Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.

THE Second BOOK OF VIRTUE IN GENERAL. (Book 2)

CHAP. I. Of Virtue in General.

IN the first Place we must take notice, that Ari∣stotle, Plutarch, and others, have observ'd three things in the Mind or Soul of Man, Faculties, Actions, and Habits: The Faculties are the Abi∣lities, from whence proceed the Actions; as of Anger, for example, or Pity: The Actions are the Deeds or Acts themselves, as to be actually Angry, to be actually Afflicted, or to have an actual Compassion: The Habits, or the Facility of

the Soul to produce such Acts, or the natural In∣clination or Tendency of the Soul to that pur∣pose.

Secondly, As there are some Actions which are Vicious and Evil, as when we are excessively Angry; some Just and Good, as when we keep within the Bounds of Moderation; so likewise there are some Habits which are Vicious, and some Good.

Thirdly, That Virtue is neither a Faculty nor a bare Act, but an Habit, viz. a virtuous Habit, that inclines and directs us to just and honourable Things.

Fourthly, As Aristotle divides the Soul into two Parts, viz. the one the Reasonable, which we term the Understanding, the other the Sensitive Appe∣tite, which we call the Will; so he admitteth in the one and the other Part, Faculties, Actions, and Habits, that both being capable of Habits, might also be capable of Virtues.

Fifthly, That there is this difference between the first and the second Part, that the Virtues of the first relate to what is true, or proposes Truth for their End; but the Virtues of the Appetite or Will, look upon what is Good, or have Goodness for their End.

Sixthly, That the Virtues of the first Part are five, Prudence, Wisdom, Understanding, Science, and Art; and of the second three, Fortitude, Tem∣perance, and Justice.

Seventhly, And because some may not think it strange that Aristotle should rank Virtue in the se∣cond Part; to obviate their Objection, he says, That this part indeed hath no Reason, yet it may be said to have it, because it hearkens to it, and is in respect of the Reasonable part, as a Son in re∣spect of his Father, who governs him by his Instru∣ctions.

Eighthly, That the Virtues which are in the rea∣sonable Part being named Intellectual, because they relate to the Mind; but the others which are in the Will, being stiled Moral, in respect of the Manners of Men; we are not to be concerned precisely with the first, but with the latter; I say precisely, where∣by to separate Prudence, which is the Guide of all Moral Virtues, and which is so interwoven with our Manners, that it is not only reckoned among the Moral Virtues, but the First and Chief of all the rest: For Aristotle saith very judiciously, That as Sagacity (he means that Faculty of Ability dex∣trously to find out the means whereby to come to the End we propose) is accomplish'd by Prudence. So natural Virtue, that is to say, a natural Pro∣pensity or Disposition to Virtue, is made perfect by Wisdom or by right Reason, which cannot be without Prudence. Therefore he terms all Vir∣tues Prudence, not properly, but because they can∣not be attain'd without Prudence: For that Rea∣son also when the Philosophers give the Definition of Virtue, they say it is an Habit conformable to right Reason, or rather that it is assisted by right Reason; now right Reason is guided by Prudence, or it is indeed Prudence it self. And therefore the Definition that Aristotle gives of Virtue, compre∣hends in it right Reason or Prudence; for he saith, that Virtue is an elective Habit which consists in a certain Mediocrity, directed by Reason or Pru∣dence; Virtus est habitus electivus in mediocritate quae ad nos est consistens, ratione definitus, aut prout vir pru∣dens definierit.

Upon which we may observe, That all the Phi∣losophers agree very well with Aristotle, That Vir∣tue is an Habit prescrib'd or regulated by Reason or by Prudence. Therefore Cicero calls it a con∣stant and even Temper of Mind, which makes

them deservedly praised in whom it abides, or rather a constant and regular Reason. Seeing that a Man is accounted virtuous, or said to be adorned with Virtue, not when casually, or out of Dissimulation, or unwillingly and contrary to his Inclination, he does an Action worthy of Praise, but when he is dis∣posed in such a manner, that what he does proceeds from a strong Inclination and constant Resolution of doing well; grounded upon serious deliberation, and continued with a Delight and Satisfaction. They agree also, that we should name it an elective Habit, because hereby it is distinguished from the Habits of the Understanding, which don't require that the Acts should be produced by the choice of the Appetite, as the moral Habits do, which indeed would not be moral if our Acts were not in our choice, and done freely. But as to what they say, That Virtue consists in a Medium, this hath given occasion to several, and chiefly to the Stoicks, to contend and exclaim that he hath lessen'd Virtue, by placing it in the middle between Two contrary Vices, and by making it in that manner to partake of both Extremes. And tho we have already men∣tioned this matter, yet it is of that great Impor∣tance, that it deserves to be treated of more at large.

In what sense Virtue is said to consist in a Medium, or to be placed in a Mediocrity.

ARistotle observes, That in the object of Virtue one may distinguish two Mediums, one he names the Medium of the Thing, Medium rei, which is from one side to the other, equally distant from the Extremes; and this is the same in the Judg∣ment of all Men; as for Example, the number of Six between Two and Ten; for it is distant from

one and the other five Unites; therefore he calls that a middle in Arithmetick, which is termed an Arithmetical Proportion. The other he stiles a Medium in respect of our selves, Medium quoad nos, or which is neither above nor beneath what is con∣venient for us: From hence it is, that it cannot be the same in respect of all Men, because the same thing is not equally convenient to all; for Example, if to Eat six Pounds weight is too much, and Two too little, the Rule therefore of the Athletes pre∣scribes not six Pounds to all, for it is too little for a Milo and too much for a Tiro. Wherefore this Middle or Medium is commonly stiled, the Middle according to Reason, Medium Rationis, because it is appointed by right Reason, and because it consists in that Reason or Proportion, which Aristotle ought to have named of Geometry, and which belongs on∣ly to the wise Man to understand.

Aristotle therefore shews, that Virtue consists not in the Medium of the Thing, but in the Medium in respect of us, Geometrically consider'd, with rela∣tion to Reason; for as Virtue hath the Passions and Actions for Objects, for Example, such as are these, to Fear, to be Confident, to Desire, to have an Aversion, to be Angry, to have Pity, and in short, to be affected with Pleasure or Grief; I say, Virtue having for its Object the Passions and Actions, in which there may happen to be Excess, Deficiency, or a due Medium between both; here it belongs to Virtue to point out a Middle, which may be most proper and convenient, both in respect of Time, Person and Place, or any other Circumstance that may attend us.

He farther demonstrates, That whereas Virtue consists in prescribing a Middle between two Ex∣tremes, it is it self that Medium or middle Habit between two vicious Extremes, the one inclining

to Excess, and the other defective, either in the thing or in the Object. So that Virtue in its Es∣sence and Nature, in that it prescribes a Middle, is really it self also a kind of Medium; but in rela∣tion to Excellency and Perfection, it is something elevated above all. This causeth them to make this common Distinction, The Middle in respect of the Object, and the Middle in respect of the Essence; be∣cause the Middle in relation to the Object, is nothing else but the Middle in relation to our selves, or in re∣spect to Reason, and which is placed or considered between two Extremes: According to what Horace says, when he tells us, That there is a just Medio∣crity to be kept in things, and that there are due Limits and Bounds which we must neither come short of nor exceed.

Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines, Quos ultra citra{que} nequit consistere rectum.

The Medium, in respect of the Essence, is no∣thing else but Virtue it self between two Vices; or as the same Author expresses it, the Middle of two Vices, in respect of both Ends.

Virtus est medium vitiorum et utrin{que} reductum.

He does afterward illustrate and prove the Mat∣ter; for Fortitude is a Middle between Cowardise and Presumption; Temperance, between Intempe∣rance and a total Neglect; Liberality, between Pro∣digality and Covetousness; Magnificence, between Niggardliness and Gaudiness; Magnanimity, between Pusilanimity and a foolish Ostentation; Modesty, be∣tween having a due regard to our Honour and Am∣bition; Clemency and an easy and tractable Con∣versation,

between a base Compliance and a cholerick Temper; Truth and Veracity, between Dissimula∣tion and vain Boasting; a pleasant Humour, between Rusticity or a clownish Temper; Amity, between Flattery and a thwarting Temper; Moderation, be∣tween Stupidity and Impudence; a just Indignation, between Envy and Jealousy, and Malevolence or Ill-will; Prudence, between Folly or Stupidity, and cunning Craft or Knavery. For Justice, though it is not properly between two Extremes, because there is nothing opposite to it but Injustice; never∣theless, it seems to acknowledge a Medium in its Object, because Justice being a Virtue that relates to others, or is between two Persons, it belongs to it so to reduce the thing to Equity or Equality, that the one may not have more, nor the other less than is due; so that Injustice stands in stead of Ex∣cess in respect of one, and of Defect in respect of the other.

He maintains also, That there are certain Vices that will not admit of any Mediums, as Adultery, Theft and Murder, because there is always a Sin in the very Act, and no Virtue can be found in it: For Example, to prescribe with what Woman, at what time and how Adultery ought to be commit∣ted; for to seek for a Medium there, is the same as to seek for one in Debauchery, in Cowardise, and in the extremities of other Vices.

Lastly, he affirms, That the Extremities are not only contrary to one another, but also to the Me∣diums; insomuch, that the Valiant and Courageous appears to the Coward Bold and Presumptuous, and to the Audacious Mean and Cowardly; The Liberal seems to be Prodigal to the Covetous Wretch, and to the Prodigal Covetous, and so of the rest. Ne∣vertheless, there are some Extremes that seem to be more contrary and opposite to the middle than

the other, and for that reason sometimes one Vir∣tue seems to incline more to Excess than to Defect, as Fortitude seems to be more like Audacity than Cowardise, and sometimes nearer to Defect than Ex∣cess, as Temperance seems to incline more to a pri∣vation from Pleasure than to Intemperance. From hence he concludes, That there is a difficulty to be∣come truly Virtuous, because it is hard to find the Medium that might be convenient in all respects; and therefore he advises them who propose that Medium, to avoid chiefly that extremity, which is most contrary, and to take heed of that Vice unto which we have most tendency, and to act as those who labouring to make a crooked Stick strait, bend it in such a manner on the contrary side, that at last they may reduce it to a perfect strait, which is that of Right and Equity.

