(For I may not heere make any large Discourse there∣of.
There are few or none that treat of Conscience but conclude it to be a kind of Practicall Syllogisme. For looke what discourse it hath with God or the mind of man, it doth Syllogistically or by way of reasoning, as thus: Every murtherer or manslaier is guilty of death; But thou art a murtherer, therefore, &c. The Proposition is called the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Conscience, the Assumption, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Conclusion 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
The Proposition is made by the help of certain Principles in the mind; for without the help of the Ʋnderstanding, it can conclude nothing, it must have the help of the rule and knowledge of that els it cannot be called Conscience. The Ʋnderstanding must first discerne of truth and falshood, of good and evill, before Conscience can ap∣proove or dislallow, or do its offices. So that Ignorance is not conscience.
The Assumption is made by the help of Memory: For though Conscience takes information from the Ʋnder∣standing, yet by the aid of Memory that must be retained which the Ʋnderstanding hath concluded: If Memorie faile, our knowledge is so farre lost; for what we re∣member not, we know not, and so no Conscience can be of that. Thus the word forgotten is made no Consci∣ence of.
In these respects Conscience is defined to be Scientia cum alia Scientia, A Science conjoyned, or a knowledge with another (as the word imports) or as S. Bernard hath it, Conscientia, quasi cordis Scientia, and so he distingusheth betwixt Scientia and Conscientia: Scientia (saith he) is when the heart knows other things; Conscientia quando cor novit se, so that the Etimology is not to be rejected being taken with his meaning.
The Proposition and the Assumption being thus made, con∣science accordingly concludes, and this is the sentence of the soule, the proper work of Conscience, in which