A treatise of morality in two parts / written in French by F. Malbranch, author of The search after truth ; and translated into English, by James Shipton, M.A.

CHAP. I. Ʋniversal Reason is the Wisdom of God himself. All Men have some Communication with God. True and False, Just and Ʋnjust is the same in respect of all intelligent Beings, and of God himself. What Truth and Order is, and what we must do to avoid Error and Sin. God is essentially Just; he loves the Crea∣tures according as they are amiable, or as they resem∣ble him. We must be Perfect to be Happy; Vertue, or the Perfection of Man consists in a Submission to the immutable Order, and not in following the Order of Nature. The Error of some of the Heathen Philoso∣phers in this Matter, grounded upon their Ignorance of the simplicity and immutability of the Divine Conduct.

I. THE Reason of Man is the Word, or the Wis∣dom of God himself; for every Creature is a particular Being; but the Reason of Man is Universal.

II. If my own particular Mind were my Reason and my Light, my Mind would also be the Reason of all intelligent Beings; for I am certain, that my Reason enlightens all intelligent Beings. No one can feel my Pain but my self, but every one may see the Truth which I contemplate; so that the Pain which I feel is a Modification of my own proper Sub∣stance, but Truth is a Possession common to all Spi∣ritual Beings.

III. Thus, by the means of Reason, I have, or may have some Society with God, and all other in∣telligent Beings; because they all possess something in common with me, to wit, Reason.

IV. This Spiritual Society consists in a participation of the same intellectual Substance of the Word, from which all Spiritual Beings may receive their Nourish∣ment. In contemplating this Divine Substance, I am able to see some part of what God thinks; for God sees all Truths, and there are some which I can see. I can also discover something of the Will of God; for God wills nothing but according to a certain Or∣der, and this Order is not altogether unknown to me. It is certain that God loves Things according as they are worthy of Love; and I can discover that there are some Things more Perfect, more Valuable, and consequently more worthy of Love than others.

V. It is true, indeed, that I cannot by contemplating the Word or consulting Reason, be assur'd whether God doth actually produce any thing out of his own Being or no. For none of the Creatures proceed natu∣rally from the Word; nor is the World a necessary ema∣nation of the Deity; God is fully sufficient for himself; and the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, may be con∣ceiv'd to subsist alone. The Creatures then suppose in God free and arbitrary Decrees, which give them their Being. So that the Word, as such, not contain∣ing in it the Existence of the Creatures, we cannot by the Contemplation of it be assur'd of the Action of God: But supposing that God doth act, I am able to know something of the manner in which he acts, and may be certain that he doth not act in such or such a manner; for that which regulates his manner

of Acting, the Law which he inviolably observes, is the Word, the Eternal Wisdom, the Universal Rea∣son, which makes me Rational, and which I can in part contemplate according to my own desires.

VI. If we suppose Man to be a Rational Creature, we cannot certainly deny him the Knowledge of some∣thing that God thinks, and of the manner in which he acts. For by contemplating the substance of the Word, which alone makes me and all other intelligent Beings Rational, I can clearly discover the Relations or Proportions of Greatness that are between the in∣tellectual Ideas comprehended in it; and these Rela∣tions are the same eternal Truths which God himself sees. For God sees as well as I, that twice two is four, and that Triangles which have the same Base, and are between the same Parallels, are equal. I can also discover, at least confusedly, the Relations of Perfe∣ction which are between the same Ideas; and these Relations are that immutable Order which God con∣sults when he acts, and which ought also to regulate the Esteem and Love of all intelligent Beings.

VII. From hence it is evident, that there are such things as True and False, Right and Wrong, and that too in respect of all intelligent Beings; that whatso∣ever is true in respect of Man, is true also in respect of Angels, and of God himself; that what is Injustice or Disorder with relation to Man, is so also with re∣lation to God. For all Spiritual Beings contemplat∣ing the same intellectual Substance, necessarily disco∣ver in it the same Relations of Greatness, or the same speculative Truths. They discover also the same pra∣ctical Truths, the same Laws, and the same Order, when they see the Relations of Perfection that are be∣tween those intellectual Beings comprehended in the Substance of the Word, which alone is the immediate Object of all our Knowledge.

VIII. I say, when they see these Relations of Per∣fection or Greatness, and not when they judge of them; for only Truth or the real Relations of Things are visible, and we ought to judge of nothing but what we see. When we judge before we see, or of more things than we see, we are deceiv'd in our Judgment, or at

least we judge ill, tho' we may happen by chance not to be deceiv'd: For when we judge of things by chance, as well as when we judge by Passion or In∣terest, we judge ill, because we do not judge by Evi∣dence and Light. This is Judging by our selves and not by Reason, or according to the Laws of Univer∣sal Reason: That Reason, I say, which alone is su∣periour to Spirits, and hath a Right to judge of those Judgments which are pronounc'd by them.

