The common interest of king and people shewing the original, antiquity and excellency of monarchy, compared with aristocracy and democracy, and particularly of our English monarchy, and that absolute, papal and Presbyterian popular supremacy are utterly inconsistent with prerogative, property and liberty / by John Nalson.

CHAP. III. The Government of a Republick examined, whether in its oven Nature so good for the Ends of Society as it is pretended. The end of all Government, the Happiness of the Society, consists in Protection, Pro∣perty, and Distributive Justice. De∣mocracy cannot in probability at∣tain those Ends; it obliges the Su∣preme Magistrates to maintain a pri∣vate Interest separate and distinct from the Publick, whereby they manage af∣fairs rather for their own advantage, than that of the Community. No secu∣rity against Foreign Force can be expect∣ed from a Democratick Republick, especially in the greatest Danger. Do∣mestick Peace not so well preserved by it as by Monarchy. No safety of Proper∣ty in a Republick, in regard of their constant Factions, nor equal distribution of Rewards and Punishments.

BUT leaving these Impatient furi∣oso's, gnawing their Nails for madness, to see their short-liv'd Com∣monwealth, with infamy from Hea∣ven

and Earth hist off the stage of the World: Let us come to examine the Constitution of a Republick way of Go∣vernment in its self; and see whether in its own Nature it is of so great ad∣vantage to the well-being of Society, as it is by some pretended.

THAT we may do this, we must look into the Ends of Government; now the End of all Government is the Well-being and Happiness of the Socie∣ty; and here I shall only concern my self with this well-being in a Politick sence, and not intermingle any thing of Society as to Religious affairs, fur∣ther than they have a respect and neces∣sary influence upon the common con∣cerns of Life.

THE Happiness of any Society does principally consist in these three things. First, in protection from Foreign Pow∣er, and the Injuries of those who are not of the same Body Politick.

Secondly, in preserving Domestick Peace, and securing to every Member of the Society their particular Right and Property, free from incroachment or oppression.

Thirdly, in the equal distribution of Justice to all, according to their Merits,

by a due proportioning of Rewards and Punishments.

TO some or other or all of these three Intentions, the Happiness of Mankind in this World must be reduced; for no man can hope or expect a greater hap∣piness in this mortal state, than to live in safety under a Power that is both rea∣dy, willing, and able to afford him protection; to enjoy with freedom and quietness what he can justly call his own; and not only to be rewarded & en∣couraged for his Industry and Diligence in promoting the publick, and by con∣sequence his own private good, but to see all such severely punished, who would rob him of his quiet and safety, or dispossess him of his Right or any part of it, either by fraud or violence.

IN general therefore, as to all the concerns of Government and the happi∣ness of any Society, it must be conside∣red, what kind of supreme Power does most effectually contribute towards the attainment of these Ends? which for this following reason a Republick can never do. For whether it be Aristocra∣tick or Democratick by Delegates chosen

to represent the People, (which is pro∣perly Oligarchy, and the form our Re∣publicans dote on) no place in the Go∣vernment can be Hereditary; nay, ma∣ny times those places of high Trust are only Annual, or however but for some few Years, and not for term of Life: For (it is their own Argument against the long continuance of this Parliament, which is against the very foundation of a Democratick way)

it is highly unreason∣able, that any one company of men should for many Years ingross so great a trust of the People, as to be their Representatives in the House of Commons, and as good men as these present Members of the Counties and Corporations

(who have as much right, according to the principles of De∣mocracy, to have their turn in the Go∣vernment) should be so long excluded. Now whoever is chosen to such places, must at the same time maintain a sepa∣rate Interest of his own private affairs, distinct from those of the publick. And there being not only a possibility, but the most tempting probability of a pri∣vate and particular advantage to be made of all publick Trusts, where there is Power and Profit, which are rarely to be found so separated, but that they