Of the Apathy, or the Insensibility of Stoicks.

NOW as the Stoicks differ from the Peripate∣ticks in particular, that the Stoicks in the first place would have a wise Man be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, with∣out Passion, whereas the Peripateticks distinguish the Passions or Affections into vain and useless, and into natural and necessary. They say well, that a wise Man ought to be free from the first sort, but that the latter should be kept in and bridled in such a manner, that we may observe a convenient Mean and a just Mediocrity. Secondly, whereas the Sto∣icks will never allow a wise Man either to complain or grieve, nay, in the midst of Pain he should keep up to such a severe and rigid Austerity as may be∣speak him almost insensible; but the Peripateticks think that this was spoken out of an Excess of Vani∣ty and Ambition, and that it is more convenient

to be moved with Tenderness, to let fall a few Tears, Sighs and Groans, than to be wise after such a man∣ner, to be inwardly tormented, as saith Crantor, by such a kind of Inhumanity and Insensibility. As there is this difference, I say between the Stoicks and the Peripateticks, let us examin in few Words what Cicero saith, who seems to be a Defender of this Insensibility in answer to the Peripateticks. After he had given such a description of a wise Man as we have already seen, thus he goes on. Therefore we ought to look upon the Judgment of the Peripateticks, as weak and contemptible, when they say, That it is necessa∣ry that the Minds of Men should be tossed up and down and disturbed; but yet they appoint a certain Moderation beyond which it is not lawful to pass: What, saith he, wilt thou assign a Moderation to Vice? Is it not Vice to disobey Reason? To desire any thing passionately, and after we have obtained it to behave our selves Proudly and Insolently; to be easily dejected, or for the very fear of Oppression to grow furious, and deprive our selves of the use of our Judgment? Is it not a great Fault and Error to be either too much Dejected or Exalted? Thus Cicero argues. But to speak the Truth, the Peripa∣teticks never had any such Fancy, that Vice ought to be moderated in such a manner that it should still remain in any respect a Vice; they held Vir∣tue to be a Medium, not that it was such as partici∣pating of the Extremes, as Lukewarm doth of Heat and Cold; but that it is between two Extremes, as the Center is between the extremities of a Diame∣ter, the strait Line between two crooked. Neither did they pretend that it was no Vice to disobey Rea∣son, for they would have Reason to prescribe a Moderation: Nor did they allow a too eager or passionate Desire of Things, or when obtained, to be too much exalted or puff'd up; for they were persuaded, that the power of Reason ought to give

a check to all Fury and Insolence, and to confine them within due Bounds: So that they denied not that it was evil to be too much Dejected and Affli∣cted, or for fear of being so, to fall into such De∣sparation and Fury, as to lose all, and be deprived of the use of their Judgment; for they still thought that we ought to rouse up our selves, and keep us free from Despair, and in a due and moderate Tem∣per. Neither did they believe that it was no Error in our Actions to express too much Grief or too much Joy; for they taught, That we ought so to correct our Error, that there might not appear either too much or too little in any thing.

He goes further on, and says, That he who seeks a Moderation in Vice, acts as he who casting himself down headlong from a steep Mountain, endeavours to stop himself in his Fall, but in vain; and to as little pur∣pose, as it is for a Man whose Thoughts are Distracted, and his Passions Predominant, on a suddain to appease 'em and make a Calm. But they will deny perhaps, that where Mediocrity or Moderation, in which Virtue consists, being observed, there should remain any thing of Vice; nor will they allow of that Com∣parison, that where a Man hath once cast himself down headlong, that its not in his Power to retrieve himself from Falling, to hold good in this Case; for he who is fallen into a Passion hath some Rea∣son in him still remaining, which is able to repress or check it, especially if he hath the fewest Grains of Wisdom remaining, or the least Inclination for Virtue, as such a one may have that we now instance in.

At last he concludes in this manner, Therefore if they approve of a Moderation in Trouble, 'tis the same as if they allowed of a Moderation in Injustice, a Mo∣deration in Cowardise, a Moderation in Intemperance; for to apportion a Moderation in Vice, is to approve of

some part of the Vice. But Cicero insists upon that which they will not allow; for he looks upon Vir∣tue not as a Medium between two Vices, but as a Vice moderated, which is quite contrary to the Judgment of Aristotle; for he saith, For to seek a Mediocrity in Adultery, or any such like Vice, 'tis the same as to admit of a Mediocrity, Excess, or a Defi∣ciency in Ʋnjustice, in Cowardise, and in Intempe∣rance.

Cicero afterwards more at large mentions the Reasonings and Arguments of the Peripateticks, with a design to oppose 'em, That according to their Judgment, the inward Disturbances and Passions are not only Natural, but that they have been allowed by Nature for good Ʋses; That they allow of Anger as a Whet-stone to Courage, because the Assault of an angry Person, against a publick Enemy, or a treache∣rous Subject, is more Powerful than if he opposed him in cold Blood; That severe Injunctions are not without a Mixture of Anger; That if an Orator is not angry, he ought at least to pretend to be so; That a Man is not a Man, if he cannot be angry, and that what Men call Calmness is a kind of stupid Insensibility; That it is impossible to perform any great thing without some Transport, witness Themistocles and Demosthenes; That without this Incentive, the great Philosophers had never made so large a Progress in the Sciences, and that without such an earnest desire, Pythagoras, De∣mocritus, and Plato had never travelled as they did about the World; That it is not without some great ad∣vantage that Nature hath appointed Displeasure and Grief, that Men might be vexed and grieved for their Crimes, and troubled for their Punishments, Reproofs, and Shame; That Mercy is useful to oblige us to assist the afflicted, and that to be emulous is not altogether useless; And lastly, That he who will take away Fear, takes away all Diligence, &c. He adds many other

Particulars which he seems to answer when he saith, Nevertheless, they confess when they Dispute of these Matters, that they ought to be cut off in part, but that they cannot, nor ought not to be totally rooted out. So that they esteem Mediocrity or Moderation to be requisite almost in every thing. And truly in rela∣tion to what he objects; for Example, That it be∣longs not to a stout and generous Spirit to be angry, but to a Fencer; that without this Anger of a Fencer, Ajax will encounter Hector, and that Torquatus Marcellus the African, was free from it, &c. They will answer, That it may be proper for a Fencer to be furiously angry and beyond Reason, but the Anger of a generous Person is more Temperate and hearkens to Reason.

And as to what he says concerning Mercy. Can∣not we be Liberal but we must be touched with Com∣passion and Pity? Seeing we ought not to afflict our selves for others, but to strive, if it be possible, to raise them out of their Afflictions. They will answer, That Mercy will cause us to be more inclined to Liberality; and that the wise Man suffers not him∣self to be vexed and afflicted for others, in such a manner as to be disturbed in himself, but it is a kind sense of Humanity that obliges him to lend Assistance to others.

In relation to Jealousie or Emulation, they will answer, That the Jealousie of a wise Man is no∣thing but a certain Motion or Desire that ingages him to strive to attain to a degree of Glory, equal or greater than that of another.

As to what concerns Fear, they will willingly agree, That Timerousness or too great Fear is to be condemned; and they will shew, that this Life cannot be without Fear, which causeth us to pro∣vide before-hand against several Casualties which we fore-see.

Finally, in relation to what he saith of Anger and Desire, they will prove that it is natural to be angry, and have an Ambition: But to be angry without measure, or to aim at any thing with too much eagerness, this proceeds from an Error that we ought to correct; so that when they advise us to avoid or abstain from all Excess, they advise us to extirpate and destroy whatsoever proceeds from Error, but not so that what is natural or naturally planted in us, either can or ought to be rooted out and totally defaced.

Of the mutual Connection of Moral Virtues.

NOw to speak something concerning the Con∣nection or mutual Relation of Moral Virtues, it is to be collected from two Particulars; First, That they are all united with Prudence, as all the Members with the Body, the Streams of Water with the Fountain from whence they run. Second∣ly, That Prudence and all the rest are unseparable from a pleasant Life, for Life cannot be pleasant without Virtue; and where-ever Virtue resides, there Life must needs be pleasant. From hence it appears, that the consequence of this mutual Con∣junction of Virtues, is grounded upon this Maxim, That things that are united in any third thing, are united among themselves. Now 'tis not needful to speak any thing of the second Particular, for we shall understand this Matter sufficiently hereafter, when we shall consider the saying of Epicurus, That Virtue is not desirable for its own sake, but for the sake of Pleasure. This hath caused some to exclaim against him. We shall be here satisfied by alledg∣ing a Passage out of Aristotle, by which it appears, that he was in this Matter of the same Opinion as

Epicurus: As, saith he, the thing beloved is pleasing to the Lover; the Horse, for example, to him who loves Horses, the Theatre and Shews to him who loves them; so to him who loves Justice, the things that are just are grateful, and generally to him who loves Virtue, the Actions that are Virtuous. I confess, that the things that please the common People don't agree together, be∣cause they are not so really of their own Nature: But such as are pleasing to them who love honesty, are of themselves, and of their own Nature, grateful and agreeable. Such are the Actions of Virtue, which are by consequence pleasing, because they are of themselves so; their Life therefore hath no need of Pleasure, as of an addition, but it possesseth in it self an inward Plea∣sure. Nay, to go yet farther, he who delights not in honest Actions, is no just and honest Man, nor can we denominate such an one a just and liberal Person to whom just and liberal Actions give no Pleasure: And the like is to be understood of the other Virtues. From hence therefore we conclude, That virtuous Actions are of themselves, and of their own Nature, Pleasant and De∣lightful.

In relation to the first Particular, the Judgment of Aristotle is yet more plain, for he gives this De∣finition of Virtue; An Habit that relates to Medio∣crity; Or, a Medium which Prudence hath prescribed and directed. This shews, that no Virtue can be without Prudence, and by consequence all Virtues being united with Prudence, they have a mutual Correspondency: This answers the Objection which some might make by saying, That sure Men are not fit for all Virtues, and therefore he may be in∣clinable to one before he hath attained another; for he distinguisheth and teacheth, that this may happen in respect of the natural Virtues, or of the Seeds of natural Virtue; For, saith he, as soon as we are born, we are qualified for Justice, for Temperance,

Fortitude, and other Virtues. But this cannot be so, in relation to such Virtues by which a Man is sti∣led a good and virtuous Man, because all the rest accompany Prudence; and to speak properly, a good Man cannot be without Prudence, and a pru∣dent Man can't be without Virtue.

