The excellency of monarchical government, especially of the English monarchy wherein is largely treated of the several benefits of kingly government, and the inconvenience of commonwealths : also of the several badges of sovereignty in general, and particularly according to the constitutions of our laws : likewise of the duty of subjects, and mischiefs of faction, sedition and rebellion : in all which the principles and practices of our late commonwealths-men are considered / by Nathaniel Johnston ...

Several Answers have been given to the Objection raised from this last Clause, as they found it in the Latin(o) Records; therefore, before I apply those, it is needful to note the Latin, which, as we find it 1 R. 2. was this, Capto per Archiepiscopum Cantuar. Sacramento Dom. Regis Corporali, de concedendo, & ser∣vando cum sucra confirmatione, Leges & consuetudines ab antiquis, justis, & Deo devotis Regibus Angliae, Progenitoribus, Plebi Regni Angliae concessas, & praesortim leges & consuetudines, & li∣bertates a gloriosissimo & sanctissimo Rege Edwardo, Clero Populo∣que Regni praedicti concessas, & servando Deo & Ecclesiae Sanctae Domini, Cleroque & Populo pacem, & concordiam integre in Deo juxta vires suas, & de faciendo fieri in omnibus judiciis suis, aequam & rectam Justitiam & discretionem in misericordia, & veritate; & otiam de tenendo & custodiendo justas Leges & Con∣suetudines Ecclesiae, & de faciendo per ipsum Dom. Regem, eas esse protegendas, & ad honorem Dei corroborandas, quas vulgus juste & rationabiliter elegerit juxta vires ejusdem Dom. Regis.

This is verbatim the Latin for the preceding French, except in the additional Clause, and the Conclusion which makes the just Laws and Customs both to relate to those of the Church,

and those that the Vulgar shall have justly and reasonably chosen.

The like we find,(q) 1 H. 4. and in the Pontificale of the Archbishops and Bishops; and it is added, after the King hath, as before expressed, answered to the Proposals, Pronunciatis omnibus, confirmat Rex se omnia servaturum, Sacramento super Attari praestito coram cunctis; i. e. that the King by his Oath, ta∣ken upon the Altar before all present, to observe these, con∣firms them.

The Solemnities and Ceremonies used at the Coronation of King Richard the Second, may be perused at large in Tho.(r) Walsingham, and he saith, he swore before the Bishops and Nobles there present, for they only could hear his Oath, that he would permit the Church to enjoy its Liberties, and would honour it and its Ministers, that he would hold right Faith, and would forbid Rapines, and all Iniquities in all their De∣grees. 2ly. That he would make to be kept, every where, the good Laws of the Land, and especially, the Laws of St. Edward King and Confessor, who was buried in that Church, and would make all evil Laws to be abrogated. 3ly. That he would not be an accepter of Persons, but would make right Judgment betwixt man and man, that especially he(s) would observe Mercy, as the Clement and Merciful God might grant Mercy to him.

Having thus given an account of these Coronation Oaths, I come to the Objections. First, They(t) say, that the word Vulgus doth signifie the two Houses, and the word elegerit is to be taken in the Future Tense; so that the King is obliged to consent to such Laws as the two Houses, especially the Com∣mons do chuse.

It is a wonder to me, how men that pretended to any read∣ing or learning in Antiquities, or in the Constitution of the Go∣vernment, could defend their Cause with such pitiful Reason∣ings, especially against King Charles the First, who neither had taken such an Oath, nor many of his Predecessors before him.

The Latin Translation of two French words gave all the oc∣casion of dispute; for that which is called Communate, is ren∣dered Plebs and Vulgus, and aura eslu is translated elegerit; whereas, were it to have been understood in the Future Tense, it should have been eslira: and agreeable to that in all the Au∣thentick Records of the Exchequer, the word elegerit is Eng∣lished in the Preterperfect Tense. Thus much may suffice as to the word elegerit. Dr. Brady's Glossary will satisfie the Curious about the import of the word it self.

Concerning the word Vulgus, one solid(u) Author saith, That we may be confident, that neither the Bishops, Privy Council, Parliament, or any other whosoever they were, that framed or penned this Oath, ever intended in this word the Commons in Parliament, much less the Lords: they would ne∣ver so much disparage the Members of Parliament, as to dis∣grace

them with a Title both base and false. It had been enough, if not too much, to have called them Populus, the Peo∣ple; but Vulgus, the Vulgar, the rude multitude (which hath the Epithete of ignobile vulgus) is a word as dishonourable to the Composers of the Oath to give, or for the King to use, as for the Members of the Parliament to receive; therefore he judg∣eth, that by Vulgus must be meant the Common People, not the Lords and Commons.

But then, saith the same Author, the doubt will be, what the Common People, or Vulgus, out of Parliament have to do to chuse Laws. In answer to which, the preceding word is to be considered; Consuetudines quas Vulgus elegerit, the Customs which the Common People have chosen. If we observe the nature of Custom, it is the Vulgus, or Common People only who chuse Customs. Common usage, time out of mind, cre∣ates a Custom; and the commoner the usage is, the stronger and the better is the Custom. No where can so common an usage be found, as among the Vulgar, who are still the far greatest part of every multitude. If a Custom be common through the whole Kingdom with us, it is all one with the Com∣mon Law of England, which is often called Common Custom; so that to protect the Customs which the Vulgar chuse, is to swear to protect the Common Laws of England.

