A short discourse about our keeping our money shewing that our money may be kept among our selves, and yet our confederates strongly assisted, by a descent upon France. By E.L.

A SHORT DISCOURSE About our Keeping our MONEY, &c.

OUR Money is running away by Millions, year after year: which will soon bring us, if it be not done already, to Beggery and Ruin. And now all the Talk is, of Mending our Money. As if a Man had almost bled to death, and were still bleeding; and He, observing his Blood to be bad, should be consulting and contriving how to Mend his Blood. whereas his first Care should be, how to stop his Bleed∣ing. I confess our Money is not so good as it should be: or rather, 'tis as bad as it can be. But yet, upon the whole matter, we should think how to keep it, before we think how to mend it. For as things now go, whe∣ther it be mended or not mended, it will be carried all away.

It is now evident to all men (but some Men saw it long since), that our great Payments abroad, and chiefly those in Flanders, are the main Cause of the Exporta∣tion of our Money. It therefore highly concerns us to

put a stop to those Payments at any rate. For we can bear them no longer: We have lost so much Bloud al∣ready, that 'tis death to lose more. But shall we not assist our Confederates? Yes, by all meanes, to the ut∣most of our power. For otherwise all Europe must be inslaved to the French, and We among the rest. It is therefore absolutely necessary that we keep our Money: and 'tis as necessary that we powerfully assist our Confe∣derates. Both which things (tho seeming so inconsistent) may at once be done, by our Assailing the French Coast by Sea: or in other words, by a vigorous Descent upon France.

A Project of such a Descent I presumed to publish, in the year Ninety one. which Project was generally ap∣proved, and the whole Kingdom was in Expectation that it would be prosecuted. Also the year next after, a Descent was intended: and another the year follow∣ing. tho, as it fell out, those Designs were not put in Execution. And in the third year was our Attempt at Camaret Bay.

But as to the Project, it is briefly this. That a good Body of Foot (twenty thousand at least, but the more the better) be Shipp'd for the Coast of France; there to move to and fro as they see occasion, and to Land where they find it convenient: and further to seize and fortify some open Sea-Town, so as it may contain a great and strong Garrison. Which Garrison being put in a State of defence, the Naval Army to proceed to new Adventures, and to seize and fortify other Places in like manner.

Here I am to make good the two things before men∣tion'd: First, that in so doing we shall keep our Money; and secondly, that we shall effectually assist our Confede∣rates. To which two things I shall adde a third; That the Design is very feasable, and hardly possible to mis∣carry.

In the first place therefore, while we assail the Sea-Coast of France, and plant Garrisons upon it; tho it be a great Expence, we shall still keep our Money amongst our selves. For whither should it go? The French have good luck, if they get any thing from us in this Affair. And none else have to do with it. At present our Army in Flanders carries our Money thither, (some say a Mil∣lion and a half yearly); and our Fleet kept upon the Coasts of Spain, stops Money from coming to us from thence: and a great Sum goes yearly to Piemont. But by a Descent upon France our Money will be no way diminish'd: and what ever is laid out, will come back and Circulate amongst us. Here will be no carrying out our Coin and Bullion, not the horrible disadvantage of Remittances.

In the second place, By a Descent upon France we shall give most effectual Assistance to our Confede∣rates. If we did nothing else, but overlay the French at Sea, and thereby destroy their Trade and Navigation; even this thing only would be an effectual Assistance. For whereas now the French are rampant; by the im∣mense Riches ('tis their Gazettiers word) which they have taken from us; they would then be impoverish'd to such a Degree, as to be no way able to carry on the War against the Confederates. And this thing we must do in the first place. For we are ruin'd unless we powerfully protect our Trade; and the same Force that protects the Trade of England powerfully, will destroy that of France. Which things I hope our Parliament hath done already, by giving a larger Summe than for∣merly for our Sea-Service. I have said before, that our overlaying our Enemies by Sea, will prove a great Assi∣stance to our Friends. But if beside this, we also Assail the French Coast with Land-Forces, that Assistance will be much greater. For it will make so great a Diversion,

