The political will and testament of that great minister of state, Cardinal Duke de Richelieu done out of French.

THE Political Testament Of the Famous CARDINAL Duke de RICHELIEƲ.

The Second PART.

THE Rules I have set down in the first Part of this Book, being well e∣stablish'd; it is the Duty of Counsellors to use their best Endeavours like Men of Honour according to certain general Principles on which the good Administration of States depends.

It would be easie to propose many, which would seem very useful; but as the Excel∣lency of Sciences consists in a small number of Principles by reason that they are the sooner and better understood, I will reduce those I look upon to be most advantagious for the Go∣vernment of this Kingdom to Nine, which in my opinion are absolutely necessary.

Tho some of them may have divers Bran∣ches, they will not increase their Number, as those of Trees do not multiply the Stems.

CHAP. I. The first Foundation of the Happiness of a State is the Establishment of the Reign of God.

THE Reign of God is the Principle of the Government of States; and indeed it is a thing so absolutely necessary, that without that Foundation it is impossible for any Prince to rule well, or for any State to be happy.

It would be easie to write whole Volumes upon so important a Subject, for which Scripture, the Fa∣thers and all sorts of Histories surnish us an infinite number of Examples, of pretences and exhortations which all tend to the same end: But all Men are so sensible by their own Reason, that their Original does not proceed from themselves, but that a God is their Creator, and consequently their Director, that they all feel that Nature has imprinted that Truth in their hearts with undefaceable Chara∣cters.

So many Princes have undone themselves, and their States, by laying the foundation of their Con∣duct upon a Judgment contrary to their own know∣ledg; and so many have been loaden with Blessings in submitting their Authority to that from whom it was deriv'd, for having only sought their Gran∣deur, in that of their Creator; and for having ta∣ken more Care of his Reign than of their own, that I will enlarge no further on a Truth too evi∣dent, to stand in need of any Proof.

I will only say this, that as it is impossible that the Reign of a Prince, who suffers disorder and vice to reign in his State, should be happy; so God will not easily permit his to be unhappy, who takes a particular care to establish his Empire within the Extent of his Dominion.

Nothing can be of greater use to such an Esta∣blishment than the Regularity of Princes Lives, which is a Law that speaks and persuades with more efficacy than all those they could enact to in∣duce People to follow the good they would pro∣cure.

If it be true, that whatever Crime a Soveraign may fall into, he sins more by the ill Example he gives than by the nature of his fault: It is no less certain that whatever Laws he may make, if he practises what he prescribes, his Example is no less useful towards the Observation of his Will than all the Penalties of his Ordinances, tho never so grave.

The purity of a chast Prince will banish more impurity out of his Kingdom than all the Ordinan∣ces he could publish to that end.

The Prudence and Discretion of those who a∣void Swearing will sooner put a stop to the Oaths and Blasphemies, which are too common in States, than all the Rigors they can exert against those who addict themselves to such Execrations.

Not but it is absolutely necessary at the same time to chastise Scandals, Swearing and Blasphemies with the utmost Severity; It is a thing in which Princes can never be too exact; for let the Life of a Prince or of a Magistrate be never so godly and regular, they will never be reputed to have per∣form'd their Duty, unless while they invite People

to it by their Example, they also force them to it by the Rigor of their Laws.

All the Soveraigns of the World are oblig'd by that Principle to promote the Conversion of those, who living under their Reign, stray out of the Road to Heaven. But as Man is reasonable by his Nature, Princes perform their Duty, in practising all reasonable means to attain so good an end; and Prudence does not allow them to attempt any so ha∣zardous, as to run the risque of pulling out the good Wheat in endeavouring to remove Dissention, which it would be difficult to purge a State of by any means but those of mildness, without exposing it to a tottering condition capable to ruin it, or at least to cause a notable prejudice to it.

As Princes are oblig'd to establish the true Wor∣ship of God, they must be very careful to banish the false Appearances of it, so prejudicial to States, that one may truly affirm, that Hypocrisy has often serv'd as a Veil to cover the deformity of the most pernicious attempts.

Many Persons, whose Weakness is equal to their Malice, sometimes use that kind of Varnish, which is the more common in Women in that their Sex is more inclin'd to Devotion, and that the little force it is attended with makes them the more capable of such disguises, which suppose less Solidity than Cun∣••ing.

CHAP. II. Reason must be the Rule and Conduct of a State.

NAtural Knowledg convinces us, that Man be∣ing created reasonable, Reason ought to be the Guide of all his Actions, since otherwise he would act against his Nature, and consequently a∣gainst him who is the Author of it.

It also teaches us that the greater a Man is, and the more he is elevated, the more he ought to re∣spect that Privilege, and to avoid abusing that rea∣son which constitutes his Being; because the advantages he has over other Men, oblige him to preserve, whatever relates to the Nature, and to the End, which he whom he derives his Elevation from propos'd to himself.

It follows clearly from those two Principles, that if Man is Soveraignly reasonable, it is his Duty to give Reason an absolute Empire; which does not only require his doing nothing without her, but ob∣liges him moreover to use his best endeavours to ob∣lige those who are under his Authority to reverence and follow it religiously.

This Consequence is the Source of another, which teaches us, that as we ought never to will a∣ny thing, but what is just and reasonable, so we must never will any thing, without putting it in execution, and without exacting an intire Obedi∣ence to our commands; since otherwise Reason would not reign soveraignly.

The Practice of that Rule is the easier in that Love is the most powerful Motive to oblige Men to obey, and that it is impossible for Subjects not to love a Prince, when they are sensible that Reason is the Guide of all his Actions.

Authority constrains to obey, but reason per∣suades to it, and it is much safer to guide Men by Ways which insensibly ingage their Will than by such, which for the most part only prevail by force.

If it be true, that Reason ought to be the Light to guide Princes in their own Conduct, and in the management of their States, it is also true, that as nothing in Nature is more inconsistent with it than passion, which blinds Men to that degree, that it often makes them mistake the Shadow for the Bo∣dy; a Prince must above all things avoid to act by such a Principle, which would render him the more odious, in that it is directly opposite to that which distinguishes Men from Animals.

Men often repent at leasure what Passion has in∣duc'd them to do in haste, and we never run that risque when we act by reasonable Considerati∣ons.

We must be positive on what we resolve by such Motives, since it is the only way to be obey'd, and that as humility is the first Foundation of Christian Perfection, Obedience is the most solid ground of subjection, and so necessary towards the welfare of States, that they can never flourish while it is de∣fective.

Many things are of this Nature, that there is no difference between the Will and the Performance, by reason of the facility we meet in the execution;

but we must will them to the purpose, that is, with so much firmness as never to desist from them, se∣verely chastising those who shall refuse to obey, af∣ter having commanded them to put them in execu∣tion.

Those that appear most difficult and almost im∣possible are only so upon the account of the diffe∣rence, wherewith we seem to will and to command them; and it is most certain that Subjects will al∣ways be religious in obeying, while Princes are stea∣dy and persevering in their Commands; from whence it follows that it is most certain, that their Indiffe∣rence and Weakness is the Cause of it.

In a word as to will a thing positively, and to do what one has a mind to, is one and the s••me thing in a lawful Prince; so to will weakly, and not to will, are things so different from 'em, that they tend to the same End.

The Government of a Kingdom requires a manly Vertue and an unmoveable steadiness, contra∣ry to the Irresolution, which exposes those who are govern'd by it, to the Enterprises of the it E∣nemies.

Men must behave themselves in all things with Vigor, principally seing that tho Success should not answer our expectation, at least we will have this advantage, that having omitted nothing in order to make it succeed, we will avoid the shame, when we cannot avoid the misfortune of an ill Event.

Tho Men should absolutely miscarry in perfor∣ming their Duty, the Disgrace would be happy; and on the contrary what ever Success a Man could have, in deviating from that which he is oblig'd to out of Honour and Conscience, he ought to be

esteem'd unhappy, since he can gain nothing there∣by to equal the disadvantages he receives by the means wherewith it has been procur'd.

Heretofore, most of the great designs of France have miscarry'd, because the first difficulty that op∣pos'd the putting of them in execution, put a stop to the Proceedings of those who in reason ought ne∣vertheless to have prosecuted them; and if it has prov'd otherwise during your Majesties Reign, it is to be imputed to your Perseverance.

When a Time proves improper for the executi∣on of a good design, we must expect another, and when we have once set our hands at work, if the difficulties we meet with oblige us to any suspension reason instructs us to resume our first designs, as soon as time and occasion prove more favourable.

In a word, nothing ought to divert us from a good Enterprise, unless some Accident happen, which renders it altogether impossible, and we must omit nothing to further the Execution of those we undertake with Reason.

That obliges me to mention Secresy and good Discipline in this Place, which are so essential towards the good Success of Affairs that nothing can be more.

Besides that Experience justifies it, the reason of it is evident, seing that whatever surprises, com∣monly astonishes somuch that it often deprives Men of the means to oppose it, and that the pro∣secuting the Execution of a design slowly, and the divulging of it, is just like the Speaking of a thing not to do it.

This is the reason, that Women who are natural∣ly lazy and have not the gift of Secresy, are so un∣fit

for Government, and if we consider moreover, that they are very subject to their Passions, and consequently little capable of Reason and of Justice, that Principle will exclude them from all public Ad∣ministrations.

Not but some might be found so free of those defects that they might be admitted to it.

There are but few Rules without Exceptions; This very Age has produc'd some which can never be sufficiently commended; but yet commonly their natural Weakness renders them Incapable of masculine Vertue, so necessary for Administration, that it is almost Impossible for their Government to be free ei∣ther of Lowness or of Diminution, which the Weak∣ness of their Sex is the Cause of: or of Injustice, or Cruelty, which the unruliness of their Passions is the True Source of.

CHAP. III. Which shows that Public Interest should be the only End of those who govern States, or at least that it ought to be perferr'd to particular Advantages.

PUblic Interest ought to be the only Aim of the Prince, and of his Councelors, or at least both ought to have so singular a respect for it, as to prefer it to all particular advantages.

It is Impossible to conceive the good a Prince, and those he Imploys in his Affairs are Capable

of doing in following this Principle Religiously, neither can any one Imagin the Miseries a State is lyable to; when Private Interest is prefer'd to Pub∣lic good: And that the last is regulated by the first.

True Philosophy, the Christian Law, and Policy give such lively demonstrations of this Truth, that the Councellors of a Prince can never sufficiently make him sensible of the necessity of this Principle, nor the Prince be too severe in the Chastisement of such members of his Councel, as are so wretched as not to put it in Practice.

I must needs observe on this Subject, that the prosperity which has constantly accompany'd Spain, for some Ages last past; is wholy to be imputed to the Care of their Councel, to prefer the Interest of the State to all others, and that most of the Misfortunes which have befallen France, have been occasion'd by the application which many of those, who have been imploy'd in the Administration, have had to their private Interest to the prejudice of the Public.

The first have all along follow'd Public Interest which by the force of its Nature, has inclin'd them to do that which was most advantageous to the State.

The others suiting all things to their Private In∣terest or Capricio, have often diverted it from its own end, to apply it to that which was most agre∣able or most advantagious to them.

Neither Death nor the Alteration of Ministers have ever occasioned any Mutation in the Council of Spain. But it has been otherwise in this Kingdom, in which Affairs have not only been alter'd by the

removal of Councellors, but they have taken such variety of Forms under the same Persons, by the variety of their Councils, that such a Proceeding had undoubtedly ruin'd this Monarchy, did not God out of his infinite Goodness extract out of the Im∣perfections of this Nation, the Remedy of the E∣vils it creates. Tho the diversity of our Interests and our Natural Inconstancy incline us often to dan∣gerous Prejudices, the same Levity does not per∣mit us to remain firm and constant even in those things which are for our good, and turns our mind with so much swiftness that our Enemies not being capable to take just measures upon such frequent Varieties, have not time enough to improve our faults to their advantage.

The Proceeding of your Council being alter'd of late, your Affairs have also taken a new face to the great advantage of your Kingdom; and if your Successors take care to follow the Example of your Majesty's Reign, our Neighbours will not have the advantages they have had for the time past: But this Kingdom sharing Wisdom with them, will un∣doubtedly share their good Fortune, since that notwithstanding Men may be wise without being happy, the best means we can use not to be unhap∣py is to tread the Path which Prudence and Reason direct us to, and not to follow the Irregularities to which the Minds of Men are subject, and particu∣larly the French.

If those to whom your Majesty will confide the Care of your Affairs, have the capacity and pro∣bity above mention'd, you will have no further care in what relates to this Principle, which of it self will not prove difficult, since the particular In∣terest

of a Princes reputation and those of the Pub∣lick have the same End.

Princes easily consent to the general Regulations of their States, by reason that in making them, they follow the dictates of Reason and of Justice, which Men easily embrace when they meet no Obstacles to lead them out of the right way. But when occa∣sion offers it self to practise the good Settlements they have made, they do not always show the same steadiness, because that is the time when divers In∣terests, Piety, Compassion, Favour and Importuni∣ties solicite them and oppose their good Intentions, and that they have not always force enough to van∣quish themselves, and to despise particular Consi∣derations which ought to be of no weight in respect to those of the Publick.

It is on those occasions it behoves them to muster up all their Force against their Weakness, conside∣ring that those whom God appoints to preserve o∣thers, must have none but such as may serve to dis∣cover what is advantagious for the Public, and pro∣per for their Preservation.

CHAP. IV. How much Foresight is necessary for the Go∣verument of a State.

NOthing can be more necessary for the Govern∣ment of a State than Foresight, since thereby we may easily prevent many things, which cannot be redress'd without great difficulties when they are come to pass.

Thus a Physitian who has the skill to prevent Distempers, is more esteem'd than he who only la∣bours to cure them. Therefore it is the Duty of Ministers of State to represent to their Master, that it is more necessary to consider the future than the present; and that Distempers are like the Enemies of a State against whom Prudence obliges us to march rather than tarry till they are come to drive them out again.

Those who do not follow this Method will fall into great Confusions, which it will be very diffi∣cult to remedy afterwards.

Yet it is a common thing among weak Men to drive off time, and to chuse the preserving of their Ease for a Month rather than to deprive themselves of it for a while, to avoid the trouble of many Years which they do not consider, because they only see what is present, and do not anticipate time by a wise Providence.

Those who never consider to morrow live happi∣ly for themselves, but others live unhappily under them.

Those who foresee at a distance, never do any thing rashly, since they consider betimes, and Men seldom miscarry when they consider before hand.

There are some occasions on which we are not allow'd to deliberate long, because the nature of Affairs does not permit it. But when they are not of that kind, the safest way is to slumber over them and to recompence by the prudence of the Execu∣tion, the delay we use the better to digest it.

There was a time in which no Orders were gi∣ven in this Kingdom by way of prevention, and even after the evil was come to pass, none but Pal∣liating

Remedies were apply'd to it, because it was impossible to proceed absolutely against it, without wounding the Interest of many particular persons, which was then prefer'd to publick good. For which reason they only endeavour'd to ease the wound, instead of curing it, which has caus'd a great deal of harm in this Kingdom.

Of late years, thanks be to God, this way of proceeding has been alter'd with so much success, that besides Reasons inviting us to continue the same, the great benefit we have receiv'd by it, obliges us strickly so to do.

We must sleep like the Lion, without closing our Eyes, which must be continually kept open, to foresee the least inconveniencies which may happen; and to remember that as Phtysick does not move the Pulse, tho' it is mortal: So it often happens in States, that those evils which are imperceptible in their Original, and which we are least sensible of, are the most dangerous, and those which finally prove of most consequence.

The extraordinary care which is requir'd not to be surpris'd on such occasions, is the reason that as all those States have always been esteem'd very hap∣py which were Govern'd by Wise Men; so it has been thought, that among those who did Govern them, the most unwise were the most happy.

The more capable a Man is, the more he is sensible of the weight of the Government that lies upon him.

Publick Administration takes up all the thoughts of the most Judicious, insomuch, that the perpetual Meditations they are obliged to make to foresee and prevent the Evils that may happen, deprives them

of all manner of Rest, and Contentment, excepting that which they receive in seeing many sleep quiet∣ly relying on their Watchings, and live happy by their misery.

As it is very necessary to consider before hand, as much as is possible, what success may attend the designs we undertake in order not to be mista∣ken in our reckoning. The Wisdom and Sight of Men having bounds beyond which they can see nothing, God only being able to see the ultimate end of things; it often suffices to know that the Pro∣jects we form are Just and Possible, to undertake them with Reason.

God concurs to all the Actions of Men by a ge∣neral Co-operation which seconds their designs, and it is their part to use their freedom in all things, according to the Prudence Divine Wisdom has in∣du'd them with.

But when Men are ingag'd in great undertakings which concern the Conduct of Mankind after having discharg'd the obligation they are under to open their Eyes doubly, the better to take their measures; after having made use of all the considerations Hu∣man Minds are capable of, it is their Duty to re∣ly upon the goodness of the Spirit of God, which sometimes inspiring those thoughts into Men which are set down in his Eternal Decrees, leads them, as it were, by the Hand to their proper ends.

CHAP. V. Punishment and Reward are two Points ab∣solutely necessary for the Conduct of States.

IT is a common but a very true saying, which has ever been in the Mouths and Minds of Men, that Punishments and Rewards are the two most considerable points for the Conduct of a Kingdom.

It is most certain, that tho' no other Principle be us'd in the Government of States, but that of being inflexible in Chastising those who act against them, and Religious in rewarding those who procure them any notable advantage. They cannot be Govern'd amiss, since all Men may be kept within the bounds of their Duty, either by Fear or Hope.

I place Punishment before Reward, because that if there were a necessity to be depriv'd of one of them, one might better dispense with the last than the first.

As good is to be imbrac'd for its own sake, there is no Reward due to those who perform it, taking it in the strictest Sence. But as there is no crime which does not violate that, to which Men are ob∣lig'd, there are none but what require the Punish∣ment which is due to disobedience, and that obliga∣tion is so strict, that in many occasions a fault can∣not be left unpunished, without committing a new one.

I speak of faults which affect the State, and are committed with premeditation, and not of many others, which happen by chance and by misfortune,

for which Princes may and ought to use Indulgence.

Tho' to Pardon in such cases is a laudable thing; not to Punish a considerable Fault, the impunity of which opens a door to Licenciousness, is a criminal omision.

Theologians allow it as well as Politicians, and all agree that on certain occasions in which the Prince would be to blame not to Pardon those who are intrusted with the Government of the Publick, they would also be inexcusable, if instead of a se∣vere Punishment, they should use Lenity.

Experience teaching those who have had a long practice of the World, that Men easily lose the re∣membrance of Favours, and that when they are loaden with them, the desire of increasing them of∣ten makes them Ambitious and Ingrateful together, shows us also that Punishment is a more certain way to keep Men within the bounds of their Duty; since they are not so soon forgotten, by reason that they make a stronger impression on the sences of most Men than Reason, which has but little power over many.

To be severe towards Private Men who make it their Pride to despise the Laws and Ordinances of a State, is to be kind to the Publick. And the grea∣test crime one can be guilty of against the Interest of the Publick, is to be indulgent towards those who violate them.

Among many Combinations, Factions and Se∣ditions that have been made in my time in this Kingdom, I have never observ'd that Impunity ever inclin'd any one naturally to correct his evil Incli∣nation. But on the contrary that they return'd to their old Vomit, and often with more success the se∣cond than the first time.

The Indulgency hitherto practis'd in this King∣dom has often reduc'd it to very great and very deplorable Exremities.

Faults not being Punish'd, every Man has made a Trade of his Place, and without regarding what he was oblig'd to do to discharge his Trust worthily, he only consider'd what he could do to get the more by it.

If the Ancients have been of opinion, that it was dangerous to live under a Prince, who will remit no∣thing of the Rigor of Right, they have also ob∣serv'd that it was more dangerous to live in a State in which Impunity opens a door to all sorts of Licenciousness.

Some Princes or Magistrates will be afraid of being faulty by too much Rigor, who would be accountable to God, and must needs be blam'd by all Wise Men, unless they exerted that, which is pre∣scrib'd by the Laws.

I have often represented it to your, Majesty and it is my humble Petition still that you would be pleas'd to remember it carefully, by reason that as there are Princes who want to be persuaded from Severity, to avoid Cruelty, to which they are naturally inclin'd, your Majesty wants to be diverted from a false Cle∣mency, more dangerous than Cruelty it self, since Impunity obliges to use a great deal in the end, which can only be prevented by Punishment.

The Rod which is the Emblem of Justice must never be useless; I own at the same time that it ought not be so much accompany'd with Rigor, as to be destitute of Goodness; but that last qualifi∣cation does not consist in the Indulgency which au∣thorizes disorders, which tho never so inconsiderable,

are often so prejudicial to the State, that they may prove it's ruin.

If any are so ill advis'd in this Kingdom as to condemn the severity which is necessary in States, because it has not been practis'd hitherto, let them only open their Eyes, and they will find that Im∣punity has been too common in it hitherto, and the only cause, that Order and Rule have not been ob∣serv'd, and that the Continuation of Disorders ob∣liges to have recourse to the utmost Extremities, to put a stop to them.

