The reasonableness and certainty of the Christian religion by Robert Jenkin ...

CHAP. V. Of the Philosophy of the Heathens.

BUT besides the Religions of the Hea∣then, divers of the Philosopherss pre∣tended to something Supernatural, as Pytha∣goras, Socrates, and some others, and there∣fore it will be proper here to examin∣likewise the Justice of their Pretensions. And indeed, whatever the Original of the Heathen Philosophy were, whether from their Gods, or from themselves, if the Precepts of Philosophy amongst the Hea∣thens were a sufficient Rule of good Life, there may seem to have been little or no necessity for a Divine Revelation. But I shall prove, 1. That the Heathen Philoso∣phy was very defective and erroneous. 2. That whatever was excellent in it, was owing to the Revelations contained in the Scriptures. 3. That if it had been as ex∣cellent, and as certain, as it can be pretend∣ed to be, yet there had been great need of a Divine Revelation.

1. The Heathen Philosophy was very defective and erroneous. It was desective in point of Authority. Socrates, though he would be thought to be inspired, or supernaturally assisted, gave Men only his own word for it. Pythagoras indeed, pre∣tended

both to Prophecies and Miracles, but he was a great Magician, in the o∣pinion both of (a) Xenophon and Plutarch, and therefore whatever he did or foretold, must be ascribed to that Power, which, as it has been before declared, the Devils may have, to do strange things, and to know things done at a distance, or some time after; and his Predictions and Miracles, (even as they are related by Jamblichus) were such, as that a bare recital of them were enough to confute any Authority, which could be claimed by them. His Impostures may be seen in Diogenes Laer∣tius. And (b) Aristotle says, Epimenides foretold nothing, whatever others relate of him. And as the Philosophers had no Divine Authority for what they deliver∣ed, so their own was but of small account; they were generally rather Men of Wit and Humour, than of sound Doctrine or good Morals. And whoever reads the Lives of the Philosophers written by Dio∣genes Laertius, and the Lives of the Caesars by Suetonius, would believe the World might have been as soon reformed by the one as the other. As to the Philosophers, who after the Christian Religion appear∣ed in the World, pretended to Miracles, it is a hard matter to think the Writers of their Lives in earnest, when they re∣late them: For a Man may as well be∣lieve

the Fables of Aesop or Lucian to be true History, as the Stories in the Life of Apollonius Tyanaeus written by Philostra∣tus, or those in the Life of Isidorus writ∣ten by Damascius, an abstract whereof we have left preserved (c) in Photius.

The Heathen Philosophy was defective likewise in point of Antiquity and Promulga∣on. Philosophy, as far as we have any account of it, was but a late thing; so it is styl∣ed in Tully (d), neque ante Philosophiam pa∣tefactam, quae nuper inventa est. (e) Sene∣ca computes the rise of it to be less than a thousand years before his own time; but the moral and useful part of Philo∣sophy, had no ancienter Original than So∣crates. And Philosophy of all kinds, has always been a matter of Learning, and confined to learned Men: There never was any one Nation of Pythagoraeans, or Platonists, or Stoicks, or Aristotelians; the greatest part of the Nations of the World, never heard so much as of the Names of the most celebrated Philosophers, and know nothing at all of their Do∣ctrine.

That philosophy was defective in its Doctrines is notorious: For, as Lactanti∣us observes, the very Name of philosophy (invented by Pythagoras, who yet would be thought to have had some supernatural assistance) implies a confession of Igno∣rance,

or imperfection of their Knowledge, and a profession only to search after Wis∣dom. And (f) Pythagoras gave this very reason why he styled himself a Philoso∣pher, Because no Man can be Wise but God only, and yet this vain Man some∣times pretended himself to be a God. So∣crates was the first of all the Philosophers that applied himself to the study of Mo∣rality; and (*) he, who first undertook to render philosophy useful and benefi∣cial to Mankind, professed to know no∣thing at all certainly, but to disprove the Errors of others, not to establish or disco∣ver Truth: In which he was followed by Plato; and before him, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and almost all the ancient Philosophers, agreed in this, tho they agreed in few things else, that they could attain to no certain knowledge of things. So that, as Tully says, Arcesilas was not the Founder of a new Academy, or Sect of Philosophers, who professed to doubt of all things, for he taught no more than what the ancient Philosophers had ge∣nerally taught before him, unless it were that Socrates profess'd to know his own ignorance of things, but Arcesilas would not own himself certain of so much as that. Indeed the notions of Philosophy were so little convincing, even in the plainest matters, that many of the great∣est

Wits took up in Sceptiscim, or little better. No man had studied all the Hy∣potheses of Philosophy more, or understood them better, or had better explained them than Tully, and yet at last all concluded in uncertainty, as he often professes: the like may be said of Varro, Cotta, and o∣thers.

