A treatise of nature and grace to which is added, the author's idæa of providence, and his answers to several objections against the foregoing discourse / by the author of The search after truth ; translated from the last edition, enlarged by many explications.

Answer.

I Answer, that we are permitted to Explain, even the Mysteries, provided we do it according to the Analogy of Faith; and suppose the Do∣ctrines received by the Church as unquestiona∣ble. The Fathers have done so: There is no greater Mystery than of the Trinity; and yet St. Augustine has Composed 15. Books upon this subject, St. Hilary 12. St. Thomas, and all the School Divines, were not afraid to speak and write there∣of. But it is certain, that Predestination is not a Mystery in this sence, as if the mind of Man can discover nothing thereof: for all the Di∣vine Decrees, do necessarily agree with Order, Reason, the Eternal Law, of which all Men have some knowledge. There's no un∣derstanding all the particulars of the Predestination of the Saints: I confess it. Yet all they who know how to enter into them∣selves and consult universal Rea∣son, which enlightens all atten∣tive minds, clearly see, that God acts not by Caprice, that his de∣signs don't prevent his knowledge, that the Predestination and choice of the Elect supposes the presci∣ence of all good works, which they ought to do by the assistance of Grace; that

it is the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, which causes one to be cho∣sen and another rejected. This is that which St. Paul says; this is that which the Fathers say; and this is also that which I Assert. I don't say that one is chosen and another rejected, simply and meerly because God wills it; for I am a∣fraid of making God like unto Man, who guides himself by Humour, and hath no regard to his own work. It is not enough to shew that God is powerful, and that he doth what he will with his Creatures. We ought, if possible, to justifie his wisdom and his goodness: We ought to re∣present him as amiable and adorable, as much at least as we make him terrible. You cry out with St. Paul, O the Height! but let us go on, and add of the riches of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God; for it is the depth of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God, which is the principle of the Predestina∣tion of Saints; it is not a blind, rash, and imperious will, such as is often observed in the great ones of the Earth.

But Men will make God such an one as they would be themselves; because they prefer Power to Wisdom, God shall always be just and wise e∣nough for them, provided he be Powerful and So∣vereign. Men love Independance; it is a sort of Servitude to them to submit to Reason; to them it is a kind of impotence not to be able to do that which she forbids. They fear therefore to make God Impotent instead of making him Wise. They place God above all Reason; according to them he observes none, he absolutely does all that which he pleases; and for this reason meer∣ly

and solely because any thing pleases him; it is just, wise, and good to be done; Principles which certainly overturn the very Foundation of Religion, as I have elsewhere explained.

Will Men never reflect that the Word of God is Sovereign and Universal Reason; that this Rea∣son is Co-eternal and Substantial with God; that he necessarily, invincibly, inviolably, loves it: that tho he be obliged to follow it, he neverthe∣less continues independent: And that thus all that God wills, is Just, Wise, Regular; because God cannot act but according to his knowledge, because he cannot love but according to Order, because he cannot despise his Wisdom, and fal∣sifie himself?

But what! must it be permitted to reason up∣on Gods way of proceeding? Yes doubtless, pro∣vided we reason upon clear Ideas, and always have regard for the Truths which Faith teaches us. 'Tis this infinitely wise Conduct which we cannot too much examine, and too much admire, nothing is more comforting and instructing both together; but we lose our time when we exa∣mine Mens ways of proceeding, for they almost always follow the motions of their passions: He who loves Order, cannot make it his pass-time to see them do so, he cannot be instructed in his duty, by hearing their discourses.

Let it suffice that the Historians make Heroes of their Benefactors, & great Men of their Friends; let all their characters flatter, but Christians ought to propose to themselves other Models. Let them be perfect, as their Heavenly Father is perfect;

let them imitate his Conduct, but I must Answer the principal Objection.

The Fathers, 'tis said, and St. Augustine chief∣ly, permit us not to seek after the reason of the choice which God makes of the Elect. I main∣tain that this is not true, and that the only thing which St. Augustine requires, is, that Gods choice should not be founded upon natural Merits; so far he is from desiring that we should not have recourse to the Wisdom and Knowledge of God to give an account of his choice. But to make this well understood, we must know that the e∣nemies of Grace, and free Predestination, always used this argument which enters naturally into the mind, and which in my opinion cannot e an∣swered by reason, but by the principles which I have laid down. Thus they reason.

There is no choice to be made, where is no inequality or difference: Now God in the distri∣bution of his Graces, chuses some rather than o∣thers.

