The political will and testament of that great minister of state, Cardinal Duke de Richelieu done out of French.

THE Political Testament Of the Famous CARDINAL Duke de RICHELIEU. (Book 1)

PART I. (Book 1)

CHAP. I. A Short Relation of the King's great Acti∣ons, until the Peace concluded in the Year—

WHEN Your Majesty was first pleas'd to admit me into your Councils, and to repose a great Confidence in me for the Direction of your Affairs; I may af∣firm with Truth, that the Huguenots shar'd the State with you; that the Grandees behav'd them∣selves as if they had not been your Subjects; and the most powerful Governours of Provinces, as if they had been Soveraigns in their Imploy∣ments.

I may say, that the ill Example of both was so prejudicial to this Kingdom, that the best regu∣lated

Communities were tainted with their Beha∣viour, and in some cases lessen'd your Majesty's lawful Authority, as much as in them lay, in or∣der to extend their own beyond reason.

I may say, that every Man measur'd his Me∣rit by his Presumption; that instead of valuing the Favours they receiv'd from your Majesty by their Intrinsick Worth, they only valued them according as they were suitable to the Unruliness of their Fancy; and that the most daring were esteem'd the wisest, and often prov'd the most happy.

I may also say, that Foreign Alliances were de∣spis'd; Private Interest preferr'd to Publick Good; in a word, the Dignity of Royal Majesty was so much debas'd, and so different from what it ought to be, by the Defect of those who had then the principal Management of your Affairs, that it was almost impossible to distinguish it.

The Proceeding of those to whom your Ma∣jesty had intrusted the Helm of your State could no longer be tolerated, without ruining all; and on the other hand, it could not be alter'd all at once, without violating the Laws of Prudence, which do not allow the passing from one Ex∣tream to another, without a Medium.

The ill Posture of your Affairs seem'd to con∣strain your Majesty to take precipitated Resoluti∣ons, without Election of Time or of Means; and yet Choice was necessary in both, to improve the Alteration which Necessity exacted from your Prudence.

The Wisest were of Opinion, that it was im∣possible, without a Shipwrack, to steer through the

Rocks that appear'd on all sides in times of such Uncertainty: The Court was full of Men, who accus'd those of Rashness, who should dare to attempt it; and all of them knowing that Princes are apt to impute the ill Success of things that have been well advis'd, to those that are about them; so few expected a good Event of the Al∣terations, it was said, I design'd, that many con∣cluded my Fall, even before your Majesty had rais'd me.

Notwithstanding all these Difficulties which I represented to your Majesty, knowing what Kings can do, when they make a good use of their Power, I presum'd to promise you without Te∣merity, in my Opinion, what is come to pass in your State; and that in a short time your Pru∣dence, your Power, and the Blessing of God, would alter the Affairs of this Kingdom.

I promis'd your Majesty that I would use my utmost Endeavours, and all the Authority you were pleas'd to give me, to ruine the Huguenot Party, to abate the Pride of the Grandees, to reduce all your Subjects to their Duty, and to raise your Name again in Foreign Nations, to the Degree it ought to be.

Moreover, I represented to your Majesty, that in order to compass a happy end, it was ab∣solutely necessary you should conside in me; and that notwithstanding for the time past all those who had serv'd you had thought no way so proper to obtain and to preserve your Confi∣dence, as to remove the Queen your Mother from it, I would take the contrary way, and that nothing should be wanting on my side to

keep your Majesties in a strict Union, so neces∣sary for your Reputation, and for the Welfare of the Kingdom.

As the Success which has attended the good Intentions which God has been pleas'd to inspire me with, for the Settlement of this State, will justifie to future Ages the steadiness wherewith I have constantly pursued that Design; so your Majesty will be a faithful Witness that I have us'd my best Endeavours, lest the Artifice of some Evil-minded Persons should be powerful enough to divide that, which, being united by Nature, ought also to be united by Grace. If after ha∣ving, for many years, happily resisted their di∣vers Efforts, their Malice has finally prevail'd; it is a very great Comfort to me, that your Ma∣jesty has often been pleas'd to express, That while I was most intent on the Grandeur of the Queen your Mother, she labour'd for my Ruine.

But I refer this matter to another place, to keep to my present Subject, and not to break the Order I am to keep in this Work.

The Huguenots, who have never slipt any oc∣casion to increase their Party, having in 1624. surpriz'd certain Ships which the Duke of Ne∣vers was preparing against the Turk, afterwards rais'd a potent Navy against your Majesty.

Notwithstanding the Care of the Sea had been so far neglected till then, that you had not one Ship, your Majesty behav'd your self with so much Address and Courage, that with those you could get among your Subjects, 20 from Holland, and 7 from England, you defeated the Army the Rochelois had put out to Sea. Which

prov'd the more wonderful and happy, in that this advantageous Effect proceeded from a Suc∣cour which was only granted to serve you in ap∣pearance.

You took the Isle of Ré by the same means which the Rochelois had unjustly made themselves Masters of long before: You routed 4 or 5000 Men they had put into it to defend it, and forc'd Soubise, who commanded them, to fly to Oleron; which your Friends not only drove him out of, but also forc'd him to fly the Kingdom.

This happy Success reduc'd those Rebellious Souls to make a Peace so glorious for your Ma∣jesty, that the most difficult were pleas'd with it; and all agreed, that it was the most advantagi∣ous that had been made till then.

The Kings your Predecessors having for the time past rather received from, than given a Peace to their Subjects; though they were di∣verted by no Foreign Wars, they were Losers in all the Treaties they made with them; and tho' your Majesty had many other Occupations at that time, you then granted it to them, reserving Fort St. Lewis, as a Citadel at Rochel; and the Isles of Re and of Oleron, as two other Places which serv'd as a good Circumvallation about it.

At the same time your Majesty secur'd the Duke of Savoy from the Oppression of the Spa∣niards, who had attack'd him openly; and not∣withstanding they had one of the greatest Armies that had been seen of a long while in Italy, which was Commanded by the Duke of Feria, a great Man; you hinder'd them from taking Verua, of which your Arms, jointly with the Duke of Sa∣voy's,

sustain'd the Siege with so much Glory, that they were finally forc'd to raise the Siege shamefully.

The Spaniards soon afterwards making them∣selves Masters of all the Passes of the Grisons, and having fortify'd the best Posts of all their Vallies, your Majesty, not being able by a bare Negotia∣tion to free your ancient Allies from that In∣vasion, in which those unjust Usurpers had the more success, by reason that the Pope favour'd them, upon the vain Hopes they gave him of pro∣curing some Advantages for Religion, did that by force of Arms, which you had not been able to obtain by strength of Reason.

Your Majesty had by that means for ever freed that Nation from the Tyranny of the House of Austria, had not Fargis your Ambassador in Spain, at the Sollicitation of Cardinal de Berulle, made (as he has confess'd it since) without your Knowledge, and contrary to your Majesty's strict Orders, a very disadvantagious Treaty, to which you adher'd at last to oblige the Pope, who pretended to be concern'd in that Affair.

The late King your Father of Immortal Me∣mory, designing to marry one of your Majesty's Sisters in England, the Spaniards thought them∣selves oblig'd to break that Project, by marrying one of their Infanta's there. The Treaty there∣of being concluded, the Prince of Wales was so ill advis'd, as to expose himself to the Discretion of a Prince, who being Master of his Person, might impose whatever Law he thought fit up∣on him, and pass'd through France incognito, in order to go into Spain to marry her.

As soon as the thing was known here, such Negotiations were set on foot, that notwithstand∣ing the great Honours he receiv'd in that Court, where the King gave him the Right Hand all the while he tarry'd there, altho' he was no Crown'd Head at that time, the Marriage was broken off, and soon after it that of France was treated of, concluded and accomplish'd, with Conditions three times more advantagious for Religion, than those which were design'd to be propos'd in the late King's time.

Soon after that Powerful Cabals were form'd at Court, into which the Duke of Orleans your Brother was engag'd by those who had the Care of his Conduct, before his Age made him capa∣ble of it.

Being constrain'd to say, with great Regret, that a Person of the greatest Consideration was insensibly drawn into it, with several others, who fomented and follow'd her Passions. I cannot omit the Merit you acquir'd before GOD, and before Men, in suppressing the Noise her impru∣dent Conduct would have made, had you not wisely wink'd at what you might have repress'd, with as much safety as reason.

The English blindly engag'd in those Cabals: Many of the Grandees of the Kingdom enter'd very far into them: The Duke de Rohan and the Huguenot Party were to wage War within, while the English with a Potent Navy were to attack the Isles and Coasts of this State.

The Plot seem'd to be so well laid, that most Men were of Opinion, that it was impossible to resist the Force of the Conspirators. Neverthe∣less,

the taking off Colonel Dornano, the Duke de Vendome and the Grand Prior; the Cha∣stisement of Chalais, and the removal of some Princesses, broke that Cabal, insomuch that all the Designs projected in your Majesty's Court were dissipated, and had no effect.

As it was not without a great deal of Goodness and Prudence together, your Majesty consented at Nantes to the Marriage of Monsieur your Bro∣ther; so the Sincerity of your true Servants in taking the boldness to represent to you before∣hand the Inconveniences which might attend it, was a very great Proof of their Fidelity, and a certain Testimony they had no design to sur∣prize you.

All these Disturbances which seem'd to weaken your Power, did not hinder you from putting a stop to the course of Duels, by the Chastise∣ment of the Sieurs de Bouteville and des Chapelles. I own that my Mind was never more agitated than it was on that occasion, in which I had much ado to forbear yielding to the universal Compassion, which the Misfortune and Valour of those Young Gentlemen imprinted in the Hearts of all Men; to the Prayers of the great∣est Persons of the Court; and to the Importuni∣ties of my nearest Relations.

The Tears of their Wives mov'd me sensibly; but the Sluces of Blood of your Nobility, to which nothing could put a stop but the Effusion of theirs, incourag'd me to resist my own Inclina∣tions, and to persuade your Majesty to cause that to be put in Execution, for the good of the Kingdom, which was almost against the Sense of

every body, and against my particular Senti∣ments.

As it was not possible to stop the Course of, and to hinder the great Preparations the English had made for a War, your Majesty was oblig'd to oppose them by Force of Arms.

Those ancient Enemies of the State landed in Re, and there besieg'd the Fort St. Martin, while it was God Almighty's Pleasure to afflict France, by the Illness wherewith he visited your Majesty at Ville-Roy.

This dismal Accident, and the Ill Conduct which Le Coigneux and Puy Laurens endea∣vour'd a-new to inspire into Monsieur, did not hinder your good Subjects from opposing the Ef∣forts of that Warlike Nation, by the Influence of your bare Name. And your Majesty no sooner recover'd your Health, but you Reliev'd the Place they had Besieg'd, Defeated their Land-Army by a signal Combat, and forc'd their Na∣val Forces to quit your Coasts, and to make for their own Ports again.

After which you Besieg'd Rochel, and took it after a Years Siege: And your Majesty behav'd your self with so much Prudence, that tho' you were sensible that the Spaniards neither desir'd the taking of the said Place in particular, nor the Prosperity of your Affairs in general; judging that the bare appearance of their Union would be of use in the opinion of the World; and that it would be no small matter to hinder them by a Treaty from joining with the English, who were your Declar'd Enemies at that time; you

made one with them, which produc'd the only Effect your Majesty expected from it.

The Spaniards, who only design'd to deceive you, in order the better to cross your Majesty's Designs, and the taking of the said City, did ani∣mate the English as much as in them lay to re∣lieve it. And the Cardinal de la Cueva promis'd them positively, to that end, that his Master would send your Majesty no Succours, until you had no further need of it, and that he would re∣call it before it could annoy them: Which was so Religiously perform'd, that Don Frederick Ad∣miral of Spain, who Sail'd from the Coronna with 14 Ships, after he was inform'd of the De∣feat of the English in Ré, refus'd to tarry one day at Rochel, upon the Report that a new Fleet was coming to relieve the said City.

This Assurance incourag'd the English at two several times to attempt the Relieving of it, and afforded your Majesty the Glory of taking it with your own Forces, in sight of a Potent Na∣val Army, which, after two useless Engagements, had the Disgrace to see it self wholly frustrated of its end.

Thus at one and the same time the Infidelity and Cunning of the Spaniards prov'd ineffe∣ctual, and the English were over-reach'd.

During this Siege the Spaniards attack'd the Duke of Mantua in Italy: They took that time on purpose, thinking your Majesty would not be able to Succour him.

Cardinal de Berule, and Marillac the Lord Keeper, advis'd your Majesty to abandon that poor Prince to the Injustice and insatiable Avidity

of that Nation, which is an Enemy to the Re∣pose of Christendom, lest they should trouble you; the rest of your Council prov'd of a different Opinion; both because Spain durst not have ta∣ken such a Resolution immediately after your ha∣ving made a Treaty of Union with the English; and that tho' they should have follow'd so ill an Advice, they could not have been able to stop the Progress of your Designs.

They represented to your Majesty, that it would be sufficient not to Declare for the Duke of Mantua while you were engag'd in that great Siege; and that you could do no more, without committing a Baseness unworthy of a great Prince, who must never consent to it, whatever Advantages might accrue to him by it.

I should commit a Crime, if I did not observe in this place, that your Majesty, according to the Sentiments of your Heart and your usual Pra∣ctice, took the best and most honourable Party on that occasion; which was attended with so much Success, that soon after it Rochel was taken, and your Arms in a Condition to assist that Prince so unjustly Attack'd.

Although at that very time Monsieur your Brother, who was become a Widower a Year after his Marriage, had a mind to marry the Princess Mary; he was so ill advis'd, that in∣stead of favouring the Duke of Mantua her Father, he cross'd him more than his Enemies, by withdrawing from your Majesty, and re∣tiring into Lorraine, at a time when it was his Interest to be strictly united with you, in order to make your Power the more considerable.

This ill Conduct did not hinder your Maje∣sty from continuing the Journey you had under∣taken, for a Design so glorious; and God bless'd you so visibly, that as soon as you came to the Alps, you forc'd all the Passages of it in the midst of Winter, beat the Duke of Savoy, assi∣sted by the Spaniards; rais'd the Siege of Cazal, and constrain'd all your Enemies to agree with you.

This glorious Action, which restor'd Peace in Italy, was no sooner atchiev'd, but your Majesty, whose Mind and Heart never found any rest but in Labour, pass'd directly into Languedoc, where after having taken Privas and Alez by force, you reduc'd the rest of the Huguenot Party through∣out your Kingdom to Obedience, and by your Clemency granted a Peace to those who had pre∣sum'd to wage a War against you; not by grant∣ing them Advantages prejudicial to the State, as had been done till then; but by banishing him out of the Kingdom, who was the only Head of that miserable Party, and who had all along fo∣mented it.

That which is most considerable in so glorious an Action, is, that you ruin'd that Party abso∣lutely, at a time when the King of Spain en∣deavour'd to raise it again, and to settle it more than ever.

He had newly made a Treaty with the Duke of Rohan, to form in this State a Body of Re∣bellious States to God and to your Majesty at once, in consideration of a Million of Livres which he was to pay him yearly, for which he made the Indies Tributaries to Hell. But their

Projects prov'd ineffectual: And whilst he had the Mortification to hear, that the Person he had employ'd to be the Bearer of so glorious an Esta∣blishment, was executed upon a Scaffold by a Decree of the Parliament of Thoulouse, before whom he was Try'd, your Majesty had the Sa∣tisfaction and Advantage to pardon those who could no longer defend themselves, to annihilate their Faction, and to use their Persons well, when they expected nothing but the Chastisement of the Crimes they had commited.

I am sensible that Spain thinks to excuse so ill an Action, by the Succours you granted the Hol∣landers; but that Excuse is as ill as their Cause.

Common Sense will convince every body, that there is much difference between the continuation of a Succours established upon a Lawful Subject, if Natural Defence is so, and a new Establish∣ment manifestly contrary to Religion, and to the Lawful Authority Kings have received from Hea∣ven over their Subjects.

The late King your Father never enter'd into a Treaty with the Hollanders, until the King of Spain had form'd a League in this Kingdom to usurp the Crown.

This Truth is too evident to be question'd; and there is no Theology in the World, but will grant, without going against the Principles of Natural Reason, that as Necessity obliges those whose Life is attempted, to make use of all Helps to preserve it; so a Prince has the same Right to avoid the loss of his State.

That which is free in the beginning, some∣times becomes necessary in the sequel: There∣fore

no body can find fault with the Union your Majesty maintains with those People, not only in consequence of the Treaties of the late King; but moreover, because Spain cannot be reputed otherwise than as an Enemy to this State, whilst they retain part of its ancient Demeans: It is evident that the Cause which has given a Rise to those Treaties not being remov'd, the continua∣tion of the Effect is as lawful as necessary.

The Spaniards are so far from any Pretence of being in the same case, that on the contrary, their Designs are so much the more unjust; that instead of repairing the Injuries they have done this Kingdom, they increase them daily.

Moreover, the late King never join'd with the Hollanders, until they were entred into a Body of State; and was constrain'd to it by an Oppres∣sion which he could not wholly avoid: He nei∣ther occasion'd their Revolt, nor the Union of their Provinces.

And Spain has not only often favour'd the Revolted Huguenots against your Predecessors; they also endeavour'd to unite them in a Body of State in yours: A holy Zeal has induc'd them to be the Authors of so good an Establishment; and that without any Necessity, and consequently without Reason; unless the Continuation of their ancient Usurpations, and the new ones they design, rectifie their Actions so much, that what is forbidden to all the World besides, is lawful in them, upon the account of their good Intentions.

Having treated this matter more at large in another Treatise, I will leave it to continue the Sequel of your Actions.

The ill Faith of the Spaniards having induc'd them to attack the Duke of Mantua again, to the Prejudice of the Treaties they had made with your Majesty, you march'd the second time into Italy, where, by the Blessing of God, after having gloriously cross'd a River, the Passage whereof was defended by the Duke of Savoy with an Army of 14000 Foot and 4000 Horse, con∣trary to the Faith of the Treaty he had made with your Majesty the Year before: You took Pignerol in sight of the Emperour's and King of Spain's Forces, and of the Person and all the Power of the Duke of Savoy; and that which renders that Action the more Glorious, in sight of the Marquess de Spinola, one of the greatest Captains of his Time.

By that means you took Susa, and overcame at once the three most considerable Powers of Europe, the Plague, Famine, and the Impatiency of the French, of which there are not many Ex∣amples in History.

After which you Conquer'd Savoy, driving an Army of 10000 Foot and 2000 Horse before you, which had a better Advantage to defend it self in that Mountainous Country, than 30000 to at∣tack them.

Soon after which the Combats of Veillane and of Coriane signaliz'd your Arms in Piemont: and the taking of Valence, Fortify'd by the Duke of Savoy, in order to oppose your De∣signs, made the World sensible, that nothing could resist the Just Arms of a King as Fortu∣nate as Powerful.

Cazal was reliev'd, not only against the Opi∣nion of most Men, but even against the very Thoughts of the Duke de Montmorency, who had been employ'd to that end; and against the Opinion of Marillac, who was substituted in his Place, who both publickly declar'd, that it was an impossible Enterprize.

The Relief of the said Place was the more glo∣rious, in that a stronger Army than your Ma∣jesty's, retrench'd at the Head of the Milaneze, which furnished them with all sorts of Conveni∣encies, and shelter'd under the Walls of Cazal, which had been consign'd in their Hands, was constrain'd to quit it, and five other Places at the same time, which the Spaniards held thereabouts in the extent of Mont-Ferrat.

Those who know, that in the very height of that Design your Majesty was reduc'd to the ut∣most Extremity by a Fit of Sickness; and that tho' your Person was dangerously Ill, your Heart was yet in a worse Condition.

If they consider, that the Queen your Mother, at the Instigation of some malicious Persons, form'd a potent Party, which, weakning you, considerably strengthen'd your Enemies: If they also consider that they daily receiv'd Advice, that your Majesty's most faithful Servants, whom they both did hate and dread, would not much longer be in a Condition to do them any harm; they must needs acknowledge, that the Goodness of God has contriouted more towards your good Successes, than the Prudence and Force of Men.

It was at that very time the Queen your Mo∣ther us'd her utmost Endeavours to change your

Majesty's Council, and to establish one to her own mind.

It was at that very time also the Evil Spirits which possess'd Monsieur's Mind, were labouring in his Name, as much as in them lay, to ruine me.

The Mother and the Son had made an Agree∣ment, which was more contrary to the State, than hurtful to those whose Ruine they openly prose∣outed, since in the present state of Affairs it was impossible to alter without ruining them.

The Son had promis'd not to marry the Prin∣cess Mary, which the Mother dreaded to that de∣gree, that in order to prevent it, she had put him into the Castle of Vincenne in your Absence, where he tarry'd until that Agreement procur'd his Liberty; in exchange of which, the Mother had promis'd to put me out of your Majesty's fa∣vour, and to remove me from Court.

In order to render these Promises the more in∣violable, they were put in Writing; and the Duke de Bellegarde carry'd them long between his Shirt and his Skin, to shew that they touch'd his Heart; and to make those that had made them sensible, that he would never lose them without his Life.

There never was a stronger Faction in any State; it would be easier to name those who were not concerned in it, than those that were.

And that which encreas'd the wonder of your Conduct on that occasion, is, that being solliei∣tous my self to withdraw from your Majesty, to oblige the Queen, who desir'd it passionately; your Majesty being destitute of all other Counsel

at that time, had no body to consult with, and to help you to resist the Authority of a Mother, the Artifices of all her Adherents, and my earnest Sollicitations against my self.

I say this, because the Marshal of Schomberg, who was faithful to you, was absent at that time; and that the Lord Keeper Marillac was one of those, who, seconding the Queen in her Designs, serv'd her against her self.

Your Prudence was such, that in removing the Lord Keeper of your own accord, you deliver'd your self of a Man, who had so great an Opini∣on of himself, that he thought nothing well done, unless done by his Order; and who thought many ill ways lawful, to compass the Ends which were suggested to him, out of a Zeal which may be styl'd Indiscreet.

In fine, your Proceeding had so much Wis∣dom in it, that you granted nothing to the Queen to the prejudice of your State; and yet refus'd her nothing that could be granted without wounding your Conscience, and without acting as much against her as against your self.

I might forbear speaking of the Peace which was concluded at Ratisbonne between your Ma∣jesty and the House of Austria, by reason that as it was agreed on by your Ambassador on Con∣ditions, which the Emperour himself was sensible he had no Power to grant; for that reason it cannot be plac'd in the number of your Actions. But if the World considers, that tho' the Fault of your Ambassador could not be imputed to you; as it requir'd a great deal of Goodness to suffer it, it requir'd no less Address to repair it in some

measure, and not to lose the Fruit of a Peace which was so necessary to this State, at a time in which your Majesty had so many Crosses.

This Action will be look'd upon as one of the greatest you ever did, and consequently such as cannot be omitted in this place.

Reason and Conduct of State did require an Exemplary Punishment of him, who had ex∣ceeded your Orders in so nice a Point, and in so important an occasion: But your Goodness ty'd up the Hands of your Justice, by reason that tho' there was no Ambassadour but himself, he had not acted alone in that Affair, but with an Associate of such a Quality, as made you rather consider the Motive of the Fault, than the Fault it self.

They were both surpriz'd to that degree with the extream Illness you fell into at Lions, that they acted rather according to the Condition into which the Kingdom would have been by your Loss, than that in which it was, and according to the Orders they had receiv'd.

Notwithstanding the ill Conditions of their Treaties, the Imperialists were soon after forc'd to restore Mantua; the Dread of your Arms oblig'd them to restore what they had usurp'd over the Venetians and Grisons; and after your Majesty had suffer'd the Duke of Savoy's Forces to enter into Pignerol, and into the Fort and Val∣ley of Perouse, according to the Treaty of Que∣rasque: You agreed so well with him, that by vertue of a new Treaty those two Places did re∣main in your Majesty's Hands, to the general Satisfaction as well as Advantage of all Italy, which for the future will be less in dread of an

unjust Oppression, since it sets a Door open to its Relief.

At that very time the Discontents the Duke of Bavaria had receiv'd from the Emperour and from the Spaniards, and the Dread which all the other Electors both Catholicks and Protestants were in of being divested of their Stares, like ma∣ny other Princes at their Sollicitations, having in∣duc'd them secretly to desire your Assistance, your Majesty treated so dexterously with them, and with so much Success, that they hinder'd, even in the Emperour's Presence, the Election of the King of the Romans, notwithstanding the Dyet of Ra∣tisbone had only been Conven'd to that end.

After which, to pleasure the said Duke of Ba∣varia, and to satisfie the Electors, as well as to con∣firm them in their Resolution, of rendring the Ca∣tholick League not only Independent of the Em∣pire, but of Spain also, which usurp'd the Di∣rection of it; your Ambassadors kept so good a Correspondence with those Princes, that they faci∣litated the means to them of depriving Walstein of the Command of the Armies of the Empire, which prov'd very prejudicial to his Majesty's Affairs.

Your Majesty's Credit prov'd as great towards the North, since the Baron de Charnau, without the Title of Ambassador, procur'd almost at the same time a Peace between the Kings of Poland and of Sweden; a Peace which had been attem∣pted in vain by many other Potentates.

The said Peace gave way to the Enterprize the King of Sweden made soon after, to prevent the Oppression of the Princes of the Empire, in Ger∣many; which Design was no sooner known to

your Majesty, but to prevent the Prejudice the Catholick Religion might receive by it, you made a Treaty with him, which oblig'd him not to interrupt the Exercise thereof in all the places of his Conquest.

I am sensible that your Enemies, who endea∣vour to justifie their own Actions, by crying down yours, have us'd their best Endeavours to render that Agreement odious; but their Design had no other Effect, than to discover their Ma∣lice.

Your Majesty's Innocence is the more appa∣rent, in that your Ambassador never enter'd into any Treaty with that Conquerour, until Sin Months after his entring into Germany; which evidently justifies, that the Conditions that were made with the said Prince were the Remedy of the Evil, of which they could not be esteem'd the Cause.

The Treaties that were made not only with that Great King, but also with many other Prin∣ces of Germany; are the more just, in that they were absolutely necessary for the safety of the Duke of Mantua unjustly attack'd, and for that of all Italy, over which Spain had no less Right, than over the Dominion of that poor Prince, since they thought their Convenience a sufficient Right.

The Danger this Kingdom had been reduc'd to by the Division the Spaniards had openly so∣mented in your Royal House, oblig'd your Ma∣jesty to seek out proper Expedients to resettle it.

Monsieur having lest the Court of France for the third time, by divers Artifices, which the

Spaniards certainly were the principal Authors of; and the Cardinal Infant having receiv'd the Queen your Mother in Flanders, as he did at that time; it is natural to conclude, that unless those good Neighbours had been employ'd at home, they would have proceeded farther, and would have employ'd themselves at your Maje∣sty's Cost in this Kingdom.

It was absolutely necessary to remove the Storm, and moreover to prepare to sustain the Effort of it, in case it could not be avoided.

For that reason, after your Majesty was assur'd of a potent Diversion, you did like those, who, in order to prevent the Plague, which the Corrup∣tion of the Air threatens them with, carefully purge themselves; being perswaded that the best and safest way to secure themselves from external Injuries, is to cleanse the Inside.

God's Providence prov'd so favourable to you on that occasion, that those who, animating the Queen and Monsieur against France, thought thereby to put them in a way to do it a great deal of Harm, only rendred them incapable of doing any; and your Conduct appear'd so much the more wonderful on that occasion, that in recalling the one, and desiring the return of the other, your Goodness towards them was evident to all the World, while the Effects of your Justice fell upon those who had advis'd them to take such ill Measures.

The Duke de Bellegarde was depriv'd of the Government of Burgundy, and consequently of the Keyes of the Gates he had open'd to Mon∣sieur, to let him out of the Kingdom.

The Duke d' Elboeuf was likewise turn'd out of that of Picardy, which your Majesty had lately given him.

The Duke of Guise being conscious of his Faults, retiring into Italy, when you call'd him to Court, there to give an Account of his Acti∣ons; that Criminal Retreat made him lose the Government the late King your Father had ho∣nour'd him with.

Thus your Majesty was deliver'd of ungrate∣ful faithless Governours, and Burgundy, Picardy and Provence, Provinces of great Consideration, remain'd in your Hands, free from those dange∣rous Spirits.

You gave the first to the first Prince of your Blood, who was passionately desirous of it; and thereby you prudently interess'd him in the Af∣fairs of the Time, and fill'd Monsieur with anxi∣ous Thoughts, who, with reason, dreaded no∣thing so much in the World, as the Establishment of a Person who came up so close to him.

You bestow'd the Second on the Duke of Che∣vreuse a Prince of Lorrain, to shew, that Faults are personal; and that your Indignation extend∣ed only on those of that Family, who had made themselves guilty by their ill Conduct.

You gratify'd the Marshal de Vitri with the Third, as well upon the account of his Loyalty, as because that being upheld by your Authority, he was naturally capable to oppose him who had lost it.

In the mean time the Declarations you caus'd to be Register'd in the Parliament, were highly approv'd of by every body; seeing that in con∣demning

the Authors and Adherents of the Queen and of Monsieur's Flight, you excus'd those two Persons, who are as dear as nearly re∣lated to your Majesty, altho' the contrary had been done formerly on the same occasions.

Your Majesty eluded with a great deal of Vi∣gilancy divers Designs, and many Enterprizes meditated and attempted in the Queen and Mon∣sieur's Names; and you shew'd so much Patience on those unhappy Occurrences, that I may almost affirm, that you made nothing known of their Ill Conduct, but what you could not dissem∣ble.

Nevertheless, in order to stop the Course, and remove the License wherewith all things seem'd lawful to be undertaken under their Shadow, you caus'd the Marshal de Marillac's Head to be cut off, with so much the more reason, that being condemned with Justice, the present Constitution of the State requir'd a great Example.

Those great and vexatious Affairs did not hin∣der you from repressing, with as much Authority as Reason, certain Enterprizes of the Parliament of Paris, which had been tolerated in many other occasions; which is more remarkable, in that it was done during the Heat of the Discon∣tents of the Queen and of Monsieur, and of all their Adherents, than for the thing it self.

Afterwards Monsieur enter'd France with Sword in Hand, at the Instigation of the Spaniards, and of the Duke of Lorrain, with Forces, of which those good Neighbours had furnish'd the greatest part.

One should have thought, that the News your Majesty receiv'd at that time of his being expected in Languedoc by the D. de Montmorency, who had a great Authority in that Province, which he was Governour of, should have put a stop to the De∣sign which had led you in Lorrain to disingage that Duke out of the ill Party he had espous'd; ••ut finishing what you had begun to so good an end, you caus'd Monsieur your Brother to be pursu'd so close by the Marshal de Schomberg, and you follow'd him so soon your self, after having receiv'd three Places from the Duke of Lorrain as Pledges of his Faith, that all the Efforts of those who were Leagu'd against you prov'd ineffectual.

The Victory which your Majesty's Forces, commanded by that Marshal, obtain'd at Castel∣naudari, was as certain an Argument of the Bles∣sing of God on your Majesty, as the Favours you afterwards granted to Monsieur, and to his Followers, when the ill state of his Affairs might have induc'd you to use them otherwise, was an evident Testimony of your Goodness.

The Sincerity wherewith you observ'd all the Promises, which were made to them in your Name at Beziers; tho' you were sensible that Puy-Laurens's only Design was to avoid the Danger he was in, under the pretence of Repentance, which he could avoid no other way, was also as Authentick a Proof of your Majesty's great Courage, as of your inviolable Faith.

