Thirteen books of natural philosophy viz. I. Of the principles, and common adjuncts of all natural bodies. II. Of the heavens, the world, and elements. III. Of action, passion, generation, and corruption. IV. Of meteors. V. Of minerals and metals. VI. Of the soul in general, and of things vegetable. VII. Of animals or living creatures. VIII. Of man. Unto which is added five books more of natural philosophy in several discourses. IX. Discourses [illegible] principles of natural things. X. Dis. 2. Concerning the occult and hidden qualities. XI. Dis. 3. Of atomes and mixture. XII. Dis 4. Of the generation of live things. XIII. Dis. 5. Concerning the spontaneous generation of live things. Written in Latin and English. By Daniel Sennert, doctor of physick. Nicholas Culpeper, physitian and astrologer. Abdiah Cole, doctor of physick, and the liberal arts.

Chap. 1. Of the Rational Soul.

IT remains now that we should treat of MAN, who being the Rule and Measure of al Living Creatures, and being compared with the rest, may be said to comprehend them all, because he is furni∣shed with al their faculties and endowments; with the considera∣tion therefore of Man we shal conclude our Treatise of Natural Philosophy.

Now a Man (as other living Creatures) consists of a Body and a Soul. We shal speak of his Soul in the first place. And seeing every Soul may be considered under a twofold notion; first as a Principle and one part of a Compound, or as the Form of the Body; Secondly as the Effi∣cient cause of al operations: We wil treat thereof also under both respects; and in the first place we wil consider how the Rational Soul stands in reference to the Body of Man: and afterwards what operations it doth work.

No sound Philosopher denies the Rational Soul to be the form of a man. But seeing there is a twofold Form, one which is called the informing Form, which is the Principle and one half of the Compound, and gives the thing its specifical being, and as a difference distin∣guishes it from al other things: another which is called the assisting Form, which does not give the specifical being to a thing, but is added to a thing already constituted in its specifi∣cal being, for the performance of some nobler operations, which of it self it cannot perform; (such a form as the Marriner is to the Ship, who gives not the Essence to the Saip, but is ad∣joyned thereto after it is perfect in its Essence, to cause it to sail, which it could not do of it self:) The Question is, Whether the Rational soul be the informing form of a Man, and the half of his Essence? or only an assistant form, which is added to a man after he is perfect, and hath his specifick form to cause in him some more noble operation, viz. Understan∣ding.

Avenrois was of Opinion that the Cogitative Faculty (by him so called and distinguished from the Fancy) was the form of a Man, and by vertue thereof a Man became a particular sort of Living Creature; but that the Rational Soul was only an assistant form. But most of the Latines hold the Rational Soul to be the true form of a Man, and one of his constituting parts; which Opinion we retain as the more true: For if the Rational Soul were not the informing form of a Man, he could not rightly be called Rational; even as a Ship, though the Sailet therein do reason, cannot be called Intelligent or Rational, which were absurd. Or thus, which is the same in effect, that whereby any thing does primarily operate, is the form of the thing to which the operation is attributed. But to Man as Man Understanding is attributed: Therefore the Intelligent Soul is the form of Mans Body. Nor does that an∣swer satisfie, when they say, That the Understanding is joyned to a Man by the Phantasms or Images of the Internal Senses: For the Phantasms are to the Understanding as colors to the Eye. As therefore neither the Color, nor the Subject of colors do see; so neither the Phan∣tasms, nor the subject of the Phantasms do understand; but rather are themselves under∣stood. Thus therefore we conclude: That whereby one thing differs specifically from ano∣ther is the form thereof. But by the Rational Soul a Man differs from alother living Crea∣tures; that therefore is the form of a Man. Aristotle also seems to have been of the same mind, as appears out of the 2. de Anima, cap. 1. t. 7.8. cap 2. t. 24.25.26. cap. 4, t. 36.37. as Zabarella does shew at large in his chap. 7. de Mente Humana.

From the Explication of this Question another Question may easily be answered, viz. Whether the Rational Soul be one in number in all men? or there be in every one a peculiar Soul? Some that hold the Rational Soul to be an assistant form, do hold that it is not mul∣tiplied according to the number of Persons, but that in al Man-kind there is one only, which is the cause of Understanding in al Men. But in very deed this Opinion is many waies con∣trary to the truth: For every informing Form, such as we have already shewed the Rational Soul to be, is multiplied according to the multiplication of particular persons. And if there were only one Soul in al Men, al should be but one; for they should have but one Form. Moreover, the operations, or understandings, or second acts, are multiplied in Men according to the multitude of Individuals; and my Understanding is one, and thine another, a third Mans another. Therefore the Soul the first act is manifold: For the diversity of operations depends upon the diversity of Forms. Finally, in one and the same Understanding there would be contrary operations: for one man is of one Opinion, another of another about the same thing.

