Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.

THE Third BOOK OF Liberty, Fortune, Destiny and Divination.

CHAP. I. What Liberty or Free-Will is.

AFter we have examined the moral Virtues, we must speak something of Destiny, Fortune and of Free-will, which some esteem to be Causes, others to be Modes or manner how certain Causes act, and others to be nothing but empty Names, vain and imaginary Notions; we must, I say, speak some∣thing, and the rather, because according as they are received or rejected, Virtues and Vices will be allow∣ed or not allowed, and consequently our Actions may deserve praise or blame, rewards or punish∣ments; for 'tis most certain that there is nothing either commendable or blame-worthy, but what is

done freely and with deliberation; and that what ever is done by Chance or out of Necessity, is neither to be commended nor condemned. This being unquestionable, the first thing that we have to do, is to examin wherein Liberty or Free-will consists, what is Fortune and Destiny, that so we may the better understand how Fortune and Li∣berty either contradict, or may agree with De∣stiny.

To begin therefore with Liberty: And here 'tis to be understood, that we mean not precisely such a Liberty as is taken in opposition to Slavery, that which relates properly to the Body, and is describ∣ed a power of living as we please; but we mean that which the Greeks were wont to name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, id quod in nobis, seu penes nos, nostrove in arbitrio potestateque situm est, that which is in us, within our Power or Free-will; namely, something which is in the Soul, and is not under Bondage to any ex∣ternal Master; or if I may make use of the words of Epictetus, That which cannot by any means be hin∣dered, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as if we should say, A full and en∣tire Power or Liberty to do any thing. The Latins, and chiefly the Divines, call it commonly liberum aribitrium, Free-will, and sometimes liberale arbi∣trium.

Upon which we must observe, First, That this is given to Reason, or which is the same thing, to the Understanding; because Reason is look'd upon as an Arbitrator between Parties, or as a Judge, to examin, to consult and deliberate, and at last to decide as the Judgment is sway'd, upon what we ought or ought not to do in a doubtful Case.

Secondly, That as soon as the Consultation and Deliberation are concluded, Reason hath indeed elected and chosen one thing preferrable before another, which she hath conceived or believed to

be the best; the Appetite or the Function of the Appetite, will immediatly follow.

Thirdly, That by this word Appetite, I under∣stand the reasonable Appetite, and that which is peculiar and proper to Man alone, as Reason is, be∣cause we shall hereafter indifferently make use of these Terms, Will and Appetite, meaning the rea∣sonable Appetite.

Fourthly, That because the Action of the moving Faculty, which is properly the pursuit of that which is good, follows the Appetite, or as we commonly speak, the Will, the Faculty being ta∣ken for the Action; that Action of the moving Faculty is for that reason termed Voluntary, as if one should say, willingly undertaken; that is, with Deliberation and Consultation.

Fifthly, That Reason or Free-will is supposed in Man to be so free, that of the several things which come under his Deliberation, there is nothing he chuseth but he hath at the same time an equal li∣berty of refusing it and making choice of something else.

Truly, we usually ascribe this Liberty to the Will, or to the reasonable Appetite, which signi∣fies the same thing; for we all agree, that the Ori∣ginal of Liberty is in Reason, which we common∣ly call Understanding, that is to say, in the intel∣lective Power; for we usually hold, that the Will is a Faculty or Power of it self blind, which can∣not incline to any thing till the Understanding goes before and holds forth, if I may so say, a Light be∣fore it: So that 'tis the Property of the Under∣standing to precede and enlighten, and of the Will to follow. So that it cannot easily be turned out of the Path it hath taken, until the Under∣standing first turns the Light, which directs it, that way. Liberty therefore seems by consequence to

be first and primarily in the Understanding, and se∣cundarily or dependantly in the Will.

To open the Matter a little more clearly. The Nature of Liberty seems, first, to consist in an in∣differency, by which the Faculty which is named Free may incline or not incline to any thing; and this is called Liberty of Contradiction; or incline in such a manner to any thing, as it may equally incline it self to the contrary; and this is called Liberty of Contrariety: And in truth, as we can∣not imagin any Liberty without a Faculty, free to chuse, 'tis certain that there neither is nor can be any Choice but where there is an indifferency, be∣cause where there is but one thing proposed, or where the Faculty is resolved and determinated to act or to pursue any certain thing, there can be no Choice nor Election; which supposeth at least two things, whereof the one is to be preferr'd be∣fore the other.

I know some are of Opinion, that the Will is then principally and altogether free, when it is so fixed and resolved on any certain thing, suppose, for Example, the sovereign or chief Good and Happiness, that it cannot be bent or diverted to any other thing, that is to say, to Evil; because, say they, the actual love, the pursuance, the enjoy∣ment of this Good or Happiness is altogether Vo∣luntary, and by consequence altogether Free. But I know not whether they take notice enough, that there is this difference between a willing Action and a free Action; for a willing or spontaneous A∣ction is nothing else but a certain propensity or im∣pulse of Nature, which impulse may be effected without any Reasoning; whereas the free Action supposeth and depends upon some Reasoning, Exa∣mination, Judgment or Choice preceding.

And to prove that a spontaneous Action is a certain impulse or propensity of Nature, they in∣stance in Children and Brutes, unto whom they never attribute the use of Reason or Liberty, yet they perform many things sponte; and this is said also of things inanimate, as of a Stone, that it falls down sponte, of its own accord; or of Fire, that it ascends sponte; so that fiery sponte and fieri natura seem to be the same thing.

Thus as the Appetite inclines of its own Nature to Good, 'tis no wonder that we should say that 'tis carried sponte of its own accord: For as a Stone, because it falls sponte, or of its own Nature down∣ward, cannot of it self rise upwards: So because the Appetite is carried of its own Nature to Good, it cannot of it self incline nor lean to Evil: Be∣sides, as the Stone, because 'tis settled to a Motion downwards hath not an indifferency for such a Mo∣tion, or for a Motion upwards: So the Appetite, because 'tis fixed on Good, is not indifferent to what is Good, nor indifferent to what is Evil. Lastly, as the Stone, for want of that indifferency to either of the Motions, is truly said to move sponte, of its own accord, but not freely or with liberty down∣ward: So the Appetite, for want of this indiffer∣ency to Good or Evil, is truly said to move sponte, of its own accord, but not with liberty to what is Good in General.

Therefore if you suppose that the Will is in such a manner fixed, for Example, on the Sove∣reign Good or Happiness, that it cannot by for∣saking it, be turned aside to follow another Object, it will be truly reputed to be inclined to it sponte, but not freely, because 'tis not indifferent to that Good or to another; and that 'tis not in its Power to incline to another and forsake that.

'Tis certain, that it inclines willingly, volens and without Reluctancy and Opposition; but this kind of Will which we might name Volentia, if it were lawful to make use of this word, bespeaks not Li∣berty, but Propensity, Complacency, libentiam, collu∣bescentiam, and consequently an exclusion of all Constraint, Violence, Repugnancy or Opposition. So that if the Pursuit or actual Love and Affection for this Good is said to be altogether Voluntary, we must not therefore infer, that it is altogether free, but only that 'tis summè libitus, if I may be permitted to make use of this Term, or libens al∣together willing, because libentia may be without any indifferency, but not libertas.

Now it behoves us to consider that what is usu∣ally spoken among the Divines, That 'tis impossible that the Will, such as is that of the glorified Saints, which enjoys fully and knowingly the Sovereign Happiness, should forsake that Good to embrace another; it concerns us, I say, to make this Ob∣servation, because it seems this may discover to us what that indifferency is, in which the Nature of the Liberty or Free-will of this mortal Life con∣sists.

We took notice before, that the Understanding bears the Light before the Will; and it is certain, that this Torch or Light is nothing else but the Judgment that the Understanding makes upon things that are Good or Evil, declaring that this is Good and that Evil; that of these two Good or Evil things, this is the greater, that the less. So that when the Will is said to be diverted from the one and inclined to the other, this happens because the Judgment is sometimes for one and sometimes for th' other, and that the Flection of the Will is conformable to that of the Understanding.

Thus, because the Understanding is often un∣constant in its Judgment, the Will is often unset∣led and wavers in its Inclination or Appetite; so that as the Understanding judges to day that one thing is Good and to morrow Evil, the Will to day loves this thing and to morrow hates it: And as it judges to day that we ought to embrace a certain thing because it is Good, and to morrow it esteems that we ought rather to embrace another, because that other appears to it better; thus the Will is inclined to day to one thing and to morrow to ano∣ther. In a word, it seems that according to the Notions that the Understanding hath of things, or according to the Judgment that it makes of them; so the Will either pursues or avoids the same.

In the same manner, because among the Good things, as among the Evil, some are true and real, others seeming or apparent, Good is sometimes dis∣guis'd with the Appearance of Evil, and Evil with that of Good. By this means the Understanding often makes a wrong Judgment; for being moved with the Appearance of Good, it judges Evil to be Good; or being moved with the Appearance of Evil, it judges Good to be Evil. In the same man∣ner, the Will often mistakes its End, because in aiming at Good and pursuing after it, it happens upon Evil; and in flying from Evil, it is disap∣pointed of some Good. Thus also the Understand∣ing mistakes the lesser Good for the greater, and the greater for the lesser; the Will by following after the greatest Good gets the less, and in flying from the lesser Evil falls into the greater.

Seeing then the Will is thus bound to follow the Understanding or its Judgment, there is no que∣stion but that the indifferency which appears in the Will, proceeds meerly and absolutely in the same manner as the indifferency of the Understanding.

Now the indifferency of the Understanding seems to consist in this, That it is not so much tied up to any Judgment that it has made of a thing which hath appeared to it true, but that it may leave it and incline to make another Judgment of the same thing if there appears in it a greater likelihood of Truth: For the Understanding is not of the num∣ber of those Faculties that are fixed to a thing, as weight in things without Life, the Faculty of Ge∣neration in the living Creatures, and so of the rest, but is naturally so flexible, that having nothing else for its Object but Truth, it may judge of things now in this manner, anon in another; and according to the Judgment it makes, may some∣times take this, sometimes that for Truth.

Therefore the Understanding may be look'd up∣on as a Balance; for as a Balance is indifferent to incline either of the Scales, and bends towards that which is most loaden; so that where there is the greater Addition of weight, it still inclines that way; thus the Understanding is indifferently in∣clined to one or other of these contrary Opinions, but is still overpoised according to the greater or less apparency of Truth. This Comparison is borrowed from Cicero, where he says, That in the same manner as the Scale of a Balance is weighed down by the weight that is put into it, thus the Mind yields to things that are plain; we cannot approve of a thing that is not plain nor manifest.

This is designed to make us comprehend that the Understanding being indifferent to follow one Judg∣ment or another, it is not nevertheless indifferent to leave a plain manifest Truth to follow after another less manifest, or to leave the Judgment that seems the truest, to embrace that which hath the less likelihood of Truth; because as a Scale weighed down by a greater weight, can never be raised by a

less weight put into the other Scale, but only by a heavier, which weighing down this, shall cause the other to be lifted up: Thus 'tis not possible that when some evident and experienc'd Truth hath prevail'd upon the Understanding to consent, that it should alter its Judgment unless upon some more weighty Reason succeeding. This chiefly appears in that we sometimes remain in suspence, pondering in doubt and in uncertainty; for this happens only because on both sides there seems to us as it were an equal weight of Truth, the equal Balance of th' one Scale hindring the rising or falling of th' other, which causeth that the Understanding leans no more to the one side than the other.

Thus if it seems to bend sometimes more to one side and sometimes to the other, this is caused by the greater Attention that it gives sometimes to one weight and sometimes to the other; and that the one draws to it as long time as the other ap∣pears not the same, but this other nevertheless draws in the same manner when it appears more strong; just as when we have pois'd a Balance even with equal weights, if you now add to one and anon take away from the other some little weights. So if the Understanding leans at last more to one side than the other, this must needs be, because something hath moved it more of that side than of the other, or rather because the Attention alone, more constant, assisted by impatience, may have procured a greater weight.

'Tis true, that sometimes the Understanding leaving the Judgment, which of it self is the truest, or absolutely true, embraces that which of it self is not so true, but absolutely false; yet that which moves the Understanding, is always the Appear∣ance of Truth which it considers in every thing; and because this Appearance may be either true or

false, it happens that what is true in it self is capa∣ble of being disguised by the Appearance of Fals∣hood, or not so true, and that which is false of it self may be covered over with an Appearance of Truth, or not so false: It happens, I say, that the Understanding may be also carried to Falshood or to that which is not so true, whiles the Falshood is veiled over with an Appearance of Truth, or of not so false, where the Truth is covered over with an Appearance of Falshood, or not so true. There∣fore as often as the Understanding being tied to a true Judgment, leaves this Judgment to follow a false one, there must have interven'd something which hath taken from the Truth its true and na∣tural Guise, and which hath given to the false a counterfeit Lustre, which hath caused the alteration in the Judgment.

And if it be generally so, it is certain that this confirms what hath been particularly spoken of the alteration of our Consent or of our Judgments, whether in respect of the Good or in respect of the Evil; and consequently that the Judgment that we make that a thing is good or better, remains in the Understanding as long as the Appearance either true or false, which causeth the thing to be reputed so, is in being and admitted, and that it is altered as soon as this Appearance is changed.

'Tis Likewise certain, that there being a neces∣sity that the Understanding should precede the Will, 'tis in vain to endeavour that the Will should change its Inclination, unless we first endea∣vour to oblige the Understanding to alter its Judg∣ment; as we labour in vain that the Will should continue in its Inclination or Appetition, if we take no care that the Understanding should persist in the same Judgment.

Also 'tis for this cause that he who designs to em∣brace Virtue and prefer it before all other Excellen∣cies, ought to take heed that no Deceit creeps in, which imposing upon the Understanding may make him imagin there is something more excellent than Virtue. And as he shall have esteemed the highest Virtue to consist in causing his Will to be agreeable with the Divine Will, he ought to imprint deeply in his Mind that he cannot desire any thing more excellent than what God will have. Saying to him∣self with Epictetus; I have brought my Desires in sub∣jection to the Will of God; if he will have me Sick, I am content; if he will have me undertake any Thing, I will undertake it freely; if he will have me accomplish any Thing, I will effect it accordingly; wont he have it so, neither will I; will he have me to Dye, I am wil∣ling.