The Doctrine of Philosophy concerning God and Providence, and a Future State, was very imperfect and uncertain, as So∣crates himself declared just before his death: but what could be certain to him, that profest to doubt of every thing; (g) Varro computed near three hundred Opinions con∣cerning the Summum Bonum; they were so far from being able to give any certain rules and directions for the Government of our Lives, that they could by no means agree in what the chief happiness of men consists, or what the aim and design of our Actions ought to be. Plato taught the lawfulness and expediency of mens hav∣ing their Wives in common; and both Socrates and Cato must hold a community of Wives lawful, as we learn from their Practice: for they lent out their Wives to others, as if it had been a very gene∣rous and friendly Act, and the very heighth and perfection of their Philosophy. (h) It was a practice both among the Grceks and Romans, to part with their Wives to o∣ther

men; though Mercer thinks the Ro∣mans were divorced from their Wives be∣fore others took them; because Cato is blam∣ed for taking his Wife again after the death of Hortensius, without the solemnity of a new Marriage. Fornication was so far from being disallowed by the Hea∣thens, that it was rather recommended (h) as a remedy against Adulteries by Cato himself. Many of the Philosophers held self-murther lawful, and did them∣selves set an example of it to their Fol∣lowers. The exposing of Children to be starved, or otherwise destroyed, was pra∣ctised amongst the most civilized Heathen Nations; and it being foretold half a year before the Birth of Augustus, that a King of the Romans would be born that year, the Senate made a Decree, (i) Nequis illo anno genitus educareter. (k) Plutarch him∣self says, that he could find nothing unjust or dishonest in the Laws of Lycurgus, tho Theft, community of Wives, and the mur∣thering of such Infants, as they saw weak and sickly, and therefore thought they would prove unfit to serve the common∣wealth, were a part of those Laws.

Revenge was esteemed not only lawful but honourable, and a desire of popular Fame and Vain Glory were reckoned among the Virtues of the Heathens, and were the greatest motive and encitement they had

to any other Vertue. (l) Plutarch tells us of Aristides so famed for Justice, that tho he were strictly just in private affairs, yet in things of publick concernment, he made no scruple to act according as the present condi∣tion of the Common-wealth seemed to re∣quire. For it was his Maxim that in such cases Justice must give way to expediency: and he gives an instance, how Aristides ad∣vised the Athenians to act contrary to their most solemn contract and oath, imprecating upon himself the punishment of the perjury to avert it from the Common-wealth. Tully, in the Third Book of his Offices, where he treats of the strictest Rules of Justice, and proposes so many admirable Examples of it, yet resolves the notion of Justice only into a principle of Honour, upon which he concludes, that no man should do a dishonest Action, though he could conceal it both from God and Men, and determines that an Oath is but an Appeal to a man's own Mind or Consci∣ence. Cum vero jurato dicenda sententia sit, meminerit Deum se adhibere testem, id est (ut arbitror) mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit ipse Deus divinius.

The Indians themselves, whatever may be thought to the contrary, have natural∣ly as good Sense and Parts as other peo∣ple; which (m) Acosta sets himself to prove in divers instances: but they had

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less communication with those, who retain∣ed revealed Religion; and by their own vices and the subtilty of the Devil, the No∣tions, which they had received from it, were lost or perverted.

The Egyptians, who were so famous for their Learning, are a great instance how poor a thing humane Reason is without the Assistance of Divine Revelation: for all their profound Learning did but lead them to the grossest Idolatry, whilst they conceived God to be only an Anima Mandi, and therefore to be worshipped in the seve∣ral parts and species of the Universe. The Stoicks in effect held the same Er∣ror, and taught (n), that there is nothing incorporeal▪ But when the excellency of the Christian Morals began to be so gene∣rally observed and taken notice of, the last Refuge of Philosophy was in the Mo∣ral Doctrines of the Stoicks▪ For almost all the latter Philosophers were of this Sect, which they refined and improved as well as they were able that they might have some∣thing to oppose to the Morality taught, (and practised too) by the Christians (o). But the Ancient Stoicks had been the Pa∣trons and Advocates of the worst vices, and had filled the Libraries with their ob∣scene Books.