Now we must observe, that this distinction may serve to resolve the Opinion, that Laertius ascribes to him, That he was perswaded that all the Vir∣tues had not a mutual Connection, for it might happen that a Man might be Prudent and Just, and yet might be Intemperate and Debauch'd; for he will reply, That those who seem to be adorned with some certain Virtues, if they have not the rest, have 'em in Appearance and Imperfect, be∣cause their seeming Actions of Virtue are not in∣livened with that inward Passion and general Incli∣nation for Honesty, whereby the Soul is influ∣enc'd to act nothing without the direction of Rea∣son. 'Tis the same as if we should say, That they have a material Virtue, but not a formal; for the Form or Perfection and Completion of all Virtue, is this Affection and general Disposition of the Mind, by which a Man does nothing but in a just manner, and out of a principle of Virtue; for ac∣cording to the Judgment of Aristotle, nothing but this Disposition can qualifie Men to be Honest and Just: So that he who is not rich, and consequently not in a Condition to shew his Liberality or Mag∣nificence, yet may have a Soul so qualified, that if his Estate increased he would do nothing but what is Just, Honourable, and Magnificent; for tho' he hath not the Habit of bestowing large Gifts, yet he hath a Propension of giving according to his Abilities, and is not sparing of that which is in his small Power to give. Therefore the Libe∣rality of that poor Country-man, who having no∣thing

else, presented Water to the King which he had drawn out of the River, was as acceptable, as the Gifts of Princes in rich and costly Vessels.

I shall not here mention the several Reasons that Alexander hath collected, nor with him stay to tell you, for instance, That it is impossible for a Man to be just, unless at the same time he hath all other Virtues; for if he be intemperate, or fearful, or covetous, he will cease to be just, when an Op∣portunity offers of Pleasure, Danger, or Hopes of Gain; and so it is with other Vices, there is not any but is able to cause us to Violate and Corrupt some part of Justice. I shall only take notice, that this Doctrin of the Connection and Correspon∣dency of Virtues together, is common not only to Epicurus, Aristotle, Plato, St. Ambrose, and St. Gre∣gory, but chiefly to the Stoicks, tho' these last add this Paradox, That Virtues are all equal. I add the word chiefly, for among them these Opinions pass for Current; That a wicked Man hath no Vir∣tue, and a just Man no Vice; That the first sins in every thing, and the latter acts nothing ill; That what∣soever a wise Man doth, he doth it assisted by all the Virtues, and if he did but wag his Finger without the direction of Reason, he would commit a Sin.

Ni tibi concessit ratio digitum exsere peccas.

A General Division of Virtue.

BUt as we are now to speak of the several kinds of Virtue, we ought here first to lay down the common Division thereof. Not to mention here what Zeno taught, that there were divers sorts of Virtues, (which yet the Megarians would not al∣low of, supposing 'em to be but one, under several

Names:) Nor what Apollophanes asserts, viz. That of Prudence only: That celebrated Division of Vir∣tue into four parts is sufficiently known, viz. of Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice. Nevertheless, Aristotle in his Morals, treats of these four Virtues in the same manner as he treats also of Gentleness, of Liberality, of the greatness of the Mind, of Magnificence, of Moderation, of just Indignation, of Modesty, of Gravity, of Truth or Veracity, of Civility, and of the rest, as distinct kinds of Virtue, not tying himself to any limited Number; And so begins to discourse of Fortitude.

For the Stoicks, tho' they have variously divided Virtue, nevertheless, Possidonius, among the rest, holds to these four kinds; and therefore Cicero seems to have taken this from the Stoicks; Whatsoever is just and honest, proceeds from one of these four Species; for either it relates to the discerning of Truth and Fal∣shood; or the Preservation of the Society which consists in the faith of Contracts, and in giving to every one what appertains to him; or the strength and greatness of the Soul; or else in the Moderation in all that we say or do: By which Words the four sorts of Vir∣tue are described. Now we must observe, that if since the days of St. Ambrose, and St. Jerom, these four Virtues have been stiled Cardinal Virtues, be∣cause they are look'd upon as the Hinges upon which the rest turn; it is doubtless in imitation of the Stoicks, who affirm, That among the Virtues some are Primitive or Principal, the others subject and depending on the former; and that the first are Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance and Justice; and the latter a greatness of Mind, Continency, Patience, quickness of Apprehension, or liveliness of Spirit, Subtilty, and sound Judgment, all which Cicero terms Companions, and Seneca branches of the first Stock.

The Schoolmen call 'em Parts, and divide 'em into three kinds, that they might refer all the Vir∣tues called Moral to one of the four chief. Thus Thomas Aquinas hath dealt. Now these three Parts are, First, Such as are properly called Sub∣jects or Species. Secondly, The Integral Parts, or which have in some respect the Parts which com∣pose the whole, and ought necessarily to assist to the perfect Act of a certain Virtue. Thirdly, The Potential, which like the Powers of the Soul, are accompanying, but have not the Efficacy of a a principal Virtue.

Thus the Virtues subject to Prudence, are the Private, the Oeconomick, the Politick, the Military, and the Royal: The Integral, are Memory, Docility, Sagacity, Reason, Providence, Circumspection, and Precaution or Fore-sight: The Potential, which bear their ancient Greek names, are Ebulia, that is, Wisdom in Counsel; Synesis, sharpness of Ap∣prehension; Gnome, a prudent Elocution.

Thus the Subject Parts of Justice, are the Gene∣ral, the Legal, and the Special, which have for Species, the commutative and distributive Justice: The Integral, are the Precepts of the Law, as To do wrong to no Body; To give to every one what belongs to him; and if we may make use of the words of Holy Writ, To fly from Evil and to do Good: The Potential, are Religion, Holiness, Piety, Charity, Obedience, Truth, Gratitude, Li∣berality, Affability, and Amity or Friendship.

In like manner, the Subject Parts of Tempe∣rance, are Abstinence and Sobriety; first in relation to Eating, the latter in respect of Drinking, Cha∣stity and Modesty; The Integral, are Bashfulness and Honesty; The Potential, are Clemency, Hu∣mility, Modesty, Mildness, Mercy, Moderation, Decency, Gratefulness, and Urbanity.

For Fortitude, as it is not usual to ascribe to it any subject Parts, because of that chief Matter about which it is employed, so only four Parts are assigned to it, which are reckoned to be Integral, when they are lookt upon as being employed about a difficult Matter; or Potential, if the Matter hath less diffi∣culty. These parts are Confidence, Magnanimity or greatness of Courage; Magnificence, Patience or long Forbearance; Constancy or Perseverance. The two first are for an Aggress or Assault, the two latter for Defence and Support.

CHAP II. Of Prudence in General.

NOW to say something to the purpose con∣cerning the four principal Virtues, and about some of their chief Species: And we will begin with Prudence, which Aristotle, Epicurus, and all the other Philosophers, not without Reason, call the Head, the Fountain, the Mistress, the Queen of all other Virtues. But to lay aside all Equivocation, tho' Prudence and Wisdom are often used Promiscu∣ously and to the same Sense, nevertheless, Aristotle distinguishes them in such a manner, that he takes Wisdom for the knowledge of Things honourable and worthy; but Prudence for a particular Virtue, which respects the Things useful and convenient for the Life of Man. From hence it is, saith he, that Anaxagoras, Thales, and some others, may very well be accounted Wise, but not Prudent; because we find that they were Ignorant of the Things that were need∣ful,

and yet they understood several excellent, admi∣rable, difficult and divine Things; but useless for the good and happiness of Life. Now 'tis certain, that we are not to speak of Prudence as it is taken for that high and speculative Wisdom, but as it is a moral Virtue, which is to rule and govern all the Actions of our Life; and which by distinguishing the good from the evil, the useful things from such as are hurtful, points out that which we are to Em∣brace, and that which we are to Avoid; and by that means leads and directs Man to live well and Hap∣pily.

Therefore Cicero gives this definition of Prudence, The knowledge of the Things that we are to desire or avoid. And Aristotle saith, 'Tis an habit of Acting according to right Reason, in the Things that are good or evil to Mankind. Now we must observe, in re∣lation to what he saith, that it is an Habit of Acting according to right Reason; that he don't under∣stand but that a prudent Man may sometimes be im∣pos'd upon by a colourable Reason, and which does not exactly answer the event of Things; yet he ought to perform nothing but with due Conside∣ration; and after he hath well examined every thing, and hath had a regard to the Place and Time of his Deliberation, he perceives no Reason truer or more probable, than that which he resolves to embrace and follow; but still at the same time, notwithstand∣ing his serious Deliberation, if a Reason more like∣ly or probable comes into his Thought, he is more ready to embrace it, and be led by it. This makes Prudence to be a very uncertain Habit, full of Con∣jectures, by which it differs from Science, as Ari∣stotle understands it; for Science hath necessary Things for its Objects, Things necessary, and which cannot be otherwise; but Prudence looks upon Things that are contingent and casual, that may happen or not, may fall out this way or t'other.

We must likewise observe, That Aristotle under∣stands by good or evil Things, chiefly the Means, which are said to be good, as they are useful and convenient for the purposes of Virtue, and evil as they are hurtful and prejudicial to such purposes: For tho we deliberate about an End, it is not abso∣lutely an End, but it is really a Means to obtain another at a distance, and which also may be lookt upon as a further Means, until we arrive at the last of all, which is Happiness, about which there is no deliberation, for there is no Body but would be Happy, and we trouble our selves about nothing else but how to attain to it. Therefore we have given this Definition of Prudence in general, That it di∣rects a Man to a good and happy Life; not but that it respects particular Cases also, seeing it is the Duty of Prudence to dictate what we ought, and what we ought not to do, on every particular occasion: But because it appears chiefly in a certain prospect of a general Life that we propose to our selves, and which may be such, that all our particular Actions mutually agree among themselves, and tend all, without any opposition, to Happiness; or, as we have said, to live Well and Happily; for that Rea∣son, Prudence is usually term'd the Art of Living; and Plato calls it, the Knowledge which procures Happiness. And Aristotle saith, That it is the part of a Prudent Man, not only to consult and mature∣ly to deliberate upon particular Matters, such as Health, &c. but generally about all things which may contribute to our living Well and Happily.