may easily be United; this is a perpetu∣al spur to men of ambitious or craving spirits, by all ways direct and indirect, to make court to those employs of State, which if they can obtain, they assure themselves they will become most ser∣viceable to their particular Interests, by advancing their Reputation, Ho∣nour, and private Fortunes. And the best men being not only the fewest, but usually least forward, and most modest, in all probability such persons will ge∣nerally sit at the Helm of the State, as will steer the publick Bottom upon such a course, as shall be most beneficial to themselves: And then the consideration of the shortness of their Power, will un∣doubtedly put them upon making Hay whilest the Sun-shine of their Authority lasts; and forcing all private advanta∣ges with the greatest expedition and se∣crecy, both to avoid the danger of lo∣sing their present opportunity, as also to avoid the fear of a future after-reckon∣ing. And in regard it is very possible, that the greatest part of such elective Governours may all be guilty of the same designs, as well the present as those who are Candidates for the future, they will the more easily be induced to

connive at one another; and by a joynt confederacy pass by all such rapacious arts and methods; and by a common consent, for their mutual advancement, father the great expences of their Private gains upon the publick Necessities, a•• well as draw them from the Publick stock: Nor will their successors be ve∣ry forward to call them to a strict ac∣compt, fearing the like treatmen•• themselves, and to their prejudice to draw it into a precedent for succeeding Authorities.

FROM hence it is easie to observe with what fidelity the common Interest will be served; which must almost un∣avoidably fall into the hands of such persons, whose designs will be so fa•• from promoting the common good, and protecting it from the Rapacious at∣tempts of others, that they will be sure, to make a certain prey and revenue of it for themselves: and the inconvenience will be so little remedied by frequent Changes and new Elections, that it will rather prove a new increase of the Malady; and the application of fres•• and hungry Leeches to the Temples of the Body Politick, will rather be a means to suck out its very heart-bloud,

than to preserve its health and well∣fare.

AND that this is not only very na∣tural, but experimentally true, no bare supposition, but a deadly Recipe, to which we can all write a sad Probatum est; we shall need no further proof, than to take a short review of the transactions of the late English Republick; whose great business was to inrich themselves, and their Confederates, by the Ruines of others, and by impoverishing the whole Nation: And to what Estates, by their ill-imployed Power, they did most of them arrive, is still visible; in that, though they were forced to their great affliction, to disgorge a great part of their acquisitions, by restoring the Crown, Bishops, Dean Chapter, and Cathedral Lands, to the right heirs and owners; yet still some of them had so well feathered their Nests out of the publick stock, that they or their poste∣rity might have lived in the greatest splendor or plenty; if their fear to be taken notice of, or their narrow, penu∣rious, and covetous humour would have permitted them; or in truth, if the dangerous Curse upon such as make more haste than good speed to be Rich,

had not like a secret rust consumed those ill gotten greatness and riches, the end of which (that Royal writer assure us) shall not be Blessed.

BUT more particularly, as to the happiness of any Society by protection from Foreign Force and Injuries; it is impossible that any persons should en∣deavour this so heartily, and with that fidelity of resolution, as to defend it to the utmost with their Lives and For∣tunes, who having a distinct Interest from the Publick, may therefore hope to save their own stake, and survive the fate of the expiring Government: And this every one who is a sharer in the Go∣vernment of a Republick may easily hope to do; and though he be devest∣ed of his Authority, by an invading Power, that is no greater loss than in a few years (or it may be days) he is sure to do of course, without such violent means; when by resigning his place, he must be reduced to the condition of a private man; yet still he may hope even under the prevailing Power, to enjoy his Life and private Fortune. Nay further, it is possible, that by selling the present Power he does possess, and bartering away the publick Inte∣rest,

he may arrive at a higher pitch of greatness, and a more durable com∣mand, than otherways he could ever have hoped for: And certainly there cannot be a stronger temptation to such men, to betray the Liberty of their Country, than assurances that they shall reserve to themselves not only the con∣tinuance of the present, but also an ad∣ditional power and greatness, and all the advantages of it by such a profitable treachery.