II. The Stoicks first sprang from the Cy∣nicks, that impudent and beastly Sect of Philosophers, and they refined themselves but by degrees. Zeno, who had as great Honour done him by the Athenians, as ever any Philosopher had, under the No∣tion of his Vertue, taught that men ought to have their Wives in common, and would have been put to death by the Laws of most Nations for sins against Nature. (p) Chrysippus taught the worst of Incest, as that of Fathers with their Daugh∣ters, and of Sons with their Mothers; and besides his opinion for eating humane Flesh, and the like; his Books were filled with such obscene Discourses, as no modest man could read. Athenodorus a Stoick, be∣ing Library-keeper at Pergamus, cut all such ill Passages out of the Books of the Stoicks, but he was discovered, and those Passages were inserted again. But these Philosophers might do as they pleased; for they pretended to be exempt from sin, and the stoical Philosophy in the Origi∣nal fundamental Doctrines of it is nothing, as Tully observed, but a vain pomp and boast of words, which at first raise admi∣ration, but when throughly considered are ridiculous; as that men must live without love or hatred, or anger, or any other passion; that all sins are equal, and that it is the same Crime whether a man mur∣ther

his Father or kill a Cock, (*) as Tully says, if there be no occasion for it. And it is no wonder that Plutarch and others wrote purposely to expose the stoical Philosophy, upon its old and genuine principles: but the latter Stoicks being very sensible of the many defective and indesensible parts of their philosophy endeavoured to mollify what seemed too harsh and absurd, that they might bring their own as near the Christian Doctrine as they could. Quin∣ctilian will not allow, that Seneca was any great Philosopher, but says that his main talent lay in declaiming against vice, (q) in Philosophia parum diligens, egregius tamen vitiorum insectator suit. It was ra∣ther the Art and Design of Seneca, who knew wherein the strength and defects of his Philosophy lay, to endeavour to give it all the advantage he could, and to re∣commend it to the world by exposing the Follies and Vices of men, rather than by in∣structing them in the Notions of his own Sect. But (r) this notwithstanding was one of his Rules, nonnunquam & usque ad ebrie∣tatem veniendum, and when he had expos'd the cruelties, the filthiness, and the absurdi∣ties of the Religions in use amongst the Heathens, in a Book written upon that sub∣ject; yet, says he, (s) quae omnia sapiens servabit, tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam Diis grata. And Tully likewise in divers

places, when he has reasoned against the ab∣surdities of their Religion, resolves the obli∣gation to observe it into the Duty which men are bound to pay the Laws of the Go∣vernment, under which they live: their Philosophy, it seems, taught them, that we must obey Men rather than God. But they held no more than (t) Socrates had taught and practised before them, Epictetus him∣self, who has set off the Heathen Morality to the best advantage, cannot be excused from as great errors and defects. He teach∣es also, that men should follow the Reli∣gion of their Country, whatever it be. Enchirid. cap. xxxviii. He allows too great indulgence to lust, cap. xlvii. And when he proposes Rules of Vertue, and cautions to arm men against Vice and Temptation, how much short doth he fall of the Christi∣an Doctrine? If any man, says he, tell you, that such an one hath spoken ill of you, make no Apollogy for your self, but answer,

He did not know my other faults, or else he would not have charged me with these only, cap xlviii.

This is a sine saying, a pretty turn of thought, but what is there in it comparable to that aweful and sacred Promise, Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you—rejoyce and be exceeding glad, for great is your re∣ward in Heaven, Mat. v. 11, 12. Again,

when a man values himself, says Epicte∣tus,

for being able to understand and ex∣plain the Books of Chrysippus, say you to your self, unless Chrysippus had writ∣ten obscurely, this man would have had nothing to boast of. But what do I design? To study Nature, and follow it?