The Chastisement of the Duke de Montmo∣rency, who never could contain himself from ma∣king an Inlet to all manner of dangerous Rebel∣lions at all times; and particularly, when an

Heir apparent of the Crown made himself, by ill Counsel, Head of those who swerv'd from their Duty, shew'd all the World that your Stea∣diness equal'd your Prudence.

That Punishment also shew'd, that your Servants preferr'd Publick Good before Private Interest; since on that occasion they resisted the Sollicitations of several Persons, whom it behov'd them to have a great deal of Consideration for, as well as the Threatnings of Monsieur, which Puy-Laurens carry'd to that degree, as to declare, That in case Montmorency were put to Death, Monsieur would find a time to make them suffer the same Fate.

The Patience wherewith you have born the new Conspiracies which Puy-Laurens form'd in Flanders, in Monsieur's Name, who retir'd thi∣ther for the third time, is altogether like that which induces a Father to excuse the Behaviour which one of his Children is inspir'd with, after having laid aside his Obedience.

That which has induc'd you to bear as long as the Good of the State and your own Consci∣ence would permit you, the Malice and Levity which have often induc'd the Duke of Lorrain to Arm against you, is a Virtue which has but few Examples in History.

The Goodness which has prevail'd with you to be contented, for the Reparation of his second Faults, with the Deposition of some Places, ca∣pable to keep him within the Bounds of his Duty, had not his Folly equall'd his Breach of Faith, will be found perhaps the more singular, in that there are few Princes who lose the opportunity of

making themselves Masters of a Neighbouring State, when they have a lawful Subject and Pow∣er at once so to do.

After so many Relapses committed by the Duke your Vassal, after he had snatch'd away from you, contrary to his Faith, against Divine and Humane Right, a Pledge almost as precious as your State; the Prudence wherewith you divest∣ed him, when his Malice and Inconstancy could receive no other Remedies but the utmost Extre∣mities; is the more to be commended, because, that had you done it sooner, your Justice might have been call'd in question. Neither could you tarry longer, without shewing your self insensible, and without committing by Omission a Fault, equal unto that which a Prince should commit in divesting another without a Cause.

What ought we not to say of the good Na∣ture, which has enclin'd you to procure Mon∣sieur's Return into France for the third time; when there seemed no longer to be any reason to trust his Faith, after the divers Relapses and ex∣traordinary Infidelities of his Followers? Many thought with Reason, that he could never come back again, without exposing your most Faithful Servants; and yet they were the only Persons who did sollicit your Majesty to draw him out of the Peril into which he had expos'd himself.

That Action will meet but few Examples in Antiquity, if we consider the Circumstances of it; and perhaps but little Imitation of it for the future.

As no body could, without a great deal of Bold∣ness, advise your Majesty to grant Monsieur, con∣trary

to your own Sentiments, a notable Aug∣mentation of Power, the Government of a Pro∣vince, and a strong Place, in order to recall him out of Lorrain, the first time he went out of the Kingdom; so it requir'd a great deal of Firm∣ness to resist the Instances he made for a whole Year together, to have one given him upon the Frontier, where he design'd to retire in quitting Flanders.

It was no small Happiness that those two Counsels succeeded so well, that the Concession of the first place occasion'd his first Return; and yet prov'd so innocent a Cause, that being useful on that occasion, they could not make an ill use of it since, when his Adherents endeavour'd it.

And that the Refusal of the Second was so far from hindring him to return to his Duty, and in∣to his Native Country, the only place of his Safe∣ty; that on the contrary, it induc'd him to re∣turn back again with as good an Intention, as he and his have confess'd since, it was bad, when under Pretence of the Safety of his Person, he de∣fir'd a Retreat to disturb the growing Peace of France anew.

The extraordinary Favours your Majesty granted to Puy-Laurens, to induce him to inspire a good Conduct to his Master, are so worthy of remembrance, that they must not be forgotten in this place.

The Punishment he receiv'd, when you disco∣ver'd that he continu'd to abuse your Favours, was too just and too necessary not to insert it af∣terwards.

I am persuaded that Posterity will observe three things, which are very considerable on that Sub∣ject: An entire Resignation of all Interests, but such as related to the Publick Good, in your Crea∣tures; who having receiv'd him by your express Command into their Alliance, nevertheless advis'd you to secure him, because the Good of the State requir'd it: A great Prudence in performing that Action in the Presence of Monsieur, who could not near hand disapprove a Council which he would have dreaded for himself at a distance; had not Experience made him sensible, that he was not aim'd at. A great Boldness, in allowing him as much Liberty as he enjoy'd before; grounded barely upon this, That as ill Counsels only had seduc'd him, the Effect would cease with the Cause; and that he would be no sooner destitute of them, but he would follow by his own Sentiments a Me∣thod quite different from that he had been put upon.

This Action, and many others transacted du∣ring your Majesty's Reign, will, I am sure, make this pass for a certain Maxim, That it is necessary on certain occasions, in which the Welfare of the State is concern'd, to assume a Male Virtue some∣times, to exceed the Bounds of Common Pru∣dence; and that it is sometimes impossible to avoid certain Evils, unless something be given to For∣tune, or rather, to Divine Providence, which seldom refuses its Assistance, when our exhausted Wisdom can no longer furnish us with any.

Moreover, your Conduct will be acknowledged the more just, in that those who will read the History of your Life, will find, that your Majesty

never punishes any body, without having first endeavour'd by some extraordinary Favours to re∣tain him within the Bounds of his Duty.

The Marshal d' Ornano was made Marshal to that end.

The Grand Prior was certain of the Command of the Sea, when he perverted his Brother's Mind; and both gave you Cause to deprive them of their Liberty.

The Marshal de Bassompierre only subsisted by your Favours, when his way of speaking and of behaving himself at Court oblig'd you to confine him to the Bastille.

The Lord Keeper Marillac was the more oblig'd to perform his Duty, because the height to which his good Fortune had elevated him, left him no room to desire any thing, tho' never so ambitious.

The Marshal his Brother settled in Verdun, and elevated to an Office of the Crown, had all the reason imaginable to avoid the Fate he deserved by his Ingratitude, and by his evil Behaviour.

The several Commands the Duke de Montmo∣rency had had in your Armies, tho' he was as yet very young to deserve them, the Office of Mar∣shal of France, the free Access your Majesty gave him to your Person, and the Familiarity he had with your Creatures, were Favours and Privileges sufficient to hinder him from flying to his Ruine.

Chateauneuf had been so lately honour'd with the Seals, when his ill Proceedings were first dis∣cover'd, that there is Reason to suspect, that at the beginning of his Magistracy he had the same In∣tentions, as when he ended it.

Nevertheless, that first place of Justice to which your Majesty rais'd him, contrary to his Expecta∣tion, an Hundred Thousand Crowns he receiv'd from your Liberality in one Year, the Govern∣ment of one of your Provinces, which are extra∣ordinary Favours for a Man of his Profession, were not sufficient Considerations to hinder him from being the Promoter of his own Ruine.

The several and great Favours Puy-Laurens re∣ceiv'd in a short time from your Majesty's Good∣ness are so extraordinary, that those who will know them, will perhaps be more surpriz'd at them, than at his ill Proceeding, which is usual enough in Persons whom Fortune raises in an instant with∣out Desert.

The Indemnity of his Crimes, which your Ma∣jesty granted him at his return from Flanders, will not be thought inconsiderable by Posterity.

The Immense Sums he receiv'd from your Li∣berality, the Government of Bourbonnois, the Quality of Duke and Peer, and my Alliance, were sufficient Engagements to keep any other Man within the Bounds of his Duty; but he was not capable of prescribing any to himself.

When Count de Cramail was put into the Ba∣stille, he had lately receiv'd, by his being recall'd to Court, an Instance of the Remission of his first Faults. But that favourable Treatment did not hinder him from resuming his former Course, in acting against the present state of Affairs, and in endeavouring to make your Majesty alter your ancient Conduct, of which the Events justify'd the Happiness, and the Blessing of God the Ju∣stice.

The Choice that was made of the Marshal de Vitry for Provence, oblig'd him to live very warily in so great an Employment, which his Courage and Fidelity had procur'd him. But his Greedi∣ness and haughty insolent Behaviour did not con∣tribute little to deprive him of it, to place him in a Government of less Extent.

If I must speak of those that were barely remov'd from Court, what Obligations had not the Duke de Bellegarde receiv'd from your Majesty, and from your Servants?

The Goodness of the one, and the Address of the other, had freed him out of some Troubles into which his exceeding Vanity, and the Unruliness of his Passions had engag'd him. He was a Duke by your Favour, and the more oblig'd to behave himself well with Monsieur, when he assisted him to get out of the Kingdom, because you had set∣led him in the first Places of his Houshold, which he stood in great need of.

From being a poor ordinary Gentleman, Thoi∣ras was seen to rise in an instant to the degree of a Marshal of France, so loaden with Favours, that he receiv'd not only the best Employments, and the greatest Governments of the Kingdom, but over and above upwards of Six Hundred Thou∣sand Crowns in Gratifications.

La Fargis had all the reason imaginable to be∣have her self well; since your Majesty, by placing her with the Queen your Consort, had put her above the Discourses that were made of her.

The Dukes de Guise and d' Elboeuf have re∣ceiv'd, to the knowledge of all the World, in∣credible Favours from your Majesty.

While the Princess of Conty was most zealous in forming of Cabals, she drew a great deal of Money out of your Exchequer for the Sale of Cha∣teaurenault; but that was not sufficient to keep her within the Bounds of her Duty.

The Duke de la Valette's Removal, tho' volun∣tary, and not forc'd, giving me an occasion to put him in this Classis; I cannot forbear observing, that a little before his solliciting Monsieur your Brother, and the Count of Soissons, to employ your Army, which they commanded at that time, against your Person, your Majesty had honour'd him with the Quality of Duke and Peer: Neither can I forbear adding, that in order to engage him the more in your Service, you were pleas'd to al∣low his Alliance with those who were altogether inseparable from it; and that in consideration of my said Alliance, you had granted him the Survi∣vorship of the Government of Guyenne, and added 30000 Livres to the Revenue of his Place of Co∣lonel of the Infantry. To which I may add, that the Pardon your Majesty was pleas'd to grant him, out of an extraordinary Goodness for so foul and so shameful a Crime, averr'd by the Mouth of two Princes, whose Testimony was undeniable, could not hinder his Weakness and Jealousie against the Prince of Conde and the Archbishop of Bour∣deaux, or his Design of crossing your Affairs, from doing a very shameful thing, in losing the occasi∣on of taking Fontarabia, when the Enemies could no longer defend it.

If it be an effect of singular Prudence to have withstood all the Forces of the Enemies of your State, with those of your Allies, by putting your

Hand into your Purse, and not to your Arms. To have made an open War, when your Allies were no longer able to subsist alone, is another of Wisdom and Courage together, which justifies sufficiently, that managing the Repose of your Kingdom, you have done like those Oeconomists, who having been careful to lay up Money, know how to spend it prudently, to prevent a greater Loss.

To have at one and the same time made divers Attacks in divers places, which was never done by the Romans or Ottomans, will undoubtedly be look'd upon by many as a great piece of Imprudence and Rashness. And yet as it is a Proof of your Power, it is a greater yet of your Judgment; since it was necessary to cut out so much Work on all parts to your Enemies, that they might be invincible in none.

The War of Germany was somewhat forc'd, since that part of Europe was the Stage on which it was begun long ago.

Altho' that of Flanders had not the Success which might have been expected, yet it was im∣possible not to look upon it as advantagious in the Project.

That of the Grisons was necessary to engage the Princes of Italy to take Arms, by removing their Dread of the Germans: and to encourage those that had taken them in Germany, by shewing them, that Italy was not in a Condition to succour the Enemies they had in their Country.

That of Italy was no less material; both because it was the ready way to engage the Duke of Sa∣voy, and by reason that the Milaneze being as it

were the Heart of the Territories that are possess'd by the Spaniards; it was necessary to attack that Part.

Moreover, considering that your Majesty had Allies on all parts, who were to join their Forces to yours; it must be concluded, that it was evident by that Union, that the Spaniards being attack'd in divers places, should be forc'd to submit to the Effort of your Power.

And yet during the course of that War, which lasted Five Years, no ill Accident ever befell you, but what seem'd only to be permitted for your Glory.

In 1635. the Army your Majesty sent into the Low Countries, as soon as they came there, won a famous Battel, before their being join'd with that of the States General: And if the Prince of Orange, commanding both, had no Success suitable to those great Forces, and to what was expected from a Captain of his Reputation, the fault of it cannot be imputed to you.

Having submitted your Arms to the Command of that Prince, it was his part to pursue the Point of an Army he receiv'd Victorious. But the Slow∣ness of a heavy Nation could not improve the Ea∣gerness of yours, which requires Execution rather than Counsel; and which by dallying, loses the Advantage which their Fiery Nature gives them over others.

That very Year the Forces of the Empire ha∣ving pass'd the Rhine at Brisac, came so near your Frontiers, that tho' you could not free them from Fear, yet you freed them from the Losses your Enemies sustain'd.

One of the finest Armies the Emperour had put on foot for a long while perish'd in Lorrain; and their Loss prov'd the more considerable, in that the bare Patience of those who commanded your Forces in those parts occasion'd it.

At the same time the Duke of Rohan, favour'd by the principal Heads of the Grisons, who desir'd their Liberty, enter'd happily into their Country with open force, seiz'd the most considerable Passes and Posts, and fortify'd them, notwithstanding the Opposition which the Neighbourhood of the Milaneze enabled the Spaniards to make conve∣niently.

The Dukes of Savoy and of Crequi, who did command your Armies in Italy, took a Fort in the Milaneze, and built another upon the Po, which prov'd a dangerous Thorn to your Enemies.

In 1636. the Cowardise of three Governours of your Frontier Towns having given the Spani∣ards a Footing into this Kingdom, and cheaply enabled them to acquire considerable Advantages: Without being discourag'd, when all seem'd to be lost, in Six Weeks time you rais'd so powerful an Army, that it might have been able totally to de∣stroy your Enemies, had those to whom you entrusted the Command of it, employ'd it as they should have done. Their Failures oblig'd you to put your self at the Head of it; and God assisted you to that degree, that that very Year, in the sight of those who had only taken those Places be∣cause you were distant from them, you retook the only one which was of Importance to your State.

You overcame many Difficulties in that Expe∣dition, which were created by your own Men;

who being prejudic'd by Ignorance or Malice, highly disapprov'd so great a Design.

If you did not succeed in the Siege of Dole, the reason which obliges every one to run to that which is most pressing, was the only Cause of it. Your Majesty remov'd your Forces from thence with great Prudence, since it concern'd you more to retake Corbie than to take Dole.

At that time Galas entring this Kingdom with the main Forces of the Empire, to which the Duke of Lorrain join'd himself with his. They were both driven out of Burgundy with the shame of Raising the Siege of St. John de Laune, a weak Place, and the loss of part of their Cannon, and of so great a number of Men, that out of 30000 wherewith they entred this Kingdom, they did not march out Ten.

The River Tosino was Witness that very Year of an Action no less fortunate in Italy, where your Forces gain'd a famous and bloody Combat. And you had Advantages in Valtelina, which were the more considerable, by reason that your Ene∣mies, having often taken the Resolution to engage your Forces, in order to drive them out of it by Force, they never attempted to put their Design in Execution, but fighting and being beaten, prov'd one and the same thing to them.

In 1637. you took two Places from your Ene∣mies in Flanders, and retook one of those which had been deliver'd up to them the Year before by the Cowardise of the Governours.

A Third being besieg'd in the Country of Lux∣emburg, was taken soon after; and your Enemy suffer'd as much Damage by the entrance of your

Armies in their Country, as they design'd to make you suffer the same way.

If the Panick Fear of him who commanded your Forces in Valtelina, and the Infidelity of some of those, for whose Liberty you had sent them thither, made you lose, through Cowardise and Treachery together, the Advantages you had ac∣quir'd there by Force and Reason: That Year was happily Crown'd by the retaking of the Isles of St. Margaret and of St. Honorat; and by the Relief of Lucare, besieg'd by the Spaniards.

By the first of those two Actions, Two Thou∣sand Five Hundred French landed at Noon-day in an Island, kept by as many Spaniards and Italians; an Island fortify'd by Five Regular Forts, joyn'd to one another by Lines of Communication, which enclos'd it almost entirely by a good Parapet. Your Men fought at their Landing, and beat your Enemies which oppos'd them; and after having forc'd the major part of them to retire into their Ramparts, they forc'd them out of them in Six Weeks time, Foot after Foot, by as many Sieges as there were Forts; tho' one of them was com∣pos'd of Five Bastions Royal, so well provided with Cannon, and with Men, and all other Ne∣cessaries, that it seem'd a Rashness to attack it.

By the Second, a potent Army, so well re∣trench'd, that there was but one Head of a Thou∣sand Fathom by which it could be attack'd; a Head so well fortify'd, that at every Distance of Two Hundred Paces there were Forts and Re∣doubts, garnish'd with Cannon, and lin'd with Infantry, was attack'd in the Night, and forc'd by an Army, which, tho' inferiour in number,

did nevertheless defeat it wholly, after several Combats.

Those two Actions are so extraordinary, that one cannot say they are signal Effects of the Cou∣rage of Men, without adding, that they were se∣conded by the Providence and Hand of God, who visibly fights for us.

In 1638. tho' the beginning of the Year prov'd unfortunate to you in Italy, at St. Omer, and at Fon∣tarabia, by the ill Fate of Arms, and by the Im∣prudence, Cowardise, or Malice of some of those who commanded yours, the End Crown'd the Work by the taking of Brisac, after a long Siege, two Battels, and divers Combats attempted to re∣lieve it.

Moreover, as soon as you had notice of the ill Event of the Siege of St. Omers, your Majesty repair'd in Person to the Place, where there was reason to expect some dangerous Events: You put a stop to the course of the Misfortunes of your Arms, by taking and demolishing Renty, which greatly incommoded the Frontier.

After which le Castelet, the only Place of yours then remaining in your Enemies Hands, was taken by Force in sight of them, without their daring to oppose the Effects of your Arms.

The Naval Engagement, in which 14 Gallies and 4 Ships of Dunkirk, all retir'd into the Bay of Gattary, under Five Land-Batteries, not daring to keep the Sea before 19 of yours, were all burnt or sunk, with the loss of Five or Six Thousand Men, of 500 Guns, and a considerable Store of Ammu∣nitions of War for the Relief of Fontarabia, are great amends, not for the Losses you sustain'd at

St. Omer and Fontarabia, which were not conside∣rable, but for the Gains you missed in not taking the said Places.

If to this Advantage we join that which you had before, when your Arms made your Enemies lose, in the Port of Passage, 14 great Ships, a great number of Guns, Colours, and all sorts of Am∣munitions, it will be found, that if the Spaniards mark this Year as being favourable to them, they esteem themselves happy when their Misfortunes are less than their Fears.

Finally, the Combat of the Gallies, perhaps the most famous that ever was fought at Sea, where 15 of yours attack'd as many of Spain, and fought them with so much advantage, that your Enemies lost between Four and Five Thousand Men, and Six Gallies; among which the Admiral and two Patrones did not a little signalize that Action.

This Combat, I say, shews, that the Prudence of your Conduct has not only been accompany'd with good Fortune, but also, that the Boldness of your Commanders has been seconded.

Several things are observable in this War.

The first thing is, that your Majesty only en∣gag'd into it, because you could not avoid it; and that you only laid down your Arms when it was proper so to do.

This Remark is the more glorious for your Ma∣jesty, in that you were often sollicited by your Allies to take Arms, and still refus'd to do it; and that during the War your Enemies often pro∣pos'd a particular Peace to you, which you would never hearken to, because you could not forsake the Interest of your Allies.

Those who shall know, that your Majesty has been forsaken by several Princes, who were en∣gag'd with you, without abandoning any of them; and that notwithstanding some of those who did remain steady in your Party, fail'd you in many important things, they have still receiv'd Effects from your Majesty suitable to your Promises; those, I say, will acknowledge, that if your Ma∣jesty's good Fortune has appear'd in the Success of your Affairs, your Virtue equals your good Fortune.

I am sensible, that had you broken your Word, it would have lessen'd your Reputation considera∣bly, and that the least loss of that kind in a great Prince is irreparable. But it is no small matter to have perform'd ones Duty in sundry occasions, in which Vengeance, and the Quiet which is na∣turally desir'd after a War, induce one to do the contrary.

It requir'd no less Prudence than Force, nor less Effort of Mind than of Arms, to persist almost alone in the same Design, which was to have been prosecuted by the Union of many.

Nevertheless it is most true, that the Defection of several Princes * 1.1 of Germany; that the Duke of Parma's being oblig'd to abandon your Party through the necessity of his Affairs; that the Duke of Mantua's Death, and the Levity of his Dowager-Mother to the Young Duke, who was no sooner Mistress, but forgetting all her Obli∣gations to France, she turn'd publickly against it; that the Decease of the Duke of Savoy, and the

Imprudence of his Widow, who lost her self, be∣cause she would not receive the Assistance that was offer'd her; I say, it is most true, that all these Accidents never shook your Majesty's Resolution; and tho' they alter'd the state of your Affairs, they did not hinder you from persisting in your De∣signs.

The Second Remark worthy of great Conside∣ration on this Subject is, That your Majesty never would condescend to free your self from the Perils of War, by exposing Christendom to that of the Ottoman Arms, which were often offer'd to you.

Your Majesty was not ignorant, that you might have accepted such a Succours with Justice; and yet that Knowledge could not prevail with you to take a Resolution dangerous for Religion, but advantagious to obtain a Peace.

The Example of some of your Predecessors, and of divers Princes of the House of Austria, who do particularly affect to appear as Religious before God, as they are in reality to their own Interests, prov'd too weak to induce you to do that, which History informs us has often been practis'd by others.

The Third Circumstance, which has caus'd a great deal of Wonder in this War, is, the vast number of Armies, and of Sums, which were re∣quir'd to sustain the same.

The greatest Princes on Earth having ever made a Difficulty of undertaking two Wars at once, Posterity will have much a-do to believe, that this Kingdom was capable to keep up separately, and at their own Charge, Three Land, and Two Na∣val Armies, besides those of their Allies, towards

the Subsistence of which they contributed consi∣derably.

Yet it is most certain, that besides a potent Ar∣my of 20000 Foot, and between 6 and 7000 Horse, which you kept all along in Picardy, to at∣tack your Enemies, you had another in the same Province, compos'd of 10000 Foot and 4000 Horse, to defend the Entrance of that Frontier.

It is moreover true, that you kept one all along in Champagne of the same Number with this last.

One in Burgundy of the same Strength.

One no less powerful in Germany.

Another as considerable in Italy, and another in Valtelina at certain times. And what is most to be admir'd, the major part of them were design'd more to attack than to stand upon the Defensive.

Although your Predecessors despis'd the Sea to that degree, that the late King your Father had not one Ship, your Majesty nevertheless during the whole Course of this War, kept 20 Gallies and 20 Ships in the Mediterranean, and about 60 well Mann'd in the Ocean. Which has not only pre∣vented your Enemies Designs upon your Coasts, but has done them as much Harm as they design'd to do us.

Moreover, you have yearly assisted the Holland∣ers with 1200000 Livres, and sometimes more; and the Duke of Savoy with upwards of a Million.

The Crown of Sweden with the like Sum.

The Landgrave of Hesse with 200000 Rix∣dollars; and divers other Princes with divers other Sums, according as occasions did require it.

By reason of which excessive Charges, the Ex∣pences of every one of the Five Years, during

which France has supported that War, has amount∣ed to upwards of 60 Millions; which is the more to be admir'd, in that it has been done without taking the Sallary of Officers, without touching the Revenue of private Persons, and even with∣out demanding any Alienation of the Fund of the Clergy, all extraordinary means, which your Pre∣decessors have often been oblig'd to have recourse to, in less considerable Wars.

Thus 60 Millions of Expence every one of those Five Years; an Hundred and Fifty Thousand Foot both in your Armies and Garrisons, and up∣wards of Thirty Thousand Horse, will be an Im∣mortal Argument to Posterity of the Power of this Crown.

If I add, that these different Occupations did not hinder you at the same time from fortifying your Frontiers to that degree, that whereas they were open on all parts before to your Enemies, they cannot look on them now without amazement, I shall touch a new Point no less considerable to Posterity, since that as this Kingdom is thereby secur'd for ever, it will receive as much Benefit by it for the future, as your Majesty has endur'd La∣bour and Pain in the Performance.

Those whom History will acquaint with the Crosses your Majesty has met with in all your great Designs, through the Envy your Prosperi∣ties, and the Fear of your Power, have created in divers Foreign Princes, by the want of Faith of some of your Allies, by the Treachery of some of your Subjects, by a Brother ill counsell'd at some times, by a Mother always possess'd by ill-dispos'd Minds, after her having depriv'd her self of your

Majesty's Councils, and separated her Interests from those of your State; being sensible, that such Ob∣stacles are no small heightnings to your Glory; being sensible also, that great Hearts having form'd great Designs, cannot be with-held by the Diffi∣culties they meet in the same: If they consider be∣sides the natural Levity of this Nation, the Impa∣tience of the Souldiers, little us'd to the inevitable Fatigues attending the course of Wars; and final∣ly, the Weakness of the Instruments you were forc'd to make use of on those occasions, among which I take the first place, they will be forc'd to own, that nothing could supply the Defect of the Tools, but the Excellence of your Majesty, who was the Workman.

Moreover, if they consider, that overcoming all those Obstacles, you have attain'd the Conclusion of a Peace, in which the Defect of some of your Allies, and the Affection you have had for them, have oblig'd you to relinquish part of what you had Conquer'd by your own Forces, they will needs be oblig'd to acknowledge, that your Good∣ness is equal to your Power, and that in your Conduct, Prudence, and the Blessing of God, have kept an even Pace.

These, Sir, have been your Majesty's Actions hitherto, which I will esteem happily ended, if they be attended with a Repose, which may allow you to bless your Kingdom with all manner of Advantages.

In order whereunto, it is necessary to consider the several Orders of your Kingdom, the State they compose, your Person, which is charg'd with the Conduct thereof, and the Means you must

follow to perform it worthily; which requires no∣thing in general, but to have a good and faithful Council, to esteem their Advice, and to follow Reason in the Principles it prescribes for the Go∣vernment of your Kingdom: 'Tis to that I will reduce the Remainder of this Work, treating those matters distinctly in divers Chapters, subdivided into divers Sections, in order to explain them the more methodically.

REFORMATION OF THE Divers Orders OF THE STATE.

ONE might make whole Volumes upon the Subject of the several Orders of this King∣dom; but the Scope of my Design not being the same with many others, who aim at nothing but to discourse well upon all the parts of a State, without considering whether the Publick will re∣ceive any Benefit by their Discoursing, or not. I will only endeavour to represent to your Majesty in few Words, what is necessary to procure the Welfare of all your Subjects in their several Con∣ditions.

CHAP. II. Of the Reformation of the Ecclesiastical Order.

SECTION I. Which represents the ill State of the Church at the beginning of the King's Reign; the Present State thereof; and what is necessary to be done to put it in that in which it ought to be.

WHEN I remember to have seen Gentle∣men and other Lay Persons, in my Youth, who held not only the major part of Priories and Abbies, but also of Cures and Bishoprick in Com∣mendam; and when I consider that in my first Years there was such a Licentiousness in Monaste∣ries of both Sexes, that nothing but Scandals and ill Examples were met with in places where Edifi∣cation was to be look'd for, I own that it is no small Satisfaction to me, to see those Disorders ab∣solutely banish'd under your Majesty's Reign; and that the said Tenures and the Disorders of Mona∣steries are scarcer than lawful Possessions and Or∣derly Communities were at that time.

The best Method, in my Opinion, for your Ma∣jesty to continue and to increase that Blessing, is to take a particular Care to place Persons of Merit and of exemplary Lives, in Bishopricks; to besto•• Abbies and other simple Benefices of your Nomi∣nation on Persons of Probity; to deprive those who lead Licentious Lives in so holy a Station, a that is which unites men particularly to God; o•• your Sight and Favours, and to make an exem∣plary punishment of the Scandalous.

I might propose many other Expedients for the Reformation of the Clergy; but provided your Majesty will be pleas'd to observe these Four Con∣ditions, and to use virtuous Men of that Profession favourably, you will discharge your Duty, and will render the Ecclesiasticks of your State either such as they ought to be, or at least so prudent, as to endeavour to become so.

To that end it is my Duty to represent to your Majesty, that it is very necessary to take Care not to be mistaken in your Judgment of the Capacity of Bishops.

A Man may be Learned, may be Capable, and yet not fit for that Function; which besides Sci∣ence, requires Zeal, Courage, Vigilancy, Piety, Charity and Activity together.

It is not sufficient to be an honest Man, to make a good Bishop; for he must be good for others as well as for himself.

I have often had a Dread that Men of Quality would hardly contain themselves within the bounds of their Duty, and that they are less regular in their Lives than others: Many others being mov'd with that Fear, are of Opinion, that Doctors of a good Life, and low Birth, are fitter for those Employments, than those who are of higher Ex∣traction: But there are many things to be consi∣der'd on that Subject.

A Bishop ought to be Learned, full of Piety, Zeal, well Born; by reason that the Authority requir'd in such Places is only to be found in Per∣sons of Quality. But as it is difficult to meet all those Qualifications in one and the same Person, I will be bold to say, that good Manners, which

must be consider'd above all things, being suppos'd, Quality and Authority, which are commonly Companions, are to be preferr'd before great Sci∣ence; having often seen very Learned Men who made very ill Bishops, either for not being able to Govern, upon the account of their low Extraction, or for living too near, according to their Birth, which borders upon Avarice; whereas Nobility, which is attended by Virtue, commonly has a par∣ticular Desire of Honour and of Glory, which produces the same Effects as Zeal, occasion'd by the pure Love of God; that they generally live with a Splendour and Liberality conformable to that Dignity; and better understand the manner of behaving themselves in, and conversing with the World.

Above all things, a Bishop must be humble and Charitable, have Learning and Piety, a steady Courage, and a great Zeal for the Church, and for the Salvation of Souls.

Those who aim at Bishopricks out of Ambition and Interest, are commonly those who make their Court best to obtain that by Importunity, which they cannot pretend to by Merit, and therefore such must not be chosen, but those whom God calls to that Vocation; which is easily known by their different way of living; these applying them∣selves to the Ecclesiastical Functions, that are pra∣ctis'd in Seminaries. And it would be very pro∣per for your Majesty to declare, That you will chuse none but such as have spent a considerable time after their Studies, in applying themselves to the said Functions in Seminaries, which are places appointed in order thereunto; since it is not rea∣sonable,

that the most difficult and most impor∣tant Profession in the World should be undertaken without having first studied it; since no Man is allow'd to exert the meanest and the most vile, without a Prentiship of many Years.

After all, the best Rule in that Choice is, to have no general one; but to chuse sometimes Learned Men, sometimes Men that have not so much Learnig, and are better Born; young Men on some occasions, old ones on others; according as Men of divers Conditions may be thought most fit to Govern.

I have always had this Consideration; but yet whatever Care I have taken to make a good use of it, I own I have been sometimes mistaken, and indeed it is very difficult not to be mistaken in Judgments, which are the less easie, in that it is al∣most impossible to penetrate into the Hearts of Men, or to fix their Inconstancy.

They change their Humour with their Con∣dition; or rather, they discover what they dissem∣bled till then, to obtain their ends.

While such Men live in Misery, they make it their business to be thought much better than they are; and when they have obtain'd their ends, they no longer constrain themselves to conceal the ill Qualifications they have had all along.