Finally 'tis certain that while we live here below, we are very Feeble and very Weak, and that we cannot promise to our selves a constancy, either of Judgment or of Will, and of Resolution; because of that Indifferency by which the Understanding and the Will may pass from a Thing that is true, to another that may appear more true; from a Thing that is good, to another that may appear better. 'Tis certain that only in the Life to come this Indifferency shall have an end, because in our fu∣ture State the highest and most perfect Truth, and the sovereign Good are easily known without mi∣stake; and because nothing truer will offer it self to the Understanding, nor nothing better to the Will towards which it might bend, 'tis impossible but that we must continue fixed most constantly, unchangeably, most necessarily, and most willingly; Summa cum libentia. And this is what we have un∣dertaken to explain.

Now that we may not seem to insist too long up∣on Things supernatural, let us return to our Mat∣ter in Hand, and say again, That Liberty or Free-Will is in Man no longer than this Indifferen∣cy that we have mentioned continues in him. For he is Free or at Liberty, First, That when Good or Evil be offered to him he may chuse either the Good by that appearance which inclines him, or the Evil if it be disguised and covered over with the ap∣pearance of Good, which seems more inviting, and consequently draws and moves him more powerfully than the appearance of real Good. Secondly, That when two Advantages are offered to him, he may follow the greater, if its appearance moves him, or the less if its appearance be more attractive and tempting than that of the greater. Thirdly, When he hath two Evils before his Eyes, he may avoid the greater, being dissuaded from it by its appea∣rance, or the lesser, if its appearance seems more troublesome and grievous.

This being supposed, this Passage out of Plato makes very much for our purpose,

That no Per∣son of his own accord is inclined to Evil, and that it is not in the power of Man's Nature to be wil∣ling to incline towards that which he judges to be Evil, and decline that which he judges Good. So that if of two Evils it be needful to chuse one, there is no Person when he may chuse the least will take the greatest.

But because what Ovid makes Medea speak seems to be an Objection, viz. I see what is better, and ap∣prove of it, yet I embrace what's worse.

—Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.

For this Reason we must observe the Question that Aristotle makes when he inquires whether it is possible, that he who knows Things well and hath a just estimate for them, such as they may deserve, can∣not forbear; Qui fieri possit ut qui de rebus recte aesti∣mat, incontinens sit••? For 'tis not without cause that Socrates said,

That it is not possible that in him who hath Knowledge, any other thing should bear sway contrary to that Knowledge; and so it is im∣possible but that he who knows and values Things as he ought, should do that which is best to be done, because if he acts otherwise, this proceeds from Ignorance.

From whence it seems that that common Saying is taken and used in answer to the Words of Medea, viz. Every Man that Sins is Igno∣rant. Omnis peccans est Ignorans.

To resolve the Doubt, and answer the Question Aristotle makes a good distinction.

For, saith he, we may know Things either habitually or actually, Habitu aut actu; For a Man may have a Know∣ledge that he makes no use of, as when his Mind is employed about other Things than what he knows, if he be asleep, in a Passion, or in Drink, and he may have such a Knowledge which he exerci∣seth, as when his Mind is busy about what he un∣derstands. Now if a Man, saith he, knows a Thing actually, and hath his Mind fixed on the Thing he knows, and that his Thoughts are not other∣wise at that time diverted, it is impossible that he should act any thing contrary to his Know∣ledge, and consequently when he percieves the excellency of Virtue, for example, and the folly of Vice, that he should forsake Virtue and follow Vice. But if he knows any Thing only habitual∣ly, or if he makes no use of his Knowledge, in such a case he is in the same Condition as if he had no Knowledge at all, or were Ignorant of the

Thing; and then he may do Things contrary to his Knowledge, and thus tho he knows habitually how beautiful Virtue is, and how abominable and fil∣thy Vice, yet that hinders him not from neglecting Virtue and embracing Vice.

But you may say, Doth it not often happen, that he who Sins, really sees and considers the beauty of that Virtue which he slights, and the filthiness of that Vice which he pursues? Aristotle answers,

That such a Man is like one full of Wine, who by a certain Custom repeats some Verses out of Em∣pedocles; or like Children that read what they un∣derstand not, or but very little; or like Stage-Players that represent Persons unto whom they are not like; for in every one that Sins there a∣riseth a Passion either of Lust, or Anger, or Am∣bition, or Covetousness, that disturbs and disorders the Mind and Knowledge in such a manner, that all the good that there is in Virtue, and all the evil that is in Vice is obscured and covered over with a kind of Mist, so that 'tis hid or scarce ap∣pears; whereas all that is Evil, that is to say, Pain∣ful in Virtue, and all that is Good, that is to say, Grateful in Vice, is discovered, and appears clear as at noon Day.

By this means what is good in Virtue works but feebly upon him who is viciously inclined, and the evil which is in Vice does but faint∣ly displease him who is virtuous. Thus a Man that Sins may very truly say, that he perceives and sees the Things that he quits are better, and what he chuses are worse, for that at another time accord∣ing to the Habit which makes him remember but confusedly and lightly, yet he was sometimes of another Opinion. But yet at that very time that he Sins he cannot say so, for then he holds for best what he embraces, and that for worse which he leaves. So that if he should say that he approves

then as best the Things that he had formerly ap∣proved of, he would tell an apparent untruth, and would contradict himself, for he certainly approves and allows as best the Things that he then pursues.

And tho he does this not without some kind of remorse and displeasure, yet that proceeds doubt∣less from a Sense of the loss of some advantage there∣by, or of drawing upon himself some Evil. But that which nevertheless shews that this displeasure is inconsiderable in comparison of the pleasure that prevails upon him, is that he does not seriously, but only lightly consider the loss of the Good, and the purchase of the Evil. This is so much the more easily to be understood, if the Punishment, the Pain, the Shame, and the other Evils, which he neither sees, nor perceives, nor fears, but only lightly and confusedly, were more seriously and plainly consi∣dered; not as at a distance, or absent, or to come, or doubtful, but ready to fall upon his Head present and certain, and as if they were immediately to succeed and follow the wicked Action at the Heels; he would certainly then forbear and desist from do∣ing it, and would not perish in the Vice.

Again, tho he that Sins and chuses the worst, should say, that he sees and approves the best, ne∣vertheless the want of consideration, or his inadver∣tency which hinders him from seeing or considering all the Circumstances that are in the Thing, or from seeing them as they ought to be, and should be, is Ignorance. For this Reason, he that Sins is said to be Ignorant, for he would not Sin if he were not so, and acted in that manner.

We must nevertheless consider, that he ought not therefore to think himself excusable when he acts ignorantly, because he follows after that which ap∣pears to him Good, and because 'tis not in his Pow∣er to hinder it from appearing in that manner to

him, under a pretence, that we are not the causes of the appearance of Things. For tho among the common excuses for Sins, Men are wont to reckon Ignorance, yet that Ignorance is, or ought to be a simple, absolute and invincible Ignorance, such as was for Example that of Cephalus when he kill'd Procris, who was lurking among Brambles and Thorns; I say, when he kill'd Procris, whom he took for a wild Beast, and could not imagin that it was his dear Wife. Whereas that Ignorance that is here pretended, proceeds from neglect and a want of due Care and Consideration, as Aristotle tells us, Per incuriam negligentiamve paritur, and for that reason is named a gross and willful Ignorance, Affectata, supina: For he that Sins is ignorant, either because he is himself the real cause of his Ig∣norance, or because he never troubles himself, nor endeavours to know more; that is to say, because he does not take sufficient care to consider every thing as he ought.

A drunken Man, saith Aristotle, is Ignorant ac∣cording to the first Case; for he himself is the cause of his Ignorance, and of his Drunkenness, and 'twas in his Power not to be Drunk, and so not to be Ignorant of what he doth; therefore, saith he, this Ignorance dont excuse him, but on the contrary it deserves a double Punishment. First, Because he made himself Drunk. Secondly, For Sinning when he was Drunk. The same Thing may be said of him who from the beginning makes no resistance to a light Passion, but suffers it to gather Strength, so that it prevails more violently:

And generally so it is of those who suffer things to come to an Habit, which at the beginning they might easily have overcome, but afterwards 'tis beyond their Pow∣er to resist 'em.

'Tis in this Case, saith Aristotle, as with him who casts a Stone which he cannot re∣call

nor cause to come back, but 'twas in his Power not to cast it; or, as with him, who living like a Glutton, becomes unavoidably sick, yet 'twas in his Power also to have lived more abstemiously.

Again, a Man who is hurried and transported by his Passions, may also say, Video meliora, proboque; because 'tis then likewise in his Power to mind the Evils, or to consider seriously what and how great Mischiefs will attend; which if he did, he would not be guilty of 'em: I say, that it is in his Power, for it often happens that when he is just go∣ing to commit an Evil, and there comes a Person of Wisdom or Note, or one of Authority, in whose Power it is to revenge and punish this evil Action; upon this he presently forbears; nay, there are some who stop in the midst of their Passion, and have so much Power over themselves, as not to suffer them∣selves to be over-come. Besides, the use of the Laws, of Precepts and Exhortations, are not in vain. We may take heed, and if the Mind be attentive, it may over-come the appearances of Things, and proceed in such a manner that they will appear really such as they ought to appear.

Truly, every time that we may say, Video meliora, proboque, 'tis manifest that the Action is not done without Deliberation, and that consequently 'tis in our Power; for we cannot say so when 'tis done rashly and unadvisedly, as when at the first moving of Anger, we are carried away with Revenge; from whence proceeds the ordinary Excuse, That the first Motions are not in our Power.

And we cannot say as the Hegesiacks in Laer∣tius, That Sins ought to be pardoned, because no Man sins but he is forced thereunto by some Passion which disturbs his Mind, Neque enim quemquam vo∣lentem, sed pertubatione aliqua coactum peccare: For

at least it is certain that till we give an occasion of the Disturbance, there is no constraint nor force.

Nevertheless, because there are certain natural Disturbances, and certain Desires which proceed from our selves, and arise against our Wills, Ari∣stotle holds that they are so much the more pardo∣nable, because they are commonly incident to all Men: And to shew that there are some Passions that are born in us, and that we derive from our Ancestors; he cites the Example of him that ex∣cused himself for beating his Father; For my Father, saith he, beat his before me, and his Father beat his, and here is my Son will beat me when he comes to be of Age. He alledgeth again the Example of him who being drag'd by his Son, commanded him when he was come to the Door to drag him no far∣ther, because, said he, I never drag'd my Father be∣yond this place.

But here I find my self obliged to take notice, that whatsoever hath been hitherto said concerning the great Inclination of the Will to follow the di∣rection of the Understanding, ought to be under∣stood with some Caution and Circumscriptions: For tho' it be certain that we never desire what is unknown, ignoti nulla cupido; and so the Will never acts until the Understanding inclines it before∣hand; and as we commonly say, holds a Torch before it to enlighten it: And tho' it is also no less certain, that the Will is so depending upon the Understanding, in following it, that of two un∣equal Advantages proposed, it usually takes the most beneficial; yet, nevertheless, when 'tis just ready to act, it may notwithstanding this direction, and without the intervention of any other, leave that which is more, and embrace or follow that which is less profitable.

It seems also that the Will does sometimes exer∣cise this Power; for if we will consult our selves, we shall find it true, that there are some Moments wherein we mind and take notice of the goodness and excellency of Virtue; that we discover it plainly, and agree, that it is to be preferred be∣fore the Pleasures and Delights that Vice can afford us: So that if we did really drive at our own In∣terest, we should decline Vice and embrace Virtue: Do we not experience, I say, that sometimes not∣withstanding we have these Notions and Considera∣tions, yet still we cling to Vice and forsake Virtue, forego the greater and make choice of the less good? In a word, we see what is better, but take up with what is worse, as Medea saith,

Video meliora, proboque; deteriora sequor.

Now this being so, it seems we should give more scope to the Power of the Will, and that we ought not to suppose it so bound up or enslaved to the directions of the Understanding, but that it may forsake them; and that if we will save our Liberty without suffering any scruple to remain, we ought not to make it so much to consist in the indifferency of the Understanding, that limits the Will, as in the indifferency of the Will that limits it self: So that when all things needful to act are supposed, it may either act or not act, follow what is good or not follow it, embrace that which appears more or less advantageous: So that 'tis not with the Will as with a Balance or Beam, which is forced to lean on that side where there is the greatest weight; but like a Balance that determines and inclines it self by its own Strength, sometimes on that side where there is the least weight, where there is the least reason, and least appearance of advantage.

Let no Man object, that a lesser advantage, in comparison of a greater, is reputed an Evil; and as the Will cannot incline to Evil as Evil, it can∣not by consequence incline to a less advantage: For we may absolutely deny that a less advantage is an Evil, in comparison of greater; for let it be never so little, 'tis always an advantage: Besides, we may answer and say, That when the Will leaving a greater Good inclines to a less, it inclines not to Evil as Evil, because it looks not upon it as Evil but truly as Good, tho' by chance it may be found to be a less Good; certainly if when two advanta∣ges are proposed to the Will, it hath Power to re∣fuse 'em both; it will doubtless have the same Power to take th' one or th' other, and conse∣quently to chuse the less.

However, it is certain that tho' we should ap∣peal to the Judgment of Plato and Aristotle (which is what our Author seems to have the greatest esteem for) so that we should make Liberty to consist in the first place and originally in the indifferency of the Understanding; yet, I say, it is certain, that in this Supposition, we may still save our Liberty, in that, when we are ready to act and prepared, 'tis always in our Power to stop and desist from acting, and to consider seriously of things; so that if we distinguish the real advantages from those that are counterfeit, we should cause the false Rea∣sonings in the Understanding to be rectified; and by that means cause this Propensity that is in the Will to be inlightned, and so consequently not to seek after an apparent good instead of what is real, Vice instead of Virtue.

CHAP. II. Of Fortune and Destiny.

THO' according to the Opinion of Cicero, Folly, Mistake, Error, Blindness and Ignorance of Things seem to have introduced and brought in fa∣shion the Names of Nature and Fortune, and that therefore Fortune cannot be without Ignorance: Nevertheless, 'tis not generally agreed upon, that this is only a foolish, vain and imaginary Name, seeing there are many that hold that 'tis not only a Cause, but a Divine Cause; which occasioned these Verses of Juvenal.

Fortune was never Worship'd by the Wise; But, set aloft by Fools, usurp'd the Skies.

