous Disputer first to prove his own Opinion with firm Reasons, afterwards to oppose the contrary. And nothing can be said so true and manifest which by contentious wits may not be called in question. I count it not worth the while to transcribe the places of Authors entire; seeing they are in the hands of al, and most of them bring nothing new, but repeat the same thing over and over again. But if any reasons may be gathered out of them, they are these:

In the first place therefore, They would prove that Forms are drawn out of the power of the Matter, because they depend upon the Matter in their making, their being, and operation. But this is to beg the Question, and there is no connexion of the major. For we grant in∣deed that those inseparable Forms cannot be made (or rather propagated) without the mat∣ter, and that they are, and work in, and with the matter: but it does not hence follow, that the Form is drawn out of the power of the Matter, and depends in its essence upon the mat∣ter, which is meerly passive. But the Question stil remains, Whence those Forms which can neither be made, nor be, nor operate without the matter, or out of the matter, have their Original.

Secondly, Unless we hold that Forms are drawn out of the aptitude of the matter, they conceive al Generation is taken away. Which argument whether it be a direct proof, or a deduction to an absurdity, I leave to others to judg. For either (say they) the Forms are somthing before Generation, or they are nothing. If they were before Generation, there can be no Generation; if they are nothing there wil be a Creation, and so Generation is again taken away. But this Dilemma is of no weight, nor is there any strength in either of its horns. For since they were al for the most part Divines who thus wrote, they ought to have considered what that text of Scripture imports, Encrease and multiply; yea, and how that axiome of Philosophers is to be understood, That every Form can multiply it self. For if they had understood that Souls can multiply themselves, they had understood withal that when any particular thing generates, a soul is not created anew, but multiplied; and that the Souls of the first Individuals of every sort, created by God at the beginning of the World, did and do suffice to propagate al the Souls of al the Individuals that ever have been, or ever shal be; and they had understood withal that when Souls which were before are mul∣tiplied, generation is not taken away, but rather established. For though the Soul were be∣fore, and only one in number; yet when it multiplies it self, and diffuses it self into more Individuals, Generation is rightly said to be made. Where notwithstanding we must pre∣sently observe when Generation is truly made. They indeed hold, when of a grain of Wheat there springs up a Wheat stalk and ear, or when a Chick comes out of an Eg, then generation is made. And it may indeed be granted, that after a sort Generation is then made. But if we would speak properly, since Generation is (as Aristotle teaches, de respiratione, cap. 18.) The first communication of the nutritive Soul together with the inbred Heat; that communica∣tion is then performed when Seed is bred and separated from the Generator: and then Plants, then Animals breed, when they communicate their Soul together with their native heat unto the Seed, and cast the same forth of themselves, but not when a Plant or Animal is produced of the Seed. Which is hereby apparent, in that when Plants spring up out of the seed the Plant that bred the seed may be destroyed, and when the Chick is hatched out of the Egg, the Cock and Hen whence that Egg came may be both dead, and so can neither communicate the Native Heat, nor the Soul. And therefore Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exercit. 6. Sect. 10.

The Tree ingenders (saies he) when it produces Seed; but a Tree is not generated when it shoots up from the Seed; but then that which was generated and imperfect is perfected. So a Dog does not engender when the Whelps are brought forth, but when the Seed is bred.