Of the general Offices or Duties of Prudence.

WE commonly divide the general Offices or Duties of Prudence into these three Parts, viz. To Consult or Advise well, to Understand and Com∣prehend

aright, to Command and Prescribe. 'Tis what is usually express'd by these Words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which are term'd in the Schools the potential parts of Prudence, tho' they are really, and rather the acts of Prudence. The first then is to advise well, the Particle [well] being here added be∣cause this belongs peculiarly to a prudent Man; for rash and inconsidering People run headlong with∣out ever examining the Matter: But Deliberation, which regards Prudence, ought to be good, as Aristotle saith, and tend to a good End. So that if any by taking wrong Measures suceeds, that cannot be said to be a good Deliberation; for tho he obtains what he seeks to obtain, yet 'tis not by such Means as he ought to make use of. Therefore Cunning or Subtilty that cares not what Methods it takes to ac∣complish its Ends, whether Good or Evil, is placed as one of the Extremes of Prudence. And there∣fore a subtil and cunning Man, having no respect to Honesty, is lookt upon by a prudent Man, just as a wicked Person is by a good Man. For Malice, saith Cicero, will often imitate Prudence.

The second Duty is to apprehend well, and un∣derstand the ways and means that we are to make use of, after we have soberly and seriously deliberated and advised. Aristotle, by this word Ʋnderstand, seems to mean nothing else but an easy Apprehen∣sion, or an Understanding quick and nimble; there∣fore he opposeth this Understanding to Stupidity, or a slowness of Apprehension. So that according to his Opinion, a prudent Man being between the Subtil and Knavish, and the Dull and Stupid, may be judged to be placed a Man between the evil Spi∣rit and a Brute; they are his own Words.

The Third is to command or prescribe the per∣formance of the Things that have been formerly judged or resolved on; or, which is in effect the

same, to order that the Means that have been thus resolved on, may actually be put in Execution: For Prudence, saith Aristotle, is of its own Nature 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Imperatoria, born and designed to Com∣mand; so that instead of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which, according to Aristotle, signifies no other thing but a right Judg∣ment, we ought to have used the Word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which imports Commanding.

Of the Dispositions or Qualities needful for performing the Duties of Prudence.

THE Duties or the Acts of Prudence being such as we have already mentioned, it is cer∣tain that some Dispositions, Qualities or Faculties, are requisite in the Soul for their due Execution. These are properly the Faculties which are called Partes Integrantes, and which are commonly com∣prehended under these general Terms, of the recol∣lecting of Things past, the right understanding of Things present, and the foresight or providing against Things to come. For first it is plain, that Prudence makes it absolutely necessary to call to Mind Things past; for in the sequel of Affairs the Things that ought to be done hereafter, have such a relation with what hath been already done, that if we forget that which hath been done, in the man∣ner as it hath been done, that accordingly we may effect what remains to be done, it often happens either that that which is already done comes to nothing, or that which is to be performed rarely succeeds, but crosses our Expectation. Besides, our Judgments are to reason and judge according to our Know∣ledge, neither can they conclude upon more cer∣tain Grounds than this, That from like Causes, pro∣bably may follow like Effects. Now it is certain, that

to be able to make this Comparison of one Cause with another, it is absolutely necessary to remem∣ber Things past: Besides, as it seldom or never happens that one thing is intirely like to another in all Circumstances, we ought to have in our Mind and Memory several Occurrences which are truly alike in most Things, and yet may be different as to other Circumstances, that so in our Resolution we may have a regard to those Circumstances. This caused Aristotle to say, That young Men may pro∣pably attain the Art of Geometry, and become Ma∣sters of such like Sciences; but they cannot so easi∣ly attain to Prudence, because this respects parti∣cular Things, whereof the Knowledge is obtained only by Experience and Observation. Wherefore Afranius says of Wisdom, that Use had begotten her, and Memory was her Mother.

Ʋsus me genuit Mater peperit Memoria: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 vocant me Graij, vos Sapientiam.

But this may properly be understood of Prudence, as Ovid seems to imitate in these Verses, where he brings in Pallas in the Habit of a grave Matron, saying, That Youth and even riper Years are igno∣rant of most Things which we ought to avoid, and that a good and judicious Choice is not to be made, but by a long tried and well season'd Experience.

—non omnia grandior aetas Quae fugiamus habet; seris venit usus ab annis.

It is likewise manifest that the understanding and knowledge of present Things is absolutely requisite, and that to act prudently we must very well under∣stand the nature, the qualities and circumstances of our present Affairs. For if it happens that, for

Example, any be obliged to take a Resolution, as we say, upon a sudden, How can that well be done, if he knows not perfectly all the Circumstances of the Business, so that he may run them over in a moment in his Thoughts, if he sees not the Cor∣respondency and Opposition that this Business hath with others, and if he knows not what will follow from this rather than from that? Suppose that he hath time to consider, yet if he understands not the Nature, the State and Circumstances of the thing he is considering of, the Will or Ability of those who may be Assisting or Prejudicial to the executing of it, what dependence it may have with Matters that may either retard or hinder it, or if he knows not his own Strength, or what he is able or not able to perform, what good can such a one do, and which way will he propose to succeed? Let us therefore take it for granted, that a Man is so much the more Prudent and more able to deli∣berate, to judge well, and execute accordingly, the greater and more exact his Memory is of the time past, for by that the greater and more exact will likewise his Knowledge be of things present.

Lastly, All the World will acknowledge, that the Fore-sight of things to come, as far as we can search into and apprehend 'em, is very requisite, that if any Evil is impendent, we may endeavour to avoid it; and if any Good, we may the better secure it, and may so adapt the means to its proper end, that all things may succeed well. I say, as far as Men are able to fore-see and apprehend; for sometimes things so fall out that all human Art and Contrivance can no wise fore-see, so that all our Imaginations have been deceiv'd and impos'd, things falling out quite otherwise than we have supposed, or our Reason could fore-see: From hence we may conclude, that our Prudence depends

much upon Conjectures, and admonishes us at the same time to remember our natural Weakness, and to acknowledge that God only knows certainly what is to happen: And here by the way, we ought to take heed of being impos'd upon by Jug∣lers and Fortune-tellers, who take upon 'em to predict things to come. Yet, notwithstanding Pru∣dence hath these three considerable Advantages, First, That tho' sometimes it is mistaken, as namely, when an Accident intervenes, which it was not possible to fore-see, yet it often attains its End; whereas Imprudence is often deceiv'd, and seldom or very rarely compasses its End, except by Accident. Secondly, That a prudent Man, consi∣dering the uncertainty of all things, he proposes nothing so certain to himself, as if it ought infal∣libly to fall out; so that hereby he prepares against all Casualties that may happen contrary to his Ex∣pectation, and by this means fore-sees as it were the Event, by being fore-warned. Thirdly, Tho' Matters succeed to him contrary to his Contrivance and Fore-sight, yet he never has just Cause to re∣pent, because he squares his Actions by the Rules of right Reason, and therefore without some Casu∣alty intervening (which is out of the reach of hu∣man Fore-sight to prevent) he could not rationally expect to be disappointed. But on the other hand, an imprudent Man is always wrack'd with Repen∣tance, because he finds that he hath neither fore∣seen nor prevented what he might have done, but suffered such things to befall him which a cautious and timely Fore-sight in all likelihood might have prevented.

CHAP. III. Of private Prudence.

NOW to descend to the several Species or di∣stinct Parts of Prudence; we have already mentioned the ordinary Division of the Schoolmen who name five; the Private, which they also call Monastic or Solitary, by which every one Governs and Rules his own proper Manners; the Oecono∣mic, by which every one Governs his Family; the Politic, which they ascribe to Subjects when they behave themselves conformable to the Laws of the Society; the Military, by which an Army is Governed; the Regal, by which a whole Nation is ruled. But Aristotle, whose Method and Con∣ception seems to be more reasonable in the Di∣vision of Prudence, makes no mention of the Mili∣tary, because it belongs to the Politic, nor of the Regal, as being also a part of the Politic; but af∣ter the Private and the Oeconomic, he acknow∣ledgeth none but the Politic, which he supposeth to be not in the Subjects but in the Governours. Therefore we shall follow the Division of Aristotle, as the most reasonable and the most convenient. I shall only take notice of the first Species, that it is named Private, Monastic, and Solitary, not be∣cause it is precisely designed to Moderate and Rule the Manners of one who leads a private Life, and in∣termeddles not with public Affairs, or who living in a solitary Place, separates himself from the Society of Men, as the Hermits; but we make use of this Appellation to signifie that every Person of what Condition soever, ought to be endowed with a cer∣tain Prudence which belongs to him alone, and re∣gards

his particular Person. So that tho' he may Govern others, he must also Govern himself chief∣ly, according to the Dictates of Reason, and so provide for himself that he may become an honest Man; that is to say, a Man of good and laudable Manners. Therefore this kind of Prudence is ne∣cessary as well for a Prince as a Master of a Family, for both are bound not only to Rule others, but more∣over to know how to Rule themselves, and not only to be good Governours, but also to be honest and good Men. From hence it is therefore, that this kind of Prudence is not only named Private or Solitary, but also Ethic and Moral; for it ought to prescribe and appoint the Manners of every par∣ticular Person, and adjust them to the Rules of Reason. For according to the Opinion of Aristotle and his Followers, it belongs to Morality, or to Moral Discipline, to look after every ones manner of living, thereby to render his life better: So that by obeying its Precepts, a Man may become a just and honest Man, viz. by living prudently, by sub∣duing Anger and his other Passions to his own Reason, by regulating their disorderly Motions, and not suffering 'em to act extravagantly; so that if he performs any thing, he may be always ready to give a good Reason why he hath thus proceed∣ed, tho' none requires it of him, and to give a check to himself, by examining his own Manners and Actions, and inquiring of himself as Phocilides did, By what Course have I steer'd? What have I been doing? What good have I performed or omitted?