Nevertheless, in using the Precautions I propose in the said Choice, you will discharge your Conscience before God: And I maintain boldly, That your Majesty will have nothing to fear, provided, that obliging those who shall be chosen with the said Caution, to reside in their Dioceses, to establish Se∣minaries there for the Instruction of their Ecclesia∣sticks,

to visit their Flock, as they are oblig'd to do by the Canons, you put them in a way to per∣form that Duty effectually.

I say this, Sir, because it is absolutely impossible for them to do it at present, by reason of the dai∣ly Encroachments your Majesty's Officers make upon their Jurisdiction.

Six things are likewise to be wish'd, that the Souls which are committed to their Care may receive all the Assistance they can expect from them.

Three of them depend on your own Authority; one on Rome only; and the other two on Rome and your Authority together.

The three first are, the Regulations of Appeals, that of Priviledg'd Cases, and the Suppression of the Regalia, pretended by the holy Chappel of Pa∣ris, over the major part of the Bishopricks of this Kingdom, until those who are nominated for the same by your Majesty have taken the Oath of Al∣legiance.

The fourth is, a Regulation of the Plurality of the Sentences requir'd by the Canons, for the Pu∣nishment of a Crime committed by an Ecclesia∣stick; to the end, that the Guilty may not be able to avoid the Punishment they deserve, by the Delays of the Formalities that are practis'd.

And the other two, which relate to the Autho∣rity of the Church and yours together, are the Exemptions of the Chapters, and the Right of Pre∣senting to Cures, which belongs to divers Abbots and Seculars.

We must distinctly examine these Cases one after another.

SECT. II. Of Appeals, and the Means to regulate the same.

I Do not design in this place to explain the Ori∣ginal of Appeals, as a thing, the Knowledge whereof is absolutely necessary; provided it be known how to apply a proper Remedy to the said Evil, it matters but little to know when it first began.

I am sensible, that it is so difficult to discover the true Source of that Practice, that the Advo∣cate General Servien us'd to say, That had he known the Author of so good a Regulation, he would have erected his Statue.

Nevertheless, there is great Reason to believe, that the first Foundation of it arose from the Con∣fidence which the Ecclesiasticks repos'd in the King's Regal Authority, when being impos'd up∣on by the Anti-Popes, Clement the 7th, Benedict the 13th, and John the 23d, who fled to Avignon for a Refuge; they had Recourse to King Charles the 6th then Reigning, to be discharg'd of the first Fruits, Pensions and extraordinary Subsidies they often impos'd upon them.

The Complaints of the Clergy of France ha∣ving induc'd that King to make an Ordinance, prohibiting the Execution of the Rescripts, Man∣dates and Bulls which the Popes might give for the future, to the Prejudice of the Franchises and Li∣berties the Gallick Church injoyn'd.

This Order gave way to the first Enterprises of the King's Officers over the Ecclesiastical Jurisdi∣ction.

Nevertheless, it was no sooner made, but the fear they had of being prejudiced by it, instead of re∣ceiving the Advantage they desir'd, prevail'd with the King to defer the Execution of the same for some Years. Afterwards, the continuation of the Vexations Benefices were afflicted with, made it to be put in execution for some Years; after which, it was finally suppress'd by King Charles VII. at the beginning of his Reign, by reason of the di∣vers Abuses that were committed in the practice thereof.

The Experience of the Abuse of such an Order, oblig'd the Clergy for a while patiently to bear the ill Treatments they receiv'd from the Officers of the Court of Rome.

But finally, the redoubling of the Exactions that were laid upon them, oblig'd them to assemble at Bourges, in 1438. to consult about the means to free themselves of the same. That Assembly, which was famous for the Number and Merit of the Pre∣lates which compos'd it, carefully examin'd the many Grievances the Church was afflicted with; and concluded, That the best Remedy they could apply to them, was to receive the Decrees of the Council of Bale; which reducing most things to the Constitution of the Common and Canonical Right, disabled the Officers of the Court of Rome from attempting any thing against the Clergy.

After which, they form'd a Pragmatical Sanction of the Decrees of that Council, which they re∣solv'd to put in practice by the King's Leave, whom they Petition'd to be Protector of the same.

The King adhering to the Supplications of his Clergy, enjoyn'd his * 1.2 Judges Roy∣al, to cause the said Pragmatical Sanction to be Religiously observ'd; and 'tis from thence the Grievances the Church labours under at this time in this Kingdom, by the in∣terposition of the King's Officers; receiv'd a new Force, after the be∣ginning they had had under the Reign of Charles VI. And it is also from thence the Parliaments have taken an occasion to assume the Cognisance of the greatest part of what only belongs to the Tribunal of the Church of God.

It was very easie for them to attribute to them∣selves, to the Exclusion of subaltern or inferiour Judges, what had been at first only committed to them, and to extend their Power under that pre∣tence beyond its lawful Bounds, since they had none but Inferiours to encounter with.

In the Establishment of the first Order, made to remedy the Infractions of the Prag∣matical Sanction, * 1.3 Appeals were not allowed of: They only cha∣stised such as did obtain Rescripts, or Mandates, from the Court of Rome, against the Common Right, upon the bare Complaint that was made and averr'd of the same, and that with∣out taking cognisance of the Merits of the Cause.

After which, Time, which changes all things, being join'd to Tower, which, like Fire, attracts all to it self, made them proceed from that Order, establish'd for the Preservation of the Common

Right, and the Franchises of the Gallick Church, against the Attempts of Rome, to the Appeals; the abuse of which, utterly annihilates the Jurisdiction of the French Prelates, as well as of the Holy See.

I am sensible, that the most subtile Adherents of the Parliaments, to authorize their Practice, may say, That the Prelates assembled at Bourges, ha∣ving petition'd his Majesty to hinder the Holy See, by his Officers, from infringing the Pragmatital Sanction, have tacitly given him a Right to op∣pose the Contraventions that might be made to the same by themselves, which authorizes them to take cognisance of the Sentences which are daily given in their Tribunal.

But the Proverb may be alledg'd in this place, which is most true, That a Bargain is nothing but what it is made; and that it is as certain as evi∣dent, That the Gallick Church assembled at Bour∣ges, never thought on what these Gentlemen pre∣tend; and moreover, that they had no reason to do it.

They had recourse to the King, against the En∣terprizes of Rome, by reason that the Holy See having no Superiour Tribunal on Earth, Tempo∣ral Princes alone, as Protectors of the Church, can put a stop to the course of the Exorbitances of the Officers of Rome, whereas the Attempts of the Bi∣shops may be repress'd by their Superiours, to whom one may and ought to appeal.

Finally, he that gives his Friend Arms to defend him, can never be suppos'd to give them for his own Destruction. The Parliaments cannot pre∣tend, that the Protection which the Prelates assem∣bled

at Bourges, desir'd of the King, gives his Officers a Right to oppress their Jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, as Evils are greater in their Pro∣gress, and in their Periods, than in their Begin∣ning, the Design of the Parliaments, cover'd with divers Pretences for a time, began to appear without a Mask in the last Age * 1.4, under King Francis I. who was the first that ever made use of the Name † 1.5 of Appeal in his Or∣dinances.

Many knowing the Illegality of that Practice, which the Church complains of at present, will think perhaps, that since it may be abolish'd with Justice, it would be proper to do it: But I'm of Opinion, that such an Alteration would do more harm, than the Evil they would avoid; and that nothing but the Abuse of such an Order is pre∣judicial.

Whatever Ground the said Practice may have, it is certain, that when it was first publickly esta∣blish'd, it was only with a pretence to put a stop to the Encroachments the Ecclesiastical Judges might attempt upon the King's Royal Juris∣diction.

In process of time, they have not only made use of it against the Transgressors of the Ordi∣nances of the Kingdom, which include many mat∣ters besides Jurisdiction, but they have also exten∣ded it to the Infractions of the Holy Canons, and of the Decrees of the Church, and of the Holy See;

and finally, by excess of abuse to all sorts of Mat∣ters, in which the Laicks pretend a Lezion of Po∣lity, which they maintain only belongs to the King's Officers.

One might reasonably desire to have the Effect of this Remedy reduc'd to its first Foundation, which had no extent beyond Attempts upon the Royal Jurisdiction, which is sufficiently regulated by the First Article of the Ordinance of 1539. But to remove all pretence of Lezion from the Officers of the Prince, and to hinder them from pretending with any appearance, that it is impossible for them to get the Ordinances observ'd, by reason of the Enterprizes of the Church; I am of Opinion, that they may consent to the said Appeals, when the Judges shall pronounce directly against the Ordinances; which is the only Case in which Charles IX. and Henry III. by the 59th Article of the Ordinance of Blois required them to be ad∣mitted. Provided they be not extended under that pretence to the Transgression of the Canons and Decrees, because many Ordinances, particu∣larly the * 1.6 Capitularies of Charle∣magne, often contain the same sub∣stance with those of the Church.

I am sensible, that it will be difficult to make so exact an Indiction of the Ordinances to this end, but that sometimes there will be abuses in whatever Regulation may be made. But it is certain, that there is no difficulty in the Will of the King's Officers, who shall be employ'd to put his in execution: The Order which he will be pleas'd to give them, will serve them as a Rule without any trouble.

The Pretence which the Parliaments use, that when Ecclesiastical Judges judge against the Canons and Decrees, of which Kings are the Executors and Protectors, they have the Power to correct the Abuse of their Sentences, is a Pretence so void of all appearance of Justice, that it is altogether in∣supportable.

Should the whole Church judge against the Ca∣nons and Decrees, one might say, that the King, who is the Protector of the same, might and ought to maintain them in an extraordinary man∣ner by his own Authority: But fince, when a Judge gives a Sentenee against their Tenor, the said Sentence may be revers'd, and he corrected by his Superiour, the Officers of the Prince cannot, without invading the Priestly Office, and without a manifest Abuse, do that which only belongs to those that are particularly consecrated to GOD: And when they do so, before the last Sentence of the Church is given, their attempt is not only void of Justice, but even of all appearance of Justice.

The Endeavours of the Parliaments also to tran∣slate all the Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, to the Tribunal of Princes, under pretence of Tem∣poral Justice, is no less void of Ground and of Appearance: And yet there is no Presidial or Judge Royal, but will ordain the time of Processi∣ons, the Hour of High Masses, and many other Ceremonies, under colour of publick Convenience; thus the Accessary becomes the Principal: And whereas the Service of God should preceed all things, and be the Rule of Civil Actions, it will no longer be in force, than while the Temporal Officers of Princes will be pleas'd to allow it.

I am very sensible, that sometimes the Male-Ad∣ministration of Justice of those who exert the Ec∣clesiastical Jurisdiction, and the Tediousness of the Formalities prescrib'd by the Canons, give a spe∣cious Pretence to the Incroachments of the King's Officers; but it cannot be with Reason, since one Inconvenience does not establish another, but obli∣ges to correct both; which is what I design to shew hereafter.

I would willingly pass under silence the Pre∣tension which the Parliaments have to render every thing abusive which is Judg'd against their Decrees, to which, by that means, they would give the force of Ordinances, if I were not oblig'd to shew, that this Abuse is the less supportable, in that they endeavour by that Encroachment to equal their Au∣thority to that of their Master and of their King.

The Detriment the Church receives by such En∣croachments, is the more insupportable, in that it hinders the Prelates absolutely from performing their Office. When a Bishop designs to punish an Ecclesiastick, he strait removes from under his Ju∣risdiction by an Appeal; if in making his Visita∣tion he makes any Ordinance, the effect of it is immediately stopt, by reason, that tho' in matters of Discipline Appeals are only by way of Devolu∣tion, yet the Parliaments make them suspensive against all manner of Reason.

In fine, we may affirm with Truth, that the Church is fetter'd; and that, if her Ministers are not blind, yet their Hands are tied; insomuch that tho' they know the Evil, it is not in their Power to redress it.

That which comforts me in this Extremity, is, that what is impossible to the Church on this Subject, will be very easie to your Majesty, on whose bare Will the remedy such Disorders de∣pends.

The first thing that is to be done in order thereunto, is, to prohibit those Appeals for the fu∣ture; unless in the Case of a visible attempt upon the Royal Jurisdiction, and of an evident Trans∣gression of the Ordinances, which only relate to the Temporal Authority of Kings, and not to the Spiritual Authority of the Church.

This Ordinance being suppos'd, if in order to have it regularly observ'd, your Majesty will be pleas'd to make a Regulation containing Six Heads. You will at once put a stop to the Incroachments of the Church, and of the Parliaments.

The First Head of that Regulation must order all Appeals of this kind to be seal'd with the Great Seal, for the Parliament of Paris; and that in all others, which the Distance of your Court obliges to make use of the Privy Seal, they may not be seal'd before three ancient Advocates have affirm'd under their Hands, that there is cause of Abuse, submitting to a Fine, in case it be found otherwise.

The Second must declare, that all Appeals made in point of Discipline, shall be only by way of * 1.7 Devolution, and not of Suspension.

The Third must order the Abuse complain'd of to be specify'd both in the Appeal, and in the Sentence that shall be given upon the same; which is the more necessary, in that it often comes to pass, that tho' there is only an Errour in point of Formality, or in some particular Head of the Sentence, which contains many, when the Parlia∣ment declares that there is an Error or Abuse, the Sentence is held void in all things; tho' it ought only to be so in one of its Circumstances, which commonly is not very material.

The Fourth must oblige the Parliaments to enter the Causes of the said Appeals upon the Rolls before any others, and to call and judge them preferrably to all others, without referring the same, to avoid the Delays; which are often desir'd by those, who only aiming to elude the Punishment of their Crimes, endeavour to tire out their ordinary Judges, from whom they Ap∣peal; and because it is not reasonable to deprive the Publick of the Administration of Ecclesiastical Justice, by making those who are the principal Of∣ficers of it bare Sollicitors before a Tribunal which is inferiour to theirs.

The Fifth must impose a Necessity on the Par∣liaments, to Fine and to Condemn those to pay the Costs, who shall appeal without a Legal Cause, without the Power of remitting the same, on any account, or upon any pretence whatever; and to send them back again before the same Judges, from whom they have appeal'd without a Cause; which is the more necessary, because that without this Remedy all Criminals would be at liberty to free

themselves of the common Jurisdiction, by Appeal∣ing without a Cause

The best Ordinances and the justest Regulations being often despis'd by those who ought to observe them most Religiously; and the Licentiousness of Soveraign Courts often proceeding to that degree, as to violate or reform your Orders, according to their pleasure; the best way to render your Will effe∣ctual, and to make your self to be obey'd in a point of such Consequence, is to add a Sixth Head to the Five foregoing, which will be as effectual a Remedy to oblige your Officers to perform their Duty on that subject, as that of Appeals is excel∣lent to hinder the Ecclesiastical Judges from being wanting in theirs in the Exercise of their Jurisdiction.

This Remedy requires nothing but to grant the humble Petition of your Clergy, that your Maje∣sty would be pleas'd to allow them to Appeal from you to your self; by applying themselves to your Council, whenever your Parliaments shall be wanting in the Observation of your Orders and Regulations.

This is the more reasonable, in that whereas, in order to suppress the Incroachments of the Church, by appealing to your Judges, Application is made to a Tribunal of an Order different and in∣feriour by its Nature; and that in having recourse to your Council, to put a stop to those of your Parliaments, Application is made to an Order of the same kind. And undoubtedly, even those who envy the Franchises of the Church, can find no fault with it, since that instead of making it inde∣pendent of Temporal Jurisdiction, it adds a De∣gree to its subjection.

Finally, it will be the more advantagious to your Ma••esty in that, as it will keep the Power of the Church within its own Bounds; it will also restrain that of the Parliaments within the just Ex∣tent, which is prescrib'd to them by Reason and by your Laws.

And if besides your Majesty's Commands to your Council, to exert the Power they have by your Au∣thority to hinder the Encroachments of all your Subjects, and particularly those of your Officers, who administer your Justice in this Kingdom, you take Care to fill it, not with Men, whose Preten∣sion and Importunity are the best Titles they can produce to obtain their Ends, but with Persons chosen for their Merit, from among all your Sub∣jects; you will have the Satisfaction to see, that those who will not contain themselves within the bounds of their Duty by Reason, will be con∣strain'd to it by force of Justice; which will not be continu'd long, but you will find clearly, that what was forc'd in the beginning will become voluntary.

SECT. III. Of Priviledg'd Cases, and the means to Regu∣late the same.

THose who Consecrate themselves to God, by devoting their Lives to his Church, are so absolutely exempted of the Temporal Jurisdiction of Princes, that they can only be try'd by their Ecclesiastical Superiours.

Divine Right, and the Law of Nations, esta∣blish the said Immunity clearly. The Law of

Nations, in that it has been acknowledg'd by all Nations. Divine Right, by the Confession of all Authors who have treated of it, before the Mo∣dern Jurisprudence of the last Age.

The Church has enjoy'd it until the Male-Ad∣ministration of Ecclesiastical Justice has open'd a way to the Ambition of the Officers of Temporal Princes to take Cognizance of the same.

The Church also being sensible, that the Mis∣fortunes of the Times hindred them from being able to redress by their own Power, many Disor∣ders, which those who were under her Jurisdiction were fallen into, resolv'd in order to remove all Cause of Complaint, upon the account of the Im∣punity of the Crimes, which were committed un∣der the Protection of her Authority, to give Se∣cular Judges the Power to take Cognizance of thm in certain priviledg'd Ca∣ses; † 1.8 because they could not do it otherwise, than by vir∣tue of the Priviledge that was particularly granted them to that effect.

It must be noted, that there is a difference be∣tween the Cases that are styl'd Priviledg'd in all States, and those that are particularly pretended such in France.

The First may be reduc'd to Two, which are Voluntary Homicide with Premeditation, and ma∣nifest Apostacy, as to perswade Clerks to despise, and to forsake an Ecclesiastical Life, to quit the Habit of it, and to live with Scandal in the World, either in bearing Arms, or in doing

any other Action directly contrary to their Pro∣fession.

The number of the Second were inconsiderable at first. When the Pragmatical Sanction was esta∣blish'd, there were but two; the bearing of Arms, and the Infraction of the King's Safeguard; but by degrees they have been extended farther.

All Trespasses against the Pragmatical Sanction have been deem'd Criminal Cases.

That of the * 1.9 Concordats has been put in the same Rank.

The Verification of Cedules before the Judge Royal is also deem'd of the same kind.

Ravishments, Robberies upon the High Ways, False Witnesses, Coining, High Treason, and all enormous Crimes are deem'd to be of the same nature by the Parliaments.

In fine, if we believe them all the Faults of Ec∣clesiasticks, even common Injuries are priviledg'd Cases, there are no longer common Trespasses.

Such Crimes as are granted to be priviledg'd Cases, in all States, are own'd as such by the una∣nimous Opinion of the whole Church; and ma∣ny of those that are deem'd such in this Kingdom, are so by Abuse, and by the Incroachments of the Officers Royal.

They have been the bolder in assuming the Cognizance of all the Deportments of Clerks, by reason that, according to the Order of the Canons, which requires three conformable Sentences for the Condemnation of their Faults, it is very difficult to punish even the most notable, and impossible to do it in a short time.

Altho' this Pretence is plausible, and that it re∣quires a Reformation of the Formalities observ'd in the administration of the Justice of the Church; nevertheless, the ancient Lawyers could not for∣bear blaming the said Incroachment publick∣ly. And it is no Argument to urge, that those Crimes which render Ecclesiasticks unworthy of their Character, deprive them at the same time of their Immunities; since by such Arguments many Conclusions would be inferr'd as false as pre∣judicial, even to those who draw such Conse∣quences.

The only Consequence that can be inferr'd of the Delays and Irregularities observ'd in the Ad∣ministration of the Justice of the Church, is, that it is necessary to remedy the same; and that as the Ecclesiasticks are oblig'd so to do, so Kings are oblig'd to maintain them in the Immunities which God has been pleas'd to confer on his Church.

In order to discharge these Obligations, the Church is oblig'd to remedy, by the means we shall propose hereafter, the intolerable Delays of these Sentences, requir'd by the ancient Canons; and in the next place, to become so exact in the punishment of the Crimes committed by those that are under her Jurisdiction, that as soon as a Scan∣dal is discover'd, the exemplary Punishment of the same may be known as soon as the Offence.

And the King making a Declaration to express all the priviledg'd Cases, which may be reduc'd to those which may be committed by such, and in all States, and in all Orders; and besides, in the bearing of Arms, the Infraction of the King's Safeguard, the Verification of Cedules, ma∣nifest

Apostacy, as it is above explain'd, Robbe∣ries on the High Way, Coining, and all Crimes of Leze-Majesty, must absolutely forbid his Offi∣cers to take Cognizance of any other Cases, until the Accus'd be sent to them by the Judges of the Church; and that in case they infringe the said Order, their Punishment may be known almost as soon as their Trespass.

Now since Justice requires an exact knowledge of a Fault before it can be punish'd; and that Kings cannot administer Justice themselves to all their Subjects: His Majesty will discharge his Obligation, in ordering his Privy Council to re∣ceive the Complaints of the Infractions made by his Officers of what Quality soever, to such a Re∣gulation, and to punish their Incroachments severe∣ly: In which case the Church being satisfy'd with such an Order, will be the more careful to admi∣nister Justice, when they do receive it from their Prince.

SECT. IV. Which shews the Consequence of the Regalia pre∣tended by the Holy Chappel of Paris over the Bishops of France, and opens a way to suppress the same.

ALtho' the Canons of the Holy Chappel * 1.10 of Pa∣ris maintain, that the Regalia was given them by St. Lewis

their Founder: Yet it is most certain, that the first Grant we find of it is of Charles the 7th, which allows them for three years only the right of en∣joying the Temporal Revenue of the vacant Bi∣shopricks, over which the Regalia should be found to have a Right. The time of the said Grant be∣ing expir'd, he continu'd the same for three years longer, and for the four following; the whole on condition, that one half of the Money arising thereby should be imploy'd for the maintenance of the Chanters who were to perform the Service; and the other, for the Reparation of the Glass Windows and Ornaments, and for the mainte∣nance of the Choiristers, according as it should be ordain'd by the Chamber of Accounts of Paris.

Charles the 7th being dead, his Son Lewis the 11th continu'd the same Favour to the Holy Chappel, during his Life, which was look'd upon to be so extraordinary, that the Chamber of Ac∣counts would only verifie the Letters Patents thereof for Nine Years.

After the Reign of Lewis the 11th, his Succes∣sors Charles the 8th, Francis the 1st, and Henry the 2d continu'd the same Favour during their Lives.

Charles the 9th went far∣ther, * 1.11 and granted to Perpetu∣ity to the Holy Chappel, what his Predecessors had only granted them for a time.

The Intention those Princes had is praise-wor∣thy, since they gave a Right which did belong to them to a good end. But the Use those of the Holy Chappel have made of it can never be suffi∣ciently blam'd, since that instead of being satisfy'd

with what was given them, they have endeavour'd under that pretence, to make all the Bishopricks of France subject to the Regalia.

The Parliament of Paris, which pretend to be the only Judges of the Regalia, have been blinded to that degree by Self-interest, as to make no Scru∣ple to declare even all those Bi∣shopricks, † 1.12 which in our days have been united to the Crown, liable to that Servi∣tude; and to order the Advocates in proper terms no longer to question, but that the extent of the Regalia was as large as that of the Kingdom.

This Incroachment being too visible to pro∣duce any Effect, induc'd the Churches which were not liable to that Right no longer to acknowledge that Tribunal for Judges, and the Kings to refer all such Causes to their Council.

The extent of that Right over all the Bishop∣ricks of the Kingdom, is a Pretension so ill ground∣ed, that in order to discover the Injustice thereof, it will be sufficient to read a Deed * 1.13, the Original of which is in the Chamber of Accounts, which the President Le Maitre caus'd to be printed, which gave an Account of the Bishopricks that are subject to the Regalia, and of those that are free from it.

Formerly the common Opinion was, that there was no Regalia beyond the Ri∣ver Loire † 1.14, the Kings Lewis le Gross and Lewis the Young exempted the Archbishoprick of Bourdeaux, and the Suffra∣gans thereof, of the same. Ray∣mond

Count of Tholouse grant∣ed the same Favour to the Bi∣shops of Provence and of Lan∣guedoc, which was afterwards confirmed to them by Philip le Bell; and St. Lewis yielded the Regalia of all Brittany to the Dukes of the Country, by the Treaty he made with Peter Mau-clerc; which shews, that he did not give it to the Holy Chappel when he founded it.

Several other Bishopricks, as Lyons, Autun, Auxerre, and divers others, are so undoubtedly free from that Subjection, that no body calls it in∣to question.

The Ordinances made at divers times shew clearly, that the Kings of France never did pre∣tend to have a Regalia over all the Bishopricks; and that Truth is so evident, that Pasquier the King's Advocate in the Chamber of Accounts, is forc'd to confess, that he who maintains that Do∣ctrine, is rather a Court Flatterer than a French Lawyer. These are his very Words.

The Ignorance, or rather the want of Spirit, and Interest of some Bishops, has contributed very much towards the Vexation the Prelates of this Kingdom suffer at this time, who, to free them∣selves of the Persecution they did receive in their own particular, have made no scruple to receive Acquittances from the Holy Chappel for Sums they never paid.

The Opinion they had, that in disputing their Right before Judges who were their Parties, they would be condemn'd, has perswaded them that they might innocently commit such a Fault, the Consequence of which would be very dangerous, if your Majesty's Goodness did not repair the harm done by their Weakness.

Common Right requiring the Disposition of the Fruits of a vacant Benefice, to be reserv'd for the future Successor; the contrary cannot be done with∣out an Authentick Title to impower one so to do.

Yet we find none of that kind to justifie the Pretensions of Kings, to dispose of them according to their Pleasure; for want of which they are forc'd to have recourse to Custom.

This Truth is so certain, that all the Ordinances made upon that Subject only maintain their anci∣ent Possession.

As it is very easie for Soveraign Princes, by di∣vers Pretences, to attribute that to themselves which does not belong to them; and that there∣by an unjust Usurpation in the beginning, may in process of time be deem'd Lawful, by virtue of Possession: There may be a great deal of Reason to question, Whether Custom can have the force of an authentick Title in the case of Soveraigns.

But not designing to dispute your Majesty's Rights, but only to persuade you to regulate them, insomuch that they may not endanger the Salvation of Souls; without endeavouring any farther to exa∣mine the Source and the Foundation of the Rega¦lia's, which I suppose valid; I only design to examine what the Holy Chappel can pretend by virtue of those Concessions of your Predecessors, and to pro∣pose the Remedy of the Abuse which is committed in the enjoyment of such a Grant.

It often happens, that a Bishop who is Rich in all the Qualifications requir'd by the Canons, and which the Piety of Good Men can desire in him, but Poor by his Birth, remains two or three Years incapable of performing the Duty of his Office, both by the Payment of the Bulls, to which he is oblig'd by the Concordates, which often sweep away a whole Year's Revenue, and upon the ac∣count of this new Right, which takes away ano∣ther. So that adding to these two Expences the Charge he must be at to buy the Ornaments he stands in need of, and to furnish his House accor∣ding to his Dignity; it will often be found, that three Years are pass'd, before he can receive any thing for his Maintenance: For which reason, many of them do not go to their Bishopricks, ex∣cusing

themselves upon necessity; or laying aside House-keeping, deprive themselves of the Reputa∣tion they ought to have to feed their Flock, as well by Acts of Charity, as by Words.

It also often comes to pass, that to avoid these Inconveniencies, they engage themselves so far, that some are prevail'd with to practsie illegal means to acquit their Debts: And those who do not fall into that Extremity, live in perpetual Mi∣sery, and finally frustrate their Creditors of what they owe them, for want of Power to pay them.

The Remedy to that Evil, is as easie as neces∣sary, since it only requires the annexing to the Holy Chappel, an Abbey of equal Revenue with that which they can receive by that Settlement.

Some perhaps will say, That it will not be easie to clear this Point as it should be, by reason of the difficulty the said Society will make of dis∣closing that which they design to conceal: But if your Majesty orders them to justifie in two Months time, by the Acts of their Registers, what they did enjoy before the perpetual Concession made to them by Charles IX. and that on pain of forfei∣ting the said Right; this lawful Proceeding will soon discover what is necessary to be done, to re∣compence the Grant they have receiv'd from your Predecessors.

I am sensible, that the said Chapter will pretend, that the Revenue they receive by the Regalia, ought to be consider'd, according to what they enjoy by it at present; but whereas it is certain, that they were no sooner sure of the perpetuity of that Grant, but they extended it on divers Bi∣shopricks which are not liable to it, it is evident,

that the Fine I propose is that on which you may justly take your Measures.

If your Majesty will be pleas'd to do this, you will easily procure an incredible advantage to your Church, by which means the Souls will more easi∣ly receive the Food that is so inecessary for them, and which they ought to expect from their Pastors.

If, in the next place, you continue the Resolu∣tion you have taken, and which you have practis'd for a considerable time, Not to grant any Pension on Bishopricks, which is absolutely necessary, you will admit nothing in your Power, to put Bishops out of danger of not being able to perform their Duty for Want.

SECT. V. Of the Necessity of Protracting the Delays that are us'd in the Course of Ecclesiastical Justice; from whence it happens, that three Crimes remain un∣punish'd.

EVery body knows, that the Orders which are meerly Political in the Church, may and ought often to be chang'd, according to the Alte∣ration of Times. In the Purity of the first Ages of Christianity, some Establishments of that kind were good, which at present would be very pre∣judicial.

Time, which is the Father of all Corruption, having render'd the Manners of Ecclesiasticks different from what they were in the Fervor of their first Zeal; it is certain, that whereas during the course of se∣veral innocent Years, the Church, in which the

Zeal of the Prelates made them as severe in the Pu∣nishment of Crimes, as they are slack and negli∣gent in that Performance at present. It is certain, I say, that whereas in those Days the Delays of the Formalities, observ'd in the Ecclesiastical Ju∣risdiction, were of no ill Consequence, they are very prejudicial at present; and Reason does not permit the continuanco of the same.

This Consideration makes it very necessary to abolish the ancient Order prescribed by the Canons, which requires three conformable Sentences for the Conviction of Clerks.

The ill use that has been made, for a long while, of the said Order, Author of all Impiety, and con∣sequently of the Disorders of the Church, obliges it to do it self Justice in that point, to remove all Pretence from Temporal Judges, to follow the Opinion of certain Theologians, who have made no scruple to say, That it were better the Or∣der should be revers'd by an Incompetent Judge, than to see Disorder reign.

It is impossible to take away the Right of Juris∣diction of the Archbishopricks, of the Primates of the Holy See; but whereas it often comes to pass, that Six or Seven Sentences are given, before Three of them happen to be conformable to one another, the said Inconvenience may be remov'd, by ordering the Sentence of the Judges Dele∣gated by the Pope, upon the Appeal of the Pri∣mate, or Archbishop, to be definitive and abso∣lute; and to the end this last Judgment may be obtained speedily, and that the Zeal of the Church may appear in the good Administration of their Justice, it will be fit his Majesty would be pleas'd

to joyn with his Clergy, to obtain from the Holy See, that instead of having recourse to Rome, in all the particular Cases that are to be Tried, his Holi∣ness would be pleas'd to Delegate, in all the Pro∣vinces of the Kingdom, Persons of Capacity and Probity, with a Power to Judge Soveraignly of all Appeals made in his Tribunal, without any new Rescripts.

This Proposition cannot be odious at Rome, since the Concordate obliges the Pope to Delegate in partibus, for the Decision of the Causes that are depending there; this difference will only be found, That whereas at present there is a necessity of ha∣ving recourse to Rome in every Cause, for the Dele∣gation of those Judges, they will then be all ready Nominated for the Decision of all the Causes of the Kingdom; which facilitating the Punishment of the Crimes of the Ecclesiasticks, will remove all pretences of the Parliament's Incroaching, as they do, upon the Justice of the Church, and all Subjects of Complaints from the Ecclesiasticks a∣gainst them.