Agreeable to this, is what the learned Dr. Brady(w) notes, That upon the whole, it signifies no more than that the Com∣munity had chosen, that is owned, submitted to, and desired still to use their Old Customs, which by use, time out of mind, they had enjoyed for the better management of Affairs, and Conveniency betwixt Man and Man, all the Nation over, or in any particular County, Hundred, Town, City or Burrough, such long practices being the foundation of all Customs: but these are to be just, which intrench not upon the Govern∣ment or Laws, and by permission and sufferance only become Laws.

But the same(x) Author judiciously affirms, That the Commu∣nity here intended was the Community of the Bishops, Abbats, Priors, Earls, Barons, Great Men, and the whole body of the Te∣nents in Capite, expressed by those words, in the former Questions, Clergy and People; for by them these demands were made, and no doubt they would first ask for themselves, for the Vulgar or Rabble could not come near to make their Demands at such a Solemnity as this was, so(y) great and splendid; there being at it, Charles and Lewis, Earls of Clermont, two of the King of France's Brothers, the D. of Brabant, the Earl of Fens, and the other great Men, both of France and England, with the Countess of Artois.

Whoever desires further satisfaction, may consult the same learned(z) Author, who makes it clear, That the word Plebs, Vulgus & Populus in the Writers of that Age was used for the Laity in way of contradistinction from the Clergy.

I shall at present leave this, and note, that for any thing ap∣pears to the contrary, the same Interrogations, Oath, &c. pre∣sented to Edward the Second and Third, (without the additions of King Richard's) continued without any alteration to Henry the Eighth's(a) time, and in that we find the King promiseth he shall keep and maintain the Liberties of the Holy Church of old time granted by their Righteous Kings of England; and that he shall keep all the Lands, Honours, and Dignities righteous and free of the Church of England, in all manner Holy, without any manner of minishments; and the rights of the Crown hurt, decay, or loss, to his Power shall call again into the ancient estate; and that he shall keep the Peace of Holy Church, and of the Clergy, and of the People with good ac∣cord; and that he shall do in his Judgment, Equity and right Justice, with Discretion and Mercy; and that he shall grant to hold the Laws and Customs of the Realm, and to his Power keep them, and affirm them, which the People and Flock have chosen; and the evil Laws and Customs wholly to put out, and stedfast and stable Peace to the People of this Realm keep, and cause to be kept to his Power. In this Oath King Henry the Eighth interlined, for the right explication of it, instead of People and Flock, these Words, which the Nobles and People have chosen with my Consent.

The Oath of King Edward the Sixth, so far as relates to my purpose was this, Do you grant to make no new Laws, but such as shall be to the honour and glory of God, and to the good of the Commonwealth, and that the same shall be made by the consent of the People as hath been accustomed?

I have not seen any Transcripts of the Oaths of Queen Mary or Queen Elizabeth, those which King James and King Charles the First took, run thus; Will you grant to hold and keep the Laws and Rightful Customs which the Commonalty of this King∣dom have; and will you defend and uphold them to the Ho∣nour of God, so much as in you lyeth?

That Branch of the Oath which relates to my purpose, taken by King Charles the Second, runs thus: Sir, Will you grant to keep the rightful Customs which the Commonalty of your Kingdom have, &c.

The Oath that our present King James the Second took at his Coronation, was in the same Words as that of his Royal Brother; wherein the Word Customs is to be taken in the lar∣gest extent, to include Laws also.

Now upon the whole we must consider First, That in the Eye of the Law the King never dyes, so that he is King before any Solemnity of Coronation. Secondly, The variety of Forms and Precedents, seem to prove that one precise form is not simply necessary; so the interlining of Henry the Eighth upon Record also shews. And if it had been of consequence to have retained the old form, we should have heard of it ei∣ther then or in some succeeding Parliaments. Lastly, it cannot be

denied, that if the King be bound by a lawful Oath to pass all Bills, it is not the form of denying it, but the not doing of it which makes the Perjury. And so when the King is tender of a flat denial, and attributing so much to the judgment of his great Council, that he only useth the words avisera; it would be a strange Doctrine, that all the Kings of England who have gi∣ven this Answer, have been forsworn, and neither Parliament nor Convocation taken notice of it in so many Ages.

But when by dint of Argument the Parliament Champions were driven from these Holds, they fled to their last Burrow. So one of them confesses, that in Acts of Grace the King is not bound to assent, nor in Acts wherein he is to depart from the particular right and interest of his Crown; and lastly that if he do not consent (however bound by Oath) yet they are not binding Laws to the Subject. But then comes the handful of Gourds which spoils the Pottage: Except in cases of necessity; If the safety of the People be concerned; If it may prove dangerous or inconvenient to them, then an extraordinary course may be taken.

This was the plausible Plea of 1641. to get the Militia into their hands: for they urged that in case of apparent and imminent danger, the Peoples safety was not to be neglected; They might not be exposed as a prey to their Enemies, there∣fore must be put into a posture of defence. This was grateful to the People, out of that real love they bare to themselves, they must favour that side which pretends to take care of their safety. Give to any Person or Society a Legislative Power with∣out the King in case of necessity,(b) permit them withal to be sole Judges of necessity, when it is, and how long it lasts: and then it is more than probable, the necessity will not determine, till they have their utmost desires, which is the same in effect as if they had the Legislative Power.