Quanam transilii, quid feci, quid boni omisi?

Rejoycing when he perceiv'd that he had judged aright, that he had acted according to Reason and done wisely, and grieving when he found the con∣trary.

Of the Offices of private Prudence.

THe Offices of a private Prudence, are gene∣rally reckon'd two; The first, is to fix upon a certain course of Life, wherein to spend the rest of our days; The second, to govern and direct all our Actions in that condition of Life, according to the Laws of Reason and Virtue. It is evident, that the first concerns us very much, and is not easily to be effected, especially if we will not venture up∣on it without advising with our best Friends, and duly consulting our Reason. For such is the Con∣dition of our Life and of all human Affairs, that upon what State soever we cast our Eyes, we shall perceive presently several inconveniences attend it, which are so much the more troublesome, because we can't well discover their Events; for they ap∣pear to us as in a kind of a Chaos, and their first Beginnings and Consequences are covered over with a kind of thick Mist not penetrable to our Under∣standing.

The ancient Greeks have often painted out to us this Incumbrance or troublesome Confusion; and Ausonius, after them, hath left us an excellent Pi∣cture in his Poem, where he tells us, That he knows not what to resolve, nor what kind of life to chuse; That the Bar is full of trouble; That the care of a Family is uneasie; That a Traveller is always thinking of what is doing at home; That a Merchant is continually subject to fresh Losses; That the fear of Poverty hinders us from quietly enjoying what we have; That daily Labour oppres∣seth and wearies the Workman; That the Seas are dreadful because of the many Ship-wracks; That a single Life hath its Inconveniences; That the idle

Suspicion of a jealous Husband is intollerable; That the War is subject to Wounds, Blood, and Slaugh∣ter.

Quod vitae sectabor iter? Si plena tumultu Sunt fora; si curis domus anxia; si peregrinos Cura domus sequitur; mercantem si nova semper Damna manent; cessare vetat si turpis Egestas; Si vexat labor Agricolam; Mare naufragus horror Infamat; poenaeque graves in coelibe vita; Et gravior cautis custodia vana Maritis; Sanguineum si Martis opus, &c.

Now as there is nothing more unhappy than to be always wavering in Uncertainty, which we see to be the Condition of many, and to spend all our Life in considering how we should spend it, and in what Condition it concerns us most to exert to the utmost of our Power, all our Faculties in consider∣ing and deliberately chusing such a State and Condi∣tion of Life, as may be least subject to Mischiefs and Inconveniences. Neither are we in this Case to slight the Counsel and Advice of wise experi∣enc'd Friends, Persons of a clear Repute, and who aiming not at their own private Gain, may afford us sound and profitable Advice. But every one ought chiefly to consult his own Nature, and un∣derstand what his own Strength can perform or not; for we ought to be best known to our selves; and we may discover in our selves, for the most part, something which is hid to all the World besides: But we ought to know the unsetledness of human Affairs, and the obscurity of the time to come to be such, that we must in all things allow something to Chance, and hope that every thing will succeed well. And because some things may happen which may make us uneasie, we ought to fortifie our Spi∣rits

against such Accidents, in such a manner that we may slight them, bear them easily, and pass over them quietly.

What has been spoken is in respect to that State and Condition which our Laws will not allow us to change, such as Marriage, a Monastical Life, or of that State which we cannot change but for a worse, and with great disgrace: For as for that which we may quit when we will to embrace ano∣ther, there is no need of so great Caution and Cir∣cumspection, tho' still we ought to engage in such an one, as if we always did intend to abide in it. Otherwise the very Thought of changing, will frequently disturb our Minds with various Imagi∣nations, and which being fixed to nothing but al∣tering every moment, as we say from white to black, we shall never remain fix'd and resolv'd, ac∣cording to that Expression of the Poet;

Aestuat, & vitae disconvenit ordine toto.

So that we ought not to change, except for some very weighty Causes; for if we alter upon every light Occasion, the same mischief will attend us in all our succeeding Conditions.

As for the last Office of private Prudence, as it is not distinct from the Offices of other Virtues, we shall not trouble our selves to treat of it par∣ticularly in this Place, and the rather because this Matter would be too tedious; and it is as differing as there are differing Affairs and Actions of Life, which are to be directed by Prudence: Therefore it seems there remains for us nothing else to do but to mention this General Rule, To undertake no∣thing rashly; or, as Cicero expresses it, of which we cannot render a probable Reason. Now this Rule hath divers excellent Particulars belonging to it.

First, That we ought to understand the Nature and Qualities of the Business that we undertake: Because if we have not a clear insight into that, it will be impossible to discover all the convenient Expedients, and consequently all our Care and Di∣ligence will be vain and useless; and therefore here we must chiefly take heed that our Mind be not blinded with Passion, and so mistake Error for Truth, but that we may give to every thing its due estimate.

Secondly, It is requisite that the Nature and Con∣dition of those with whom we are concerned be not concealed from us, for if we don't understand whether they be honest Men or deceitful, wary or rash, powerful or weak, &c. we can undertake no∣thing with any assurance, neither can we reaso∣nably expect it. And here it is, that we must keep to a certain Medium between Confidence and a too great distrust, because as it is often hurtful to have too great Confidence, so it is no less and as often to be too distrustful.

The Third, Is to consider our own Strength; because if we know not what we can do of our selves, or by our Friends, or by our Riches, we cannot promise to our selves to compass any thing. I confess we must yield something to Chance and Destiny, but in the mean while, we must be enabled with Industry and Strength to drive on to a Per∣formance, or to divert the Casualties that oppose us.

Fourthly, We must have the Means and Instru∣ments ready at hand, for there is nothing more ri∣diculous than to undertake a Business and not know where to begin it. And here the Circumstances, in relation to the Thing, or in relation to the Agent, which may either further or hinder the execution, are chiefly to be inquired into.

Fifthly, That we take care to make use of a fit Time and Occasion, for fear if we be too hasty, we over-throw all, or by too long delay all our Coun∣sels become useless.

Sixthly, That when the Business hath been be∣gun, after a serious Deliberation, we ought to proceed vigorously, for fear that if the Mind stops in the execution, or wavers in considering and me∣ditating upon the Resolution, it will effect nothing. This hath given occasion for that famous Sentence of Bias, Aggredere tarde agenda, sed aggressus age constanter. Undertake deliberately, but when you have begun, proceed with Vigour and Resolution.

Lastly, That we keep our selves steady and fixt in the Resolution we have taken, never to deviate out of the Paths of Virtue and Honesty. What∣ever Temptation may be offer'd, we must never prefer Profit before Honesty, nor Injustice before Justice, but we are to observe constantly this ge∣neral and excellent Rule of Morality, That it is better never to succeed in any Business, by keeping our Conscience blameless and undefiled, than to succeed by polluting it; for he that cannot tax himself with any Guilt, is not to be deemed mise∣rable, and he that is conscious of any Evil, cannot be counted happy.

That it is dangerous to undertake any thing against our natural Inclination.

WE ought here, upon the occasion of the first Particular, to examine if Lactantius had any Cause to upbraid Epicurus with this supposed Crime, That he adviseth in general, to follow Nature; and the rather because if this Saying be rightly under∣stood, and taken in a good sense, it seems very

reasonable; for seeing that Nature and Inclination differ in several Persons, what Rule more general and more secure could be given, than to advise with our selves, and to provide our selves a settlement in a certain condition and state of Life, accord∣ing as we find our selves either fit or otherwise? Should any Man in a Business of so great Moment forget himself, I mean not remember his own Tem∣per and Abilities, and by that means cast himself into a necessity to be always labouring in vain, as Sisyphus, or as the Gyants, contend with the Gods to no purpose. This Cicero calls striving against Nature. It is, without doubt, a very dangerous Ambition to pretend to excel in any thing, out of a meer Fancy, that by the same means others have been made Famous, tho' we are often destitute of the same advantages of Mind and Fortune which others had. 'Tis by this means that Parents make their Children Miserable, by putting them upon Em∣ployments, without considering their Nature, Tem∣per, and fit Qualifications, but out of a foolish Ambi∣tion to raise them in the World, higher than their Circumstances will permit. Wee need but hearken to Seneca upon this occasion. Before all other Things, we ought to make a right Judgment of our selves, and put a just and true value upon our Abilities; for com∣monly we fancy to have more Strength and Merit than really we have. Some lose themselves by trusting too much upon their Eloquence. Others spend more than their Estates will allow; and some who have but infirm Bodies, have lain oppressed under too weighty Employ∣ments. The Modesty of some will not suit with publick Functions, that require a bold and daring Countenance; and others have too much Pride, or too little Complacen∣cy, to obtain any Suit at Court. Some can never be moved, and others at the least distast, are provoked to a high degree. Some cannot behave themselves with any

Decency and Civility, nor refrain themselves from offer∣ing sharp Jests, whatever danger they incur. To all these kind of People it is more convenient for them to live a private Life, than to be admitted to the manage∣ment of publick Affairs; for a proud and hasty Temper ought to avoid all occasions that might interrupt or ob∣struct its own Freedom. Cicero speaks almost to the same purpose, when he saith, We must behave our selves in such a manner, that we may not act against our Nature in general, but follow our own Disposition; for we must not oppose nor force Nature, or proceed in any thing, as we say, Invita Minerva, that is, against the Grain. If there be any thing Commendable, it is doubtless the equality and evenness of our Life and Actions, which you can't possibly observe, if you imitate the Tem∣pers of others, and neglect your own. Let every one therefore consult his own Genius, and judge exactly of himself, of his Vices, and of his good Disposition, that the Stage-Players may not seem to excel us in Prudence: For they chuse to represent not always the most excellent Persons, but such as best becomes them. Now let us hear what Lactantius objects.