And since we have averred the Rational Soul to be the Form of Man, here arises a Que∣stion, whether or no it be immortal? or, Whether it can without perishing be separated from the Body? As for us, according to the Tenets of our Religion we hold, that our Soul is immortal; and the Immortality of the Soul is counted one of the Hinges upon which Christian Religion turns. But whether or no it may be proved by Philosophical Reasons, and what Aristotles Opinion was concerning the same, hath been carefully enquired into by many.

In the first place, this we must hold, as Scaliger hath it, Exercit. 61. Sect. 5. and Exercit. 307. Sect. 20. that only God is truly immortal, and incorruptible. And therefore a thing may be said to be immortal two waies; either because it cannot perish at al, because it is most simple, and hath its Essence of it self, and depends upon none; and such is only God, and in respect o•• him al other things may be called corruptible: For although Angels and the Rational Soul, which are said to be immortal after the second way, are never actually corrup∣ted, have no contrary, and are separate from their subject; yet seeing they are not without Cause, and they have not the Cause of their Essence from themselves, but are by another,

and by another may naturally come to be no more. For every dependent may be changed by that on which it depends, if it be a voluntary principle, and at the pleasure of the first princi∣ple it may be deposed from its Essence wherein it was thereby instated. Now some things are not corrupted, because the Creator wil not have them so to be, who hath created nothing in them contrary, whereby they might be corrupted, nor hath plunged them so in matter, as they can neither be, nor operate without it. And that the Soul of man is of this kind, and that it may be separated from the body without corruption, Marsilius Ficinus endeavors to prove by many Arguments, de Immortal. Anim. Lib. 5. Tolet. Lib. 3. de Anima, cap. 5. quest. 16. Franciscus Piccolhomineus Lib. 2. de Humana Mente, Colleg. Conimbri∣cens. in tract. de anima separata, disp. 1. Artic. 3. and others.

We shal briefly thus determine the matter: Every thing is known by its operations, and every form discovers it self what it is by its operations. And therefore since the actions of Man are so noble that they cannot proceed from a mortal substance wholly plunged in the matter; it is plainly to be hence gathered, that the rational Soul from which they pro∣ceed is immortal and separable from the matter: for the Understanding abstracts and severs things from the matter, and knows without conditions of matter, without quantity, without figure; it understands things tree from matter; it is not offended with the multitude and ve∣hemency of the Objects as the Sense is; it can conceive things infinite; and although it knows very many things, it may alwaies know yet more, and can encrease a number though never so great; and not only knows a thing, but also knows it self, and understands that it under∣stands what it doth understand; it can wil and refuse, hath an unsatiable appetite of eterni∣ty, knowledg, happiness; which because it cannot be satisfied in this life, it is credible that it shal enjoy another condition wherein those appetites shal be satisfied; also it performs ope∣rations without corporeal Instruments. See Franisc. Piccolhomineus de bumana Mente, cap. 6. Aristotle also seems to have been of this opinion, as appears in his Physicks, Lib. 7. cap. 3. text 20 1. de Anima cap. 3. text 49. cap. 4. text 64, 65, 66. 2. de Anima, cap. 2. text 21. 3. de Anima, cap. 4. t. 3.4.7.12. cap. 5. text 19.20.7. de part. animal. cap. 1.12. Me∣taphys. t. 17. of which see Francisc. Piccolhom. Lib. 2. de humana mente, cap. 2. et se∣quent.

Thus far we have shewed how the rational Soul is reserred to the body of man: we are now to explain the nature thereof, as it is a principle of operation. Now Aristotle expresses the nature thereof, in this respect, in Lib. 3. de Anima, when he saith; that the rational soul is unmixed. Now the Soul must be unmixed two manner of waies: first, in respect of the Objects, so that it must not have their nature in its essence, but only a power to receive them. For because it ought to know the Objects, and it knows them by receiving them, it must needs of it self be free, unaffected and unmixed, since nothing receives that which it hath already; and that which is within hinders the ingress of another. And this immixture (that I may so speak) is common to the rational Soul with the Senses, which also have not their Objects actually in themselves, but only a power to receive them: save that the senses are respe∣ctively uanffected and unmixed, viz. with some sort of being, as the sight (for example sake) within colour, seeing they are not conversant about every kind of being: but the ratio∣nal Soul is quite free from the natures of al other things, as being directed to al things, and its office being to understand all things.