Further it must be considered that necessity upon that sup∣position must be very evident, there needs no such great stir who shall be Judge of it; when it comes indeed, it will shew it self; when extream necessity is disputable, it is a sign it is not real. Secondly, The Agent must be proper, otherwise it cuts in sunder the very Sinews of Government, to make two su∣premes in a Society, and to subject the People to contrary com∣mands.

But to claim such a Power over the King in extraordinary cases alone, doth not much vary the case: for at the same time they voted themselves the proper Judges of such necessities, and the erecting of any superintending Power in the circum∣stances of those times, and in all parallel cases, would not on∣ly unsoveraign the King (by making this Power the Soveraign) but the exercise of it would be subject to more dangerous ex∣travagances than Regal Power is, and yet less capable of Re∣gulation than it. For the Law knowing there is none but God, qui custodiat ipsos custodes, concludes from the weakness and

imperfection of every other form of Government, that the So∣veraignty of Law-making was better placed in the hands of a sole Prince, than in a Popular or Aristocratical hand; and that a positive known Law without any coercive Superintend∣ent was a sufficient, and the best boundary of Regal Power: For the Law and the Transgression of it, being both at once made manifest and notorious, it will be so sufficient(c) security of the future observance of the Law, that Princes will not offer to violate it. Now if such a Supreme Power, as these would have in the two Houses, in what case soever, be once enacted, that must either be boundless or circumscribed by a Laws; and if that be circumscribed with a Law, then must that Law also have a Superiour Power to enforce it: and so there must be a Superiour Power over Superiour Power in infinitum, and yet at last leave the most Superiour Power in that liberty which the Ob∣server calleth boundless, Arbitrary and Tyrannical.

If this Principle were true, all is but misleading formality of Law, the Soveraignty is not in the King but in the People; the King is the only Subject and but a common Voucher, whose concurrence is unavoidably implied; his Will, his Understand∣ing and his Power are all subject to the Body of the very Sub∣ject that in Parliament doth swear subjection to him: and these pretended Rights being hid ever since the beginning of the Kingdom, the whole generation of the Subject ever since, hath by the injury of our Laws been most impiously mis-sworn in their Allegiance. And whereas the trust is irrevocably commit∣ted to the King and his Heirs for ever, how can it be con∣ceived it should sleep during the sitting of a Parliament, unless that jocular saying of King James were to be understood real∣ly, That during the Sessions of a House of Commons there were five hundred Kings? And if any such Power were in the Houses, it was a strange oversight to leave it to the Kings dis∣posal, when to call the Body together, and when to dissolve it (as before I have touched) whereby the King might solely de∣termin where, and how long he would be over-ruled, and when King again: whereas by the false suggestion of the Observer (that it was fit the Houses should have a Superintendent Power, in case of extraordinary danger, and they only to be Judges of that danger) he cunningly turns the Tables, and makes the Houses to be Soveraigns as long as they pleased; and when they were weary of reigning, the Kingdom should be out of danger, and then it should be the Kings turn to command a∣gain.

But to draw to a conclusion on this subject, which cost so much Blood and Treasure: There(d) neither is nor can be the same necessity of observing an old Law, to which a King is obliged by his Charter and his Oath, and of a new Law to which he hath not given his Royal Assent. If Magna Char∣ta extended to this, it were Charta Maxima, the greatest Charter that ever was granted. To be be denied nothing, is a

Privilege indeed as good as Fortunatus his Purse; or as that old Law which one found out for the Kings of Persia, That he might do what he would. The taking away the Kings Nega∣tive Voice, may indeed secure us against Tyranny, which ne∣ver can come in upon us, as long as the two Houses(e) Negatives ballance it; but it leaves us open and stark naked to all those Popular evils and Epidemical diseases, which flow from Popu∣lar Government, as Tumults, Seditions, Civil Wars, and the Ilias of Evils which attends them; the Negative Voice being the Soveraignest remedy against such great Mischiefs.

One Wheedle I find more they used, since the King was so tender of violating his Coronation Oath, in giving Assent to their new Bills, which were diametrically opposite to the old fundamental Laws, made in defence of Episcopacy, and the Kings Prerogative in the Militia, &c. they quit their Title of Parliament men, and would be Casuists to resolve his Consci∣ence, telling him that where the People by Publick Authority, will seek inconvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interested as themselves, it was more inconvenience and injustice in the King to deny than to grant it.

Thus the Houses would have granted the King a Dispensation to have acted against the dictates of his Reason, Conscience, and the fundamental Laws. And because he would not own their Commission for it, they persecuted him to the Scaffold. This was an unheard of Villany to be offered to so Pious and Religious a Prince, that as Father of his People, would not give them a Stone instead of Bread, or a Scorpion instead of a Fish. The Heathen was much honester, who prayed Jupiter to give him good things, though he never opened his Mouth for them; and to withhold bad and prejudicial things, though he petitioned never so earnestly for them. This was a strange Principle, that the King should be bound by Law to destroy his People, or not preserve their Right, unless he not only violate his own Conscience, but their very Liberties. Can a man ima∣gine those People, of whom Juvenal speaks,

—evertere domos totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles—

if they had understood their own Prayers, would have accused the Gods for denying them.