And thereby the Mouths of those that are open Enemies of the Church, or envious of her Immu∣nities, will be shut; and her best Children who have been silent hitherto upon that Subject, will maintain her Cause, and speak boldly and freely to defend her Liberty, against those who would oppress it without Reason.

I am sensible, that the Holy See will fear, lest those Delegates should become perpetual Dictators in time; but the changing of them from time to time, which I think to be fit and necessary, will remove the fear of that Inconvenience; and con∣tinuing

to sue out the Appeals at Rome in every Cause which may be suffered, the Rights of the Holy See will remain entire, without any dimi∣nution.

It may be urg'd, That it will require no more time to obtain a new Delegation of Judges from Rome, for every Crime that shall be committed, than to sue out an Appeal to remove the Cause, before those that are already Delegated; but the thing is very different, since it is certain, that one of the principal Abuses which hinders the Punishment of the Crimes of the Clerks, consists in that the Appellant commonly obtains at Rome his Removal, before such a Judge as he thinks fit in France, by Collusion with the Benchers, who for Money serve their Clients as they please.

SECT. VI. Which represents the Prejudice the Church receives by the Four Exemptions several Churches enjoy, to the Prejudice of the Common Right; and pro∣poses Means to remedy the same.

EXemption, is a Dispensation, or Relaxation of the Obligation we lay under to Obey our Su∣periours: They are of different kinds; some are of Right, others of Fact.

The Exemptions of Right, are those we enjoy by the Concession of a lawful Superiour, who grants them upon mature Deliberation, and for certain Reasons.

The Exemptions of Fact, are those we are in pos∣session of without a Title, * 1.15 but only by the use thereof Time out of Mind.

The Exemptions of Right are approv'd of by all Casuists, as granted by a Lawful Authority.

Those of Fact, though not lawful in themselves, are not always condemn'd by them; because those that have enjoy'd a Priviledge Time out of Mind, had formerly Bulls for the same, though they can∣not produce them.

There are Three different Exemptions of Places; The First is that of Mendicant Monasteries, which the Bishop does not visit, though he is receiv'd so∣lemnly there, whenever he goes thither, may hold his Orders there, and perform all the Episcopal Functions, whenever he thinks fit.

The Second is of many other Places, in which they are not receiv'd, and can perform no Episco∣pal Function, unless they make a Declaration, That it is without prejudice to the Rights and Pri∣vileges of the said Places. The Abbeys of Marmou∣tier, and of Vendosme, and many others, are of this kind.

The Third is of certain Territories, in the ex∣tent of which, the Bishop exerts no Jurisdiction, not even over the Laity; over which, those who enjoy such Exemptions, have the sole Jurisdiction, and the Power commonly call'd, Lex Diocoesana: The Abbeys of S. Germans des Prez, or of the Fields, of Corbie, of S. Florent le Vieil, of Fescamp, and many others are of this kind within the whole extent of their Territories, the Monks themselves exert all the Episcopal Jurisdiction.

They give Dispensations of Banes; they ap∣point Monitories; they publish Jubilees, assign the Stations after the Orders are come from Rome; the Visa's are expedited in their Names. Moreover, they pretend a Right to chuse whatever Bishops they think fit to give Orders, without Leave from their Diocesan Bishop.

Finally, they give Demissories to receive Orders from any Bishop.

The Chapter of Chartres enjoys this Exemption; by virtue of which, the Bishop cannot make his Entry into the Church, without giving an Act, by which he promises to preserve the Priviledges of the Church, nor make any Visitation, either of the Holy Sacrament, or of the Holy Oyls.

Those Persons are so far exempted from the Ju∣risdiction of the Bishops, that when a Canon be∣comes a Delinquent, the Chapter nominates the Judges that are to Try him; and if there be an Ap∣peal of Judgment, they apply themselves to Rome, to have Judges in Partibus, because that Church ad Sanitam Romanam Ecclesiam, admisso nullo medio, pertinet.

They publish Indulgences; they have a hun∣dred and odd Parishes; they exert all the Diocesan Jurisdiction, and the Appeal of all their Sentences is carried to Rome: They ordain all General Pro∣cessions.

St. Martin of Tours enjoys the same Priviledges.

Four sorts of Persons are particularly exempted in the Church; the Archbishops of the Primates; the Bishops of the Archbishops; the Monks, and the Religious of the Bishops; and the Canons of the Bishops and Archbishops.

Those Exemptions differ in many Circum∣stances; some only exempt Persons, and others also exempt the Place of their Abode, and that dif∣ferently.

Anciently the Archbishops were subject to the Primates * 1.16, to whom the Pope sent the Pallium to exert Power and Authority over the Metropo∣litans. But since those of France, excepting those of Tours, of Sens, and of Paris, have obtain'd, ei∣ther by Bulls, or by Prescription, leave to have no Dependance on the Primates.

Some Bishops † 1.17 have also obtain'd the Exemption of their Subjection to their Arch∣bishops from the Pope.

The Monks are almost all exempted from the Common Jurisdiction, and their Right is grounded on the free Concession of their Bishops, or of the Popes; their most ancient Exemptions, are those that were granted them 7•• or 800 years ago, by the Bishops and Archbishops; but all those they have obtain'd since, have been granted by the Popes, to one of these ends, either least the Pre∣sence and Court of the Bishops should disturb their Solitude, or to free them from the Rigour of some, by which they were, or pretended to be severely us'd.

The last that have been exempted from the Juris∣diction of their Superiours, are the Canons. In their first Institution they were so strictly bound and united to their Bishops, that they could do no∣thing without their leave; and to endeavour to free themselves of their Obedience to them, would have been look'd upon as the greatest Crime they commit in those days.

Many have been of Opinion, that they have obtain'd all their Exemptions from the Anti-Pope▪ or that they are evidently surreptitious, or barely grounded on the Possession of a Time out of Mind; but it is most certain, that some of them are more ancient than the Schisms, and more authoriz'd than those which draw their Force and Virtue from the Anti-Popes.

The most lawful have grant∣ed some; * 1.18 either in Confir∣mation of the Concessions of the Bishops, or of the Agree∣ments made with them; or of their own accord, under pretence to secure the Ca∣nons against the ill Usages they did receive from them.

In order to penetrate into the bottom of this matter, and clearly to distinguish the good Ex∣emptions from the bad, we must consider the Bulls by which they are Authoriz'd differently.

Those that were granted by the Popes before the Misfortune of the Schisms are different from those which were granted since the Extinction of the same.

The first sort must be look'd upon as good and valid; but yet such Bulls being an Exemption from

the common Right, which is always odious, must be carefully examin'd, for fear of being mistaken in the Tenor of them; since it is certain, that many are produc'd as Bulls of Exemption, which are only Bulls of Protection, which were obtain'd anciently; and Bulls, which grant some particular Priviledges, but not an Exemption from the usual Jurisdiction; or Bulls, which only authorize Chap∣ters to erect a Jurisdiction inferiour to that of the Bishops; like unto those of the Arch-Deacons, who in some Churches have a right to Exeommu∣nicate, to Interdict, and to injoin publick Penances, tho' they are still subordinate to the Bishop's Ju∣risdiction.

As for the second sort, as they are void in them∣selves, for want of a Lawful Authority in those who did grant them, particularly by the Constitution of Pope Martin the 5th, * 1.19 which annihilates all Bulls obtain'd during the Schisms, no body can pretend, without Malice or Ignorance, to make use of them to the Prejudice of the Com∣mon Right.

The third sort have been granted, either to serve for new Exemptions, or to confirm preceding ones.

The first must be reputed void, either because they are directly opposite to the Decree mention'd by Martin the 5th; or because they have been surreptitiously obtain'd, as the Parliament of Paris and Tholouse have adjudg'd it, against the Chapters of Angers and Cahors.

The second being only granted to confirm an ancient Right, which is never found to be lawfully establish'd, must, in the Judgment of all Impartial Persons, be look'd upon as of no Effect.

It now remains to see whe∣ther the Exemptions * 1.20 ground∣ed on the bare Concessions made by the Bishops, or on the Agreements and Arbitral Sen∣tences interpos'd upon that Sub∣ject against them and their Chapters, are good and valid.

If it be never lawful for Bishops to alienate their Temporal without an evident Advantage and Pro∣fit, much less can they renounce their Spiritual Au∣thority, to the great prejudice of the Church, which thereby sees her Members divided from the Head, and the Rule whereby it subsists chang'd in∣to a Confusion, which destroys it.

The Nullity of Agreements, mutual Promises, or Arbitral Sentences is very visible by that Princi∣ple: No Man can compromise or transfer a thing, the Disposition whereof is not in his Power; and if there be any Authors who are of Opinion, that Spiritual things may be transferr'd, all in general except some, among which the Subjection of this nature is the first: And indeed those sort of Titles are so invalid in the Case in question, that tho' they were confirm'd by the Popes, they would not be sufficient to deprive of their Right the Succes∣sors of the Bishops, who have parted with their Superiority in one of the three ways above spe∣cify'd.

As Reason shews that none of these ways can be of force against common Right; it also shews, that Bulls barely confirming the said Concessions, Agree∣ments, or Arbitral Sentences, give no Right to those who would make use of them, because they can have no more Force than the Foundation they suppose.

One Point only remains liable to Examination, viz. Whether the Custom and ancient Possession which Chapters claim against the Authority of their Bishops, is a Title sufficiently valid to make the Church undergo the Prejudice it suffers by Exemptions.

* 1.21 Custom is a very deceit∣ful Rule; the ill ones, tho' ne∣never so ancient, are universal∣ly condemn'd; and all those that are against common right, and destroy an Order establish'd by Ecclesiastical Constitutions, must be reputed so, and can be no just ground of Prescription, much less in what relates to Ecclesiastical than to Civil Laws, since the Settlements of the Church are grounded on a more certain Principle; and the Difficulty propos'd must be decided every where, by saying, That Custom may serve as a Title in those things which may be possess'd by common Right, but never in those in which Possession vi∣olates it; in which Case it is absolutely void, unless it be accompany'd with a Title so Authen∣tick, that it may be liable to no manner of Suspi∣cion: Whence it results, That Common Right submitting all Canons to their Bishops, there is no

Custom sufficiently powerful to exempt them from that Subjection.

It is impossible to imagine the many Evils Ex∣emptions are the Source of. They overthrow the Order the Church has establish'd consonant to Reason, which requires Inferiours to be subject to their Superiours. They ruine the Concord which ought to be between the Head and the Members; they authorize all sorts of Violences, and leave many Crimes unpunish'd, as well in the Person of the Priviledg'd; as in that of many Libertines, who take the Advantage of them to secure them∣selves.

There are two ways to redress that Evil, either by annihilating the Exemptions absolutely, or by regulating them.

I am very sensible that the first Expedient, as the most absolute, is the most difficult: But since it is not impossible, I will nevertheless propose it to your Majesty, who has ever delighted in do∣ing that which your Predecessors durst not at∣tempt.

However, I do not think it proper in relation to the Exemptions which Monks and their Mo∣nasteries enjoy. As they are dispers'd in divers Dioceses, the Uniformity of Mind, which ought to reign among them, requires, that instead of their being govern'd by divers Bishops, whose Minds are different, they should be under the Go∣vernment of one Regular Chief; upon which Foundation I affirm boldly, That it is as necessa∣ry to allow them the Possession of the lawful Ex∣emptions they enjoy, as it is just to know the Va∣lidity of them, by the Examination of their Bulls,

which they extend sometimes farther than Reason requires.

But I say moreover, that the other Exemptions may be abolish'd with so much Advantage for the Church, that that Universal Motive is sufficient to make one despise particular Interests on that occa∣sion.

When a thing is just, it is a sufficient Induce∣ment for us to undertake it; and we are abso∣lutely oblig'd to do it when it is altogether ne∣cessary.

The Church having subsisted hitherto without the Alteration I propose, I do not suppose it has this last Quality; but I say, that it would be very useful, in that it would leave no subject of Excuse to the Bishops, in case they were wanting in their Duty.

To make use of this first Expedient would only require a Revocation made by his Holiness of the Exemptions and Priviledges in question, and a Power given to the Bishops to exert their Jurisdi∣ction over their Chapters, and all other priviledg'd Persons, except those above mention'd.

Such a Bull, accompany'd by a Declaration from your Majesty, verify'd in your Parliaments and in your Council, would break the Fetters which tie the Hands of the Prelates of your King∣dom, and would make them answerable for the Disorders of their Dioceses, which it is almost im∣possible for them to do at present.

The obtaining of the Pope's Bull would prove the easier in my Opinion, in that it is consonant to the overtures of the Council of Trent, which de∣clares

particularly * 1.22, That the Chapters and Canons cannot by virtue of any Exemption, Cu∣stom, Possession, Sentence, Oath and Concordat whatever, be ex∣cus'd of being visited, corrected, and chastis'd by their Bishops, or other Persons deputed by them: And tho' this Expedient ••ere not relish'd at Rome, where Novelties, tho' useful, are com∣monly odious, and where the least Opposition generally ob∣structs great Advantages; your Majesty causing the Decree of the Council to be observ'd on this Subject, will have no need of any new Expedition.

I am sensible that this Remedy will be dislik'd by the Parliaments, with whom Use and Practice is far more prevailing, than whatever Reasons can beurg'd; but after having foreseen that good, and consider'd all the Obstacles which may be met in it, I declare boldy, that it would be much better to pass over all of them, than to stop at any oppositi∣on whatever: And your Majesty may undertake the said Alteration the better, and with more Rea∣son, because that in restoring things upon the foot of common Right, you will restore them in their own Nature; and that it sometimes becomes So∣vereigns to be bold on certain occasions, which are not only just, but of which the Importance cannot be que∣stion'd * 1.23.

The Canons keep their Titles so conceal'd, that it is impossible to come to the knowledge of them, unless by the King's Authority: Moreover, they often suppose them, when they have none; which Peter de Blois and Peter le Venerable openly com∣plain of.

Tho' the Advantage of these two Expedients, which indeed are but one and the same, ought to prevail with the World to approve them; yet the Fear I am in, that the Difficulties which would be met with, to put them in Execution, would make them ineffectual, makes me pass to the second, which consists in the Nomination of Commissioners, Bishops, Canons and Monks, which being joyn'd to Deputies of the Council and of the Parliaments, shall take an Account of all the Exemptions and Priviledges of the Church; to the end, that being represented to your Majesty, those that will be found good and valid may be regulated; and those that have no lawful Founda∣tion, retrench'd and abolish'd: And the said Ex∣pedient is the more practicable, in that the Ordi∣nances of Orleans * 1.24, made un∣der Francis the 2d, have a par∣ticular Article for the Regula∣tions of Exemptions.

If, in the next place, the Pope would be pleas'd to impower in every Metropolis the Delegated Judges we have above propos'd, to regulate by the

Authority of the Holy See, what the Bishops will not be able to do of themselves, by reason of the Exemptions, which will remain in their Force and Vigour, and your Majesty to command your Council to take Cognizance of the Differences which will arise upon such a Subject, you will ab∣solutely remedy all the Evils the said Priviledges occasion.

SECT. VII. Which represents the Inconveniences that arise from the Bishops not having an Absolute Power to dispose of the Benefices that are un∣der them.

IT now remains to speak of the Evil which pro∣ceeds from, that the Bishops do not dispose of the major part of their Cures of their Dioceses, to which the Ecclesiastical or Lay-Patrons have a Right of Presentation.

The Ecclesiasticks began to enjoy the right of Patronage * 1.25 in the Council of Orange, where it was ordain'd, That the Bishops, who should build Churches in another Diocese, should have a Right to put such Priests there as they should think fit, provided their Capacity was approv'd of by the Diocesan Bi∣shop.

* 1.26 The same Right was also given by Justinian to the Lay∣men, who should be Founders of Chappels, which they obtain'd afterwards even in respect of Monasteries, which they should be Founders of.

* 1.27 The Ninth Council of To∣ledo moreover extended the Right of Laick Patronage to Parochial Churches, allowing the Founders to nominate Curates, lest the Negli∣gence wherewith Bishops would serve their Foun∣dations should discourage them from making any new ones.

In the beginning this Right was of no longer continuance than the Founders Life, Gregory and Pellagius extended it to their Children; and finally, under Charlemayne it pass'd to the Heirs, whoever they were, which has continu'd ever since.

This Right, which is approv'd of by several Fathers of the Church, being confirm'd by divers Councils, particularly that of Trent, must be look'd upon as holy and inviolable, by reason of its An∣cientness, for its Authority founded on the Canons of the Fathers and of the Councils, and for the Advantage which accrues to the Church by the same, in favour of which many Foundations are made, thereby to acquire the Power to nominate those that are to enjoy them.

But when I consider, that Necessity has no Law, and that the Use of a Priviledge, which was good during the fervour of the Founders, is at present so prejudicial by the Corruption of those who are Heirs of their Estate, but not of their Zeal and of their Virtue, nor even sometimes of their Religi∣on, that it is impossible to continue it, without exposing many Souls to their Ruine: I dare af∣firm boldly, that a Disorder of that Consequence can no longer be conniv'd at, without being an∣swerable for the same before God.

Many are of Opinion, That the best Remedy for this Evil, is wholly to abolish the Cause of it; but when I consider, that a Legacy of this nature cannot be possess'd with Justice, without perfor∣ming the Conditions on which it has been given; and that the Fathers of the Council of Trent, who were sensible of the Abuses of the same, durst not alter them, I am at a stand; and I do not think that a private Man can, without Temerity, pro∣pose such a Remedy: It will be better to have re∣course to a milder way, in some measure propos'd by the Council of Trent * 1.28, though not directly.

That way is, † 1.29 That the Synod should Elect Examiners, by which all the Pretenders to Benefices, which have the Cure of Souls, shall be carefully examin'd, to the end that their Capacity and Probity being known, they may afterwards pro∣pose two or three of the most Capable, to the Pa∣trons of the Cures which shall be vacant, for them to chuse, and present to the Bishop the Person which shall be most agreeable to them.

I am sensible that this Expedient takes off some∣thing of the Liberty Patrons enjoy in France at present; but since in restraining it, it nevertheless leaves it them, and hinders incapable Persons from being put into Cures, it ought to be receiv'd; and that the more willingly, in my Opinion, since that in redressing the Evil which arises from the Presentations to Cures, if the Order of the Council be observ'd, it will also redress those that are caus'd by the facility wherewith the Archbishops often re∣ceives the Priests, whom their Suffragans have

refus'd; in that as the Council's Orders, that the Examiners, propos'd by it, to be the Judges of the Capacity of those that are to be nam'd for Cures, shall be oblig'd to give an account of their Pro∣ceedings to the Provincial Councils; so it will not allow the Archbishops to pass by their Judg∣ment, without so just a Cause, that no body may disapprove it.

SECT. VIII. Of the Reformation of Monasteries.

AFter such just Regulations, as are above mentioned, it will suit with your Majesty's Piety to Authorize the Reformation of Monaste∣ries as much as is possible.

I am very sensible, that many Considerations may give cause to fear, that those which have been made in our Days, are not so austere in their Pro∣gress, as in their Beginning; but yet it is very necessary to mind, and to favour them; since Good does not change its Nature in not being lasting, but still remains good; and that he who does what he can with Prudence for a good End, performs his Duty, and answers what God expects from his Care.

It is true, that I ever was of Opinion, and am so still, That it were better to establish moderate Re∣formations, in the Observation of which, both Bo∣dies and Minds may subsist with some ease, than to undertake such austere ones, that the strongest Bodies will hardly be able to bear the Rigour of them. Temperate things are commonly con∣stant

and lasting; but it requires an extraordinary Grace to make that subsist, which seems to force Nature.

It is also observable, That the Reformations of Religious Houses in this Kingdom, must be diffe∣rent from those of other States, which being free of Heresies, require rather a profound Humility, and an exemplary Simplicity in the Members thereof, than Doctrine, which is altogether neces∣sary in this Kingdom, in which the Ignorance of the most Vertuous Monks in the World may prove as prejudicial to some Souls who stand in need of their Learning, as their Zeal and Vertue are use∣ful to others, and to themselves.

I must needs say by the bye on this Subject, That as to what relates particularly to the Refor∣mation of the Monasteries of Women, to restore the Elections, and particularly the Triennial, instead of the King's Nomination, is not always an infal∣lible Expedient.

The Brigues and Factions which reign some∣times amidst the Weakness of that Sex, often rise to that degree, that they are not supportable; and I have seen your Majesty oblig'd twice to alter it, in places where you had setled it, to restore Things to their former state.

As it behoves your Majesty's Piety to labour about the Regulation of ancient Monasteries, so it behoves your Prudence to put a stop to the progress of the over-great number of new Monasteries which are daily establish'd.

In order whereunto, it is necessary to despise the Opinion of certain Persons, as Weak as De∣vout, and more Zealous than Prudent; who often

fansie, that the Salvation of Souls, and the Safety of the State, depends on that which is prejudicial to both.

As none but such as are wicked or blind, can be insensible or disown, that Religious Houses are not only very useful, but also necessary; so none but those who have an indiscreet Zeal can be igno∣rant, that the excess of them is inconvenient, and that it might come to such a point as would be ruinous.

That which is done for the State being done for God, who is the Basis and Foundation of it; to Reform the Houses that are already establish'd, and to put a stop to the excess of new Establishments, are two Works very agreeable to GOD, who loves Rule in all things.

SECT. IX. Of the Obedience which is due to the POPE.

THe Order which God requires in all things, gives me an occasion to represent to your Majesty, in this place, That as Princes are oblig'd to acknowledge the Authority of the Church, to submit to their Holy Decrees, and to pay an entire Obedience to the same, in what relates to the Spi∣ritual Power which God hath placed in her hands for the Salvation of Mankind; and that as it is their Duty to maintain the Honour of the Popes, as Successors of St. Peter, and Vicars of Jesus Christ; so they ought not to yield to their Attempts, when they endeavour to extend their Power beyond its Bounds.

As Kings are oblig'd to respect the Thiara of the Soveraign Pontifs, the same Obligation lies upon them to preserve the Power of their Crown.

This Truth is acknowledged by all Theolo∣gians; but it is very difficult to distinguish the Extent and Subordination of these two Powers aright.

In such a matter, Princes are neither to credit the Gentlemen of the Long Robe, who common∣ly measure the King's by the Form of his Crown, which being round, has no end; nor those who by the excess of an indiscreet Zeal, declare them∣selves openly in favour of Rome.

Reason advises us to hear both the one and the other, in order afterwards to resolve the Difficul∣ty by Persons of so much Learning, that they may not be liable to mistake through Ignorance; and so sincere, that neither the Interests of the State, not those of Rome, may prevail with them against Reason.

I may declare with Truth, That I have ever found the Doctors of the University of Paris, and the most Learned Monks of all Orders, so reaso∣nable on this Subject, that I have never observ'd the least Weakness in them, that could hinder them from defending the just Rights of this King∣dom; neither have I ever observ'd any excess of Affection in them for their Native Country, which could induce them, contrary to the true Sentiments of Religion, to diminish those of the Church to augment the others.

In such Cases, the Opinion of our Fathers must be of great Weight; the most famous and most impartial Historians and Authors, who have writ∣ten

in all Ages, must be carefully consulted on those Occasions, in which nothing can be more, dangerous than Weakness or Ignorance.

SECT. X. Which sets forth the Advantage of Learning; and shews how it ought to be Taught in this Kingdom.

HAving represented, that Ignorance is some∣times prejudicial to the State; I am now to speak of the Necessity of Learning, one of the greatest Ornaments of States, this being the most proper place for it, since the Empire of it is justly due to the Church, by reason that all sorts of Truths have a natural Relation to the first, the Sa∣cred Mysteries of which, Eternal Wisdom has been pleas'd to make the Ecclesiastical Order Deposito∣ries of.

As the Knowledge of Letters is absolutely ne∣cessary in a Commonwealth, it is certain, that they ought not to be taught without distinction to every body.

As a Body having Eyes in all its Parts, would be monstrous; a State would be the same, if all the Inhabitants thereof were Learned; we should find as little Obedience in it, as Pride and Presumption would be common.

The Commerce of Letters would absolutely ba∣nish that of Trade, which enriches Nations; would ruine Husbandry, the true Mother of the People; and would soon destroy the Nursery of Souldiers, which encreases more in the Rudeness of Ignorance, than in the Politeness of Sciences: Finally, it would

fill France with Litigious Persons, more proper to ruine private Families, and to disturb publick Peace, than to do the State any good.

If Learning were prophan'd to all sorts of Minds, we should see more Persons capable to form Doubts, than to resolve them; and many would be fitter to oppose Truths, than to defend them.

'Tis this Consideration which induces Politici∣ans to say, that a well regulated State requires more Masters of Mechanick Arts, than Masters of Liberal Arts to teach Letters.

I have often heard Cardinal du Perron, for the same Reason, earnestly wish the Suppression of part of the Colledges of this Kingdom; he was de∣sirous to have four or five famous ones establish'd in Paris, and two in every Metropolitan City of the Provinces.

He added to all the Considerations I have urg'd, that it was impossble to find a sufficient number of Learned Men in every Age to supply a great number of Colledges; whereas being contented with a moderate number, they might be fill'd with worthy Persons, who would preserve the Fire of the Temple in its Purity, and would transmit by an uninterrupted Succession the Sciences in their Perfection.

I cannot forbear thinking, when I consider the great number of Men who profess the Teaching of Letters, and the multitude of Children that are instructed, that I see an infinite number of Sick People, who only aiming to drink pure and clear Water for their Cure, are press'd with such a dis∣orderly Drought, that receiving without distincti∣on all those that are presented to them, the major

part drink such as are impure, and often out of poyson'd Cups; which encreases their Drought and their Distemper, instead of easing either.

In fine, this great number of Colledges, indif∣ferently establish'd in all places, produces two Evils; the one, by the mean Capacity of those that are oblig'd to Teach, there not being a suffi∣cient number of eminent Persons to fill the Pul∣pits; the other, by the want of natural Dispositi∣on in those whose Fathers oblige them to study, by reason of the Conveniences of it, without ex∣amining their Capacity; which is the reason, that most of those that study have only a mean Tin∣cture of Learning; some for want of more Capa∣city, others for not being well instructed.

Tho' this Evil is of great consequence, the Re∣medy is easie, since it only requires to reduce all the Colledges of such places as are no Metropoli∣tans to two or three Classis, sufficient to free the Youth from gross Ignorance, prejudicial even to those who design to follow Arms, or to spend their Lives in Trading.

By that means, before Children are determin'd to any Condition, two or three Years will disco∣ver the Capacity of their Minds; after which, those that have a good Genius, being sent to great Cities, will succeed the better in their Learning, both upon that account, and by their being instru∣cted by abler Masters.

Having thus provided against this Evil, which is much greater than it seems to be, we must also provide against another into which France would infallibly fall, if all the Colledges that are esta∣blish'd were in one Hand.

The Universities pretend, that a great deal of wrong is done them, in not leaving them ex∣clusively from all others the faculty of Teaching Youth.

The Jesuits on the other hand would not be dis∣pleas'd, perhaps, of being the only Persons im∣ploy'd in that Function.

Reason, which ought to decide all sorts of Dif∣ferences, does not permit the frustrating of an an∣cient Possessor, of what he possesses with a just Ti∣tle: And Publick Interest cannot suffer a Society, not only recommendable by their Piety, but fa∣mous for their Learning, as the Jesuits are, to be depriv'd of a Function, which they are able to per∣form with great Advantage for the Publick.

If the Universities should teach alone, there would be cause to fear they would in time resume their former Pride, which might prove as preju∣dicial for the future as it has been heretofore.

If on the other hand the Jesuits had no Compa∣nions in the instructing of Youth, besides that the like Inconvenience might be fear'd, there would be moreover a just subject to fear many others.

A Society which is govern'd, more than any ever was, by the Laws of Prudence; and which, devoting it self to God, without depriving them∣selves of the knowledge of the things of this World, lives in so perfect a Correspondence, that the same Spirit seems to animate the whole Body: A Society, which by a blind Vow of Obedience is submitted to a perpetual Chief, cannot, according to the Laws of Sound Policy, be much Authoriz'd in a State, in which a powerful Community must be formidable.

If it be true, as it is most certain, that Men have a natural Inclination to advance those they have receiv'd their first Instructions from; and that Parents have always a particular Affection for those who have educated their Children. It is also true, that the absolute Education of Youth cannot be committed to the Jesuits, without be∣ing expos'd to give them a Power, which would be the more obnoxius to States, in that all the Places and Honours which give the management thereof, would be fill'd by their Disciples; and that those who take an Ascendant early over the Mind sometimes retain it during their whole Life.

If we add, that the Administration of the Sa∣crament of Penance gives that Society a second Au∣thority over all sorts of Persons, which is of no less weight than the first: If we consider, that by those two ways they penetrate into the most secret Motions of Hearts and Families, it will be im∣possible not to conclude, that it is not fit to leave them the said Ministry alone, without Competitors.

Those Reasons have been so powerful in all States, that we have no Example of any hitherto, who have been willing to yield the Empire of Let∣ters, and the absolute Education of their Youth to that Society alone.

If that Society, good and harmless in it self, created so much Jealousie in the Arch Duke Albert, one of the most pious Princes of the House of Au∣stria, who only acted according to the Motions of the Council of Spain, that he thought fit to exclude them out of certain Universities, in which they were actually settled, and to oppose the new Settlements they design'd in Flanders.

If they have behav'd themselves so, as to induce some Republicks to remove them absolutely out of their Dominions, tho' with too much Rigour, it is the least that can be done in this Kingdom, to give them some Check, seeing not only that they are submitted to a Foreign and Perpetual Chief, but moreover, subject and, at the Devotion of Princes, who seem to desire nothing more, than to humble and ruine this Crown.

As in point of Faith all the Catholick States of the World have but one Doctrine; in that which does not relate to it, there are many who differ, from whence the Source of their Fundamental Maxims is often deriv'd; for which reason, stand∣ing in need of some Theologians, who may on certain occasions couragiously defend the Opinions, which have been always receiv'd there, and pre∣serv'd by an uninterrupted Transmission, they re∣quire some free from any Ingagement with any suspected Powers, having no dependance to de∣prive them of Liberty in things, in which Faith allows it to all the World.

History informs us, that the Order of St. Benedict was formerly so absolutely Master of the Schools, that no body was taught in any other places, and that it decay'd so absolutely in point of Sci∣ence and of Piety together in the Tenth Century of the Church, that it was call'd Unhappy upon that account. It also informs us, that the Domini∣oans have afterwards enjoy'd the same Advantages which those good Fathers were first possess'd of; and that Time has depriv'd them of it like the others, to the great prejudice of the Church, which happen'd to be infected at that time with

many Heresies: It also informs us by the same means, that Letters are like passing Birds, which do not always remain in the same Country. And therefore Policy requires the preventing of the said Inconvenience, which being come to pass twice, is with Reason to be fear'd a third time; and which probably will not happen, if that Society has Companions in the Possession of Letters.

All Parties are dangerous in point of Doctrine; and nothing can be more easie, than to form one under pretence of Piety, when a Society thinks it self oblig'd to it by the Interest of their Subsi∣stance.

The History of Pope Benedict the 11th, against whom the Cordeliers, nettled upon the account of the Perfection of Poverty, viz. of the Revenue of St. Francis, were animated to that degree, that they did not only declare open War against him by their Books, but moreover by the Empe∣rour's Arms; by favour of which an Anti-pope arose, to the great prejudice of the Church, is too great an Example to require any thing more to be said upon that subject.