that both Flanders and Germany, and likewise Piemont and Catalonia, will feel an exceeding great Ease and Be∣nefit by it. We are not able to maintain an Army in Flanders: it will bring swift Destruction upon us. But we are able to maintain a Coast Warre. And our Con∣federates must and will be content, if we do for them as much as we are able. Suppose we take forty thousand Men out of Flanders, to assail the French Coasts. If these draw away, or keep back, a greater number of Frenchmen, as they will certainly do; 'tis the same thing or better. And we may be making Descents in Nor∣mandy and Bretagne, before the Armies in Flanders can take the field. By these Descents we shall touch the Enemy in his most sensible part, (as His Majesty hath been pleas'd to express it); that is, on his Sea Coast. How tender they are here, we found at our Bombard∣ing of Havre de Grace. When we came before that Town, their Militia's and Regular Troops were com∣manded thither from all Quarters, with all haste pos∣sible: and the Alarm reach'd Paris it self. From whence that King (as all our Relations agreed) sent away his own Guards to the Sea Coasts. What to do? Not to hinder our Bombardment, for therein they could do no service: but to hinder the Descent of our Land-Forces; who were not above seven thousand in number. It was this handful of Men, that caus'd all that Terror and Affrightment. We may see therefore, that tho the Pro∣ject here offer'd should fail in the main; though we should not be able to fortify and make good any Town, nor so much as Land our Men; yet the very Attempting these things in several places (in one place to day, and a hundred Miles off to morrow); would so harass and torment the French, that they would never be able to bear it. But there is no fear that the Project here offer'd should fail in the main, or not have its full Effect.

In the third place, the thing proposed is feasable and easy; and hardly possible to miscarry. 'Tis hardly pos∣sible that the French should hinder our Landing; 'tis hardly possible they should hinder our Fortifying; or should take from us the Places we fortify. I shall speak first to our Landing. And here I must confess, that if we should resolve to Land at one place precisely; and the French should discover our Design some Months be∣fore hand; and should accordingly provide for the de∣sence of that place, with a great Body of Horse and Foot, with Forts and Intrenchments, and with Bombs and Cannon; and we knowing all this, should attempt that place notwithstanding; we might fairly be repuls'd and baffled, as we were at Camaret Bay. But if we are at large, to Land where we see convenient, there is no such danger. When we sail'd from that Bay towards Flanders, along by the French Shores, the whole Country was in a high Alarme: and they brought down all their Forces to Guard their Coast. But yet, (as I have it from those who saw it with their Eyes), there were a great many places, convenient for Landing, that had no Guard at all, either upon them or near them: we seeing far and wide that the Coast was clear. And both our Landmen and Seamen were most chearfully desirous to go upon French Ground, if there had been Orders for it. Nor had they in truth found any Opposition. Sir Walter Rawleigh doth fully demonstrate, that the Landing upon an Ene∣mies Goast can by no means be hindred. Provided the Assailants be Masters at Sea, and in case the Coast be large and accessible. Which thing is also confirm'd by the Experience of all Ages. For 'tis hardly to be found in History, that ever any Attempt of this kind miscarried, except Ours which I mention'd but now. And Reason tells us, that our Landing upon France (to speak of that in particular) cannot be prevented. Suppose we have

forty thousand Men imbark'd, to assail the French Coast: and the French have fifty thousand to defend it. Their Coast upon Our Channell, (for That must be the Scene of these Actions) is five hundred Miles in length. so that here is a thousand Men for every ten Miles. But how slender a Guard will this be against our Invading Army? Had they a hundred thousand Men, or a thousand for every five Miles of ground, all would be found too few to oppose our Landing.

