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Sir, I did give an account unto Mr. C. in a Letter to him, which I know was suf∣ficient, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
The vanity of this brag you will soon acknowledge, when you shall compare that Letter with this unto me; for in this you apply the second reason unto the latter cause
as a congruent proof; it it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly: And this you point out to be your meaning, and say, That I could easily have un∣derstood it: But in your Letter to Mr. C. you aver, that this second reason is ap∣pliable onely unto the first clause; That every man is inclined to evil, some more, some less, &c. and not at all unto the second; nay, that it is not appliable unto it, with∣out a mistake of not onely the second, but the four other reasons also; and of this too, you say that it must be your meaning, and that 'tis clear enough, and easie in the expression; and you wonder that Mr. Jeanes, if he be the man, that he would be thought could mistake it: Here you propound inconsistent and contrary meanings, and it seems you intend to tie me unto such hard meat, as that I must finde out each to be your meaning; but this is a task, that my understanding cannot perform, and therefore I shall beg assistance from the light and learning of yours: and until you afford this, I shall offer unto your consideration this common rule in Logick, That contrary propositions cannot be both true, but one of them must needs be false: But these two propositions, this second reason is referred unto the second clause, as a competent proof, and this second reason is not referred unto the second clause, are contrary propositions; the opposition betwixt singular propositions, being, as Scheibl••r well sheweth, de prop: cap. 11. num. 18. most aptly reducible unto contrariety; and yet both these propositions are yours, the first in this letter, the latter in your former letter, and therefore one of them must needs be false; you are not then so much 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, extra teli factum, out of Gun-shot, but that my poor trifling Logick is able to reach you: if you should deny the matter of Fact, that both these propositions, are yours, your letters will convince you of untruth, and I shall need no more then to transcribe your own words: The first Proposition you have in these words of this Letter, To be inclined to evil, is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly, viz. of nature, &c. a sin natural and necessary; now that it is not this, I do suppose that reason, which you so misconstrued, is competent, &c. The second, in several passages of your former Letter; as for the other clause, it is an effect, or condition of nature, but no sin properly, that was the less principal part of the Proposition, and to it one∣ly the first reason was apportioned; and again afterward, none of the other reasons, the first onely excepted, relate to the latter part of the Proposition: But let us hear your reason for the sufficiency of your Letter unto Mr. C.