That it is not really so, Plutarch, according to Plato, holds, That it is a Cause by accident, which unexpectedly follows things acted according to Counsel. And agreeable with this is Aristotle's Opinion, That it is a Cause by accident in things done for a certain End, and that this Cause is un∣certain and changable. For this example is alledged as a common Instance; he who digging in the Ground with an intent to Plant a Tree, found a Treasure which he never thought of; now, the Dis∣covery of the Treasure is an Effect by accident, that is to say, that it happen'd beyond the Expecta∣tion and Intention of him that acted: So that he who digged being the cause of the Pit made in the Earth, is also the cause by accident of the Discove∣ry of the Treasure.

'Tis in this manner that the Notion of Fortune is commonly explained. Nevertheless it may seem by this Name that something else, I know not what, is understood, and that they call not pro∣prerly Fortune, either him who digs, or his action. Therefore often we call a casual thing by the name of Fortune, or that which happens unexpectedly. And it seems by this Name of Fortune, we are to understand,

The concurrence of several Causes that happen without any mutual dependence or advice; so that from them proceeds an event or an effect called Casual, which all the Causes, or some of them, or at least he to whom it happens, had never in his Mind and Intention.

So as by the casual Discovery of the Treasure, 'tis not only requisite that some should dig in the Earth, but that some other body should first hide the Mony: 'Tis manifest, that Fortune or the cause of the Dis∣covery, is the concurrence of the hiding of the Mony and of the diging in the Earth in that place.

I say, without any mutual dependence or advice, and beyond or besides the Intention of all or some of the Causes: Because, tho' one or many of the Causes may have designed it and intended it, 'tis no less Fortune in respect of that Cause that never was thought upon: As if one hides a Treasure, with a design that he whom he foresees will dig in the Earth, should find it. In this Case, the Event is not truly Casual, in regard of him who hid the Trea∣sure; but it will be nevertheless in regard of him who was ignorant that any thing had been there concealed. Thus that which happened at the opening of the Sepulcher of Nitocris was not abso∣lutely a Hazard or Casual, in respect to Nitocris; for he imagined that some King would come to open it, being induced by this Inscription; If any

of the Kings of Babylon that shall come after me be in want of Mony, let him open this Sepulcher, and let him take as much as he please; but let him not open it un∣less he hath need, for in such a Case it will avail him nothing. But the Event was a Hazard or Casual, in relation to Darius, because instead of Mony he found this written within. If thou wert not unsatia∣ble of Mony, thou would'st not have opened the Sepul∣chers of the Dead. We must nevertheless acknow∣ledge, that we call that properly Fortune, that of all the Causes which concur together, not one of them foresees what will happen from thence. An emi∣nent Example of this is instanced in delaying the death of Socrates, after Sentence had been pro∣nounced: For the cause of this delay hapned thus;

The day before the Sentence was given, it hap∣ned, according to the yearly Custom, a Ship was Crowned in order to be sent to Delos; and in the mean while, till its return, it was not lawful to execute any Person. But here, neither, the Priest in Crowning of the Ship, nor the Judge in Pro∣nouncing the Sentence ever thought, by this ac∣cident, to delay the death of Socrates.

Now 'tis not without cause, that Epicurus per∣suades us so much, that we should not acknowledge Fortune as a Goddess; for the weakness of Men is such, that they don't only admire that which they understand not, but they fancy it also as some di∣vine Thing, and above Nature: So that when they had perceived that sometimes Fortune was fa∣vourable and sometimes adverse and contrary; they adored it under several Shapes, and erected Tem∣ples to it under these several Titles, Fortunae Bonae, Malae, Blandae, Averruncae, Calvae, Equestri, &c. This hath given occasion to the Complaints of Pliny,

That all over the World, and at all times, Men address themselves to Fortune; so that she alone

is called upon, she alone accused and condemned; she alone is praised and blamed; that she alone is worshiped with Scoffs. Many fancy her uncer∣tain, unconstant, blind, favouring those who de∣serve it not, &c.

From hence is that common Expression; The May-game, or Sport of Fortune. And this hath caused the life of Man to be likened to playing at Dice or Cards, which is equally ha∣zardous to the Gamester, whether he understand the Game or not.

'Tis true, that as the Play and the Life of Man are managed by Industry, a skilful Gamester and a a wise Man commonly succeed best; but this hap∣pens not always, for often the ignorant Gamester, is more fortunate than the skilful, and the weak Man more successful than the wise; and very fre∣quently Fortune hath as much or more a hand in things than Wisdom. This caused Plutarch to say, That Fortune and Wisdom, tho' very much differing, often bring forth very unlike Effects. And as there are but few Men who make Profession of Wisdom, that know well how to manage and govern the Pro∣ceedings of Fortune, Theophrastus hath been so bold as to say, That 'tis Fortune, and not Wisdom that governs our Life.

Vitam regit Fortuna, non Sapienta.

And Lucretius speaking according to the Vulgar, saith, That Fortune often attends those who do not greatly seek it, and as often flies from those who eagerly pursue and hunt after it: So true is it, saith he further, That there is some secret hidden Power that over-rules human Affairs, and seems to delight and sport it self with over-turning Crowns and Dignities, and trampling 'em under Feet.

Ʋsque adeo res humanas vis abdita quaedam Obterit, & pulchros fasces, saevasque secures Proculcare, & ludibrio sibi habere videtur!

Of Destiny.

AS to what concerns Destiny, Homer speaks more plainly of it than of Fortune; for he makes Hector say, That if the Destinies don't ap∣point nor order it, nothing is able to take away his Life beside; but no Man can avoid his De∣stiny.

Nam nisi Fata vocent, nemo me mittat ad Orcum: At Fatum vitat nemo, mihi crede, virorum.

Now tho' Cicero fancies that Fate and Destiny is but a foolish, idle, and superstitious Name, Anilis plenum superstitionis fati nomen; and Epicurus, That 'tis only a fantastical Name, and that nothing is done by Destiny: Nevertheless, as there have always been Maintainers of Destiny, some taking it in one sense, others in another, we must here endeavour to understand the several Opinions into which they have been divided.

Among these Opinions there are two Principal; for some will have Destiny to be Divine, others a meer Natural thing. The First, were the Disci∣ples of Plato, and the Stoicks; according to whose Opinion, Plutarch, Chalcidius, and some others, look upon Destiny or Fate in two manners; First, As a Substance, which they took for God himself, or for that eternal Reason, which from all Eternity hath ordered all things, and hath so joined all Cau∣ses, both Superior and Inferior together, that

all that happens, either Good or Evil, happens persuant to these Causes. They bestowed several Names upon this Divine Substance or Reason; for sometimes they termed it, as Plato, The Soul of the World; The Reason and the eternal Law of the Nature of the Ʋniverse. And sometimes, as Zeno and Chry∣sippus, The moving Virtue of Matter, a spiritual Vir∣tue, and the Reason of the Order that Governs and Rules all Things. Sometimes God, Jupiter, Under∣standing or Intellect, as Aristotle and Seneca; And sometimes with Heraclitus, The Reason that pene∣trates into all Things; And sometimes, as Pythagoras, The governing and ruling Cause of all Things, both Ʋniversal and Particular.

Secondly, As an Act; namely, in part for the Decree it self, or for the Command by which God hath established and ordained all things, and partly for the Order it self; that Consequence and Con∣catenation of Causes at first appointed, in which it pursues its course without varying in the least from the Rules and Methods at first prescribed: For thus they spoke of it when they called Destiny, The Law of Nature, The Companion of the Whole, The Daugh∣ter of Necessity, The Order that includes and compre∣hends all other Orders; Or, as Chrysippus saith, A certain eternal and immutable sequel of Things, &c. Sempiterna quaedam & indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena volvens semetipsa sese, & implicans per aeter∣nos consequentiae ordines in quibus apta, connexaque est. To which Lucan seems to allude in these two Ver∣ses,

At simul à prima descendit origine Mundi Causarum series, atque omnia Fata laborant.

And Hesiod, when he speaks distinctly of the three Parcae which Spin the Life of Man, the first

is named Atropos, because the Time past is irrecove∣rable, which is as the Thread spun and wound in the Spindle: The second is called Clotho, because of the Time present that runs, which is as the Thread in the hand of her who Spins: The third is Lachesis, because of the Time to come, or the ha∣zard, which is as the Wool or Flax that is not yet twisted. Lachesis, in Plato, is said to govern the Time past, Clotho the present, Atropos the future: That which is added of Lachesis, that she receives the celestial Actions of the two other Sisters, that she joyns them together, and that she distributes them here below upon the Earth; shews the Opi∣nion of the Astrologers, who bind the Fate of Man∣kind to the Stars, and make it to depend upon them, and come from them, according to Mani∣lius;

Fata quoque & vitas hominum suspendit ab Astris.

An Opinion among the Astrologers more cer∣tain than that of the Sybils, and the Oracles which were said to utter forth the Destinies: For to hear them speak, they seem to be no less acquainted with the Designs and Decrees of Heaven, than the Oaks, which Plato tells us came forth from Voices of the Enchantresses, as Virgil observes,

Quam comitabantur fatalia carmina quercus.

Moreover, as the Disciples of Plato, the Stoicks, and the other Patrons of Destiny, seem consequent∣ly to defend Necessity, which Seneca stiles a Ne∣cessity of all Things, and of every Action, which no Violence can break or alter:

For the Destinies, saith he, exercise their Right and their absolute and uncontrolable Power, without favouring any,

and without being moved either with Prayers or Compassion, they observe their fatal course ap∣pointed and irrevocable; like as the swift and fu∣rious downfal of the Waters from some steep Places which neither go back nor stop for those Waters which follow, but continually thrust down the first; thus the constant sequel of Destiny makes the order of Things under this first and eternal Law, to submit to the irrevocable Decree.

As therefore they seem to maintain, I say, a Necessity, which altogether destroys the Liberty of human Actions, and leaves nothing in our Free-will; for that reason these Objections are opposed, proceed∣ing from the Inconveniences that will ensue.

The Chief of these Inconveniences, is, That if our Souls, as they are placed and ranked in the sequel of Things, be governed by the Destinies, and being deprived of all Libery, they act always out of an immutable and unavoidable Necessity; the Liberty and ordinary Conduct of the Affairs of hu∣man Life fails, and all Consultations are useless; for whatever you resolve upon, there shall nothing happen but what hath been decreed by the Desti∣nies, Thus Prudence will become idle and need∣less, the study of Wisdom frivolous, Legislators and Tyrants will be equally ridiculous; because they command things that we must unavoidably do, or what we can by no means perform: So that there will be neither Vice nor Virtue, nor any thing that will deserve either Praise or Blame, seeing that they alone are reputed worthy of Praise who might do ill but behave themselves well, and those worthy of Blame who might do well but be∣have themselves ill. In this case, no body will de∣serve Reward for any good Deeds, as no body will deserve Punishment for any bad, because the first cannot but act well, and the latter hath not the

Power to forbear and abstain from what is ill: Fi∣nally, if all things proceeded from an unavoidable Necessity, in vain should we offer up our Prayers, our Vows and Sacrifices, &c.

'Tis therefore upon occasion of this Doctrin of the Stoicks, that Lucian brings in Cyniscus very plea∣santly, upbraiding Jupiter:

That he dreads not his Thunder-bolts, if the Destinies have not de∣signed that he should perish in that manner, see∣ing that Jupiter himself, and the other Gods, are bound and subject to Destiny: So that both Gods and Men are but the Servants and Ministers of the Parcae, or rather meer Tools or Instruments, as an Ax or a Sythe; insomuch, that Jupiter with his great Power was not able to deliver his own Son from Death, his beloved Son Sarpedon.

Tot nati cecidere Deûm, quin occidit unà Sarpedon mea Progenies.

This Doctrin of the Stoicks made Seneca to say, That God truly prescribed the Destinies, but that he himself is bound to obey them: Ille ipse omnium Conditor & Rector scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur; semper paret, semel jussit.

That we are carried away by the force of De∣stiny, unto which we must willingly yield; That nothing is able to prevail upon the inexorable La∣chesis, or to make her unwind her Spindle; That all that the Mortals do or suffer comes from above; That all things proceed in a certain setled and appointed Course, and that each Day presses on the former.

Fatis agimur; cedite fatis. Non sollicitae possunt curae Mutare rati stamina fusi

Quidquid patitur mortale genus; Quidquid facimus venit ex alto; Servat{que} suae decreta colus. Lachesis dura revoluta manu, Omnia certo tramite vadunt, Primus{que} dies dedit extremum.

Manilius speaks almost the same Things, and saith plainly, That the Destinies govern the World, that we Dye as soon as we are Born, and that our End takes its date from our first Beginning.

Fata regunt orbem, certa stant omnia lege, Larga{que} per certos signantur tempora cursus; Nascentes morimur, finisque ab origine pendet.

Lastly, Those Philosophers who hold that De∣stiny is a thing altogether natural, and that it de∣pends not upon any Decree, are divided into two Sects; The first have supposed a sequel of natural Causes, linked and tied together in such a manner, that the last always is depending upon the first, and so successively each by th'other, so that they cannot but do what they do; and from hence follows that Necessity which can by no means be avoided, and which is altogether agreeable with that which is de∣duced from the first Opinion, or at least differs not much, but only in this, that in the first Opinion the sequel of Things runs and proceeds from an eternal Decree of God, but according to this latter Opinion, they run of themselves, and of their own accord. The others truly suppose a sequel of natural Causes, tied and joined together, but yet in such a manner, that the last Causes depend not in such a manner upon the First, or are not moved by them so much, but that they may be hindred from doing that which they would otherwise do. I say that they may

be interrupted either by Things casual, or by Things that act freely.

Among the First are reckoned Heraclitus, Em∣pedocles, Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus and some others; but I shall only mention Democritus, because he was the most famous of 'em all. This Philoso∣pher maintains, That Nature cannot act otherwise than it doth, because the first Principles, or as he calls 'em Atoms, from whence all Things have their Beings, and are made, have a natural and an unal∣terable Motion by which they must of necessity be carried and moved. The compounded Beings that are all made of Atoms, cannot but be moved by the same Motions that move the Atoms. And from thence he gathers this supposed Necessity, by which he will have all Things done, and by which the World it self is made in that manner that it now subsists; because the Atoms, as he saith, which ca∣sually have here met together, have had such and such Motions, that they could not gather together in any other manner, nor make any other Form or Shape; and that when this Form was once laid, they cannot but proceed in that Motion that they are in, and by these Motions all Things are accomplished: So that this Necessity, in his Opinion, is nothing else but the motion, the percussion and repercussion of the Matter, that is to say of Atoms, out of which all Things are form'd.