I hope I have made out, that our Landing cannot be hinder'd by the French. I must now shew that they can∣not hinder our Fortifying. It would be very strange, if such a Body of Men, having the Sea and a Fleet be∣hind them; and having at least ten days time to In∣trench, before a superiour or even an equal Force can be brought against them; should not be able so to cover themselves, as not to fear the Insults of any Enemy. The Works we cast up at Landen in one short night, the French Lines in Flanders, and several late Circumval∣lations, shew what great Things great Numbers can do. But we must not think of Pioniers for this Work; our Soldiers must do it themselves. And they will do it chearfully, if those that labour have some Pay extraor∣dinary. Which was the way of the old Princes of Orange, the Grandfather and great Uncle of our King. Moreover the place where we Intrench, will be the place we intend for a Garrison. And the Line which may be full mann'd by ten thousand Men, when the Works are compleated; may contain the whole Army for a time. For none of these Garrisons should be less then ten thousand: the greater they are, the far∣ther they will command, and the better they will maintain themselves.

And now I come to the point remaining, which is, That 'tis hardly possible that the French should take these Garrisons from us. And this is evident of it self; if the Places be (as they ought) relievable by Sea, and not commanded by Land. A Place that is com∣pleatly fortified; that hath a great Garrison, with great store of Cannon, and hath room for great Renforce∣ments; and that lying opposite to England, with a nar∣row Sea between, may receive these Renforcements (and all manner of Supplies) with every Snatch of Wind; I say such a Place as this, may justly be reputed Im∣pregnable.

Thus I am come to the End of the Project: which is, the Establishing some Garrisons upon the Coast of France. There is no more to be done: the rest will do it self. And as I have said elsewhere; England will then be glorious, when we have a Range of Garrisons the whole length of the Channel, upon French Ground, and maintain'd by French Contributions. Every such Garrison, with a thousand or two of Horse and Dra∣goons put into it, would dismember a whole Province. If Tourville, when he Landed so easily at Torbay, had had an Army on board him, and had settled a rampant Garrison there, would not the whole County of Devon (and Cornwall to boot) have been dismember'd by it? And had not Deal (or any place upon the Downs) done the same by Kent; and any place in Sussex, and another in Dorset, dismembred each of those Counties? Espe∣cially if the French were still Masters at Sea; and had still an Army on board, to pour in upon us (when they pleas'd) from any of those places Consider, what a horrible Condition we had then been in. and in the same Condition will France be, in case this Project be duely prosecuted. They will be so distracted and con∣founded by it, that they will never be able to resist the

Confederates, assailing them in all Quarters. We may then hope for a good and speedy End of this Warre: whereas by keeping our Army in Flanders, there is no hopes of it. For as things go there, tho our Forces be never so great, tho we over-power the Enemy never so much; we must account it a Glorious Success, if we take one Town in a year. But what doth this signify to∣wards making an end of the Warre? At this rate we may be twenty years in recovering Flanders: And we, for our parts, shall be ruin'd in the tenth part of that time. For if our Forrain Payments continue two years longer, they will entirely Ruine us: and I doubt one year will do it.

If from Flanders we could carry the Warre into France, there would be some hopes. But 'tis plain we cannot do this, because we do not. Tho 'tis a great wonder that we cannot. Why cannot We March into France, as well as the French have march'd so often into Flanders; the Dauphin into Germany two years ago; and the Grand Visier to Vienna, a hundred Miles within the Emperor's Quarters? As for the French Lines, they are a meer Cuckow Hedge. We might not only fly over it, (as we did at Namur, to besiege that place), but might go be∣side it: their Quarters beyoud the Maes lying open. But as I have said elsewhere. The great and swift Conquerours in all Ages, never lay pelting at Frontier Garrisons, but broke into the Countries. We shall never see a good Conclusion of this Warre, till the Warre be carried into France: and since that cannot be done by Land, we must do it by Sea. which is the End and Drift of the Design here pro∣posed.

Some loose things are here added, relating to the Discourse above-written.

1. No great number of Horse are required for this Service. For they are not useful either in Landing or Fortifying: which are the things to be done. It seems therefore sufficient, that a thousand or two of them be imbark'd at first, and about twice as many ly ready in England, till there be occasion for them: that is, till some Garrisons be settled to which they may go. For to have them all on Ship-board while the Fleet and Army is upon Wing, and may be plying to and again for several days, would be too chargeable and cumbersome.