As they thus sought to hush the Kings Conscience, so that endeavoured to find a quaint salvo for their own more brawny ones: For when it was urged, that to deny the Kings Nega∣tive Voice, was to dissolve the excellent constitution of Parlia∣ments, and was directly against the settlement of it upon the true basis of the Ballance, and the mutual stipulation of the King and his People, as they loved to phrase it they answer by their Prolocutor, that those who contract to their own ruin, or esteem such Contracts before their own preservation, are

felonious to themselves, and rebellious to Nature. Inferring from thence, That if the legal Constitution of Government, be not agreeable to the Liberties the House conceives needful for them, they are obliged to contend to alter them: which is no more nor less, than if a Criminal being condemned to be hanged, should be guilty of another Felony and Treason a∣gainst Nature to yield to the Sentence, but that he ought in his own defence to kill as many as he could, that he might there∣by save his life by escape.

Thus I hope I have made apparent the falshood of the Posi∣tions ranged in defence of that dismal Parliament, who made use of them as Platforms upon which to plant the Artillery of their Acts and Ordinances. For under the pretext of their obligation to preserve the Kingdom, they voted to put it in a posture of defence; and they voted from the King his Navies, Officers, Privy Counsellors, and Revenues, pretending the Navies were still reserved for the King, in better hands than he would put them, and for the other they would furnish him with better principled Ministers. Whereas by the same Prece∣dent, the Subjects were bound to give up their Estates to their ordering, as often as they pretended they could dispose of them more wisely. For they might alledge, the State (which they reputed themselves) had an interest paramount in them in case of publick extremity: so that as they pretended the Head without the Body was the State before, so now it was fit the Body should be without the Head; whereas the Law hath provided against either exorbitances: and if there was necessity we must fall into one, we ought in reason to chuse the former, because being better acquainted with that, we could better digest it; and it would be less burthensom to our Estates to satisfie one than five hundred, nay ten thousand, as it appeared when the greedy Commonwealths men with their Committees, Armies, &c. was that flat Vermine in the Bowels, which (how true soever it is of the lumbricus latus) was certain∣ly true of this Monster, That it was every where Head and Mouth.

It is to be well weighed, that as Parliaments are in the highest degree beneficial, when they keep within the bounds of duty and sobriety; so when they will have their Ordi∣nances to have the force of Laws, and not govern themselves by known Laws, they are the cause of many Distempers in a Kingdom, and the Subjects condition is most unhappy in the Multitude of Physicians: for extraordinary Remedies, such as they always pretend to use, are, saith Sir Henry Wotton, like hot Waters which may help at a pang, but being too often used spoil the Stomach.

A Compleat Parliament is that(f) Panchreston or Soveraign Salve for all Sores; but some would make the name of Parli∣ament a Medusa's Head to transform reasonable men into Stones, and subordinate Monarchy to the two Houses, who

must be denied nothing; but with their good will would claim for them a paramount interest with the Soveraign, whom they would advance only to the height and mighty Dignity of a Doge of Venice, or a Roman Consul, whilest they must be the Tribunes of the People their Supervisors. So that we cannot be content to gather the blessed fruits right con∣stituted Parliaments would afford us, but we must rend away the top Branch, yea stub up the Tree that we may scramble for the Fruit.

Tacitus(g) gives a Caution how a Prince may support his Au∣thority, that he do not vim Principatus resolvere, cuncta ad Sena∣tum revocando. It is fit a Prince should have the Glory of performing those things himself which are his Prerogatives, and not to refer such things to Conventions of Parliament, which properly belong not to their Cognizance. Since there∣fore by the condescensions of our Wise and Gracious Princes, there are several things in England, the King cannot by Law do alone, it is a most requisite Wisdom in Princes, that as they observe the Laws in securing the Peoples Liberties and Privileges; so by no Arbitrary Assumption of either or both Houses, to let their Prerogatives be invaded: for those are now no more than are rationally and politically necessary for orderly and established Government.

The Encroachments of the never to be forgotten long Par∣liament, (several of which I have in this and the foregoing Chapter hinted) may be sufficient documents to Princes, not to yield such a body too much Power: for if the ballance once decline, a little weight will sink it.

Therefore though Princes are not to enlarge their Prero∣gatives, nova siti ad alia aliaque properare; yet they ought to preserve those that remain. For any Raveling once yielded, will make the Royal Cittadel defenceless. Testudo ubi collecta est in suum tegmen, tuta est ad omnes ictus; ubi exerit partes ali∣quas, quodcunque nudavit, obnoxium & infirmum est: The Tor∣toise as long as it keeps within its shell and coverture is safe; but if it unbare any part, it is obnoxious to danger.

Above all things a Prince should he careful never to part with the Prerogative of Summoning and Dissolving Parlia∣ments. For we cannot forget that the Houses of 1641. not content with a Bill for Triennial Parliaments, got an Act for perpetuating themselves; and that would not satisfie, but they prepared a Bill for the certainty of future Parliaments, whe∣ther the King had occasion for them or not: so that if the King omitted the sending out of Writs and Summons, the Chancellor might, and for failure the Sheriff, and I know not what inferiour Officers; of which the Blessed King com∣plains.