The only Source of all the Parties that have been form'd heretofore against Kings, has been their over much Indulgence. Finally, those who are acquain∣ted with our History, cannot be ignorant of this Truth, of which I produce a Testimony which is the less to be suspected, in this case because it is ta∣ken from the Mouth of our Enemies, which almost in all other occasions would make it suspicious.

Cardinal Sapata a Man of good Sence, meeting Baraut and Bautru in the King his Master's Anti∣chamber, a quarter of an hour after their having receiv'd the News of the Duke de Montmorency's Exe∣cution, put this question to them; Which was the chief cause of that Duke's death? Hautru answer'd immediately according to his flery temper, in Spa∣nish; Sus falsa••. No, reply'd the Cardinal: Pero la Clemensia de lors, Royes antepassados: which was as much as to say, that the Punishment of the said Duke was more to be imputed to the faults the King's Predecessors had committed, than to his own.

In Crimes of State, it is absolutely necessary to banish Pity, and to despise the Complaints of per∣sons concern'd, and the discourse of an ignorant

Multitude, who sometimes blame what is most useful to them, and often absolutely necessary.

Christians ought to bury the remembrance of pri∣vate Injuries; but Magistrates are oblig'd not to forget those which concern the Publick; add indeed to leave them unpunish'd, is rather to begin them a∣new, than to pardon and remit them.

There are many whose ignorance is so stupid as to imagin that a new Prohibition is a sufficient re∣medy to any Evil, but they are so much in the wrong, that I may affirm with Truth, that new Laws are not so much a remedy for the disorders of States, as Testimonies of their Illness, and certain proofs of the weakness of the Government; by reason that had th' antient Laws been put in exe∣cution; there would be no necessity to revive them, nor to make others to prevent new disorders, which would no sooner have appear'd, but it would have been easy to punish the evil committed.

Ordinances and Laws are altogether useless unless they are put in execution, which is so absolutely necessary, that notwithstanding in the course of Common Affairs, Justice requires an authentick proof, it is not so with those which concern the State; in such cases, that which appears by pressing con∣jectures must sometimes be held as a sufficient con∣viction, seeing that the Factions and Conspiracies that are form'd against publick safety, are common∣ly carry'd on with so much Art and Secresy, that we have seldom any evident proof of them, but by the event, which is past remedy.

In those cases it is sometimes necessary to begin by Execution, whereas in all others, proving the Fact evidently either by Witnesses or undeniable Authorities ought to precede every thing.

Those Maxims seem to be dangerous, and in∣deed they are not altogether void of peril, but they will most certainly be found good, if not making use of the last, and extream remedies, in faults which will only be verify'd by conjectures, the course of them is barely prevented by innocent means, as the Banishment or Imprisonment of suspected persons.

The good Conscience, and the penetrat of a juditi∣ous Mind, who being learn'd in the course of Affairs, is able to know the future almost with as much certainty as the present, as well as a meaner capa∣city, by the very sight of things, will secure that Practice from ill consequences; and at the worst, the abuse that can be committed in it being only dangerous for private Persons, whose life will not be in danger this way, it ought not to be rejected, since their Interest is not to be compar'd to that of the Publick.

Yet it requires a great deal of Prudence not to make it an In-let to Tiranny, which will be avoided undoubtedly, if, as I have said, in doubtful cases, none but Innocent remedies are practis'd.

Punishment is so necessary in what relates to Publick Interest, that we are not so much as allow'd to commit faults of Indulgence in this kind, recom∣pensing a present evil, for a past good; that is to leave a crime unpunish'd, because the person that has committed it, has done good service on other occasions.

Nevertheless this has hitherto been often practis'd in this Kingdom, in which not only light faults have been forgotten, in consideration of important services; but the greatest Crimes abolish'd, by ser∣vices of no moment, which is altogether insuppor∣table.

Good and Evil are so different in their Nature, that they can never be put in Parallel one with another; they are Enemies, among which there is no Quarter to be given, nor Exchange to be made; if the one is worthy of Reward, the other deserves Punishment, and both ought to be us'd according to their Merit.

Altho' Conscience would allow the leaving of a signal Action unrewarded, and a notable Crime without Punishment, Reasons of State could not al∣low it.

Punishment and Rewards relate to the future more than to the time past; a Prince must be severe of necessity, to prevent the mischiefs that might be committed, in hopes of a Pardon, if he were known to be too Indulgent; and very kind to those that are of use to the Publick, to encourage them to con∣tinue their Endeavours, and every body to imitate them and follow their example.

There would be a great deal of pleasure in par∣doning Crimes, if the Impunity of the same had no ill consequence; and the necessities of the State would sometimes lawfully excuse a Prince from Re∣warding a Service, if in depriving him, who has done it, of his Reward, he did not at the same time de∣prive himself of the hopes of receiving others for the future.

Noble Souls taking as much pleasure in good, as they are loath to do harm, I quit the discourse of Punishments and Executions, to conclude this Chap∣ter agreeably, by Favours and Rewards; where∣upon I must needs observe, that there is this diffe∣rence between the Favours which are bestow'd as a Reward of Service, and those that have no other

foundation than the inclination of Kings, that these ought to be greatly moderated, whereas the others ought to have no other bounds than those of the Services they have done the Publick.

The Good of States does so absolutely require that their Princes should be Liberal, that when at any time it is come into my mind, that there are Men, who out of a natural propensity are not in∣clin'd to do good; I have always concluded, that this natural defect, blamable in all Men, is a far greater imperfection in Sovereigns, who being in a more peculiar manner the Image of their Creator, who by his Nature does good to all the World, cannot fail of imitating him in that point, without being an∣swerable for the same before him.

The Reason of it is, That it is his pleasure they should follow his example, and bestow their Favours handsomly; for those who oblige without that con∣dition, are like the Misers, who serve good Meat in their Treats, but so ill dress'd, that those who are invited to them, ear them without any pleasure, and without thinking themselves beholden to those that have been at the charge of it.

I would enlarge more upon this Subject, if I had not done it already in one of the preceding Chapters, representing the necessity of Princes be∣ing kind to those of their Council, who serve them faithfully.

CHAP. VI. A Continual Negotiation contributes much towards the good Success of Affairs.

STates receive such advantages by continual Ne∣gotiations, when they are manag'd with Pru∣dence, that it is almost incredible to any but those who have had the Experience of it.

I own that I had been imploy'd five or six years in the management of Affairs before I discover'd this Truth: But I am so certain of it at present, that I dare affirm boldly, that to Nagotiate continually, openly, or secretly, in all Places, altho no present benefit be received by it, and but little Prospect for the Future, is a thing absolutely Necessary for the good of States.

I may say with Truth, that in my Time, I have seen the Affairs of France and of Christendom quite alter'd, by having put that Principle into Practice, by the Kings Authority, which till then had been absolutely neglected in this Kingdom.

Among the Seeds of them some produce Fruit sooner than others; some are no sooner in the Ground but they sprout while others are a long while without producing the same Effect.

He who Negotiates finally finds out a proper mo∣ment to compass his Ends; and tho he should not find it, at least, it is certain, that he can lose nothing, and that by the means of his Negotiation, he is inform'd with what passes in the World, which is a thing of no small Consequence for the good of States.

Negotiations are Innocent remedys, which never do any harm; it is necessary to Act every where, far and near, and particularly at Rome.

Among the good Councils, which Anthony Perez gave the late King, he advis'd him to make him∣self powerful in that Court, and not without rea∣son, since the Ambassadors of all the Princes in Christendom, who repair there, judg that those who have most Credit and Authority in that Court, are in reality those who have most Power in themselves, and most Fortune; and indeed their Judgment is not ill grounded, since it is certain, that tho Popes ought to respect Reason above all other Men, yet there is no Place in the World in which Power is more consider'd than in their Court, which is so evidently true, that the Respect which is paid to Am∣bassadors there, increases or diminishes daily accor∣ding to the good or ill State of their Masters affairs, from whence it often comes to pass that those Mini∣sters receive two different Faces in one day, if a Courier who comes at night brings different News from those that came in the Morning.

It is with States as it is with Human Bodies, the fresh Colour which appears in our Faces, makes the Physitian conclude that all is well within, and as that good Complection proceeds from the good Dis∣position of the Noble and Internal Parts, so it is certain that the best way a Prince can put in Pra∣ctice, to be in favour at Rome, is to settle his Affairs well at home, and that it is almost impossible to have a great reputation in that City, which has been long the Head, and is the Centre of the World, without having the same throughout the Universe, to the great advantage of publick Interest.

Natural Reason teaches us, that we ought to have a great regard for our Neighbours, by reason that as their Neighbourhood gives them an opportunity to annoy, it also puts them in a condition to serve as the Out-works of a Place, which hinder the Im∣mediate Approach of the Walls.

Persons of mean capacity limit their thoughts within the extent of the States in which they are born, but those to whom God has been pleas'd to give more knowledg, learning from Physitians, that in the greatest Distempers Revolutions are made with most Violence in the most distant Parts, they use their best Endeavours to fortify themselves at a distance.

It is necessary to act in all Places (which is to be observ'd) according to the humour and by suitable means to the capacity of those with whom we ne∣gotiate.

Different Nations have different Wayes, some speedily conclude what they design to do, and o∣thers are very slow.

Republics are of the last kind, they proceed slow∣ly, and commonly they do not at first grant what is desir'd of them, but one must be satisfy'd with little in order to obtain more.

As great Bodies do not move so easily as small ones, those kind of States being compos'd of seve∣ral heads, they are much slower in their Resolutions and in their Executions than others.

And for that reason, Prudence obliges those who negotiate with them to give them time, and to press them no more than their natural Constitution per∣mits.

It is observable, that as strong and solid Reasons are excellent for Men of vast Genius, weak ones are better for Men of meaner Capacitys, because they are more suitable to their reach.

Men conceive Affairs according to their capacity, the greatest seem easie and small to Men of good Understanding and great Courage, and those who want these qualifications commonly find every thing difficult.

Such Men are incapable of apprehending the Weight of what is propos'd to them, and sometimes slight what is most considerable, and also often set a great stress on things which deserve no considera∣tion.

It is necessary to act with every Man according to his Capacity: On some Occasions to Act and to speak, couragiously, when we have right on our side, is so far from making a Breach, that on the contrary, it is rather the way to prevent and to slifle it in it's Birth.

In others, instead of resenting unseasonably, cer∣tain imprudent Expressions spoken by those we treat with, we must suffer them with Prudence and Ad∣dress together, and have only. Ears for those things which may conduce to our Ends.

There are Men who are so presumptuous, as to think they ought to shew their Bravery on all oc∣casions, hoping thereby to obtain what they cannot get by reason, and what they cannot constrain Peo∣ple to do by force.

They think they have done harm by threatning it; but besides, that this proceeding is contrary to reason, it never succeeds with Persons of Honor.

As Fools are not fit to negotiate, there are Minds so very nice and refin'd, that they are as unfit for it as they, by reason that subtilizing upon every thing they are like those who break the Points of Nee∣dles in whetting them.

The most proper Men are those who keep a Me∣dium between those two extreams, and the most subtle making use of their Wit, to avoid being de∣ceiv'd, must take care at the same time not to use it to deceive those they treat with.

Men are always diffident of those that act craf∣tily, and give an ill Impression of the frankness and fidelity they ought to behave themselves with; That never advances their Affairs.

The same Words have often two Senses, the one depends on the Sincerity and Ingenuity of Men, the other on Art and Subtlety by which it is very easie to turn the true Signification of a Word to volunta∣ry Explications.

Great Negotiations must not have one Moments Intermission, it is necessary to pursue what we un∣dertake with a perpetual chain of designs, never ceasing to act, unless with Reason, and not by a Relaxation of Mind, Indifference, wavering thoughts and contrary resolution.

Neither must Men be disgusted by an ill Event, since it often comes to pass, that what is underta∣ken with most Reason, succeeds with least happiness.

It is difficult to combat often, and always to be Conqueror, and it is a Sign of an extraordinary Blessing when Success is favourable in great Under∣takings, and only contrary in those that are of little Moment.

It is enough that Negotiations are so harmless, that one may receive considerable advantage by them, and never any harm.

If any body urges, that some of them prove prejudicial sometimes, I give him leave to reject my Judgment, if he does not find, in case he will open his Eyes, that instead of having any reason to impute the ill success he has observ'd in the Remedy I propose, they are only to be imputed to those who did not know how to make a good use of it.

Tho it should produce no other advantage than to gain Time on certain occasions, which happens commonly, the practice of it would be very com∣mendable and useful in States, since a moment of∣ten serves to avoid a Storm.

Notwithstanding the Alliances, which are often contracted by Marriages between Crowns, do not always produce the Effect that might be desir'd, yet they must not be neglected; and they often prove the most Important matters of Negotiations.

They always produce this advantage, that they retain States for some Time in some considerations of Respect one towards another; and to have a Va∣lue for them, it is sufficient that they prove some∣times advantageous.

As the way to get good Fruit is to Graft; the Princes of France, who derive their Birth from Pa∣rents of Equal and high Quality, must in Reason be more elevated, and without doubt, their Blood remains the more Illustrious, in being less mix'd with other.

Moreover Alliances serve sometimes to extin∣guish Leagues and Ingagements among Princes, and tho they do not always produce that good Effect,

the advantages the house of Austria derives by them, shows that they are not to be neglected.

In matters of State, all things must be improv'd, and what may be useful, must never be dispis'd.

Leagues are of that kind, the Benefit of them is often very uncertain, and yet they must be respected: However I would not advise a great Prince, to ingage himself voluntarily, upon the account of a League in a design of difficult Execution, unless he finds himself powerful enought to make it succeed altho his Colleagues should fail him.

Two Reasons oblige me to advance this Proposi∣tion.

The first draws its Original and Force from the Weakness of Unions, which are never very certain among divers Soveraign Heads.

The second consists in that Petty Princes are often as careful and diligent, to Ingage great Kings into great Enterprises, as they are slow in seconding them, notwithstanding they are strictly oblig'd so to do, and that there are some, who save their own stake, at the cost of those they have ingag'd against their Will.

Altho it is a common Saying, that whoever has Force, has commonly Reason, it is true never theless, that two unequal Powers being joyn'd by a Troary, the greatest is in danger of being forsaken by the o∣ther; the reason of it is Evident. Reputation is a thing of so much Importance to a great Prince, that no advantage can be propos'd to him, to recom∣pense the loss he would suffer by it, in case he should forfeit the Engagements of his Word and Faith: And such Terms may be offer'd to him, whose Po∣wer is Inconsiderable, tho his Quality is Sovereign;

that according to all Probability he will prefer his advantage to his Honor, which will make him fail in his Obligation towards him who, foreseeing his Infidelity, cannot resolve to prevent it; by reason that to be abandon'd by his Allys, is not of so∣much Consequence to him, as the prejudice he would receive in violating his Faith.

Kings must take a great deal of Care what Trea∣tys they make; but when they are made they must keep them Religiously.

I am sensible that many Polititians teach the Con∣trary; but without considering in this Place what the Christian Faith affords us against those Maxims; I maintain, that since the loss of Honor is greater then the loss of Lise, a great Prince should sooner venture his Life, and even the Interest of his State, than to break his Word, which he can never vio∣late without loseing his Reputation, and consequently the greatest Force of Sovereigns.

The importance of this Place makes me observe, that it is absolutely necessary to be exact in the Choice of Ambassadors, and other Negotiators; and that a Prince can never be ••••o severe in punishing those who exceed their Commissions; since by those Faults, they expose the Reputation of Princes, and the Well fare of the Commonwealth at once.

The easiness, or corruption of some Persons, is sometimes so great, and the desire of others, who are neither so weak nor so wicked, to do something is often so extraordinary, that if they are not kept with∣in the bounds which are prescrib'd them, out of fear of absolute Ruin, there will always be a grea∣ter Number of those who will be drawn in to make ill Treatys, than to make none at all.

I have had so much Experience of this Truth, that it forces me to end this Chapter, saying, That whoever shall not be Rigorous in those Occasions, will be wanting in what is necessary to the subsistance of States.

CHAP. VII. One of the greatest Advantages, that can be procur'd to a State, is to give every one an Employment suitable to his Genius and Capacity.

SUCH Misfortunes befal States through the In∣capacity of those that are Imploy'd in the principal Places and most important Commissions, that the Prince, and those who have a share in the Administration of Affairs, can never be too careful to employ none but such as are fit for the Places they are design'd for.

The most clear sighted being sometimes blind, and there being but few Men, who are willing to impose Bounds to themselves, according to the Rules of Reason; Those who are in credit about Princes al∣ways think themselves worthy of all sorts of Im∣ployments, and upon that false Foundation, they use their utmost Endeavours to obtain them.

Nevertheless it is certain, that a Man who is ca∣pable to serve the Publick in certain Functions, may be capable to ruin it in another.

I have seen such strange Inconveniences proceed∣ing from the ill choice that have been made in my time, that I cannot forbear exclaiming upon that Subject to avoid the like for the future.

If Physicians will not suffer Experiments to be made on Persons of any consideration, it is easy to conceive how dangerous it must be to put unexperi∣enc'd Persons in Places of the greatest Trust, since thereby you give way to Learners to make Essays on occasions, in which Masters and Master pieces are so necessary.

Nothing can be more capable to ruin a State than such a Proceeding, the true source of all sorts of disorder.

An Ambassador ill chosen to make a Treaty may cause a notable prejudice out of Ignorance.

A General of an Army incapable of such an Im∣ployment is capable of hazarding all his Master's Fortune, and the happiness of the State unseason∣ably.

I dare say on the contrary, That if all those who are imploy'd in Public Trusts were worthy of them, States would not only be exempted from many acci∣dents, which often trouble their quiet, but they would enjoy unexpressible Felicities.

I am sensible that it is very difficult to meet Sub∣jects, which have all the Qualifications requir'd for the Places they are design'd for; but at least they must have the Chief, and when none that are ac∣complish'd can be found, it is no small satisfaction to chuse the best that can be found in a barren Age.

If the mask most Men put on, and if the Ar∣tifices they usually practise to disguise themselves, and to conceal their Defects, deceive us, insomuch that being once settl'd in great Places, they appear as malicious as they were esteem'd full of Virtue when they were chosen; the said mistake must be rectifi'd immediately, and tho Indulgence may induce to

Tolerate some small Incapacity, it must never excuse malice which is so to prejudicial to States, to be Tolerated in consideration of Private Interest.

It is on this Occasion our Duty obliges us to re∣present freely to Princes, to what degree they are answerable before God, when they give Places of great Trust out of pure favour, which can never be possessed by mean Capacitys, without prejudice to the State.

It is on the said Occasion, we are oblidg'd to show, that tho we do not absolutely Condemn particular Affections, which have no other foundation but that natural Inclination, which Men have rather for one Person than for another; we cannot excuse Princes who suffer themselves to be prevail'd upon so far, as to give those, they Love thus, Places, in the ad∣ministration of which they show themselves as preju∣dicial to the State, as useful to themselves.

Those who have the happiness to Injoy the favour of Princes, by the force of their Inclination, must not be depriv'd of receiving Advantages from them, tho they have not all the Qualifications requir'd to make them worthy of the same, and the Public can not complain of it with Reason, unless they are Immoderate.

But it is a sinister Omen for a Prince, when he, who is the most Considerable for his Interest, is not the most consider'd by his Favour, and States are never in a worse Condition, than when the In∣clinations the Prince has for some particular Persons, prevail before the services of those that are more useful to the Public.

In such a Case, neither the Esteem of the So∣veraign, nor the Affection one has for him, nor

the hope of reward do any longer excite Virtue. Men remain on the contrary in an Indifference of Good and Evil, and Envy, and jealousie, or Spite, Induce all Men to neglect their Duty, because that in performing it, they have no prospect of re∣ward.

A Prince, who desires to be belov'd by his Sub∣jects, must fill up all the Places of Trust, and the first Dignitys of his State, with Persons so much esteem'd by every one, that the Cause of his Choice may be found in their merit.

Such Men must be carefully sought after through∣out the State, and not receiv'd by importunities, or chosen in the Croud of those who press most about Kings, and about their Favourites.

If Favour has no hand in Elections, and Merit be the Sole foundation of them, besides that the State will be well serv'd, Princes will avoid a great deal of Ingratitude, which is often met with in certain Men who are the less grateful for the favours they receive, in that they least deserve them: It being most certain, that the same Qualifications, which ren∣der Men worthy of favours, are the same which make them Capable and desirous to acknowledg them.

Many have good sentiments in the moment you Oblige them, but the Constitution of their Nature sways them soon after, and they easily forget what they owe others, because they only love themselves; and as Fire converts all things into its own substance, they only consider Public Interests, to convert them to their one advantage, and equaly despise those who do them Good, and the States in which they re∣ceive it.

Favour may innocently be allow'd in some things; but a Kingdom is in a sad Case, when the Throne of that false Goddess is raised above Reason.

Merit should always turn the Scale, and when Justice is on our side, favour cannot prevail with∣out Injustice.

Favourites are the more dangerous, in that those who are raised by Fortune seldom consult Reason; and whereas it seldom favours their designs, it proves commonly Ineffectual to stop the Course of those they form to the prejudice of the State.

In my opinion nothing is more likely to Ruin the most flourishing Kingdom in the World, than the Apetite of such Men, or the inordinate Passions of a Woman, when a Prince is possessed by them.