AND though so long as a Common∣wealth can keep a-float, the sweetness of Sovereignty, and the other advanta∣ges which the present possession of, gives them a greater satisfaction in, than the largest promises of an Enemy, of whole fidelity they cannot be absolutely certain; and such like considerations may make them struggle hard to pre∣serve the Bird in hand, rather than trust to two in the Bush, by resigning their Power; yet most certainly when they see it in manifest danger of sinking, (which is the only season for trial of Courage and Fidelity) they will be so far from employing their utmost efforts, to buoy up the Ship of the Common∣wealth, that they will quit the crazy

and leaking Vessel, and fairly tack about in their own private Chaloup, and stand in with the next shore of safe∣ty; or by striking Sail, and coming un∣der the Lee of the Conqueror, save their own Interest, and it may be obtain ho∣nourable and advantageous conditions for their early submission.

BESIDES, in all Democratick Go∣vernments there dwells a certain dan∣gerous and mischievous person which the common people call No Body; who always walks invisible, and shelters himself from discovery amongst the crowd of Governours: So that when there happens any notable miscarriage of State, No body knows the occasion, or Author, or who it was that did it; and if at last the publick sink and perish▪ No body must be charged with it; be∣cause amongst so many, it will be diffi∣cult to fix it upon any particular person or persons; and they who are really guilty, will yet have the confidence to protest their Innocence; and it may be, that they may appear so, will be for∣ward-enough to charge any such mis∣carriages upon the opposite Faction; which this kind of Government is never without; whereby they do not only

shelter themselves, but expose their Enemies to the general Odium, and it may be to the popular Rage; and by that means at the same time secure their treachery and revenge themselves.

THUS it was with the Romane Se∣nate, who though for above four hun∣dred years they stood many violent shocks, yet still they were never in a manifest danger of an intire Ruine, till such time as the conquering Genius of the mighty Julius had overthrown the great Pompey and his Confederates, who appear'd the defenders of the Re∣publick: (though possibly had victory waited upon their Eagles, they would have made the same Quarry of the Com∣monwealth that Caesar's did) for imme∣diately the Senate gave way to the Con∣queror and his fortune, and decreed him a Triumph; the first badge of their co∣wardize, treachery, and slavery. And though the ingrateful Brutus, and his conspiring Friends, thought by his death, with three and twenty wounds, to have revived the expiring Republick, and healed those which Caesar had given it; yet were they but such convulsive struggles as did presage its certain and near approaching death; for no sooner

had Augustus the heir of Caesar's Fortune and Empire, overcome Anthony, but the tame Senate resigned it self and the Government into his hands; and the rather, in regard he permitted them to keep the Name, and to enjoy their private Fortunes, together with many places of trust and advantage in the ma∣nagement of publick affairs; though he transferr'd the absolute Power and Do∣minion from them to himself. And there is not the least doubt to be made, but since the greatest, most durable, and potent Commonwealth that ever was in the World, did so easily submit; the less and more inconsiderable would soon be perswaded to follow their ex∣ample.

NOR would any of our Modern Republicks be of long duration, were it not for the assistance of their Neigh∣bours, who to keep the scale even, do not think it fit to let them fall as an ad∣dition to the Territories of a neighbour∣ing Prince, lest by the accession of so considerable a Power, he should become too dangerous and formidable: to which policy of State, and not to the goodness of their Constitution they are therefore obliged for their continuance and preservation.

BESIDES, to the safety of any Government there is necessarily requi∣red great unity in Councils, and secre∣cy in the conduct of many State affairs; neither of which can with any probable reason be expected from a Government which is committed to so many Heads, who have all Tongues, and it may be not brains enough to guard them: Nay, supposing them all wise men, they will very difficultly be brought to agree up∣on the same expedients, and it may be the more hardly for being such: Since every mans own reason weighs more to himself than all the World, because he apprehends and understands it best. Now they who dissent from the rest (which some will generally do) out of envy and private Pique that their ad∣vice was rejected and despised, will be apt enough to retard the publick affairs, and to divulge the most important secret Counsels of the opposite Faction, there∣by to render them ineffectual, and to ad∣vance their own Interest, by shewing from events, that their Advice, Opini∣on, and Counsel was the best.