2. It is no way necessary, that the Places we fortify should be good Ports. The French have few such upon this Coast: and for these Places, 'tis sufficient if they are relievable by Sea, and can receive and secure small Vessels. For the business of these Garrisons is; that we may harrass and torment the French, from these Garri∣sons. Perhaps another year, when the French are weak∣en'd and humbled, we may think of Attacquing their best Ports, and of a Voyage Royal. But at present we should attempt nothing, but what we are sure we can do: for what we are sure we can do, will sufficiently ruin the French King. It will cost us some Labour, but we shall run no Hazard.

3. A Voyage Royal, or a main Invasion, will not be of that advantage, as the desultory Sea Warre here pro∣posed. In that way we may perhaps do something, if our Force be throughout superiour, and We cleerly and for con∣tinuance Masters of the Field: But in the otherway, we shall be sure to do something, and to gain our point, tho the E∣nemies Force should be much superiour to Ours. By the first way, we shall only divide the Enemies Force by di∣viding our own, without any further Advantage.

4. Forty thousand of our Men on Shipboard, will do more Service to Flanders by the Diversion they make, then a much greater number kept there. And 'tis well known, how great benefit the Duke of Savoy received, by our Fleet with a few Land-Men aboard, hovering about Provence last Summer. It drew so many French to guard that Coast, that the Duke took Casal the while without Interruption.

5. That brave-spirited Prince deserves our highest Re∣gards. And the Assistance we have given him may seem well bestowed. But we cannot send more Money to Piemont, whence it will never return. It were better for us to expend twice or thrice as much in our own Seas: for That Money will return, or rather will never go from us. And this powerful Revulsive will be felt in Piemont, to its great Ease and Benefit. But let it be as it will, we must send away no more Money.

6. Our Silver Coin that is left, as Mr. Lowndes com∣putes it, may be about five Millions and a half, (but some think, it cannot be neer so much): Whereof four Millions, being Clip'd half way, is in effect but two Millions. And so three Millions and a half is the Summe effective. What will become of us, if a full Moiety of this Money be carried to Piemont and Flanders, this very next year; for the growing Expence, beside great Debts that must be satisfied? And either the Payments must be there made by Money in specie; or they must be made by Bills, with most grievous loss, the Exchange being so high against us. So that 'twere better our Money went at once. And Merchants know that forrain Pay∣ments, whether made by Bills or in specie, are the same thing in effect; and carry Money alike out of the Kingdom.

7. This height of the Exchange against us, occasi∣on'd by our great Payments abroad, is an infinite disad∣vantage

to our Merchants: and will continue as long as those Payments do, to the ruin of our Trade, and con∣sequently of our Nation. As for our Clipp'd Money, That had no effect upon the Exchange, till Guineas did rise: which was less than a year since. And when our Coin is reform'd, that Effect will cease. But our forrain Payments are the more durable and substantial Cause. It is these Payments that make Silver more valuable, and better, and dearer, in other Parts than it is in Eng∣land. We cannot have weight for weight: nor receive so many Ounces there, as we pay here. It is most cer∣tain, that our Money never flyes from us, but when Silver is more valuable in other places than in England. Now Silver (as all other Commodities) is there most valuable and dearest, where it is most in demand. And 'tis most in demand, where there are greatest Occasions for it, and the most and greatest Payments to be made. They therefore that are to make these Payments, must buy the Convenience of having Money there for that Use, and the Exchange will run high against them. Which is our present case.

8. I have omitted One Advantage, which we shall have in our Descents upon France: and that is, that we shall never want Men for this Service. Men will be as forward and willing to go for France, provided they have good English Officers; as now they are backward and unwilling to go into Flanders. The Service in Flanders having got a very ill Name, amongst our common Men.