I am the bolder in advancing this Proposition, because there are no Remedies against those Evils, but such as depend altogether on Chance and Time; which often suffering the Sick to dye, without any assistance, must be look'd upon as the worst Physici∣an in the World.

As the greatest Light in Nature cannot make the blind perceive one glimpse of their way, so there is no Ray capable to unseal the Eyes of a Prince, when they are seal'd by Favour and Passion.

Those whose Eyes are blinded, can never make good Choices unless by Chance, and therefore since the welfare of the State requires them ever to be made with Reason, it also requires that Princes should not be possessed by Persons who deprive them of the Light, they stand in need of to see the Objects, which are put before their Eyes.

When the Hearts of Princes are ingag'd by such means, it is almost Useless to do well; because the

Craft of those who are in possession of their Affecti∣ons, tarnish the lustre of the purest Actions, and make the most signal Services pass for Offences.

Many Princes have undone themselves, by prefer∣ring their particular Affection to Public Interest.

Such misfortunes have befallen some, by the un∣ruly Passions they have had for Women.

Some are fallen into the like Inconveniences, by such a simple blind Passion they have had for their Favorites, that in order to raise their Fortune, they have ruin'd their own.

There have been others, who having no natu∣ral Inclination for any thing, have nevertheless been sway'd with so much Violence in favour of some particular Persons, that they have occasion'd their Ruin.

Men perhaps will wonder at this Proposition, which is nevertheless as True, as it is easy to be conceiv'd; and if Men consider, that such Motions are distempers to the Minds that are influenc'd by them, and that as the Cause of Feavours is the Cor∣ruption of Humors; one may also say, That those sorts of Violent Affections, are rather Grounded on the defect of the Person in which we find them, than on the Merit of those who receive the Eflect, and Advantage of them.

Such Evils commonly carry their Remedy along with them, in that being Violent they are not last∣ing; but when they continue they often occasion Death, as well as the Feavers of that Kind; or a want of health, which is seldom repair'd after∣wards.

The wisest Princes have avoided those divers kinds of Evils, in making Reason the guide of all their Affections.

Many have cur'd themselves of them, after hav∣ing found to their Cost, that unless they did it, their Ruin was Inevitable.

To return precisely to the Point of the Question proposed in this Chapter, the scope of which is to show how Important it is to discern those who are the fittest for Employments; I will conclude it, say∣ing, That since Interest is that which makes Men guil∣ty of Male-adminnistration in the Places that are committed to them: Ecclesiasticks are often to be preferr'd to many others, in what relates to Places of great Trust: Not that they are less subject to their own Interest, but because they have a great deal less self Interest than other Men, since that having neither Wives, nor Children, they are free from the Bonds which ingage Men most.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Evil which Flatterers, Detractors, and Intriguers commonly occasion in States, and how necessary it is to remove them from Kings, and to banish them from their Courts.

THere is no Plague so capable to ruine a State, as Flatterers, Detractors and certain Men, who apply themselves wholly to form Cabals and Intrigues in their Courts.

They are so industrious to spread their Venom, by divers imperceptible ways, that it is difficult to scape it, without abundance of care.

As they are neither of a Quality, nor Merit, to have a share in the Management of Affairs, nor good enough to be concern'd for the Publick Good, their only aim is to disturb both; and expect∣ing great advantages from Confusion, they omit no means to overthrow, by their Flatteries, by their Crafts, and by their Detractions the Order and Rule which deprives them absolutely of all hopes of Fortune, since it is impossible to build any in a well disciplin'd State, unless it be upon Merit, which they are wholly destitute of.

Besides that as it is a common thing for those who have no share in Affairs, to endeavour to ruine them, those sort of Men are capable of doing all manner of Evils; and therefore it behoves Princes to take all the precautions imaginable against the malice, which disguises it self in so many different dresses, that it is often difficult to ward it.

There are some, who notwithstanding they have neither Courage nor Wit, have nevertheless so much of both as to feign as much steadiness, as a profound and severe Wisdom, and to set off themselves, in finding fault with every body's Actions, even when they are most to be commended, and that it is Impossible to do better, in respect of the thing in question.

Nothing is so easy as to find apparent Reasons, to Condemn what cannot be better done, and what has been undertaken upon such Solid Foundations, that one could not have done otherwise without commit∣ting a notable fault.

Others having neither Mouths nor Spurs, dislike by their Gestures, by shaking of their Heads, and by aserious Grimace, what they dare not Condemn

with Words, and cannot be blam'd with Reason.

Not to flatter in what Relates to such Men, It is not enough for the Prince to refuse them his Ear, he must also banish them from the Cabinet, and Court together; because that as their facility is sometimes so great, that to speak to them and to per∣suade them, is the same thing; even when they can∣not be persuaded, there still remains some Impression, which has its Effect another Time, when the same Artifice is renew'd: And indeed the Little Applica∣tion they have to Affairs, induces them often to Judge the Cause, rather by the number of Witnesses, than by the Weight of the accusations.

I could hardly relate all the Evils, those Evil Councelors have been the Authors of, during your Majestie's Reign. But I have so lively a Resentment of it for the Interest of the State, that it forces me to say, That there can be no room for mercy for such Men, in order to prevent the mischiefs that have been done in my Time.

Tho a Prince be never so Firm and Constant, he cannot without great Imprudence, and without exposing himself to Ruin, keep ill Men about him, who may surprise him unexpectedly, as during a Contagion a Malignant Vapor siezes in an Instant the Heart and Brains of the strongest Men, when they think themselves soundest.

Those Public Plagues must be remov'd, never to return, unless they have cast all their Venom, which happens so seldom, that the care we ought to have of repose, obliges more to the Continua∣tion of their Removal, than Charity can Invite to recall them.

I boldly advance this proposition, because I have never seen any of those Lovers of Factions bred in the Intrigues of the Court, lose their Ill habit, and change their Nature, unless for want of Power, which, properly speaking, do's not Change them, since the will of doing Ill remains in them, when the Power has left them.

I am sensible that some of those Men, may be sincerely converted, but experience teaching me, that for one who persists in his repentance, twenty return to their old Vomit; I decide boldly, That it is better to use Rigor against one Person who de∣serves favour, than to expose a State to some pre∣judice by being too Indulgent, either towards those who keep their malice in their Heart, only acknow∣ledging their fault in Letters, or towards those whose levity may give a reason to dread a relapse, worse than their former Evil.

'Tis no wonder that Angels should never do any Evil, since they are confirm'd in Grace; but that those who are obstinate in that kind of Malice should do any good, when they may do harm, is a kind of Miracle, which must be wrought by the immediate Powerful hand of God, and it is certain that a Man of great Probity, will find much more difficulty to subsist in an Age corrupted by such Men, than one whose Vertue they will not stand in dread of this Reputation not being so Intire.

Some are of Opinion, that it suits with the good∣ness of Kings to Tolerate things which seem to be of small Consequence in the beginning; but I say, That they can never be too careful to discover and to extinguish the least Intrigues of their Cabinets and of their Courts, in their Birth.

Great Conflagrations being occasion'd by small sparks; who ever puts out one, do's not know what mischief he has prevented: but to discover it, if he leaves any one unextinguish'd, tho the same Causes do not always produce the same Effect, he will perhaps find himself reduc'd to such an Extremity, that it will no longer be in his Power to remedy the same. Whether it be true or no that a little Poyson stops a great Vessel, the Course of which it cannot advance of one Moment, it is easy to conceive by what Naturalists relate to us of that Poyson, that it is absolutely necessary to purge a State of that which may put a stop to the Course of Affairs, tho it can never advance it.

On such occasions it is not sufficient to remove great Men upon the account of their Power, the same must be done to the meanest, upon the ac∣count of their Malice: All are equally dangerous, and if there is any difference, mean Persons, as those that are most conceal'd, are more to be fear'd than the others.

As the bad Air, I have already mention'd, lock'd up into a Trunk often Infects a House with the Plague, which afterwards spreads throughout the Town, so the Intrigues of Cabinets often fill the Courts of Princes with partialities, which finally disturb the body of the State.

As I may affirm with Truth, that I have ne∣ver seen any Troubles in this Kingdom, but what did proceed form thence, I answer once more, that it is more Important than it seems to be, to extin∣guish not only the first sparks of such Divisions, when they appear, but also to prevent them, by the removal of those who make it their whole business to kindle them.

The Peace of the State is too Considerable, to neglect that Remedy, without being answerable for it to God.

I have often seen the Court in the midst of Peace, so full of Factions, for want of practising this good Counsel, that they were very like like to over∣throw the State.

That knowledg, and that which History has given your Majesties of the like Perils, to which many, and particularly the last of your Predecessors, have often been exposed upon the same account, having oblig'd you to seek out a Remedy, I have seen France so peaceable at home, while she had Wars abroad, that considering the Repose it injoy'd, no body could have thought it was oblig'd to oppose the greatest Powers.

Perhaps some may urge that the Factions and Troubles I have mention'd, have been occasion'd more by the invention of Women, than by the Malice of Flatterers.

But that Instance is so far from being against what I have urg'd, that on the contrary it confirms it powerfully, seeing that in speaking of Flatterers, and the like, I do not design to exclude Women, who are often more dangerous than Men, and to whose sex a World of Charms are annex'd, more powerful to Disturb and to Imbroyl Affairs, Courts and States, than the most subtil and industrious Malice of any others whatever.

It is true, that while the Queens Catherine and Mary de Medicis, had a share in the Government and that many Women being Influenc'd by them, meddl'd with the Affairs of the State, many of them very powerful in Sence and Charms,

have done a world of Mischief, their Places hav∣ing acquir'd them the best Qualify'd Persons of the Kingdom, and the most Unhappy; they have drawn this advantage by it, that being serv'd by them ac∣cording to their Passions, they have often prejudic'd those who were not in their Favour, because they were useful to the State.

I might Inlarge upon this Subject, but divers respects stop my Pen, which not being Capable of Flattery, when it condemns openly, cannot forbear observing, That the Favourites I have mention'd in the preceeding Chapter, often supply the place of those, whose Malice I have examin'd in this.

After those Truths, I have no more to say, but that it is Impossible to secure States against the Evils those sort of Persons may occasion, but by removing them from the Court; which is the more necessary, in that it is Impossible to keep a Snake in ones bosom, without exposing one's self to be stung by it.

CHAP. IX. Which Treats of the Power of the Prince; and is divided into Eight Sections.

SECTION. I. The Prince must be Powerful, to be Respected by his Sub∣jects and by strangers.

POWER being one of the most necessary Ingredients towards the Grandor of Kings, and the prosperity of their Governments; those who have the chief Management of Affairs, are par∣ticularly oblig'd not to omit any thing, which may contribute to Authorise their Master so far as to make all the World Respect him.

As goodness is the object of Love, Power is the cause of Dread: and it is most certain, that a∣mong all the Princes who are capable to Stir a State, Fear grounded upon Esteem and Reverence, has so much Force, that it ingages every one to perform his Duty.

If this Principle is of great Efficacy in respect to the internal Part of States, it is to the full as pre∣vailing abroad: Subjects and Strangers looking with the same Eyes upon a formidable Power, both the one and the other abstain from offending a Prince, whom they are sensible is in a condition to hurt them, if he were so inclin'd.

I have observ'd by the by, that the ground of the Power I am speaking of, must be Esteem and Respect; I add, that it is now a thing so necessary, that when it is grounded upon any other Principle, it is very dangerous; in that case instead of crea∣ting a reasonable Fear, it inclines Men to hate Prin∣ces, who are never in a worse condition than when it turns to public aversion.

The Power which induces Men to respect and fear Princes with Love, is of many different kinds; It is a Tree which has five divers Branches, which all draw their nutriment and substance from one and the same Root.

The Prince must be powerful by his Reputation.

By a reasonable Army always kept on Foot.

And by a notable Sum of Money in his Coffers, to supply unexpected exigencies, which often come to pass when they are least expected.

Finally, by the Possession of his Subjects hearts, as we may easily see.

SECTION II. The Prince must be powerful by his Reputation; and what is necessary to that End.

REputation is the more necessary in Princes, in that those we have a good opinion of, do more by their bare words than those who are not esteem'd, with Armies.

They are oblig'd to value it beyond Life; and they ought sooner to venture their Fortune and Grandeur, than to suffer the least Breach to be

made in the same, since it is most certain that the least diminution a Prince receives, tho never so slight, is the step which is of most dangerous consequence for his ruin.

In consideration of which I declare freely, that Princes ought never to esteem any Profit advanta∣gious, when it reflects in the least upon their ho∣nour: and they are either blind, or insensible to their true Interests, if they receive any of this nature.

And indeed History teaches us, that in all Times and in all States, Princes of great reputation are al∣ways happier than those, who being inferior to them in that Point, have surpass'd them in Force and Riches, and in all other Power.

As they cannot be too jealous of it, their Coun∣sellors can never be too careful, to cry up the good Qualities they possess.

Those who will form their Conduct upon the Rules and Principles contain'd in this present Testa∣ment, will undoubtedly acquire a Name which will be of no small weight in the mind of their Subjects and of their Neighbours, particularly if being Re∣ligious towards God, they observe the same Rule towards themselves.

That is, in being true to their word, and faith∣ful to their Promises; conditions which are so abso∣lutely necessary for the reputation of a Prince, that as he who is destitute of them can never be esteem'd by any body, so it is impossible for him who does possess them not to be reverenc'd and credited by all the World.

I could instance many Examples of this Truth; but as I do not design this Work for a Common Place, easy to be perform'd by all sorts of Men,

who will extract good Books; I will only instance such as are so certain and so clear, that all sensible Persons will find the Proof of them in their own Reason.

SECTION. III. The Prince must be Powerful by the force of his Frontiers.

NONE but such as are depriv'd of common sence, can be unsensible how necessary it is for great States to have their Frontiers well Forti∣fy'd.

It is a thing the more necessary in this Kingdom, in that, that tho the Levity of our Nation should make it incapable of making great Conquests; their Valour would render them Invincible, in their de∣fence; having considerable Places, so well fortify'd, and so well provided with all things, that they may be able to show their Courage, without being exposed to suffer great hard-ships, which are the only Enemies they have to overcome.

A Frontier well fortify'd is capable either to dis∣courage Enemies from the designs they might have against a State, or at least to stop the Course of the same, and their Impetuosity, if they dare ven∣ture to do it by open force.

The subtil motions of our Nation stand in need of being secured against the Terrour they might re∣ceive in an unexpected attack, if they did not know that the entrance into the Kingdom has such strong Ramparts, that no foreign Impetuosity can be capable to take them by Storm, and that it is

impossible to overcome them, without a considerable Time.

The new method of some of the Enemies of this State being more to starve the Places they besiege than to take them by force of Arms, and to ruin the Country they invade by a great number of horse, than to advance by degrees into it with a considerable body of Foot, as was done antiently; it is clear, that Frontier Places are not only useful to resist such Efforts, but also to secure States, in the Bowels of which it is impossible for Enemies to make any great Progress if they leave Places behind them to cut off the communication of their Coun∣trys and their Convoys together.

These considerations oblige me to represent, that it is not sufficient to fortify Places, and to put such Provisions and Ammunitions into 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as may serve to resist brisk attacks, but also to ••••••••ish them with all things necessary for a year at least, which is a sufficient time to relieve them conveniently.

I am ••••nsible that it is almost impossible for great Kings, to provide many Citadels thus; but it is not to with great Towns in whichi the Society of Men produces a great store of many things, which a par∣ticular Governor cannot make a sufficient provision of, and it is easie to oblige the Inhabitants to pro∣vide Provisions for a Year, which will always suf∣fice for six Months and more, if they turn out use∣less Mouths, as reason requires.

I am so far from pretending that this Order should exempt Princes from having publick Magazins, that on the contrary I am of opinion that they can never have too many, and that after having provi∣ded them, they must establish such good Orders to

preserve, them that the Governors, to whom the disposition of the same belongs, may not have the Liberty to dissipate them in vain, either out of neg∣ligence, or a desire to convert them to their own Uses.

I do not particularly specify the Number of Can∣nons , of Powder and of Bullets, and of all other Warlike Ammunitions, which are to be put in every place, be∣cause it is to be different according to their different Largeness. But I will say that Provisions for the Mouth are not more necessary than those of War, and that it would be to no purpose for a Town to be well stor'd with Vi∣ctuals, if they wanted what is abso∣lutely necessary, both to defend them∣selves and to annoy their Enemies, see∣ing particularly that Experience show∣eth us that those whoshoot most, commonly kill most▪ when a Place i•• ••••sieg'd, one might better spare Bread than Powder.

The Antients having observ'd very well, that the real Strength of Towns consists in the number of Men, I cannot forbear adding, that all Fortificati∣ons are useless, unless the Governor and the Offi∣cers, who command in a place, have a Courage e∣qual to the Strength of the Walls and Ramparts, and unless the Number of Men is proportion'd to the Largeness of the place, and the quantity of the Posts that are to be defended.

Experience has show'd us in divers occasions, that the least Holds are impregnable by the steadiness of the courage of those who defend them, and that

the best Citadels make no great resistance, when those that are in them have not a Courage suitable to their Force.

Therefore Princes can never be too careful in choosing those to whom they intrust Frontiers, since the Welfare and repose of the State depends chief∣ly on their Fidelity and Vigilancy, their Courage and Experience, and that often the lack of one of these Qualifications costs millions to States, if it does not prove the absolute cause of their Ruin.

SECTION. IV. Of the Power a State ought to have by its Land-Forces. This Section has several Subdivisions, upon the account of the abundance of matter it contains, which will be specify'd in the Margin.

THE most potent State in the World cannot boast of injoying a certain Peace, unless it be in a condition to secure it self at all times, against an unexpected Invasion, or Surprise.

In order thereunto it is necessary that so great a Kingdom as this is, should always keep a sufficient Army on Foot to prevent the designs which hatred and envy might form against its Prosperity and Grandeur, when 'tis look'd upon to be in a secure Repose, or at least to stifle them in their Birth.

Who has Force, has commonly Reason on his side; and he that is Weak, is commonly thought in the wrong in the Judgment of most Men.

As a Souldier who do's not always wear his Sword is lyable to many inconveniences; that King∣dom

which do's not always stand on its Guard, and keep it self in a condtion to prevent a sudden sur∣prise, is in great danger.

Public Interest obliges those who have the management of States to Govern them so, as not only to secure them against all the Evil which may be avoided, but also from all apprehen∣sions of it.

As Reason requires a Geometri∣cal Proportion, between that which sustains, and that which is sustained, it is certain that there must be con∣siderable Forces, to sustain so great a Body as this Kingdom.

Those that are necessary to so great an End, may and ought to be of a different Nature, that is, that a∣mong the Men design'd for the preservation of this State, some must be listed to be ready on all occa∣sins, and others actually in Arms, in order always to be in readiness to make a good defence.

In order to provide for the Fron∣tier Towns, and to keep a Body on foot to oppose all unexpected De∣signs, it is necessary to keep at least four thousand Horse, and forty thousand Foot a∣ctually in Arms at all times, and it is easie without burthening the State, to keep ten thousand Gentle∣men, and fifty thousand Foot listed, ready to be rais'd on all Emergencies.

It may perhaps be urg'd that the Defence of the State does not require such great Preparations, but whereas the said Establishment is so far from being

a Burthen to France, that on the contrary the No∣bility and the People will receive a Benefit by it; I say, that it is necessary to make War, when ever the Good of the State will require it.

In the opinion of the most judicious, War is sometimes an unavoidable E∣vil; and on other occasions, it is ab∣solutely necessary and advantagious.

States stand in need of it at certain times, to purge their ill humours, to recover what belongs to them, to revenge an Injury, the Impunity of which draws on another, to free Allies from Oppression, to put a stop to the Progress of a Conqueror's Pride, to prevent the Evil one is threaten'd with, when there is no other way to avoid them, or, in fine, to pre∣vent many other Accidents.

I maintain, and it is an undoubted Truth, that no War can be happy unless it be just, and that not being so, tho the Event should prove favourable according to the World, yet an account must be gi∣ven for it at the Tribunal of God.

Therefore the first thing to be done, when a Prince is forc'd to take Arms, is to examin the Equity of the Cause for which they are taken, which must be done by Doctors of Capacity and Probity.

This Foundation suppos'd, the means to carry it on vigorously must be consider'd, and to time it well, is not one of the least Material.

There is this difference betwixt him who pursues revenge with Anger, and he who does it with Rea∣son, that the first does mischief, at the venture of receiving the same, chusing rather to suffer himself than to lose an opportunity to prejudice his Enemy; and the last dissembles his resentment, until he finds

an occasion to punish him who has wrong'd him, without sharing his Sufferings.

The first acts like a Beast, according to the Im∣pulse of Nature; and the last behaves himself like a Man, suffering himself to be guided by reason.

In order to succeed in War, it is not sufficient to chuse a fit opportunity, to have a strong Army, a∣bundance of Money, of Provisions, and warlike Am∣munitions, the main point is to have Men fit for the Service they are design'd for, to know how to make them observe a good Discipline, to make them live regularly, and to manage ones Money, Provisi∣ons and Ammunitions prudently.