I cannot dismiss this Subject without taking notice of the Fundamental cause of Factious Members of Parliament. In England there is no such powerful Engine to make Faction and

Sedition formidable and dangerous to Government, as when the Majority of the Freeholders are wrought upon (by the Arts I have in some measure hinted before, and shall more largely in the Chapter of Faction) to chuse Members of the House of Commons of their own Temper: for such a Num∣ber being imbodied in that House, give and receive mutual strength from one another. For when such are met, they do not take care to unite the minds of the Subjects to their Prince, or one to another, or imploy their time upon the great concerns of the Nation; but are drawn to promote private Animosities under(h) pretence of the Publick; and are so far from proceeding calmly and peaceably to curb the motions of unruly Spirits that endeavour to disturb them, that they expose the King to the Calumny and danger of those worst of men, who endeavour to render him and his Government odious to the People. I shall now touch upon some of the Artifices used to bring in such Members in the Parliament of 1678. and some succeeding ones whereby their Conventions were rendred useless for the King and People, and inglorious to themselves, though they pretended to as much Loy∣alty and Publick good as those in 1641. did at their first sitting.

The King having dissolved the long Parliament and sum∣moned this to sit the 6th of March, 1678. the industry of the Dissenters, Male-contents, and we may suppose Common∣wealths men, was extraordinary great, as now hoping they should be able to chuse such Members as would be more favourable to them.

They had been long instilling into the Peoples Heads, that in the former House there had been a Court and Country Party, the former were for Arbitrary Government, fleecing the People, Persecution, and such as gave no great credit to the Tragical representation of the Popish Plot: The latter were moderate men, and not so much for Ceremonies as the purity of Religion, would stand for the Peoples Liberties and Pro∣perties, by riding night and day about the Villages, and trudging about Corporations, and the weekly Conventicles, they spread this Character abroad, and with all the Arts ima∣ginable, endeavoured to proselyte(i) all that were not sharp-sighted enough to pierce into their designs. If any seemed not to believe those Characters, or declared himself for the Government, Civil or Ecclesiastical, established by Law, and neither for Popery or Arbitrary Government, nor yet for a Commonwealth or Dissenters, they run them down with noise, traduced them behind their backs as Papists in Masquerade and men of Arbitrary Principles. And if any were so bold as to scruple the coherence of the Narratives of the Popish Plot, he was vilified as a Defamer of the Kings Evidence, as stifler of the Plot; and from hence they concluded to insinu∣ate into the Populace, that those Loyal Gentlemen who had been Members of the late long Parliament, had joyned with

the Court to hinder the Discovery of the Plot; and if any gainsaid them, they used such questions, What, Are you for Popery? Will you give your Voice for a Papist? Are you willing to have your Throat cut? Are you for Arbitrary Go∣vernment? By which means they won over too many to joyn with them, to exclude many Loyal and Orthodox Gentle∣men from being chosen Members of Parliament.

Their design was advantaged because some were their friends of old, others had come the half way over to gain the reputation of moderate men, others had been disgusted by the Government. The Conventicle Teachers rallied up their Flocks, and they all joyned to slander the Clergy as if they had a kindness for Popery in their hearts, though they durst not discover it for the present: And generally blasted all the Loyal Gentry as Popishly affected, the Court-Party Pensioners, &c. So that if any one bore any Publick Office Military or Civil, he was eo nomine to be rejected. The Per∣sons they recommended to the People to be chosen, were first all those Gentlemen, who called themselves the Country(k) Party, who had appeared most zealous against his present Majesty, the Queen Dowager, and Ministers of State. To these they added as many as they could of the reliques of the old Rebellion, or their Children, and made up the num∣ber out of the moderate and discontented Gentlemen, Bur∣gesses and Tradesmen. It was sufficient recommendation if the Government had displaced any, for these were looked upon as not to be corrupted or bought off: and here and there they took in an honest Gentleman, in hopes to win him to their side by this kindness.

After the dissolution of this Parliament, when his late Majesty issued out his Writs for another to convene, 17 Oct. 1679. they added to their former Arts the loud clamours against French Pensioners, Popery, Arbitrariness, and all those who voted against the Bill of Exclusion, as Popishly affected, or downright Papists; traducing his Majesty, the Court, the Ministers of State, and almost all the Loyal Gentry and Clergy for endeavouring to have those men chosen. The second advantage they made was the pretended discovery of(l) Sir Stephen Fox of the Pensioners of the late long Parliament: which discovery being hastily made, and no Record of it be∣ing entred, they took the confidence to add to it whomso∣ever they pleased to have so thought; They made the Peo∣ple believe they knew who would be Pensioners likewise, and led the diffidence to that height, as to exclude as far as they could possibly, not only all the Courtiers and other Per∣sons who had any places of profit and advantage under his Majesty, but their Relations too, and wanted not much that they had excluded all those who bore any Honorary Imploy∣ment. So that nothing recommended a man so effectually for a Parliament man, as that he had not been thought fit

to be trusted in the least by his then Majesty, or their Neighbour Gentry, these they cried up as true Friends to the Protestant Religion, and the Country; and he was an hard∣hearted Man in their Dialect, who called the Sincerity of their Loyal Intentions in question: However by their Actings, many of them have been discovered to be but cold Friends to the Government.