The Doctrin of Epicurus, saith he, hath always been more famous than the rest, not because it is more agre∣able with Truth, but because he speaks more agreable with the Inclinations of every one; and by that means, he hath drawn the common People to his side. To him who is Slothful, he forbids Study; to the Covetous, he admonishes to forbear Grieving; to the Effeminate and Slothful, to enter into the managment of publick Affairs; the Coward, he advises not to go to the Wars; to him who hates Company, he praiseth a solitary Life. If any delights not in Marriage or hath unruly Children, his directions to him is to keep to a single Life. He who is Stout and Courageous, shall be told that the wise Man is Happy even under Pain. If any Fancies Honour and Preferments, he will counsel him to be acquainted with

Kings; but another who cant bear a repulse, he'le admo∣nish to depart from the Court. These are the Objecti∣ons of Lactantius.

In the mean while, if we may take the Words of Epicurus, in a plain Sense, without any such Gloss, in my Judgment they will not seem so unreasonable: For first, for the advice he offers to a lazy Fellow not to ingage himself in Study, he don't hereby blame Study absolutely, but rather he esteems and values it highly; for he exhorts both Young and Old to the Study of Philosophy; and for the sake of those who would apply themselves to it, he took the Pains to make Abridgments of his own Works. But because Arts and Sciences are not to be obtain'd without a resolute and continued Labour, if there be any that either cannot or will not endure the Fa∣tigue of this Labour, what harm is there to forbid him to ingage himself in it, seeing thereby he would do himself no good? We have before cited this Sentence of Epicharmus.

Labor nobis cuncta Dij vendunt bona.

But if this be true, in respect of other Things, how much more in relation to the Sciences; which as they cannot be bought with all the Gold of the World, they cannot be obtained but by a vast La∣bour and Industry. And if in another place he ad∣vises the Covetous to be sparing in his Bounty, he don't thereby condemn Liberality, or those Ex∣pences which are made for good and lawful Uses; but he means plainly, that if any fears to fall into Want, that he should not be too lavish of his Estate, and cast it away in such Liberalness, as belongs only to Princes, and such as abound in Wealth. If he forbids them that are naturally Slow and Lazy to engage themselves in publick Affairs, it

was not without great Reason, as we shall see here∣after.

He forwarns a timerous Man to go to the Wars. But why should we not approve of his Advice? As if we ought not to make choise of Men for the Wars, or as if we should desire such to go thither who tremble and are affraid of the least Noise, and whose Sword falls to the Ground at the sight of Dan∣ger: Are we not sensible, that in an Ingagement one Coward does more mischief with his idle Fears, than a great many brave Men may do good with their Courage? And don't pretend that we should rather encourage a fearful Spirit, and make him Courageous; for if he be so of his own Nature, we know the common Saying, It is not an easy matter to turn an Hare into a Lion; Or, of a slender Reed to make a Lance.

He advises a wise Man to do all for himself. But we have already discovered how that is to be un∣derstood, and that the wise Man acts for himself, tho he puts himself upon Inconveniences, or even Dies for the sake of his Friend; and yet what is there more dear and precious than Life?

He praiseth Solitariness, to him who naturally cares not for Company. How can we blame this, with∣out blaming the Retreat of many great Men, and the Rules of Living of several Societies or Frater∣nities of ancient Philosophers and religious Persons, who purposely shun the throngs of Men, for the bet∣ter improving of their Minds?

If he praiseth the single Life to such as decline Women, and the Happiness of having no Children, to such as are troubled with Disobedient ones: He means not that he who hath a wicked Wife or per∣verse Children should shake them off; but he would have him who thinks of Marriage, consider how he would endure his uneasiness, if he had a troublesome

Wife, or Children of corrupt Manners; so that by apprehending the Mischiefs that may proceed from thence, he may the better understand, that it is not convenient to have either.

CHAP IV. Of Oeconomick Prudence.

AS to Oeconomick Prudence, which consist in the due ordering of a Family, and wha belongs to it, I shall not insist on it; for let us b•••• suppose private Prudence, and it is easy from then•••• to learn what belongs to Oeconomick, if we w•••••• but mind such as do generally exercise themselv•••• in it, or prescribe Rules for it: Nevertheless, th•••• we may not seem totally to neglect this Matter, it is necessary to observe; First, what we meet with in Aristotle, That the Oeconomick Dominion is a kind of Monarchy or Principality, because every House is governed by the command of one single Person. Secondly, That he who governs in a Fa∣mily is called Father, or Father of a Family, in re∣spect of the Children; Husband, in respect of the Wife; Master, in respect of the Slaves and Ser∣vants; Owner, in respect of the Goods and Estate. Thirdly, That the Houshold or Family, in respect of the Relation between Husband and Wife, Parents and Children, is called Natural, and first instituted by Nature; for there can be none more agreeable with Nature. Fourthly, That for the Government between Master and Servant, it is also agreeable with Nature, for among Men some seem to be born

to Command, and others to Obey; so that besides that Slavery that the Laws or Rights of Nations have introduced, in respect of those who have been taken Prisoners in War, or have been Sold; there is another certain natural Slavery, by which, as the Soul commands the Body, and Men Brutes, so he who excells in the Abilities of the Mind, commands over him who excels only in Strength of Body, and the rather, because it is needful for the latter to be ruled by another, as it is useful for Brutes to be tamed by Men. Fifthly, in respect to the Right that we have over certain Things which we possess to our selves; for tho according to the primitive Right of Nature, one thing is no more mine than thine, nor thine more than mine; nevertheless, it seems agreeable with Nature, That every one should have and possess to himself something which is not law∣ful for another to take away, because there is no∣thing more agreeable with Nature, than to preserve our selves safe and secure, which would be impossi∣ble among the Quarrels and Violences, unto which Men would be continually subject and liable, if all Things did so belong to all Men, that every one might have Right over his Neighbour's Goods, and might lawfully take them away at his Pleasure. Sixthly, That our Housholds, chiefly those of Princes and great Persons, are far from the plainness of our Ancestors, when Men reckoned among the principal Possessions of a Family, the Wife and the Ox.

—Ʋxorem{que} Bovem{que} jugalem.

When a cold Cave was all the House which con∣tained the Fire; the domestick Gods, the Houshold-Goods, and all the Stock under the same Roof.

—Cum frigida parvas Praeberet spelunca domos, ignemque laremque Et pecus, & dominos communi clauderet umbra.

Lastly, That the Oeconomick Prudence is divi∣ded into four Parts; The Nuptial, or that of a married State, in relation to the Wife; The Pa∣ternal, in respect of the Children; The Lordly or Magisterial, which relates to the Servants and Slaves; The Possessions, which respects the Goods, Possessions, and other Enjoyments of the Family.

Of the Nuptial Prudence and its several Duties.

AS for what concerns, among other things, the Nuptial Prudence, it is most certain that the first and principal Duty, is to chuse a good Wife; for he who endeavours to marry with Beauty, No∣bility, or Riches, rather than Virtue, is striving doubtless to load himself with a tedious and trouble∣some Cross. When the Election is made, and the Marriage consummated, the Husband ought in such a manner to labour to gain the Love of his Spouse by all the Expressions of Affection and Respect, that she may easily see her own Happiness, and be persuaded that she could never meet with a better Husband, a more honest Man, nor a more suita∣ble and more pleasant Companion. Yet this ought to be managed with so much Moderation and Dis∣cretion, that no occasion may be given to her to become Insolent; and that with the Love she bears to her Husband, she may not forget the Respect that she owes him: For tho' there is an Equality be∣tween the Husband and the Wife, there are a great many things in which the Husband ought to have

the Pre-eminence; and if in such Cases he yields by chance to the Ambition of the Woman, he will quickly find himself under a most intolerable Yoke, and with the loss of his Authority, he will lose al∣so his Peace and Quiet.

He ought likewise to train her up and instruct her in such a manner, in the Management of Domestick Affairs, that he may leave to her the ordinary Care and Command of the Family, and may him∣self be better able to look after the Concerns abroad. By this means she will share in the Government, and ease her Husband of those Cares which are of less Moment, and within the reach and capacity of the Female Sex.

He must also acquaint her with such of his De∣signs which he knows do not exceed the capacity of her Understanding, and which he believes she will keep secret if there be any need of Conceal∣ment; that she may thereby understand that she is not slighted, and that her Husband desires that she may have a share in his Affairs; and that if she is to be concerned in doing any thing, she may per∣form it more satisfactorily and with greater affe∣ction. Besides, as she is admitted to be a Fellow-labourer, she will add to his Joy upon good success, and lessen his Grief upon ill.

I need not mention, that he ought not to vio∣late his conjugal Faith that he has plighted to her; for this were to do her a great Injustice, and to incline her to return him the like; besides, this is apt to beget a certain Indignation and Aversion in her, with a domestick Hatred never to be re∣conciled, attended with perpetual Quarrels; not to mention something else which too commonly at∣tends the furious Jealousie of a Woman, Quid non possit foemina furens?

Lastly, if she hath neither Modesty nor Manners, and after that the Husband hath applyed all possi∣ble industry to make her better, if she remains still untractable, it is not lawful doubtless to destroy her, as it was among the Romans, the Greeks, and the Gauls, according to thee too cruel Laws of their Country; but in such a case it is convenient either to separate, or to resolve to submit with Courage, and to alleviate with Patience the Evil that we can∣not Remedy, especially if there be Children, that so the Follies and Infamy of the Mother, and the Discredit of the Family may not be divulged.

But we must here acknowledge the Truth, That the brutish Temper and ill Conduct of Men, oftner make Marriages unhappy, than the Lightness, Un∣constancy, Vanity, and Ambition of Wives. There∣fore the modern Persians have a common Proverb, That the Husband who hath an ill Wife, don't deserve to be married. They mean thereby, That a Man who dares venture upon Marriage, ought, besides the certain knowledge of his bodily Strength, to know at the first beginning, how to manage and order the Mind and Temper of his Wife, so as to make her become good. Now if he be defective in this, it will be accounted his Fault, his want of skill or complacency of Temper, and consequently his incapacity of rendring Matrimony so easie and agreeable as it ought to be.

Of paternal Prudence, and its several Duties.

THE principal Office of paternal Prudence, seems chiefly to have regard to the begetting of Children; because from hence proceeds the Tem∣per of the Body, and consequently the Disposition and Inclination, either to Good or Evil Manners.

