The Polite gentleman, or, Reflections upon the several kinds of wit viz., in conversation, books, and affairs of the world / done out of French.

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Title
The Polite gentleman, or, Reflections upon the several kinds of wit viz., in conversation, books, and affairs of the world / done out of French.
Publication
London :: Printed and are to be sold by John Nutt ...,
1700.
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"The Polite gentleman, or, Reflections upon the several kinds of wit viz., in conversation, books, and affairs of the world / done out of French." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A55313.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 3, 2024.

Pages

XXXI.

What hinders Men the most from seeing this Defect, is a certain Education too com∣mon

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in the World, even amongst those who think themselves the most Ingenious. They are more addicted to read than make Reflections, and particularly to read those Books which please and delight more than Instruct. They form to themselves a fine Idea of Knowledge and Learning, by en∣deavouring to read every Thing, and to retain all they read, but principally those things which may serve to please or distin∣guish them in Company, as Poetry, History, great Exploits, Genealogies, witty Jests, and the like, for in reality, those Things infinitely please, and though very often they no not distinguish the useful from the use∣less part of them, provided they take a pro∣per time to recite them, they may hope to gain the Minds of most Men, to prepossess them, and by this means obtain their Esteem. So that if a natural Disposition draws Men of good Memory into the afore∣said Errors, the Pleasure they find, and the Pride they take in them does not a little contribute to confirm 'em therein. And we are not surpris'd, that even those who have not this Gift of Nature, endeavour to cultivate their Memory to the Prejudice of their Mind, and fill it with a vast Number of Facts heap'd the one upon the other, to use upon Occasion to gain the Admiration

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of those who highly applaud a good Me∣mory, and are delighted with Narrations.

I do not here examine whence it hap∣pens, that we are more willing to hear those who relate a Story, than those who argue or discuss a Point, and that our con∣versation runs most upon Recitals. But I well know that by this very Thing Men of good Memories are distinguish'd, and that they set too great a Value upon themselves for it. They discourse when others are oblig'd to be silent; and all the Company turns and listens to them. They are the only Men taken notice of; 'tis not civil to interrupt 'em, but a sign of Folly and Levi∣ty not to be attentive; and we constantly extol and praise them. How can they choose but be pleas'd? and why should not others endeavour to excell the same way? They gain the Hearts and Minds, and are reckon'd ingenious Men, in spight of good Sense, as also of those who have a greater Esteem for it than Memory. 'Tis such an Allurement to the intirely cherishing of this, and abandoning the other, that they ren∣der themselves incapable of making a right Use of it.

A good Memory, I must confess, is a mighty Help, and such as deserves to be rank'd amongst the good Qualifications of

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an ingenious Man. There are a Thousand Occasions where we can do nothing with∣out it; it being not only advantageous to us; but also absolutely necessary. The Mischief is, that we can scarce enjoy this Quality, but we in some manner neglect the Judgment, which is, much more pre∣ferable. Let Men then if they please study the Perfection of their Memory, I consent to it, provided they take mre care of their Minds; let 'em exercise that, provided they make more use of this. Happy are they who have a just regard both for the one and the other. But, by way of Caution, if one minds it well, 'tis infinitely better to render one's self capable of judg∣ing, than remembring well; and I hold it for a certain Maxim, that good Sense may in some Occasions supply the want of Me∣mory; whereas the extraordinary Talent of Remembring cannot on any Occasion supply the want of good Sense.

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