Therefore there are some Persons whom God judges more worthy of Grace, and more fit to re∣ceive it than others. God wills that all Men should be saved; he wills that all should come to the knowledge of the Faith: Now all are not saved, even the Gospel has not been preached to all. Therefore there is some inequality, or some dif∣ference among Men; for if there was a perfect equality among them, since God would enlighten them all, all would, at least, have the gift of Faith. Now this difference can only come from the good or ill use of Liberty: Therefore 'tis Man who makes himself in this sense to differ

from another , and in some sort merits Grace. For surely tis just, or at least more reasonable, that God should give his Grace to those who are better disposed to receive it, and more likely to make a good use of it than others; to those who actually use their Liberty better, who make some essays towards acquiring Virtue, and who have more love for Order, the Truth and Justice, than to those who make no use of their Liber∣ty, and blindly follow the motions of their pas∣sions. Therefore Grace does not prevent our wills, for God acts always with the most wisdom and reason that can be: Before he assists us, he expects that we should make that use of our Liberty, which we ought and may. 'Tis upon this account that he made us free, our Salvation is in our own hands; the necessity of a prevent∣ing Grace ruins free will, and renders the exhor∣tations and councils of J. C. useless. 'Tis Grace must make us act, but 'tis in our power to will, to pray, and to begin.

These Reasonings are so plausible, and so ea∣sily enter into the mind, that Men are naturally Pelagians. A Man speaks the Language of the Church, when he is upon his guard, when he actually feels his own weakness, and remembers that Grace is not given according to his merits. But when nature speaks, he scarce ever fails to speak those things which favour and exalt it. The Greek Fathers, who lived before Pelagius's Heresy, or who were not cautious enough against this error, have often spoke so as to seem to main∣tain it; this is a thing sufficiently known. St. Augustine himself, before he throughly understood

the matter of Grace, thought it was in our po∣wer to believe and will, but in Gods only to give strength to perform † And St. Jerome himself writing against the Palagians, says, Ʋbi autem misericordia & gratia est, liberum ex parte cessat arbitrium, quod in eo tantum est ut velimus at{que} cupiamus, & placitis tribuamus assensum. Jam in Domini potestate est, ut id quod cupimus, quod la∣boramus ac nitimur, illius ope & auxillio implere va∣leamus. Since we always feel that we are free, and do not always actually think upon the proofs which Scripture gives us of the necessity of Grace, 'tis difficult to keep our selves from saying no∣thing in behalf of Liberty against Grace; since we know and are assured, that God always acts with Reason and Wisdom, we desire to find e∣ven in the Elect themselves, some reason of their Election.

Since it can't be said, that the councils and exhortations of God are useless, we think with∣out reflecting that it altogether depends upon us to follow them. In short, on what side soever we look upon the sentiments of the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians, we find them agreeable enough to Reason; and because they pleasantly court our Pride and Self love, 'tis difficult not to let fall some words in their favour. Hence it is that we find many passages in the Fathers which may be used as a foundation for the errors concerning Grace; insomuch, that there are those who with∣out ceremony reckon some of the Greek Fathers among the Hereticks: For there are Men who judge of the Sentiments of Authors, when they seem to contradict one another, only by report∣ing

the passages in them. They do not consider that all that is said thro prejudice, according to the opinion of those to whom a man speaks, and without having seriously examined what is said, signifies nothing; but on the contrary, it is suffi∣cient once to say a truth against common preju∣dice to discover his opinion. For my part, I be∣lieve that the Greeks and Latines do not much differ one from the other, and that if they of∣ten speak very differently, 'tis because they were not equally cautious against the same errors, and had not equally examined them.

Therefore the enemies of Grace believing them∣selves so strong in reasons, accus'd St. Augustine as denying Liberty, making all depend upon fate, attributing unto God respect of persons, and ren∣dring all Preaching and Councils useless. They continually demanded of him a reason of God's choice, since he would not grant the reason of it to be an inequality or difference of wills, since it could not be an inequality of natures: But St. Augustine on his part, stuck to the Scriptures. He answer∣ed that Grace was not given according to Merits, that Man could not make himself differ from a∣nother, that he was unable not only to do good without the assistance of Grace, but that he could not will it; that the heart of Man is in the hands of God, that he disposes of it as he pleases, and that of our selves we are not able to think a good thought. In short, that he was not obliged to give an account of the reason of the choice of the Elect, because the Judgments of God are un∣searchable.

But tho St. Augustine says in an hundred pla∣ces,

that the Judgments of God are unsearcha∣ble, to silence the enemies of Grace, who would have the reason of our being chosen in our selves; he no where says, that these Judgments are not agreeable to the reason and wisdom which all Men consult, when their senses and their passions keep silence. The judgments of God are impenitrable, because 'tis impossible to know them in particu∣lar; but we ought not to be afraid of asserting that they are Just, Wise, Reasonable, full of Goodness & Equity; St Augustine himself sometimes seeks and gives Reasons of them: He was always disposed to receive those which could be reconciled with Faith, and he rejects not those of his ad∣versaries, but because they supposed, that Grace was given according to Merits; that which Re∣ligion and Christian morality can by no means grant. See how St. Augustine speaks, Ex duo∣bus ita{que} parvulis originali peccato obstrictis, cur iste assumatur, ille relinquatur, & ex duobus aetate jam grandibus impiis, cur iste ita vocetur, ut vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur, aut non ita vo∣cetur; inscrut abilia sunt judicia Dei: Ex duobus autem piis, cur huic donetur perseverantia us∣que in finem, illi autem non donetur, inscrutabiliora sunt judicia Dei. According to St. Augustine, the most unsearchable judgments of God are those by which perseverance is granted to some just Persons, and not to all. In the mean time St. Au∣gustine himself gives a reason of them in his let∣ter to Vitalis and elsewhere; and is so far from blaming them who examine Gods way of proceed∣ing with humility, and according to the Analo∣gy of Faith, that on the contrary he is very rea∣dy