The more Societies adhere to their Chief or Su∣periour, the more they are to be fear'd, particu∣larly by those to whom they are not favourable.

Since then Prudence obliges not only to oppose whatever may be prejudicial to the State, but also to prevent whatever might contribute thereunto; since the Power of so doing often creates a Desire so to do.

Since also the Weakness of Humane Nature re∣quires a Counterpoise in all things, and that it is the Foundation of Justice; it is more reasonable,

that the Universities and the Jesuits should Teach in Emulation of one another, to the end that the said Emulation may whet their Vertue, and that Sciences may the better flourish, and be certain in the State, in that being deposited into the Hands of Two Guardians, if the one should chance to lose this sacred Pledge, it may be found among the others.

SECT. XI. Means to Regulate the Abuses which are committed by Graduates in the obtaining of Benefices.

WHereas it would be prejudicial to a State, if Men of all Capacities should apply themselves to the Sudy of Letters, it is to be wish'd that Men of Sense may be encourag'd in it. Your Majesty cannot do a more useful thing to that end, than to put a stop to the Abuses which are com∣mitted in the Distribution of Benefices, which ought to be reserv'd for those to whom they are due, as a Reward of their Labours.

None but such as are Enemies to Learning and Vertue can question that Right. The Council of Basle * 1.30, and the Concordate which pass'd afterwards at the Council of Lateran, between Leo X. and Francis I. have setled it too clearly, for any one to have such a Thought: But yet, at the same time, Men must be void of Justice and Reason, not to be desirous

to correct the Abuses of the same; which are so great by fraudulent Permutations, by suppos'd Resignations, by the Artifice of Patrons, and by the Authority of the Indulta∣ries, who are more powerful than the Graduates, and by the Industry of those who are only in∣debted to their Purse for their Degrees; that the said Priviledge is so far from being the Reward of Vertue at present, that it is only the Recompence of the Craft and Villany of those, who being ig∣norant of Letters, are only learned in Liti∣giousness.

The true Remedy to that Evil, is to prefer, conformably to the Holy Canons, Doctors and Batchelors in Divinity, to all those who have the same Degrees in other Faculties.

That among Theologians equal in Degrees, those who have preach'd the Word of God, or Theology longest, be provided before the others.

That Doctors and Batchelors at Law may have the same Advantage over such as are only Ma∣sters of Arts; and that among the last, those who have been longest Regents, be preferr••d first.

That none be allow'd to take out his Letters for the Mastership of Arts, nor his Degrees in Civil or Canon Law, but in the Universities where he has studied.

That none of the said Letters be granted to any, but such as have actually made an entire Course of Philosophy; nor any Degrees in Civil or Ca∣non Law, but to such as have studied for the space of Three whole Years in Law-Schools, and

have made their Exercises publickly, with the In∣tervals requir'd.

In case this Order be carefully observ'd, the Merit of Letters will certainly be rewarded; and Ignorance will no longer be protected by it, and receive what is only due to Learning.

If, in the next place, your Majesty will be pleas'd to free those, who shall make themselves famous for Learning, from the Persecution of the Indul∣taries, it will encourage many to redouble their Labour, in order to receive the deserv'd Reward of the same.

SECT. XII. Of the Right of * 1.31 INDULT.

THE Right of Indult being deriv'd from a Bull of Pope Eugene † 1.32, which is not to be found; if it should be exa∣min'd with rigour, we would find that the Foundation of it is not solid; since, according to Reason, such things as cannot be prov'd, ought to be put in the same Classis with those that are not.

I am sensible, that Paul III. being willing to ob∣lige the Presidents and Counsellors of the Parlia∣ment of Paris † 1.33, who did op∣pose the Concordates, gave them a Power of Nomination to Regular and Secular Benefices. I am also sen∣sible, that the Chancellor of France, as President of the said Parliament, receiv'd the same Privilege

by the same Bull: But if we consider that the said Bull is grounded on that of his Predecessor, which is not to be found; that Consideration will have no force, since Lawyers inform us clearly, That a Re∣ference can have no force, un∣less the thing referr'd unto, is clear and evident * 1.34.

The less the Foundation of that Privilege is cer∣tain, the more the Abuses which are committed in it, are insupportable.

Notwithstanding the said Right is Personal; that is, Though it was only granted to the Person of the Officers, specified by the Bull of Pope Paul III. it passes now to the Widow, and to the Heirs, as a Temporal Heritage: And tho' the said Favour was only granted them, in order lawfully to grati∣sie either their Children, or some of their Relati∣ons or Friends, capable of the Benefices to which they should be Nominated; they often, contrary to Divine and Human Laws, constrain those who ob∣tain Benefices by virtue of their Indults, to resign them to whomsoever they think fit; abusing the said Priviledge to that degree, that often those who will not hold them in Commendam, can only avoid that Crime, by committing another, which makes them guilty of Simony before God.

The Weakness of the Foundation of the said Grant, and the Number * 1.35 of Abuses committed by virtue thereof, might lawfully induce your Majesty to abolish it; which would be the easier, in that it would be suf∣ficient in order thereunto, to refuse the Indultaries their Letters of Nomination, without which, they

can pretend to no Benefices: But Experience teaching us, That an accustom'd Evil is often more supportable than a Good, the novelty of which is vexatious; it will be sufficient for your Majesty to make so good a Regulation, that those who are to enjoy the Benefit of the said Grants, may not be able to make an ill Use of the same, as they have done heretofore.

If you hinder the same Officer from having his Nomination upon several Benefices: If you order those that shall be presented by him to be Nomina∣ted, not to be admitted before a good Examina∣tion, according to the Ordinances, without Fa∣vour.

If you make an Order, that the Letters of their Nomination shall express positively, That the Benefices to which they are Nominated, shall be really for them: That it shall not be allow'd for them to be constrain'd to resign them to any body; and that if it be discover'd that if they lend their Names to any to possess the said Benefices in Gommendam, they shall not only be made inca∣pable of ever possessing any Benefices for such a Crime, but moreover be liable to Punishment.

If, in the next place, you are pleas'd to order the said Right, which is only Personal, from be∣ing transmitted to Heirs; the Observation of such a Regulation, will produce this effect, That your Officers not being depriv'd of the Favour your Pre∣decessors have obtain'd for them, Learned Men will receive a great Advantage under your Reign, and will be deliver'd of the great Vexation they receive from them.

You might also refuse to allow your Offi∣cers, after having Nominated a Man to an In∣dult, to substitute another in his room, in case he should die before it be fill'd.

CHAP. III. Of the NOBIITY.

SECT. I. Divers Means to Advantage the Nobility, and to make them Subsist Honourably.

AFter having represented what I esteem ab∣solutely necessary for the Re••establishment of the First Order of your Kingdom; I proceed to the Second; and say, That the Nobi∣lity must be Respected, as one of the principal Si∣news of the State, capable to contribute much to∣wards its Preservation and Settlement. They have been so much depress'd of late Years, by the vast Number of Officers, which the Misfortune of the Age has elevated to their prejudice, that it is very necessary to protect them against the Attempts of such Men. The Wealth and Pride of the one, triumphs over the Necessity of the others, who are only rich in Courage, which induces them to employ their Lives freely for the State; of which your Officers reap the Advantage.

As it is necessary to protect them against those who oppress them; so a particular Care must be taken to hinder them from using those that are under them, as they are us'd by the others.

It is a common Fault in those that are born in that Order, to exert Violence against the People, to whom God seems rather to have given Arms to get their Livelihood, than to defend them∣selves.

It is absolutely necessary to stop the course of such Disorders, by a continu'd Severity, to the end that the weakest of your Subjects, though un∣arm'd, may be as safe under the protection of your Laws, as those who are arm'd.

The Nobility having shewn in this War, hap∣pily ended by a Peace, that they have Inhe∣rited the Vertue of their Ancestors, which induc'd Caesar to prefer them before all others; it will be fit to Discipline them, to the end that they may acquire a new, and preserve their former Reputa∣tion, and that the State may be usefully serv'd.

It is most certain, That the Nobility which does not serve you in the War, is not only useless, but a Burthen to the State; which in that Case may be compar'd to the Body which supports an Arm which is troubled with the Palsie, as a Load which burthens it, instead of affording it any ease.

As the Gentry deserves to be well us'd when they do well, it is necessary to be severe against them, when they are wanting in what their Birth exacts from them: And I make no scruple of say∣ing, That those who degenerating from the Vertue of their Forefathers, do not serve the Crown with their Swords and Lives, with all the Con∣stancy

and Courage which the Laws of the State require, deserve to be depriv'd of the Advantages of their Birth, and to be reduc'd to bear part of the Burthen of the People.

As Honour ought to be dearer to them than Life, it were better to chastise them, by depriving them of the first, than of the last.

To take away the Life of Men who expose it daily upon a meer Notion of Honour, is much less than to take away their Honour, and to save their Life; which in that Condition, is a perpetual Torment to them.

As all means must be us'd to maintain the No∣bility in the true Vertue of their Fathers; so none must be omitted to preserve them in the possession of the Estates they have left them, and to help them to acquire new ones.

As it is impossible to find out a Remedy against all Evils; so it is very difficult to find out a gene∣ral Expedient to the Ends I propose.

The many Marriages which are contracted in every Family in this Kingdom, (whereas in other States, seldom any but the Eldest Marries) are one of the true Causes which ruine the best Families in a short time. But if that Custom impoverishes private Families, it enriches the State, the main force of which consists in the Multitude of Men; inso∣much that instead of complaining of it, it must be encourag'd; and instead of opposing it, means must be found out for the subsistance of those it brings into the World, according to the Purity of Heart they derive from their Birth.

In order thereunto, it is necessary to distinguish the Nobility which is at Court, from those who live in the Country.

That which is at Court will be considerably eas'd, by retrenching the State and insupportable Expences which have been introduc'd there by de∣grees; since it is most certain, that such a Regula∣tion will do them more good than all the Pensions they receive.

As to those who live in the Country, though such an Order will not ease them so much, by rea∣son of their Misery, which will not allow them to make superfluous Expences, they will neverthe∣less find the Benefit of the said Remedy; so neces∣sary for the whole State, that, without it, it can never avoid its ruine.

If your Majesty be pleas'd to add to the Regu∣lation of that Disorder, the Establishment of Fifty Troops of Gens d'Armes, and the like number of Chevaux Legers, to be paid in the Provinces, on the Conditions hereafter specified, it will be a great help for the Subsistence of the most indigent No∣bility.

If, in the next place, you suppress the Sale of the Governments of the Kingdom, and of all Mi∣litary Imployments, which the said Order pays suf∣ficiently for, at the Rate of their Blood.

If you observe the same Method in what relates to the Places of your Houshold: If whereas at pre∣sent all manner of Men are admitted into the same, by the dishonourable Traffick of their Purse, you prohibit the receiving of any Person into them, but such as have the Happiness of being of a Noble Blood: If, moreover, the Entrance there∣of

be no longer allow'd, even to those who have that Advantage, unless by your Majesty's choice of them, in consideration of their Merit, the said good Regulation will prove both Advantagious and Honourable to all the Nobility.

Whereas at present Gentlemen can only pur∣chase Places and Dignities at the Rate of their Ruine, their Fidelity will be the more certain for the future, by reason that the more they will be gratified, the less they will think themselves in∣debted, for the Honours they will receive, to their Purses, and to their Creditors, who never put them in mind of what they owe them; but at the same time they are troubled for being rais'd that way.

If, moreover, you will be pleas'd to extend your Favour so far, as to be careful to gratifie their Children (who shall be found to have as much Learning and Piety as is requir'd) with part of the Benefices that are in your Gift; that Order will be the more oblig'd to you, in that dischar∣ging them of part of the Burthen which over∣whelms them, you will put them in a way to keep up their Families, since the Support and Preservai∣tion of the best, depends often on those who espousing an Ecclesiastical Life, commonly look on their Nephews as their own Children, and place their chief Delight in bringing up some of them to Learning and Vertue, in order to their being promoted to some of those they are in possession of, if they prove capable of them.

I might mention many other things to ease the Nobility; but I suppress the Thoughts of it, upon Consideration, That as it would be very easie to

write them, it would be very difficult, if not im∣possible, to put them in practice.

SECT. II. Which Treats of the Means to prevent Duels.

SO many Edicts have been made hitherto to no purpose, to put a stop to Duels, that it is very difficult to find out a certain Way to stop the course of that Rage.

The French despise their Lives so much, that Experience has taught us, that the most rigorous Proceedings have not always prov'd the best to stop their Frensie.

They have often fancy'd, that it was very glo∣rious to violate the Edicts; and to shew by such an Extravagance, that they valued their Honour more than their Life: But the dread of losing the Conveniency, without which, they cannot live happy in this World, having a greater influence over them than the fear of Dying without the Grace of God, without which they will be unhappy in the next; the fear of losing their Places, their Estates, and their Liberty, has prov'd more pre∣vailing than the fear of losing their Life.

I have us'd my utmost Endeavour to find out some proper Remedy for the Cure of this dange∣rous Distemper. I have often consulted to know, whether as it is lawful for Kings to make two pri∣vate Men Fight, to prevent a Battel, and thereby to decide the difference which has oblig'd them to take Arms, they might not also grant some Com∣bats, to avoid the multitude of Duels that are

daily Fought. I urg'd, That it was very likely that this proceeding might free France of this Frensie, which is so prejudicial to it, since that in putting those in hopes of obtaining leave to Fight, who should have a just Reason to claim the Com∣bat, every Man would freely submit to the Judges deputed to examine the Nature of the Offence; which probably might prevent the Misfortune of Duels, since most Quarrels would be determin'd by a good Accommodation.

The better to favour this Thought, I added, That formerly many Duels had been allow'd of in this Kingdom, which had also been practis'd in divers States.

I thought it might be a means to abolish the Barbarity of the Custom, which wills, That every Man that is offended, should do himself Justice, and find his Satisfaction in his Enemy's Blood: But after having perus'd, over and over, what the most Authentick Authors say upon those Matters, and often mus'd on this important Subject, I have found by the Advice of the least scrupulous and most resolute Theologians of the Time, That Kings being Establish'd to preserve their Subjects, and not to ruine them, they cannot expose their Life without some publick Use, or particular Ne∣cessity: That they cannot permit private Combats, without exposing the Innocent to receive the Pu∣nishment of the Guilty, seeing that God not having oblig'd Himself always to render Reason victo∣rious, the Fate of Arms is uncertain: And that notwithstanding such Permissions have been Au∣thoriz'd sometimes, at least in divers States, and even with the Approbation of some particular

Churches, they have ever prov'd abusive; which appears evidently, since finally the Universal Church has prohibited and condemned them, un∣der very great Penalties. I have discover'd, that there was a great deal of difference between making two particular Persons fight, to prevent a Battel, and to put a period to a War, and making them fight to prevent a Duel.

The First is lawful; because Nature teaches us, That Part ought to be expos'd for the Whole; and that Reason requires, That Particular Persons ought to be hazarded for the General Good; by reason that besides that the said Expedient has been practis'd at all times, we find Examples of it in Holy Writ; and that the Effect of it is wholesom and certain, in that whatever Event a Duel allow'd of in this Case may have, it saves the Lives of abundance of Men, who may serve the Publick in other Occasions.

But it is not so with the Second, which is un∣lawful in its Nature, since that instead of certainly saving the Generality, by the hazard of some pri∣vate Persons, and thus to prevent a great loss by a small, it exposes private Men directly to their Ruine, upon the bare Imagination of a publick Good, which has no certain Foundation: This Method is the less allowable, since that instead of preventing Duels, it is capable to increase the Li∣contiousness of them; because the Blindness of the Nobility is such, that many being of Opinion, That to demand a Combat thus, would be to seek out a way to avoid it, would think themselves ob∣lig'd in Honour to find out a shorter way to right themselves, and to shew their Courage.

The late King attempted this Way, in 1609. with all the Circumstances that could make it useful: He depriv'd all those of Estates, Places, and Life, who should Fight without leave; but all in vain: And that oblig'd your Majesty, after having made the same Trial at the Beginning of your Reign, to have recourse by your Edict of March 1626. to another Remedy, which has prov'd more effectual, by reason that though the Penalties of it are more moderate, yet they are more smart∣ing to those who value their Lives less than their Estates and Liberty.

Now whereas the best Laws in the World are useless, unless they are inviolably observ'd; and that those who commit those kind of Faults, use so much Art to invalidate the Proofs of it, that it is almost always impossible to convince them.

I presume to tell your Majesty, That it is not enough to punish averr'd Duels and Challenges, by the Rigour of your Edicts; but when there is a Notoriousness without Proof, it will be absolutely necessary to imprison the Delinquents at their own Charge, for more or less time, according to the divers Circumstances of their Faults: Otherwise, the common Negligence of your Attorneys-General to inform against them, the Indulgence of your Parliaments, and the Corruption of the Age, which is such, that every Man esteems it as Ho∣nourable to assist those who have Fought to dis∣guise their Crime, as an honest Gentleman would think it shameful to conceal the Theft of a Rob∣ber, will make the Edicts and your Cares inef∣fectual.

'Tis in such a Case, that nothing but the way of Fact can oblige Men to observe your Laws and Ordinances; 'tis on those Occasions your Au∣thority must pass over Forms to maintain Rule and Discipline, without which a State cannot subsist; and it will enable your Officers to punish Crimes according to Forms, since it is more probable that the Cause and Proof of a Fault will be sooner found when the Guilty are seiz'd, than when at liberty to use their utmost Endeavours to stifle the Discovery of the same.

If, in the next place, your Majesty will be pleas'd to order Rancounters to pass for Duels, and to be punish'd as such, until those who have been guilty of them, surrender themselves Prisoners, and are absolv'd of the same by Law; you will do whatever is probable to stop the course of that Frensie; and your Care to preserve the Lives of your Nobility, will make you Master of their Hearts, and will engage them to so strict an Alle∣giance, that they will pay with Usury, whatever your Majesty can expect from them, in all the Im∣ployments they are gratified with.

CHAP. IV. Of the Third ORDER of the Kingdom.

TO Treat of the Third Order of the King∣dom with Method, and to see clearly what is proper to be done to make it susist in the State in which it ought to be, I will divide it into Three Parts.

The First shall contain the Body of the Officers of Justice.

The Second, of those who have the Manage∣ment of the Finances. And

The Third, the People, which commonly bears the Burthen of the State.

SECT. I. Which relates in general to the Disorders of the Courts of Justice; and examines in particular, whether the Suppression of the Sale of Offices, and of Here∣ditary Offices, would be a proper Remedy for such Evils.

IT is much easier to discover the Defects of the Courts of Justice, than to prescribe Remedies for the same: Every body is sensible, that those who are appointed to hold the Scale even in all things, have inclin'd it so much themselves on one side to their own Advantage, that there is no longer any Counterpoise.

The Disorders of the Courts of Justice are come to that pass, that they can go no farther: I would enter into the Particulars of the said Disorders, and of the Remedies which may be applied to the same, if the Knowledge I have both of the Person of him who has the First Office of Justice at present, and of his Design to render it as pure, as the Corruption of the World will allow it, did not oblige me barely to propose certain general Remedies to your Majesty, to stop the progress of the principal Dis∣orders.

In the Opinion of the Generality of the World, the Chief consists in suppressing the Sale of Offices, in extinguishing the Inheritance of the same; and in giving them gratis to Persons of such known Capacity and Integrity, that even Envy it self may not be able to contest their Merit.

But whereas it is a thing which cannot be done at this time; and that it will be difficult to pra∣ctice this Expedient at any other, it would be use∣less at present to propose Means to that End.

Whenever the said Design is undertaken, some will certainly be found, which cannot be foreseen at present; and those one might prescribe, would be no longer in season, when the thing might be attempted.

In the mean time, though it is commonly dan∣gerous to be singular in Advising, I cannot forbear saying boldly, That considering the present State of Affairs, and that which may be foreseen for the future, it is better, in my Opinion, to continue the said Sale and Inheritance of Offices, than abso∣lutely to alter the Settlement thereof.

So many Inconveniences are to be fear'd in such an Alteration, that as though the Elections for Be∣nefices are more ancient, and more Canonical than the Nomination of Kings; nevertheless the great Abuses which have been committed in the same, and which it would be impossible to prevent, render the Nominations more supportable, as less subject to ill Consequences.

So, notwithstanding the suppression of the Sale, and Inheritance of Offices, is consonant to Reason, and to all the Constitutions of Right; yet the inevitable Abuses which would be committed in the distribution of Offices, depending so much on the bare Will of Kings, and consequently on the Favour and Craft of those who should have most Power with them; would render the present proceeding in the same, more tole∣rable than that which has been us'd heretofore, by reason of the great Inconveniences which alway at∣tended it.

All reasonable Men must needs see the difference between these two Parties, and heartily desire the suppression of the Sale and Inheritance of Offices, supposing that in this case Places would be distribu∣ted by the pure Consideration of Vertue.

Neither can they be ignorant, that in such a Case, the Artifices of the Court would prevail be∣fore Reason, and Favour before Merit.

Nothing contributed more to make the Duke of Guise so Powerful, in the League against his King and Country, as the great Number of Officers his Credit had introduc'd in the greatest Employments of the Kingdom. And I have been told by the Duke of Sully, That the said Consideration was the

most powerful Motive which induc'd the late King to the Establishment of * 1.36 the Annual Duty: That that great Prince had not so much re∣gard to the Revenue which ac∣cru'd to him by it, as to the Means to secure him∣self for the future against such Inconveniences: And that notwithstanding Treasure had a great Influence over him, Reasons of State were more prevailing on that occasion.

In the new Establishment of a Commonwealth, it were a Crime not to banish the Sale of Offices, because in such Cases, Reason obliges to establish the most perfect Laws Human Society can permit: But Prudence does not allow it in ancient Mo∣narchies; the Imperfections of which are turn'd to use, and the Disorder of which (not without Advantage) composes part of the Orders of the State.

In such Cases, Men must submit to Weakness, and prefer a moderate Regulation, to a more au∣stere Settlement, which perhaps would be less pro∣per, the Rigour of it being capable to shake the Fabrick which one would strengthen.

I am sensible that it is a common Saying, That he who buys Justice by the Lump, may sell it by Retail; but yet it is certain, that an Officer who lays out the best part of his Estate upon a Place, will be kept from doing ill in a great measure, for fear of losing all that he is worth; and that in such a case, the Price of Offices is not an ill Pledge of the Fidelity of the Officers.

The Complaints which are made against the Sale of Offices, have been the same in all the Ages

of the Monarchy; but though they have ever been look'd upon as reasonable in themselves; yet the Disorders, upon which they are grounded, have been tolerated, supposing that we are not capable of the austere Perfection which is the scope of them.

Those who are not ignorant of History, must needs know, that some Writers, not even sparing the King St. Lewis, have upbraided his Reign, because Places were not bestow'd gratis in his Time: That they condemn others after him, be∣cause the Traffick of Offices was already so pub∣lick, that the Money arising by the same was Farm'd; and that they cast an Odium upon the Memory of the great King Francis, because he was the first, who upon the account of the neces∣sity of the Age he liv'd in, made a Regulated Com∣merce of them, which has lasted ever since.

I own that it is a Misfortune for that great Prince, to have been the first Author of that evil Establishment; but perhaps he would not be bla∣mable, if the Reasons which constrain'd him to do it were known. The Knowledge he had that his Favours were sold by private Persons without his Leave, and the Importance of the Affairs which overwhelm'd him, persuaded him that there was no better nor more ready way to get the Estates of his Subjects voluntarily, than to give them Ho∣nour for Money.

The late King, assisted by a very good Coun∣cil, in a profound Peace, and in a Reign free from Necessity, added the Establishment of the Annual Duty, to the Sale of Offices, introduc'd by that great Prince:

It is not to be presum'd that he did it unadvi∣sedly, and without having foreseen, as much as Humane Prudence could permit, the Consequences of the same; and it is most certain, that those things which have been done by Princes, whose Conduct has been Judicious, cannot be chang'd without a Reason; unless Experience discovers the Prejudice of them, and that it is evident that one might do better.

The Disorders which have been Establish'd by Publick Necessities, and strengthned by Reasons of State, cannot be reform'd without Time: It must be done by degrees, without passing from one Extream into another.

An Architect, who by the Excellence of his Art corrects the Defects of an ancient Building, and who without pulling of it down, reduces it to some supportable symetry, deserves more Praise, than he who ruines it absolutely, to erect a new Edifice perfect and accomplish'd.

It would be very difficult to change the Order establish'd for the disposition of Offices, without altering the Hearts of those that are in possession of them; in which case, there would be reason to fear, That whereas in Times past they have been serviceable to keep the People within the Bounds of their Duty, they would contribute more towards their Debauches for the future, than any others. Prudence obliges sometimes to weaken Remedies, to make them the more effectual; and those Orders which are most consonant to Reason, are not always the best, because they are not al∣ways proportion'd to the Capacity of those that are to put them in practice.

Whereas the suppression of the Sale and Inheri∣tance of Offices, ought to make way for Vertue, it would only make way for Brigues and Factions, and would fill Places with Officers of low Extra∣ction, often more loaden with Latin than Estates; which would produce many Inconveniencies. If Men could obtain Places without Money, Mer∣chandise would be forsaken by many, who being dazled with the Splendor of Offices, would sooner embrace Offices and their Ruin together, than ad∣dict themselves to Merchandise, which inriches Fa∣milies.

Moreover, it is very well known, that the Weakness of this Age is such, that Men yield more to Importunities, than they are guided by Rea∣son; and that instead of being rul'd by Justice, Fa∣vour oftentimes sways us.

The Experience of what is past, should make us fear the future; both because; it has ever shewn us, That the most powerful in Credit often gain their Cause, to the prejudice of Vertue; and that as the Prince and his Confidents can only know the Merit of Men, by the Judgment of others, they are often liable to take the Shadow for the Body.

A low Birth seldom produces the Parts which are necessary in a Magistrate; and it is certain, that the Vertue of a Man that is well-born, has something more noble in it, than that which is found in Men of meaner Extraction. The Minds of such Men are difficult to manage; and many of them have such a nice Authority, that it is not only troublesome, but also prejudicial.

It is with the first, in respect to the second, as with Trees, which being planted in a good Ground, produce better Fruit, and finer, than those which

are in an ill one: And therefore the Sale of Offices ought not to be condemn'd, because it excludes many Persons of low Extraction from Places and Offices; since, on the contrary, 'tis one of the Rea∣sons which rather makes it tolerable.

A good Estate is a great Ornament to Digni∣ties; which are so much heightned by exteriour Lustre, that one may boldly affirm, That of two Persons of equal Merit, he whose Circumstances are the most easie, is preferrable to the other; since it is most certain, That a poor Magistrate must have a world of Vertue to withstand the Temptations of Interest. Experience also informs us, That the Rich are less liable to Extortion and Bribes, than the others; and that Poverty con∣strains an Officer to be very careful of the Revenue of the Bag.

It may perhaps be urg'd, That though these In∣conveniences may induce to suffer the Sale of Of∣fices; yet it is most certain, that the Annual Duty ought to be suppress'd, because it puts Offices out of Price, and hinders vertuous Men from obtaining them even for Money.

The late King foreseeing that Evil, had incer∣ted, in the Edict he made upon that Subject, Pre∣cautions capable to prevent it; excepting not only from the Annual Right the Offices of first Presi∣dents, Attorneys, and Advocates General, but moreover reserving to himself the disposal of the Offices that are compris'd in the same, when they were vacant, paying in lieu thereof, to the Heirs of those who were in possession of them, the Price they should be valued at.

Those Precautions were as equitable as necessary; and to say the truth, the Evils which the Annual

Duty causes at present in the State, do not pro∣ceed so much from the Defect of its Nature, as from the Imprudence of those who have remov'd the Clauses which that great Prince had included in it. Had the Edict been kept in its first Purity, Offices had never come to the excess of Price they are at present. The Alterations that have been made in it, have made the use of it as prejudicial, as it would have been innocent, had it been left in the first from in which it was made; and therefore it is fitter to correct the Abuses of it, than to re∣verse it.

The Revocation of the Annual Duty, would ob∣lige the old Officers to quit their Offices, when the Experience and Maturity of their Age would ren∣der them most capable to serve the Publick. Yet it is necessary to have both old and young ones, by reason, that as the Prudence of the first may be of great use to direct the others, the Vigour of the younger sort is necessary to revive and animate the old ones.

If I had a mind, by this Work, to acquire the Inclination of the People, rather than to deserve their Good-will, by making my self useful to the State, I would maintain, That it is necessary to suppress the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty at once; all Men are so prepossess'd that they are the two Sources of the Disorders of the Kingdom, that the Publick Voice would decree Crowns for me, without examining whether I deserve them or no.

But being sensible, that those who endeavour to gain Reputation, by the Overture of a Reforma∣tion, more conformable to the Rigour of the Laws, than proportion'd to the Strength of the State,

only seek their own Interest, and can never excuse a Vanity, which is not only blamable, but crimi∣nal also; and that in such a case, their Cares, though specious, are as prejudicial to the Publick, as the Negligence and Malice of others.

I will take special care not to commit such a Fault; the suppression of those two Edicts is at∣tended with too many Inconveniences, to conclude it necessary to be done.

If they did really contribute towards Negligence and Vice, as it is commonly suppos'd, I would give my Vote immediately for the revocation of them: But when I consider, that if any Persons are ad∣mitted into Offices, not being qualified for the same, it is only the fault of the Attornies General, who are to enquire into their Lives and Conversa∣tion, and of the Courts; which being Judges of their Capacity and Vertue, ought to refuse them when they want the Qualifications requir'd. I cannot forbear saying, That the Remedy of the Evil consists more in the observation of the Ordi∣nances, than in the suppression of the Sale of Of∣fices and Annual Duty, which are not the Causes thereof.

Perhaps it may be urg'd, That if Places of Judi∣cature were not sold, Justice might be administred gratis; but provided the Charges of it be regula∣ted, they cannot be consider'd as a great Grie∣vance.

I am sensible, that examining the thing with rigour, that very Price which is due for the Admi∣nistration of Justice, is paid for the loss of the Li∣berty of those who have voluntarily submitted them∣selves to the Observation of Laws; and therefore, that to oblige those who go to Law, to give

Money, is obliging them to buy that a second time, which they have already dearly purchas'd by their Subjection. Nevertheless, the said Custom has prevail'd so far, that though the Spice is sharp by its Nature, yet no body dares complain of that which is paid in the * 1.37 Palace; and should any body propose to a∣bolish the use of it, they would expose themselves to the Laugh∣ter of all the World.

There are Abuses which must be tolerated, for fear of falling into Inconveniences of worse Con∣sequence: Time and Occasion will open the Eyes of those who will succeed in other Ages, to perform that usefully, which we dare not undertake in this, without exposing the State imprudently to a great deal of danger.

All the Reasons abovesaid, and many others being maturely consider'd, though the Sale and Inheritance of Offices are not Canonical; though it were to be wish'd that Merit were the only Price of Offices, and Vertue the only Title to transmit the succes∣sion of them to the Heirs of the Officers, instead of concluding for the alteration of those two Settle∣ments, the present Constitution of the State obliges me to say three things determinately.

The First is, That by the Reversion of the Act for the Sale of Offices, the Disorders which would proceed from the Brigues, and the Sollicitations which would be made for the obtaining of Offi∣ces, would be greater than that which arises by the liberty of Selling, or Buying of them.

The Second, That if the Inheritance of the same were only abolish'd, besides that the abate∣ment it would daily occasion in the Price of the

Offices which would become vacant, would render the Revenue, which occrues to the King by the Sale of the same, wholly insignificant; and that thereby a base Commerce would be introduced, which would enable many Men of little Merit, se∣cretly to share the Favours, which Kings only design for their Officers, we would relapse in∣to the Evil the late King endeavour'd to free the State from, when by the Esta∣blishment of the * 1.38 Paulette, he depriv'd the Grandees of the Kingdom of the means to make many Creatures at his Cost, to serve them on all Occasions, to the prejudice of the Publick Good.