But Intending to discourse more fully of the several Arts us'd by designing Men in the Chapter of Factions, I shall at present quit this Subject, and only desire Kings to consider, that they can condescend no lower to gratifie Importunities of Parlia∣ment or People, in yielding up any of their Privileges.

The Philosopher of old hath noted, how Kingly Authority was lessened among the Grecians, which was no ways profita∣ble to them. He speaking of Kings. in the Heroick times,(m) That then they had the Government and Administration of Matters in the Cities, and the adjoyning Territories within their Dominions, and what extended without the Limits of the Empire (viz. to preserve and protect their Subjects against their Enemies, make War and Peace, &c.) But after, partly by the spontaneous Concessions of the Princes, and partly by the En∣croachment of the People, they came to be lessened in Power, and in some Cities had only the Power of Sacrificing left, in others the Command of their Armies. This, as well as other Reasons, must needs demonstrate, That if ever any two Hou∣ses of Parliament should by Arts of Insinuation (as that of 1641. did, That unless the King would grant they might not be dis∣solved without their Consents, they could not have time to settle his Throne, and redress Grievances) or by denying ne∣cessary Supplies, force a King to grant them a Power of pro∣longing their own Sitting, or meeting at stated times without his Writ, or yielding to their Bills implicitly, (as the Black Par∣liament of 41. endeavoured) and then to have the Power of nominating the Great Ministers of State, and the Officers of the Militia, an end would be soon put to Monarchy.

Therefore every one that loves their Country, the continu∣ance of that most excellent Frame of Government, for the Subjects security, as no other Country enjoys; those who would avoid the sad Ravages of Civil War, who would make their Prince Glorious, their Country Renowned, themselves and their Posterities Happy: let them be careful to elect Loyal and Judicious Members, neither tainted with Faction, Ambition, or Self-ends; and if any such be elected, let the Wise and Loyal, when they meet in that Great Assembly, watch over the De∣signs of such ill Members, discover their Intriegues, be careful not to be circumvented by their Artifices, stick close to the Fundamentals of Government; and then all things will be pro∣sperous, and they will have the honour of being stiled True Patriots of their Country.

Sir(n) Edward Coke hath noted, That Parliaments succeed not

well in five Cases. First, when the King hath been in displeasure with his Lords or Commons; therefore it was one of the Peti∣tions of the Commons to Edw. 3. That he would require the Archbishop, and all other of the Clergy, to pray for his Estate, for the Peace and good Government of the Land, and for the con∣tinuance of the King's Good-will towards the Commons; to which the(o) King replied, The same prayeth the King. The like Petition he saith, many times the Lords have made, and further adds, That the King in all his weighty affairs, had used the ad∣vice of his Lords and Commons, always provided, that both Lords and Commons keep within the Circle of the Law, and Custom of Parliament.

The second is when any of the great Lords are at variance among themselves, as he instanceth in the third(p) of H. 6. in the Controversy betwixt John Earl Marshal, and Richard Earl of Warwick, and 4 H. 6. betwixt the Duke of Gloucester and Bishop of Winchester, whereby little was done in any Par∣liamentary Court, and that little of no moment.

The third, when there is no good Correspondence betwixt the Lords and Commons; which happens, when some People out of design to render the meeting of the two Houses in∣effectual, do project some matters, whereby the Houses may clash about Privileges, as was lately in Shirley's Case, about the Mony-Bill from the House of Lords, and many other Par∣ticulars might be instanced in; therefore Sir Edward Coke saith, That when it was demanded by the Lords and Commons, what might be a principal Motive for them to have good success in Parliaments, it was answered, They should be insuperable, if inseparable, Cum radix & vertex Imperii in Obedientium con∣sensu rata sunt. The very root and top of Government con∣sists in the consent of the Obedient, and the Subjects Happiness is in that Harmony, when it is betwixt the two Houses, and a∣mong themselves: but much more happy, when it is likewise betwixt the Sovereign, and the two Houses. It is that which compleats their own, and the Peoples Felicity. But when the two Houses, or one of them, are for wresting the Sovereigns Prerogative from him, as in Forty one, then it is the most fatal and ill-boding sign of any other.

The fourth is, when there wants Unity in the House of Com∣mons, as we had not long since Experience, when within those Walls (from whence wholesome Counsels are expected, and all things tending to the preservation of the King's Peace, Crown, and Dignity;) such Heats were amongst the Members, that if one Sword, that was half drawn, had been wholly unsheathed, it was thought a very bloody Battel had been fought.

The last he makes, is when there is no preparation for the Par∣liament before it begin; for which purpose the Summons of Par∣liament is forty Days or more before the Sitting, to the end that Preparations might be had for the considering the arduous and urgent affairs of the Realm. And Sir Edward saith it was

an ancient custom in Parliament, in the beginning thereof, to appoint a select Committee to consider of the Bills in the two preceding last Parliaments that passed both Houses, or either of them, and such as had been preferred, read, or committed, and to take out of them such as were most profitable for the Commonwealth.