It is easy to set down these general Principles, but the practice of them is difficult, and yet in case it be neglected, the Success of a War cannot be hap∣py, unless by chance or miracle, which wise Men must never trust to.

There is no Nation in the World so unfit for War as ours; their Levity and Impatience in the least hardships, are two Principles which are but too well known.

Tho Caesar says, that the French understand two things, the Military Art, and that of Speaking, I own that hitherto, I have not been able to apprehend up∣on what ground he attributes the first of these Qua∣lifications to them, since Patience in Labour and Suf∣ferings, a Qualification absolutely necessary in War, is but seldom found among them.

Were this Qualification joyn'd to their Valour, the Universe would be too little to bound their Conquests, but as the great heart God has given them, makes them fit to overcome whatever oppo∣ses them by force, their Levity and Laziness make

them incapable of overcoming the least Obstacles, which the delays of a subtle Enemy opposes to their Eagerness.

This is the reason why they are not fit for Con∣quests which require time, nor to preserve those they might make in an instant of Time.

They are not only inconstant, impatient, and little inur'd to Faituges, but moreover they are accus'd of never being pleas'd with their present condition, and to have no great Affection for their Country: and the said Accusation is so well grounded, that no body can deny, that there are more among them who are wanting in those Duties which their Birth exacts from them, than among all the other Nati∣ons of the World.

There are few who wage-War against France, without having French Men in their Army, and when they are Arm'd for their Country, they are so indifferent in what relates to its Interest, that they do not use the least Endeavours to overcome their Natural Defects to it's advantage.

They run an hundred Leagues to seek a Battle, and yet would not expect the occasion of one a week, the Enemy tires them out, even before they have begun to work.

They are not afraid of Peril, but they will ex∣pose themselves to it without any Pains; the least delays are insupportable to them, they have no Flegm to tarry one moment for their happiness, and they are tir'd even with the continuation of their Prospe∣rities.

At the beginning of their Enterprise, their ea∣gerness is not common, and indeed they are more than Men that moment, but they cool by degrees,

so that they become equal to those who have but a common Vertue, and in process of Time, they are disgusted and grow effeminate, insomuch that they are less than Men.

They still retain Courage enough to fight; provided they are put to't immediately, but they do not keep so much of it as to tarry for an occasion; tho their Hon the Reputation of their Country and the Service of their Master requires it.

They can neither improve a Victory, nor resist the Fortune of a Victorious Enemy; Prosperity blinds them beyond other Men, and yet they have neither Courage, nor Judgment in Adversity, and in Labour.

In fine, They are subject to so many faults, that it is not without reason, some judicious Persons won∣der how this Monarchy has been able to subsist from it's Birth, since that as it has always found faithful Children for it's Defence, it has never been attack'd but it's Enemies have found Sectators in it's Bosom, who, like Vipers, have us'd their utmost Endeavours to gnaw the Bowels of their Mother.

I am sensible at the same time that the French have good Qualifications to counterpoise those Imperfe∣ctions; They are Valiant, full of Courage and Hu∣manity; their Heart is void of Cruelty, and so free from Rankor, that they are easily reconcil'd.

But tho these Qualifications are the Orna∣ments of Civil Society, and Essential to Christianity; yet it is certain, that being destitute of Flegm, of Patience, and of Discipline, they are exquisite Vi∣ctuals serv'd without Sawce to relish them.

I am not ignorant that the Providence of God, which is admirable in all things, is particularly so, in

having counterpois'd the ill Qualities of every Na∣tion, by other advantages which make amends for their defects.

If the French Nation is inconstant and impatient, their Valour and Impetuosity often makes them do that at the first Onset, which others are a long time about.

If their uneasiness hinders them from remaining long in Armies willingly; God's Providence has made it so abounding in Men, that there are always abundance of them, who being mov'd by the same Principle of Levity, are ready to supply the room of those who are desirous to come home again, and these are ready to go back, before those who have succeeded them, are weary.

If their want of affection for their Country in∣clines them some times to take Arms against their King, the Inconstancy and sudden Motions, to which they are subject, not permitting any body to rely upon them, they do themselves more harm than they are capable of doing to their Country.

'Tis most certain, that the Spaniards surpass us in Constancy and Steadiness, in Zeal, and in Fidelity for their King and Country; but in exchange, that Kingdom is so barren and so desart in some Places, and so little abounding in Men, that were it not for their Constancy, it would often be abandon'd by itself.

Moreover, if among the French, some particu∣lar Persons ingage against their Master, the Spa∣niards some times mutiny and revolt in Bodys in their Armys.

If the Emperor has the advantage to govern a Nation, which is the Nursery of Souldiers, he has

the disadvantage, that they easily change their Par∣ty and Religion together, besides that they are very much addicted to Drunkenness, and far more unru∣ly than ours in the Field.

In a Word all Nations have there defects, and the most prudent are those who endeavour to acquire by Art, what Nature has deny'd them.

It is more easy to add Flegm, Patience, and Dis∣cipline, to the Courage, Valour, and Courtesy of the French, than to inspire that Fire in Flegmatic Nations, which they have not naturaly.

The French are Capable of every thing, provided their Commanders are Capable to teach them what they are to do.

Their Courage, which inclines them to seek out War all the World over, Justifys this Proposition: Since they live like Spaniards in their Armys, like Sweedes in their Country, like Crawats when they are listed among them, and like Hollanders in their States.

They observe their several Disciplines; which shows, that if they keep their Natural Imperfections in their Country, it is because they are tolerated, and that their Officers do not know how to Correct them.

If they live in this Kingdom without Discipline, it is not so much their fault, as the fault of their Leaders, who commonly content themselves with making fine Ordinances, and do not take so much care as they should do to cause them to be observ'd.

Nothing can be more easy than to prescribe Rules to live well, and nothing more difficult then to put them in practice; however it is not impossible.

Endeavours must be us'd to show the Justice of them by reason, and then no mercy must be shown to those who Violate them.

If one, two, or three Examples of Punishment do not put a stop to Disobedience, the continuance of it will do't; and I dare assure your Majesty, that if you find Chiefs worthy to command, you will never want Subjects fit to obey. It is most certain, that the general Opinion of the World, That the French are incapable of Rule and Discipline, has no other Foundation than the Incapacity of their Com∣manders, who do not know how to chuse necessa∣ry means for the Ends they propose.

The Siege of Rochel, in which during thirteen Months an Army of 25000 Men receiv'd Orders, and obey'd like Monks bearing Arms, and the Ex∣pedition of Pignerol, where they did the same, plain∣ly demonstrate what I have said.

But the General must be a Man of Resolution, and no respecter of Persons, and known to be so; for it is certain that unless he has so much steadiness as to remain inflexible in the Rigor of the Rule he has prescrib'd, no Man will think himself oblig'd to observe it; or at least many will venture to break it, in hopes of a Pardon.

But when a General persists as much in punishing as the Delinquents in their Faults; his steadiness will stop the course of our excessive Levity; and without such a Remedy it is in vain to expect to keep so hot and so impetuous a Nation as ours is, within the Bounds of Reason. The Punishments of Marillac and of Montmorency, have reduc'd all the Grandees of the Kingdom to their Duty in an in∣stant of time; and I dare affirm, that the same being

practis'd against Ten Officers, and Fifty Souldiers, will maintain the Armys in Discipline, and in a con∣dition to perform whatever will be desir'd of them.

Punishing those thus, who shall be wanting in the Performance of their Duty, few Men will be punish'd, since few will venture to expose them∣selves to ruin, finding it inevitable, and by the Death of a small Number, the Lives of many will be pre∣serv'd, and Order observ'd in all things.

The Defects of this Nation never appear'd more than under your Majesty's Reign, which being sig∣naliz'd by great Prosperity and Power by your Conduct, will also be signaliz'd in the opinion of the most judicious, for many Infidelities you have suffer'd, and by a World of Attempts against your Service.

After having made divers Inquiries into the Rea∣sons of both, I am not afraid of saying, That they proceed from the Weakness of your Majesty's Mi∣nority, during which Men have so insensibly ac∣custom'd themselves to all sorts of Licentiousness, that they thought they might continue the same under your Reign with the same Impunity as here∣tofore.

The first is, that as there are more Colleges of Religious Orders, more Officers of Justice, and of the Finances than for the time past, there are not near so many Souldiers, for which reason the deser∣tion of those who retire from the Armies is more apparent, because there are not so many found as formerly, to supply the room of those who forsake their Duty.

The second, that Souldiers advanc'd their For∣tune more, formerly than in these Times, in which

the Officers of the Finances, and the Partisans reap all the Fat, to the great disgust of those who are con∣strain'd to expose their Lives almost to no purpose.

The third, that Generals are less careful in our days of military Discipline, and less levere in cha∣stising those who swerve from it than our Fore-fa∣thers were.

The fourth, that the long discontinuation the French have had of Foreign Wars, in which they had powerful Enemies to encounter, had almost made them forget the Trade, and disus'd them from the Fatigues they are little capable of, tho they must go through many, when they have brisk and po∣tent Enemies to deal with.

I add to these considerations, that your Maje∣sty's health has not always permitted you to be in the Army, and that the Injustice of the French is so great, that they are never satisfy'd in a Place, where they venture their Life, unless they see their King, whose presence they fancy does in some mea∣sure secure it.

None but the Enemies of this State can make War successfully by their Lieutenants; the Flegm of their Nation gives them that advantage; but the French are the most unfit for it of any other Nati∣on, because the eagerness of their Courage and the desire of fighting gives them an Impatience, which can never be vanquish'd, but by the presence of their King.

If at any time any great Enterprise has met with Success under Lieutenants, it will either be found that those who have had that good Fortune, were Men of very great Authority, by the Trust re∣pos'd

in them by their Master, and by their parti∣cular Merit, or that those Wars were not so lasting, as to oblige them in overcoming the Enemies also to vanquish the humour of the French.

It is no small Trouble to me to be oblig'd in this Place to discover the defects your Majesty has often ob∣serv'd in your Nobility; yet they are so public, that it is impossible to conceal them.

The Affection I have for that Order, obliges me to examin them, to find out Examples and to endeavour to remedy the same.

The esteem they were in heretofore will hardly permit one to believe, that they have committed faults on some occasions in your Reign; but I will discover the reason of them to those who have be∣held their Effects.

All Men easily apprehend, that there is a great deal of difference between the Spirits, which natu∣rally ascend on high, and the grosser Parts of their Bodies which remain below.

The excellency of the Nobility which love War, are those Spirits which ascend on high, esteem'd by all the World; and those who only follow it, because the Laws of this Kingdom constrain them so to do, are if not the Lees, at least the Wine which drops out of the Cask, which is hardly fit for Servants.

There are no Communities in which there are not more ill Subjects than good ones; and whereas a little Tare is capable to spoil several heaps of Wheat it is no wonder if, when the Nobility is assembled, the greater number corrupts the less, tho better; and as the best Wine mix'd with the Lees is nought, so the Service of the best Nobility is not only useless

but prejudicial, when joyn'd with the Lees which alters it.

This Discourse ingaging me to speak of the Ban, and Arriere Ban, I cannot forbear saying that it is an Assembly of Gentry, which having no Head with any Authority, governs it self without Rule, and lives without Discipline.—

An Assembly the subsistance of which has so lit∣tle certainty, that the fickleness, cowardice, malice or disgust of three or four Persons, is capable to diffi∣pate it in a moment.

An Assembly which ruins the Places through which it passes far more than the regular Forces, which ruining your Majesty's Country pay part of what they spend, whereas those pay nothing at all.

They never perform any Guard in an Army, which produces a double Ill, Laziness and the Dis∣gust it creates in others.

Unless they fight at their first Arrival, as they are quick in coming, they are speedy in going back, and threaten it every moment; in retiring they do not only debauch many by their ill Example, but the most ingenious among them, invent whatever Craft can suggest to cover their Infamy, and to persuade that they do not retire without reason; so that they both weaken and astonish Armies at one and the same time.

Your Majesty being much better acquainted with these Truths, of which you have seen the practice, than I am, without insisting on the defects of an Order, the Perfections of which I have represented, my Conscience obliges me to declare freely, that Princes must never have any recourse to such a Suc∣cour,

which is much more prejudicial than useful to the State.

But that this Kingdom may not be depriv'd of the Service of the Nobility, which has always been the Principal Sinew of it, and is oblig'd to serve it in time of VVar, upon the accounts of the Fiefs which have been granted them on that condition, and of the advantages they injoy over the People in time of Peace: It will be necessary to tax all the Fiess in every Bailywick, according to their Reve∣nue, to form regular Troops with the said Mo∣ney, into which such as had rather serve in Person, than to pay the Contribution of the Fiefs shall be admitted, provided they ingage to perform the Conditions of their Obligation.

Prudence requires that Men should be imploy'd according to their capacity, and that the defects of Nature should be supply'd by Art; and for that rea∣son it is necessary to make this use of the Body of the Nobility, in order to derive some advantage by them.

Next to this Observation, proceeding on, I am oblig'd to observe, that it is almost impossible to un∣dertake great Wars with Success with the French alone.

Foreigners are absolutely ne∣cessary to maintain the Body of Armies, and if the French Horse are good to fight, there is no being without Foreigners to perform the Guards, and to support the Fatigues of an Ar∣my.

Our Nation, tho hot and eager in Combats, is neither vigilant to guard it self, nor proper to form

Designs or Enterprizes, which require toyl and labour.

One half of the French Armys were formerly Com∣pos'd of Foreigners, and we have experienc'd how advantageous it is to use them, to supply the defect of our Nation, besides that the good qualifications of those by whom we may be assisted may in some measure correct our Imperfections.

But whereas if we want well disciplin'd Souldiers, steady and constant in their Duty, we are yet in greater want of Commanders, qualifi'd as they ought to be; it will be needless to remedy one of these Evils, un∣less we also correct the other.

There are but few of them in the World, and less in France than in any other part, who do not suf∣fer themselves to be blinded by Prosperity, and do not lose their Courage and Judgment in Adversi∣ty.

Nevertheless it is necessary there should be Men imploy'd in the administration of the State, and in the Command of Armys free from these defects, other∣wise we should be in danger of never improving the favourable occasions, which God may offer us, and of being considerable losers by the first frowns of Fortune.

Tho the Head guides the rest of the Body, and Judgment is the most Essential Part of him who Commands, Nevertheless I prefer a great deal of Courage and Indifferent Parts in a General, be∣fore a great deal of Wit, and an indifferent Heart.

Many perhaps will wonder at this proposition, because it is contrary to the opinion of many, but the reason of it is Evident.

Those who have a great deal of Coruage are ne∣ver astonish'd in danger, and make use of all the Wit and Judgment God has indued them with on such occasions; whereas those who have but little Courage being easily astonish'd, are so much dis∣may'd in the least danger, that let them have ne∣ver so much Wit, it is absolutely useless to them, fear not allowing them to Use it.

I make but little difference between giving the management of the Finances to a Thief, and the Command of an Army to a Man of mean Cou∣rage.

As Avarice, and the desire the first has of get∣ting an Estate, hinders him from improving the oc∣casions to increase his Master's Fund, so the se∣cond, having a desire to preserve his Life, and to avoid many Perils, which are only such in his Ima∣gination, commonly loses and avoids many advan∣tageous occasions to imploy his Arms; and thus if the first is capable of committing faults out of a desire to fill his Purse, the last is lyable to do the same, in order to secure his Life.

Among Men of Courage, some are naturally Valiant, and others are only so by reason; The first are fitter to be Soulders than Captains, by reason that their Valour is commonly accompany'd with Bru∣tality; but the last are good to make Commanders: Nevertheless it is always to be wish'd that their rea∣sonable Valour may not be void of Natural Cour∣age, because otherwise it were to be fear'd, that the consideration of many incoveniences which may hap∣pen, and yet do not happen, might hinder him who proceeds with too much caution from un∣dertaking

that which might succeed in others with less Wit and more boldness.

Want of Judgment contributes considerably to∣wards the Valour of some Men, who perform Actions which are the more hazardous, in that they are not sensible of the Peril to which they expose them∣selves.

Judgment is of no small use to others to feign a great boldness on some occasions, which tho dange∣rous in appearence, are neither so in Effect, nor in the opinions of those, whom God has indued with more knowledge than others.

As a General's Valour must not be destitute of Judgment: So tho he be Prudent and Judicious to the highest degree he must have sincerity to hinder him from making Artifices pass for Actions of Cour∣age. Men disguise themselves so many different ways, that it is almost Impossible to distinguish the Effects which proceed from the head from those which proceed from the Heart.

There are Men so naturaly Valiant, that they continue so to their dying day.

Others, which not being so, make an Effort in their Youth to appear such, to gain some Reputati∣on, in favour of which they may pass their Life without Infamy.

These last have no sooner obtain'd their Ends, but the Effects of their Valour disappear, because they have what they desire, and that Artifice is the Sourse of their Courage, and not their natu∣ral Inclination.

Great Care must be taken not to chuse a Chief of that Nature, remembring that Craft is as dan∣gerous

in those who Command, as Judgment and Courage is necessary.

Those two qualityes ought almost to keep an even pace, but they must be accompany'd with many others.

Great enterprizes not being Childrens Play, they require a ripe Age in those who perform them; but as the maturity of Judgment which advances with years is useful to form a design, the Fire of Youth is no less necesseary to put it in execution, and it is most certain that Fortune often Smiles on Youth, and Frowns on Age.

Therefore it is fit to observe, that there is a great deal of difference between a Novice, a young Man, and an old one. It is difficult to be good and bad at once.

To be Excellent, it is necessary to be young in years, but not in Service and Experience. For tho Old Men are commonly the Wisest, they are not the best to undertake, because they are often destitute of the fire of youth, which is requisite in such oc∣casions.

In conclusion, Courage, Wit, and good Fortune are three qualifications so Essential in a General, that tho there are but few who possess them altoge∣ther, it is difficult to expect without hazard great events from those who are destitute of either of them.

But if a Prince be so happy as to find any, in whom these qualifications are met, it will be easy to remedy the defects of those who shall be committed to their Conduct.

One of those which do's most harm, as I have observed, is the Inconstancy of our Nation, which rendering it almost incapable of remaining long in

the same State, an Army is no sooner Rais'd, but one half of it dwindles away.

I have thought sometimes that the best Expedient that could be taken to make Souldiers Subsist, and to maintain them in Discipline, would be to restore the Establishment of Legionarys, formerly practis'd in this Kingdom, adding some particular Orders to it, altogether necessary to make it safe; but Reason and Experience have alter'd my mind.

Reason, in that it shows clearly that what is com∣mitted to the care of many, is the less certain, in that every one lays the blame upon his Companion, and that the Elections which are made by the advice of Communities, are rarely made by the bare motive of Reason, because that tho there are many Persons of Wisdom, and Probity among them, the number of Fools, and of Knaves is always the greatest.

Experience, in that it Teaches every body, that no money is laid out worse than that of Communities.

Besides that I may say with Truth, that when ever the urgent ne∣cessitys of the State have constrain'd your Majesty to imploy Forces sent by Princes, led and paid by their own Officers, which I have seen Twice du∣ring this last War; they have always cost double, and have com∣mitted as much and more disorder than the others, and have done less service than those which were rais'd at the same Time, and conducted by particu∣lar Persons at your Charge.

Those considerations have convinced me that in∣stead of Charging the Provinces with the Raising

and maintaining of Souldiers; Soveraigns ought to take the Care of it, and that they may make them subsist with order if they will use proper means to that end, according to the following order.

All Souldiers must be Listed, their Names, place of Birth, and of abode, Enter'd, that in case they should run away from their Colours, they may be the sooner found again.

The Register of every Place must be charg'd with the number of those that shall be rais'd within his Precinct, and the Judges oblig'd to use their en∣deavours for the apprehending and punishing, ac∣cording to the Ordinances, all those who shall come back from the Armys without leave; on pain of the said Judges being turn'd out of their Offices, upon proof of their having receiv'd Infor∣mation of the return of your Souldiers without having prosecuted them for the same.

For the Listing of Souldiers, every one must be oblig'd to serve three Years without demanding to be dismiss'd, unless in the Case of an Evident Ilness, on condition that the said Term being expir'd it shall not be lawful to refuse it them, when demanded.

This condition is very necessary, by reason that when the French think themselves constrain'd, and kept against their Will, they commonly think of no∣thing but running away, tho they were to lose a thou∣sand Lives, if they had so many, whereas when they are at Liberty to retire, it is likely they will freely remain in the Armies, Nature commonly in∣clining Men to have a less desire for what they are allow'd to do, than to do that which is forbidden them.

Whatever Souldier shall obtain his dismission, shall be oblig'd to enter the same into the Register of the Jurisdiction in which he was rais'd.

The Chiefs and Officers of a Regiment shall not be allow'd on any pretence whatever, to receive Souldiers of another, on pain of being degraded of Arms, nay more, of their Gentility, if they are Gentlemen.

And the Souldiers who shall abandon their Cap∣tains without leave, shall be sent to the Galleys without Mercy, at whatever time they are taken, neither shall any change of Place, or of condition exempt them from the same.

No Furlow or Dismission shall be allow'd of, un∣less sign'd by the Colonel, or Commander in Chie•• in his Absence, and seal'd with the Seal of the Re∣giment.