Again, the rational Soul is after a peculiar manner free from Organs, nor mixed there∣with; that is to say, when it operates by understanding or willing, it makes no use of the body, but performs those functions without it. For, inasmuch as to perform the actions which are done in and by the body there is required a certain temper of the qualities (see∣ing every body any waies tempered and disposed doth not receive every thing) and conse∣quently also a certain Organ; since the several parts of the body have several temperaments; and the rational Soul is not tied to any temper of the first Qualities, nor any waies affected by the qualities, not is there any proper Organ thereof in the body: we must doubtless therefore beleeve that it depends not upon the body, in respect of its operations, nor that it is after any such manner mixed therewith.

From this other immixture we may gather, what kind of operations those of the foul are. For since in its acting it is no way mixed with the body, and the actions of the body have nothing to do with the action of the mind: it is manifest that the Understanding and the Wil are inorganical faculties, and act of themselves; so that to understand and to wil, are actions proper to the mind; nor doth the mind understand by the body, or any Organ of the body, as by a medium wherewith it acts. The Soul indeed hath need of a Phantasm;

since the Soul while it is in the Body never understands without a Phantasm, Lib. 3. de Ani∣ma, cap. 7. but it useth the same not as an Organ, but as an object; because an intelligible matter must be presented to the mind by the Senses. And therefore if any have affirmed that the actions of the mind are organical, and that the rational Soul doth use the help of the Brain, Spirits, and Senses, as corporeal Organs, that is not to be admitted save in this sence, viz. that the soul doth not understand while it is in the body, without the foregoing operation of the Organs of the body, and before its own operation: or that in subordinate operation•• it uses an organ, and needs the brain, and spirit: but while it is in working of it self, or while it purely understands, and purely wils, it needs them not, nor doth it understand by organs, but this mind only is the subject of understanding, as also of the act of willing, which out barbarous Authors cal volition, by a new necessary and fitting word, as Scaliger saies, Exercit. 307. sect. 3. and sect. 9. and though when the Brain is hurt Reason is depra∣ved: yet that is done for no other cause, but that the administring or the subordinate facul∣ties, which are organical and depend upon the constitution of the Brain, are hurt.

And although the rational Soul be furnished with all those faculties which we have hi∣therto attributed to the vegetative and sensitive Soul: yet hath it besides two proper and peculiar faculties, whereby it excels Plants and other Animals; the Understanding, where∣by we apprehend and know things; and the Wil, whereby we are carried out to such things we understand to be good. And there is a manifest difference betwixt these faculties, see∣ing it is one thing to know, another thing to desire the thing known; and these two are per∣formed by a several way of working; the former by passion and reception of the species, so that the things may be carried to the mind: but the latter by following, so that the mind is carried and drawn to the object. Finally the diversity of the object severs the power of knowing from the power of willing, seeing we know things as Entia or Beings; but we de∣sire them as good.

The Understanding is therefore actually none of all the other Beings that are: yet it can spiritually receive and know them all. And although in respect of its essence it is one and the same, as being an inorganical part of the soul, which hath no variety from the Organs: yet according to certain respects it is divided into sundry differences. And in the first place Aristotle cals one the active Understanding, another the passive, supposing that in our mind besides that which is apt to be made every thing, viz. by understanding, and which is as it were the matter, there is somwhat in the nature of a form which is apt to make all things, that is to say, actually intelligible.

But what the active Understanding or the Intellectus agens is, is an obscure point in Phi∣losophy. Very many hold that the active understanding is God, or some Angel who is as∣sistant to a man. But these mens opinion seems to differ both from Aristotle and the Truth. For the Intent of Aristotle (in Lib. de anima) is to speak of the humane understanding, and he plainly in Lib. 3. de anima, chap. 5. cals the active understanding a difference in the Soul. Again, that understanding which proceeds from the Intellectus agens or active Intellective faculty is in our own power, nor doth it proceed immediately from God or any Intelligence or Angel. Moreover seeing God when he first made our understanding could put as much light into it as he pleased, there is no need that he should alwaies be assisting the same, like some Judg at the Assises, as Scaliger saies in Exercit. 307. sect. 19. But the active understan∣ding is (according to the opinion of the Philosopher) a difference of our Soul not informing, which of things potentially intelligible makes things actually understood. For as to a na∣tural affect there is required an agent of the same kind, and for artificial effects there is need of Art: so for the work of the mind, viz. Understanding, an agent is required, not separate from the Soul, but which is a part, or some difference of the soul.