FURTHER, many times the De∣bates and Consultations amongst so ma∣ny different Judgments are so long pro∣tracted,

that before they can arrive at a resolution, many favourable opportuni∣ties for action are irrecoverably lost: And whensoever any great enterprize is to be undertaken for the defence or safety of the Publick, in regard they cannot execute their own Commands, and all be Generals or Admirals, there∣fore the Commissions they grant to those high Officers, are from their fears so li∣mited and restrained, lest they should by too great latitude of power grow ab∣solute, that it frequently occasions great miscarriages: And the fear which their greatest Commanders have to offend so many Masters, though it will infallibly render them most cautelous and wary, yet will it most certainly make them slip the advantages of many sudden unex∣pected emergencies, which they will be afraid to lay hold of, without advice or command from their many Superiors, lest the success not answering the pro∣mises in the attempt, they should fall a sacrifice to an enraged Populace: And thus whilest they wait for an Express, occasion, which will wait no mans pleasure, slips away, and shews them the bald part of his head, which is ne∣ver to be laid hold of again.

NOR is there a greater probability of expecting Domestick Peace from a Republick, which is the second parti∣cular required from all Government, in order to the happiness of any Society. For where there are many who pretend to an equality and parity in Power and Dignity, there will of necessity be jea∣lousies, emulations and animosities ari∣sing from the differences of Judgment, as to the conduct and management of all great, weighty or profitable affairs of State: And where all things must be carried by majority of Vote, since all men naturally have a good opinion of themselves, their own wisdom, pru∣dence and ability; every man will judge most advantageously of his own counsel and advice; for otherwise he would not offer it in opposition to others; and therefore in all transactions mana∣ged by suffrages, those persons whose opinion is rejected, will look upon it as a lessening of that esteem for Wisdom and Policy, which they think they de∣serve, because they desire it should be so; and by an unavoidable consequence they will be most certainly dissatisfied, if not exasperated with thoughts of re∣venge against the prevailing and oppo∣site

number. These discontents occasi∣on the making of parties, entring into secret combinations of Faction, and fre∣quently end in popular Insurrections, Tumults, and Disorders, to which, for this very reason, whoever will take the pains to observe it, shall find the Go∣vernment of a Republick far more ob∣noxious than any other way. And Af∣fairs being generally (if not constantly) managed by a prevailing Faction, (who endeavour to ingross the sole Authority and advantage to their party and favou∣rites) rather than by an even and unani∣mous consent; it makes that party who think themselves injured and affronted (by being deprived of the fundamental parity of their constitution) restless and industrious in their endeavours to ad∣vance their Interest, so as to be able to counterbalance the other.

THUS it was with the Roman Commonwealth; when ever the busie, active, and ambitious spirits were not employed in foreign Wars, they were always running into Mutinies amongst themselves; Parties, Factions, and po∣pular Insurrections, which would have been more frequent and dangerous, had not the policy of the prevailing part of

the Senate taken care to cut out Sword∣work for them abroad. The first re∣markable Sedition was about the Lex Agraria, immediately upon granting a forty years truce to the Veientes, which was appeased by raising a War against the Sabines, Aequi and Volsci. No sooner was that at an end, but a greater Sedition arose, in which ten Tribunes of the common people were created; and this Decemvirate by violence wrest∣ed the Government from the Senate and Consuls: And after the creation of the Military Tribunes, they did for almost seventy years usurp the Government and Authority. And generally all those Tumults and great Disorders happened whilest they enjoyed peace and quiet with their Neighbours; which can be attributed to nothing, but that then the Factions, and Factious spirits had time to mind their Interest at home, whilest they wanted employment abroad. And that there are no greater or more frequent popular Insurrections amongst the modern Commonwealths, is to be attributed to that mixture of Monarchy they have in them, which ba∣lances the Factions, and like the natu∣ral Salt of the Body keeps those bodies

Politick from a Dissolution; as also be∣cause they are almost perpetually inga∣ged either as Principals or Confede∣rates in foreign Wars.