The Third is, That since the Virtue of Men is not always strong enough to induce them to pre∣fer Merit before Favour; it is better to leave the Sale of Offices and the Annual Duty, than to abo∣lish those two Settlements, which are very difficult to alter all of a sudden, without endangering the State.

But, I add, That it is absolutely necessary to mo∣derate the Price of Offices; which is risen to that de∣gree, that the excess of it is intolerable.

If the Excellence of a Council consists in its be∣ing useful and easie to put into practice, this ought to be receiv'd, since the Benefit of it is evident, and the Practice easie; since the execution of it only re∣quires to restore the Edict of the Annual Duty to the first terms of its Settlement.

In so doing, Offices being reduc'd to a reaso∣nable Price, which will not exceed one half of that, to which the Extravagance of the Age has brought it at present; and the King having the liberty to pay it to the Heirs, to dispose of the said

Places according to his Pleasure, the State would be so far from receiving any prejudice by it, that, on the contrary, I dare repeat, that a considerable Ad∣vantage would accrue by it.

Moreover, things may be reduc'd to that point, without affording the least cause of Complaint to the Parties concern'd; since it is easie to make them amends for the Prejudice they have done themselves by divers means I do not specifie at present, by reason that if they were discover'd, they would lose their Force, before they could be put in pra∣ctice.

SECT. II. Which proposes the general Means which may be us'd to put a stop to the Disorders of the Courts of Justice.

AFter what is abovesaid, I have nothing to add before I conclude this Chapter, but what I have represented to your Majesty, upon the Subject of the First Order of your Kingdom.

If you encourage those Officers of Justice, who are Men of an unspotted Reputation; if you dis∣courage those, who being destitute of all Merit, have nothing but Money to obtain the Magistracy; if you deprive all those of your Favour, and cause them to be punish'd who do not perform their Duty, and do sell Justice to the prejudice of your Subjects, you will absolutely do whatever can be usefully done for the Reformation of that Body, which, as well as that of the Ecclesiastical Order, depends more on those who have the Administration of them, than on Laws and Regulations; which remain useless, unless those who are employ'd to see them observ'd, are willing to perform it.

Although the Laws were defective, if the Offi∣cers are Men of Honour, their Integrity will be capable to supply that Defect and let them be ne∣ver so good, they prove ineffectual, when the Ma∣gistrates neglect the putting them in execution; much more when they are so wicked as to pervert the use of them, according to their Passions: Since it is difficult to be a Judge, and young at the same time, I cannot forbear observing, after what I have said, That it is a thing of no small Consequence, in order to reform the Courts of Justice, to put the Ordinances in execution, in what relates to the Age of Officers.

In my Opinion, it is impossible to be too exact in it, nor consequently too severe towards the At∣tornies General who shall be wanting in their Du∣ty, in taking care that the Parties concern'd may not be able to surprise the Judges on that Subject, nor to elude the good Intentions of the Prince, by Suppositions or Concealments.

Thereby the Evil of Youth, which is considerable, will be avoided, as well as that of Ignorance, which is the Source of many others.

Officers not being able to precipitate themselves, as they do at present, in their Reception, will study more; since otherwise they would remain idle, which seldom happens to those who have study'd until they have obtain'd the End they propose.

I must not omit saying on this Subject, That it would be fit absolutely to retrench the Practice of certain Doctors, who, prompting the Young ones like Parrots, often teach them to say things they do not understand, and only make them Learned in cheating the Publick, and themselves also.

Such Men may be compar'd to Fencing-Masters,

who are only good to instruct Men to their own ruin, and to hinder them from Learning the true Exercises of Soldiers, which are only learn'd in Armies, with a great deal of time and fatigue.

The banishment of such, would be of great use; which in the Practice would be found as difficult, as it is easie in the Proposition. Therefore I rather chuse to condemn the Fathers in this place, who suffer their Children to be instructed thus, and to advise them no longer to commit any such Faults against their own Blood, than to intreat your Majesty to prescribe new Laws upon that Subject; which would be no sooner made, but a thousand ways would be found out to elude the Effect of the same, and to avoid the putting of them in practice.

The Experience which Twenty Years of conti∣nual Occupation I have had, in the Administration of Publick Affairs, has given me, obliges me to ob∣serve, That though it were to be wish'd, that the Sedentary Courts, which are absolutely establish'd to administer Justice to every one, and to prevent and regulate all the Disorders of the Kingdom, should acquit themselves so well of their Duty, that there might be no necessity to have recourse to ex∣traordinary Commissions to maintain them in the same. It is nevertheless so difficult to hope for that, which is to be wish'd on that Subject, that I dare be bold to say, That in order to maintain this great State in the Policy and Discipline, without which it can never flourish, nothing can be of greater use, than to send from time to time in the Provinces Chambers of Justice, compos'd of Counsellors of State, and Masters of Requests, well selected, to avoid the Thorns of Parliaments, which foment Difficulties upon every thing; to the end that the

said Court receiving the Complaints which may be made against all sorts of Persons, without any ex∣ception of Quality, may remedy the same imme∣diately.

I am sensible, that the Soveraign Courts will be loth to suffer any such Establishments to be made: But as they must needs know, that a Soveraign is not oblig'd to suffer their Negligence, and that Reason obliges him to remedy those Defects; I am not afraid of saying, That it is safer on that occa∣sion to acquire their Esteem in performing one's Duty, than to preserve their Good-will, in being wanting in what is due to Publick Good. But whereas it is impossible to send such Commissions at one and the same time in all the Provinces, and that it will suffice, for one of that Nature, com∣pos'd of the same Officers, or different, to make the Circuit of France in six Years time; I am of Opinion, that it will be necessary to send often Counsellors of State into the Provinces, or Masters of Requests well selected, not only to perform the Function of Intendants of Justice in Capital Cities, which may serve more toward their Vanity, than be of any use to the Publick; but to go into all the Parts of Provinces, to enquire into the Beha∣viour of the Officers of Justice, and of the Finances; to see whether the Impositions are rais'd according to the Ordinances; whether the Collectors commit no Injustices in vexing of the People; to discover how they perform their Offices; to know how the Nobility behaves it self; and to put a stop to all Disorders, especially to the Violences of those who, being Powerful and Rich, oppress the Weak, and the King's poor Subjects.

SECT. III. Which represents the necessity of hindring the Officers of Justice, from incroaching upon the King's Au∣thority.

AFter having represented what ought to be practis'd, and may be done with ease, to ren∣der the Officers of Justice such as they ought to be, in relation to private Persons, I cannot, without a Crime, abstain from proposing what is necessary to hinder so Potent a Body, as that which they com∣pose, from being prejudicial in the whole to the State.

One would think there were a great deal to be said upon that Subject; and yet I will say as much as is necessary in three Words, if I set forth that it only requires to restrain the Officers of Justice from medling with any thing but the administring of the same to the King's Subjects; which is the only End of their Establishment.

The Wisest of your Predecessors have made it their Business, and have found the Benefit of it; your Majesty has follow'd their Example as long as I have had the Honour to serve you: And indeed it is a thing of such moment, that unless a strict hand be kept over those Powerful Societies, it would be impossible afterwards to keep them within the Bounds of their Duty.

It would be impossible to hinder the ruin of Royal Authority, in following the Sentiments of those, who being as Ignorant in the Practice of the Government of States, as they presume to be Lear∣ned in the Theory of their Administration, are neither capable to Judge solidly of their Conduct, nor

proper to make Decrees upon the Course of Publick Affairs, which exceed their Capacity.

As nothing must be suffer'd from those great Com∣panies, to wound Soveraign Authority, it is Pru∣dence to tolerate some of their Defects of another kind.

It is necessary to wink at the Imperfections of a Body, which having several Heads, cannot have the same Mind; and which being influenc'd by as many different Motions, as it is compos'd of diffe∣rent Subjects, cannot sometimes be inclin'd to dis∣cover, or to suffer its own Good.

Every body must needs blame their Proceeding, when they act contrary to Justice and Equity; but in condemning it with Reason, it is difficult to find a Remedy for it; by reason that in great Companies the number of the Wicked always exceeds the Good; and that though they were all Wise, yet it would not follow, that the best Sentiments would be found in the Majority; Judgments being so various, even in those who only designing Good, do neither differ in their Intentions, nor in their Ends.

It is a thing so common in such Bodies, to pry in∣to, and to find fault with the Government of States, that no body can wonder at it.

All Subordinate Authority looks upon that which is Superiour to it with an envious Eye; and not da∣ring to dispute the Power of it, they take the liber∣ty to exclaim against the Conduct thereof.

The mildest Government is in some measure odious, even to the most reasonable: And upon that Consideration, one of the Ancients said, with a great deal of Reason, That among Men who are Equals by Nature, there are few who do not repine at the difference which Fortune puts between them;

and who being oblig'd to submit, do not blame those who have a Command over them; to shew, that though they are inferiour to them in Power, they exceed them in Merit.

SECT. IV. Of the Officers of the Finances.

THe Officers of the Finances and the * 1.39 Partisans, are a separate Classis, prejudicial to the State, but nevertheless necessary.

Thesesort of Officers are an unavoidable Evil; but they must be reduc'd to supportable Terms.

Their Excesses, and the Disorders which have been introduc'd among them, are come to that heighth, that it is impossible to suffer them any longer. They cannot raise their Fortunes higher, without ruining the State; and without undoing themselves, by giving the Prince a just Pretence of seizing their Estates, upon the bare knowledge of the excessive Riches they have heap'd up in a short time, upon the difference which will be verified between what they had when they were first em∣ploy'd, and what they are found to be in possession of.

I am sensible, that such a Proceeding may be liable to great Mistakes, and that it may serve as a Pretence for very unjust Violences: Neither do I mention this, by the bye, to advise the putting it in practice, which would occasion great Abuses; but I maintain, that no body could justly complain of it, if it were manag'd with so much caution, that in punishing those who do inrich themselves of a sudden, by the sole Industry of their Fingers, no

prejudice were done under that Pretence, to the Estates of those who are grown Rich and Powerful, either by their Patrimony, one of the most lawful means to rise; or by the Gratifications receiv'd from the Favour of their Master, which exempts them from Crime; or by the Rewards which have been given to their Services; which is also one of the most lawful, since that in being useful to pri∣vate Persons, it is also advantageous to the State; which will be the better serv'd, when those who serve it usefully are well rewarded.

It is absolutely necessary to remedy the Incroach∣ments of the Financiers, otherwise they will finally occasion the ruine of the Kingdom; which is so much impair'd by their Robberies, that unless a stop be put to the same, it will be quite undone in a short time.

The Gold and Silver they abound in, affords them the Alliance of the best Families in the King∣dom; which are so much Bastardiz'd by that means, that their Issue proves as different from the Gene∣rosity of their Ancestors, as they often differ in the Resemblance of their Faces. I may affirm, as ha∣ving been an Eye-witness of it, in many occasions, that their Negligence, or Malice, has been very prejudicial to Publick Affairs.

After a serious Consideration, on all the Reme∣dies of the Evils they occasion, I dare say, that the best is to reduce them to as small a Number as is possible; and to employ, by way of Commission on important Occasions, Men of Probity and Capa∣city, instead of Persons whose Places being for Life, or Hereditary, think it a sufficient Title to Rob, without the least fear of Punishment.

It will be very easie, in time of Peace, to suppress

many Officers of this kind, and thereby to free the State of those who, without doing it any Service, suck up all its Substance in a very short time.

I am sensible that it may be urg'd, That they are commonly us'd like Leeches, who with a Grain of Salt, are often made to disgorge all the Blood they have suck'd up, and, like Spunges, which are easily squeez'd dry again, though never so full be∣fore. But, in my Opinion, it is an ill Expedient; and I look upon the Agreements and Compositions which are sometimes made with the Officers, as a Remedy which is worse than the Disease; since, pro∣properly speaking, it gives them a Title to Rob anew, in hopes of a fresh Pardon; and that if any thing be got out of their Purse that way, they do not only recover the Principal they have given, but also the Interest at a much higher rate than is al∣low'd of by the Law. Wherefore I conclude, That besides certain necessary Officers, as a Treasurer of the Exchequer, a Receiver General, Two or Three Treasurers of France in every Generality, and such others as are absolutely necessary, it will be no small piece of Service to the State, if in satisfying those who have, bona fide, given their Money in hopes to advance themselves by such Employments, according to the course of the times, all the rest are suppress'd. Without this Remedy, whatever Re∣gulation may be made, it will be impossible to pre∣serve the King's Money, since all Punishments, tho' never so great, are not capable to hinder many Officers of that kind from converting part of the Money, which will pass through their hands, to their own use.

SECT. V. Of the PEOPLE.

ALl Politicians agree, That when the People are too easie, it is impossible to keep them with∣in the Bounds of their Duty. Their Reason is, That being more Ignorant than the other Orders of the State, which are much more cultivated, or bet∣ter instructed, unless they are kept under by some Necessity, they will hardly keep within the Bounds prescrib'd to them by Reason, and by the Laws.

Neither does Reason allow their being exempted from all Charges, since that in losing thereby the Badge of their Subjection, they would also lose the Remembrance of their Condition; and that if they were discharg'd of Tribute, they would also think themselves discharg'd of Obedience.

They must be compar'd to Mules, which being us'd to Burthens, are spoil'd more by Rest than by Labour; but as the Labour must be moderate, and that the Burthens of those Animals must be propor∣tion'd to their Strength; so unless the Subsidies which are impos'd on the People are moderate, even when they are useful to the Publick, they are unjust.

I am sensible, that when Kings undertake Pub∣lick Works, 'tis said with truth, That what the People gets by it, returns to them again by the Pay∣ment of the Taille: But then one may also main∣tain, That what Kings get out of the People, re∣turns to them again; and that they only advance itto get it again by the Enjoyment of Rest, and of their Estates, which cannot be secur'd, unless they contribute towards the Maintenance of the State.

I know moreover, that many Princes have ruin'd their States, and their Subjects, by not keeping sufficient Force on foot for their Preservation, for fear of over-burthening them; and that some Sub∣jects have been expos'd to the Servitude of their Enemies, by desiring too much Liberty under their Natural Soveraign. But there is a certain Point which cannot be exceeded without Injustice, com∣mon Sense teaching every Man, that there must be a proportion between the Burthen and the Strength of those who bear it.

That Proportion must be so Religiously observ'd, that as a Prince cannot be esteem'd Good, if he exacts more from his Subjects than is necessary, those are not always the best, who never raise but what is absolutely necessary.

Moreover, as when a Man is wounded, the Heart, which grows faint by the loss of the Blood which flows from it, does not draw that of the lower Parts to its assistance, until the greatest part of that which lies in the uppermost is exhausted; so in the urgent Necessities of States, Soveraigns must, as much as in them lies, make use of the abundance of the Rich, before they bleed the Poor extraordinarily.

'Tis the best Counsel your Majesty can take; which you may easily put into practice, since for the future you may draw the principal Subsistence of your State, out of your General Farms, in which the Rich are more concern'd than the Poor, by reason that as they spend less, they do not contri∣bute so much to the Product thereof.

CHAP. V. Which considers the State in it self.

SECT. I. Which represents how necessary it is, that the several Parts of the State should remain every one with∣in the extent of their Bounds.

AFter having spoken separately of the divers Orders the State is compos'd of, I have but little to say in the main; but that as the Whole only subsists by the Union of its Parts in their Order and natural Situation; so this great Kingdom can never flourish, unless your Majesty takes care to keep the Bodies which compose it, in their Order; the Church having the First Rank, the Nobility the Second, and the Officers, which are at the head of the People, the Third.

I speak this boldly, because it is as necessary as just, to put a stop to the Incroachments of some Officers, who being puff'd up with Pride, either upon the account of the great Estates they are pos∣sess'd of, or by the Authority they derive from their Places, are so presumptuous as to challenge the First Rank, whereas they can only pretend to the Third. Which is so contrary to Reason, and to the Good of your Service, that it is absolutely necessary to put a stop to the Progress of such Enterprises; since otherwise France would no longer be what it has been, and what it ought to be, but a monstrous Body, which as such, could never subsist or be lasting.

As it is most certain, that the Elements which

are capable of weight, have none when they are in their Place; so it is certain, that none of the Orders of your State will prove burthensome to the other, while each do remain in the Place which their Birth has assign'd them.

And as neither Fire, Air, nor Water, can sustain a Terrestrial Body, because it is heavy out of its place; so it is certain, that neither the Church, nor the Nobility, can support the Burthen of the Officers, when they endeavour to move out of their Sphere.

As I am very sensible that your Majesty knows how to keep all Orders within their Bounds, with∣out enlarging any farther upon this Subject, I will proceed to two Questions, which I incent in this Chapter, because they have an equal Relation to the Threedifferent Orders of the State.

SECT. II. Which examines, Whether it is better to make the Governments Triennial in this Kingdom, than to leave them Perpetual, according to the Use which has been practis'd hitherto?

EVery body will fancy at first, that it will be better to make them Triennial; but after ha∣ving compar'd the Advantages which may thereby accrue, to the Inconveniences that are to be fear'd; perhaps it will be thought, as I have already ob∣serv'd it, that though the Nomination to Benefices is not so Canonical as the Elections, the Use of it is nevertheless more advantagious at this time, for several Reasons; as also that notwithstanding the suppression of the Sale of Offices is to be defired for several Reasons, yet the not tolerating the Use of it

would occasion many Inconveniences express'd in their proper places.

So it is impossible to render the Governments of Provinces and of Towns Triennial, without being expos'd to far greater Inconveniences, than those which may be fear'd by the perpetual Settle∣ment of Governours.

I am sensible, that some may urge, That a Man having a Government only for Three Years, will, in all probability, endeavour to quit it with Repu∣tation, and to behave himself with so much Pru∣dence, that his Administration may be preferr'd be∣fore his Predecessor's; whereas having it for Life, the certainty of it gives him more Licence.

But it is much more likely, that he who knows he is not long to continue in his Office, will endeavour to draw as much Profit out of it, as he might ex∣pect during his Life, if he were to enjoy it to his Death. Moreover, considering the Inconstancy of our Nation, there might be some reason to fear the employing of some, who foreseeing the End of an agreeable Administration, might resolve to perpe∣tuate it, by receiving those as Masters, whom they ought to look upon as Enemies.

If the Practice of Spain be urg'd, which of∣ten changes Governours, after having answer'd, that Example shews us, that nothing can be more dangerous than that Government; I will add, That as there are Fruits, the Use of which is ex∣cellent in one Country, and a Poison in another; so there are Settlements, the Practice whereof is good in one State, but yet would prove pernicious in another.

Some may say, to prevent the Objections which may be made against the Practice of the Order of

Spain in this Kingdom, That those who will lay down an Office, after the expiration of the term of their Administration, will have no reason to be dis∣satisfied, since they will be employ'd in others which will prove better; but such great difficulties will be met with in the Practice of such an Order, that it will be impossible to overcome them.

A Man may be fit to Govern in Piccardy, by reason of his being born there, who will not be fit to be employ'd in Brittany, where he has no Acquaintance, and where the Place which will be given him, will hardly be able to maintain him.

The Governments of France are, for the most part of so little Profit, that unless they are given to Persons who are more desirous of them upon the account of Honour, and for the Convenience of their Neighbourhood, than out of any other Con∣sideration; there are few who are able to bear the Expence of them: Besides, there are not Men enough in the Provinces, for the Alterations which must needs be made, if Employments are made Triennial.

Those Mutations are not only practicable, but absolutely necessary in the great Employments of Spain; as those of the Viceroys of Naples, of Sicily, of Sardinia, the Government of Mi••an, and other Employments of the like Consequence: And all of them are so profitable to those that possess them, that in quitting the Abundance of the one, they enter into the Wealth of the other.

Places which are distant from the abode of Princes, require a Change of Governours in Pla∣ces of the Consequence of those I have mention'd, by reason that a longer Residence than that of Three Years, might enable them to form Projects

to settle themselves there for ever; seeing particu∣larly that the Ambition of Men is so prevailing, that they are easily inclin'd to change the Condition of Subject into that of Master.

But the case is different in France, where the Go∣vernments are not so distant from the abode of the Kings, as to fear such Inconveniences; nor the said Employments so great, as to give the Possessors a sufficient Authority to make themselves Masters of the same.

Therefore provided your Majesty, and your Suc∣cessors, keep the Power of Changing the Govern∣ments as you shall think fit, upon real Cause given so to do, which you may always do with Justice, provided they are given gratis, and not sold; I dare be bold to say, That it is better in that point to follow the ancient Custom of France, than to imitate that of Spain; which is nevertheless so poli∣tick and so reasonable, considering the extent of its Dominion, that though it cannot be usefully pra∣ctic'd in this Kingdom; yet it will be proper, in my Opinion, to make use of it in those Places, of which France will preserve the Possession in Lorrain and in Italy.

SECT. III. Which condemns Survivorships.

THe Survivorships in question in this Place, are granted either against the Will of the Posses∣sors of Places, or by their Consent.

All Men are sensible, that it is very unjust to nominate the Successors of a Man, while he is alive, against his Will; since it exposes his Life to the Ar∣tifices of the Person that is to profit by his Death,

and that the Dread which may justly seize his Mind, is a kind of Death to him.

That Practice which was formerly very much in vogue in this Kingdom, is at present banish'd from thence. It is so dangerous, that the Councils, and the best Constitutions of Temporal Princes, do con∣demn it, as well as Reason.

Neither can the Consent of the Possessors any ways justifie that Proceeding, since that whatever Confidence they may repose in those who are ap∣pointed to succeed them, they are often mistaken: Though it is impossible to satisfie every body in a State by Grants, yet it is necessary at least to af∣ford hopes to those to whom nothing better can be given: Which can never be done, if Places, Offi∣ces, and Benefices are given to Children, who in the height of their Merit, and of their Age, would perhaps hardly dare to expect those Honours and Dignities which are granted them in the Cradle.

Such Favours, in which the State is greatly con∣cern'd, hardly oblige any body. A Man does not think that that is given him, which his Father, or another Relation is in possession of, he looks upon the Survivorship of it as a Right of Inheritance, rather than as an effect of the Prince's Goodness.

Notwithstanding that the Good of the State re∣quires, that in the Promotion of Offices, Merit should be preferr'd to all other things; in what relates to Sur∣vivorship, a greater regard is had to the Service of him who demands a Successor, than to the persons that is to succeedhim can do. The Favour of the one on such occasions, often serves in lieu of Merit in the others, who have nothing but their Importunity to recommend them.

Therefore I conclude, that the less Favours of that kind are granted, is certainly the best; and that it would be better yet never to grant any; seeing that whatever particular Considerations can be alledg'd, the Consequence of them is dangerous in States, where Examples have often more Force than Reason.

If any one observes that I condemn a thing in this Article, the practice whereof I have suffer'd even in respect to my own Relations * 1.40, I am sure that he will remain very well satis∣fied, if he considers, that while a Disorder is in vogue, without any possibility of a Remedy, Reason requires that Order should be extracted out of it: Which was my Intention in preserving Places, which had been establish'd by my Cares, to Persons whom I could more strictly oblige to follow my Intentions and my Steps. If it had been possible, during the Troubles of a Reign agi∣tated by divers Storms, to settle the Regulation I propose, I would have been a very Religious Ob∣server of it.

CHAP. VI. Which represents to the King, what Men think he ought to consider, in relation to his Per∣son.

GOD being the Principle of all Things, the Soveraign Master of Kings, and He who makes them Reign prosperously; if your Majesty's Devotion were not known by all the World, I would begin this Chapter, which re∣lates to your Person, in representing to you, That unless you follow the Will of your Creator, and submit to his Laws, you must not expect to have yours observ'd, and to find your Subjects obedient to your Orders.

But it would be superfluous to exhort your Ma∣jesty to Devotion; you are so naturally inclin'd to it, and so much confirm'd in it, by the Habit of your Vertue, that there is no reason to fear that you will ever deviate from it.

Therefore instead of representing to you what Advantages Religious Princes have above others, I will content my self with saying, That the Devo∣tion which is necessary in Kings, must be free from Scruples: I say it, Sir, because the Niceness of your Majesty's Conscience often makes you dread to offend GOD, in doing things, which certain∣ly you cannot abstain from without Sin.

I am sensible, that the Faults of Princes, which are of this nature, are much less dangerous for the State, than those which incline to Presumption, and to the Contempt of those things they ought to

reverence. But since they bear the name of Faults, it is necessary to correct them, particularly if it be true, as it is most certain, that many Inconve∣niences may arise from thence, very prejudicial to the State.

In consideration of which, I make it my humble Petition to your Majesty, That you would be pleas'd more and more to fortifie your self against Scruples; calling to mind, that you can never be guilty before GOD, if you follow (on Occasions which will prevent themselves of difficult Discussion, in what relates to your Conscience) the Advice of your Council, confirm'd by that of some good Theologians, unsuspected, in the case in question.

This first Foundation being laid, as nothing can be more material towards the Welfare of your Affairs, than the Preservation of your Majesty's Health, I cannot forbear resuming so important a Subject.

The careful and diligent Observations I have made on all that relates to you, makes me say bold∣ly, That nothing is requir'd to so important an End, but your own Will, which nevertheless is the greatest Enemy you have to encounter with on this Subject; since it is often very difficult to pre∣vail with Princes to will that, which is not only very useful, but absolutely necessary for them.

Your Majesty's Mind has so absolute a Sway over your Body, that the least of your Passions seize your Heart, and disturb the whole Frame of your Person; many Experiences have convinc'd me of this Truth, with so much Certainty, that I have never seen you sick by any other Principle.

GOD has been pleas'd to give your Majesty Force enough couragiously to bear those things, in which you are most concern'd, in Affairs of the greatest Consequence; but as a Counterpoise to this great Quality, He has permitted your be∣ing so sensible, to those things which concern you, in Subjects of far less Consequence, that even things which one should think at first could not displease you, trouble you to that degree, that it is im∣possible to ease you on such occasions, according to one's Desire: Time, which makes those Fumes that surprise the Sense to evaporate, has hitherto been the sole Remedy to such Distempers in your Maje∣sty, who has no sooner been seiz'd by them, but the Consequence has prov'd a corporal Indisposi∣tion.

In that, you are like those, who despising the Points of Swords, through the greatness of their Courage, cannot, nevertheless, by a certain natu∣ral Antipathy, bear the pricking of a Launcet.

If it were impossible for all Men to prevent, by Reason, the Surprises they receive by their Passions; yet I would not think it so in your Ma∣jesty, who has many excellent Qualities which others have not.

And therefore I am of Opinion, That the first Heat of your eager Youth being past, the Flegm of a riper Age will assist you, to secure your self by Reason, against an Enemy, which is the more dangerous, in that it is internal and dome∣stick; and which has done you so much harm, par∣ticularly twice or thrice, that it had like to have cost you your Life.

As it is a thing very important for your Health, it is no less considerable for your Reputation and

Glory, which cannot suffer that any thing, which is nothing in Reason, should have an Influence over your Sentiments, which ought to be regulated by it in all things.

Neither can I forbear, on this Subject, to reite∣rate a Petition I have often made to your Majesty, conjuring you to apply your Mind to great things important to your State, and to despise little ones, which are unworthy of your Cares and Thoughts.

It will be advantagious and glorious to you, of ten to meditate on the most considerable Designs which the course of Affairs will put in agitation; whereas you will be so far from deriving the least Advantage, by applying your Mind too much on those which are not of that nature, that, on the contrary, you will receive great prejudice by it; not only in that such Occupations will divert you from others of more Consequence, but also by reason that as small Thorns are more capable of pricking than great ones, which are easily perceiv'd, it would be impossible for you to avoid many Vexations, of no use to the Affairs of the State, and very preju∣dicial to your Health.

The great Disquiets wherewith I have seen your Mind agitated on divers occasions, oblige me to represent to you, in this place, as I have done on sever I other occasions, That as certain Cares are necessary for the Welfare of Human Affairs, there are some which can produce no other Effects, than to alter the Good Disposition of Him who applies himself too eagerly to them; and such a Surprise to those who serve, that the Trouble of their Mind renders them the less capable to perform what is ex∣pected from them.

The Experience which a Reign and Govern∣ment of Twenty five Years affords your Majesty, does not permit you to be ignorant, that in great Affairs, the Effects never answer the Orders that have been given exactly. It also informs you, that you should rather pity those to whom you com∣mit the execution of your Will, when their Labour does not succeed, than to impute to them the ill Events which they are not guilty of.

GOD alone can render his Resolutions infal∣lible; and yet his Goodness is such, that, letting Men act according to their Weakness, he suffers the difference there is between their Events, and his Dispositions; which teaches Kings to suffer that pa∣tiently by Reason, which their Creator only indures out of his Goodness.

Your, Majesty being naturally of a tender Con∣stitution, not very healthy, of a restless impatient Humour, particularly when you are in an Army, of which you take the Conduct upon your self, I should think my self guilty of a Crime, if I did not make it my humble Request to you, to avoid War for the future as much as it is possible; which I do upon this Foundation, That the Levity and In∣constancy of the French, can only be vanquish'd by the Presence of their Master, and that your Majesty cannot, without exposing your self to Ruin, fix upon so lasting a Design, nor consequently expect a good Success from it.

You have sufficiently shewn your Valour, and the Power of your Arms, to think on nothing for the future, but to enjoy that Peace and Tranqui∣lity which you have acquir'd to the Kingdom by your Labour, keeping your self in a posture to de∣fend

it against all those, who, contrary to Publick Faith, would offend you anew.

As it is very usual to many Men to have no acti∣on, unless they are animated by some Passion, in which they may be compar'd to Incense, which never smells sweet but when it is put into Fire, I cannot forbear telling your Majesty, that this Con∣stitution, which is dangerous in all sorts of Men, is particularly so in Kings, who ought to be guided by Reason above all others.

And indeed whenever Passion inclines to Good, it is by chance, seeing that by its Nature it makes us swerve so much from it, that it blinds those in whom it reigns; and that though a blind Man may chance to hit upon the right Way, yet it is a wonder if he does not lose himself; and he must needs stumble often, unless he has an extraordinary Fortune.

So many Misfortunes have befallen Princes and their States, when they have follow'd their own Sen∣timents to the prejudice of Reason; and that instead of consulting Publick Interest, they have been gui∣ded by their Passions, that it is impossible not to intreat your Majesty to reflect often upon it, in or∣der to confirm your self more and more in what you have all along practis'd to the contrary.

I also humbly crave you would be pleas'd often to call to mind what I have represented several times to you, That no Prince can be in a worse Condition, than he who not being always able to do those things himself which he is oblig'd to do, is loth to permit others to do them for him; and that to be capable to suffer himself to be serv'd, is not one of the least Qualities a great King can have; seeing that other∣wise occasions are often sooner fled, than Men can

dispose themselves to take hold of them, whereby favourable Conjunctures for the advancement of the State are lost, for Subjects of no consideration.

The late King your Father being reduc'd to a great Necessity, paid his Servants with good Words; and made them do things by Caresses, which his Necessity did not allow him to incline them to any other way.

Your Majesty not being of that Constitution, has a natural driness, which you take from the Queen your Mother, as herself has often told you in my presence, which hinders you from imitating the late King on this Subject. I cannot forbear representing to you, that it is your Interest to do good to those who serve you; and that at least it is reasonable to take particular care not to say any thing to disoblige them.