IX. The Mind of Man being finite, cannot see all the Relations that the Objects of its Knowledge bear to one another; so that it may be deceiv'd when it judges of Relations which it doth not see. But if it judg'd of nothing but just what it saw, which without doubt it may do; certainly, tho' it be a finite Spirit, tho' it be Ignorant, and in its own Nature subject to Error, it would never be deceiv'd; for then the Judg∣ments fram'd by it would not proceed so much from it self, as from the Universal Reason pronouncing the same Judgments in it.

X. But God is infallible in his own Nature; he cannot be subject to Error or Sin, for he is his own Light, and his own Law; Reason is consubstantial with him, he understands it perfectly, and loves it in∣vincibly. Being infinite, he discovers all the Rela∣tions that are comprehended in the intellectual Sub∣stance of the Word; and therefore cannot judge of what he doth not see. And as he loves himself invin∣cibly, so he cannot but esteem and love other things according as they are valuable and according as they are amiable.

XI. It is probable that Angels and Saints, tho' in their own Nature subject to Error, are never deceiv'd; because the least attention of Mind represents to them clearly the Ideas of things and their several Re∣lations; they judge of nothing but what they see; they follow the Light, and do not go before it; they obey the Law, and do not set themselves above it: In them Reason alone judges definitively and without appeal. But Man, such as I find my self to be, is of∣ten deceiv'd, because the labour of Attention is ex∣tremely tiresom to him; and tho' his Application be

strong and painful, he hath commonly but a con∣fus'd fight of Objects. Thus being weary and not much enlightned, he reposes himself on probability, and contents himself for some time with the enjoy∣ment of a false Good; but being soon out of relish with it, he begins his search anew, till being tir'd or seduc'd again he takes some rest, till he be in a con∣dition to begin afresh, tho' weakly, his difficult en∣quiries.

XII. Since speculative and practical Truths are no∣thing else but relations of Greatness or Perfection, it is evident that Falshood is not any thing real. That twice two is four, or that twice two is not five is true, because there is a Relation of Equality be∣tween twice two and four, and a relation of Inequali∣ty between twice two and five. And he that sees these relations, sees Truths, because the relations are real. That twice two is five, or that twice two is not four is false, because there is no relation of equa∣lity between twice two and five, nor of inequality be∣tween twice two and four. And he that sees, or ra∣ther believes he sees these relations, sees Falsities. He sees relations that are not. He thinks he sees, but indeed he doth not see; for Truth is intelligible, but Falshood in it self is absolutely incomprehensible.

XIII. In like manner, that a Beast is more valuable than a Stone, and less valuable than a Man is true; because a Beast bears a greater proportion or relation of perfection to a Stone, than a Stone doth to a Beast; and a Beast hath a less proportion of perfection com∣par'd to a Man, than a Man hath compar'd to a Beast. And he that sees these Relations, sees such Truths as ought to regulate his esteem, and consequently that sort of Love that is determin'd by esteem: But he that esteems his Horse more than his Coachman, or thinks that a Stone is in it self more valuable than a Flie, or than the very least of organiz'd Bodies, doth not see that which perhaps he thinks he doth; it is not universal Reason, but his own particular Reason, that makes him judge after that manner: It is not the love of Order, but self-love, which inclines him to love as he doth. That which he thinks he sees, is

neither visible nor intelligible; 'tis a false and imagi∣nary Relation: And he that governs his esteem or love by this or the like Relation, must necessarily fall into Error and Irregularity.

XIV. Since Truth and Order are Relations of great∣ness and perfection, real immutable and necessary re∣lations, relations comprehended in the substance of the Divine Word; he that sees these relations, sees that which God sees: He that regulates his Love according to these Relations, observes a Law which God invincibly Loves. So that there is a perfect conformity of Mind and Will between God and him. In a word, seeing he knows that which God knows, and loves that which God loves, he is like God, as far as he is capable of be∣ing so. So likewise since God invincibly loves himself, he cannot but esteem and love his own Image. And as he loves things in proportion to their being amiable, he cannot but prefer it before all those Beings which either by their nature or corruption are far from re∣sembling him.

XV. Man is a free Agent, and I suppose him to have all necessary assistances: In respect of Truth, he is capable of searching after it notwithstanding the dif∣ficulty he finds in Meditation; and in respect of Or∣der, he is able to follow it, in spite of all the efforts of Concupiscence. He can sacrifice his Ease to Truth, and his Pleasures to Order. On the other side he can prefer his actual and present Happiness before his Du∣ty, and fall into error and disorder. In a word, he can deserve well or ill by doing good or evil. Now God is just; he loves his Creatures as they are wor∣thy of Love, or as they resemble him. His Will there∣fore is, that every good action should be rewarded, and every evil one punished; that he who hath made a good use of his Liberty, and by that means hath ren∣der'd himself in part perfect and like God, should be in part happy as he is, and the contrary.