cap. lxxiii. This is no ill Satyr upon the va∣nity of men; but is there any thing in it like that Piety and Authority, with which St. Paul reproves the same vice? 1 Cor. viii. 1.2, 3. The best thing that can be said of the Heathen Philosophers is, that most of them frequently confest the great imperfection of their Philosophy, and pla∣ced their greatest wisdom in this, That they were more sensible than others of their ignorance: and Socrates profest that to be the Reason, why the Oracle of A∣pollo declared him to be the wisest man, because he knew how ignorant he was, better than other men did. As to the Chinese Philosophy we know little of it, their (u) Books of Philosophy being all de∣stroyed at the command of a Tyrant, who reigned about two hundred years before Christ: from the Fragments which were af∣terwards gathered up, and yet remain a∣mong them, we can only perceive that Confucius, and the rest of their best Philo∣sophers taught no more than what they had learnt by Tradition from their Ancestors; and when they forsook this Tradition they

fell into the grossest errors, which are main∣tained by the learned men amongst them at this day.

II. Whatever there is of excellency in the Philosophy of the Heathens is owing to Revelation. It is generally supposed, that humane Reason could have discovered the more common and obvious Precepts of Mo∣rality, contained in the Scriptures; but it is more probable, that it could not have disco∣vered most of them, if we may judge by the gross absurdities, which we find as to some particulars, in the best Systems of Heathen Philosophy, and from the gene∣ral practice of offering up men for sacri∣fices to their Gods, and of casting away and exposing their Children in the most civilized Nations. But it is evident from what has been already proved at large, that the Heathens were not left destitute of many helps and advantages from the Scriptures, which divers of the Philoso∣phers had read: and many things, which seem now to be deductions from natural Reason might have their Original from Revelation: for things once discovered seem easie and obvious to men, which they would never have been able to dis∣cover of themselves. We wonder now, how men should ever suppose there could be no Antipodes, and are apt to admire how America could lie so long concealed,

rather than how it came at last to be discovered: and the case is the same in many other Discoveries, especially in mo∣ral Truths, which are so agreeable to Rea∣son, that they may seem the natural Pro∣ductions of it, though a contrary custom and inclination, and the subtlety of Satan working upon our depraved Nature might perhaps have made it very difficult, if not impossible, without a Revelation, to discern many Doctrines even of Morality, which now are most common and fami∣liar to us: What Maxim is more agree∣able, and therefore, as one would think, more obvious to humane Reason, than that every man should do to others, as he would have them do to him? And yet Spartianas an Heathen Historian says, that Alexander Severus had this excellent rule of natural Justice and Equity either from the Jews or Christians. There is no Book of Scripture which seems to contain plainer and more obvious things, than the Proverbs of Solomon, and (x) yet an Au∣thor of great Learning and Judgment has given an Essay, how a considerable de∣fect of Learning may be supplyed out of this very Book, producing such cautions, instructions, and axioms from thence, re∣lating to the business and government of humane Life, in all varieties of occasion, as are no where else to be met withal.

No man can tell, how far humane Rea∣son could have proceeded without Reve∣lation, since it never was without it, but always argued from those Principles, which were at first delivered by God himself to Noah, and were propagated amongst his Posterity throughout all Ages and Nati∣ons, though they were more corrupted and depraved in some Ages and Nations than in others.

(y) Plato derives the Original of all Laws from Revelation, and the Doctrines of Morality of the most ancient Philoso∣phers were a kind of Cabbala, consisting of general Maxims and Proverbs without argument or deduction from Principles; and it is the same thing at this day in those Countries, where Aristotle's Philosophy has not prevailed, who was one of the first that undertook to argue closely from Principles in Morality. And in other parts of Phi∣losophy, I shall prove by some remarkable instances, that humane reason failed them in the explication of things which were generally received and acknowledged. The existence of God is clearly and un∣answerably demonstrated by Tully, and (z) the Unity of the God-head is as plain∣ly asserted by him; with what strength of Reason, with what plainness, with what assurance doth (a) Balbus the Stoick speak concerning the existence of the Dei∣ty,

but when he would explain the Divine Nature, he describes a mere Anima Mundi, and exposes himself to the scorn and laugh∣ter of his Adversary; which shews, that humane Reason could go no further, than to discover the existence of God, and that we can know little of his nature but by Revelation, and that whatsoever true and just notions the Heathens had of the Di∣vine Nature must be chiefly ascribed to that.