to receive the reasons of others upon this sub∣ject, provided they agree with the Scripture. Prop∣ter hujus timoris utilitatem, ne regenerati & pie vi∣vere incipientes, tanquam securi alta sapiamus, qui∣dem non perseveraturi perseveraturis Dei permissione vel pravisiones ac dispositione miscentur, quibus ca∣dentibus territi, cum timore & tremore gradiamur viam justam. Sed de hac re, id est, cur quidem non permansuri in fide, & sanctitate christiana, tamen accipiant ad tempus hanc gratiam, & dimittantur hic vivere donec cadant, cum possint rapi de hac vita, ne malitia mutet intellectum eorum, quod de sancto immatura aetate defuncto Scriptum est in Libro Sa∣pientiae; quaerat quisquis ut potuerit, & si invenerit praeter hanc quae a me reddita est & aliam pro••abi∣lem rationem, a recta fidei non recedens, teneat eam, & ego cum illo, si me non latuerit †.

'Tis to make us fear, least being regenerated and beginning to live piously, we become secure and high-minded, that by Gods permission and prescience, some who will not persevere, are mix't with those who will; that thus we being afrighted by their fall, may walk in the way of righteousness with fear and trembling. But it will be said, why do they who will not per∣sist in the Faith, receive it, and continue there∣in till they fall? Why doth not God take away their Lives, before the wickedness of their hearts corrupts their minds, as 'tis written in the book of wisdom, of a Saint dying in his Infancy? Let every one seek after the best reasons of this, and if he shall find any other besides this which I have given, which renders a reason, that is probable, and according to the Analo∣gy

of Faith, let him embrace it, and if it shall be imparted to me, I shall embrace it with him.

The Author of the calling of the Gentiles, ob∣serves the same way of proceeding, that St. Au∣gustine doth. He every where says that the Judg∣ments of God are unsearchable, because he op∣poses the same errors; and that Faith doth not suffer us to give a reason of Gods choice of Men, from the difference of their natural Merits . If, for example, he asks himself whence it is, that all Children are not Baptized? He is not afraid to say, that if this came from any ill use of the general Grace given to the Parents, that, if all received Baptism, the Parents were too negligent, not fearing lest their Children should be surprized with Death: He says, that such answers would give some ground to believe, that the grace of Baptism was due to the innocence of age, and to deny original sin. When the question is about excluding natural merits, he cries out, that the Judgments of God are unsearchable; but yet, he nevertheless doth not fail to give some gene∣ral Reasons thereof, upon other occasions. His principle is, that a Reason of all the Designs and Works of God cannot be given. Tertia Defini∣tio temperanter, & sobrie protestatur, non omnem vo∣luntatis Dei comprehendi posse rationem, & multas divinorum operum causas ab humana intelligentia esse subductas. An undeniable principle! But neither he, nor St. Augustine, nor, I believe, any of the Fathers, ever maintain'd that the Judgments of God were so unsearchable, as that it should be a crime to seek, and give some general Reasons

of them. They never forbad Men, to represent God Amiable, and Adorable, by justifying his Conduct, by that Idea which we have of a Being infinitely Perfect, and by the Truths Faith teach us; That which I have endeavoured, in The Treatise of Nature and Grace.

Notes

• Praedestinatio fine praesci∣entia esse non potest, Prosp∣resp. ad Cap. XV. Gall. Non tamen Electio praecedit ju∣stificationem, sed electio∣nem justificatio; nemo e∣nim elegitur, nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum est quia elegit nos ante mundi constituti∣onem, non video quomodo sit dictum nisi praescientiâ, Aug. l. 1. ad Simp. quaest. 2.
• In the Explicat. of the na∣ture of I∣deas, To. 3. of the Search.
• Vid. Prosp. adversus Col. c. 6.
• See St. Augustine lib. 1. ad. Bonif. c. 19. & lib. 2. c. 8. & elswhere
• †

  No∣strum est enim cre∣dere, illi∣us autem dare cre∣dentibus & volen∣tibus fa∣cultatem bene o∣perandi. Lib. Re∣tractat. Cap. 23.
• Lib. 3.
• De bo∣no perse∣ver. c. 9.
• †

  Epist. 107. de Cor. & Grat. c. 23.
• Lib. 1. c. 13. & seq
• Lib. 2. c. 23.
• C. 24.
• Lib. 2. c. 30.