And although this Agent Understanding seems to some unnecessary, who would have it banished out of natural Philosophy: yet it seems altogether necessary to hold an Agent Understanding, for this cause, seeing every thing that is done is done by somwhat and in somwhat, so that that by, and that wherein, do differ. Universals are made in the passive understanding, therefore there must be besides it another power to make Uni∣versals. For since every Patient requires some Agent, and nothing in nature brings it self from power to act; and our understanding is constituted in a possibility actually to under∣stand, and by receiving intelligible objects doth actually suffer: cleer it is, that holding a passive understanding, we must withall hold an active, and taking away the latter we deny the former. The Agent understanding therefore is for this cause necessary, that it may do or make all things, viz. as to their intellectual being, that is, that it may transfer the object from one order to another. For seting the Object or Phantasm is material, and so under an

opposite condition to the intellective faculty, which is abstract from all matter; it cannot be by the said faculty understood, unless it be made proportionate thereunto, viz. abstra∣cted and immaterial: now this cannot be done save by an abstract Virtue, and an Intelligent nature.

From whence it is apparent, that it is the Office of the active understanding to act, that is to draw from power to act, and of things potentially intelligible to make things actual∣ly intelligible. This Office of the understanding Aristotle expresses by the analogy it bears to Art, Nature, Habit, Light. For it is as it were the eye and sight of the mind, and it is to the Phantasms, as light to colours. For it illustrates the Phantasms, being inveloped with material conditions, which like darkness do hinder their being understood, so as they may put on the nature of things intelligible, and may be diffused to the passive understan∣ding: even as Colours by means of Light do send forth a Picture of themselves unto the sight: yet this illustration of the Phantasms is not performed formally, so that any quality is imprinted upon them; nor objectively only, but effectively; because the Agent under∣standing like external light by imparting its Ray yet doth actively elevate the Phantasms, to the production of an Intelligible species; nor is the Agent Understanding requisite only in respect of the object, but it hath also another office, viz. in reference to the passive understan∣ding, that it may produce therein the act of understanding, representing thereto an object in a species intelligible, which it performes when together with the illustrated Phantasm it produces a species of the thing to be understood, into the passive understanding.

Whence we may collect, upon what and how the Agent understanding doth act. For it is requisite in respect of both action, v••z. that it may act upon the Phantasms, and upon the passive understanding. But it acts upon these in a different manner; for it is joyned to the Phancasms before Intellection, and indeed while they are yet in the Fancy, where illu∣strating them it becomes their form, whereby they are made a moving object of the passive understanding: afterwards, the adjoyned Phantasms being illuminated, it acts upon the passive understanding, by producing therein an intelligible species or representation, and by consequent the act it self of understanding: But the Agent understanding it self as it is an Agent doth not understand; since it doth not receive the intelligible speces or notions, though it produce them, nor is in aptitude to understand; but the act of understanding is in the Passive Intellect, as in its subject. This therefore is called formally the Intellect; the other only effectively, because it makes the understanding or Intellection.

The Passive understanding is as it were the subject and matter, whereon the intelligible spe∣cies are imprinted; and therefore 'tis called Patient and Passive, because it suffers by recei∣ving the species, through means of the Phantasms. It is also called Intellectus possibilis, the possible understanding, and the mind in power; because it may be made all things, though it is actually none of them.

And here in the first place we must remember that the passive understanding is indeed in respect of the object a passive power; seeing it acts upon no other thing: but compared with the Intellection it is a power, both active, inasmuch as it works Intellection; and also passive, inasmuch as it receives the said Intellection. For an immanent action must be re∣ceived in the same power by which it is produced.

Moreover we must observe how that it is to be understood that the understanding when it understands, is made all things, which in the most elegant words of Scaliger, Exercit. 307. sect. 6. thus we explain. In the first place (quoth he) I deny that the Philosopher saith, that our understanding is all things essentially or formally as they use to say. But it is all things, subjectively, even as the first matter is, which is not made the Essence of an Horse under the form of an Horse: but it remains that which it was, a certain substance, of which and the form this thing is made. But the information of the understanding is af∣ter another manner: for it is not a meer possibility, as the first matter, which may be redu∣ced to be actually this or that by the form. But it is our form substantial, separable, incor∣ruptible, eternal; of which as a subject essentially perfect, and the species which it receives, is made the formed intellect, not another from it self; save as Caesar being learned differs from himself unlearned, by reception of accidental species. It is not therefore made the un∣derstanding simply, nor is it made the species it self, but under the species. So far Sca∣liger.