But when they that hold Forms are drawn out of the power or aptitude of the Matter would explain their Opinion, they variously and miserably vex themselves and trouble their Brains to no purpose; as is usual when there is nothing at the bottom; and while they en∣deavor to explain the matter, they rather obscure and perplex the same, as may be seen out of the Authors fore-alleadged, also from Tolet. 1. Physic. cap. 9. qu. 19. and 1. de gene∣rat. & corrupt. cap. 3. qu. 2. Benedictus Pererius, Lib. 5. Phys. cap. 22. and others, whose words I think not fit to transcribe; and at last when they have turned this way and that way with much anxiety, at last they conclude with those words of Aquinas, Part. 1. Quest. 90. artic. 2. for the Form to be drawn out of the aptitude of the matter is nothing else but for a thing to become actually what it was before potentially. But whether this can satisfie a mind that hungers after Truth, I leave to the Reader to judg. Whence Tolet. 1. de Gener. & Corrupt. cap. 3. quest. 2. I confess (saies he) this is a wonderful Vertue which partakes of a creating power; but it is not a creating power because it alwaies works upon subjects. The Vertue also of the matter is wonderful, out of the aptitude whereof are brought things which are not actually. Where rather he should have admired at their stubborn headiness, who would needs have it to be brought out of the matter which is impossible, and is neither in the power of the Matter nor of the Agent, than at the won∣derful power of the Matter which is none at al. And Benedictus Pererius, Lib. 14. cap. 9. at the end, where he treats of the Original of Forms, and endeavors to answer some doubts, at last he concludes: Whether these Answers are true, and whether they quite take away the difficulties proposed, I leave to the judgment and consideration of learned men: they do not (truly) quite take away my scruple, nor perfectly satisfie my mind. For they involve certain things which seem either absolutely false, or more doubtful than that whereof we now doubt; such as is, that there is an ultimum or last of Quality, which may be brought in in an in∣stant. And indeed they can no waies answer the doubts that are brought against their Opi∣nion. For if you ask them, what it is to be brought out of the power of the matter? or what that power is? they answer, That it is the disposition of the matter to a certain form, that when the ordinary power of the Agent or efficient is added, a form grows and results therefrom. But when they themselves grant, that this disposition belongs to the second mat∣ter (not to the first, for that is indifferent to receive al forms, nor more determined to one than another. And if the first matter should contain al forms in its bosom, and the forms did owe their Original to the first matter, that matter were a more noble principle than the form) since one disposition is required to the form of an Oak, another to the form of a Chick, ano∣ther to draw out the form of a Horse; and the same Expounders of Aristotle determine, that the Matter wherein such specifick forms hang, is the Elements variously mixed and disposed: it is demanded (since they hold the form is made actually, which was there before potential∣ly) Whether it be made of nothing? or whether that same disposition and Qualities of the Matter, which are nothing but a certain temper of a mixed body, or the very form it self of the mixt Body or Elements, is changed into the form of an Oak, an Hen, or an Horse▪ None of which can be said without absurdity; since neither an accident can be changed into a substance, nor one form into another; nor can the forms of living things be compoun∣ded of the Elements. And which way soever that disposition to the form can be explained (since it is made successively by parts, and the last degree is of the same kind and perfection with the former) it cannot make up the act of a thing, nor give Essence to a Sub∣stance.

Moreover, Neither can they produce any thing of certainty concerning the immediate and principal Efficient of that Form which they say is drawn out of the power of the mat∣ter. The matter it self being a passive principle cannot be the Efficient cause; nor the Sun, or other Stars (since they are only remote and specifical, not universal causes, as was said before, Chap. 2.) Nor the external Heat of the Air, Womb, Hen-sitting, Furnace, or any external thing whatsoever. For so a substance should be produced by an accident. More∣over, there could not be assigned a specifical Cause of a special Effect; but the same special Effect should be produced by divers Causes: as we see Plants sprout out of the Seed both by the heat of the Sun and of a Stove, and the Chickens of one Bird hatched by another Bird not of the same, but a different kind; yea, and the seeds of Silkworms are hatched in the bo∣som of a Damsel, as Vida relates in his Poeme of the Silkworm. Moreover by the action of

one Agent most different Forms should be produced. For since in the same Garden most different Plants do grow, they cannot al proceed from the same Agent, viz. The external Heat. Moreover, according to this Opinion the things generated should not have their form from the Generator, but only a disposition to the form, which afterwards of its own accord upon the action of an external Agent (as Heat for example) should spring out of the power of the matter, the Agent communicating nothing thereunto. And so according to this Opini∣on it cannot be said that a living thing begets its like, not that every form does multiply it self: which yet al sound Philosophers do grant. For if the Generator should transfer no∣thing of its own Essence into the thing Generated, but should only determine the matter to such a like form, and afterward the Efficient (which is not of the same kind) should make it actually to break forth; how I pray you can the form be said to multiply it self? Verily, if some Plant in the Indies when it produces Seed gives nothing but the matter with a deter∣minate aptitude to receive a like form, out of which after a yeer, two, or three, the Plant it self being now burnt or putrefied, the form should break out by vertue of heat, not only of the Sun, but of the fire in a stove, as the Agent: that Plant cannot be said to have bred its like, nor that form to have multiplied it self. Nor is it enough to cause an univocal Genera∣tion, and the true production of a like Essence, to afford a matter with some proclivity and propension to receive the form. And after this reckoning the Agent heat (and that an accident) should confer more towards the Generation than the Generator it self, since it makes the form actually to arise which the Generator caused to be there only potentially. And thus it remains yet unexplained, whence the substantial and specifick form of a thing, or that more excellent, more divine and chief part of a thing hath its Original. Mean while we grant that the disposition of the matter is necessary to the Generation of living things, since every mat∣ter is not fit to receive every form, but a determinate matter a determinate form: but not that the form or soul should be made out of it; but that it may be propagated thereinto, and afterwards dwel therein, as shal be said hereafter.