That the world was created, the Philo∣sophers before Aristotle generally asserted, and that Water was the first matter out of which it was formed, is acknowledged by (b) Aristotle, to be esteemed the most ancient opinion; but when he set himself to argue the point, he concluded the world to be eternal, which, according to modern Philosophy, is as absurd and im∣possible as any thing that can be imagi∣ned

The Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, was delivered down from all Antiquity, as Tully assures us, but the Antients gave no reasons to prove it by, they only re∣ceived it by Tradition: Plato was the first who attempted to prove it by Argument: for though Pherecydes Syrus, and Pythago∣ras had asserted it, yet they acquiesced in Tradition, by which they had received it from the Eastern Nations; but Plato,

(as it is generally supposed) conversing with the Jews in Egypt, or at his com∣ing into Italy, being there acquainted (c) with the Doctrine of the Souls immorta∣lity amongst other notions of the Pytha∣goreans, began to argue upon it, but not being able to make it fully out, has on∣ly shewn how far reason could proceed upon those grounds, which were then known in the world from Revelation. Se∣neca, (d) tho he sometimes asserts the im∣mortality of the Soul, yet at other times doubts of it, and even denies that the Soul has any subsistence in a separate State. And yet this Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, which the greatest of the Heathen Philosophers could not certainly prove from reason, was firmly believed even amongst (e) Barbarians.

(f) Confucius, the famous Chinese Philo∣sopher, profest himself not the Author, but the Relater only of the Doctrine which he taught, as he had received it delivered down from all Antiquity, and (g) Aristotle has declared, that the Ancients left many Tra∣ditions, which their Posterity had corrupt∣ed, but from the remains of those Traditi∣we know that they were originally derived from Revelation. The first of the Philoso∣phers that taught the immortality of the Soul was (h) Pherecydes and he left his Writings to Thales, from whence he had the

notion, that all things were produced from water. Pythagoras was a Scholar of Phere∣cydes, and Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle conversed with the Learned Jews. (i) So∣crates disputed of a future State from Tra∣dition, and (k) profest that he always fol∣lowed the Tradition which had descended from Antiquity, and that he was at a loss whenever that failed him. (l) And this Tradition could not have its Rise from the Greeks, who were confest to understand lit∣tle or nothing of Antiquity. The notions in Philosophy of the latter Heathens, were much improved by Ammonius, a Christ∣ian and a Teacher of Philosophy at Alexan∣dria. And we find that upon the propa∣gation of the Gospel, Moral Philosophy in a few years attained to greater per∣fection than ever it had done before, as we may see in the works of Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, M. Antoninus, Maximus Tyrius, and others.

We may therefore reasonably conclude that the Precepts and Rules of Morality, which Philosophers all along taught, had their original from Revelation, rather than from the strength and sagacity of their own reason; because they err in things no less obvious to natural reason, and it appears that they had opportunities of becoming acquainted with the Scriptures, and that they spared no pains either by reading or con∣versation,

in their own, or in foreign Countries, in their search and enquiries after truth.

III. If the Heathen Philosophy had been as certain and excellent, as it can be pretend∣ed to be, yet there had been great need of a Divine Revelation. For, 1. The rules of Philosophy lie scattered up and down in large and learned works, mixt with many wrong and absurd notions, and therefore must be in great measure useless; how cer∣tain and excellent soever they may be in themselves, they can be no rule of Life to us. No perfect rule of Manners is to be found in any one Author; and if it were possible to compile such a rule out of them all, yet what man is able to collect them? (m) Lanctantius is of opinion, that if all the truths dispersed up and down among the several Sects of Philosophers could be collected together into one System, they would make up a Body of Philosophy a∣greeable to the Christian Doctrine, but then he concludes it to be impossible for any man to make such a collection, without a supernatural Assistance. And if there were no other reason for it but this, it is no won∣der that we find (n) the XII Tables pre∣ferred before all the Writings of the Philo∣sophers. If there be nothing so absurd, as Tully says, but the Philosophers have taught it, then it is necessary that men

should not be left to the uncertainties and absurdities of Philosophy: for tho some few of them might be free from such ex∣travagancies, yet their Notions were no Rule or Standard to the rest, and the best were not without many great Er∣rors.