Thus 'tis easy to see what he means when he says, The necessity by which all Things are made, is the De∣stiny, the Justice, the Providence and the Contriver of the World, &c. For he supposeth that the sequel of Things, in which the nature of Destiny consists, cannot be otherwise than it is, and that it depends upon this sequel that such a thing should be, or should be thought Just, and another Unjust; that the World should be governed in the manner that

it is, and that in the beginning it was so made, &c. He refers all Things to the natural Motion of Atoms. And upon this Supposition he believed, First, That the Soul it self, which he fancies to consist chiefly of globular Atoms and well polished, moves seve∣ral ways of its own accord, because of their differ∣ing Motions, for Example in the Sad and Mournful in one manner, in the Cholerick in another, and otherwise in those who have a good and mild Tem∣per. Secondly, That it is diversly moved and carri∣ed by the different movement of these Atoms; where∣of the Images or sensible and intellectual Shapes are joined and intermingled. So that it cannot but be attracted if these Shapes be agreeing, and can∣not but be repelled if they be disagreeing. Third∣ly, That if at some time it is not drawn by some alluring Shape, this proceeds from that there are others on the same side more powerful that resist; likewise if it be not driven by some that naturally resist, 'tis because on the same side there arise and move some more powerful that draw at the same mo∣ment towards the same Place. Fourthly, That con∣sequently he cannot but be inclined to Good, or to that which intices, and flatters, and attracts, while he perceives it not mingled with any Evil, nor can∣not but fly from Evil, or that which hurts and be∣gets an Aversion, while he sees no Good mingled with it. Fifthly, That of two Advantages proposed, he cannot but be carried to the greater, because he is drawn to it more powerfully, and of two Evils he cannot but fly from the greater, because he is the more strongly driven away. Lastly, That through the Ignorance and Blindness of the Spirit of Man, he sees not often all the Evil that is consequent to the Good, nor all the Good is consequent to the Evil, he is really deceived, and often carried to an Object from which it were to be wished that he

were diverted, and flies from that which is really to be wished that he should follow after; but in the mean while Things happening in this manner, and not otherwise, he cannot but be carried whither he is carried, nor cannot but be driven from what he is driven. So that there remains nothing else for him to desire, but that the Shapes of Things might come to him such as they ought, to make them ap∣pear as really they are, and that the Evil might not impose upon him under the disguise of Good, nor the Good under that of Evil.

He fancies further, that certain Things seem tru∣ly to be in our Power, seeing that we try, that we advise, and consult, and that we freely chuse without constraint one thing before another: But nevertheless that is nothing in reality, because the occasion of the Consultation or the representation of several Things, which make us almost, equal, and keep the Ballance steddy, holding our Spirit in sus∣pence, cannot but be made to us, because of the sequel of Things which proceeds from a higher Principle; the Mind remaining in an uncertainty until the usefulness of the one appears to exceed that of the other, and then the first usefulness draws and fixes it. As if election were no other thing but a pur∣suance of what is best, or of that which seems best, and which is done without Constraint or without Aversion, because we naturally love Good of our own accord, and willingly seek after it. So that in his Opinion Liberty is nothing else but Libentia.

Moreover he holds, as all others do, who are De∣fenders of this Doctrin of Fatality, and namely Manilius, viz. That to treat now of Fate or Desti∣ny, and to examine its Laws and Nature as we here at present do, that this is according to the Laws and Course of Destiny.

Hoc quoque fatorum est legem perdiscere fati, Hoc quoque fatale est sic ipsum expendere fatum.

Because if you suppose any kind of human Action, he will have its nearest cause to have been so moved by some other going before, and this by another, and that other by one preceeding that, and so on to Infinity; that such a Series of Causes hath been appointed, and that such and such Actions could not but follow. Such as is, saith Cicero, the Desire of Ennius; Would to God that never any Ax had out down those unhappy Trees of Pelion. He might have taken his Rise a little higher in this manner, Would to God that never any Trees had grown upon Mount Pelion; nay, further yet, Would to God that Mount Pelion had never been; and so by ascending still high∣er to wish, That the Ship had never been made, and that Medea had never departed from her own House.

Among those who have truly allowed of a natu∣ral Necessity, but nevertheless not absolute and un∣avoidable, the chief are Aristotle and Epicurus. In respect of Aristotle, he will have Destiny or fatal Necessity to be nothing else but Nature it self, or if you please, every Cause as it acts according to Nature, or according to its natural Course.

As for Epicurus, he was of the same Opinion as Aristotle, and accordingly he took away the abso∣lute and unavoidable necessity of Things, but he hath this Conceit particularly to himself, that he hath invented for that purpose another Hypothesis, and hath fancied this long series of Causes, or this mixture of Atoms mentioned before, that there might be something to break off the necessity of Destiny, and might preserve the liberty of the Will, which he saith is free and not subject to the Fates.

—Et fatis avolsa voluntas.

That is to say, out of that sequel or series of Move∣ments, which according to Democritus follow one another by an absolute, everlasting and unavoidable Necessity, as if Experience and Reason had drawn this Truth from the Mouth of Epicurus, contrary to his own Principles.

Besides, did all Things move in a direct Line, Did still one Motion to another joyn, In certain order, and no Seeds decline, And make a Motion fit to dissipate, The well-wrought Chain of Causes and strong Fate; Whence comes that perfect freedom of the Mind, Whence comes the Will so free, so unconfin'd, Above the power of Fate, by which we go, When ere we please, and what we will we do?

But Democritus, as Cicero hath afterwards done, would but make a Jest of that Hypothesis or Sup∣position, not only because 'tis a meer Imagination, but also because 'tis of no use to Epicurus nor to his design; for saith he,

This declining Motion of Atoms being as natural as the perpendicular, all Things will be done always in the same manner as by Destiny, seeing that which will happen will happen always by the same necessity according to the difference and diversity of the Causes of these Motions which follow one another, as in a kind of Chain by a certain continued Series; be∣cause he supposing the Spirit of Man to be corpo∣real, or composed of Atoms as other Things are he draws it not out of that everlasting Chain of Motions, which are of themselves natural and necessary, as he makes all the Atoms generally to be.

It can never be, saith Democritus to Epicurus, That the Mind of Man can shew or exercise this Li∣berty, by which he desires, as suppose, for instance an Apple: He ought first to have the Idea or visible Shape of the Apple in his Imagination, which Idea passing through his Eyes, moves his Understanding to know the Apple: And that the Apple may be able to transmit that Idea to the Eye, it ought to be put into such a place by one who hath gathered it from the Tree, or that he hath had elsewhere. Now the Tree, besides the Sun-beams, the Moi∣sture and the Earth, which have made it grow, ought to have had a Grain of Seed from whence it had its beginning: This Grain must have proceeded from another Apple, that Apple from another Tree, which Tree was set in that place and in that time, and not in another; and thus going back to the very beginning of the World, in which time the Earth and all Earthly Seeds were generated, as he says from a general Meeting or Concourse of these Atoms, which that they might be able to meet or gather together in such a place, and in that manner ought to come from thence and not from any other place, from that World and not from another, and so of all the foregoing Eternity. Besides, if, as he pretends, the Spirit is made up of Atoms, these Atoms ought to have been con∣tinued in the Seed of the Parents; they ought to gather there together, from certain Food, from a certain Air, from a certain Sun: Such and such Food ought to have been taken and no other, their Causes and all other Causes ought to have been so, and to proceed from such Causes and from no other, and so from all Eternity. So that these Causes have from all Eternity been so bound to the other Cau∣ses, that when these last have met together; the

Mind could not but desire and wish for this Ap∣ple.

This is what Cicero seems to have in his Fancy, when he laughs at this Declension of Atoms, as a thing altogether whymsical and fantastical, and of no use to save our Freedom and remove the abso∣lute Necessity of Things; for if the right and per∣pendicular Motion of the Atoms proceeds from a Necessity of Nature, that of the Declension will al∣so be of the same Necessity. So that tho' we may say that Epicurus deserves to be commend∣ed for having endeavoured to preserve human Liberty, we may also say, that he hath not suc∣ceeded well in it, and that he could never do it by continuing in his own Principles and Doctrin: Therefore we shall take our leave here of Epicurvs, with his Clinamen Principiorum, and endeavour to explain it by some other Means.

CHAP. III. How Destiny may be reconciled, or consist with Fortune and Liberty.

HAving explained the several Opinions of the Philosophers, concerning Destiny, we must now examin whether we are to allow it or not, and in what manner, and how we may reconcile it with Liberty. First, The Opinion of Democritus ought to be rejected, because he takes from God the Creation and Government of the World; nor is it consistent with the Doctrin of our Faith: Be∣sides, it is repugnant to the Light of Nature, which shews us by our own experience, that we are Free and at Liberty. That of Aristotle and Epi∣curus may be allowed, as to this, That it makes Destiny and Nature, or natural Causes to be the same thing, and that it endeavours to preserve our Liberty; but it ought also to be laid aside as to this, That it allows not in God the Knowledge of Things, and that it supposeth that there is neither Creation nor Providence: So that there remains none but Plato's Opinion, and that of the Stoicks, unto which we may adhere; and the rather, be∣cause they hold, that it is God who hath created and disposes, and governs the World.

But now as the chief Difficulty, which appears here, is to reconcile Destiny with Liberty, it will not be very needful that we should reconcile it with Fortune; for in a word, we may say, that Destiny and Fortune may be allowed, upon Condi∣tion that we agree that Destiny is the Decree of the Divine Will, without which nothing is done;

and Fortune, the Concourse or the Event, which, tho' it is not foreseen by Men, hath been neverthe∣less foreseen by God and placed among the Series of Causes. We shall not therefore so much busie our selves to reconcile Fortune, as to make Free∣will agree with Destiny: It seems that we cannot better proceed, than by supposing, with St. Tho∣mas, That Destiny, in respect of Men, is nothing else but that part of Providence that the Divines term Predestination; for by this means we shall reconcile both Predestination and Destiny with Li∣berty. We shall say, That God hath created ne∣cessary Causes and free Causes, and that both are so subject to the Divine Providence, that they all act after their own manner; the necessary in a ne∣cessary manner, and the free freely: But we meet here with two great Difficulties.

The first Difficulty, is that which proceeds from the Fore-knowledge or the Divine Prescience, which Ammonius saith is so obscure, that it hath obliged many learned Men to reject that which we name Contingency: For 'tis not only among the Divines, that this way of Argument is in Vogue, viz.

Ei∣ther God knows infallibly and certainly that Pe∣ter will deny him, or he knows it not: We can∣not say, that he knows it not, for he foretold it, and is no Liar; and if he knows it not, he would not know all things, and consequently he would not be God; he therefore knew it infallibly and certainly. It could not therefore otherwise hap∣pen, but Peter must deny him; for if it could have otherwise been, and that making use of his Liberty, he had not really denied him; we might then say, that God's Fore-knowledge had been deceitful, and his Prediction false. But if that cannot be, he was not free either to deny or not to deny; he had therefore no Free-will.

I say,

'tis not only among the Divines alone, that this way of Reasoning is usual; we have the like among the Philosophers: In this manner they speak in the Writings of Ammonius;

Either the Gods know infallibly the Event or Justice of things that are contingent; that is to say, which of the things shall happen, or they know not:

We cannot say, &c.

Know then that the Divines solve this Difficulty by distinguishing two sorts of Necessities, the one absolute, the other conditional or upon supposition; for Example, it is absolutely necessary that two times two should make four, or that Winter should be past; but yet 'tis not necessary that you shall lay the Foundation of a Building, or that you should depart out of Town; however if you will suppose that you are to Build, or that you should be in the Country, then 'tis required that you shall lay Foundations, or that you should go out of Town; but this Necessity is still a Necessity upon Suppo∣sition, which takes not away our Liberty; because he who lays Foundations, might chuse whether he would lay them or no, as he who goes out of Town might not go out if he pleased. So in re∣spect of Peter, 'tis true, say they, the denyal of Pe∣ter which God foresaw, shall be infallible; but it shall only be through a Necessity upon Supposition, which, as we have said, injures not our Freedom. And 'tis doubtless no wonder, say they, that this Necessity is not repugnant to Liberty, because it don't precede or go before it, but follows after, and that it is not so much in the Thing as in the Cir∣cumstance of the Time: For when we say, that it is necessary that Peter should have denied, we don't understand that there was any thing in Peter antecedently, to constrain him to act so, but only that now there is something in the Time which

hath caused him to act in the time; I say, which as it is past and cannot but be past: So the thing that hath been done, in what time, in what man∣ner soever it hath been done, cannot but be done: So that all the Necessity falls upon the Time past. Now as God knows all things, he truly foresees that Peter would deny him; but the foreseeing of this Denyal, follows the foreseeing of the free De∣termination: So that he only foresees plainly that Peter would deny him, because he foresees that Pe∣ter would determin himself, or freely resolve to deny him: From whence it is, that we commonly say, That Peter will not deny; because God fore∣saw, but God foresaw because Peter will deny.

In truth, all Knowledge is outward and exterior to the thing known, and that a thing borrows not what it hath from that Knowledge, but it hath it of it self, or from its Cause. As the Snow is not white, because 'tis known to be white, but it is known to be white because 'tis white.

I confess, that there is this difference between the Divine Knowledge and Ours, that ours can∣not extend to things that are contingent, but only to the things that are present or past; whereas the Divine Knowledge reaches to the time to come: Nevertheless, as the things that are now past were formerly to come, and in the same Condition as those that are now to come; and that we under∣stand that the things that are now to come shall hereafter be past, and in the same Condition as those that are now past; so 'tis certain, that as the Knowledge either of God or of Men makes not the things which heretofore have been, to be past, be∣cause they are known to be past, but they are known to be past because they are now past; and thus those that are to come are not to come, be∣cause God knows them, but because they are to come.

Thus, for Instance, If Peter could have not de∣nied, and that upon using his Liberty, he had not denied; there would then have been in God's Fore∣knowledge and Fore-telling a deceit. This we deny; for at the same time we don't agree, that God would foreknow or foretel that Peter should deny: For if it had been so, he had foreseen and foretold that he would not have denied; because in this Case there would be a Supposition contrary, namely, that Peter would freely resolve to not deny: Now we agree, that Peter will deny, and that God foresees and foretels that truly because Peter being able to resolve either to deny or not to deny, he will resolve rather to deny than not.