Every Regiment shall have a Provost, a Commissa∣ry, a Comptroller, and a Pay Master, who shall all be obliged to follow the Regiment; on pain not only of being cashier'd, but also of Exemplary Punishment.

In case any disorders happen, and the Provost do's not Punish the offenders according to the Laws of Arms he shall be punished himself, as soon as the said Complaint is brought to your Majesty, or to the Generals.

In case the Regiment is not Compleat, and the Comptroller or Commissary do not give Notice there∣of, they shall be answerable for it themselves, and be severely punished.

If the Men are unpay'd by the Pay-Master's fault, either by his imbezeling the King's Money, by bare put offs or delays, or other failures, he shall be liable

to pay the quadruple, and to be exemplarily punish'd.

The said Officers shall only be imploy'd by way of Commission, Experience having shewn that no∣thing spoils the King's Officers more, particularly in Military Affairs, than to give them Places for Life, which properly speaking, is nothing but a Title to steal with Impunity.

Those who command the Forces, shall be oblig'd to put them in Battalia whenever it shall be re∣quir'd by the Commissaries.

To the end that those who shall have such Com∣missions, may perform them faithfully; the Com∣missary shall have 200 Livers a month, the Comp∣troller 150 Livers, the Provost 100 Livers, his Clerk 50 Livers, and every one of his Men 30 Livers.

And whereas it would be to no purpose to regu∣late the Souldiers and inferiour Officers, without prescribing the Order which must be observ'd by the principal Officers. The Colonels, Captains, Serjeants Major, Lieutenants and Ensigns, shall not be allow'd to quit their Posts, without leave from their Generals, and Commanders of the For∣ces, or from your Majesty: and in case any shall in∣fringe the said Regulation, they shall be Cashier'd, Degraded of their Gentility and Arms, if they are Gentlemen, or barely Cashier'd if they are not, with∣out any prejudice to greater punishments. It will be fit for Your Majesty to impose this Law upon Your Self, never to grant them any such leave in time of War, without a Lawful Cause: but when they are in Garison, Your Majesty may be so kind as to grant furlows to a third part of the Officers

for four months, to the end, that in a years time they may have it all in their turn.

If with this good Rule, which cannot be thought too Austere, even by those who may suffer by it, particular care be taken of the Souldiers: If Bread be given them all the year round, six Musters and a Suit of Cloathes: If the Military Missions be con∣tinued which were practis'd in 1639. to prevent their falling sick: If when they are ill, Hospitals be provided to follow the Army in all places, as it was done in the said year, and a livelyhood secur'd for those who shall be maim'd in the King's Service, in the Commandery of St. Lewis design'd to that end; I dare answer, that the Infantry of this Kingdom will be well Disciplin'd for the future.

It will be the same with the Horse, if raising them with the same Order, (which I do not repeat, to avoid a tedious Narration) every Trooper be obli∣ged to keep two Horses for Service and a Sumpter: If they are made to observe the Ordinances rigorously, which oblige them never to be without Arms: and if in time of Peace they are put in Garison in close places, to prevent the disorders which it is impossible to secure the People against, when Souldiers are Quarter'd in the open Countrey.

They have behav'd themselves so ill in these last Wars; that in case they should remain in the same condition, they would be no longer fit for any Ser∣vice.

The true cause of their decay is the vast number that has been rais'd in these latter times, to oppose the Cavalry of Foreigners who make all sorts of Men Troopers indifferently.

For which reason it has been impossible to raise them among the Gentrey of Courage and Activity as formerly, and the Officers have been oblig'd to take not only old Souldiers, but also raw young Men of all conditions, whose Courage or Strength had never been Try'd.

If in imitating Strangers who receive all sorts of Men in their Cavalry, ours had learnt also to sup∣port Fatigues as well as theirs, tho' they had lost part of their ancient Valour, which made them recom∣mendable, we should have some reason to comfort our selves; but the Inconstancy and love of ease which reigns almost among all conditions in our Nation, having quite alter'd them; they have lost the best qualification they had without acquiring that which they had not.

Tho' Physicians esteem the cure of a Distemper in a very fair way, when the cause of it is known; I own that notwithstanding the source and reason of the Evil in question be known, the cure is never∣theless very difficult.

If none but Gentlemen are admitted into the Ca∣valry, it will be impossible to raise a sufficient num∣ber of them, to oppose that of the Enemies; and if all sorts of Men be receiv'd among them, it is impossible they should be such as History represents the French Horse.

The only expedient that can be taken, in my O∣pinion, in this Extremity, is to exhort the Captains to get as many Gentlemen in their Troops as can be got, to make an Order that none of them shall be admitted to Muster, unless one half of them are Gentlemen.

To oblige all those of that Birth being 20 years of Age, to bear Arms, declaring them incapable of any Imployments or Dignities, unless they have actu∣ally served three years in Your Majesty's Forces.

To forbid all Officers of Horse to List any Soul∣diers in their Troops, not being Gentlemen, unless they be above 25 years of Age, and have born Arms in the Foot at least three years.

Finally, to cause the ancient Military Orders to be put rigorously in execution, which ordaint all Troopers who shall abandon their Commander in a Combat, to be disarm'd upon the bare knowledge of the said fault.

If this Regulation is Religiously observ'd, I do not doubt, but the French Horse will regain its for∣mer Reputation, and Your Majesty's Infantry and Cavalary being well Disciplin'd, you will be able to boast your being strong in Arms, at any time what∣ever, and in a condition to give your Subjects in time of Peace as much safety as terror to your Ene∣mies.

It now remains to know whether this State will be able to bear the expence of so great a Body of Men, as that which I have drawn a Project of. Which will be examin'd hereafter.

In the mean time tho' there is reason to hope that by means of so useful a Regulation, and so easie to be observ'd, as that which I propose, the Ar∣mies will subsist for the future, according to our wishes; or at least that they will behave themselves a great deal better than heretofore; I will never∣theless make six Remarks which will be the more ne∣cessary in a great War, in that Prudence requires many expedients in important Affairs, that Men may never fall short of their Measures.

The first is, that in order to have 50000 effectual Men, it is necessary to raise a hundred, recko∣ning upon a Regiment of 20 Com∣panies which ought to consist of a hundred Men, only as a thousand.

The second, that it is necessary to refresh Ar∣mies often by new Levies, without which though they are strong upon the Rollo, they will be weak in Effect.

The third, that such Refreshments ought rather to be made by frequent Recruits of old Regiments, which must be preserv'd tho' absolutely decay'd, than by raising of new ones, which nevertheless must be done on certain pressing occasions, because Souldiers love to List themselves under new Officers.

The fourth, That when Forces are ruin'd, it is better to pay them on the foot on which they are, than to disband them, because it is impossible to do it without losing excellent Officers and good Souldiers.

I am sensible, that the remaining Souldiers may be put into other Regiments. But it is not practi∣cable, the kindness Souldiers have for their Captains, giving them a pretence to retire, or at least of co∣vering their inconstancy in so doing.

I am also sensible that in reforming Regiments, one might imitate the Spaniards who do not only initiate the Souldiers into old Regiments, but the Officers also.

But tho' it be easie to resolve upon such an Order, no severity will be sufficient to put it in execution; the ambitious, inconsiderate humour of our Nation, not permitting them to suffer themselves to be com∣manded, after having commanded, whatever ad∣vantage

they might receive by such an Obedience.

The Fifth, that it is absolutely Impossible in Wars which require extraordinary Efforts, to pay the musters of the Forces that are rais'd regularly, as it may be done in an Enterprize which do's not ex∣ceed the Power of a State: But in such a case these two Expedients may serve to remedy such a defect,

The first consists in making so good a Provision that the Souldiers may never want Bread.

The Second, to oblige the Commanders, who be∣ing satisfyed, have too much Interest to preserve the Men under their Command, not to use their utmost Endeavours in order thereunto; whereas when they are misus'd their Complaints and Negligence give way to the Licentiousness of their Souldiers, and give them a desire to run away, tho otherwise they would not think on't of their own accord.

However I must not forget to observe, that to do well, it is necessary to make three Musters, during the Campaign, besides five Months of VVinter Quarters which the Forces must have regularly.

And whereas nothing is more material towards the subsistance of Armys, and the success of all the designs that can be undertaken, than to take such measures that Provision may never fail them.

I add for the sixth remark, that the said care is one of the chief that is to be taken, and that Oeconomy and Policy are the chief qualifications of Generals.

Armys hardly fight once in a year: But they must live daily, and subsist with order; which cannot be done without an extraordinary Oeconomy, and Policy.

History affords us the Example of more Armys that have perished for want of Bread, and Policy, than by the effort of the Enemys Arms; and I am a faithful

Witness, that all the Enterprizes which have been made in my dayes, have only miscarry'd upon that account.

Those who have no Experience, commonly think they have done all when they have rais'd Armys, and provided for their Pay; but let them be paid never so well, unless they are in a Place where they may live conveniently, their Money is of no use to them, and cannot hinder them from perishing.

Therefore I must needs say, that it is dangerous to rely upon the Faith of a Purveyor who obliges himself to provide all the bread of an Army.

The Life of such Men is too poor a security for the mischief their negligence may occasion, to rely upon their Faith.

The Care of the Provisions ought to be commit∣ted to Persons of Quality, of known Vigilancy Fi∣delity and Capacity; since the Welfare of Armys and often of States depends upon it.

No men can be too great to be imploy'd in such Places.

In order not to be mistaken in our reckoning, in putting an Army on Foot, the Provisions must be set∣tled so, that every Regiment of a thousand Men may have 15. Wag∣gons to carry Bread for a Fortnight which is partly as much as is requir∣ed for a considerable Enterprize: Moreover it is necessary to have a hundred or two, over and above the common Calculation, otherwise one might fall short.

Special care must also be taken to carry Mills and Ovens, for tho Commonly the use of them is not good, yet it is necessary to have some, to make use of them in certain Places in which it would other∣wise be impossible to subsist, and in which it may hap∣pen that a stay of four days may give the Enemys a great advantage, over an Army which wants Provision.

As the least things ought to be consider'd in great designs, the General of an Army must take a par∣ticular care of every thing belonging to his Train.

He must know that a Cart is not so cumbersom as a Waggon which turns with more ease in narrow Passes; but on the other hand that they are sooner overthrown, and that the overturning of one is capa∣ble to stop a Train a long while. Therefore it behoves him to consider the Places he is to march through, to make use of the one or of the other, according as he will think it most proper.

He must also know that there are two ways of carrying the Bread, either in Carriages which are ve∣ry heavy and cumbersom, or in Carts plaited on the sides and cover'd with cere Cloths which are more Convenient.

After these six Remarks, I have only two Coun∣cels to give to those who Command our Armys.

The first is, always to be the first in the Field, be∣cause it is difficult for an Army, tho never so con∣siderable to make any progress, when they find another ready to oppose them, and often very easy for those that come first into the Field to secure a good success.

The Second is to attack, when it may be done without rashness, rather than to stand upon the de∣fensive; by reason that, besides that he who has the

boldness to attack gives some Impression of fear to him he attacks, the Imparient and Inconstant Tem∣per of the French, is as unfit for the defensive part, as their fire and first eagerness qualifys them to perform their duty in the first.

Experience makes me speak thus, and I am per∣suaded that those who are perfect Commanders will say the same.

SECTION. V. Of Naval Power.

THE Power of Arms do's not only require that the King should be strong a shore, but also potent at Sea.

When Anthony Perez was receiv'd in France by the late King your Father, and that in order to soften his misery he had secured him a good Pen∣sion: That stranger being desirous to express his Gratitude to that great King, and to show him that tho he was unfortunate he was not ungrateful, gave him three Councels in three Words which are of no small Consideration, Roma, Consejo, Pielago.

The advice of this old Spaniard consummated in Affairs, is not so much to be looked upon for the Au∣thority of him that gave it, as for its own weight.

We have already mention'd the Care Princes ought to take to have a good Council, and to be au∣thorised at Rome, it now remains to show how it be∣hoves the King to be Potent at Sea.

The Sea is, of all Heritages that in which Sove∣raigns pretend to have the greatest share, and yet

it is that on which the Rights of every body are least agreed upon.

The Empire of that Element was never well se∣cur'd to any. It has been subject to divers Revoluti∣ons according to the inconstancy of its nature, so sub∣ject to the Wind that it submits to him who Courts it most, and whose Power is so unbounded that he is in a condition to possess it with violence against all those who might dispute it with him.

In a word, the old Titles of that Dominion are Force and not Reason, a Prince must be Powerful to pretend to that Heritage.

To proceed with Order and Method in this point, we must consider the Ocean and the Medi∣terranian seperately, and make a distinction between the Ships which are of use in both those Seas, and of the Gallies, the use of which is only good in that which Nature seems to have reserv'd expresly be∣twixt the Lands to expose it to less Storms, and to give it more shelter.

A great State must never be in a condition to receive an injury without being able to revenge it.

And therefore England being situated as it is, un∣less France is powerful in Ships, the English may attempt whatever they please to our prejudice, with∣out the least fear of a return.

They might hinder our Fishing, disturb our Trade, and in blocking up the mouth of our great Rivers, exact what Toll they please from our Merchants.

They might Land without danger in our Islands, and even on our Coasts.

Finally, The Situation of the Native Countrey of that haughty Nation, not permitting them to fear the greatest Land-Forces, the ancient Envy they have against this Kingdom, would apparently en∣courage them to dare every thing, should our weak∣ness not allow us to attempt some thing to their prejudice.

Their Insolence in the late King your Father's time towards the Duke of Scily, obliges us to put our selves in a posture never to suffer the like again.

That Duke being chosen by Henry the Great for an extraordinary Embassy into England, Embark∣ing at Callis in a French Ship with the French Flag on the Main Top Mast, was no sooner in the Chan∣nel, but meeting a Yacht which came to receive him, the Commander of it Commanded the French Ship to strike.

The Duke thinking his Quality would se∣cure him from such an affront, refus'd it boldly; but his refusal being answer'd with three Cannon shot with Bullets, which piercing his Ship, pierc'd the Heart of the French; Force constrain'd him to do, what Reason ought to have secur'd him from, and whatever Complaints he could make, he could get no other reason from the English Captain, than that as his Duty oblig'd him to honour his Quality of Ambassador, it oblig'd him also to compel others to pay that respect to his Master's Flag, which was due to the Soveraign of the Sea.

If King James's words prov'd more civil, yet they produc'd no other effect than to oblige the Duke to seek for satisfaction in his own Prudence, feigning himself cur'd, when his pain was most smarting, and his wound incurable.

The King your Father was oblig'd to dissemble on that occasion; but with this Resolution another time to maintain the Right of his Crown by the Force, which time would give him means to acquire at Sea.

I represent this Great Prince to my mind proje∣cting in that occurence, what your Majesty must now put in Execution.

Reason obliges to take an Expedient, which with∣out ingaging any of the Crowns, may contribute towards the preservation of the good understanding which is desirable among the Princes of Christen∣dom.

Among many that might be propos'd, the follow∣ing are in my opinion the most practicable.

It might be agreed upon, that French Ships mee∣ting English Ships upon the Coast of England, should Salute first, and strike the Flag; and that when English Ships should meet French Ships upon the French Coast, they should pay them the same Ho∣nors, on condition that when the English and French Fleets should meet beyond the Coasts of both King∣doms, they should both steer their Course without any Ceremony, only sending out their respective Long-Boats to hail each other, coming no neerer than within Cannon shot.

It might also be agreed upon, that without having any respect to the Coasts of France or England, the greater number of Men of War should be Saluted by the smaller, either in striking (the Flag or other∣wise.

Whatever Expedient is found out on that sub∣ject, provided it be equal on all parts, it will be juste if your Majesty is strong at Sea, that which is real sonable, will be thought so by the English who are

so much blinded on that subject, that they know no Equity but Force.

The advantages the Spaniards, who are proud of being our Enemies at present, derive from the In∣dies, oblige them to be strong on the Ocean.

The reason of a sound Policy does not allow us to be weak there; but it obliges us to be in a con∣dition to oppose the designs they might have against us, and to cross their enterprizes.

If your Majesty be potent at Sea, the just appre∣hension Spain will lay under of your attacking their Forces, the only Source of their Subsistance: of your making a Descent on their Coasts, which have upwards of six hundred Leagues Circumference: your surprising some of their places, which are all weak, and in great number: that just apprehension, I say, will oblige them to be so powerful at Sea, and to keep such strong Garisons, that the major part of the Revenue of the Indies will be consumed in Charges, to preserve the whole, and if the re∣mainder suffices to preserve their States, at last it will produce this advantage, that they will no longer he able to trouble their Neighbours, as they have done hitherto.

Had your Majesty been as weak as your Predecessors, you could not have reduc'd to Ashes, in the midst of the Waters, all the Forces Spain could assemble in 1638. on the Ocean.

That proud haughty Nation, could not have been constrain'd to suffer the checking of their Pride, not only within sight of Italy, but also before the Eyes of all Christendom, which seeing the Isles of St. Marguerits and of St. Honorat snatch'd out of their

hands by open force, whereas they had only got them by surprize, has beheld at once and with the same Eye, the shame of that insolent Nation, and the Glory and Reputation of yours.

You could not finaly have fought that famous Combat of the Gallies, on the Seas of Genoa, which striking your Enemies with Terror, increas'd the Love and Esteem of your Allies, and imprinted so much Reverence in the indifferent, that the weight of respect ingag'd them absolutely on your side.

Your Majesty having Allies so distant from this Kingdom, that it is impossible to have any Com∣munication with them but by Sea, if they found France destitute of necessary means to succor them on certain occasions, it would be easie for those who are Enemies of the happiness of both sides, to sow the same Division in the minds, which is between the States; whereas your Naval Forces being con∣siderable, tho' divided as to place, they will remain strictly united in Heart and Affection to this State:

Nature seems to have offer'd the Empire of the Sea to France, by the advantagious Situation of her two Coasts, equally provided with excellent Havens, on the Ocean, and on the Mediterranean.

Britanny alone contains the finest in the Ocean; and Provence, which has but 160 Miles extent, has many larger and safer than Spain and Italy toge∣ther.

The separation of the States, which form the Body of the Spanish Monarchy, renders the preser∣vation of them so difficult, that Spain has no other way to keep them in some Union, than by keeping a great number of Ships on the Ocean, and of Gal∣lies in the Mediterranean, which by their continual

going backwards and forwards, may in some mea∣sure preserve the Union between the Members and the Head, transporting to and fro whatever is ne∣cessary for their subsistance; as Orders for whatever is to be undertaken, Officers to Command, Soul∣diers to Execute, Money, which is not only the Sinew of War, but also the Fat of Peace; from whence it follows, that obstructing the Liberty of such passages, those States which cannot subsist of themselves, can never be able to avoid confusion, weakness, and all the desolations wherewith God threatens a divided Kingdom.

And whereas the Western Coast of this King∣dom, separates Spain from all the Territories pos∣sess'd by their King in Italy, so the Providence of God, which will keep an even Balonce, seems to have been pleas'd to separate the Territories of Spain, by the Situation of France, to weaken them by their Division.

If your Majesty constantly keeps forty good Men of War well Rigg'd and Equip'd, ready to put out to Sea on all occasions, that number will be suffi∣cient to secure you against all Injuries, and to make you fear'd on all the Seas, by those who have hither∣to despis'd your Forces there.

As Men of War are necessary to that end in the Ocean, Gallies which are light Ships, and can make great Courses with their Oars in Calms, which are more usual in the Mediterranian than elsewhere, are as useful in the Levant.

With thirty Gallies your Majesty will not only balance the Power of Spain, which by the assistance of their Allies can put fifty in a Body, but you will overcome them by the reason of Union, which re∣odubles the Power of the Forces it unites.

As your Gallies may remain in a Body, either at Marseilles or Toulon, they will always be in a condi∣tion to oppose the conjunction of those of Spain, which are so much separated by the Situation of this Kingdom, that they cannot assemble without pas∣sing in sight of the Ports, and Roads of Provence, and even sometimes without Anchoring there, by rea∣son of the Storms which surprize them half way the Chanel, which those light Ships are not able to bear without great hazard, in a troublesome passage in which they are very frequent.

The Gulph of Leon is the most dangerous passa∣ge in all the Seas of the Levant; the inconstancy and contrariety of the Winds, which commonly reign there, render the passage of it very difficult, what∣ever way it is undertaken.

All stormy weather is very dangerous there, and unless our Coasts are favourable to those who pass by them, they seldom have a safe passage.

The true reason of the hazard of this passage, proceeds from the contrariety of Winds, occasion'd by divers Aspects of the Coasts.

The more a Coast is Mountainous and elevated, the more it raises Winds, when the heat of the ground is oppos'd by the coldness and moisture of the water, or of the Snow it is covered with.

This is the reason that the Coasts of Provence which are of this nature, being ever moisten'd during the Winter with Rain or Snow, are never free from Wind, which blowing from the Shore, are always contrary to those who have a mind to land there.

And tho' those Winds are contrary to the ap∣proach of Vessels, yet they are not strong enough to carry them back to the places from whence they

come, because they commonly meet with other shore Winds which drive them back again; in so much that the contrariety of Winds from our Coasts, and from those of Spain, force the Ships into the Gulph, where generally by Tempestuous Weather their ruine proves inevitable.