And so much shal suffice to have said of the first difference of the understanding: where this again is to be observed: that the Agent and passive understanding are not really and es∣sentially distinguished, but only respectively; since two internal forms are not knit together by new accidents, and to the receiving and effecting of an immanent action (such as under∣standing

is) such a principle is requisite as is essentially one. And therefore we must con∣clude that the Essence of the Agent and Passive Intellect is al one, and that one Understan∣ding in Essence, inasmuch as it makes things intelligible, or illustrates the Phantasms, and reposits them in the Passive, is Agent; but inasmuch as it is the subject receiving the ab∣stract Phantasms, it is called the Patient.

Besides the Differences reckoned up, there are also other notions of the Understanding, as the Understanding in habit, and the Understanding in act; which indeed are not divers Understandings, but one that hath divers degrees, which Aristotle cals differences. For the Intellect in habit is that which hath the Phantasm reserved in the Phantasie; and it is in a more perfect degree than the possible Intellect: for this is in aptitude to the first act, the other is in aptitude to the second, or to the operation, and therefore is very like to him that hath science, and does not contemplate. Howbeit Zabarella seems to think otherwise in this point, Lib. de specieb. Intellect. cap. 8. after this manner; That our mind is first born rude and unfit for the knowledg of things; but afterwards by multiplied acts of Understan∣ding it acquires a certain greater ability and aptitude to understand things, so that it can without any labor when it pleaseth turn to the Fancy, and presently understand a thing: and that the Understanding being furnished with this ability is called the Intellect in habit. But when the Passive Understanding does actually operate, and actually perceives the thing offered, it is called the Intellect in act.

Finally, the Understanding is distinguished into Speculative and Practical; by which terms nevertheless there are neither made two faculties of understanding, nor are the diffe∣rences and degrees of the same Faculty intimated; but each Faculty of the Intellect is signi∣fied by the Theoretick or Speculative, the Understanding properly so called, and by the Pra∣ctical the Will. For seeing the Understanding in respect of the apprehension of a thing, al∣so in respect of Affirmation and Negation of that which is true or false, cannot be otherwise called than Speculative; of necessity that difference must arise in respect of a third attribute of the Practical Understanding, viz. Desiring and avoiding, which belong to the Will.

The operation of the Understanding to which al the Functions of its degrees do tend, is Intellection, which is not one and the same thing with the Intelligible Species, but really differs therefrom, and is more rightly defined by reception of Intelligible species (in which sense it is by Aristotle termed a kind of Passion, 3. de Anima, cap. 4.) and passing judg∣ment thereon. For the Intellect exercises a twofold operation about its object; the former of which is simple Apprehension and Cognition; but the other is termed Composition and Division, and it is compound Apprehension and Judgment, which consists in Assent and Dissent. And hence Intellection is said to be twofold; Simple when the Intellect knows that which is simple and incomplex, as they cal it: and Compound, when it knows a propo∣sition true or false.

The Object of Intellection which at once moves and terminates the intellect, is a Being or thing Universally taken, comprehending things material and immaterial. To which ne∣vertheless some conditions must needs be added. And in the first place Universality: For that a Being may be perceived by the Intellect, it must be abstracted from al singularities. Then Secondly, Intelligibility, or abstraction from the conditions of matter. Thirdly, Verity. This Object as it is fitted and proportioned to the Mind by the Agent Intellect, is called an Intelligible Species; as that which the Senses receive is called a Sensible Species.

Now the Intelligible Species are illuminated Phantasms, that is to say, freed from the conditions of matter, and by the Agent Intellect imprinted upon the Passive, and consequent∣ly spiritual and indivisible accidents: For a Substance is not received into the Sense, as Sca∣liger would have it, Exercit. 303. Sect. 7. but only accidents. And therefore only accidents do make the Species or Image in the Intellect; amongst which are both time and place, and the finite Unity of quantity, which being removed by the operation of the Intellect it self, there remains an Universal substantial Species: As if you see a man armed and disguised; first you apprehend the Arms the disguise, and afterward having removed them you conceive the Man himself.