Fortunius Licetus, de spont. vivent. ortu, Lib. 1. cap. 83. endeavors to explain the Edu∣ction of forms out of the power of the matter, after this manner: We say (quoth he) that the Eduction of the form out of the bosom of the matter is not the drawing out of that which lies hid into the open view, but the conversion of aptitude into act. For the form which is produced by the Agent only by the transmutation of the matter did potentially pre-exist therein, out of which it is brought into act. Moreover, we deny that the Form is made of nothing, and absolutely created, if it be granted that it is not made of the matter as a principle, nor out of that in which it did actually pre-exist. For in the first place, whatsoever things are truly created they are made simply of nothing, and of no subject at al; but al forms under the Soul of Man are made of nothing of their own, but not absolute∣ly of nothing, as those things which are created; since forms are made by the agent, by a transmutation made in such a determinate subject, on which therefore the forms depend in their Being, and by which added to their Essence they are defined according to Aristotle. Again, if it were not so accidents also should be made of nothing, and most properly crea∣ted: for no heat did pre-exist in the water which is made hot. But verily forms are not truly created, nor are they out of nothing of their own, but properly out of the bosom of the Matter they are drawn, and out of the aptitude thereof, because they are truly generated of some rudiment of themselves pre-existing in the matter, which rudiment of the form is perfected by the action of the Agent, and turns to a perfect Form. So far Licetus. But this is a vain put-off. For let Licetus teach us what that Rudiment of a Form is. Whether the substance of the matter it self, or some accident thereof. If the former, (to which he seems to incline when he writes that the forms are made by the agent, by a transmutation made in such a subject so determined) then the matter should be changed into Form: if the latter, an accident must be changed into a substance. Let him shew us also, that there is any rudiment and beginning of a form, since forms are indivisible, and have their Essence like numbers; and therefore where they are they are totally, or not at al. Nor does the same Fortunius Licetus explain this matter more happily, Lib. 4. de spont. vivent. ortu, cap. 15. where he defines the Beginning of Forms, and holds that in the matter there is pre-existing a rudiment of the future form, that the generical nature of that form remains under the oppo∣site privation, to which the efficient cause joyning the specifical difference of the form is said both to constitute the form, and to further the Generation, and at once to generate a sub∣stance compounded of matter and form. But that same pre-conceived Opinion touching the eduction of forms out of the power of the matter seduced that man, otherwise a most di∣ligent searcher into Nature. For no form is capable of more or less, but consists in an indi∣visible

point, nor can it be remitted, since remission is made by mixture of a contrary, nor is it possible that the form should first have a generical Nature, and receive the specifical diffe∣rence from the Efficient. And whereas Licetus denies those axiomes owned by al Philoso∣phers, and saies they hold true only in compound substances, but not in simple; this he does without Reason. For since compound substances become such by reason of the simple of which they consist, if the simple substances, matter, and form, may be remitted, also the compound might be remitted; and since the form gives being to the thing by reason of the form the compound also should be more or less such. Nor does Licetus agree with himself in this point, since in the same Book, chap. 2. he writes, That those things which are said to breed of themselves are not made by an external Agent, but by an Agent which lies hid in the matter of the thing to be made, which does not generate a new form different from it self, but exhibits it self thereto for a new form, that is to say, communicates it self. Nor is there in the Soul (which is a most simple Essence) any composition of sundry Essential parts, and in such a manner, that like a Genus it might be present without a specifical difference. The Soul is one most simple Essence, only furnished with sundry faculties. Nor can he shew how that remission is made. For whereas Licetus saies, that only an accidental remission or abatement is made by the mixture of a contrary, but not an essential, such as he holds to be in forms, is asserted without any reason; and it lies him in hand to prove, That (as he feigns) an essential remission may be made without admixture of a contrary. And which way soever he turns himself he fals into absurdities, and contradicts himself. For when he saies that that same rudiment of a form is no true form, but the generical Nature thereof, and that the kinds have an Essence really distinct from their sorts, he confounds Logical Conceptions with the Nature it self of things, or the Logical kind with the Natural. For the Logical kind is in the mind, and is by the mind abstracted from the sorts; but the Physical Genus signifies a common nature, which consists in the things themselves out of the Mind. And the Logical kind indeed may by the mind be separated from the sorts; but the Physical kind does not exist in Nature, save in its sorts, nor does the Animal exist any where save in a Man, a Lyon, a Horse, &c. And therefore it is a vain figment to say that the Generical Nature is the Ru∣diment of the Form, and as it were half the Form. And from this very Opinion it would follow, that like does not engender its like. For since the specifical Form gives to every thing its Nature, but not the Generical; if the Generator should only afford the matter wherein the Generical form is, or a rudiment of the Form, or an half form, as Licetus speaks; but the external agent as Heat should introduce the specifick difference; not the Genera∣tor which might die in the mean time before the external agent come should be the Parent and Author of the thing generated, but the external Agent; and that not univocal, but equi∣vocal. Also I wonder a man so exceeding learned should defend this Doctrine of the Edu∣ction of Forms, since he hath no need thereof to explain his Opinion, as holding in 1. de sponte vivent. ortu, cap. 125. That the seed is animated, and Lib. 4. cap. 32. that it is an imperfect Animal: and he holds that such things as are said to be generated of their own ac∣cord do not proceed from an external Agent, but from an Agent that lies hid within the matter, as was lately said.