2. The Rules of Philosophy were no better than good Advice, and carried no Authority with them to oblige men in Con∣science; they had not the force of a Law, and failing in this necessary point, what∣ever their intrinsick worth had been, they never could have had that effect upon the Lives of men, which Revealed Religion has. Vertue was propounded by Philoso∣phers rather as a matter of Honor and De∣cency, than of strict Duty; those were esteemed and admired indeed that observed it, but such as did not, only wanted that commendation. Some Philosophers spoke great and excellent things, but they past ra∣ther for wise sayings, than for Laws of Na∣ture: their own Reputation, which was greater or less with different sorts of men, was the only Authority they had: it might be prudence to do as they taught, but there appeared no absolute necessity for it. They commonly represented Vertue as very lovely, with many very great and powerful charms, and all that were of another mind, did not know a true Beauty, and that was

an intolerable disgrace: the Sanction of Re∣wards and Punishments in the next Life was little insisted upon by them. They recommended Vertue for it's own sake, not as it is enjoyed by God, and will be re∣warded by him, and the contrary punished; and those, who could not soar to their Heights, were rather the worse than the better for such Doctrines, which they look∣ed upon as the impracticable speculations of some, who had a mind to speak great things. And they often spoke the Truth indeed, which they had from Tradition, or from the excellency of their own Wit and Genius, but they were not able to make it out by any such Principles, as are wont to influence and govern humane Actions. Accordingly we find, that as the several Sects of Philo∣sophy suited to the Tempers and Humors of particular men, so far they prevailed, and no farther. The curious and inquisitive be∣took themselves, to the Academicks, the soft and effeminate to the Epicureans, and the Morose to the Stoicks; men applyed themselves to what ever opinion they liked best, and found most agreeable to their Na∣ture and Disposition. Thus a severe and haughty Gravity made up the Composition of Cato; it had been hard for him to avoid the being a Stoick, and he might probably have founded that Sect, if it had not been known in the World before. The Philosophers

had no Authority to promise rewards or to threaten punishments upon the ob∣servation or neglect of their Precepts, and therefore every man was at his li∣berty to chuse or to reject what they taught, and divers of them were sensi∣ble of this unavoidable defect in all hu∣mane Doctrines, and therefore pretended to Revelation.

There is no inconvenience therefore in supposing, that many of the Precepts contained in the Proverbs, and other Books of Scripture might be known without a Revelation: for there is not∣withstanding very good Reason, why they should be inserted into the Scrip∣ture; Because the Scriptures have the Authority of a Divine Law, and are to be looked upon, not as a System of Ethicks, or a Collection of Moral Precepts, but as a Body of Laws given out upon Divers occasions and as Rules of In∣struction, which at the same time both shew us our Duty, and command our O∣bedience. It is not expected that Kings in their Laws shouid argue more profound∣ly than other men do, but they should command more effectually than others can teach; they do not dispute, but pro∣nounce and dictate, what their subjects must take notice of at their peril. And it is no diminution to a Princes Authority

to command the most known and obvious things, though it may be a fault in the sub∣ject to need such commands. And God in his word did not design to furnish us with a Treatise of Philosophy, to gratify our cu∣riosity, with strange and new notions, and make us profound Scholars; but to speak to the necessities of men, and put them in mind of known Duties, to appeal to their own Consciences, and to enforce those notions of Good and Evil, which natural reason perhaps might suggest to them, by the authority of a re∣vealed Religion, and a Divine Law, established upon Rewards and Punish∣ments.

3. Though the Philosophers were able to discern something more than other men, yet they durst not openly declare what they knew, but were over-born with the errors and vices the Times and Countries in which they lived, even to the Commission of Idolatry, and the worst of vices, and therefore their Do∣ctrines whatever they were, could do but lit∣tle good towards the reformation of the World. I shall not enquire into the Re∣ports concerning Socrates and Plato, Sene∣ca and Cato himself, but only observe that Socrates, who was the only Martyr among the Philosophers, for the truth, yet when he comes to die, speaks with no assurance

of a Future State, and ordered a Cock to be sacrificed to Aesoulapius, which can hard∣ly be reconciled to that Doctrine, for for which he is supposed to die. And after his Death, how did his Friends and Disciples behave themselves? Did they openly and courageously vindicate his in∣nocence, and teach the Doctrine for which he suffered? Did they not use all means to conceal and dissemble it? But Man∣kind stood in need of a perfect example of Virtue, and of such instructors, as should both teach and practise the Do∣ctrines of it at their utmost peril, and of a succession of such Men, as should bear Testimony to their Doctrine, both by the Miracles wrought during their Lives, and by the constancy of their Deaths.