And since we have just now asserted, That such things as are offered to the Intellect, and received by it, must be separated from matter and al particular conditions, the Question is; How the Intellect understands particular things, or whether it be capable only of universals? We answer, That the Mind of Man does also know particulars. For since al knowing Fa∣culties being subordinate, are so joyned that the end of one action is the beginning of ano∣ther,

and what ever is known by the Inferior Faculty is also known by the Superior; and the Senses and Fancy know particular things, the Mind also must needs know the same. And by means of this knowledg it comes to pass that a man is able to compare a singular with an universal, and that the mind can frame singular propositions, collect universals from them, and frequently correct the judgment of the Senses about singular things, viz. As oft as they (by reason of an evil disposition of the Object) do commit any error. Now the manner of knowing singulars is also by accidents; because out of the proper singular accidents we draw out a notion or phantasm proper to the single Objects; even as out of the notions proper to a sort we draw out a notion proper to the same sort.

Intellection is commonly divided into direct and reflex. It is termed direct, when we on∣ly know somwhat, and make no further enquiry, but the Species gives a stop to the Intel∣lect, as when the Understanding staies at the first apprehension of a Man, an Ox, an Horse, &c. but that is termed Reflex, or doubled and reciprocal as it were, whereby the Mind knows it self, viz. That it knows, and hath the power to know and Understand; or when we understand the Intellection it self, and the Understanding knows that it is an Understan∣ding, viz. That it self is an Essence and an unmixt one, and knows that it understands, be∣cause that it is able to know it understands.

And here you must observe, what it is to abstract. Now Abstraction is the separa∣tion of one thing from another, and the apprehension and understanding of one thing without the apprehension or understanding of others. For in Abstraction al things are not known which are in a thing, but that only which is abstracted: for examples sake; To abstract the Living Creature from the Horse, is to consider only the Nature of a living Crea∣ture in general, not regarding the particular Nature of an Horse.

Finally, The Will (that we may also speak briefly thereof) is the other Faculty of a Rational Soul, whereby we follow or avoid such things as are known by the Understanding; or (as Scaliger hath it, Exercit. 307. S. 3.) The Will is the Understanding extended to the having or doing what it knows. Others cal it the Rational Appetite. For as after the know∣ledg of Sense there follows a Sensitive Appetite; so after the knowledg of the Mind an Ap∣petite follows proper thereto, which to difference it from the former, they cal it Voluntas, the Will; and that this Rational Appetite differs from the Sensible is hereby apparent, be∣cause they are frequently at enmity one against another.

The Object of the Will, is Good known by the Understanding and presented to the Wil, and the contrary Evil: Hence it follows the Good, and shuns the Evil. The Actions of this Faculty are to Will or Desire, and to Nill or Refuse. Now the Actions of the Will are twofold; Drawn out, and Commanded. The Drawn out, are those which the Will puts forth and performs of it self, and not by the inferior powers. The Commanded are those which the Will commands and enjoyns the inferior Faculties to perform. Now the Will hath command over the Locomotive Faculty, and the Sensitive Appetite: for at the word and command of the Mind and Will we move and rest. But the command which the Will ought to have over the Sensitive Appetite is much weakened by sin, and that same har∣mony disturbed betwixt the two Appetites; so that many times the Sensitive Appetite casts off the command of the Will and right Reason, and that saying becomes true:

Hurry'd the Coach-man is, and the Coach away, by the Horses.

But the Will hath no command over the Vegetative Faculty, and it acts meerly naturally, nor can we be nourished or grow according to our own will and pleasure.

Notes

• the Essen∣tial parts of Man.
• Whether the Ratio∣nal Soul be the in∣forming Form of a Man.
• Whether there be one Ratio∣nal Soul in all Men.
• Whether the Ratio∣nal soul be immortal?
• A thing two waies immortal.
• The ra∣tional soul is unmix∣ed.
• The Ope∣rations of the ratio∣nal soul are inor∣ganical.
• The rati∣onal Soul hath two proper fa∣culties.
• the diffe∣rence of the under∣standing.
• What the active un∣derstan∣ding is.
• The Office of the a∣ctive un∣derstan∣ding
• The Sub∣ject
• The pas∣sive under∣standing what it is.
• The Agent & passive Intellect do not re∣ally differ.
• the under∣standing in habit:
• the specu∣lative and practical understan∣ding:
• the Ope∣ration of the under∣standing:
• Intellecti∣on is two∣fold:
• Intelligi∣ble species what they are.
• Whether or no, and how the understan∣ding per∣ceives par∣ticulars?
• Under∣standing Direct.
• Reflex.
• What it is to abstract
• The Will what it is.
• The ob∣ject of the Will. Its actions twofold. 1. Drawn out. 2 Com∣manded.