The second Difficulty is taken from that kind of Question or Sophistical Argument which is called the Slothful Reason, because if we obeyed and fol∣lowed it, saith Cicero, we should remain always with folded Elbows, and never attempt or endea∣vour any thing in our Life;

Either I am prede∣stinated, or I am not, that is to say, either I am elected from all Eternity to an everlasting Glory, or reprobated and designed for perpetual Tor∣ments. If I am predestinated, then whatsoever I do, I cannot be damned; but if I am a reprobate, then whatsoever means I use, and whatsoever pain I suffer, I cannot be saved; now one or the other must necessarily be true: Therefore whatso∣ever I do, seeing I cannot advantage my self, what need is there that I should take care about any thing?

From thence some draw this Conclusion, That they may boldly go on in a course of Vice and Wickedness; for we often hear People reason∣ing in this manner;

If I am predestinated, neither my Crimes nor my evil Deeds can damn me; If I am a reprobate, my Piety and Sanctity will profit me nothing, but I am one of them: Therefore I

need not trouble my self, I may do what I please.

In the same manner, in the Works of Cicero, we find certain Philosophers of his time arguing thus;

If it be your Fate that you should be cured of this Distemper, whether you desire the Physician's Assistance or no you will be cured. And if your Destiny be that you shall not be cured, call the Physician or call him not, you cannot be cured; but one of these two must be; therefore it pro∣fiteth nothing to call for the Physician's Assist∣ance: We may also, without using the word Destiny or Fate, alter the words in this manner, and say thus, If from all Eternity this hath been true, That you shall be cured of that Disease, call for the Physician or call not for him, you shall be cured. And so if from all Eternity this hath been true, You shall not be cured of that Disease; whe∣ther you have a Physician or no, you shall not be cured.

This Difficulty hath caused among the Divines two famous Opinions; in either of which there is always this to be noted, that after they have been both well examined, we are still forced to confess, of what Persuasion soever we are, That this My∣stery is above the reach of human Judgment; and to say with the Apostle, That the depth of the Riches of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God is great, his Judgments incomprehensible, and his Ways past finding out: O altitudo divitiarum sap∣entiae & scientiae, Dei; quam incomprehensibilia sunt ju∣dicia ejus & investigabiles viae ejus!

The first Opinion maintains, That God from all Eternity hath predestinated and chosen out from among the Generations of Mankind a certain num∣ber of People, to whom out of his meer Bounty, and without any consideration of their Merits, nor

any foresight of their good Actions, he hath de∣creed their everlasting Happiness, and that he hath reprobated or condemned all the rest to everlasting Torments, considering nevertheless, and foreseeing their wicked Actions.

The second holds, That God hath also prede∣stinated some to Glory, but with a respect to their good Deeds foreseen, as he hath reprobated all the rest, with a respect to their evil Deeds foreseen: For in this manner the Matter being conceived ac∣cording to Man's Judgment, may be thus explained.

God from all Eternity hath decreed to create the World; and in this World, Men, who being left to the use of their Reason and Liberty, might be capable of Rewards and Punishments. He hath al∣so decreed to grant to all Men a supernatural As∣sistance, that is to say, a sufficient Grace, to the end that those who according to their Liberty should make use of this Grace to do well, should be destinated or designed for Glory; and that those who should abuse and neglect it, by doing Evil, should be designed for Torments. Lastly, because he hath foreseen that some would make a good use of his Grace, and should die in that State; whereas all the rest would make but a bad use of it, and would never reform, not even at the very hour of Death; for that Reason, he hath de∣creed to the first Glory everlasting, and to the last everlasting Punishments.

Now either of these Opinions answer and con∣tradict the slothful Arguments or way of Reason∣ing; the last hath this advantage, that it may an∣swer it more easily than the first; for truly 'tis very difficult for the first Opinion to preserve Liberty or Free-will in those who, by an efficacious decree of God, without any regard had to their good Works foreseen, have been predestinated to Glory; for as

this Decree preceeds all the Motions of the Will foreseen, how can the Will be free to do any thing from whence may ensue everlasting Damnation? For if it should do it, then the Decree of Election would be void and frustrated, neither is it less difficult to preserve it in the reprobate; for if we suppose them not to be elected, they cannot, what∣ever they do, be admitted among the Elect.

I know there are some who offer here a seeming difference, when they allow to God a certain con∣ditional Knowlede and that of Means. And they require good Works in such a manner, if not for the Decree of Election, at least for the Execution; so that no Body arrives to this Glory without Works and without Merits preceeding, at least without the Merits of a Saviour; but as the difficulty is not thereby removed, the Truth is, that they acknow∣ledge no other Liberty but that which we under∣stand commonly by this Word Libentia.

Nevertheless they bring this reason against them who would make use of this slothful reasoning, That there is a very good cause why a Man should endea∣vour to do Good rather than Evil, because tho the Decree is unknown to us, nevertheless 'tis certain that no Man shall ever be promoted to Glory if he hath not done good Works; neither shall he be banished into Torments if he hath never done Evil.

They say moreover, that it concerns us very much to attain as much as we are able to a certain∣ty of our Election by good Works, rather than of Reprobation by Evil, that so we may be able to allay the Fears and apprehensions in which we must otherwise spend our Lives, and that we may act and proceed on with this assurance, that while we do well we have no reason to dread any Evil from God, who is most Good and most Just.

But in the mean while that no Person might glo∣ry that he ought to be elected because of his good Works, and that none should complain because he was not comprehended in the Election, and that it was none of his; Fault against him that boasts they make use of this Expression, O Man! What is it that distinguishes thee? If any one happen to complain; They tell him; Who art thou that darest contend with thy God? Shall the Earthen-Vessel say to the Potter, Why hast thou made me thus? Is it not lawful for the Potter to make one Vessel of Honour and another of Dishonour? And to them who are too curious to seek after the Secrets of God, they make use of the Words of the Holy Doctor; Judge not why he draws this Man and not that Man, if thou wilt not err; Noli judicare quare hunc trahat, &c.

As for the other Opinion; its Defenders seem to be better able to refute him who makes use of the unactive Argument. Either I am Predestinated, say you, and elected for Glory, or reprobated and con∣demned to Torments. This is what must be grant∣ed; but we must at the same time add, That now 'tis in your Power either to be Predestinated or Re∣probated, for now you are in that Condition in which God hath foreseen that you should be inabled with a sufficient Grace, and this depends upon your Free∣will, whether he hath foreseen you a good Man or an Evil. So that in consideration of this fore∣sight he hath either Predestinated or Reprobated you. Thus you see that it belongs to you and con∣cerns you to do good now, and to crave assistance of the Divine Grace, that God foreseeing from all Eternity this assistance that you should crave may have Predestinated you; for if you act otherwise, in consideration of these very wicked Actions, God will have reprobated you.

Pretend not that God knows from all Eternity, if you be Predestinated or not, and therefore you must needs unavoidably be what you are or ought to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be, seeing that the Divine Knowledge cannot be deceived nor changed; for God hath truly known it from all Eternity, but consequently to his Decree, and he hath not made his Decree, but by foreseeing what you would do. Therefore this Action of your Will preceeds God's Foresight, both the Di∣vine Decree of your Predestination or Reprobation, and the Divine Knowledge of your everlasting Hap∣piness or Misery; not that these antecedent and con∣sequential Decrees still relate to time; but ac∣cording to our humane way of Speaking, we con∣ceive and declare them to be so, when we consider the Nature of Free-Will and the Nature of God, who is Just, and cannot but act justly.

And although we might hence infer that there is here no antecedent Will which might hinder our Will from being free, nor do what it pleaseth, nor be able to carry its Hand either to the Fire or Wa∣ter, yet you cannot therefore pretend that 'tis in your Power to frustrate the Divine Decree, because that Decree was made but upon this Supposition of what you were to do, and its unchangeableness pro∣ceeds from a necessity of Supposition, which does not in the least deprive Man of his Liberty of act∣ing freely.

But possibly you may say, if God in consideration of the good Works that I perform at present, hath Predestinated me, I shall be beholding to none for my distinction, but to my self. This dont follow: For 'tis not of your selves by the power of your own Virtues and Strength, that you are thus distinguish'd, but the Grace of God, without which you cannot do these good Works. Thus it will not be difficult to say, why this Vessel hath been thus fashioned,

this a Vessel of Honour that of Dishonour; why this Man should be drawn, and that Man not; seeing that sufficient Grace being allowed to all in general, the Resolution and Determination pursuant to that Grace is the Cause.

I confess this may seem to look a little hard when we consider how God hath made some Men for Honour, and others for Dishonour; and that all suffer not themselves to be freely and willingly drawn, nor Co-operate with the Divine Grace, see∣ing that he might have made them all in such a man∣ner, that they might have been all designed for Honour, and none for Dishonour and Contempt, and that all might have Co-operated with the Grace of God. And truly as the Choice of Virtue and Vice that we embrace, and that God hath foreseen in Predesti∣nating or Reprobating Men, depends upon the No∣tions and Representations of Things which appear to us, we have always a great Cause to cry out as we before did, O the Depths, &c. because it dont depend upon us that such or such Objects appear so to us, and consequently that we should be possessed with such or such Notions or Imaginations; but from the Series, the Concatenation and disposition of Things, which God hath established according to the adorable and unsearchable course of his Wis∣dom. 'Tis therefore also that tho this Opinion seems to be the easiest, it seems nevertheless to leave always some difficulty or doubt behind, and we cannot so plainly discover all Things here, but we are obliged again to recur to the Saying of the Apostle, O Altitudo divitiarum Sapientiae, &c.

But having Travelled through many Nations where People have been strongly possessed with the Opinion of Predestination, I shall freely speak my Thoughts, as to what I have seen and known, That the first Opinion hath strong Consequences, and that

it appears to me very dangerous and pernicious to publick Society; for it is either able to oblige Men to all manner of Vices, or to cast them into De∣spair. But not to insist upon the Reasons of Divines, nor to listen to that Persian Author, who suppo∣sing that by destroying Liberty or Free-Will, you at the same time destroy all Religion, for this is The Spunge, as he calls it, to blot out all Religions. How think ye that a Turk, for example, will excuse his Vices when a Dervise undertakes to admonish him, How now Dervise, saith he, dost thou not know as well as I, that all is written above, and that these are Characters not to be blotted out, but everlasting and irre∣vocable Decrees? Doest thou not agree with me, that this supposed Liberty, this pretended Power, either to act or not to act, to do Good or to do Evil, is a foolish Fancy of the Jahours or Infidels, and that consequently we have in us nothing but the Will, but the Inclination and Propensity, which is very much differing from that we call Free-Will and Liberty? Are not these thy Do∣ctrins as well as mine, and dost thou yet tell us that God doth Predestinate us, and Save us without the conside∣ration of our good Works, without any regard to our Merits; but that he doth nevertheless Damn us with a respect to our Crimes and our Demerits? As if this were not a plain Contradiction: As if thou wouldest make us believe that we are free to one, but that we are not free nor at liberty to the other: Or as if we could deserve an everlasting Punishment, but cannot merit the least Re∣ward. Forbear Dervise, forbear then to speak in this manner; if thou wilt discourse after thine own Principles and mine, God Damns us as he Saveth us. I tell thee again, All Things are written above, and according to thy Doctrin these Names of Choice and Liberty are but foolish Fancies and Chimeras. If I do Well, 'tis because I cannot do Evil; if I do Evil, 'tis because I cannot Well; If I am designed for Happiness, I shall by a meer

necessity die a Saint, as Ali; If thou art designed for Misery, Necessity will force thee to hang thy self in de∣spair, as Yahoud.

Horrid blasphemous Expressions! which shews a wilfull blindness and despair, a hardness of Heart like that of Pharoah. Now these being the Dis∣courses and Opinions, or rather the Blasphemies of these Mahometans, which have often made me tremble when I have either read their Books or heard it from their Mouths; Pray tell me what Wickednesses are not such Men capable of, who argue in this manner; chiefly if they are in Power or of a Temper that inclines them to Cruelty, to Revenge, or any other Vice? Is there any Crime or any act of Tyranny that can offend them? Their poor Subjects and People under them are made too sensible of it: And is there any debauch∣ed or filthy Pleasures in which they are not ready to plunge themselves? 'Tis easily to be observed by those who have lived but a little while among them.

Besides, is there any thing more dreadful and terrible than this Doctrin, and these ways of Wor∣ship, to a Man who is naturally tender, and not as yet altogether hardned in a wicked Course of life? For according to this Belief, he cannot look upon God any longer but as a powerful and unmerciful Tyrant; he will have no longer any hopes in his Bounty and Mercy, no longer hopes to prevail upon him by Prayers, by Alms-Deeds, or by Re∣pentance; he will have always before his Eyes Hell open to devour him, and if he runs not headlong into Destruction, he will lead but a miserable life, distracted by a multitude of dreadful dismal Thoughts, because he will be deprived of that sweet Cordial and chief Consolation that I have just now mentioned, viz. of the Assurance that he

may have in the Bounty and infinite Mercy of God. I have therefore many times spoken it, and say it again, This Opinion seems to me to be so dange∣rous because of its Consequences, that if it were impossible to be true, I know not whether, for the Welfare and Safety of Mankind, it were not convenient to suppress, it, or at least to forbid it to be spoken among Men. 'Tis not but that we must press upon the Minds of the People the fear of God, and to make them sensible of his Judgments; but we must take great heed not to cast them into despair, by taking from them what I cannot too often repeat, viz. the Assurance that we have upon God's divine Goodness and Mercy, which is the only Relief and Consolation of the poor, sick and afflicted Sinner, who is sensible of his former Sins and Miscarriages, and resolves un∣feignedly to repent and return to the right way: Besides, if we would awe the People and keep them within the Bounds of Duty, it is the highest Con∣cernment to instruct them that they have a liberty of acting freely. That God's Foreseeing forces no more than Man's foresight would do, or that of an Angel, which we might suppose to be as certain as that of God's; that they are predestinated or re∣probated only in respect of their good or evil Actions, and that they have all the Means and As∣sistances needful to do well, and that consequently they only are in fault if they live otherwise: So that if they act wickedly and damn themselves, they ought not to complain of God but against themselves, against their Wills, of their own wil∣ful Neglect or Obstinacy.

From what we have said, judge whether I have any Reason to believe this Doctrin so destructive to human Society: Certainly when we consider that they be chiefly the Mahometan Nations who

are infected with it, and that it is principally a∣mong them, that it is now entertained and encou∣raged; I might very well imagin that it was the Contrivance of some of those Tyrants of Asia, as Mahomet, Enguis-Kan, Tamarlane or Bajazet, or some of those other Plagues of the World; who, to satisfie their restless Ambition, endeavoured to possess their Souldiers with this Opinion of Prede∣stination, that they might more freely encounter the greatest Dangers, run boldly headlong, on oc∣casion, into the Breaches of a besieged Town or City, and so serve as a Bridge for the rest to pass over into it.