THERE is nothing more evident, than that the very Essence and Natural Constitution of a Republick inclines it to Faction; and it is as plain, that Go∣vernment by Faction can never be for the general good of any Community of Men. For all Factions and Parties are constantly for oppression of those who are opposite and contrary to them: Esteeming that the securest method to keep them under, and to disable them from opposing, or however from over∣throwing their Power. So that no man can have any assurance of safety or property, but by swimming down the stream of a prevailing Party; and in the beginning of such Factions, it is impos∣sible for any person to prophesie which will be so, or how long their power shall continue, in regard of the frequent change of Governours. He that un∣luckily espouses the falling side, is sure to be crushed with them; and if for his security any person shall embrace a cun∣ning Neutrality, he does thereby ex∣pose himself a prey to both parties; for

neither of them will look upon him to be theirs, but will be jealous, that se∣cretly he is of the adverse Faction; and accordingly, whilest he is a declared friend to neither, he will be treated as a secret enemy to both; so that it is im∣possible there can be any such thing as quiet security, where Property is al∣ways left to the mercy of perpetual changes and revolutions of Faction, which inconvenience like its shadow is the inseparable companion of a Com∣monwealth so long as the Sun of prospe∣rity shines upon it.

BUT further, where there are ma∣ny Governours, who as before was said, have a separate Interest, distinct from that of the Publick; these Interests are dispersed through the several parts of the Dominions, where their particular Estates and Places of Residence are: And if they are Proud, Ambitious, Co∣vetous or Imperious Men, they will be most absolute and arbitrary in all such places: And if they be not naturally guilty of those Vices, Government and supreme Authority are but too apt to taint all such persons with some measure of them, who are exalted, and not born to the greatness of Sovereignty and

Power; for where these are not heredi∣tary, men look upon such promotions to be the pure effects of their merit: and whoever sets that high value upon him∣self, as to be of that belief, cannot escape the danger of insupportable pride as well as vanity; for all promotion comes from a higher and unseen Power▪ But however there will be found few amongst the ordinary rank of people (let them be great by chance or merit) who will have the spirit or confidence to contradict or oppose them, though they do invade their property, or incroac•• upon their rights, to advance their own greatness, riches and power; and with very good caution, lest being exaspera∣ted by any such treatment from their In∣feriors, though but in maintaining their own priviledges, they should make use of that power which they have in their hands, to revenge their private quarrels, or however (as they may ea∣sily) do them many ill offices: Nor would there be any remedy by com∣plaints; every offence committed against such a person as he would re∣present it, nay, the very complaint it self would be look'd upon as a contempt or affront of Authority, which in pro∣bability

would procure severe rebukes, if not punishment, rather than redress to such foolish complainants; there be∣ing nothing to be expected, but ex∣pence of time & money in the pursuance of an affair where the application must be made to those who are both Judges and Parties.

ALL this and much more was ex∣actly verified by the Members of the late Rebel Faction of a Parliament, and the Officers, nay, the very common Sol∣diers of the Army: who were such ab∣solute Princes in the several Counties and places of their Residence or Quar∣ters, that no person durst question any of their Actions, though never so un∣just, for fear they should question him for a Malignant, and make his Estate a Delinquent; which most certainly they would have done; it being an in∣fallible sign that a man was disaffected to the Government, if he went about to oppose their most Lawless Actions: And to satisfie their private splene, they would not fail to execute upon him the publick revenge; for he that could not submit to be a slave to the Governors, was presently adjudged an Enemy to the Government; and for that was sure

to suffer in his Estate, if they were so abundantly super-merciful, to let him preserve his Life in a tedious Prison.

NEITHER is the Government of a Republick much more happy in the thirds particular required to the prospe∣rity and well-being of Society, which is the equal distribution of Rewards and Punishments 3 and it being impossible to separate Faction and Interest from this kind of Authority, it will likewise be impossible, but that there will be the greatest inequality in the administration of distributive Justice; for it will ne∣ver be proportioned to the real worth or merits of Men or Actions, but accord∣ing as they shall be judged favourable or advantageous to the Interest of the Ruling Faction; which most common∣ly will happen to be the worst, the number of good Men in all Ages and Places being much inferior to that of the Vicious and Ill: So that all Offices of Profit and all Places of Trust, Dignity or Honour, will most certainly be con∣ferr'd upon such persons as are esteem∣ed Friends, and their want of merit or ability to discharge such considerable employs, will be abundantly recom∣penced by the fidelity they either have