All Ships and Gallies going from Spain into Italy, always set Sail from the Cape of Quiers, and from the Gulph of Roses, and commonly tarry for a Werstern and North-west Wind, safely to reach the Coast of Genoa, or Morgues which is their first landing place; but tho' they put out with a fair Wind, it changes as soon as they come to the Gulph.

If the Wind turns to the S. W. or S. S. W. they must of necessity make for the Coast of Provence, and if it turns to the South East and by East, it is im∣possible for the Gallies and Ships which are near our Coasts, either to reach Italy, or to turn back to Spain, and in hard weather it is a Miracle if they are not lost on the Banks of our Coasts.

On the other hand, the Ships which go from Italy into Spain, set sail commonly from Morgues, which is the last Port of Italy.

In order to have a good Passage, they tarry for a North West and Northerly Wind, but they are never half way the Gulph, before the Weather changes, and without their being in Peril; because a South Fast or a Southern Storm renders their loss inevitable, unless our Ports are open to receive them.

Therefore France being strong in Gallies and in Gallions, they can have no certain Passage, since they can never undertake to make the middle of the Chanel in the Winter time, without running the

hazard of being lost, either on our Coasts, or in Barbary, if the Wind turns wholly to the North.

And even when the North East and by Nore drives them towards Majorca and Minorca, and the North West and by Nore drives them into Corsica and Sardinia, the violence of the Storms often breaks and destroys them before they can reach the shelter of the Isles that are favourable to them.

And if to avoid that Peril they resolve to tarry for a fair Wind to sail along our Shores, it will not happen once in thirty times, that they will pass safe∣ly, without striking by some ill Weather, with∣in our sight.

And tho' they should meet with such favourable Winds, as to escape all the dangers of the Sea, the least advice we have of their Passage, will enable us to cross it, the more easily, in that we may al∣ways put out to Sea, and put in again without Peril, whenever the Weather threatens us, by reason of the Neighbourhood of our Ports, which they dare not come near.

Thirty Gallies will afford your Majesty this ad∣vantage, and if to such a Body you add 10 Gallions, true Citadels of the Sea, formidable to Gallies, when they have a favourable Wind, because their Body bears no proportion to the weakness of those light Ships, and that they are not afraid of them even in the greatest Calms, by reason that being provided with as good Guns as their Coursiers, they are capable to do them a great deal of harm if they come too near them.

Tho the King of Spain should increase his Forces of one half in that Sea, which he cannot do with∣out

a great Expence, he would not be in a condition to repair the harm we could do him, by reason of the Union of our Forces and the Division of his.

Such a Body may attempt any thing, it may attack the Spanish Armies in their Ports, when they are assembling there, experience having convinc'd us in the retaking the Isles of St. Marguerit and St. Honorat, that floating Fortresses, prevail over the most secure of the Sea, when Men know how to use them boldly.

By this means your Majesty will preserve the Li∣berty of the Princes of Italy, who have been hither∣to as it were, Slaves to the King of Spain.

You will incourage those who have endeavour'd to cast off the Yoke of that Tyranny, which they only bear because they cannot free themselves from it, and foment the Faction of those who are French∣men in their Hearts.

The late King your Father, having order'd Monsieur d' Alincourt to make reproaches to the Great Duke Ferdinand, for having made a new engage∣ment with Spain, notwithstanding the Aliance he had contracted with him, by the Marriage of the Queen your Mother: The Great Duke after ha∣ving given a patient hearing to what he said to him upon that subject, made an answer which signify'd much in few words, and which must be consider'd by your Majesty and by your Successors; Had the King had forty Gallies at Marselles, I would not have done what I have done.

The Passage Pignerol gives your Majesty into Ita∣ly, being well preserv'd, if you open another by Sea, time and the steadiness which will be observ'd in your Councils, the inconstancy of which is fear'd

upon the account of the Levity of our Nation, will alter the Hearts of many Italians, or rather will in∣courage them to shew what they have been all along.

Italy is look'd upon as the Heart of the World, and indeed it is the noblest part of the Empire of the Spaniards, it is the place where they dread most be be attack'd and troubl'd, and that in which it is most easie to obtain great advantages over them, provided we go about it as we should do.

And consequently, tho' one had no design to do them any harm, nevertheless it is necessary to be in a condition to give them a Counter: stab so near the Heart whenever they shall attempt any thing a∣gainst France, that their Arms may no longer have strength enough to attempt any malicious designs against us.

That Force will not only keep Spain in Awe, but it will oblige the Grand Seignior and his Subjects who only measure the Power of distant Kings, by that which they have at Sea, to be more careful than they have been hitherto, to keep the Treati••s they made with them.

Algier, Tanis, and all the Coast of Barbary, will respect and fear your Power, whereas, they have despis'd it hitherto with an incredible infidelity.

In that case the Barbarians will either live willing∣ly in Peace with your Majest's Subjects, or if they are not so wise as to do it, they will be compell'd to do that by Force, which they have refused to do by Reason.

Whereas at present tho' we think we have no War with them, we receive all the Evils of it, and we neither enjoy Peace, nor the advantage we ought to reap by it; We will find Calm and Safety in War,

which is very advantageous with Men whose natural Infidility is so great, that there is no way to avoid it but by Force.

It now remains to examine the Expence, which will be necessary for the maintenance of the num∣ber of Ships above projected, which tho never so great will be inconsiderable in comparison of the ad∣vantages we will receive by it; And yet it may be done with two Millions and five hundered thousand Livers, according as it will appear by the Settlement which will be inserted at the end of this Work.

SECTION. VI. Which Treats of Trade, as a dependency of the Power of the Sea, and specifies those which aremost Convenient.

IT is a Common but a very true saying, that as States often are Inlarg'd by War, so they are commonly inriched in time of Peace by Trade.

The Wealth of the Hollanders, which properly speaking are only a handful of Men reduc'd into a Corner of the Earth, in which there is nothing but Waters and Meadows, is an Example and Proof of the usefulness of Trade, which admits of no contestation.

Tho that Country produces nothing but Butter and Cheese, yet they furnish all the Nations of Europe with the greatest part of what is necessary to them.

Navigation has made them so famous, and so po∣werful throughout the whole World: That after having made themselves Masters of the Trade of the

East Indies, to the prejudice of the Portugueze who had been long settled there; they have cut out a great deal of Work for the Spaniards in the West Indies, where they injoy the Major part of Brasil.

As in England the greatest part of those whose Circumstances are the least easy maintain themselves by common Fisherys the most Considerable drive a greater Trade in all the Parts of the World, by the Manufactures of their Cloth, and by the Sale of Lead, Tynn, and Sea Cole, which are product∣ions of their Country. The Kingdom of China, the Entrance into which is allow'd to no body, is the only Country in which that Nation has no Place settled for their Trade.

The City of Genoa which only abounds in Rocks makes so good a Use of its Trade, that I may safely affirm that it is the Richest City in Italy, if the suc∣cors of Spain. —

France only abounding too much within it self, has hitherto neglected Trade, tho they are as con∣veniently seated for it as their Neighbours, and might free themselves of the assistance they receive from them on that account at their own Cost.

The Fisheries of the Ocean are the easiest, and most useful Commerce, which can be made in this Kingdom. It is the more necessary, in that there is no State in the World so well Peopled as France.

That the Number of those who are out of the Road to Heaven, is very inconsiderable compar'd to the Catholics, who living under the Laws of the Roman Church, abstain the third part of the year from the use of Meat.

And that none of the dispensations practised in Spain are used there, to eat Meat at all times under a specious pretence.

Trade will be the easyer for us, in that we have a great number of Sea Men, who heitherto have been oblig'd to seek out imployment among our Ene∣myes, having none at home, and we have made no other use of them hitherto but to get salt Fish and Herrings. But having wherewith to imploy our Mariners, instead of being Constrained to strengthen our Enemies, by weakning our selves, we will be able to carry into Spain and other Countrys, that which they have hitherto brought to us, by the assistance of our Men who serve them.

France is so fertile in Corn, so abounding in Wine, Flax and Hemp to make Cloth and Riggings so ne∣cessary for Navigation, that Spain, England, and all other Neighbouring States, must have recourse thither.

And provided we know how to improve the ad∣vantages which Nature has given us, we will get money of those who have occasion for our Goods, without troubling our selves much with their Commoditys which are of little use to us.

Spanish, English and Dutch Cloths, are only super∣fluous; we may make them as good as theirs, getting Wool from Spain as they doe. Moreover we may have them more conveniently, upon the account of our Corn, and Linen Cloths, if we will exchange them to make a double gain.

Our Kings having made a shift with Draps de Berry, we may very well make a shift now with Draps de Sceau, and de Meu∣nier or Millers Cloth, which

are now made in France, without having recourse to those that are made abroad, the use of which will be abolish'd by this means, as well as the Serges of Chalons and of Chartres have abolish'd those of Milan.

And indeed the Draps de Sceau are insomuch re∣quest in the Levant, that next to those of Venice made with Spanish Wool, the Turks preferr them to all others; and the Citys of Marselles, and of Lyons. have heitherto driven a very great Trade in them

France is Industrious enough, Not to stand in need of the best Manufactures of our Neighbours such fine Plushes are made at Tours, that they are sent into Spain, Italy and other foreign Countrys, the Plain Tafetas which are made there also, are so much in Vogue throughout France, that there is no need to look for any elsewhere. Red, Purple and Spotted Velvers, are made finer there now than at Genoa: It is also the only place in which Silk Serges are made. Mohair is made as good there as in Eng∣land; the sinest Cloths of Gold are made finer there, and Cheaper than in Italy.

So that we may easily forbear that Trade, which only serves to foment our Laziness, and to feed our Pride, to stick solidly to that which may increase our Wealth, and imploy our Mariners, insomuch that our Neighbours may not improve our labours at their cost.

Over and above those above specify'd which are the best in the Ocean, many others may be made.

The Skinners Trade of Canada is the more neces∣sary, because there is no need of carrying Money there, and that they take such Commodities in Ex∣change, as scizzer Cases, Knives, small Pen-knives,

Needles, Pins, Bills, Hatchets, Watches, Hat-bands, Points, and other sorts of Mercery Wares.

That of the Coast of Guiny in Africa, in which the Portgueze have long possess'd a place call'd Castel de Mine, which the Hollanders of the West-India-Com∣pany have taken from them within these 2 or 3 years is of the same nature, in that the only Goods ex∣ported there, are Pedlars Wares, Canvass and course Linen Cloths, in exchange of which the Negroes give Golden Powder.

The Merchants of Roans have formerly driven a Trade of Linen and Woolen Cloths in the King∣dom of Fez and of Morrocco, by means of which they got a great deal of Gold.

Were the King's Subjects strong in Shipping, they might ingross all the Trade of the North, which the Dutch have got, by reason that the North stan∣ding absolutely in need of Wine, Vinegar, and Brandy-Wine, of Chesnuts, of Pruens, and of Nuts; all Commodities in which the Kingdom abounds, and which cannot be consum'd in it, it is easie to make a considerable Trade of them, and the better in that returns may be made of Wood, of Copper, of Pitch and Tar; things not only useful for our selves, but necessary for our Neighbours, who can not get them from them without our Goods, unless they will lose the fraight of their Ships in going thither.

I do not enter into the particulars of the Trade which may be driven in the East-Indies, and in Persia, by reason that the humour of the French being so hasty, that they will see the effects of their desires as soon as they have conceiv'd them: Long Voyages are not suitable with their temper.

However as abundance of Silks and Carpets are brought from Persia, many Curiosities from China, and all manner of Spices from divers places in those parts of the World, which are of great use to us, that Trade is not to be neglected.

To make a good Settlement, it would be neces∣sary to send two or three Ships into the East, Com∣manded by Persons of Quality, Prudence, and Wisdom, with Patents and necessay Powers, to Treat with those Princes, and to Make Allyances with the People on all sides, as the Portugueze, English, and Dutch have done.

This design would succeed the better, by reason that those who have taken a footing in those Na∣tions, are very much hated by them at present, ei∣ther because they have deceiv'd them, or because they have subdued them by Force.

As to the West, there is no great Trade to be expected there, Drake, Thomas Cavendish, Sperberg, L'Hermite, le Maire, and the late Count Maurice, who sent twelve Ships thither of 500 Tuns, on purpose to Trade there, either by way of Friend∣ship, or by Force, not having been able to make any settlements there; there is but little to be hop'd for on that side, unless a Military Force be sent thi∣ther to take possession of the places Spain possesses there at present.

The little Isles of St. Christopher, and others sea∣ted at the Head of the Indies may yield some To∣bacco, some Skins, and other things of small con∣sequence.

THERE NOW REMAINS TO KNOW WHAT MAY BE DONE IN THE ME∣DITERRANEAN.

Trade of the Mediteranean.

Memorial of the different Trades driven in the Levant.

Napoli de Romania.

The French carry some Goods there and Mo∣ney, and bring back Silks, Goats Leather, Wool, Wax, and Cheefe, part of which is destributed and sold in Italy.

Satalia.

The French only carry Money there, and bring back Cotton, Wax, and all manner of Goat Skins.

Smyrna.

The French carry more Goods there than Money, abundance of Merchandise going off there, for Chio, the Archipelago and Constanti∣nople. The Goods carry'd there, are Pa∣per, Caps, Draps de Paris, and of Languedoc, Brasil Wood, Cutchaneal, Spices, Satins made at Lyons; and sometimes they bring back Persian Silks, and Rubarbs, which the Persians bring thither, Cottons spun into Thred, Wax, Ma∣stick, and course Carpets.

Scala Nova.

Sometimes our Ships take in Wheat and Le∣gumes there.

Constantinople.

The French carry abundance of Goods there, which are the same that are carry'd to Smyrna, ex∣cepting Gold, Silver, and Silk Stuff, and very seldom Money; they bring back Leather and Wool, there being nothing else; and often not finding Commodities for the Goods that have been sold there, they are oblig'd to send the said Money to Smyrna to be imploy'd there, or else it is remitted by Bills of Exchange to Aleppo, there are always abundance of Goods to be bought there to carry into Christendom.

Isle of Cyprus.

In which there are divers Ports; Money is carry'd thither, some Cloths and Caps; and in return we take Cotton spun into Thred, Silks made in the said Isles, and some Drugs.

Alexandria and the Port of Aleppo.

Abundance of Merchandice and Money are carry'd thither from France. Those Goods are the same which are carry'd to Smyrna. And vast quantities of Silks and Drugs are taken in there, all sorts of Cottons, Oak Apples, Goat Skins, which they stile of the Levant, Red, Yellow, and Blue, Callicos, and sometimes Indian Goods, which are brought there from Persia. Before the English, and Dutch went into the Indies, all Per∣sian Silks, Drugs, and other Goods were brought to Aleppo, from whence they were brought to Marseilles, and from thence they were afterwards sold throughout France, England, Hol∣land

and Germany. And now the said English and Hollanders, have taken away the said Trade from us, and do not only furnish all France with Per∣sian Goods, but also with those they buy on the Grand Seignior's Territories, which they carry through Persia to Goa, where they lade.

The Goods that are brought from the Levant, are dispos'd of in Sicily, Naples, Genoa, Leghorn, Majorca, and throughout Spain, Flan∣ders, and Germany.

Seyda, the Port of Tripoly, Barut, and St. John d'Acre.

The French carry some Commodities thither, and for the most part Money; they bring back from thence Silks, spun Cottons, Ashes to make Soap, Drugs which come from Damascus, sometimes they take in Rice, and when they have a good Crop of Wheat, they suffer our Ships to take lading of it.

Alexandria, the Port of Aegypt and Grand Cairo.

The French carry several French Commodities thither, as Cloth, Paper, Brasil, Cochaneal; but more Money than Goods; they take in their Natron, Drugs of divers sorts, and most of the Goods which sell in Italy or in Spain.

Formerly all sorts of Spices were brought to Alexandria through the Red Sea, which were car∣ry'd to Marseilles; but now the English and Hol∣landers go into the Indies, we must buy them of them.

Tunis.

Wine is transported thither from Marseilles, Hony, Tartar, Cloth, Paper, and other Goods, and seldom any Money, and Leather and Wax is taken in there.

Algiers and the adjacent Ports.

The same Commodities are often carry'd thi∣ther from Marseiles which are carry'd to Tunis, and Leather and Wax, are also brought from thence.

I own I have been long deceiv'd in the Trade the Proveneals drive in the Levant.

I was of opinion with many others, that the said Trade was prejudicial to the State, thinking accord∣ing to the common notion of the World, that it ex∣hausted the Money of the Kingdom, in exchange of Goods no wise useful, and only fit to indulge the Luxuriousness of our Nation.

But having made an exact enquiry into the Na∣ture of that Trade, condemn'd by the publick voice, I have alter'd my opinion upon such solid grounds, that whoever will know them, will certainly think I have done it with Reason.

It is certain that we stand in absolute need of most of the Commodities of the Levant, as Silks, Cot∣tons, Wax, Goat Skins, Rubarb, and several other Drugs which are necessary to us.

It is also certain that if we do not fetch them, Strangers will bring them to us, and get the profit, we might get our selves.

It is likewise certain that we do not carry near so much. Money into the Levant, as French Commodi∣ties: our Hemp, our Linen Cloath, our Timber

to build Ships are in greater request there than Money.

Those who understand the Trade of the Levant, know that the Money which is carry'd thither, is not of the growth of France, but Spain, from whence we draw it by the Trafick of those very Commodities we bring from the Levant; which is very observable.

They are moreover sensible that the more the City of Marseilles Trades into the Levant, the richer it is in Money.

That the Silks and spun Cotton which are the principal Commodities which come from the Le∣vant, are wrought in France, and from thence tran∣sported into Foreign Countries, with a profit of Cent. per Cent upon the buying of the said Manufa∣cture. That the said Trade maintains a vast num∣ber of Workman, and that it preserves us.

That it imploys abundance of Seamen, useful in time of Peace, and necessary in War.

Finally, That the Customs of the said Trade amount to a great deal of Money.

And therefore it is evident that the said Trade is not only advantageous, but absolutely necessary.

Whatever advantages may accrue by the Trade of the two Seas, the French will never apply them∣selves to it with delight, unless the means appear as easie to them, as the end is useful.

One of the best expediments to incourage them for their own good, is that your Majesty would be pleas'd yearly to fell them some of your Ships at an easie rate, on condition that they shall imploy them for Trade, and not sell them out of the Kingdom.

This Medium applying a Remedy to their im∣patience, which does not permit them to tarry for

the building of a Ship, to make use of it, will be the more agreeable to them, in that it will enable them to reap almost as soon as they have sown.

Beside the profit that will thereby accrue to pri∣vate persons, the State will receive a considerable advantage by such an Order; by reason that the Merchants will be very considerable in six years time by the number of their Ships, and in a condi∣tion to assist the Kingdom in case of need, as it is practis'd in England, where the King makes use of his Subjects Ships, in time of War, without which he would not be so powerful at Sea, as he is.

Moreover the number of Ships your Majesty de∣signs to keep, will not be lessen'd by it, since the Publick Docks you have been pleas'd to re-establish, will furnish you yearly as many as you please.

There is no State in Europe fitter to build Ships than this Kingdom, abounding in Hemp, Linen Cloth, Iron, Rigging, and in Workmen whom our Neighbours commonly debauch from us, because they are not imploy'd at home.

The Rivers Loire and Garrone have such conveni∣ent places for Docks, that Nature seems to have de∣sign'd them for that use.

The cheapness of Victuals for the Workmen and the conveniencies of divers Rivers which disburthen themselves into them, and bring all manner of ne∣cessaries, justifie the said Proposition.

If next to this Expedient, your Majesty will think fit to grant Merchandising some Prerogatives to give a Rank to Merchants, whereas your Sub∣jects are oblig'd to obtain it by divers Offices, which are only good to maintain their idleness, and to please their Wives, you will restore Trade to that

degree, that every one, and all in general will be advantag'd by it.

In fine, if besides those two Favours, you will be pleas'd, to take a particular care to clear these two Seas from Pirates, which may easily be done; France will soon add to its Natural Plenty, what Trade af∣fords to the most barren Countries.

Six Guard Ships of two hundred Tuns, and six Pinnaces well Arm'd, will be sufficient to secure the Ocean, provided the said Ships keep constantly at Sea.

And in order to secure the Sea of the Levant, it will also be sufficient to put out to Sea yearly to∣wards the month of April, a Squadron of ten Gallies, steering their Course towards the Isles of Corsica and Sardinia, cruising all along the Coast of Barbary, un∣to the Streights, steering the same Course back again, not to come home again until the Weather com∣pels them to it, at which time six Ships well Equip'd shall put out to Sea in their room, to perform their Caravan in the Winter time.

SECTION VII. Which shows that Gold and Silver are one of the princi∣pal and most necessary supporters of the State; declares the means to make this Kingdom Powerful in that kind: shows the revenue of the same at present, and how it may be improv'd for the Future, in discharging the People of three parts in four of the Burthen which overwhelms them at this Time.

IT is an old saying, that the Finances are the sinews of a State; and it certainly is the point of Archi∣medes which being firmly settled, Inables to move all the World.

A necessitous Prince can never undertake a Glo∣rious Action, and necessity ingendring Contempt. He can never be reduced to that condition without being exposed to the Efforts of his Enemys and of those who are Envious of his Grandeur.