To these may be added a most material one, that makes un∣fortunate Congresses of Parliaments, viz. When the Members come up, with strong Resolutions to provide Remedies for some Grievances, either real or surmised, and at the same time the Sovereign is in great Straights, for supplies for the safety, repute, or necessary occasions of the Government; for then (as in most of the Parliaments of King Charles the First) the Houses are for redress of Grievances, before supply, how pressing and urgent soever, and do not credit the King that he will give them time to redress them, after he is supplied; and they from design, rather than this diffidence, will not suffer sup∣ply and grievances to go pari passu, Hand in Hand, as we may remember in those Parliaments, wherein the popular Men made such Harangues, that they would know whether they were Free∣men, or Slaves, or had any thing to give before they entred up∣on the giving part: The like we saw in King Charles the Second's Reign, in some of his last Parliaments, whereby all their Con∣sultations were abortive; and both the Kings had no other Ex∣pedient but Prorogation, or Dissolution; and disuse of Parlia∣ments for some Years followed.

How much happier have we been in the last Session of the Parliament, under our most Wise, Magnanimous and Gracious King, wherein no strife or contention was, but who should be forwardest to supply the necessities of the Crown, to shew all Loyal Dutifulness to their Sovereign, whereby a most dange∣rous Rebellion in both Kingdoms was the easilier crushed; and which endears them to the King, that there can be no danger, but whatever good and wholsome Laws they shall propose for the general good of the Kingdom, will find a chearful allowance by him.

How happy had our Forefathers been if King Charles the First had met with such considerate Parliaments, who by a seasona∣ble supply and compliance, might have had (without that vast effusion of Blood and Treasure) all their Grievances redressed, and the flourishing State of the Kingdom preserved, and the Memories of a great many Noblemen and Gentlemen had been transmitted without stain to their remote Nephews.

But to draw towards a Conclusion of this Discourse, Some that may not be willing to hear of the Miscarriages of some Par∣liaments, wherein probably they were concerned, may say, what need is there now, to bring again upon the Stage the rigorous Proceedings of the two Houses of Parliament, or more proper∣ly of the leading and designing Men in the House of Com∣mons, in the Years 1640, and 1680. since we are now happi∣ly

past these Rocks, Quicksands, and treacherous Shores.

All the World indeed must acknowledg we have a Royal, wise Pilot, who knows full well to steer the Soveraignty of the Commonweal. He hath weathered out high going Seas; so that neither their over-whelming liquid Mountains, nor the terrible Shot from the floating Castles have daunted him; mag∣nanimity, unparallel'd Courage, and an Experience be∣yond most Crowned Heads, have raised him great Trophies of his Victorious toils: He is served with sage Councils, both private and National. So that all must confess we have less cause to fear any more dangers of Hurricanes and Shipwracks.

But though we now enjoy Halcyon days, under a Sovereign, enriched with Royal abilities to the heighth of our Wishes; though he is blessed with a Parliament, as Loyal as can be de∣sired, betwixt whom there is no other Strife, but who shall out-pass the other in mutual Obligations: Yet are we secure, that no ill Exhalations may be gathered in after-Ages?

Can we expect always temperate Weather, pleasing Sunshine, and fruitful Showres? No, in small revolutions of Years we find Epidemical Diseases return; excesses of Drought, Rains, or Frosts, are often marked in our Annals, even after promising Configurations of the Coelestial Bodies.

I write not an Almanack for a Year, or Pamphlet for a time, my Design is not Infandum renovare Dolorem out of any Pique; but as much as in me lies to show from the by-past Irregulari∣ties, and Exorbitances of some Men, how Loyal, good, and Just Men may measure things by the Golden Standard of the Laws; how mischievous Practices and Principles may be ob∣viated; how every one may see what the upshot of rebellious Principles will be; how to detect, and how to avoid the same kind of Rocks and Sands in after-Ages.

I know some Persons recovered from a valitudinary Condi∣tion, love not to hear of the Torments they have undergone, nor of the Extravagances of their delirous State: Yet this should not hinder but the Healthful, and those that would a∣void the Calenture, should patiently endure to hear a Descrip∣tion of the Causes and Symptoms.

In this Discourse I have only culled out such Particulars, as I find Judicious Authors have insisted upon, against the unpre∣cedented Proceedings of some late Houses of Commons; which I think all Loyal Persons disapprove; and I believe a great many as well as my self, have heard many of the then sitting Members dislike, when things were carried with an impetu∣ous Torrent, that it was more dangerous to speak against their proceedings, or question the unlimited Power assumed by that House, than it was to speak Seditious (I had almost said Trea∣sonable) Words against the King.

Therefore I hope none of this present Honourable House of Commons (who have so signalized their Loyalty in the last Ses∣sion) will take offence at what, from such judicious Persons as

I have met with, I have delivered the Sentiments of. My inten∣tion is no ways to lessen the Rights, or necessary Privileges of that venerable Assembly; which never can be unbeneficial to the King, or People, but when Discontent, Faction, and Se∣dition hath too spreadingly infected the Electors.

