An antidote against Arminianism, or, A succinct discourse to enervate and confute all the five points thereof to wit, predestination grounded upon man's foreseen works, universal redemption, sufficient grace is all, the power of man's free-will in conversion, and the possibility of true saints falling away totally and finally : all which are demonstrated here to be damnable errours, both by Scriptures and reason &c. ... / published for the publick good by Christopher Ness.

Answer 1. It is granted, that Adam had a Posse non cadere, but not a Non posse cadere; his standing was possible Respectu Rei, but not Respectu Dei. To say, that Adam might not have finned, is a Caregorical and Simple Proposition, and will hold true in Sensu diviso, as Adam is considered in him∣self, as cloathed with a Freedom of his own Will; and to say it could not be, but that Adam would sin, is as True in Sensu composito, considering Adam as subordinate to the Decree of God determining,

what Adam would do out of the Freedom of his own Will: This latter Proposition is modal and qualified, so not not of the same kind with the former, and therefore not opposite to it, for Oppo∣sita should be Ejusdem Generis: As for Instance, 2 Kings 8.10. [Thou may'st certainly recover] was true Respectu Rei & in Sensu diviso, because his Disease was of it's own Nature curable; and yet [Thou shalt surely dye] was true also Respectu Dei, & in Sensu composito, as subordinate to the Divine Decree fore-ordaming that Hazael should stisle him by the Occasion of this Disease; so 'tis a plain Fallacia Divisionis, a Fallacy of Divi∣sion.

2. Adam might have stood (as well as fal'n) Respectu Rei, for God gave not his Creature a Law only, but furnish'd him with Power suffi∣cient to keep that Law also, if he would; and if Man had not been mutable, he had been God and not Man, for not to be mutable is peculiar to God, whereby he is distinguish'd from all Cre∣ated Beings: Yet respectu Dei, it was not possible he should stand; for in God's Decree it was cer∣tain, that Man being left to the mutability of his own Will (upon Saran's tempting, and God's permitting) would voluntarily encline to Evil; and this was a Certainty or Necessity of Infal∣sibility, Quoad eventum, but not of Compulsion, Quoad modum agendi et eveniendi.

3. Adam sinned freely in respect of himself, yet necessarily in respect of God; he acted as freely therein, as if there had been no Decree; and yet as infallibly, as if there had been no Li∣berty: God's Decree took not away Man's Li∣berty.

God decreed that Man should act freely in the Fall, and not by any Compulsion from his Decree [Non per Coactionem a principio externo eli∣gebat, sed perlubentem Inclinationem a principio inter∣no] though God decreed it to be, yea, and con∣curred also as the Universal Cause, yet Man ex∣ercis'd the proper Motions of his own Will, saith Austin: The Liberty of Man (tho' subordinate to God's Decree) freely willeth the Self-same Thing, and no other, than what it would have willed, if (upon supposition of an Impossibility) that there had been no Decree.

4. It was a Truth from Eternity (before there was either Man or Sin) that Man should certainly sin, yet the Sin it self was but possible in it self; nevertheless that Possibility passed into a futuri∣tion by the Will of God; for God wills that Sin should be [quia bonum est malum esse, non vult ip∣sum malum, quia bonum non est ipsum malum] be∣cause it is good Sin should be; but God wills not the Sin it self, for Sin it self is not good: There∣fore God by decreeing Adam's Sin, did not sub∣tract from Adam any Grace that he had, for he decreed that he should sin voluntarily, so did not diminish any power that he was endued with, but only he super-added not that Grace whereby Adam would infallibly not have fallen, which Grace was no way due to Man, nor was God any way bound to bestow it on him; so it was according to God's Will (not from it) for what God simply would not have done, that cannot be done at all.

5. If Man can determine his own Will, and not destroy the Liberty of it, how much more

may God do so that is [Intimior intimo nostro] more inward with us, then we with our selves. The Will is its own free Mover, yet is not the first Mover; 'tis only a second Free Agent, and God the first: So the subordinate Free Agent (the thing being yet to do) may either do or not do the same Act; although which of the two Man will freely incline to, be infallibly sore∣ordained: Thus Adam might stand in respect of himself, yet certainly fall in respect of God.

6. The Jews might have broke Christ's Bones in respect of their own Free-will in such Actions, yet was it not possible they should do so, as the Will of Man is sub∣ordinate to the Will of God: It was possible respectu rei, that Christ should be delivered from his Passion by a Legion of An∣gels, yet impossible respectu Dei, for God had decreed that Christ should dye: It was possible in respect of the thing, that God might have pardon'd Sinners without a Christ; but impossible it was, as God had decreed Christ to be the Ran∣som: And to argue on their Hypothesis of Free∣will, respectu Rei, 'tis possible none may be saved, or none may be damned; yet respectu Dei, both are impossible, for then either Heaven or Hell would be superfluous Things.

Notes

• John 19.36.