I know very well that some may perhaps say, That this Opinion is mistaken, and not well un∣derstood by the Mahometans, and that they have not the true Considerations of the Corruption of our Nature by original Sin, such as we should have. But however, what can we reasonably expect from a Doctrin which may be so easily mistaken and ill understood, and that may either by mistake or otherwise have such pernicious Consequences?

For my part, if I could prevail, we should men∣tion it but very seldom, or not at all, not busying our selves to stir up those Difficulties which are of no use, but to intangle the Minds of Men; and which the Apostle himself esteems too deep to be search'd into and discover'd by our human Under∣standings, but truly to acknowledge our own Igno∣rance, and be contended to say with him, O infi∣nite and unfathomable Depth of Wisdom and Knowledge, how incomprehensible are thy Judg∣ments, and thy Ways past discovery to Mankind! Quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus & investiga∣biles viae ejus!

CHAP. IV. Of Divination, or the foretelling of future Contingencies.

AS Epicurus could not understand how two contrary Propositions, which regard a fu∣ture Contingency, the one could be certainly true and the other infallibly false, and that notwith∣standing Man could continue his Free-will and be at liberty to make his Choice; and of two Things proposed to do one or t' other, tho' there could be but one determined to be done; he therefore was of Opinion, that there could be no Divination or certain Prediction, in relation to things to come, which were of themselves contingent: And that therefore there was no Art to Divine, nor any true Divination; and if there were, the things that were foretold and should come to pass would not be in our Power: For if what were predicted were absolutely true and unquestionable, it could not be otherwise but it must happen accordingly, and con∣sequently the contrary could not: So that there would be a necessity for the doing one, and no li∣berty left for the other. But we have already proved that the Fore-knowledge and Fore-sight of God may very well agree with the Free-will of Man, and therefore the Truth of the things which have been foretold by the Prophets, inspired from above and contained in the Holy Scriptures, re∣mains entire.

Therefore we shall only mention that Divination which was so famous among the ancient Heathens. Cicero saith, that of all the Philosophers, there is

none that hath more despised and ridicul'd it than Epicurus, Nihil tam ridet Epicurus quam praedictiones rerum futurarum. And when he speaks of the Sto∣icks, who were addicted to, and protectors of this Opinion, he says, that he was sorry that those who were of his Sect had given occasion to the Epicu∣reans to laugh at them; Doleo Stoicos nostros Epicu∣reis deridendi sui facultatem dedisse; non enim ignoraes quam ista derideant. And elsewhere he saith, if we should give heed to those Discourses, we should commit an Act of Superstition, we should adore all those Sooth-sayers and Fortune-tellers, Tanta im∣bueremur superstitione, ut Haruspices, Augures, Harioli & Conjectores nobis essent colendi. Epicurus, saith he again, delivered us from all those Fears, and set us at Liberty; His terroribus ab Epicuro soluti fuerimus & in libertatem vindicati, &c.

Epicurus gave no Credit to Dreams, as Eumolpus saith in Petronius, This gives us to understand, saith he, that Epicurus was an excellent Man, for he ri∣diculed all those sorts of Fooleries. And Tertullian, Vana in totum somnia Epicurus judicavit. Cicero, In∣solenter credo ab Epicureo aliquo inductus disputat som∣niis credi non oportere.

He laughs in Lucretius for the Interpretation that was made of those Prodigies.

But not by reading Tuscan Books enquire The Gods Design by this celestial Fire.

He had no greater Opinion of the Oracles; if we may credit Origen and Eusebius, who inform us that Epicurus and all his Disciples laughed at 'em. And Plutarch brings in a certain Boethian, an Epi∣curean, who found fault with the Verses of the Sy∣bils, as weak, simple and senseless, without, quan∣tity or measure, and as having nothing Divine in

them, Tanquam principio truncos, medio elumbes, fine claudicantes, &c. and that the Style was so flat that there was no Poet that would offer to imitate them. Besides, the same Plutarch observes, that Colotes sus∣pected the Oracle of Apollo concerning Socrates. And Lucretius commends Empedocles, and other Phi∣losophers, for having given Answers savouring more of Sanctity and Certainty, than those of the Delphick Oracle.

— For some rare Inventions justly fam'd Which they have left as Oracles more sure Than from the Tripod spoke, and less obscure Than those the Ancients from the Pythia heard.

And because Epicurus saw that commonly Men suffered themselves to be carried away with a per∣suasion, that this kind of Divination was effected by the means of the Gods or of the Demons; and that those who made Profession of this Art, were as it were inspir'd with a Divine Fury when they were ready to prophecy or foretel future Events, as may appear by these Verses:

Now to the Mouth they come; Aloud she cries This is the time, enquire your Destinies He comes; behold the God! — Greater than Human Kind she seem'd to look And with an Accent more than Mortal spoke When all the Gods came rushing on her Soul, &c.

And as may be seen in that Passage of Apuleius, where one may see the Relation of all those Fop∣peries of Antiquity, which the common People re∣ceived for Truths, and the wiser for Cheats.

Among the Demons, every one hath his distinct Office, some have the care to adjust and interpret

Dreams; others to make certain Remarks on the Bowels of Beasts; others to govern the flying of Birds, and to teach them the augurial Notes or Chirpings; others to inspire their Prophets; o∣thers to manage the Thunderbolts, and cause the Lightning to burst out of the Clouds;

and thus of other Circumstances, by which we under∣stand the things to come, which depend only upon the Will and Power of the Celestial Divinities; but are discovered to us by the Means, Media∣tion, and care of the Demons. Thus by a Dream Hannibal was advertised of the loss of an Eye. The Soothsayers were Impowered to foretel Flaminius the danger he was in of losing a Battle; Accius might by a Miracle cut asunder a Whetstone with a Raizor that there might appear the signs of the alteration in the Royalty; that an Eagle should continue over the Head of Tarquin to shadow him; and that the Countenance of Servius Tullius should look as if inraged: In a Word, that all the Pre∣dictions of the Soothsayers, the appearances of Lightnings, and the Verses of the Sybils, &c. Be∣cause I say Epicurus saw that Men suffered themselves to be commonly imposed upon by these things which he look'd upon as childish and as most un∣reasonable; he therefore denied the being of Spirits, and fancied that all those Events were to be ascribed rather to Fortune or Chance than to any unknown Cause; and the rather because if we should agree that there were any Demons, we ought not therefore to believe that their Under∣standing is so large as to penetrate into things to come, or to foresee and foretel the certainty of future Events.

By the same Reason he denied that Divination which they commonly proved by the things that

these Spirits foretold, when they appeared to Men; for after that Brutus had discerned that famous Ap∣parition of his Genius or Ghost to Cassius, a Dis∣ciple of Epicurus, answered him plainly, You are deceived; 'tis not to be believed that there are any Spirits, and if there were, they cannot have any hu∣man Shape or Voice, nor any thing answerable to our Senses: Yet I would to God that these things were true, that so we might not only rely upon our Arms, our Troops and our strong Fleets at Sea, but also upon the Succours and Supports of these Demons and Spirits, we who are the Generals of so Holy and Religious a Party! Now this Opinion of Epicurus ought not to be condemn'd, because he laughed at that too great Credulity and Superstition of the Hea∣thens, as well in Relation to Divination as in Rela∣tion to the Demons; but it is to be blamed, in that at least he hath not believed in general the being of Spirits; seeing that not only Religion, but Rea∣son assures us of their Existence, as it did really perswade those Philosophers, amongst whom Plu∣tarch reckons principally Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, the Stoicks, besides Empedocles and some others, who affirmed that there were Demons who are living Substances; and there are also Heroes, who are Souls either Good or Evil, freed from their Bodies: For tho' they have erred as well in Rela∣tion to their Substance as to the Qualities that they attributed to their Demons, yet however they judged aright when they believed that there were such. But seeing we are to discourse of Divination, per∣haps it will not be amiss to speak first something of the Demons, unto whom it was commonly as∣cribed.

Of Demons or Spirits, according to the Opinion of Antiquity.

LET us suppose that they are those unto whom the Holy Writ gives usually the Titles of An∣gels, and sometimes Demons, Devils or Satan, when it speaks of the Apostate Angels. The Hea∣thens call them not only Demons, but also Genii; tho' amongst them they were reputed to be of a Divine Nature, or of a Nature little lower than the Divine. They were also named Gods and Demi-Gods, and Sons of Gods, but yet Bastards, as be∣ing born of Nymphs, &c. Not to insist upon the saying of Aristotle, that they were separated Sub∣stances, because not Corporeal, and according to his Disciples, Intelligences, because they have Under∣standings, Intelligences in Latin signifying the same as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Greek, if what Lactantius and Macro∣bius, after Plato, have taught us, is really true.

This being premised, now that we may the bet∣ter understand what notion Pythagoras, Plato, and the rest of 'em had of Demons, we must call to Mind what hath been said of the Soul of the World: For they who have received this Opinion have fancied that these Demons as well as our Souls, were nothing else but Particles or small parcels of the Soul of the World. And because they believed also that the Soul of the World was the same as God, they imagin'd that the Demons were Parti∣cles of the Divine Nature; and from them seve∣veral Heretick have taken occasion to discourse of Angels in the same manner, in the infancy of the Christian Church, for they fancy them to be taken out of the Divine Substance.

These Philosophers therefore thought the Soul of the World to be like a vast and bottomless Ocean, from whence proceeds Angels and the Souls of Men, upon Condition to return back again, and reunite at last, after a time, as so many little Streams that run into the Sea. Plotinus seems to compare them to the Body of a Tree, whereof Demons and Souls were as the Branches, the little Twigs, the Leaves, the Flowers and the Fruits: Thus they fancied that in the same manner as the Water that runs through the Earth carries with it something of the Substance of the Minerals through which it passeth, so the Particles of the Soul of the World clothed it often with the Substance of the most subtil Bodies, unto which they remained chiefly fixed and tied.

And as they judged that this Soul though it is dif∣fused through all the World, it resided neverthe∣less more particularly in the upper Region, and consequently amongst the Stars, and chiefly in the Sun; So they believed that when the Celestial Bodies spread abroad their Influences to revive and entertain the earthly Beings, that they proceed from Heaven as so many Beams from this Soul that revives all things, and that they Incorporate or be∣come Bodies in a differing manner in their Passage, clothing themselves with a kind of Airy Habit, and remaining afterwards some in the Air, and the others proceeding as far as the Earth: So that they have believed that these kind of Substances which are thus composed of a thin Body, such as is the Air, and of a Particle of the Soul of the World, are the Demons and the Souls: Demons when they con∣tinue free from any mixture of the grosser Bodies of this Earth.

I shall not examin their other Fancy, That if the thin Body with which the Particles of the Soul of the

World is clothed, be found to be of a sweet kind and favourable Composure, then in their Opinion they happen to be good Demons or Spirits; but evil when it is sharp and malicious. Neither shall I take notice of their other Imagination, That when our Souls are departed out of our Bodies, they become again Demons, not immediately, nor equally, because retaining some Relicks of the Hu∣man Body, they could not be Demons until they were entirely stript, but only Heroes or demi-Gods. Let these be mention'd only in reference to the Opinion of those who chiefly follow Hesiod, who as Plutarch relates, hath made mention of four sorts of Beings that are endowed with Reason, the Gods, the Demons, the Heroes and Men; I say those who follow Hesiod, for Plato, Pythagoras and o∣thers, who believe these last to be the greatest Pro∣tectors of Demons, have divided Rational Beings into three sorts, namely Gods, Demons and Men.

Moreover we may shew by several Passages that they fancied these Demons to be of a certain middle Nature, between the Gods and Men, or as they speak, upon the Confines of Immortals and Mortals: But no Man better explained this Opinion than Apuleius; for after that he had said that 'tis by their Means and Mediation that there is a Correspon∣dence between the Gods and Men; and as the other Regions of the World have their Beings to inhabit and live there; so the Superiour Region hath the Stars; the Fire the small Animals mentioned by Aristotle; the Sea Fish; the Earth all our Terrestrial Animals: So the Air ought not to be without its Inhabi∣tants, which are the Demons. In this manner he explains himself,

The Bodies of the Demons, saith he, have very little weight which hinder them from ascending to the highest Regions; nor are

they so light as to fall down to the lowest. They are Creatures of a third Nature, suitable to the middle Region, where they dwell. They are between the Gods and Men, being immortal as the Gods, but subject to Passions as Men; for as they are, as we, subject to Anger and to Mercy; and like us suffer themselves to be overcome by Pray∣ers and Intreaties, by Gifts and Honours; so they are like us stir'd up to Wrath by Injuries and Con∣tempt. In a Word saith he, Daemones sunt genere animalia, ingenio rationabilia, animo passiva, corpore ae∣ria, tempore aeterna.

Where you may observe what he saith of Eternity, cannot agree with the Opinion of others, who make them subject to Generation and Corruption, unless we understand a long time for Eternity: For as these last say; Man is said to be Mortal because of the Dissolution of that part by which the Soul is tied and joyned to the Body, tho the Soul by that means ne∣ver perisheth; so the Demons ought to be reputed Mortal, because tho that Beam of the Divinity which makes up the principal and intelligent part of their Being never perisheth, yet this part is separated from the thin Body, unto which when it is united, it is reputed a Demon. This is likely to have given occasion to what we have before spoken of their Opinion, That the Demons did sometimes become Gods, as heretofore the Egyptians believed concern∣ing Isis and Osiris, Hercules, Liber and others, as Plutarch observes. And by that we may under∣stand what Jupiter speaks in Ovid, That he hath Demi-Gods;

Their dwells below a Race of Demi-Gods, Of Nymphs in Waters and of Fauns in Woods; Who, tho not worthy yet in Heaven to live, Let them at least enjoy that Earth we give.

But tho all this be full of fabulous Inventions, however we may thereby perceive that the antient Philosophers allowed the existence of Demons, and that several have treated about 'em, and declared them to be of a Nature differing from the Divine Nature. But if they have fancied them to have Bodies, this Opinion is to be excused among those Philosophers, because 'tis but of later Ages that we have been better instructed, that God alone was a Spirit without Body, they being persuaded that An∣gels and the Souls of Men were made of a very fine and thin Substance, and for that reason there is no∣thing to hinder the assigning to them Images, tho they are persuaded also, that they are Immortal by the special favour of God.