Gold and Silver, are the Tyrants of the World, and tho' their Empire is unjust in it self, it is some∣times so reasonable, that we must suffer the Domi∣nion of it; and sometimes it is so extravagant that it is impossible not to detest the yoke of it, as all-together Insupportable.

There must be, as I have already observ'd it, a proportion between what the Prince draws from his Subjects, and what they can give him, not only without ruining themselves, but without a notable Inconvenience.

As it is reasonable not to exceed the Power of those that give, neither can less be exacted than what the necessity of the State Requires.

None but Pedants, and the real enemys of the State, can say, that a Prince ought not to exact any thing from his Subjects, and that his sole Treasure ought to lay in the Hearts of those who are submit∣ted under his Dominion.

But at the same time, none but Flatterers, and the true Plagues of the State, and of the Court, can Insinuate to Princes, that they may exact what they please, and that in that Case their Will is the Rule of their Power.

Nothing can be more easy than to find plausible Reasons, to raise Money even when there is no ne∣cessity for it; neither is any thing less difficult than to produce apearent arguments, to Condemn the same tho never so necessary.

Men must lay aside all Passions, to be able to Judge, and to decide, what is reasonable on such oc∣casions, and there is no small difficulty to find the dertain point of a just Proportion.

The Expences which are absolutely necessary for the subsistance of the State, being fix'd, the less a Prince can raise among the People is the best.

In order not to be forc'd to raise great summs, it is necessary to spend little, and the best way to make moderate expences, is to banish all Profusion, and to Condemn whatever may tend to that end.

France would be too Rich, and the People too abounding, if it did not suffer the dissipation of the public Revenue, which other States spend with rule.

They lose more, in my opinion, than some King∣doms who pretend some Equality with us, Com∣monly spend.

A Venetian Ambassador told me, one day, witti∣ly upon this Subject, speaking of the Wealth of France, that in order to make us perfectly happy, he only wish'd we knew as well how to spend that well, which we dissipate without reason, as the Republic knew how to lay out every Quatrain, without waste, and without overmuch husbandry.

If it were possible to regulate the appetite of the French, I would think that the best way to man∣age the King's purse, were to have recourse to that expedient; but as it is impossible to prescribe bounds to the greediness of our Nation, the only way to contain them is to use them as Physicians do famish'd Pationts, whom they constrain to use abstinence, by keeping all manner of Victuals from them.

To that end it is necessary to reform the Finances, by the suppression of the chief means, by which Men get money unlawfully out of the King's Coffers.

Among them all, none are so dangerous as that of the Comptans, the abuse of which is grown to that heigth, that not to remedy it, and to ruin the State is one and the same thing.

Tho it is useful to use them on some occasions, and that it seems necessary in others, nevertheless the great inconveniences, and the abuses which ar∣rise by it do so far surpass their usefulness, that it is absolutely necessary to abolish them.

Whole Millions will be sav'd by this means, and a thousand conceal'd profusions will be redress'd, which it is impossible to discover as long as the se∣cret ways of spending the public Treasure will be in use.

I am sensible that some will urge that there are some foreign expences, which by their Nature must be kept secret, and which the State may receive considerable advantages by, which it will be depriv'd of whenever those in favour of whom they may be made, will think they can get no more Money out of them.

But so many robberys are committed under that Pretence, that I am of opinion upon mature deli∣beration, that it is better to lose some advanta∣ges which may accrue by it, than to be thereby exposed to all the abuses which may be daily com∣mitted to the ruin of the State.

However not to Obstruct the means of making some secret Expences to the advantage of the State, a million of Gold may be allowed for the said

private expences, on condition that the laying of it out shall be sign'd by the King himself, and that those who shall have a share in it, shall give acquittances for the same.

If any one urges that these Comptans are necessary for the remitments which are in use, I say that it is one of the reasons, for which it is fit to remove them.

Since Men have liv'd in former ages without the aforesaid Comptans, the same may be done again, and if in laying aside the use of them, the use of Farming were also abrogated, instead of doing any harm, it will do a great deal of good.

Some perhaps may wonder, why, since I know the use of the Comptans to be of ill consequence, I did not retrench it in my time.

The great Henry was sensible of the evil establish'd in his Predecessor's time, and could not remove it.

The Troubles, and Intestine broils, the foreign Wars, and consequently the great Expences, and the extraordinary Farms the King has been oblig'd to make and to let out to raise Money, have not permitted the thinking on the Execution of so good an advice.

The ruining the Huguenot Party, abating the Pride of the Grandees, maintaining a great War against Powerful Enemys, in order to secure the fu∣ture Tranquillity of the State by a good Peace, are all means which have been used to reach the ends proposed, since that is the way to remove the Causes of the Toleration of those abuses.

The Subject of the Comptains, having given me an occasion to speak of the letting out of extraordi∣nary Farms, I cannot forbear saying that the great augmentations of the revenue, which may be made that way are so far from being advantageous to the State, that on the Contrary they are very preju∣dicial, and Inpoverish it, instead of Inriching it.

Perhaps this proposition may be looked upon at first as a Paradox; but it is impossible to examin it carefully, without discovering the Justice and Truth thereof.

The King's Revenue can only be increas'd by the augmentation of the Impositions which are laid on all sorts of Commoditys, and therefore it is evident that increasing the revenue that way, Expences are increased at the same time, since those things must be bought dearer, which were bought cheap∣er before.

If Mear grows dearer, if the Price of Stufs, and of other things rises, the Souldiers will not be able to maintain themselves, and consequently it will be necessary to augment their Pay, and the salary of all Workmen will be greater than it was before, which will make the increase of the Expence an∣swerable to the augmentation of the Revenue and tho it will be a great grievance to the People, the Prince will be but very little the better for it.

Poor Gentlemen whose Estates consist in Land will not improve their Revenue by such Impositions; the Fruits of the Earth, will hardly rise in Price, at least for their advantage, and if the Times make them dear the less of them will be sold, so that at the Year's end, the poor Gentry will find no aug∣mentation in their Revenue, tho a very considera∣ble

one in their Expences, by reason that the new subsidys will raise the Price of all those things which are necessary for the maintenance of their Families, which they will make shift to maintain at home, tho' poorly, but they will be no longer able to send their Children into the Armies, to serve their King and Country, according to the obligation of their Birth.

If it be true, as it is most certain, that the sale of those Commodities which your Subjects deal in, diminishes according to the increase of Imposi∣tions, it may happen that such augmentations will lessen your Majesties Duties instead of increasing them.

If we consider such as are imploy'd in the Kingdom, it is certain that when Goods are at a rea∣sonable price, People buy, and really spend more, than when the price of them is excessive, for then they retrench even those which are most necessary.

If on the other hand we consider those Commo∣dities which are carry'd out of the Kingdom, it is plain that Foreigners who have hitherto been incou∣rag'd to buy them because they were cheap, will provide their stores elsewhere, if they can better themselves, which will leave France abounding in the Fruits of the Earth, but unprovided of Money: whereas the Impositions being moderate, the great quantity of Fruits which will be Exported by Fo∣reigners, will recompense the loss some may fancy by the moderation of Subsidies.

Moreover the increase of Impositions is capable to reduce a considerable number of the King's Sub∣jects to idleness, since it is certain that the major part of the poor People and Workmen imploy'd in

Manufactures, will rather be idle and do nothing, than consume their whole life in an ungrateful useless labour, if the unreasonableness of the Sub∣sidies hindering the sale of the Fruits of the Earth, and of their Labour, hinders them at the same time from receiving what they have earn'd by the sweat of their Body.

To resume the thred of my Discourse, after having condemn'd the abuse of the Com∣tans, and demonstrated that the aug∣mentation of Subsidies, is sometimes not only uselss, but often prejudicial; I say that there ought to be a Geometrical propor∣tion between the Subsidies and the necessities of the State, that is, that no Impositions ought to be made but such as are absolutely necessary for the subsistance of the Kingdom, in its Grandeur and Glory.

Those last words signifie much, since they show not only that it is lawful to raise that upon the Peo∣ple which is requisite to preserve the Kingdom what∣ever condition it may be in, but also to raise that which may be necessary to maintain it with Lustre and Reputation.

Nevertheless care must be taken not to extend those last conditions so far, as to think that the Prince's bare Will should be, under that pretence, the Rule of those Impositions, Reason must be the only Rule in those cases; and if the Prince exceeds those bounds, exacting more from his Subjects than he ought to do, tho' even in that case they owe him Obedience, he will be answerable for it before God, who will call him to a strict account for the same.

Moreover Reason and Policy, can never allow the increasing of the Peoples burthen, to receive no benefit by it: those that do it, draw publick Male∣dictions upon their Heads, which are attended with very ill consequences, since it is certain that the Prince who exacts more than he should do from his Subjects, only exhausts their Love and Fidelity, which are far more necessary towards the Subsistance of the State, and the Perservation of his Person, than the Gold and Silver he may hoard in his Coffers.

I am very sensible that in a great State it is al∣ways necessary to have a Fund to supply unexpected occasions; but that Fund must be proportion'd to the Riches of the State, and to the quantity of the Coyn'd Gold and Silver which is in the King∣dom; and unless it be regulated by that, the Riches of the Prince, would prove his Poverty, since his Subjects would no longer have any Fund themselves, either to keep up Trading, or to pay the lawful Duties they owe their Sovereign.

As a Prince ought to be careful to lay up Money to supply the necessities of the State, and Religious in preserving it, when there is no necessity to lay it out, he must be liberal in imploying it when Pub∣lick good requires it, and in doing it in due time; for delays in such cases are often dangerous to the State, and time thus lost, is never to be retriev'd.

We have examples of Princes who to preserve their Money, have lost both it and their States to∣gether, and it is most certain that those who lay out their Money with regret, commonly spend more than others, because they do it too late: It requires a great deal of Judgment to know the most impor∣tant hours and moments, and some may be capa∣ble

to lay up, who not knowing how to lay out, may occasion unutterable misfortunes.

But whereas general Maxims are always useless, unless a proper application be made of them; there now remains to see,

What the revenue of this Kingdom may amount to.

What the Expence of it may be.

What Fund is necessary to be kept in the Coffers; and to what degree the People may be eas'd.

The Revenue of this Kingdom may be consi∣der'd in two respects.

Either as it may be in time of Peace, with∣out altering the advance of Money which is drawn at present out of the general Receipts and Farms, making no other augmentation save that which may be made in reducing the old Rents which will be preserv'd, to six per Cent, as well as the Salary of certain Officers, who will rather suffer the Dimi∣nution of the same, than the Suppression of their Places with reimbursements.

Or, as it may be, in making certain alterations, thought so reasonable, and so useful, by those in whose Hands I have seen the Management of the Finances, that in their opinion no other opposition is to be fear'd but that of Novelty.

By the first Settlement, the Exchequer m••y expect to receive 35 Millions of Livers yearly, according to the following acount.

By the Taille, 17 Millions 350000 Livers.

By all the Gabelles, 5 Millions 250000 Livers.

By the Aids, one Million 400000 Livers.

By the Reduction of Rents to 6 per Cent, one Million.

By the Reduction of the Treasurers of France to two thirds of their Salary, which they will willing∣ly consent to, provided they are freed from the new Taxes they are daily plagu'd with, 552000 Livers.

Des Parties Casuelles, which is the Income the King receives by the Sale of Offices, and the Annual Du∣ty paid him out of the same, two Millions.

By the Farm of Bourdeaux, 800000 Livers.

By 3 Livers per Muid of Wine for the entrance into Paris, 700000 Livers.

By the ancient 30 Pence and the new addition of ten more for entrance upon every Muid of Wine brought into Paris, 503000 Livers.

By the Farm of 45 Pence instead of the Tolls, 503000 Livers.

By the 9 Livers 18 Pence per Tun of Picrady, 154000 Livers.

By the Farm of Brouage, 250000 Livers.

By the Exportation of Goods from Languedoc, Spices and Drugs from Marseilles, and two per Cent from Arles, 380000 Livers.

By the third additional Tax of Lyons, 60000 Li∣vers.

By the five great Farms, two Millions 400000 Livers.

By the new Impositions of Normandy, 240000 Livers.

By those of the River Loire 225000 Livers.

By the Farm of Iron, 80000 Livers.

By the Sales of common Woods, 550000 Livers.

By the Demeans, 550000 Livers.

By the second Settlement, discharging the Peo∣ple absolutely of the 17 Millions of Livers, which the King receives at present by the Tailes, the Re∣ceipt may amount to 50 Millions, as the following account will clearly justifie.

By an Imposition to be put upon Salt, or upon the Fens, in all the Provinces of the Kingdom, the King may receive all Charges being paid 20 Millions.

By a Penny per Liver upon all the Merchandise and Commodities of the Kingdom, 12 Millions.

By the Aids, one Million 400000 Livers.

By the Reduction of the price of the Rents constituted on the Hostel de Ville, six Millions.

By the Reduction of the Treasurers of France 550 thousand Livers.

By the Income the King receives by the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty paid him for the same, two Millions.

By the Farm of Bourdeaux, 1800000 Livers.

By the three Livers per Muid of Wine entrance into Paris, by a new Imposition, 700000 Livers.

By the ancient 30 Pence, and the new addition of ten more for the entrance of every Muid of Wine into Paris, 580000 Livers.

By the Farm of 45 Pence instead of the Tolls and Grants, 530000 Livers.

By the 9 Livers 18 Pence per Tun of Piccardy, 174000 Livers.

By the Farm of Brouage, 254000 Livers.

By the Exportation of Goods from Languedoc, Spices and Drugs from Marseilles, two per Cent from Mies, 380000 Livers.

By the additional Tax of Lyons, 60000 Livers.

By the five great Farms, two Millions 400000 Livers.

By the new Impositions of Normandy, 250000 Livers.

By those of the River Loire, 225000 Livers.

By the Farm of Iron, 80000 Livers.

By the Sale of common Woods, 550000 Li∣vers.

By the Demeans, 550000 Livers.

Summ Total, 50 Millions 483000 Livers.

I am very certain that this Settlement being well understood, will be found just and reasonable by all those who have any Experience and Capacity in the direction of States.

Among the several super-intendants of the Fi∣nances in my time, I have known some of the most learn'd in what relates to the Treasury, who equal'd the bare Imposition upon Salt, or upon the Fens, to the King of Spain's Indies, and who preserv'd that secret as the true foundation of the ease of the Peo∣ple, of the Reformation, and of the Wealth of the State.

And indeed let Men be never so dull, they must needs be sensible that it is impossible to express the discharge, and satisfaction the People would re∣ceive, if they were allow'd to use Salt as they do Wheat, every one buying no more than he thought fit, and could imploy.

It is certain that the suppression which would be made of the great number of Officers, which are established for the Imposition of the Salt, and the de∣liverance of the Disputes and Law-Suits they often commence to discharge their Trust, and sometimes

out of Malice, to constrain the People to take the Salt that is impos'd upon them, would be a wonder∣ful ease to them.

It is moreover certain, that one might easily re∣compence the Provinces, which hitherto have in∣joy'd the Exemption of Salt, by such a discharge of Tailles, that if for the future they were oblig'd to buy it dearer than they have done heretofore, the Dimi∣nution of the Taille would be equivalent to the aug∣mentation of the price of the Salt, to which they would be liable, tho' they should buy it freely.

It is also certain, that tho' it may be said, that the Diminutions of the Tailles only relate to the Peo∣ple, and that the augmentation of the price of Salt, which has hitherto been sold in the Provinces with∣out any Imposition, would concern the Clergy, the Nobility, and those who are free. All of them would receive the benefit of the Diminution of the Tailles, bp reason that the Revenue of the Tailles being taken off, the Revenue of Estates would in∣crease according as the Farmers who rent them were discharg'd of the Impositions which are laid on the Estates, they Farm.

Finally, It is certain, that notwithstanding the difficulties of such an Establishment, might prove great, yet they might be overcome.

If after having consider'd this Establishment of the Salt, we examine that of the Penny per Liver, it will be found the more just, in that it is established in many Countries, and that it has already been re∣solv'd upon twice, by the Body of the State, under the Great King Francis, and in the Assembly of the Notables at Roans, under the Great Henry of Eternal Memory.

Nevertheless whereas Suspicions are so natural in the People, and in communities, that they com∣monly place their principal safety in their dissidence, which ever induces them to fear that what is most useful for them, will prove disadvantagious, and that great alterations are for the most part liable to dangerous Revolutions. Instead of advising such an establishment, I presume to advise the contrary, and the more boldly, because such Novelties must never be attempted, unless they are ablolutely neces∣sary.

Now France is so far from being under such circum∣stances, that on the contrary I am of opinion that it will be much easier to ease the People, and to inrich the State, without having recourse to such expedients, than in putting them in practice: see∣ing that tho' there is no difficulty in it but what may be overcome; yet undoubtedly much greater would be met with, in having recourse to such alterations.

In order to verifie this proposition, it will be suf∣ficient to examine the Expences one may make a shift with in time of Peace, and to see what im∣provement may be made with the Money the times will allow to lay up.

The Safety and Grandeur of the Kingdom will allow no diminition of the expences of War, above mentioned, which will amount near unto twelve Millions.

The Charge of the usual Garisons, which a∣mounts yearly to three Millions, might be suppress'd, both because the major part of the Forces which will then be maintain'd by the State will be quar∣ter'd in the said Garisons, and by reason that the best part of the said three Millions are only

taken out of the King's Purse, to inrich the Gover∣nour's, who commonly keep but ten Men, when they should have a hundred.

But whereas it is difficult, not to have some Pri∣vileg'd places of such consequence, that it would be impossible to refuse the Governors of the same, some particular Garisons, to enable them the better to answer for them, as being of their own choice; In my opinion it will be proper to retrench two thirds of the said Expence, to reduce it to one Million.

The Expence of the Western and Eastern Sea, cannot be less than of two Millions 500000 Li∣vers, as it appears by the particular Settlements of the same.

That of the Artillery will amount to 600000 Livers.

That of the King's, the Queen's, and Monsieur's Housholds, to three Millions 500000 Livers.

The Pensions paid to the switzers, which can∣not be retrench'd in honour, amounts to 400000 Livers.

The Buildings will cost 300000 Livers.

AMbassadors 250000 Livers.

The Fortifications 600000 Livers.

All the Pensions might absolutely be retrench'd, which cost the King four Millions; but as it is im∣possible to pass from one extream to another with∣out a medium, and that the Court of France is not us'd to resist importunities, tho' never so unjust; I am of opinion that it will be sufficient to retrench one half of them. Which is the more necessary, in that it is advantagious for the Publick, that the I∣dleness of Courtiers may meet with no roward, and

that they may be all annexed to the Perils of the War, and thus Pensions and Salaries will only a∣mount to two Millions for the future.

The King's Gentlemen in Ordinary, 50000 Livers.

Warrants for the payment of certain summs 400000 Livers.

Casual Accounts, and the King's Progresses, two Millions.

Arrears of Duties, 150000 Livers.

The King's Privy Purse, 300000 Livers.

All these Expences amount only to 25 Millions, which being deducted out of 35 to which the Re∣ceipt amounts; there will remain ten, which for the first year shall be imploy'd towards the diminution of the Tailles.

The true way to inrich the State, is to ease the People, and to discharge both of their Burthens: In lessening the Charges of the State, the Tailles may be diminish'd, and no otherwise; and there∣fore it is the chief end which ought to be propos'd in the Regulation of this Kingdom.

In order to take true measures in an Affair of that consequence, it is necessary to know that tho' all the Le∣vies which are made in this Kingdom amount to near 80 Millions; upwards of 45 of the same are imploy'd in Charges, which may be so well husbanded, that whereas we may say at present, that the said Charges prove the

King's Ruine: I dare affirm that the King will be eas'd and inrich'd by the means thereof.

Many without doubt will be of opinion, that it would be fit to ease the State of all that burthen, but as it is impossible to make agreat Body subsist with∣out divers Expences absolutely necessary for its main∣tenance. As the weight of all these Charges toge∣ther cannot be born by the State, so the intire sup∣pression of the same cannot be desir'd with reason.

Three means may be propos'd for the diminution of the said Charges.

The first is grounded on the over long injoyment which private persons have had of the King's Mo∣ney, upon the Fund they have disburs'd to acquire the Rents, Offices, and Rights they enjoy.

I am sensible that it would be easie to dispossess some of the said persons of the Rents and Duties they receive, by making a true supputation of the Summs they have receiv'd, in which besides the Interest allow'd by the Laws, it would be easie to find the reimbursement of the price at first laid down by them for the same.

But tho' the Justice of the said expedient were al∣low'd of, Reason would not permit the making use of it, since that in so doing, it would be impossible for the future to find out Money to supply the necessi∣ties of the State, Whatever securities were offer'd.

Therefore it is necessary to observe that a thing may not be unjust, and yet contrary to Reason, and sound Policy, and to take care never to have recourse to any expedient, which without violating Reason, would nevertheless violate publick Faith.