But which way soever they turn themselves, the matter comes to the same pass, that they are fain to confess, that besides the disposition of the matter there is somwhat formal in the Seed, the cause of action, and that besides the disposition of the matter there needs somwhat else by which the thing may be brought into its perfect act. And that power of which they speak they are forced at last to explain to be meant not of a passive power, but an active, which makes that that which is in the first act come to be in the second act, or in an act simply; so that that Soul which was destitute of Instruments to operate by is now furnished there∣with, so that it is able to operate. Which very thing also Aristotle taught; when in 7. Metaphys. cap. 9. tit. 31. he writes: The Seed hath the Form potentially in it self, which after a sort hath the same name with that from whence it came. And 2. de Generat. cap. 1. It is all one whether you name the Seed, or that from whence it came. For the Sum of the business is, That that Power which Aristotle speaks of is formal, as later Writers phraze it, and differs not from the first act.

A certain late Writer (whose Understanding is capable of nothing but what is Elementary) when he saw he could not defend the Eduction of Forms out of the power of the Matter by any Philosophical reason, at last he flies to the Authority of the Holy Scriptures. But he endeavors to introduce his own mind and pre-conceived Opinion into the holy Scriptures, whiles he holds, that Moses, Gen. 1. when he brings in God saying; Let the Earth bring forth, let the Water bring forth the living Creature, does assert that the Souls of Plants

and Beasts were then by God produced, and do at this day arise from the Elementary mat∣ter. And thus therefore he explains it, that the specifical Forms are not made of the Ele∣ments, inasmuch as they are the matter of the mixtion, and the conven••ent subjects of Forms; or that they are not made by mixture and composition of the Elements, but that the Elements concur to the generation of corruptible things as they contain an universal matter so affected, under the matters of the Elements, that out of the aptitude thereof as out of a rich and unexhaustible Treasure might be drawn and propagated to the end of the World the sorts of al things, such and so many as the most good and great God would have to exist for the accomplishment and ornament of this lower World. For since the Ele∣ments contain no matter but the first, he must needs by that universal matter understand the first matter. But who I pray you, either Philosopher or Divine, did over so teach concer∣ning the first Matter, especially being considered without the Forms of the Elements? Did Aristotle (whose Opinion he conceives this of the Eduction of Forms to be) know any thing of that Divine Benediction given at the first Creation? And where do we read (I pray you) in the Scriptures that God so blessed that Universal Matter? This indeed we read in the first of Genesis, That God once commanded that the Earth and Waters should bring forth Animals created by him; and when they being created by God were come out of the Earth and Water like a Child out of the Womb, as Franciscus Junius speaks in his Ex∣plication, we do not read that God again commanded that the Earth and Water should pro∣duce Plants and Animals, and that he blessed them to that intent; but thus we read, That the Earth brought forth the green Herb bearing Seed, and the Tree bearing Fruit, and each thing having seed according to its kind; and that God blessed the Fishes and Birds being created, saying; Encrease and multiply, and fil the Waters of the Sea, and let Birds multiply upon the Earth.

Notes

• Whether Souls are drawn out of the ap∣titude of the matter
• Who was the Author of the Opi∣nion of drawing of form out of th aptitude of the mat∣ter.
• Reasons for the E∣duction of forms out of the ap∣titude of the matter.
• How living things are generated.
• when ge∣neration of living things is truly made
• whether that Opi∣nion of the eduction of forms out of the power of matter can be ex∣plained.
• Absurdi∣ties which follow the Opinion of drawing the Forms out of the aptitude of the matter
• The Opi∣nion of Fortunius Licetus concerning the Edu∣ction of Forms out of the ap∣titude of the Matter.
• The diffe∣rence of a Logical & a Natural kind.
• Whether the Edu∣ction of the Form out of the ap∣titude of the Matter he founded on the holy Scriptures