The Reason that induced these antient Philoso∣phers to believe that there are Demons, seems to be grounded upon the Notion they had of the Di∣vine Providence; for tho they believed that God takes care of all Things, yet they fancied never∣theless that it did not become his glorious Majesty to extend his Care to every particular Person by himself, and without some Ministers that might ex∣ecute his Orders. They therefore imagin'd that God keeps his Court in Heaven, is attended by Mi∣nisters and Servants always ready to obey him, by whose means he provides for all the World, but especially for this inferior World: They called these Ministers (whom they acknowledged to be very nimble and active Beings, and to us invisible) De∣mons; but they assigned the name of Genii to those whose chief office is to take care of Men.

Now tho we cannot but acknowledge that they have hit upon a real Truth, seeing 'tis certain that there are Spirits and Angels in the World who are God's Ministers, and who give their assistance espe∣cially to Men; nevertheless this Opinion is to be

understood with caution; for to speak absolutely, 'tis not unbecoming the Majesty of God to do all Things, and provide for all Things of himself; for 'tis from him that all his Ministers have received all their Strength and Power, and 'tis he who is pre∣sent at the doing of every Thing, and assists every particular Action by his Divine Influence. So that God makes use of Ministers, not because 'tis below him not to make use of 'em, or because he is not able to govern otherwise: But because, we sup∣pose the State of the World to be such as he will have it, and that he hath thought it convenient thus to order it.

But let this be as it will, their Fancy appears not only conformable to this distinction of the Hierar∣chies and celestial Orders taken out of the Holy Scriptures, but to those Doctors also and learned Di∣vines, who hold, That God hath ordained parti∣cular Angels to watch for the preservation of di∣vers kinds of Beings, of several sorts of Animals and Plants, &c. And who judge that there is no Absurdity, that there should be sometimes in the Air Demons or Spirits, who by the permission or command of God do wonderful Things; as to cause Showers of Blood, of Stones, Thunder and Storms, or extraordinary Earthquakes. And truly if we may believe Philo, Those which the Philosophers call Demons, are the same with those whom Moses names Angels, namely Souls that fly about the Air, that the Air might have its Creatures, as well as the Earth, the Water and the Fire have theirs. Besides in Holy Writ we read of certain Powers of the Air: Nay, some use Inchantments against Demons, who mix themselves in the black and thick Clouds, from whence we usually apprehend the coming of Thun∣ders, Hail and Storms.

That which these same Philosophers speak of Ge∣nii, namely that there is one Chief who governs a whole Nation, and therefore called the Genius of the People or Nation, and a particular Genius for every Man, which is chiefly and properly stiled his Genius, is also agreable with what we say in other Words, The protecting Angel of a whole Nation, and the Guardian Angel of every private and par∣ticular Person; For God, saith Epictetus, hath given to every Man a tutelar Genius that watches continually, that never Slumbers, and cannot be deceived; O Mor∣tals! when you have shut your Doors upon you, and closed your Windows, and that you are buried in Darkness, never fancy your selves to be alone, and take heed of acting any thing unjust. You are not then alone, God is in your Chamber, and your Angel is there; they have no need of Light to see what you are doing and contri∣ving. Plato speaks almost the very same Thing, and is of Opinion, That every one of us have our Guardian, from whom we can conceal nothing, and who is a con∣stant Witness of every thing that we do, whether it be Good or Evil, and for whom we are to have a particu∣lar Respect. These Philosophers also were persua∣ded that there were good and evil Genuii, whom we name good and evil Angels; for they thought that the good Things came from the Good, and the Evil from the mischievous Angels. Now that God suffers evil Angels or Demons to be the Ene∣mies of Men, and to endeavour to destroy them, this relates to the general Providence of God, who hath done nothing but for just and reasonable Ends, tho not known nor discoverable to Men. And we may say in a Word, that God suffers them, as well that good Men might be exercised, and that by their Sufferings and Patience they might deserve more, as that the Wicked by their means might be Pu∣nished.

That which we ought here to add is, That tho we are sometimes tempted by the Devil, that we are not therefore to pretend that to be a sufficient Excuse for the Evil committed, as if it were only the Work of the Devil, for the Holy Scripture de∣clares, That every one is rather tempted and drawn by his own Lusts. Hereby we ought to understand, that we have no reason to fear so much the Devil as our selves, and that we ought to accustom our selves to allay the Fire of our Concupiscence and Lust, by Temperance, that so we might the easier frustrate all the Devils endeavours.

—Or do the Gods inspire, This Warmth, or make we Gods of our Desire?

They have also been acquainted with that abo∣minable Art of Inchantment and Conjuration, which is acquired and practised by a familiarity with the Devils. I suppose there may be and are fabulous Relations in this Matter, especially when the Poets Hyperbolize and are upon their high Flights, as when Horace makes Canidia say in Anger that she can at her Command make the Images of Wax to walk, pull the Moon out of the Heavens, and make the Ashes of the Dead to revive.

An quae movere cereas imagines, Ʋt ipse nosti curiosus, & Polo, Deripere lunam vocibus possim meis, Possim crematos excitare murtuos? &c.

As when Ovid introduces Medea, imploring the assistance of Diana, of the Gods of the Forests, and of the Night, by whose help she made the Rivers to turn back to their Spring Heads, scattered the

Winds, made the Vipers to burst, the Forests and Trees to walk, &c.

Thou Night, my Spells too faithful to betray, Ye Golden Fires, whose Reign succeeds the Day; Thou triple Hecate with all thy Forms, The Witness and the Partner of my Charms. Ye secret Arts, Ye magick Lays we sing, Ye Potent Herbs, Ye Countries where they spring; Ye Mountains, Lakes and Streams, Ye Winds and Airs, Ye Gods of Woods and Night, come all and aid my Cares. By your Assistance, to their Fountain's Head, Oft from their wondring Banks have Waters fled. Winds at my Will and Clouds, I raise or lay, And move the smooth, and smooth the moving Sea. My Verse seals up the Vipers poisonous Jaws, And living Rocks, and Earth's wide Entrails draws, And Forests at my Call, the groaning Ground, Improves the Voice, and trembling Hills resound. The frighted Ghosts forsake their dark Abode, And thou, O Moon, forget'st thy Heavenly Road.

The same thing may be said of a great many Sto∣ries that we continually here concerning the like Matters. If you remove the Cheats and Cosenages of Impostors, the Mischiefs caused by Poysonings, and the Tales and Dreams of old Women, and the easy credulity of the common People, you'll scarce find any Truth remaining.

And here it seems we might speak in like man∣ner of that abominable Magick, by which some wick∣ed Wretches fancy themselves to be carried about the Air upon Goats, or transported by flying Ser∣pents, after that they have anointed themselves with Narcotick Ointments, and thus by a strong Imagi∣nation, have thought themselves conveighed to, and

present at the wicked and dreadful Assemblies of Devils and Witches.

Thus 'tis with them who fancy themselves turn∣ed into Hobgoblins. When the melancholy Hu∣mour is Predominant, and works upon them, they become fanciful and froward, and are possess'd with divers foolish Fancies of the like nature.

As for those who are said to be really tormented or possess'd by the Devil, we must acknowledge that there are some such, seeing that Holy Writ testifies as much, and that the Practice of the Ex∣orcists proves the same: But we know also what Caution we must use to distinguish between a real Possession and a deluded Imagination; what may proceed from Weakness or the Malice of the Sex, the Effects of a Disease or a design'd Cosenage among Men, who commonly understand one ano∣ther, &c.

But now let us return again to Divination, whereof we must speak somewhat.

The Gentiles believed that sometimes there was a Divination by the assistance of the Demons. Truly, tho' in this particular, there hath been a great deal of Superstition and Cosenage; neverthe∣less, there must needs have been sometimes some∣thing of Truth to have obtained Credit, and given Birth to so general a Belief; for as Cicero saith,

I find no Nation whatever, whether Learned or Ig∣norant, Civil or Barbarous, but hath been per∣suaded that there are some Signs and Prognosticks of future Events; and that some Men have been able to understand and interpret them.

The Difficulty consists in this only, when the Prediction hath been performed by the means of the Devil, or by the cunning and subtilty of the Sooth-sayers, or by the credulity of those who make the Inqui∣ries: For as God hath foretold many things by the

Angels, which are contain'd in the Holy Scrip∣tures; likewise he hath suffer'd that many things should be foretold among the Heathens by the means of the Devil: This hath caused the Fathers and the holy Doctors to exclaim against the Hea∣thens, because they suffer'd themselves to be per∣suaded and cheated by the Devils. And Historians as well as Poets, tell us, That some of these De∣vils were become Dumb, and were forced to be silent, as well at the appearance of Christ in the World, as at the Presence and Command of cer∣tain holy and religious Persons. But sometimes these things were only meer Fancies, Dreams, De∣lusions and Impostures, which were ascribed to the Demons. But let us insist upon this no longer.

Let us rather observe, that when it concerns Di∣vination or the Fore-knowledge of things to come, we understand not that Divination, by which we foresee and foretel things; whereof the Causes are natural necessary and not to be hindered, as are the Eclipses, the rising of the Stars, and such like Phaenomena that depend upon a certain disposition and a constant Motion of the Celestial Bodies. Neither do we understand that which is taken for a simple Conjecture grounded upon likely Causes, that every one according to his Capacity, and ac∣cording to his Cunning or happens in guessing well to foretel. In this sense Euripides, and after him Cicero have said, That he is the best Prophet whose Conjectures come to pass.

Qui conjicit bene, ille V••tes optimus.

Thus Thales might have been look'd upon as a Prophet, when he foretold the great quantity of Olives, by natural Prognosticks, which we have mentioned before. In the same manner Pherecides,

when he saw the Water that was newly taken out of the Well, declared that an Earthquake would speedily ensue: And generally whosoever is expert in his Art may be esteem'd for a Pro∣phet; for we may say with Cicero,

No Man can better tell by what Tempest the City is threatned than the Governour, nor what is the Nature of the Disease than the Physician, nor how we must behave our selves in the War than the General of an Army.

We mean not therefore that kind of conjectural Divination, but such as relate to things meerly casual, that is to say, those kind of Events that have no Causes that may be seen, and that are such that their dependence upon their Causes is not known; as that Eschylus shall be kil∣led by the fall of a Tortoise, which an Eagle shall cast upon his Head, and such like Events.

This being pre-supposed, it follows, that all Di∣vination is performed either artificially or natural∣ly. The artificial is that which glories to have taken its rise from Experience and long Observa∣tion, tho it can give no Reason, nor tell the Cau∣ses of those things that are foretold; such is that unto which the Augures, among the Romans pre∣tended, who predicted by the flight or chirping of Birds; The Haruspices by looking into the Bowels of Animals; The Sortilegi by Lot; The Interpre∣ters of Dreams that were dubious and obscure; The Interpreters of Thunders, Monsters and Pro∣digies; Those skill'd in Physiognomy and Palmestry, and such as pretend by the Lines of the Hand to foretel certain particular Events, attended with the Circumstances of Places, of Times, of Persons and Things. As to what concerns the Temper and natural Inclinations, no doubt but there are signs of them in the Body; but yet these signifie not, that such and such things shall come to pass at such

and such a time, and that in such and such a man∣ner.

As to that other sort of Divination, which is not performed by Art or by the help of Signs or long Observation, this is effected by some Appari∣tion, or a discourse with Ghosts or Spirits, or by a certain Agitation or Fury of Mind, either super∣natural or caused by the Devil: Such is that which we believe to have been in the Sybils, and such as have been in an Extasie, of those whose Under∣standing, sometimes when they have been awake and other times in their sleep, hath been so moved and exalted beyond its ordinary Station, that it sees many things that in a natural and peaceable Temper it sees not.

As for artificial Divination, 'tis not needful that we should busie our selves to refute it, seeing by that what we have said concerning judicial Astrology, 'tis certain, that if this Art, which among all the Arts of Divination is the Chief, and yet is but vain and fantastical; the rest ought not to be otherwise esteem'd: And truly if there were any reality in these Arts, why at present, since they are of no use in any Religion, should they be looked upon as of worth, seeing that heretofore when their Re∣ligion ordered them to be taken notice of, the learned and most intelligible Men of those Times slighted them? For we know what Advice Thales gave to Periander, when a Monster, half Man and half Beast was born of a Mare, from whence the Chief Priest concluded that there would be a dan∣gerous Sedition that would follow: 'Tis also known what Cato, as Cicero tells, used merrily to say, That he wondered that when a Fortune-teller or Cunning Man met with another of the same Trade, that is to say, one Cheat met with another, how he could contain himself from smiling; Mira∣ri

se quod non rideret Haruspex Haruspicem cum vi∣disset. 'Tis the same thing which was said upon the occasion of a Serpent that had wound it self about a Lever; that it had been indeed a wonder if the Lever had been wound about the Serpent. Thus Hannibal spoke to King Prusias, who was loath to fight, because the Bowels of the Beasts were not favourable; Had you rather give Credit to the Entrails of a Calf, than to an able and expe∣rienced General of an Army, as Hannibal? Such ano∣ther Story is related of Claudius Pulcher, who was resolved to ingage in a Sea-Fight, tho' the Chickens would not come out of their Coup: Well, said he, to the Keeper who told him that it was but an ill Sign, cast them into the Sea; for seeing they will not eat they shall drink, Quia esse nolunt, bibant. Marcellus also said pleasantly, That when he would perform any thing he was willing to, the better not to be hindered by these Men of Art, was wont to march with his Litter shut. And Mosamac, who kill'd a Bird that hindered a whole Caravan from marching on their Journey, because they saw it flying sometimes this way sometimes that, spoke thus to 'em;

Are you such Fools as to believe that this Bird that knew not how to preserve its own life, should know any thing of our Journey?

We may alledge our daily Experience; certainly when Experience is constant, there is nothing but ought to yield to it. But how often do things hap∣pen contrary to what is foretold?

Flavinius, saith Cicero, obeyed the Sooth-sayers, and perished with his Army. A year after Paulus, who was also persuaded by them, was also killed with all his Army at the Battel of Cannae. What shall we say of the Answers of the Augures? I know of a great many that have had no Events, or such as were contrary to their Predictions. These Di∣viners,

forbid Cesar to pass over into Africa before Winter; yet he passed over and Conquered.