The continuance of that worst of Parliaments of 1641. in their disloyal Practices so long, by the overgrowing of the Tares, which were only suffered to thrive, occasioned so much corrupt seed to be sown, as in twenty years there was no wholesom grain left. We saw too late, how by some evil Seedsmen, a fertile, but dangerous Crop was shooting up apace. It is not a little Labour, nor small diligence, will howe and weed out the Briars, Thistles, and destructive Shrubs, and poysonous Weeds, that shoot their spreading Roots so far: But I hope the great Wisdom of this Loyal Parliament, will find out ways and me∣thods to prevent the danger of their thriving in a Soil, worthy of better Plants, than any will be set by Republican Hands.

Notes

• The Oath of King Richard the Second.
• (o)

  Cl. 1. R. 2. m. 44.
• This is an additional Clause.
• (q)

  Rot. Parl. 1 H. 4. num 16, & 17.
• King Henry the Fourth's Oath.
• (r)

  Hist. Aug. fol. 194, 195. Juravit coraem Archi∣episcopo & Proceribus qui ibi aderant, quo∣niam ipsi solum ejus Juramentum audire potuerunt.
• (s)

  Praecipue miseri∣cordiam observaret, si∣cut sibi suam indul∣geat misericordiam clemens & misericors Deus.
• (t)

  Prynne's Treache∣ry and Disloyalty. Answer to the Ob∣jections about the Words Quas vulgus elegerit.
• (u)

  Freeholders Grand Inquest, b. 46. What meant by Vul∣gus. according to the Opinion of some.
• Customs chosen by the Vulgar, or Com∣mon People.
• (w)

  Glossary, p. 36.
• (x)

  Id. p. 35.
• What meant by the Community.
• (y)

  Walsingham, fol. 95. num. 20.
• (z)

  Elossary, p. 24.
• (a)

  Book of Oaths, fol. 1.
• The Oath of King Henry the Eighth. I find in the Heralds Office the words thus: Do ye grant the rightful Laws and Cusioms to be holden, and permit ye, after your Strength and Power, such Laws as to the Honour of God shall be chosen to the People, by you to be strengthned and de∣sensed? Vid in Coll. Arm. p. 60.
• Oath of Edward the Sixth.
• Oaths of Queen Ma∣ry and Queen Eliza∣beth not seen by the Author. The Oaths of King James the First, and King Charles the First. The Oath of King Charles the Second, Hist. Coronationis Caroli 2. in Colleg. Arm.
• The Oath of King James the Second.
• Considerations upon this Discourse of the Coronation Oaths.
• How the Long Par∣liament Writers would have the King part with his Prerogative in Ca∣ses of necessity only.
• (b)

  Answer to Ob∣serv. b. 76.
• That the Houses should be Judges of this Necessity.
• (c)

  Review of Ob∣servations.
• By the Arguments of the Parliamenta∣ry Writers, the So∣vereignty is not in the King, but in the People.
• (d)

  Answ. to Observ. p. 72, 73.
• The King's Nega∣tive Voice Necessa∣ry.
• (e)

  Idem, p. 136.
• That the King is not bound to con∣sent, where what is desired is more in∣convenient to the People than himself.
• The Writers for the Parliament af∣firm, That where the Houses think the Constitution of the Government is not agreeable to the Liberty of the Peo∣ple, they may alter it.
• How the Long Par∣liament voted all the Power into their own Hands.
• When Parliaments beneficial, when not.
• (f)

  Answer to Ob∣serv. p. 150.
• (g)

  10 Annal.
• Kings not to grant away their Preroga∣tives at the Impor∣tunity of Parlia∣ments.
• The fundamental Cause of Factious Members in Parlia∣ment.
• (h)

  King's Speech, 6 March, 1678.
• The Artifices used by designing People, to get such as they desired, to be elect ed.
• The Characters they gave Men of the Court-party.
• (i)

  Address, part 2. p. 2, 3.
• Papists in Masque∣rade.
• Excluding Loyal and Orthodox Gentle∣men.
• (k)

  Idem, p. 5.
• French Pensioners.
• (l)

  Address, part 3. p. 5.
• Pensioners to the King.
• (m)

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Polit. l. 3. c. 14.
• Kings never to yield what the Long Par∣liament were so ear∣nest for.
• The Care to be had in Elections.
• (n)

  4. Instit. p. 35.
• Several Cases where Parliaments succeed not well, when the King is displeased with the Two Hou∣ses.
• (o)

  Rot. Parl. 25 E. 3. num. 15. 43 E. 3. num. 1. 50 E. 3. num. 2.
• (p)

  Rot. Parl. 3 H. 6. num. 18. When Variance a∣mong the Lords.
• When no good Cor∣respondence betwixt the Lords and Com∣mons.
• Sitis insuperabiles, si fuertis inseparabiles.
• When Disagreement in the House of Commons.
• When no Prepara∣tion for the Parlia∣ment.
• When Redress of Grievances are pre∣ferred to the Sup∣ply of the King.
• The happy Harmo∣ny in the last Session of Parliament, June 1685.
• Some not willing to hear of the Miscar∣riages of Parlia∣ments, think this Discourse needless.
• Because we have a most wise King, and good Parliament.
• Yet we are not se∣cure but that in af∣ter-Ages evil Mem∣bers of Parliament may be.
• The Design of the Author in writing against the Exorbi∣tances of some.
• Some love not to hear of their Di∣stempers.
• The Author's Apo∣logy for himself.
• What evil Principles taught during the Long Parliament.