As I shall have an occasion in the sequel to treat of the Liberality which is necessary in Princes, I will say no more of it in this place; but I will en∣large upon the Evils which attend those who speak too freely of their Subjects.

The Wounds which are receiv'd by Swords, are easily cur'd; but it is not so by those of the Tongue, particularly by the Tongues of Kings, the Authority of which makes them incurable, un∣less the Cure comes from themselves.

The higher a Stone is thrown from, the more impression it makes where it lights; many would freely expose themselves to be run through by the Swords of their Master's Enemies, who cannot bear a Scratch from his hand.

As a Fly is not Meat for an Eagle; as the Lion despises those Animals which are not of his Force; as a Man attacking a Child would be blam'd by all

the World; so I presume to say, That great Kings ought never to wound private Persons with Words, because they bear no proportion to their Gran∣deur.

History is full of the ill Events which have been occasion'd by the liberty great Men have formerly allow'd their Tongues, to the prejudice of Persons they deem'd to be of no Consideration.

GOD has been pleas'd to favour your Majesty so much, that you are not naturally inclin'd to do harm; and therefore it is reasonable you should regulate your Words so much, that they may not do the least prejudice.

I am certain, that you will not willingly fall into that Inconvenience: But as it is difficult for you to stop your first Motions, and your sudden Agitations of Mind, which do sometimes transport you, I should not be your Servant, unless I ac∣quainted you, that your Reputation and Interest requires your taking a particular care to suppress them, seeing that though such liberty of Speech should not wound your Conscience, yet it would very much prejudice your Affairs.

As to speak well of one's Enemies, is an Heroick Vertue. A Prince cannot speak licentiously of those who would venture a thousand Lives for his Service, without committing a notable Fault a∣gainst the Laws of Christians, as well as against sound Policy.

A King whose Hands are undefiled, whose Heart is pure, and whose Tongue is innocent, has not a common Vertue; and those who possess those two first Qualities eminently, as your Majesty does, may easily acquire the third.

As it suits with the Grandeur of Kings to be re∣serv'd in their Words, that nothing may come out of their Mouths capable to offend private Persons; so in Prudence it behoves them not only to take care never to say any thing to the disadvantage of the Principal Communities of their State, but more∣over, to speak in such a manner of them, that they may have reason to believe they have an Affection for them: The most important Affairs of the State oblige them so often to cross them, for Publick Good, that Prudence requires they should be satis∣fied in things which are not of that nature.

It is not sufficient for great Princes, never to open their Mouths to speak ill of any body; but Reason requires they should shut their Ears against Slanders and false Reports, and that they should turn out, and banish the Authors of them, as dan∣gerous Plagues, which infect the Courts and Hearts of Princes, and the Minds of all those who come near them. If those who have a free access to the Ears of Kings, without deserving it, are dangerous, those who possess their Hearts out of pure Favour, are much more so; seeing that in order to preserve such a Treasure, they must needs make use of Art and Malice, to supply the want of Vertue which is not in them.

I cannot forbear adding upon this Subject, That I have always dreaded for your Majesty the Power of such Men, more than the Power of the greatest Kings of the World; and that it behoves you more to beware of the Artifice of a Menial Ser∣vant, than of all the Factions the Grandees could form in your State, though they should all tend to the same End.

When I was first introduc'd into the Manage∣ment of Affairs, those who had had the Honour to serve you before, were prepossess'd that your Ma∣jesty believ'd whatever was reported to their preju∣dice; and upon that Foundation, their principal Care was ever to keep some of their Confidents about you, to secure themselves against the Evil they were afraid of.

Though the Experience I have of your Majesty's steadiness in relation to me, obliges me to acknow∣ledge, either that their Opinion was ill grounded, or that the Reflections which Time has allow'd you to make upon me, have remov'd that Easiness of Youth; yet I must needs conjure you to settle your self so firmly in the Conduct you have been pleas'd to use towards me, that no body may have reason to dread a contrary Fate.

In the next place, I must also tell you, That as Prince's Ears must be shut against Calumnies, so they must be open to hearken to the Truths which are useful to the State; and that as the Tongue must have no motion to say any thing to the prejudice of any body's Reputation; so it must be free and bold to speak, when Publick Inte∣aest is concern'd.

I mention these two Points, because I have often observ'd, that it was no small trouble to your Majesty to have the Patience to hearken even to that which was most important to you; and that when the Welfare of your Affairs oblig'd you to express your Will, not only to Persons of great Quality, but also to those of mean Condition, you had much ado to resolve to do it, when you suspe∣cted that it would be disagreeable to them.

I confess, that the said Dread is a sign of Good∣ness; but to be no Flatterer, I must also tell you that it is a sign of Weakness, which though tole∣rable in a private Man, cannot be so in a great King, considering what Inconveniences it may be attended with.

I lay no stress upon that such a Proceeding would lay all the Odium and Hatred of Resolutions upon your Majesty's Council, because that is inconside∣rable, if it could prove beneficial to the Affairs of the State; but that which is worth considering, is, that there are often occasions, in which whatsoever Authority a Minister can have, it cannot be sus∣ficient to produce certain Effects, which require the Voice of a Soveraign, and an absolute Power.

Moreover, if the Grandees were once persuaded, that an unseasonable Shame would hinder a King from performing the Office of a King, in Comman∣ding absolutely, they would always pretend to ob∣tain by Importunity, the contrary of what has been order'd by Reason; and finally, their Audacious∣ness might proceed so far, that finding their Prince apprehensive of acting like a Master, they would grow weary of acting as Subjects.

Princes must have a Masculine Vertue, and do every thing by Reason, without being guided by Inclination, which often leads them into dangerous Precipices, if those which blind them, and induce them to do whatever they please, are capable to produce Mischief, when they follow them with too much Inadvertency, the natural Aversion they re∣ceive sometimes without a Cause, may cause grea∣ter yet, unless they are temper'd by Reason as they ought to be.

In some occasions your Majesty has stood in need of your Prudence to check the Tendency of those two Passions; but more in the last than in the first, since it is easier to do Mischief, following the Di∣ctates of Aversion, which requires nothing but a Command in a King, than to do good according to one's Inclination; which cannot be done, with∣out depriving one's self of one's own, which many Persons can hardly resolve to do.

Those two Motions are contrary to the Genius of Kings, principally if reflecting little upon them, they oftener follow their Instinct than their Reason.

They often induce them to engage in the Divi∣sions, which are frequent in Courts, among private Persons, which has occasion'd great Inconvenien∣ces in my time. Their Dignity obliges them to reserve themselves for Reason, which is the only Party they ought to espouse on all occasions; they cannot do otherwise, without divesting themselves of the Quality of Judges and of Soveraigns, to take that of Parties, and submitting, in some measure, to the Condition of private Men.

They thereby expose their State to many Ca∣bals and Factions, which are form'd afterwards. Those who are to defend themselves against the Power of a King, are too sensible that they can ne∣ver do it by Force, to attempt it otherwise than by Intrigues, Artifices, and Cabals, which often occa∣sion great trouble in States.

The Sincerity which is necessary in a Man who makes a Testament, does not permit my Pen to end this Section, without making a Confession as true as it is advantagious for your Majesty's Glory,

since it will testifie to all the World, That the Law of GOD has always been a Bound capable to stop the Violence of any Inclination or Aversion, which could have surpris'd your Mind; which being liable to the least Defect of Human Nature, has always Thanks be to GOD, been free of the most no∣table Imperfections of Princes.

CHAP. VII. Which represents the present State of the King's Houshold; and sets forth what seems to be necessary, in order to put it into that in which it ought to be.

THe Order of Arts, and of all good Disci∣pline, requires that a Man should begin his Work by that Part which is most easie.

Upon this Foundation, the first thing an Archi∣tect does, who undertakes a great Building, is to make a Model of it; in which the Proportions must be so well observ'd, that it may serve him as a Measure and Foot for his great Design: And when he cannot compass the said Project, he lays aside his Enterprize; common Sense making the dullest sensible, that he who cannot perform the least, is altogether incapable of the most.

In that Consideration, as the meanest Capacities are sensible, That as the Structure of Man is an Abstract of that of the Great Word, so private Fa∣milies are the true Models of States, and of Re∣publicks; and every body being persuaded, that he who either cannot, or will not regulate his Fa∣mily, is not capable to Order a State Reason did require, that in order to compass the Reformation of this Kingdom, I should begin by that of your Majesty's Houshold.

Nevertheless, I confess, that I never durst under take it, by reason that your Majesty having ever had an Aversion for the Orders you reckon'd to be of small consequence, when any private persons were concern'd in them, no body could propose such a Design, without openly shocking your In∣clination, and the Interest of many Men, who be∣ing continually about you in great Familiarity, might have prejudic'd you against those Orders which were most necessary for your State, to put a stop to those of your Houshold, the Irregularity of which were useful to them.

But as a Testament sets forth many Intentions, which the Testator durst not divulge during his Life, this will petition your Majesty towards the Reformation of your Houshold, which has beem omitted, both by reason that though it did seem more easie than that of the State, yet it was in ef∣fect much more difficult; and also because Prudence obliges to suffer in some measure small Losses, to gain considerably in others.

As it is obvious to all the World, that no King ever carried the Dignity of his State to a higher degree than your Majesty; so no body can deny, that none ever suffer'd the Lustre of his Houshold to be more trampled upon.

The Strangers who have travell'd in Fr••••••e in my time, have often wonder'd to see a State so exalted, and a Houshold so debas'd.

And indeed it is insensibly decay'd to that de∣gree, that some are in possession of the first Places of it, who under the Reigns of your Predecessore, durst not have presum'd to aspire to the least: All things have been in confusion there, from the Kitchen to the Cabinet.

Whereas in the King your Father's time, the Princes, the Officers of the Crown, and all the Grandees of the Kingdom, did commonly eat at your Tables; in your time they seem only esta∣blish'd for Servants, common Chevaux Legers, and Gens d'Arms. Moreover, they have been so ill serv'd, that some of them have been so nice as to despise them, instead of being fond of them.

Strangers have often found fault, even with your own, being serv'd by common nasty Sculli∣ons, whereas those of other Kings are only serv'd by Gentlemen.

I am sensible that this Custom has not been in∣troduc'd in your time; but it is never the more to∣lerable for being ancient, since it is absolutely dero∣gating from the Dignity and Grandeur of so great a Prince.

I am also sensible, that the said Practice has been suffer'd hitherto, under pretence of the Safety of Kings, saying, That it is impossible for Officers to answer for what they have done, unless they carry, or see it carried themselves to your Ma∣jesty.

But this Reason seems inconsiderable to me, since there is no reason to believe, that a Scullion will be more faithful to his Master, than a Gentle∣man, who in divers other occasions might betray him, if he were so minded.

Fourscore young Gentlemen, whom your Ma∣jesty maintains Pages of your Chamber, or of your Stables, would be much better employ'd in that Service, than in barely serving your First Gentle∣men, or Queries who Command them; and with∣out

doubt as they would do it with more Dignity, they would not perform it with less Fidelity.

The Neatness, which is becoming in all places, is consequently more requir'd yet in the Palaces of Kings: The Magnificence of Furniture is the more necessary there, by reason that Foreigners only judge of the Grandeur of Princes by what appears externally; and yet though your Majesty is vastly stor'd with the same, both fine and rich, which are destroy'd in the Places where they should be preserv'd: Your Majesty often uses such in your Chamber, that those to whose share they fall when you lay them aside, do not think fit to use them after you

The Entrance into your Cabinet has been al∣low'd to all Men, not only to the Prejudice of your Dignity, but also in Contempt of the Safety of your Person.

Ambassadors have been crowded more by Foot∣men, by Pages, and other inferiour Officers, than by the Grandees of your State, in their Audien∣ces; and nevertheless, your Dignity, and the an∣cient Custom of this Kingdom, require on such Oc∣casions your being attended by the Princes, Dukes, and Peers, the Officers of the Crown, and other Grandees of your State.

I am sensible, that most Kingdoms have diffe∣rent Customs: That in Spain, the Greatest see their King oftner than in England: There are such good Orders there upon that Subject, that though all the Doors are open, none are seen in the Chambers or Cabinets, but such as have a free entrance there, by their Dignities and Em∣ployments.

I know moreover, that it is a Privilege of those who bear your Crown, to be crowded by their Subjects; but it should be with this distinction, that usually it ought to be by your Nobility, and on the occasion of receiving Foreigners by qualify'd Persons, of which there is a sufficient Number in your State, to make them observe the Grandeur and Singularity of it, by that Prerogative.

In a Word, Disorder reigns so universally in all your Majesty's Houshold, that there is no particu∣lar place free from it.

Though all great Princes are careful to have an Equipage of great Horses, suitable to their Grandeur, your Majesty never had one in your great Stable, which you could use on occasion; though you are at a greater Charge about it, than ever any of your Predecessors were.

I might easily specifie many other Defects, no less remarkable than this; but I will not enter into the Particulars of so great a Disorder, both because it would be a very difficult Task, without descen∣ding too low for the Dignity of this Work; and that it is sufficient to know a Distemper without publishing it, to prescribe Remedies for the same. I will perform my Duty, in proposing to your Ma∣jesty the true means to afford as much Lustre to your Houshold, as there is Meanness and Disorder in it at present.

The first thing which is necessary to that end, is, That your Majesty should be strongly bent to the said Reformation; since it is certain, that in Affairs of this nature, the Will of Kings is like the Will of GOD, in relation to the most difficult things, in which to will and to do, is one and the same thing.

The second is, That you would be pleas'd, for the future, to employ none but Persons of Quality in the First Places of your Houshold, having all the Qualifications which are requir'd to discharge their Trust worthily.

Let an Officer be never so great, he will apply himself to the least Dependencies of his Office, if he be capable of it; because he will judge them to be of Consequence, as indeed they are.

Unless the Stewards, for instance, take a parti∣cular Care, to cause those Places to be cleans'd, Morning and Evening, where People eat, as soon as the Tables are remov'd, they will be wan∣ting in one of the most material Points of their Charge.

I may say the same of all the Principal Officers, and particularly of the First Gentlemen of your Chamber, who must be careful to keep all your Majesty's Apartment so neat and so clean, that it will not be too much to sweep and perfume them three or four times a day, by reason of the vast Concourse of People which cannot be avoided there, though it be never so well regulated.

Provided every Man be qualify'd for his Office, every thing will be done according to your Maje∣sty's Desire; and the Regulation of all the rest, depends on this point: For whatever Rule be esta∣blish'd, it will prove useless, unless there are Men capable to see it perform'd; and if they are, they will have Wit enough to cause that to be done, which Reason will shew them to be necessary for the Dignity of their Place, and for the Service of their Master.

The third consists in That your Majesty should employ none but Gentlemen in all the Places of

your Houshold, unless in the Lowest; which con∣tributing much towards your Dignity, will create the more Affection into your Nobility, in that they will have more means to advance themselves near your Person.

By this means, your Majesty may make the four Troops of your Gens d'Arms of the Body, the Four best Troops of Gens d'Arms in your Kingdom; it being most certain, that there are many Gentlemen who would be over-joy'd to have a means to live in that Quality, provided those Places be given them gratis, which are now sold at who gives most.

In that case, many will be glad to have that Em∣ployment, who would by no means accept of it at present, because it is usurp'd by Persons who do not deserve it.

And all Gentlemen will willingly accept of it, upon the account of the access it will give them at Court, where a Chance and some Acquaintance may advance their Fortune in an instant.

Your Majesty will also receive another Benefit by the said Establishment, in that as it will lessen the Number of the * 1.41 Roturiers, who are freed of the Tailles by the Places they enjoy in your Houshold, it will encrease the Number of those who are to help the People to bear the Burthen they are over-whelmed with at present.

The fourth is, That your Majesty should give all the Places of your Houshold gratis, without allowing them to be sold upon any Consideration whatever.

It may be urg'd, perhaps, That it is not rea∣sonable, that those who have bought Places very dear, should not be allow'd to sell them again; but as it is impossible to make any Settlements of great use for the Publick, without their being at∣tended with some Inconveniencies for private Per∣sons, the said Inconvenience is not considerable, seeing that as they did not buy their Places with an assurance of leave to sell them again, like those Officers who pay an Annual Duty to the King, they may be depriv'd of the Hopes they had fram'd to themselves, without any Injustice.

And though some private Persons may find themselves griev'd by such an Alteration, all the Nobility and the Greatest will find a notable Ad∣vantage by it, in that whereas they were former∣ly oblig'd to sell a considerable part of their Estates to get Places, which has often ruin'd the best Fami∣ies of the Kingdom, there will be no means left to expect them, but Merit; which will hinder them from ruining their Estate, and will oblige them to acquire Vertue, which is despis'd in this Age, because the Price of all things only consists in Money.

Moreover, there will be so many means to sa∣tisfie those who upon the account of any parti∣cular Consideration will deserve to be exempted from the general Rule, That the Publick will re∣ceive the Benefit of the Advantage your Ma∣jesty will be pleas'd to procure them, and yet such private Persons as might have cause to com∣plain with Justice, will receive no prejudice by it.

As it is impossible to question the Usefulness of these Propositions, the Facility to put them in Execution is evident, since, as abovesaid, it on∣ly requires a firm and constant Resolution in your Majesty, to reap the Benefit of the same, and to restore your Houshold to its former Greatness.

CHAP. VIII. Of the PRINCE's Council.

SECT. I. Which shews that the best Prince stands in need of a good Council.

IT is no small question among Politicians, to know, Whether a Prince who Governs a State by his own Head, is more desirable than he who not confiding so much in his own Abilities, relies much on his Council, and does nothing with∣out their Advice?

Whole Volumes might be compil'd of the Rea∣sons which might be alledg'd for and against it: But referring this Question to the particular Fact which obliges me to introduce it in this place; after having preferr'd the Prince who acts more by his Council, than by his own Opinion, to him who prefers his own Head to all those of his Coun∣sellors; I cannot forbear saying. That as the worse Government is that, which has no other Spring than the Head of a Prince, who being incapable, is so presumptuous as to slight all Counsel; the best of all is that of which the main Spring is in the Sense of the Soveraign, who, though capable to Act by Himself, has so much Modesty and Judgment, that he does nothing without Advice, upon this principle, That one Eye does not see for well as many.

Besides that Reason discovers the Solidity of this Decision, Truth obliges me to say, That Expe∣rience has convinc'd me so much of it, that I can∣not forbear affirming it, without doing my self a Violence.

A Capable Prince is a great Treasure in a State; a Skilful Council, and such as it ought to be, is no less considerable: But the Concert of Both toge∣ther, is of an inestimable Value, since thereon de∣pends the Felicity of States.

It is certain, that the most happy States are those, in which Princes and Counsellors are the Wisest.

It is also certain, That there are few Princes ca∣pable to Govern States alone; and, moreover, though there were many, they ought not to do it.

The Almighty Power of GOD, his infinite Wisdom, and his Providence, do not hinder Him from making use, in things which he might do by his bare Will, of the Ministry of Second Causes; and consequently Kings, whose Perfections are limit∣ted, instead of being infinite, would commit a no∣table Fault, in not following his Example.

But whereas it is not in their power, as in GODs, to supply the Defects of those they em∣ploy, they must be very careful to chuse them as perfect and as accomplish'd as possible can be.

Many Qualifications are requir'd to make a per∣fect Counsellor; nevertheless they may be reduc'd to Four, viz. Capacity, Fidelity, Courage, and Application, which includes many others.

SECT. II. Which represents what Capacity is requir'd in a good Counsellor.

THe Capacity of Counsellors does not require a pedantick Knowledge: None can be more dangerous in a State, than those who will Govern Kingdoms by the Maxims they find in Books: They often ruin them thereby, because the Time past has no relation to the present, and that the Constitution of Times, Places, and Persons, is dif∣ferent.

It only requires Goodness, Steadiness of Mind, Solidity of Judgment, true Source of Prudence, a reasonable Tincture of Letters, a general Know∣ledge of History, and of the present Constitution of all the States of the World, and particularly of that in which they are.

Whereupon two things ought particularly to be consider'd:

The First, That the greatest Wits are more dangerous than useful in the Management of Affairs; unless they have a great deal more Lead than Quicksilver, they are no ways fit for the State.

Some are fertile in Inventions, and abounding in Thoughts; but so variable in their Designs, that those of the Morning and of the Evening, are never alike; and have so little connexity and choice in their Resolutions, that they alter the good, as well as the ill ones, and never remain constant in any.

I may say with truth, as knowing it by Expe∣rience, that the Levity of such Men is no less dan∣gerous, in the Administration of Publick Affairs, than the Malice of many others.

Much is to be dreaded from Minds whose Viva∣city is accompanied with little Judgment; and tho' those who excell in the Judicious part should not have a great reach, yet they might be useful to States.

The Second Remark to be made on this Subject is, That nothing can be more dangerous in a State, than to give a great Authority to certain Men, who have not Sense enough to Govern themselves, and yet think they have too much to stand in need of any body's.

They are neither capable to take a good Coun∣sel from their own Head, nor to follow the Advice of those who are capable to direct them; and thus they commit gross Faults.

Presumption is one of the greatest Vices a Man can be guilty of, in publick Employments; and if Humility is not requir'd in those who are design'd for the Conduct of States, yet Modesty is absolutely necessary; since it is most certain, that those who have the greatest Parts, are sometimes the least ca∣pable to admit Society and Counsel; Qualifications without which, even those to whom Nature has given most Knowledge, are not fit for Govern∣ment.

Without Modesty, Men of great Parts are so wedded to their own Opinions, that they condemn all others, though better; and the Pride of their na∣tural Constitution being join'd to their Authority, renders them altogether insupportable.

The wisest Man in the World ought to hearken to the Advice of those whom he thinks less capable than himself.

As in Prudence a Minister of State ought to speak but little, so it behoves him to hearken much. A Man may profit by all sorts of Advices; the Good are useful in themselves, and the Ill ones con∣firm the Good.

In a word, The Capacity of a Minister of State, requires Modesty; and if with that Qua∣lity he has a good Genius, and Solidity of Judg∣ment, he will have whatever is necessary.

SECT. III. Which represents the Integrity that is requir'd in a good Counsellor.

IT is a different thing to be an honest Man in what relates to GOD, and in relation to Men.

He who takes a particular care to observe the Law of his Creator, performs his Duty in the first; but to do it in the second, be must observe that which is prescrib'd by the Honour of Men.

Those different Integrities are necessary in a Counsellor of State; but it is uncertain yet, whe∣••her he who possesses all the Qualifications which are requir'd in order thereunto, as to those of the World, also commonly has those which make him an honest Man before GOD. A Man might be very careful to regulate his Conscience according to the Will of his Creator, who being

depriv'd of some of the Conditions of that Integri∣ty, will be less fit to be employ'd in the Ministry of publick Affairs, than he who having them all, may be subject to some particular Defects, in re∣lation to the first.

However, as the Disorder of Conscience is the true Source of all the Imperfections of Man; I declare boldly, That the Two Integrities I am speaking of, are equally necessary for the Per∣fection of a Counsellor of State, and that he can∣not have the second, if he be destitute of the first.

In a word, A States man must be Faithful to GOD, to the State, to all Men, and to himself; which he will be, if, besides the Qualities above∣mention'd, he has an Affection for the Publick, and has no private Ends in his Counsels.

The Integrity of a publick Minister, does not suppose a fearful scrupulous Conscience; on the contrary, nothing can be more dangerous in the Government of a State; since that as the want of Conscience may occasion many Injustices and Cruelties, Scruples may introduce many Emotions and Indulgences, very prejudicial to the Publick: For it is most certain, that those who tremble in the most certain things, out of fear to ruin them∣selves, often ruin States, when they might save themselves with them.

As the Integrity of a Counsellor of State can never agree with a certain Rigour, which is ac∣companied with Injustice, it is not contrary to the Severity which must be us'd of necessity in many occasions; on the contrary, it advises and prescribes it sometimes, and often obliges to be Pitiless.

It does not hinder a Man from minding his own Business, in serving the State; but it only for∣bids him to think on it, to the prujudice of pub∣lick Interest, which ought to be dearer to him than his own Life.

That Integrity does not allow a certain Good∣ness, in those who are employ'd in publick Af∣fairs, to hinder them from boldly refusing those who have unjust Pretensions; on the contrary, it requires, that in granting that which is rea∣sonable, they should be steady in denying what is not so.

I cannot proceed on this Subject, without say∣ing what Ferdinand Great Duke of Florence, who liv'd in our time, was us'd to say on the said Subject, That he would prefer a corrupted▪ Man, before one whose Facility was extraordi∣nary; because, added he, a corrupted Person can∣not always be wrought upon by his Interest, which does not always come in play; where is he who is of an easie Temper, is easily sway'd by all those who press him; which happens the oftner, by reason that it is known, that he is not capable to resist those who press him.

The said Integrity requires that all those who are employ'd in the Government•• of a State, should walk an even pace; and that as they act to the same End, they should hold the same Language; other∣wise, if any one be found, who, though he behaves himself well in effect, speaks less resolutely than the rest to decline Envy; besides, that he will be wan∣ting in the Integrity requir'd in a Minister of State, he will load those with Hatred whose freeness of Speech is consonant to the Steadiness of their Actions.

There are Men, whose Vertue consists more in Bewailing Disorders, than in applying a Reme∣dy to the same, by the establishment of a good Discipline.

Those are not the Men we seek for; their Ver∣tue is only in appearance; and as it has no Acti∣on which can be of use, it differs but little from Vice, which has none but what may be hurt∣ful.

The Integrity of a Counsellor of State must be active; it disdains Complaints, and fixes on so∣lid Effects, which may be useful to the Publick.

There are others, who having nothing but the good of the State in their Mouth, have so extra∣vagant an Ambition in their Heart, that no End can stop their Desires, and nothing can satisfie or content them.

Others proceeding farther, not contented with never being so, convert, under specious Pretences, Publick Interests to their own; and instead of guiding Particular Interest by that which is Pub∣lick, they do the contrary, with as much Injustice as Boldness.

Such Men are not only destitute of the Integrity which is necessary in the Employment of Publick Affairs but they are moreover true Plagues to a State; they are the wild Boars of the Scripture, in the Vineyard, in a full Vintage, who do not only fill their Bellies with it, but spoil and de∣stroy all the rest.

Those who are of a wilful Temper, and follow their Passions more than Reason, and who, instead of chusing Men barely upon the account of their Capacity, in those things in which they are to be

employ'd, chuse them only because they are sen∣sible that they have an Affection for them, and that they are link'd to their Interest, cannot neither be reckon'd Men of the Integrity which is requir'd in the Administration of States.

If a Man be Revengeful, to put him in Authori∣ty, is to put a Sword in the hand of a Fury: if he follows his Appetite, and not Reason in his Ele∣ctions, it is exposing the State to be serv'd by Men of Favour, rather than of Merit; which will occa∣sion many Inconveniences.

A Man of true Integrity must never 〈…〉〈…〉 own Injuries, unless when he rights those 〈…〉〈…〉 State: Moreover, he must not be indue•• to pub∣lick Vengeance, upon the account of his particular Interest; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 when he does it, as those who ha•••• a scrupulous Integrity, often inju•••• themselves by a good Principle, it may be said with truth, that he does good by an ill one.

As the Integrity of a Counsellor of State re∣quires his being proof against all forts of Interests and of Passions, it also requires his being so against Calumnies; and that all the Crosses he may meet with, may never discourage him from doing well.

He must know, that the Labour Men undergo for the Publick, is seldom acknowledg'd by pri∣vate Persons; and that no other Reward is to be expected for it on Earth, than that of Fame, which is the true Reward of great Souls.

He must also know, That the great Men who are employ'd in the Government of States, are like those who are condemn'd to suffer; with this difference only, That those receive the

Reward of their Faults, and the others of their Merit.

Moreover, he must know, That none but great Souls are capable to serve Kings faithfully, and to support the Calumnies which the Wicked and Ig∣norant impute to Men of Honour, without dis∣quiet, and without slackning in the Service they are oblig'd to do them.

He must likewise know, That the Condition of those who are call'd to the Administration of pub∣lick Affairs, is much to be pity'd; by reason that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 do well, the Malice of the World lessens 〈…〉〈…〉 of it, pretending that one might do bet∣ter, though it were absolutely impossible.

Finally, he must know, That those who are em∣ploy'd in the Ministry of the State, are oblig'd to imi∣tate the Stars, which notwithstanding the Barking of Dogs, lighten them, and follow their Course; which ought to oblige him so far to contemn such Injuries, that his Integrity may not be shaken by it in the least, nor he hinder'd from prosecuting those Ends steadily, which he has propos'd to him∣self for the Advantage of the State.

SECT. IV. Which represents what Courage and Force is requir'd in a Counsellor of State.

THe Courage which is necessary in thsi case, does not require so much Boldness in a Man, as to dispise all sorts of Perils; nothing can be more likely to ruin States: And a Counsellor of State ought to be so far from behaving himself so, that, on the contrapy, it behoves him to be very wary on all occasions, and to undertake nothing without great Consideration, and in pro∣per Time.

Neither does the Courage requir'd in a perfect Counsellor of State, oblige him to think on no∣thing but Great Things, which happens often to the most elevated Souls, when they have more Courage than Judgment; on the contrary, it is absolutely necessary, that he should stoop to the meanest, though they may seem below him at first; because great Disorders often arise from small Be∣ginnings; and that the most considerable Establish∣ments, have sometimes Principles which seem to be of no Consideration.

But the Courage in question requires a Man to be free from Weakness and Fear, which render those who are tainted with those two Defects, not only incapable of taking good Resolutions for the Publick Good, but also from putting those in exe∣cution which they have taken.

It requires a certain Fire, which makes Men desire and prosecute great things with as much Eagerness, as the Judgment embraces them with Wisdom.

It requires moreover a certain Steadiness, which makes Men undergo Adversities bravely, and hin∣ders them from appearing, and from being alter'd in the greatest Alterations of Fortune.

It ought to give the Minister of State an honest Emulation of Glory; without which, the most ••a∣pable and the most worthy seldom signalize them∣selves by an advantagious Action to the Pub∣lick.

It must give him the force to resist, without be∣ing daunted, Envy, Hatred, Calumny, and all the Crosses which are commonly met with in the Administration of Publick Affairs.

Finally, It must justifie the Saying of Aristotle in his Person, who affirms, That whereas those that are Weak make use of Cunning and of Craft, those who are strong despise both equal∣ly, by the just Confidence they have in them∣selves.

To this end, we must observe, That to be Va∣liant, and to have Courage, is not the same thing.

Valour supposes a Disposition to expose one's self willingly on all occasions to the Perils which present themselves, which Courage does not re∣quire, but only a sufficient Resolution to despise Peril, when we are engag'd in it, and to support Adversity patiently when we are involv'd there∣in.

We may even proceed farther, and say, That besides the Disposition above specify'd, Valour

requires another, which is Corporal, and which enables Men to shew their Valour by their Arm.

I am sensible, That those who have spoken of the principal Vertues of Man heretofore, did no•• understand those Distinctions; but if you consi∣der them maturely, you will find the first abso∣lutely necessary, and the second not superfluous; because most Men only judge of a Man's Va∣lour, by the Performances of his Arm, which shew his Worth.

Whatever sence you take Valour in, it is not necessary in a Counsellor of State; there is no need of his having a Disposition to expose him∣self to Perils, nor even a corporeal Aptness to shew his Worth by the virtue of his Arm; it is sufficient for him to have so much Courage, that an ill-grounded Fear, and the Crosses he may chance to meet with, may not be able to divert him from his good and generous Design; and as the Mind governs, and not the Hand, it is sufficient that his Heart should sustain his Head, though it cannot influence his Arm.

SECT. V. Which represents what Application is requir'd in Counsellors of State.