If what we Dream of happens sometimes, how often doth it never come to Pass? and because some∣times it never happens, ought we not to con∣clude, that if it happens 'tis Chance, rather than to think that there is any Art in it? Who is it that shoots every Day with a Bow, and will not sometimes hit the Mark? We sleep every Night, and there is scarce any of us but Dream, and we seem surprised when what we have dreamt of sometimes comes to pass: You will say 'tis an effect of the Providence of the Gods to intimate to us before hand by Signs, the things that may befall us; for there is nothing more useful to us. But to what end should the Gods give us Signs of the Mischiefs that must fall upon us? Why should they give us such Signs that we cannot un∣derstand without Interpreters? Why should they signify to us what we cannot avoid? and if the Signs are of a Divine Original, why are they so obscure? Is it probable that the Immortal Gods those Divine and Excellent Beings, should busy themselves to buz about the Beds and mean Re∣tirements of poor Mortals, in what part of the World soever they be; and that when they find any of them snoring, they should present them with troublesome, dubious and obscure Visions to fright them, and to oblige them the next Morning to run and consult the Soothsayer? Is not this a natural Effect that our active Spirits having been lately disturb'd should fancy to see sleeping what they had seen when awake? Which of these is most becoming a Philosopher, to In∣terpret things by the Superstion of Fortune-tellers and Conjurers, or by the Explication of Na∣tural

Causes; and the less we are to heed them, because they who exercise this Profession, are Fel∣lows made up of the Dregs of the People, and very Ignorant.

One that was to run in the Olypick Games dreamt as he was a sleeping, that he was carried away upon a Chariot with four Horses. In the Morning he went and consulted the Soothsayers; they told him you will infallibly carry away the Prize, the swiftness and the strength of the Horses intimate as much. The same Per∣son went to advise with Antiphon, who assured him that of Necessity he would be overcome; Don't you see that four ran before you? A married Wo∣man that desires to have a Child, and questions whether she is Pregnant; and fancies that her Womb is shut up: The Soothsayer that she went to advise with in the Morning, told her that she could not possibly Conceive, because her Womb was closed up: Another tells her that doubtless she was with Child; because nothing is sealed or closed up in vain, and without cause. What ought we to think of that Conjectural Art which is to no other end but to delude and deceive us by the subtilty of Wit? Is it that the great number of Observations and Precepts that the Stoicks have gathered con∣cerning this matter, signifies any thing else but a little Cunning and Subtilty, which from some like∣lyhood carries its Conjecture, now this way, than a∣nother? Suppose one should now find a Serpent twin'd about the young Roscius yet in his Cradle, which perhaps was false; but if there should be found one in the Cradle, there is no great won∣der, because the Serpents are very common and numerous at Celoin, they being often found by the Fire-side.

I know that these Soothsayers pretend that there is nothing more Illustrious; nothing more Noble, more Excellent, than their Art. I wonder why the Immortal Gods should be willing to shew such strange and miraculous Thing, in favour of a Charlatan, and that they would never shew so much Favour to a Scipio Africanus.

For as to that Divination which is without Art, we might justly take for Fabulous; such as that re∣lated amongst the Heathens of certain Spirits that appeared openly, and familiarly discoursed and foretold things that were to come: For to mention something of that of Brutus that told him that he should lose the Day at the Battel in the Fields of Philippi, and that he would there ap∣pear to him: We must observe that Brutus having revealed this Apparition the foregoing Night to Cassius, the next Morning Cassius told him that this supposed Apparition or Spirit was but a Mist before his Eyes, or of his deluded Imagina∣tion: And that this was the more probable because Brutus was of a Melancholy Temper, as Plutarch observes, that the troubles of his Mind so oppressed him that he seldom slept; and when he considered in what danger the Common-wealth was, and re∣membred that Pompey had been unhappy in a like cause, he pondred what Resolution he might take if things succeeded not well; and that which is considerable, ruminating and thinking upon these and such like things, when the Night was well spent all his Camp very silent, all their Lights out, and he half asleep, 'tis no wonder that he then thought he had seen and heard his Genius or Spirit, because he was perswaded by the Doctrines of his Sect, be∣ing a Stoick, that there were good and evil Spirits; besides there are four Circumstances that discover

in what disturbance his Mind was then in, and that we may suppose him to have been but in a Slumber, or as we say Dreaming, or half asleep: The first is that he enquired of his Servants if they had heard nothing: This shews that he him∣self was doubtful whether this had happened to him awake or asleep. The second, that the Do∣mesticks answered him that they had neither seen nor heard any thing; nevertheless if it had been so, they could not but have seen that monstrous Image or Appearance, at least to have heard its Voice, which Brutus declared to be to this effect; I am, O Brutus! thy evil Genius, thou shalt see me a∣gain at the Fields of Philippi: The third, that his Servants should have heard the Speech of Brutus to the Spirit, when he askt it whether it was a God or Man, and what it would have? Ecquis tu Deo∣rum aut hominum es? Ecquid tibi vis qui ad nos venisti? And that Word which he spake without being daunted, after the Spirit had discoursed with him, Videbo: The fourth, is that Brutus according to the Relation of Plutarch, was settled in his Mind after that he had heard and advised with Cassius, by whose reasoning he understood that all this was but a meer Dream.

But what shall we say of that famous Genius or Demon of Socrates? 'Tis true Socrates himself speaks of it diversly in several Places; but as this Philosopher was altogether employed about pre∣scribing Precepts of good Manners; he may per∣haps make use of this cunning to add a greater weight to his wholsome Admonitions; for we may know well enough with what authority he speaks who is supposed to be divinely Inspired: Besides, when Simias in Plutarch made it his business to in∣quire of Socrates himself what this Genius was;

Socrates never answered him a Word: This shews sufficiently that Socrates would not tell a lie by confirming it, nor would deny it by answering, for fear that his wholsome and good Councils should lose thereby their Authority and Influence.

So that we may suppose that the Genius of Soc∣rates was nothing else but his Reason, his Wis∣dom, and Natural Prudence, which had been em∣powered by a constant and continual Study of Philosophy, and which discover'd to him what was best to be done, and furnished him with those good Counsels which he imparted to his Auditors; and this is so much the more probable because Xeno∣crates, one of the Disciples and Successors of Plato, and who consequently ought to know the Thoughts of Plato and of Socrates, saith, That he is happy who is inriched with a good Soul, and that such a Soul is to every one of us a Genius or advising Spirit. And Plato speaks in this manner of that most excellent part, our Soul, That God hath bestowed it upon us to be as our Demon that inhabits in the highest and loftiest Fortress of our Bodies; and that he who takes care of that divine Spark within him, and who emproves well his familiar Spirit, becomes extraordinary Happy. Clemens Alexandrius speaks almost to the same Purpose, when he teaches, That Happiness is nothing else but to emprove well our Spirit or Genius, and that the prin∣cipal part of our Souls is called by the name of Demon.

As to what concerns that supposed Agitation by which the Spirit being as it were out of it self, and seperated from all Matter, foretold things to come; this supposeth that the Spirit is a Particle of God, or of the Soul of the World, and by that means knows all things, as being of the same Na∣ture with God, who is present in all Actions, and every where, and therefore is ignorant of nothing.

Now the Disciples of Plato, and generally all those who are perswaded that our Soul is part of the Soul of the World, fancy that when the Soul is ingaged in the Body, it sees not plainly all things as that Soul doth whereof it is a Particle; but nevertheless, that it is in a possibility to see and know them; first when it is stirred up by the strength of certain Diseases; for Aristotle acknow∣ledgeth, that in those Persons who are troubled with Melancholy, there seems something Divine, which predicts the time to come.

Secondly, when it withdraws its self in its own Being, and is in a perfect Tranquility, and Se∣questring it self at the same moment from the Thoughts and Incumbrances of Corporeal Matters; and is if we may so say, altogether in its own Power, which happens as they say, chiefly in Dreams, or when we are ready to die, and when it begins to free it self from the Clog of the Body; for these be the very Words of Plato, cited by Cicero. Plato therefore appoints us to pre∣pare and dispose in such a manner our Bodies for sleep, that there may be nothing to cause a mistake or distur∣bance; for this cause the Disciples of Pythagoras were forbidden to eat Beans, because this Food causeth the the Stomach to swell, and begets Wind and Vapors that disturb the Tranquility of the Mind; when therefore in our sleep the Spirit is disengaged from these hindrances of the Body, it calls to Mind the time past, sees the pre∣sent, and foresees the time to come; for the Body of a sleeping Person is like that of a dead Man; but his Spirit is living, and in its full Vigour.

But not to stay here to refute this Persuasion; because 'tis a meer Fable to say that our Souls are the Particles of the Divine Substance, and that there are some who can Prophecy in their Madness, in

their Melancholy, or in their Sleep: Let us only conclude with Cicero's Words, That 'tis very ab∣surd to believe that God sends Dreams; for that they are incident not only to Men of Sense and Ho∣nour and Wisdom, but even to Men of meanest and lowest Degree.

Of the Oracles.

LAstly, for the Oracles and those Predictions that are ascribed to the Sybils and to the Prophets, when they were possess'd with a divine Fury that disturb'd them, caused their Colour and Counte∣nance to change, their Head and Breast to swell in such a manner that they were quite out of breath, and as it were ready to expire, as Virgil excellently represents it:

—Thus while she laid, And shivering at the sacred Entrance staid, Her Colour chang'd, her Face was not the same And hollow Groans from her deep Spirit came: Her Hair stood up; convulsive Rage possess'd Her trembling Limbs, and heav'd her labouring Breast; Greater than Human Kind she seem'd to look, And with an Accent more than Mortal spoke: Her staring Eyes with sparkling Fury roul, When all the Gods came rushing on her Soul.

I shall not say that this kind of Fury seems not becoming the Divine Majesty, and therefore Cicero hath great cause to speak of it in these words; What Reason or Authority can you produce for this Divine Fury? Can it be suppos'd, that what a wise Man cannot foresee, a Fool or a Man de∣priv'd of his Senses should be able to discover? I shall only observe some Particulars that will dis∣cover to us the Vanity and Folly of the thing: The first is the affectation of delivering their Ora∣cles in Verse and not in Prose. We have already observed that the Disciples of Epicurus made but a

sport of those Verses, as being ridiculous and un∣worthy of the Divinity: In this manner Cicero speaks of them,

These Verses which they say the Sybil in her fury made and pronouc'd, savour more of Cunning and Subtilty, than of Transport and Disturbance of Mind; for the Author who compos'd them, hath artificially contrived, that whatsoever happen'd, it will seem to be thereby foretold, for they express nothing precisely nor plainly, neither of Men nor Times; but have de∣signedly made them obscure, that they might seem at another time to be fit for other purposes; all which does not denote a Person in furious Transports, but one who is sensible and cautious of what he doth or saith.

The Second particular is this Amphibologia, or manner of delivering these Oracles with a double Signification, which Savours of a Subtilty that is no greater than what belongs to Man. Besides among many of those who are most Famous, there are se∣veral that are forged and invented meerly for Plea∣sure. For Example in relation to these.

Craesus, the Halys passing, shall destroy, A mighty Mass of Wealth— Pyrrhus, thy Force the Romans shall destroy.

Cicero informs us that the First was never given to Croesus, and that Herodotus may have invented it of his own Head, as Ennius contrived the latter. And especially as to the latter, for that it was cer∣tainly forged at pleasure, and that it was never de∣livered to Pyrrhus, because Apollo never spoke in Latin, and that in the Days of Pyrrhus, Apollo had left off making Verses.

The third particular is the Juggling or Forge∣ries related at large by Eusebius, which prove that the Oracles were never delivered by the Gods or by the Demons, but that they were contrived by cunning Knaves, Cheats and Impostors; as Lucian very well observed, when he tells us by what means

he himself discovered all the Subtilty by which the false Prophet, Alexander, had made himself so fa∣mous in the Oracle. He saith moreover, that this false Prophet hated very much the Christians and the Epicureans, because they maintained, that the Oracles were nothing but meer Lies. In this man∣ner Eusebius speaks of them;

They have among them Promoters and Ministers of their Cheats and Tricks, who walk up and down and round about to inquire diligently, and ask those who came, for what purpose and upon what occasion every one comes to consult the Oracle: They have in their Temples a great many dark Corners and Places to retreat and hide, where the People are not to enter, and where they place themselves to hear what is spoken, without being seen. So that the Darkness of the place, the Precaution, the Superstition of those that come, and the Au∣thority of the Ancients who have believed in these Oracles, are of great use to 'em: We might add also the Folly and Stupidity of the People, who never try nor examin things, and the Dex∣terity, the Cunning and Subtilty of those who manage the Business, and who promise to every one pleasing Things, and entertain all the World with fair Hopes, &c.

He relates afterwards their ambiguous manner of speaking, their unusual and barbarous Words, and the affected composure of their Expressions, how often the Oracles have been proved guilty of Fals∣hood, and how often those who by their Advice have undertaken Wars, and have met with very ill Success; how many Persons they have deluded, unto whom they promised Health and Prosperity: And after his Conclusion from hence, that they were no Gods but Impostors, who uttered these Oracles, he continues and goes on thus,

But why do you think it is that they thus court Strangers, and give them such great Encouragments, more

than the Inhabitants of the Place, who are their Friends or Fellow-Citizens, unto whom they should consequently endeavour to render the Gods more Propitious than to others who are no ways related to them? The Reason is plain; for it is much more easy to deceive Strangers, who understand not their Jugglings, than Neighbours who are ac∣quainted with all their slights and cunning. This shews sufficiently that there is nothing here Di∣vine, nothing that is above the Reach and Con∣trivance of Man.

Afterwards he reckons up several Oracles that have faltred, and divers of their Temples that have been burned; and then argues from thence,

If these wonderful Utterers of Oracles are not able to protect their own Temples nor defend them∣selves in time of Danger, how can they defend others? But the strongest Reason of all is, that many of these Diviners, Sooth-sayers and For∣tune-tellers having been by the Ancients examin∣ed, and more lately by the Romans, have plainly discovered the Truth, and declared that the Mi∣stake proceeded from the too easie credulity of Men, and that all was nothing but Subtilty and Cheat.

We are not here to forget, that after Eusebius had made mention of the Disciples of Ari∣stotle, and of the Cynicks, says as to the Epicu∣reans,

That he wonder'd at them, because being bred from their Cradle, after the manner of the Greeks, and instructed by their Parents in the Belief and Doctrins of the Gods; they neverthe∣less would not suffer themselves to be cheated by Mistakes, but have boldly declared their Senti∣ments against such Oracles, tho' they were then very famous and much frequented from all parts of the World, protesting that they were meer Cheats and Impostures, and making it appear that they were not only foolish, idle, and vain, but also wicked.