XVI. It is God alone that acts upon his Creatures; at least he hath a power of acting on them, and can do what he pleases with them. He hath power there∣fore to make spiritual Beings happy or miserable; happy by the enjoyment of Pleasure, and miserable by the suffering of Pain. He can exalt the just and per∣fect

above other Men; he can communicate his Pow∣er to them for the accomplishment of their desires, and make them occasional causes for himself to act by in a Thousand manners. He can pull down the wicked, and make them subject to the action of the lowest Beings: This Experience sufficiently shews, for we all, as we are Sinners, depend upon the action of sensible objects.

XVII. He therefore that labours for his Perfection, and endeavours to make himself like God, labours for his Happiness and Advancement. If he doth that which in some sort depends upon himself, that is to say, if he deserves well by making himself perfect, God will do that which in no sort depends upon him, in making him happy. For since God loves all Beings propor∣tionably as they are amiable, and the most perfect Beings are the most amiable; the most perfect Be∣ings shall be the most powerful, the most happy and the most contented. He that incessantly consults his Reason, and loves Order, having a share in the Per∣fection of God, shall have also a share in his Happi∣ness, Glory and Greatness.

XVIII. Man is capable of three Things; Knowing, Loving, and sensibly Perceiving; of knowing the true Good, of loving and enjoying it. The knowledge and love of Good are in a great measure in his own power, but the enjoyment of it doth not at all depend upon himself. Nevertheless, seeing God is just, he that knows and loves him, shall also enjoy him. God being just, must of necessity give the pleasure of enjoyment, and by it Happiness, to him that by a painful application seeks the knowledge of the Truth, and by a right use of his Liberty and the strength of his Resolution, conforms himself to the Law of God, the immuta∣ble Order, notwithstanding all the efforts of Concupi∣scence, enduring Pain, despising Pleasure, and giving that Honour to his Reason, as to believe it upon its Word, and to comfort himself with its Promises. It is a strange thing! Men know very well that the enjoyment of Pleasure and avoiding of Pain do not depend immediately on their Desires: They find on the contrary that it is in their own power to have

good Thoughts, and to love good Things, that the light of Truth diffuses it self in them as soon as they desire it, and that the loving and following of Order depends on themselves. (I still suppose those ne∣cessary assistances which are never wanting to those who have Faith, but through their own negligence.) And yet they seek after nothing but Pleasure, and ne∣glect the foundation of their eternal Happiness, that knowledge and love which resemble the knowledge and love of God, the knowledge of Truth and the love of Order; for as I said before, he that knows Truth and loves Order, knows as God knows and loves as he loves.

XIX. This then is our first and greatest Duty, that for which God hath created us, the love of which is the Mother of all Vertue, the universal, the funda∣mental Vertue; the Vertue which makes us just and perfect, and which will one Day make us happy. We are rational Creatures; our Vertue and Perfecti∣on is to love Reason, or rather to love Order. For the knowledge of speculative Truths, or relations of Greatness doth not regulate our Duties. It is princi∣pally the knowledge and love of the relations of Per∣fection, or practical Truths wherein consist our Per∣fection. Let us apply our selves then to know, to love and follow Order. Let us labour for our Per∣fection; as for our Happiness, let us leave that to the disposal of God, on whom it wholly depends. God is just, and necessarily rewards Vertue: Let us not doubt then but that we shall infallibly receive all the Happiness that we have deserv'd.

XX. The Obedience which we pay to Order and submission to the Law of God, is Vertue in all Senses. Submission to the divine Decrees, or to the power of God is rather Necessity than Vertue. A Man may follow Nature, and yet walk irregularly, for Nature it self is irregular. On the other side, he may resist the action of God, without opposing his Orders; for oftentimes the particular action of God is so deter∣min'd by second or occasional Causes, that it is not conformable to Order. It is true indeed that God wills nothing but according to Order; but he often

acts contrary to it: For Order it self requiring, that God as the general cause, should act in a constant and uniform manner according to certain general Laws which he hath establish'd, the effects of that cause are many times contrary to Order. He forms Monsters, and is subservient as it were to the Wickedness of Men in this World, by reason of the simplicity of those ways by which he executes his Designs. So that he who should think to obey God, in submitting to his Power, and in following and observing the course of Nature, would offend against Order, and fall into Disobedience every Moment.