If any urges that the publick must be pre∣ferr'd to private Interest, allowing his pro∣position, I desire him to consider that in the dis∣cussion of this point, those different kinds of Inte∣rests are not in the least concern'd, but that those of the publick, are counter-pois'd by others of the same nature, and that as the future has a far greater La∣titude than the present, which passes in an instant, those Interests which relate to the time to come, must be respected before those of the present, contrary to the custom of sensual Men, who prefer what is at the least distance from them, because the sight of their Reason has no greater extent than that of their Senses.

If we consider publick Faith in this point, as I think it absolutely necessary, the State will be far more eas'd by it than it would be, tho' part of its Charges should be suppress'd without making any new Lives, in that it will remain Master of the Purses of its Members on all occasions, and yet will considerably increase its re∣venue.

The second means to diminish the Charges of the Kingdom consists in the reinbursement of the Mo∣ney which was actually paid by private persons; but the verification of it would prove difficult, since that in order to facilitate the Sale of what the neces∣sity of the State has oblig'd to alienate that has of∣ten been given at four years purchase which appears to be ingag'd at six.

This medium tho justin it self, is not practicable without giving a pretence to many complaints, tho' ill grounded.

The third means for the Diminution of the Charges of the State, consists in reimbursing those that are not necessary, at the same price at which they are sold among private persons: Reimbursing the Owners of the Offices of the Rents and of the Duties which will be thought necessary to be sup∣press'd in this manner, they will receive no preju∣dice, and the King will not make use of the com∣mon advantage he has with private persons, who have the liberty to free themselves of the said Debts, when they are able to pay them at the rate they are commonly sold at.

This medium which is the only one that can be us'd, may produce its effect divers ways, either in many years time, by the bare management of the injoy∣ment of the said Charges, or in one only, by an im∣mense sum of Money which must be had ready by the supply of an extraordinary Fund.

The natural Impatience of our Nation, not al∣lowing us to hope, that we will be able to per∣severe 15 or 20 years in the same resolution: The first way which requires so much time, is nowise receivable.

The great Fund which is necessary to reim∣burse all at once such immense Charges as those of the State, would make this second proposition as ridiculous as impossible, and so the third only remains practicable.

In order to make use of it, with so much Just∣ice, that no body may have cause to complain, it is necessary to consider the charges which it will be necessary to suppress in three different manners, according to the divers rates at which they are sold.

The first Rents constituted up∣on the Taille which are commonly sold at five years purchace, ought only to be consider'd and reimburs'd at that rate, according to which their Injoyment of the same makes the Reimbursement of them in seven years and a half.

The other Rents constituted upon the Taille since the late King's Death, which are paid either in the Elections, or in the General Receipts, must be re∣imbursed at the rate of six years purchace, which they are sold at, the Injoyment of which will only reimburse them in eight years and a half.

The Offices of Elections with salaries, Taxa∣tions of Offices and other Rights which they injoy must be reimbursed at the rate of eight years Purchace, which is the common Price of such Places.

Reason requires the taking of the same method for the Reimbursement of the charges constituted upon the Aids, upon all the Gabelles, upon the five great Farms, upon the Foreign Farm of Langue∣doc and of Provence, upon the Customs of Lyons, upon the Convoy of Bourdeaux, the Custom of Bay∣one, the Farm of Brouage, and such Reimbursements can only be made by the bare Injoyment in eleven years time.

I am sensible that Rents of that kind are daily sold for less than eight years Purchace; but I pro∣pose the Reimbursement of them at this Rate, for the satisfaction of the partys concern'd, being sen∣sible that if in an affair of that importance, there must be a loss, it is better it should fall upon the King than upon them.

The Rate of all the Reimbursements which can be made, being justly establish'd; it is necessary to consider that there are some Charges so necessary in this Kingdom, or ingaged at so high a Rate, that I do not place them among those of which the Reimbusement is to be thought on, by the way I am proposing.

Those are the salarys of the Parliaments and other sovereign Courts, of the Presidials and royal Courts, of the King's Secretarys, of the Treasurers of France and receivers General.

Not that I think that no suppression ought to be made in those kind of Offices; that's far from my thoughts: But to proceed with order towards the diminution of the Charges of the Kingdom, Rea∣son requires that one should begin by the Reimburse∣ment of those which are sold at lower rates, and which are inconvenient to the Public.

For that reason, I prefer the suppression of the Rents establish'd upon the Tailles, and that of many Places of assessors, to all others.

That of those sorts of Rents, by reason of the low∣ness of their Price, and that of the assessors, be∣cause those offices are the true source of the People's Misery, both upon the account of their Number which is so Excessive, that it amounts to upwards of four Millions in Exemptions, as also of their Male∣administrations which are so Common, that there is hardly any one Assessor who do's not discharge his own Parish; that many draw considerably out of those they have nothing to do with, and that some of them are such abandon'd wretches, that they are not affraid of loading themselves with crimes, by adding Impossitions on the People, which they con∣vert to their own use.

That very consideration is the only one which hinders me at present from speaking of the suppres∣sions of many Offices of judicature, the Multitude of which is useless their Price being as extraordinary as their salarys are Inconsiderable, it would be an ill piece of husbandry to meddle with them, upon the account of the present necessity. When it will be thought fit to lessen the Number of them, the best way in order thereunto will be to make so good

a Regulation of the Paullette, that the said Offices being reduc'd to a mo∣derate Price, the King may be able when they become vacant, to Reim∣burse them to the owners, and suppress them at once,

Neither do I as yet include in the number of the suppressions, the Colleges of the King's Secre∣tarys, the Offices of the Treasurers of France, and the Receivers General, not upon the account of the smalness of their Profit, which is pretty considerable; but upon the account of the summs they have paid for the same which are not small.

Neither do I put in the old Rents which have been created in the time of your Majesty's Prede∣cessors which are paid in the Office of the City of Paris, both by reason that the actual summs disburs'd by the Purchacers, are greater than that of all the rest, and because it is fit that the interest of Subjects should in some manner be mix'd with those of their Soveraigns, as also because they are devolv'd to se∣veral Religious Houses, Hospitals, and Communi∣tys, towards the maintenance of which they are necessary; and that having been often divided in Familys, they seem to be settled there in such a manner that it would be difficult to remove them without disturbing their settlements.

Nevertheless in order not to omitt any husbandry that may be made with reason, to the advantage of the State, I must observe two things in this place.

The first is that the Office of the Treasurers of France remaining, a third part of their Salarys may be retrench'd, since they will think themselves very

favourably used in the general Reformation of the Kingdom, if in securing them against all new Taxes their Salary is redu'd to two thirds of what they have injoy'd hitherto, and had by their first Cre∣ation.

The second is that in not suppressing the Rents establish'd upon the Town House, in the late King's time, which are all Created at the rate of eight per Cont, which will be the more reasonable in that as no private Persons do allow above six, the owners of the said Rents settled upon the Town-House, will by your Majesty's favour get two per Cent more, in the injoyment of those of this Nature.

And as they will find an advantage by this, the King will do the same by reason that the Rents charg'd upon the State, will be more co∣veted than those of private Persons, supposing they be paid exactly without any deduction, as in reason they ought to be.

In order to pay the said Rents as well as the Sala∣ry of divers Officers either absolutely necessary or at least which cannot be suppressed in these Times, I am of opinion that it will be fit to suppress thirty Millions out of the fourty five this Kingdom is at present charged with, leaving the rest to acquit the remaining charges.

Out of the thirty Millions which are to be suppress'd, there are near seven, the Reimburstment of which being only to be made at the rate of five years Purchace, the suppression of the same will be perform'd in seven years and a half's time•• by the bare Injoyment of the same.

As many will be found, out of the remaining twenty four, which being to be reimburs'd at the rate of six years Purchace, which is the Currant price of them, will be suppress'd in eight years and a half's time, by the bare injoy∣ment.

But whereas, as abovesaid, long Winded designs are not the safest in this Kingdom, and that upon that account it is necessary to reduce all the suppres∣sions which are fit to be made to a number of years not exceeding the compass of our Patience; in or∣der to accomplish the Reimbursments which will be undertaken at the same time in which the Rents which are sold at five years purchace will be sup∣press'd by the very income of the same, an extra∣ordinary Fund must be rais'd to the Value of a sixth part of the currant price of the Rents, which amounts exactly to seven Millions once paid, for the suppression of as much revenue.

To accomplish the suppression of the thirty Mil∣lions propos'd, there still remains 16 to be reim∣burs'd, which must be done at the rate of eight years purchace, because it is the common price of them.

And whereas the reimbursement of those sixteen Millions, cannot be perform'd under twelve years time by the bare enjoyment of the same, and that it is necessary to shorten that time, to reduce the said suppression to the term of seven years, as well as that of the fourteen preceeding Millions, out of

eight parts three must be supply'd by extraordinary Funds, amounting to 48 Millions.

Tho' the greatness of the said summ may sur∣prize at first; those who are acquainted with the facility of Affairs of that nature in this Kingdom, will not question the feasibleness of the same, consider∣ing that it is only to be paid in seven years time.

And Peace will be no sooner set∣tled, but the practice of Parties, which is usual at this time to find out Money, being abolish'd, those who are bred in those sort of Affairs, not being able to alter their former way of living all of a sudden, will willingly convert all their Industry, to destroy what they have rais'd, by the same means they did use to establish it at first; That is, to extinguish and suppress by virtue of the Bargains they will make to that effect, the Rents, Rights and Offices, the creation of which they have promoted by virtue of other Bargains.

Thus the Kingdom may be eas'd in seven years time, of thirty Millions of common Charges which it bears at present.

The People being actually discharg'd of the 22 Millions of Taille, which is one half of what they bear at present; The Revenue of the Kingdom will be found to amount to 57 Millions, as the following Settlement will justifie.

RECEIPT

• Of the Tailles, 22 Millions.
• Of the Aids, 4 Millions.
• Of all the Gabelles, 19 Millions.

• Of all the other Farms 12 Millions.
• Total, 57 Millions.

Out of which deducting 17 Millions, which will be yearly put into the Exchequer, the said summ must be look'd upon to be so considerable, that there is no State in Christendom which lays up half so much, all the Charges of it being deducted before.

If next to these suppressions, which will make many persons liable to the Tailles, without their having any reason to complain of it, all Offices are suppressed which are officiated by Inrollment or by bare Commissions; if the number of Notaries be regu∣lated, not only such as are Royal, but those of com∣mon Jurisdictions, it will ease the People conside∣rably, both in that they will thereby be deliver'd of so many leeches, and that as there are upwards of 100000 Officers of this kind to be turn'd out, those who will sind themselves deprived of their usu∣al imployments, will be constrain'd to follow the Wars, to ingage into Trade, or to turn Labourers.

If in the next place all Exemptions are reduc'd to the Nobility, and to the Officers in ordinary of the King's Houshold, it is most certain that the Cities, and Com∣munities which are exempted, the Soveraign Courts, the Offices of the Treasurers of France, the Elections, the Salt Magazines, the Offices of Waters and of Forests, of the Demain, and of the Tithes, the In∣tendants and Receivers of Parishes, which compose a Body of upwards of 100000 exempted persons, will discharge the People of more than one half of their Tailles; it being also certain that the Richest, which are liable to the greatest Taxes, are those who get exemptions by dint of Money.

I am sensible that it will be urg'd, that it is easie to make such Projects, like unto those of Plato's Commonwealth, which tho' fine in his Ideas, is a real Chimera.

But I dare affirm, that this design is not only so reasonable, but so easie to execute, that if God pleases to grant your Majesty a speedy Peace, and to preserve you for this Kingdom with your Ser∣vants, of which I esteem my self one of the meanest, instead of leaving this Advice by Testament, I hope to accomplish it my self.

SECTION. VIII. Which shews in few words, that the utmost point of the Power of Princes must consist in the Possession of their Subjects Hearts.

THe Finances being manag'd as above written, the People will be absolutely eas'd, and the King will be Powerful by the Possession of his Sub∣jects Hearts, who considering his care of their E∣states, will be inclin'd to love him out of Interest.

Formerly the Kings thought themselves so happy in the Posses∣sion of their Subjects Hearts, that some were of opinion that it was bet∣ter by this means to be King of the French than of France.

And indeed this Nation had formerly such a Pas∣sion for their Princes, that some Authors praise

them, for being always ready to spill their Blood, and to spend their Estates for the Service and Glory of the State.

Under the Kings of the first, second, and third Race, until Phi∣lip le Bell, the Treasure of Hearts was the only publick Wealth that was preserv'd in this Kingdom.

I am sensible that former times have no relation nor proportion to the present; that what was good in one Age, is often not permitted in another.

But tho' it is certain that the Treasure of Hearts cannot suffice at present, it is also very certain that the Treasure of Gold and Silver is almost useless without the first: both are necessary, and whoever shall want either of them, will be necessitous in Wealth.

CHAP. X. Which concludes this Work, in showing that whatever is contain'd in it will prove in∣effectual, unless the Princes and their Mi∣nisters are so mindful of the Government of the State, as to omitt nothing which their Trust obliges them to, and not to abuse their Power.

IN order to conclude this Work happily, I am now to represent to your Majesty that

Kings being oblig'd to do many things more as Soveraigns, than as private Men, they can never swerve so little from their Duty, without commit∣ting more faults of omission, than a private person can do of commission.

It is the same with those upon whom Soveraigns discharge themselves of part of the burthen of their Empire, since that Honour makes them liable to the same obligations which lie on Soveraigns.

Both of them being consider'd as private persons, are liable to the same faults as other Men; but if we regard the Conduct of the publick which they are intrusted with, they will be found liable to many more, since in that sence they cannot omit with∣out sin, any thing they are oblig'd to by their Ministry.

In that consideration, a Man may be good and virtuous, as a private person, and yet an ill Ma∣gistrate, and an ill Soveraign, by his want of care to discharge the obligation of his Trust.

In a word, unless Princes use their utmost en∣deavours to regulate the divers orders of their State.

If they are negligent in their choice of a good Council; if they despise their wholsom Advice.

Unless they take a particular care to become such, that their Example may prove a speaking voice.

If they are negligent in establishing the reign of God, that of Reason, and that of Justice together.

If they fail to protect Innocence, to recompence signal Services to the Publick, and to punish diso∣bedience and the Crimes which trouble the order of the Discipline and Safety of States.

Unless they apply themselves to foresee and to prevent the evils that may happen, and to divert

by careful Negotiations, the Storms, which Clouds easily drive before them, from a greater distance than is thought.

If Favour hinders them from making a good choice of those they honour with great Imployments, and with the principal Offices of the Kingdom.

Unless they are very careful to settle the State in the Power it ought to have.

If on all occasions they do not preferr Publick In∣terest to Private Advantages, tho' otherwise never so good livers, they will be found more guilty than those who actually transgress the Commands and Laws of God; it being certain, that to omit what we are oblig'd to do, and to commit what we ought not to do, is the same thing.

I must moreover represent to your Majesty, that if Princes, and those who are imploy'd under them in the first Dignities of the Kingdom, have great advantages over private Men, they injoy that bene∣fit upon hard conditions, since they are not only lia∣ble by omission to the faults I have already observ'd, but also that there are many others of commission, which are peculiar to them.

If they make use of their Power to commit any injustice or violence, which they cannot do as private persons, they are guilty of a sin of Prince or Magistrate by commission, which their sole Authority is the source of, and for which the King of Kings will call them to a very strict account on the day of Judgment.

Those two different kind of faults peculiar to Princes and to Magistrates, must needs make them sensible that they are of a far greater weight than those of private persons, by reason that as universal

Causes, they influence their disorders to all those who being submitted to them, receive the impres∣sion of their movements.

Many would be sav'd as private persons, who damn themselves as publick persons.

One of the greatest of our Neighbouring Kings, being sensible of this Truth at his Death, cry'd out that he did not stand in so much dread of the sins of Philip, as he was apprehensive of the King's.

His thought was truly Pious, but it would have been much better for himself and for his Subjects to have had it before his Eyes in the heighth of his Grandeur, and of his Administration, than when in discovering the importance of it, he could no longer make that use of it which was necessary for his Conduct, tho' he might for his Salvation.

I humbly crave your Majesty would be pleas'd to reflect this very moment on that which that great Prince perhaps only thought on a few hours before his death; and to invite you to it by Example, as much as by Reason, I promise you that I will spend no day of my life without endeavouring to introduce that into my Mind, which ought to be there at the hour of my Death, in what relates to those Publick Affairs which you are pleas'd to intrust me with.

THE END.

Notes

• To omit no∣thing, I will ob∣serve in this Place, that it is better to have Magazins of Salt Petre, of Brimstone and of Coals than of Powder rea∣dy made, by rea∣son that it spoils in time by kee∣ping, and that an Accident of Fire is the more to be fear'd.
• The Power of Princes is the only means that can produce that Effect and there∣fore it only re∣mains to know what Forces ought to be kept on Foot in this Kingdom.
• The Number of Men which ought to be kept on foot in this Kingdom.
• War is some∣times recesla∣ry.
• Those that farm the Public Reve∣nue.
• Arriere Ban.
• Strangers necessary.
• A Remedy to make Armys Subsist.
• This Truth is so well Justify'd by the male ad∣ministration of the Summs raised for the Reparation of Citys and Churches.
• Cavalry.
• Remarks to make Armies subsist, and to make War ad∣vantagiously.
• A Waggon with four Horses must carry Se∣ven or eight Sep∣tiers of Wheat in all Countrys, amounting to 1500. pound weight. Every Septier weighing 240 in Bread it ought to carry 1000 Rations which must weigh 500 pounds, in Bisket it will carry 2000 Rations, thus 15 good Waggons will carry Bread for a fortnight for a tthousand Men, and Bisket for three Weeks, and consequently 225. Waggons will carry bread for 25. days and Bisket for 30 for an Army of 15000 Men.
• Compat of Gattary.
• The Guns plac'd in the Gallerys of the Gallies.
• The Manuscript is defective in this place.
• The Draps de Sceau, are made at Roan, and the Draps de Meunier at Remorantin, and Elbaeuf.
• Persons imploy'd to pay private ser∣vices.
• Persons imploy'd to pay private ser∣vices.
• Persons im∣Ploy'd to pay Private Services.
• Rents created upon the City, at 8 per Cont.

  Salt, one Mil∣lion 231411 Li∣vers.

  Aids 851000 Li∣vers.

  General Receipts 474184 Livers.

  All these Rents have been constituted from the year 1551 un∣til 1558.

  No Rents have been created in the Reign of Henry the 4th nor even in that of Henry the 3d. There are 23 Generalities; in every Office 24 Officers, which are in all 552. every one of which ha∣ving 1000 Crowns Salary, the third part thereof amounts to 552000 Livers.
• Like Guild-Hall.
• Of 44 Millions to which all the different sorts of Le∣veys, which are rais'd upon the People by virtue of the brief of the Taille amount; thereare 26 Millions imploy∣ed towards the payment of the Charges settled upon the Taille, which consist in Rents, or in Salaries and Taxation of Offices, or in Rights which have been en∣gag'd to them.

  Tho' the Farm of the Aids produces yearly 4 Mil∣lions, there is but 400000 Li∣vers return'd out of it into the Exchequet. The Rents Salaries, Taxationis, and Rights ingag'd upon the said Aids, consume all the rest, which is upwards of three Millions and a half.

  Notwithstanding all the Gabelles produce near 19 Millions, there is only five Millions 500000 and odd Livers of the same re∣turn'd into the Exchequer, because the remaindor which amounts to near 13 Millions is imploy'd towards the payment of the Rents created upon the said Gabelles, or towards the Salaries, Taxa∣tions and Duties of the Officers of the Magazins of Salt, or to∣wards the Salaries of the Parliament of Paris, Chamber of Ac∣counts, Court of Aids, Grand Council or the King's Secretaries.

  Although all the other Farms of the State produce twelve Millions, the King receives but ten of them, because upwards of two Millions must be deducted out of the same which are settled for the payment of some Rents. Salary of Officers, Taxations and alienated Duties.
• The Major part of the Rents constitu∣ted upon the Taille since 1612 are still in the hands of the Grand-Farmers, of their Heirs, or of those to whom they have made them over, and they have purchas'd them at so low a Rate, that they dayly expect the retrenchment of them, which would be a far greater greivance to them than the Reimburse∣ment of the same, at the common Price.

  The new Rents established upon the Aids, are only sold at se∣ven years Purchase, and they amount to two Millions.

  The new Rents upon the Gabelles are sold at seven years and a half Purchase, and they amount to five millions 260 thousand Livers.
• The Annual Duty the said Officers pay to the King.
• The Rents of which the Courant price is seven years pur∣chace, will a∣mount justly to six Millions 812 thousand Livers, Viz. six Millions which have been settled out of the eight allienated Millions upon the Tailles in the month of Febru∣ary 1634. 415 thousand Livers settled by Le Sr. Gaillard and his Partners in the month of January 1634. And 112 thousand Livers settled by an Edict of the month of March of the said year, by the Creditors of Moyssel and Payen.
• Farming part of the Re∣venue.
• Philip de Va∣lois.
• Ammian Marcellin Lib. 16 and 17.
• That Poli∣cy was ground∣ed upon the say∣ing of a great Prince, who tho' depriv'd of the Light which consists in Faith, nevertheless was so clear sighted by Reason, that he thought he could never want Money in his necessities, since he was belov'd by his People, who had enough for him.

  Cyrus and Xenophon, Book the 5th of his Institution.