4. As the Heathen Philosophy wanted the Authority of a Law, and the exam∣ple of those who taught it; so it wanted principal Motives to recommend the pra∣ctice of it to the Lives of Men. The Philosophers teach nothing of the exceed∣ing Love of God towards us; of his desire of our happiness, and his readiness to as∣sist and conduct us in the ways of Virtue. They owned no such thing as Divine Grace and Assistance towards the attainment of Vertue, and the perseverance in it.— (o) Virtutem autem nemo unquam acceptam Deo retulit, nimirum recte: propter virtutem e∣nim

jure laudamur, & in virtute recte glo∣riamur, quod non contingeret, si id donum a Deo, non a nobis haberemus—nam quis, quod bonus vir esset, gratias Diis egit un∣quam—Jovem{que} optimum maximum ob eas res appellant, non quod justos, temperatos, sapi∣entes efficiat, sed quod salvos, incolumes, opu∣lentos, copiosos. This occasioned those (p) insolent Boasts of the Stoicks, equaling themselves to the Gods, and sometimes e∣ven preferring themselves before them, be∣cause they had difficulties to encounter, which made their conquests of vice, and their improvements in virtue more glori∣ous, than they supposed the like excel∣lencies to be in their Gods, who were good by the necessity of their own Na∣ture.

Wherefore, tho the Rules of Philosophy had been never so perfect, yet they must needs be ineffectual, being so difficult to find out, and so unactive and dead, when they were discovered, without that Authority, and Life, and Energy, that may be had from Divine Revelation, which there was a necessity for, not only to supply the imper∣fections, and correct the errors of Philoso∣phy, but to enforce the Doctrines of it, tho they had been never so true and perfect.

Notes

• (a)

  Xe∣noph. Epist. ad Aeschinem Plutarch. in Numâ.
• (b)

  Arist. Rhet. l. iii. c. 17.
• (c)

  Phot. Cod. ccxiii
• (d)

  Tull. de Divin. lib. i.
• (e)

  Apud Lactant. de fals. sa∣pient. c. 16.
• (f)

  Diog. Laert. in Pythag. Jemblich. vit. Py∣thag.
• (*)

  Tull. Acad. Qu. lib. i.
• Vid. Diog. Laert. in Pyrrhon.
• (g)

  Aug. de Civ. l. 19. c. 1.
• (h)

  Alex. ab Alex. lib. l. c. 24.
• (h)

  Horat. Serm. lib. i. sat. 2. Cic. pro. M. Coelio.
• (i)

  Sueton. August. c. 94.
• (k)

  Plu∣tarch in Lycurg.
• (l)

  Plut. in Aristide.
• (m)

  Jos. Acost. Hist lib. iv. c. 1.
• (n)

  Tull. Acad. Qu. lib. i.
• (o)

  Theo∣phil. ad Autolych. lib. iii.
• (p)

  Diog. Laert. in Zenon. & Chrysipp.
• (*)

  Tul••. pro Mu∣raena.
• (q)

  Quint. l••st. lib. x. c. 18.
• (r)

  Seu de Tranqu. Animi. c. 15.
• (s)

  Aug. Civit. Dei lib. vi. c. x.
• (t)

  Xeno∣phen. Me∣morab. lib. 1.
• (u)

  Con∣fuc. lib. iii. Par. 4. p. 36. & Philippi ••••uplet Prooem. Declar.
• (x)

  Ld. Bacon Ad∣vance of Learning B. viii. c. 2.
• (y)

  Plat. de Legib. Dialog. 1.
• (z)

  Tull. de Legib. lib. 1.
• (a)

  Tull. de Natur. Deor. lib. 2 ii.
• (b)

  Arist, de coelo lib. i. c. 10. Metaphys. lib. i. c. 3.
• (c)

  Tull. Tusc. Qu. lib. i.
• (d)

  Epist. 54.102.
• (e)

  Grot. de verit. lib. i. Anot.
• (f)

  Con∣suc. lib. iii. Part. 4. p. 36.
• (g)

  Arist. Metaph. lib. xii. c. 8.
• (h)

  Tull. Tusc. Qu. lib. i.
• (i)

  Plat. Phaed.
• (k)

  Plat. Phileb.
• (l)

  Plat. Timae.
• (m)

  Lact. de vit. Beat c. 7.
• (n)

  Tull. de Orat. lib. i.
• (o)

  Tull. de Nat. D••or. lib. iii.
• (p)

  Sen E∣pist. 53.