XXI. If all the motions of Bodies were caus'd by particular acts of the Will of God, it would be a sin to avoid the Ruins of a falling House by flight; for we cannot without injustice refuse to render back to God that Life which he hath given us, when he re∣quires it again. At this rate it would be an Affront to the Wisdom of God, to alter the course of Rivers, and to turn them to Places that want Water; we should follow the Order of Nature and be quiet. But since God acts in consequence of certain general Laws, we correct his Work, without injuring his Wisdom: We resist his action, without opposing his Will; be∣cause he doth not will positively and directly every thing that he doth. For example, he doth not direct∣ly will unjust Actions, tho' he alone gives motion to those that commit them: And tho' it be only he who sends Rain, yet every Man hath a liberty to shelter himself when it Rains. For God doth not send Rain but by a necessary consequence of general Laws; Laws which he hath establish'd, not that such or such a Man should be wet through, but for greater ends, and more agreeable to his Wisdom and Goodness. If the Rain fall upon Men, upon the Sea, or upon the Sand, it is because he is not oblig'd to alter the uniformity of his Conduct, for the uselessness or inconvenience of the con∣sequences of it.

XXII. The case is not the same between God and Men, between the general cause and particulationes. When we oppose the action of Men, we offend them; for since they act only by particular motions of the

Will, we cannot resist their action without opposing their Designs. But when we resist the action of God, we do not at all offend him, nay we often promote his Designs: For since God constantly follows those general Laws which he hath prescrib'd to himself, the combination of those effects which are the necessa∣ry consequences of them, cannot always be conforma∣ble to Order, nor proper for the execution of his Work. And therefore it is lawful for Men to divert these natural effects, not only when they may be the occasion of their Death, but also when they are in∣convenient or disagreeable. Our Duty then consists in submitting our selves to the Law of God, and fol∣lowing Order: For to submit to his absolute Power is necessity. This Order we may know by our union with the Word; so that the immutable Order may be our Law and our Guide. But the Divine Decrees are absolutely unknown to us: And therefore let us not make them our Rule. Let us leave that chimerical Vertue of following God or Nature, to the Sages of Greece and the Stoicks. But let us consult Reason, let us love and follow Order in all things; for then we truly follow God, when we submit to a Law which he invincibly loves.

XXIII. But tho' the Order of Nature be not precisely our Law, and a submission to that Order be by no means a Vertue, we must observe nevertheless that we ought oftentimes to have a regard to it: Yet still this is because the immutable Order so requires, and not because the Order of Nature is an effect of the Power of God. A Man that suffers Persecution, or rather one that is tormented with the Gout, is oblig'd to bear it with Patience and Humility, because being a sinner, Order requires that he should suffer, besides other Reasons which need not here be produc'd. But if Man were not subject to Sin, and the immutable Order did not require that he should suffer to deserve his Reward, certainly he might, nay and ought to seek his ease, and avoid all sorts of inconveniences, tho' he were persecuted, if that were possible, by the inclemency of the Seasons, and by the Miseries which Sin hath brought into the World. And a Man, tho'

he be a sinner, may shelter himself from the Rain and the Wind, and avoid the action of an avenging God; because Order requires that he should preserve his Strength and Health, and especially the liberty of his Mind, to think upon his Duty, and search after Truth: And because Rain and Wind being conse∣quences of the general laws of the Order of Nature, it doth not plainly appear that it is the positive Will of God that he should suffer that particular inconve∣nience. For it would be a hainous Crime in us to avoid the Rain, if God should make it Rain on pur∣pose to wet and punish us: As it was in our first Pa∣rent to eat of a Fruit, because of the express Prohi∣bition, and his formal Disobedience. But if Vertue consisted precisely in living in that condition where∣in we are plac'd in consequence of the Order of Na∣ture, he that is born in the midst of pleasure and abun∣dance, would be vertuous without pain; and Nature having been happily favourable to him, he would fol∣low it with pleasure. But Virtue must be painful at present, that it may be generous and meritorious. A Man ought to sacrifice himself for the possession of God: Pleasure is the Reward of Merit, and there∣fore cannot be the foundation of it, as I shall shew hereafter. In a Word, Truth it self informs us of one that was commanded to sell his Goods, and distri∣bute them to the Poor, if he would be perfect; which was to change his state and condition. Perfection then or Vertue doth not consist in following the Order of Nature, but in submitting wholly to the immutable and necessary Order, the inviolable Law of all intelli∣gent Beings.

Notes

• See the first and second Christian Meditation, or the Illu∣stration on the Nature of Ideas, Search af∣ter Truth, Tom. 3.
• See the 3. Discourse of the Treatise of Nature and Grace.
• See the Re∣marks upon the seeming efficacy of second Causes, or the 5 and 6 Christian Meditations.
• This Age is so ill-na∣tured or so nice, that there are some∣things which it is not suf∣ficient for a Man not to say, but he must also assure the World and, that more than once that he doth not say them. And therefore my Readers must pardon me if I seem to di∣strust their equity.
• See the 7 and 8 Chri∣stian Medit.