9. I have also omitted one Leak of our Money, which is to be well consider'd. We keep an Army in England, at a great Expence: and most of this Army are Forrai∣ners. Who living very close, and spending little, lay up a good part of their Pay. It deserves an Enquiry, whe∣ther it be true that is said of them; That they are con∣tinually

(even the common Soldiers, and much more the Officers) sending their Money, which they thus save, to their own Countries. If it be so, tho the particular Summes be not very great; yet there being many thou∣sands of them, it may amount to a large Summe in the whole. And it may prove as bad to keep Forrainers in England, as to maintain an English Army in Forrain Parts. Some think it no way necessary, to have a For∣rain Army in England. For the People of England are so firmly Knit to his Majesty, both by Interest and Af∣fection, that there is little need of Forrainers to force us to Obedience. Aristotle is too severe, when he says in his Po∣liticks, (Lib. 5. Cap. 10.), That forrain Guards are Ty∣rannical: for just and good Princes may have them. But some think that in England, under another King, forrain Guards and a forrain Army might be of dread∣full danger to our Liberties. Tho under his Majesty now regnant, (who hath been our Redeemer, and is still our Protector and Preserver) there is no Cause to fear.

I most humbly submit these things, to the Conside∣ration of our States now Assembled. 'Tis They that must take care, Nequid Respublica detrimenti capiat, That the Kingdom receive no prejudice: or rather, as things go now, That it be not destroyed. Which it must be, if we part with more Money; and which therefore we must not do. No Concerting of Measures, no Treaties or Agreements, can oblige us to Impossibilities; and that which cannot be done without destroying the Kingdom, is morally and honestly impossible. We may say ho∣nestly and truly, that for us to part with more Money, is a thing that cannot possibly be done.

Since the writing of the foregoing Treatise, the Com∣mons with great Prudence have Address'd the King, that he will be pleased to procure; that the Commodi∣ties and Provisions sent from England to our Forces A∣broad, may be exempted from Duties and Excises. Which is, we may presume, in order to the supplying our Flanders Army with those Things from England, instead of sending Money for that Use. And this, I confess, will put a great Stop to the carrying out our Money. But no small Quan∣rities of Money must still go to Flanders. For tho the common Soldiers may be content with Provisions brought by Sea, yet the Officers will not. They must fare better, and live like Gentlemen, and spend their Money. Which Money thus spent will amount to a large Summe. And what is spent in Flanders, is lost to England. But in our Descents we shall spend no Money: and all must be con∣tent with what they have from England, or can get from the Enemy. Moreover, tho our supplying our Flanders Army from England may lessen the Necessity of a Descent, yet the Convenience and Advantage of it continues the same. And we may be confident, the French dread it above all things in the World. According to all humane probability, it will in one Summer give the French Ty∣ranny a mortal Wound, if not break it to pieces. Espe∣cially if our whole Quota, our whole eighty seven thou∣sand Men, were employed upon it. And if but forty thou∣sand were thus employed, the rest (if it must be so) being in Flanders and elsewhere; we might well expect great things.

Some think that a Naval Army might do great things, without the help of Garrisons. But that is a mistake. For they can do nothing, as to ravaging and commanding the Country, without Horse; and these cannot readily disbark and reimbark. Beside, by being long on Ship-board, the Hor∣ses will be disabled and spoild. And in this way, it will be

thought a great Adventure, if we go five Miles from the Sea-side. But if we have nothing to do, but to cross over to a Garrison or strong Quarter of our own, where we may Land without any possibility of Interruption, and where a good Body of Horse lyes ready to joyn us; we may make a much greater Impression.

In case we have only one Garrison, the French may per∣haps coop it up with Lines, after their Flanders fashion. But in case we have several, back'd by our Naval Army, they can never bear up against them. So that tho they had no other Enemy, and should oppose us with treble our Force; yet we should be too hard for them, having so great an advantage. And this is the way to put a speedy and victorious End to the Warre; without sending out, or carrying out our Money. Whereas otherwise; this heavy and destructive Warre is like to continue, our Money like to be all gone, and the Kingdom to be ut∣terly ruin'd.

And thus much hath been said about Keeping our Mo∣ney. The Mending I leave to Others. But the admi∣rable Resolves of the House of Commons, have made that work short and easy.

FINIS.