It is not therefore without Reason, that this Re∣proach is so common, Genuit te Parens ebrius cum foret. Thy Father was Drunk when he begot thee. But if we should advise Men what Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others have taught concerning the Age, the Season, the Manners of Living, the pre∣ceding Continency and other things requisite, they would but little regard it, being carried to the Act by a blind and lustful Fury; so that it is a hazard if the Off-spring thus engendred prove vir∣tuous or otherwise; and Children thus casually be∣gotten, are educated such as they are born.

Therefore if we consider this Duty, the First thing will be to look carefully to Children in their Infancy; to take a principal care that if the Mother hath not the Patience to suckle her Infant, and to give it the Breast, and that Milk which Na∣ture hath bestowed upon her for that purpose, to make choice of a Nurse of a good Disposition, sound Constitution, and good Temper; for cer∣tainly this first Nourishment hath a great influence upon the remaing part of our Life, upon the health of our Bodies, and the disposition of our Minds.

The Second thing is to train 'em up in good Manners, and give 'em prudent Instructions, which is of so great importance, that we cannot be too careful and solicitous in providing 'em able and discreet Tutors. And here by the way, I cannot but admire at the niggardly Thrift of some Parents in this particular; not considering that this lays the foundation of their Childrens future Happiness or Ruin. And if a Child shall perceive, when he comes to Age, that any thing in that respect hath been wanting to him, he will scarce ever forgive them.

The Third, is to design 'em to a certain man∣ner of Life, always with a regard to their Condi∣tion,

Abilities, and chiefly to their Genius and Na∣tural Inclination, for fear that we should engage them in an Employment which they are not able to discharge with Credit, or to reap much Advantage or Pleasure by.

The last Duty is to admit them in such a man∣ner into their Counsels, that they may understand betimes the Business of the Family, and how it is like to go for time to come, for fear that they should be altogether ignorant of it, and be unable to bear the Burthen, if the Father should happen to fail. It is doubtless, a foolish and ridiculous kind of Envy in Fathers and Mothers, to be unwilling to com∣municate their Concerns to their Children, as if it did not behove them to be acquainted therewith; for if thereby they imagin the better to support their Authority, they are very much deceived, not considering that by this Concealment they lessen the Love that Children would have had for them, and offer 'em Motives, if not to desire their death, at least to bear it with less Concern. 'Tis true, a Father ought always to preserve himself in the Esteem and Veneration of his Children, and as we commonly say, Command over his Family till Death. But this Respect must be obtained in such a manner, as he ought not to lose his Childrens Love, which cannot be better preserv'd than by such Actions as may convince them they love them sincerely, and that they labour only for their good. They ought to behave themselves after such a man∣ner, and with so much Prudence, that they may esteem themselves happy to be the Children of such a Father, who is one of the best of Parents and faithfullest of Friends that they could ever desire. These Expressions of Affection are so much the more needful for Fathers and Mothers, because as it hath been always observed, Love never ascends

as it doth descend. The love of Children to Pa∣rents, is commonly much less than that of Fathers and Mothers to their Children, the latter seeming as it were much more natural than the former.

Of the Prudence of Superiors, and their several Duties.

ARistotle teacheth, That the Prudence of a Lord hath in it nothing great and sublime, be∣cause it sufficeth, that the Master knows how to Command what the Slave should perform. Yet according to his Opinion, there is a particular Knowledge that regards the Government of Slaves: The First Office is to distinguish and understand the Ability and Capacity of each Servant or Slave, lest by a mistake we should employ one who is by birth fit to be an Overseer, in mean and labo∣rious Drudgeries, or on the contrary we should advance one who is less capable, to a more consi∣derable Post.

Secondly, so to behave our selves with our Ser∣vants, that they may not grow Insolent, nor be cast down, or too much discouraged; for this purpose we must shew some Respect to such as are the best qualified, the most polished and most civilized, and supply the meanest with a competent Subsistence; for that little Respect that we render to the first, and the necessary Allowance that we give to the latter, is instead of a Reward and Incouragement to them for their Labour.

And tho' what we have said be commonly un∣derstood only as to Slaves, yet it may also be meant of those whom we call Servants, in whose place many would willingly have Slaves restored, for Reasons that are sufficiently known: However, whether we use Slaves or Servants, we ought al∣ways

so to behave our selves towards them, that they may be inclined to perform their Duty with Respect and Willingness, which may easily be ob∣tained, unless it be sometimes in Servants, because they have the liberty to leave and depart, and sel∣dom will endure Correction. But it is not sufficient that they serve with Respect, but we should endea∣vour that Affection may accompany it, which can never be expected, unless we make them sensible that we love them our selves, that we have a care of them, and that whiles they perform their Duty, we shall never be wanting in our care of their Wel∣fare; and that at the appointed time, some shall have their Freedom, others their Reward: At last, whe∣ther we promise them any Reward, or whether they have any Reason to expect any, we must not suffer them to be disappointed of their Expectation, not only because Equity requires it, but also be∣cause Prudence is concerned, that other Servants and Slaves may serve so much the more willingly, because they will expect to be treated in the same manner, and will thereby understand that they have to do with a good Master, and a very honest Man.

Of Possessory Prudence and its Offices.

LAstly, As to this sort of Prudence, its main Office it seems is to take care that nothing ne∣cessary be wanting to the Family; for a Father of a Family commands over all its Members, to the end that by his Prudence and Diligence, he may mind that nothing be deficient, which they are to have with respect to the Condition of the Person: For tho' absolutely, and according to the Prescript of Nature, nothing is necessary but that which ex∣pels

Hunger, Thirst, Cold, and such like Incon∣veniences; nevertheless, civil Society makes seve∣ral other things needful, which are suitable to the Rank and Degree that we bear in that Society. A consequence of this Duty is to take heed that our Expences do not exceed our Incomes, because the Debts contracted by degrees, will drain the Fund and bring the Family to Penury and Want. We don't speak of idle and ridiculous Expences, which are never to be suffered, but such as Prudence will permit, and which are to be regulated according to our Abilities and the clear Rents and Incomes of our Estates; which cannot well be expected with∣out this second Duty, that seems to be of a greater Concernment than all the rest, That the Master himself should understand his own Business; and if he cannot think upon every particular thing, he ought not to trust so much to his Agents and Ste∣wards, but that he should well know in what his Estate consists, and be perfectly acquainted with the state of his Incomes and Expences. We commonly see that all things go to wrack in great Houses when the Master understands not his Affairs, but leaves 'em to the Management of Servants and Stewards, in such a manner that they think they may do what they please without being called to an account or controlled. It is known what Socrates and Aristotle relate of a certain Persian, who being asked what it was chiefly that made his Horse so fat, answer'd, The Eye of his Master. And we have likewise heard the answer of that African, from whom they inquired, What was the best means to improve Land and make the Fields fertile, answer'd, The Foot-steps of the Landlord. From whence we may con∣clude, that commonly a Business is never better ma∣nag'd, than when those who are chiefly concerned, take care of it themselves.

Now because some would have the preservation and increase of an Estate patrimonial, or an Estate otherwise obtained, to belong to this kind of Pru∣dence; this doubtless is to be understood, where our Estate is not so large as to spend our Days in Ease and Leasure, and have sufficient to leave to our Posterity. In such a Case, 'tis not only Honorable, but also needful to employ our Cares to increase our Estate. But to think upon nothing else but how to heap Riches, and to purchase Lands, to add Houses to Houses and Fields to Fields, is to run into that Covetousness and unsatiable greedy Desire, of which we have been Discoursing before.

But as there are Three expedients of gathering Wealth, Husbandry, Industry, or honest Labour and Usury; Cicero tells us, that of all those means by which we get an Estate, there is none better, more pleasant, and more suitable, and worthy of a Free∣man, than Husbandry. He Speaks of Merchandise, that if the Traffick and Gain be small, it is Sordid and Base; but if great and large, and gives an Op∣portunity of being Bountiful without Vanity or Pre∣sumption, it is not to be slighted. But for Usury, saith Aristotle and Cicero, 'tis hated not without cause, but chiefly when it is excessive. For as the Poet observes, constant Usury destroys the Poor.

—Velox inopes usura trucidat.

I know there are other Means to grow Rich; as the Service of great Men, Flattery, &c. But it is not requisite that we should speak of those that take these Courses; nor of such as purchase Offices, and make Parties by Bribery; nor of such as going to the Wars, not contented with their Pay, plunder and take the Goods of other Men; seeing such kind of Men differ in nothing from those who make them∣selves

Rich by Cheating, by Perjury and Robbing: But not to stay too long upon this Master, let us examin Two great Complaints that are made against Epicurus.

The First because he saith, That a wise Man ought not to be Married, nor trouble himself in the Education of Children; which seems not only to overthrow the very Foundations of Families, but even of Common-wealths. The Second is, they seem to charge him with having said, That there is no natural communi∣cation among Men, and that the great Affection of Parents toward their Children, is not the effect of Na∣ture.

As to the First, it is certain that he never intended this as a general direction to all Mankind, but only to a few wise Men; neither hath he prescribed, that wise Men may not nor ought not to Marry, if the good of the Common-wealth, or some other weighty Consideration require it. Now how can this be to overthrow the Foundation of the Com∣monwealth? Is not this, I pray, more Holy and Religious than the practice of Aristotle, who pro∣mulg'd a Law, That such Children as were defici∣ent in their Members, should be destroyed, that the number of such as should be brought up might be limited, and that as many as should happen to be Born beyond that Number, should be expos'd; but if any Constitution of the Country prohibits such Practices, they should cause the Fruit of the Womb to perish, before it comes to have Life or Feeling: And as to the Reason or Excuse he pretends, of the privation or want of Sense and Life in the Foetus, it is but a meer Mockery, for he cannot prove that when a Woman Miscarries, the Fruit or Foetus hath neither Sense nor Life; and that to destroy any such Fruit, which would be alive in a very short time, if it be not already, is the same thing as to

destroy a Corps or a Body, altogether incapable of Life.