APplication does not require that a Man should Labour incessantly in Publick Af∣fairs; on the contrary, nothing is more capable to make him useless, than such a proceeding: The nature of State-Affairs requires respite, by rea∣son that the weight of it is greater, and more bur∣thensom than all others; and that the Forces of the Mind and Body of Men being limitted, a conti∣nual Labour would exhaust them in a short space of time.

It allows all manner of honest Divertisements, which do not divert those who take them, from those things to which they ought to be particularly apply'd.

But it requires, that he who is engag'd in Pub∣lick Affairs, should make them his particular Care, and should fix his Mind, his Thought and Affe∣ction on them; it requires that the greatest of his Pleasures should be the good success of his Af∣fairs.

It requires that he should often surround the World, to foresee what may happen, and to find means to prevent the Evils which are to be fear'd, and to execute those Enterprises which Reason and Publick Interest advise.

As it obliges not to lose one moment in certain Affairs, which may be ruin'd by the least delay;

it also requires, that we should not precipitate our selves in others, in which time is necessary to take such Resolutions as one may have no reason to re∣pent of.

One of the greatest Grievances of this King∣dom is, that most Men apply themselves more to those things to which they cannot apply them∣selves without a Fault, than to those they can∣not omit without a Crime.

A Soldier speaks of what his Captain ought to do; the Captain, of the Defects he imagines in his Colonel; the Colonel finds fault with his Ge∣neral; the General disapproves and blames the Conduct of the Court; and none of them move in their own Sphere, or think of performing those things which their Station particularly obliges them to.

There are Persons of so little Action, and of such weak Constitutions, that they never apply themselves to any thing of their own accord, but barely receive occasions, which influence these more than they do them.

Such Men are fitter to live in a Cloister, than to be employ'd in the Administration of States, which require Application and Activity toge∣ther; so that when they are in them, they do as much harm by their languishing Conduct, as another may do good by an active Applica∣tion.

We must not expect great Effects from such Minds; no body is oblig'd to them for the Good they do; neither can they be blam'd much for the harm they do, since properly speaking, Chance acts more in them than themselves.

Nothing can be more contrary to the Applica∣tion which is necessary in Publick Affairs, than the Inclination which those who have the Administra∣tion of them have for Women.

I am sensible, that there are Minds so absolute∣ly Superiour and Masters of themselves, that though they are diverted from what they owe to GOD by some unruly Affection, yet it does not divert them from what they owe to the State. There are some, who not giving those an Influence over their Will, who sway their Pleasures, only apply them∣selves wholly to their Business.

But there are but few of this nature; and it must be granted, That as a Woman lost the World, nothing is so capable to ruine States as that Sex; when influencing those who Govern them, they often make them move as they please and consequently ill. The best of Women's Thoughts being commonly ill, in those who are govern'd by their Passions, which generally usurp the Empire of Reason in their Mind, whereas Reason is the only and true Motive which must animate and influence those who are employ'd in publick Affairs.

Whatever Force a Counsellor of State may have, it is impossible for him to apply himself as he should do to his Trust, unless he be free from all such Engagements. He may chance to perform his Duty with them; but heing free of them, he will do much better.

Whatever Station he is in, in order to do well, he must divide his Time so, as to have Hours to work alone about the Expeditions which are re∣quir'd by his Place, and others to give Audience

to every body; Reason obliges him to treat every one courteously, and with as much Civillty as his Staition, and the distinct Quality of Men who have Business with him requires.

This Article will give Posterity a Testi∣mony of my Integrity, since it prescribes what I have not been able to perform in every point.

I have always liv'd civilly with those who had Business to treat with me, the Nature of Affairs, which obliges to refuse many Persons, does nei∣ther allow ill Looks, nor ill Words, when we cannot satisfie them by Effects: But the illness of my Health has not allow'd me to give access to every body, as I could have wish'd; which has often troubled me to that degree, that that Consi∣deration has sometimes made me desirous to re∣tire.

Nevertheless, I may affirm with truth, That I have husbanded the Weakness of my Forces so well, that if I have not been able to answer the Desires of every body, they have never been able to hinder me from performing my Duty in rela∣tion to the State.

Finally, Application, Courage, Integrity, and Capacity, form the Perfection of a Counsellor of State; and the Concurrence of all those Qualities must meet in his Person.

A Man may be very honest, who having no Talent for Affairs of State, would be altogether useless in them; and would keep Places he were not able to discharge.

Another might be capable, and have the In∣tegrity which is requir'd, who not having Courage

enough to sustain the divers Casualties which it is impossible to avoid in the Government of States, would be prejudicial instead of being useful.

Another might mean well, be capable, and have Courage together, whose Laziness would prove destructive to the Publick, he not applying himself to the Functions of his Office.

Another may have a good Conscience, be ca∣pable, have Courage and Application to his Employment, who being more sensible to the Ob∣ject which touches him, than to what Concerns the Interest of the Publick, though he serves often usefully, is nevertheless much to be fear'd.

Capacity and Probity produce such a perfect Agreement between the Understanding and the Will, that as the Understanding knows how to chuse the best Objects, and the properest means to acquire the Possession of them; the Will also knows how to embrace them with so much eagerness, that it omits nothing within its power to compass the Ends propos'd by the Understan∣ding.

Integrity and Courage produce an honest Bold∣ness, to tell Kings what is useful for them, though it be not altogether pleasing to them.

I say, an honest Boldness; because unless it be well regulated, and always respectful, instead of being reckon'd among the Perfections of a Counsellor of State, it would be one of his Vices.

Kings must be spoken to with silken Words. As a faithful Counsellor is oblig'd to mind them in private of their Faults with Caution, he can never represent them to them in publick, without committing a great Fault.

To speak that aloud which ought to be whi∣sper'd, is a Reproach which may become crimi∣nal in the Mouth of him who utters it, if he Pub∣lishes the Imperfections of his Prince, to advan∣tage himself by it; being more desirous, out of a vain Ostentation, to shew that he disapproves them, than that he has a sincere Desire to correct them.

Courage and Speculation produce so much Stea∣diness in the Designs chosen by the Understan∣ding, and embrac'd by the Will, that they are prosecuted with Constancy, without being liable to the Changes which the Levity of the French often produces.

I have not spoken of the Force and Health of Body necessary in a Minister of State, by rea∣son that though it is a great advantage, when it meets with all the Qualifications of Mind above mention'd, it is not, nevertheless, so necessa∣ry, but that Counsellors may perform their Fun∣ctions without it.

There are many Employments in the State, in which they are absolutely necessary, because the Body is to act as well as the Mind, in repairing to divers Places, which often must be done with speed; but he who holds the Helm of the State, and whose sole Care is the Direction of Affairs, stands in no need of that Qualification.

As the Motion of Heaven only stands in need of the Intelligence which moves it; so the Force of the Mind alone is sufficient to conduct a State; and that of the Arms and Legs is not necessary to move all the World.

As he who Governs a Ship has no other Acti∣on than that of the Eye to see the Compass; after which, he orders the Turning of the Helm, according as he thinks fit; so in the Conduct of a State, nothing is requir'd but the Operation of the Mind, which sees and orders at once what it thinks fit to be done.

If it be true, that the Sun which heats all things is not hot in it self; it is evident, that in order to make the World act corporeally, the Action of the Body is not requir'd.

I own nevertheless, that I have often wish'd my self rid of the Government of the State, upon the account of my want of Health; the Line of which has been so short, that it has almost been impos∣sible for me not to exceed the measure of it often.

Finally, After having serv'd your Majesty ma∣ny Years in the most difficult Affairs that can be met with in a State, I may confirm by Ex∣perience, what Reason teaches all the World, That it is the Head, and not the Arm, which conducts States.

SECT. VI. Which represents the Number of Counsellors of State that is requisite, and that one among them ought to have the Superiour Authority.

AFter having examin'd and discover'd the Qua∣lifications that are necessary in those who are to be employ'd in the Ministry of State, I must also observe, That as the Plurality of Phy∣sicians sometimes causes the Death of the Patient, instead of contributing towards his Cure; so the State will receive more prejudice than advantage, if the Counsellors are in great Number: I add, That no benefit can be deriv'd by them, if their Number exceeds Four; and moreover, That one of them must have the Superiour Authority, to be as it were the Primum Mobile, which moves all the other Heavens, without being mov'd by any thing but its Intelligence.

I am loth to set down this Proposition, be∣cause it will look as if I design'd to maintain my own Cause; but considering that it would be easie for me to prove it by several Authorities of Scripture, of the Fathers, and of Politicians; and that the Confidence your Majesty has always honour'd me with, while you have been pleas'd to give me a share in the Administration of Publick Af∣fairs, wants no other Principle for the defence of it, but that which was necessary for its Esta∣blishment; I mean, your Will; whick will be look'd upon by Posterity as a just Reason of the

Authority I have had all along in your Councils; I find that I may speak upon this Subject without being suspected; and that it is my Duty to do it, to prove that by Reason, which the Honour I have always receiv'd from your Goodness will au∣thorise by Example.

The natural Envy which is commonly met with among equal Powers, is too well known to every body to want a long Discourse, to shew the Truth of this Proposition.

Divers Experiences have made me so know∣ing in this matter, that I should think my self answerable before GOD, if this present Te∣stament did not declare in proper terms, That nothing can be more dangerous in a State, than divers equal Authorities in the Administration of Affairs.

What the one undertakes, is cross'd by the o∣ther; and if the worthiest Men is not the most capable, though his Propositions should prove the best, they would always be eluded by the most powerful in Sense.

Each will have their Sectators, which will form divers Parties in the State, and will divide the Forces of it, instead of uniting them toge∣ther.

As the Distempers and Death of Men only proceed from the Discord of the Elements they are compos'd of; so it is certain, that the Contra∣riety and the want of Union, which constantly reigns among equal Powers, will ever disturb the Peace of the States they have the Management of, and will produce divers Accidents, which finally may ruin them.

If it be true, That Monarchical Government is more consonant to GOD's than any other; If all Politicians, both Sacred and Prophane, teach us, that that Form surpasses all those that were ever put in practice; we may boldly affirm, That if the Soveraign cannot, or will not have a continual eye himself upon his Map, and upon his Compass, Reason requires that he should give the peculiar Charge thereof to one above all the rest.

As divers Pilots never put their Hands at once to the Helm; so there must be but one at the Helm of the State.

He may receive the Advice of others; more∣over, he ought sometimes to desire it; but he is to examine the Goodness of it, and to turn his Hand to the Right or Left, as he thinks it best, to avoid the Storm, and to steer his Course.

The main point consists in making a good Choice on that occasion, and never to be deceiv'd in it.

Nothing can be more easie than to find a Pri∣mum Mobile to move all, without being mov'd by any Superiour Authority but that of his Ma∣ster; but nothing is more difficult than to find one to move well, without being able to be mov'd by any Consideration which might disorder its Motion.

All Men will think themselves, by their own Sence, capable of that Function; but as no Man can be a Judge in his own Cause, the Judgment of a thing of this importance, must be referr'd to those who have no interest to blind them.

Such a Man will not be capable of being wrought upon by the Practises and Presents of the Enemies of the State, who may be mov'd by their Artifices.

Another may be capable of being wrought upon by Interests; which though not criminal, might nevertheless prove very prejudicial to the State.

There are many, who would rather die than act against their Conscience, who nevertheless would not be useful to the Publick, because they are too apt to yield to the Importunities, and to the Tenderness they have for those they love.

Some may be incapable of being mov'd by any Interest whatever, who may be mov'd by Fear, by Astonishment, and by a panick Terrour.

I am sensible, that the Capacity, Integrity, Courage, and, in a word, all the Qualities which we have attributed to Counsellors of State, may remedy such Inconveniences; but, to speak the truth, as the Minister we are speaking of must be above all the rest, so he must have all those Qua∣lities in an eminent degree, and consequently he must be carefully examin'd before he is chosen.

The Prince must have a personal Knowledge of the Person he intrusts with so great an Employ∣ment, and though the said Person must be elected by himself, yet the Choice he makes of him, must if possible, be accompanied with Publick Appro∣bation; for if he has the liking of every body, he will be the more capable to do good.

As those who are the best skill'd in Astronomi∣cal Supputations, can never be deceiv'd of one Minute, but the Judgments they make afterwards

must be liable to all manner of Falsities; so it is certain, that if the Qualifications of the Person who is to govern others, are only good in appearance, his Conduct will prove very bad; and that if they are but mean, his Government will not prove excellent.

It is is easie to represent the Qualifications that first Ministers ought to have; but it is difficult to meet them all in one Subject.

Nevertheless, it is certain, that the Happiness, or Unhappiness of States, depends on that Election; which lays a strict Obligation on Soveraigns, either to take that Care themselves, which the Weight of their Crown Charges them with, or to make so good a choice of him on whom they will disburthen themselves of it, that their Opinion may be ap∣prov'd by Heaven and Earth.

SECT. VII. Which represents what the King's Behaviour is to be towards his Counsellors; and shews, that in order to be well serv'd, the best Expedient he can take is to use them well.

YOur Majesty having thus chosen your Coun∣sellors, it is your Business to put them in such a state, that they may be able to labour to∣wards the Grandeur and Felicity of your King∣dom.

Four things are particularly necessary to that end.

The First, that your Majesty must confide in them, and that they should know it, which is absolutely ne∣cessary,

because that otherwise the best Counsellors might be suspected by Princes; and that the Mini∣sters not being certain that their Sincerity is known, would restrain themselves in many occasions, in which their silence might prove very prejudicial.

'Tis a common Saying, That a Physician who is lik'd by his Patient, and is belov'd by him, will be able to do him more good than another: And 'tis also certain, that there is none who could apply himself boldly to the Cure of his Pa∣tient, if he were persuaded that he was diffident of him.

The Second is, To command them to speak freely to him, and to assure them that they may do it without Peril.

That Condition is absolutely necessary, not only for some weak and timorous Minds, who want to be encourag'd, but also for those who not being naturally timerous, employ their Zeal the more usefully for the Advantage of the Publick, in being certain that their Boldness cannot be prejudicial to them.

The Soldier who fires behind a Breast-work, is more confident than he who knows that in shooting he may be shot; and indeed, few Men would expose themselves to Ruin to serve the Pub∣lick.

It is true, that an honest Man must never consider his own Interest, when the Publick is concern'd; and that the highest Point of Fide∣lity that can be desir'd in a Servant, is, to speak that ingenuously which he knows to be for his Master's Interest, without the least fear of in∣curring

the Hatred of those who have most interests with him, nor even of displeasing him: But there are but few who have so much Zeal as to run such a Risque.

The Third, To be liberal towards them, and to give them reason to think, that their Services will not be unrewarded.

Which is the more necessary, because there are but few Men who love Vertue naked; and that the only way to hinder a Servant from thinking too much on his own Interest, is to practice the Advice of that Emperour, who recommends to his Son, to have a great care of the Affairs of those who are very mindful of his.

No honest Man ever endeavours to enrich himself at the cost of the Publick, in serving it; but as it would be a Crime to have such a Thought, nothing can be more shameful in a Prince, than to see those who are grown old in his Service, loaden with Years, with Merit, and with Poverty together.

The Fourth is, To authorise and maintain them so openly, that they may be certain, that they need neither fear the Artifices, nor the Power of those who would ruin them.

The Interest of the Prince obliges him to be∣have himself thus, since no Man can serve the Pub∣lick effectually, without incurring the Hatred and Envy of every body; and that few would be found so vertuous as to do well, if they thought it would prove prejudicial to them.

There is no Town in the World, though never so strong in it self, but will be taken in process of time, unless a particular Care be taken to defend her Out-works.

It is the Case of the Greatest Kings, who can never preserve their Authority entire, unless they take a singular care to maintain it in the least of their Officers, near or distant from their Per∣sons, which are Outworks that are attack'd first; the taking of which, imboldens Men to make Efforts against those within, though they seem to be impregnable, as sacred and fix'd to the very Per∣son of Kings.

Few Men will be so presumptuous as to attack those by open force, whom the Prince will make choice of to serve him; because all are sensible that their Power cannot cope with their Sove∣raign, who is too much concern'd to protect his Servants, to neglect it to his prejudice; but there are always some who endeavour to ruin them by Artifices and indirect Means, difficult to be dis∣cover'd.

Men behave themselves commonly with so much Cunning in those occasions, that when the least prospect is observ'd in such Designs, they must be look'd upon as certain; not to harm those who are suppos'd guilty before they are convicted, but to prevent them with Prudence.

The Artifice of Men makes them disguise them∣selves a hundred different ways to compass their Ends: Some speak openly, under pretence that their Silence would be criminal; but there are few of that kind: Others feign to be Friends to those they design to ruin: Others employ a Third

Person to speak, and reserve themselves to second the ill Offices they have begun. Finally, there are so many ways to do harm in that kind, that a Prince can never be too much upon his Guard, to secure himself against surprises, in a thing of that im∣portance.

Whenever any body speaks to him in private a∣gainst the Government of the State, under any pretence whatever, he may assure himself that it is to ruin and to undo him.

We may compare those who behave themselves so, to those who have Fevers, which are the more malignant, in that the external Fire seems little, when they are almost parch'd up within.

Such Distempers must be prevented in time, without staying for a perfect Knowledge of them, because it often happens that we can only have it by the Event, and the Effect of the ill Design which is projected.

Those who make such Enterprises, are too sen∣sible of the Danger to which they expose them∣selves to begin them, without a Resolution to go thro' with them. On such occasions, Men begin slow∣ly and fairly; but afterwards, the nature of such Affairs obliges them to double their pace, and to run for fear of being surpris'd by the way.

In that, they imitate the Stone which is flung from the top of a Mountain; its first motion is slow, and the more it descends, the more weight it receives, and redoubles the swiftness of its fall: And as it requires more force to stop it in the midst of its fall, than in the beginnig; so it is very difficult to stop a Conspiracy, which not be∣ing stifled in its Birth, has already made a great Progress.

The more considerable a Place is, the more the Enemy endeavours to seduce the Governour of it; the more a Woman is beautiful, the more Men endeavour to engage her Affections: So like∣wise the more a Minister is useful to his Master, powerful in his Mind and Favour, the more Men envy him, and are desirous of his Place, and en∣deavour to supplant him to come in his room.

Among faithful Governours, those are most esteem'd, who do not only resist the Propositions which are made to them against their Duty, but also refuse to hear them, and who immediately stop the mouths of those who will tempt them by such means.

Among chast Women, those who have no Ears to hearken to the ill Discourses which Men would make to them to seduce their Purity, are, by the Judgment of the Wisest, preferr'd to those who open them, even when they shut their Hearts.

So among Masters who have Servants, whose Fidelity has been tried on so many occasions, that they cannot question it with Reason, those are the Wisest who stop the Mouths of those would speak ill of them.

Whatever Virtue there may be in resisting Temptation; Princes and Husbands are esteem'd too Indulgent, when they allow their Governors and their Wives, to give Ear to those things which they would not have them adhere to, and to which they cannot consent without a Crime; and Masters must condemn themselves, when they give Ear to what Men would tell them against those, whose Fidelity is unreproachable. The Primitive Reason of this decision consists in that, as to expose

ones self boldly to danger in a just and useful occa∣sion, is an Act of Valour; so to do the same with∣out Cause or Reason, is an Act of Temerity; and it is in that Sence, it has been said with great Reason, that whoever gives Ear to Calumnies deserves to be deceiv'd.

Perhaps some will say, that there is a great deal of difference, between the Duty of the Governor, of the Woman, and of the Prince, in the case which is represented: That it is true, that the Go∣vernor and the Woman, do a great deal better not to hearken, because they can in no wise consent to what is to be propos'd to them; but that the case is different in relation to the Prince, who must keep his Ears open, since he may be told Truths of that consequence, that he will be oblig'd to provide against them.

To that I answer in the first place, That in speaking only of such Servants whose Fidelity is unreproachable, and whose Conduct has heen try'd on many occasions of that importance, that it is impossible to meet with greater; the disserence will be so inconsiderable in the Comparison afore∣said, that in Reason it must be look'd upon as none; the Rule of Moral Things, obliges to look upon those things as nothing, which are of slight consequence.

I add in the second place, That the some in∣convenience might attend the closing of ones Ears against what any body would say against a Ser∣vant of approv'd Fidelity; It is so inconsiderable in respect to those which are inevitable, in opening them to the prejudice of Persons thus qualifi'd, that I may say absolutely, that the Governor, the

Woman, and the Prince must equally shut them in the occasions above-mention'd.

There is no ground to presume, that he who has been faithful all his Life, would become un∣faithful in a moment, without Cause or Reason, principally when the Interest of his Fortune is joyn'd to his Master's.

An Evil which can happen but seldom, must be presum'd not to happen at all; particularly, when to avoid it, we must expose our selves to others which are inevitable, and of greater Consequence, which is the Case in question: It being certain, that it is almost impossible for a Prince to preserve his most faithful and most assured Servants, if under pretence of not shutting his Ears against Truth, he opens them to the Malice of Men; besides, that it is certain that he will lose more, in losing one thus Qualify'd; than if for want of giving Ear, he should tolerate in any one, Faults which can∣not be of great consequence, if he finds him faith∣ful in the most important Occasions.

If he who gives a free entrance to the Murthe∣rers who kill a Man, is guilty of his Death; he who receives all sorts of Suspicions, and of Calumnies, against the Fidelity of one of his Servants, without examining the Case to the bottom, is answerable before GOD for such a proceeding.

The best of Actions are deem'd ill by two sorts of Men; by the Malicious, who impute every thing to Ill by the excess of their Malice, and by those who are naturally suspicious, who explain every thing ill by their Weakness.

There is no Man on Earth, though never so vertuous, that can pass for innocent in a Master's

Mind, who not examining things himself, gives ear to Calumny.

As there are but two ways to resist Vice, either by Flight, or by Combat; so there are also but two to resist the Impressions which are made by Calumnies, the one consists in rejecting them ab∣solutely, without hearkning to them; the other in being so careful in the Examination of what is told, that the Truth or Falshood thereof may be averr'd.

To avoid all Inconveniences, to secure one's self against the Artifices and Snares that are laid by the Wicked, to ruin honest Men, and not to be depriv'd of the means to discover the ill Beha∣viour of those who serve ill; the Prince must look upon all those things as Calumnies which are only whisper'd to him; and upon that account, refuse to hear them: And if any Man will maintain what he has to say in the presence of those he accuses, then he may give ear to them thus, on condition of a good Recompence, if he says any thing mate∣rial to the Publick which proves to be true; and of a great Punishment, if his Accusation prove false, or not considerable and important, though it should prove true.

I have always begg'd of your Majesty to follow this Method in relation to my self, in order to give those who would censure my Actions an opportu∣nity to do it, and me means to defend my self.

I may say with truth, That your Majesty never had the least Disgust against my Conduct, but when you have not practis'd this Council, which is the more to be receiv'd, in that it is altogether innocent.

The End of the First Part.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Saxony first a∣bandon'd the King of Sweden, Bran∣denburg, the Land∣grave of Hesse, se∣veral Hans Towns. Wirtemberg, Par∣ma, and Mantua.
• * 1.2

  The Judges Royal had already begun a little to affect the Cognisance of what only belongs to the Church, un∣der pretence of the possession of Be∣nefices, of which the Bull of Pope Martin, given in the Year 1439. at∣tributed the Co∣gnisance to them.
• * 1.3

  That first Regula∣tion never had the Name, End, or Effect of Appeals.
• * 1.4

  Ordinances of 1539.
• † 1.5

  The Wor•• has its Original from the Practice of At∣tornies and Ad∣vocates; who according to the Order of applying themselves before the Par∣liament by way of Appeal, gave the same Name to the recourse Ecclesia∣sticks had there.
• * 1.6

  Regulation of Church Affairs.
• * 1.7

  The like Remedy was practis'd 15 Years after the Pragmatical Sancti∣on, to stop the course of the Secular Judges Ʋsurpations over the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction; it was ordain'd, That those who had a mind to get Letters out of the Chan∣cery, to oppose the Rescripts and Letters of the Popes, should be oblig'd to quote evidently the means by which they did pretend to justifie, that the Pragmatical Sanction was infring'd.
• † 1.8

  Fifty Years ago this distinction of Priviledg'd Cases and of Common Tres∣passes was unknown to the Church: Common Tres∣passes are all the Faults, the Cognizance whereof belongs to the Ecclesiasti∣cal Tribunal.
• * 1.9

  Agreement made be∣tween King Francis the 1. and Pope Leo the 10. a∣bout Benefices.
• * 1.10

  By Letters Patent of 1453. Charles the 7th granted that favour to the Holy Chappel, instead of the Gift Charles the 5th had made to them of the remainder of all the Accounts deliver'd in the Chamber, which he desir'd to be employ'd for the Reparation both of the Palace and of the Holy Chappel.
• * 1.11

  By the Edict of Febr. 1569.
• † 1.12

  The Bishop du Bellay.
• * 1.13

  The Deed begins with these words, Dominus Rex.
• † 1.14

  The Ordinance, Dum Episcopus alicujus Epis∣copatus, ubi Rex habet Regaliam.

  Philip the 4th in his Philippines of the Year 1302. uses these words, In aliquibus Ecclesis Regni.

  Philip the 6th in his Ordinance of the Year 1334. speaks thus, In the Bishopricks in which we have a Regalia.

  Lewis the 12th in his Ordinance of 1499. cited by the first President Le Maitre, We have and do forbid all our Officers in the Archbishopricks, Bi∣shopricks, Abbies, and o∣ther Benefices, in which we have no Right of Re∣galia, or of Guard, to e∣stablish any there, on pain of being punish'd as guil∣ty of Sacrilege.

  Pasquier in the 3d Book of Enquiries, chap. 13.

  The late King Henry the 4th, by his Edict of the Year 1606. Art. 17. We only design to enjoy the Rights of the Regalia, as our Predecessors and our selves have done heretofore, without extending the same to the Prejudice of the Churches, that are exempted from it. And that good Prince believing that the Parliament of Paris would judge to the con∣trary, suspended all the Causes about the Regalia for a year by his Letters Patent of the 6th of Octob. 1609.

  The King now Reigning having inherited his Piety as well as his Kingdom, declares by the Ordinance of 1629. Art. 16. That he only designs to en∣joy the Regalia as it has been done for the time past. And the Clergy having complain'd, that those Terms were not express enough, H.M. order'd his Commissioners to make this Answer, That the Ordinance being refer'd to that, of 1606. those Terms were sufficient to satisfie the World, that he did not desire to enjoy the Regalia in those places where it has not been enjoy'd for the time past.

  The Ordinance, Dominus Rex, makes use of these Words, Consuevit capate Regaliam.

  Philip the 4th, in his Ordinance of 1302. says, Regalias, ques Nos & Praedecessores nostri consuevimus precipere.

  And the Philippine of the Year 1334. Our Predecessors Kings upon the Account of the Regalia, and the Nobility of the Crown of France have us'd and have been accustom'd to be in Possession and Seisin. And since all the Kings in their Ordinances have only spoken of the Custom and of their Possessions.
• * 1.15

  Quòd enim, qua sine Privilegio potest acquiri. Consuetudine immemori∣ali, say the Canons.
• * 1.16

  'Tis but 60 Years ago, since the Archbishop of R••üen has been freed of the Yoke of the Primate of Lyons, and has made himself Primate of Nor∣mandy.
• † 1.17

  The Bishop du Puy is exempted from the Ju∣risdiction of the Arch∣bishoprick of Bourges, and so are many others in Ita∣ly; yet they are oblig'd to appear in the Provincial Councils that are held by the Archbishops.

  St. Gregory of Tours exempted an Hospital, a Church, and a Monastery from the Jurisdiction of the Bishops of Autun, at the Request of Queen Brunehalt, and of her Grandson King Thierry.

  Crotbert Archbishop of Tours exempted the Monastery of St. Martin from his Jurisdiction.
• * 1.18

  A Letter of Alexan∣der the 3d to the Chap∣ter of Paris, shews, that the Popes have granted Exemptions.
• * 1.19

  The Exemptions of Sens, Paris, Bourges, Bourdeaux, Limoges, Meaux, Auxerre, and the Country of Mans, have been obtain'd by the Anti-Popes.
• * 1.20

  The Exemption of Au∣xerre, Noyo••s, Orleans, B••auyais, Chalous, Angers Poitiers and Lyons are grounded on the Con••••ssi∣ons of the Bishops, and the Agreement made among them.
• * 1.21

  Cyprianus. Frustra quidam qui ratione vin∣cuntur consuetudinem no∣bis opponunt, quasi con∣suetudo major sit verita∣te, aut non fuerit in spi∣ritualibut sequendum; si melius fuerit à spiritu sancto revelatum.
• * 1.22

  Sess. 14. Cha. of Ref. 1. Capitula & Cathedra∣lium & aliarum maje∣rum Ecclesiarum illorum Person•••• Exemptionibus, Consuetudinibus, Senten∣tiis, Jaramentis, Concor∣datis▪ fieri ••st possint, quo minùs à suis Episcopis, & aliis majoribus Prelatis per 〈…〉〈…〉 vel illis quibussing videtur adjun∣ctis, jux•••• Canonicas san∣ct••••••es; toti••s quoties opus fucrit visitari, corrigi, & emandari, etiam autho∣vitat••, Apostolica possint & valeant.
• * 1.23

  Isidorus. Sape per Regnum Terrenum, Cu∣leste Regnum profecit, ut qui infrà Ec̄clesiam positi contra Fidem & Disciplinam Ecclesia agunt, vigore Principium conte∣rantur.
• * 1.24

  Ordinance of Orleant, Art. 11. All Canons and Chapters, whether Secu∣lars or Regulars, and of Cathedral or Collegiate Churches, shall be equally subject to the Archbishop, or Diocesan Bishop, without being allow'd to plend any Priviledge or Exemption, in relation to the Visitation and Punish∣ment of Crimes, all Opposition or Appeals whatever notwithstanding, with∣out Prejudice to the same, of which we have transferr'd the Cognizance and retain'd the same to our Privy-Council.
• * 1.25

  The Year 441.
• * 1.26

  Nouvell. 123. Ch. 18. the Year 541.
• * 1.27

  St. Gregory's Epistle to Secundinus, in the Year 598. justifies that Point.
• * 1.28

  Sess. 2. Ch. 18. of Reff.
• † 1.29

  Idem Sess. 24. of the same Chapter.
• * 1.30

  Sess 31. The Council of Basle ordained, that one third Part of the Benefices should be con∣ferr'd on Masters of Arts, Batchelors, Licenciates, and Doctors of Physick, Law, and Theology, which have studied a certain time in a Priviledg'd Ʋniversity.

  By the Concordate, which was made since at the Council of Lateran, ber∣tween Leo X. and Fran∣cis I. it was agreed, that Graduates should enjoy vacant Benesicet the 3d. part of the Year, viz. in the Months of Jannary. April, July, and October.
• * 1.31

  A Grant from the Pope to Confer Benefices.)
• † 1.32

  Bull of Pope Eugene, granted to King Charles 8th.
• † 1.33

  The Bull was sent to King Francis I. in 1538.
• * 1.34

  Non creditur referenti, nisi constet de relato.
• * 1.35

  Aug. Ipsa mutatio con∣suetudinis etiam qua ad∣juvant utilitata novitat perturbat.
• * 1.36

  Duty yearly paid by the Judges and other Officers, &c.
• * 1.37

  The place where the Courts of Judicature are held,
• * 1.38

  A yearly Revenue which the King receives from all Officers of Judicature, &c.
• * 1.39

  Those who Farm the King's Revenue.
• * 1.40

  When the Command of the Sea was given to the Cardinal, Trade was al∣most totally ruin'd, and the King had not one Ship.
• * 1.41

  Yeomen, or all those who are not of the Order of the Nebility or Gentry.