or well dissemble to the side and Interest of their Patrons, who will always be willing to gratifie such, to depress their Enemies, and to support their own Party and Power; judging that their gratifications will oblige to a firmness and fidelity, lest they should be depri∣ved of those advantages they possess from, by, and under them: Though after all the obligations that can be laid upon them, these Mercenary fidelities are all like Soldiers of fortune, who will certainly list themselves under those Standards where there is the best pay and preferment. Whereas on the con∣trary, no ability to discharge any Place or Office of trust, no Integrity shall be able to turn the balance of Rewards against the heavy charge, or but suspi∣cion of being no friend to the present over-ruling Faction, or their proceed∣ings: So that in short, all Vertue (if we measure it by what is rewarded or incouraged in a Commonwealth) will consist either in the artifice of a well manag'd flattery, or a real joyning with that party of the Government which is uppermost; without which unmanly compliances no other sort of goodness will recommend any person to the capa∣city

of Rewards; and will scarcely be able to protect him from Injuries and Punishments. And since Vertue is not over natural to Mankind, it is like to thrive but very poorly in a soil where it is not tenderly cherished, and frequent∣ly refreshed with the incouraging Dews of Rewards and Benefits; they being very rare and uncommon persons, who will espouse Vertue, though the great∣est Beauty in Nature, without any other portion than what she has in her self of excellency and satisfaction: And how happy any Society of men in process of a little time are like to be without Vertue, and how long lived she is like to be upon so thin a diet, where (Pro∣bitas laudatur & alget) she is commend∣ed and starved, I think I need not spend time, or trouble the sober and judicious Reader with arguments to prove and demonstrate.

THE same may be said of Punish∣ments as of Rewards: And if it shall be said, that the frequent changes of the Governours will be a means to prevent these inconveniences; I answer, it will indeed change the Governours, but not the nature of the Government, which of it self is inclinable to these Imperfe∣ctions,

and apt to deprave the best Na∣tures into these miscarriages, which do attend the very Essence of its constituti∣on; and though the Governours may be altered, yet it is probable the same Faction and Interest will bear the sway, and in all common Policy will take what care they can of the succession; notwithstanding which, it will so hap∣pen sometimes that the contrary Faction will get into the Saddle; and the more frequent such changes are, it will ren∣der the condition of all people so much the worse, uneasie and insecure in all the forementioned consequences of Fa∣ction; for since first one Party will be uppermost, and then another; the re∣membrance of the injuries they may have received from their Enemies, will prompt them to the like measure of se∣verities against them, when they are vested with the power of Revenge; which few tempers have the moderati∣on to resist or refuse, when it is not on∣ly proportioned to the treatment they formerly received, but necessary to keep their own Power and Authority in safety and Being.

SO that upon the whole, it will ap∣pear, that this way of Government by

a Republick, is not in any probability of attaining those excellent ends of So∣ciety, which all men propose to them∣selves when they enter into it; and the hopes and enjoyment of which can only render any Society durable and happy.

Notes

• Republick Go∣vernment in its own Nature considered, whe∣ther so useful for the Ends of Society as pre∣tended?
• The end of all Government Happiness of the Society.
• Wherein it con∣sists.
• 1. In Protecti∣on.
• 2. In Peace and Property secured.
• 3. In equal di∣stribution of Rewards and Punishments.
• Democracy can∣not in probabi∣lity attain these Ends in regard the Supreme Magistrates must always maintain a separate interest distinct from the Publick, which will oblige them to manage the affairs of State rather to their own advantage, than that of the Commonwealth.
• Prov. 20.21.
• No security against Foreign Force can be expected from a Democratick Republick, espe∣cially in the greatest dan∣gers.
• Domestick Peace not so well secured by a Republick as by Monarchy.
• A. V. 281. T. Liv. lib. 2.
• A. V. 297. Liv. lib. 3.
• A. V. 311. Liv. lib. 4.
• No safety or security of Pro∣perty in a Re∣publick in re∣gard of their constant Facti∣ons.
• No equal Di∣stribution of Rewards and Punishments can rationally be expected from a Repub∣lick which must of necessity be managed by Fa∣ction and Inte∣rest.