For the Second, 'tis true, Epictetus represents Epi∣curus exclaiming against that vulgar Error, That there is a natural Communication between Men, and that the Affection of Parents to their Children, is Natural or Born with them. Be not deceived, as he represents him Speaking: Ne decipiamini O Mor∣tales! Non est ratione praeditis ulla inter se naturalis Communicatio; Amor Parentum erga Liberos non est Naturalis. Mihi credite, qui secus loquuntur in errorem inducunt vos, ac rationibus falsis circumveniunt vos. But doubtless the Envy and Hatred against Epicurus hath caused many to make him say things that he never imagined: For certain it is, that he allows a natu∣ral Communication between Nations, and among Men who live under the same Laws. Now if this be granted, 'tis plain that there is more reason to allow a natural Communication between those of the same Blood, and between Parents and Children who are immediately united together by Blood and Na∣ture. Epictetus himself acknowledges that Epicurus was of Opinion, That we are naturally inclined to Communication, and that when we have a Child Born, 'tis not in our Power not to Love it, or to Slight and Disregard it. It seems they will have him maintain this Doctrin.

Nevertheless, I will say, That if they will abso∣lutely make him hold this, that the Love of Parents to their Children is not Natural, they should at least give him liberty to interpret his own Words. His Meaning is, That this Affection is begot in us, and increases by degrees, not so much by a certain blind instinct of Nature, as by a persuasion of the Father that it is his Child, and a part of himself; and by the Hopes that he shall be Beloved and Honoured, or Relieved and Supported by him; or because he

judges his Name to be eternized and conveyed to Posterity by this means, and that the plain and in∣genuous Conversation of a Child that promiseth much, rejoyceth his Heart.

Epicurus seems to have very good Reasons to be of that Opinion; First, because we see many that have equal Affection for Children that are none of their own, but Bastards, as they have for their own, if they believe them to be lawfully begotten. Se∣condly, we find not that Love in those whose Chil∣dren are lawfully Begotten, if they are otherwise persuaded. Thirdly, we find as great a Love in those who have adopted Children, when the Reso∣lution or Will supplies the defects of the Persuasion. Fourthly, That if the Fruit is Abortive, the Father and the Mother are not so much afflicted, as if it had continued with them a longer time, and been conversant with 'em; not so much when it dies a young Infant, as when it departs in a more advanc'd Age; when it hath many Brethren, as when it is the only Child; if he hath had already any Children, as if he hath none left behind; if he be Debaucht and Untractable, as if he were Wise and Vertu∣ous.

CHAP. V. Of politick or civil Prudence.

WE shall now speak of Politick Prudence, which Aristotle calls not only Science or Ability, but supposes it to be the Lady and Queen of all the rest, the knowledge of Morality being subject to it as a part of it; for he tells us, That it belongs to a Politician to understand what may make for the Happiness of the People, that he is proper∣ly the Master and chief Contriver of their Welfare, and that consequently it belongs to him to take cog∣nizance of Pleasure and Pain, and of Virtue and Vice, which are the Springs of Pleasure and Pain. Now the politick Prudence, is like the Oeconono∣mick; for as the latter is to regulate a Family, com∣posed of several particular Persons; so the Politick or Civil is to govern a City or Town composed of divers Families. We ought therefore, first to exa∣mine in whom this Prudence resides, or ought to re∣side, as in its proper Subject: This appears not difficult to resolve, for it is plain that it ought to reside in none more than in him who hath the so∣vereign Power, the chief Authority, or the abso∣lute Right to Command, which Right may be dis∣covered chiefly by certain particulars, which Ari∣stotle mentions: As to be able to conclude Peace or War; to make Alliances, and dissolve them; to establish and disannul Laws; to determin about Life, Death, Banishment, confiscation of Goods or Resti∣tution.

Of the first Origin of Sovereign Power, according to the Opinion of the Ancients.

THIS Power is supposed by the Vulgar, to have first taken its beginning, when Men, like Beasts, wandred up and down the Fields without any subjection, each enjoying his full Liberty accord∣ing to his own Will and Pleasure. Hereupon they contrived to make up Societies, in which every one renouncing, in some measure, his own Liberty, yeilded to the Will of the Multitude, which by this means claimed a Right and Authority over each in∣dividual Person; and provided not only for their Safety and quiet way of Living, by giving a check to the most Powerful and Robust, by hindering them from insulting over their weaker and more peacable Neighbours, but also hereby they made a more equal Distribution of the Products of the Earth, and likewise communicated to each other the effects of their Arts and Labours, wherein any ex∣celled another: For that lawless freedom which they pretended to enjoy in those early Days, must doubt∣less cost them dear, because every one having an equal Right over every Thing, and no Man being able to appropriate any thing to his own use, which another was able to take from him; they must needs be continually Warring and Contending with one another. So that such a way of Living being full of Quarrels, cannot be properly called a Freedom, be∣cause of the many Inconveniences and Mischiefs that attend it. Therefore true and natural Liberty is easier to be found in a Society, where Men being obedient to the Laws of that Society, I mean those Laws that were enacted and approved for their Be∣nefit and Advantage, act in all other things as they

please, and have a Right to their proper Goods, so that no other can take them away, because of the publick Authority and Power that protects 'em.

For this Reason, Aristotle seems to disapprove of Plato's Common-wealth, in which Women, Children, Estates, and all other Things were to be common: For if we take away Mine and Thine, the Common-wealth is so far from being at Unity thereby, and consequently more perfect and compleat, that it is the only way to introduce again that primitive Bar∣barity and brutish manner of Living; for what we Fancy to be common to every one, belongs properly to no Body. This made Colotes, a Disciple of Epicurus, to say, That they who have made the Laws, and have settled the Government and the Magistracy in Cities, have thereby secured Mens Lives, and settled them in a peaceable State; and that if we offer to abolish them, we must return to live like Beasts, and devour one another. There may perhaps be found some who in considera∣tion to Virtue, and out of their own good Inclination, may Rule and Govern themselves: But truly they seem Strangers to the generality of Mankind, who Fancy that they will restrain from Acts of Injustice by the Principles of Reason or of Honesty, rather than by the Terror of the Magistrates or of the Laws.

But to return to our Matter in hand, I omit to speak of the sovereign Power or sovereign Authori∣ty, translated by common Consent from particular Persons to all the People. Now the People meeting together to deliberate and resolve upon any Busi∣ness, what was resolved by all, or by the greatest part, was taken to be the Resolution of the whole Society. And because it is inconvenient that all the People should meet, and that every private Person should declare his Sentiment, it happened that all the People, of their own accord, made over this Power to a certain number of Persons, or to one

single Person, or it may be that this one Person, or a greater Number, by Force or by Cunning have taken it upon them. I observe only, that we un∣derstand from thence, why we commonly di∣stinguish according to the saying of Tacitus, Cunctas Nationes et Ʋrbes Populus, aut Primores, aut Singuli re∣gunt; Three kinds of Common-wealths, or of poli∣tical Governments, namely, Monarchy or the Do∣minion of a single Person, when the sovereign Pow∣er resides in one who Commands all the People, and is Commanded by no Body: Oligarchy or the Do∣minion of a few particular Persons, when the sove∣reign Power is in a small Number: Poliarchy or the Dominion of many, it may be of all the People, when the sovereign Power resides in every private Person. Moreover, tho from these three Sorts we may observe and distinguish two Kinds, one Good, Lawful and Praise-worthy, the other Vicious, Un∣lawful and deserving Blame; yet common Expe∣rience hath Taught us to call the good sort of the first kind Kingdom, and the evil, Tyranny; but the good sort of the second Aristocracy, or the Dominion of the Chieftains, and of the best; the evil ought to be called Kyristocracy, or the Dominion of many wicked Persons, but it retains the Name of Oligar∣chy. Besides, Plato, Xenophon, and several others Teach, That the third kind is called Democracy, or Dominion of the People: Aristotle nevertheless tells us, That the word Democracy is ascribed to the vicious Species of that kind of Government, and that the best is named Common-wealth; but accord∣ing to the present Use and Practice, the Three sorts or forms of Government are called Monarchy, Ari∣stocracy and Democracy.

Now 'tis not necessary that we should busy our selves in giving the Character or Marks of each sort of Government, they are sufficiently known; I shall

only here observe Two or Three particulars: First, That to the two kinds of Monarchy, namely, King∣ly and Tyrannical, they commonly add a Third, which they name Despotick; for the Kingly is when the Monarch Rules his Subjects, as a Father his Children; and that as his Subjects are Obedient to his Commands and Laws, he himself is Obedient to the Laws of Nature, suffering his Subjects to enjoy as well their natural Liberty, as the propriety of their Goods. But the Tyrannical is that where the Monarch commands his Subjects as Slaves or Brutes, and trampling under Foot all the Laws of Nature, he deprives them of all Liberty and Propriety, which he Usurps and claims to himself as his own. The Despotical, they say, is where the Monarch Com∣mands his Subjects, which have been overcome by War, as a good Master of a Family doth his Slaves. Secondly, I shall observe, That 'tis not without Cause that the regal and tyrannical Dominions are said to be contrary; for as the Regal aims at the common good of the Society, and designs for its End the Security, the Tranquility, the Plenty, and in a Word, the publick Happiness: So the Tyrannical aims at nothing but its own private Advantage, and fills all Places with Fear, Trouble, Poverty and Ca∣lamity. And as in the regal Government, not on∣ly the Subjects are Happy, but also and chiefly the Prince, because of that Respect and Love which he knows that his Subjects have for him, when he shews them that he fears God, that he is Obedient to the Laws of Nature, and that he looks upon the wel∣fare of his People, as his greatest Interest; that he is wise in his Deliberations, courageous in his Actions, moderate in Prosperity, constant in Adversity, re∣solved in the Execution of Justice, faithful to his Promises, mild to good Men, severe to the Wicked, supporting his Friends, terrible to his Enemies, in a

Word, that he is the Father of his Country, and a true Shepherd of his People: Thus in the tyrannical Government all kind of Mischiefs, Griefs and Anxi∣eties oppress not only the Subjects, but more par∣ticularly the Tyrant himself, who is not insensible of the secret Contempt they bear him, and the im∣placable Hatred that his Subjects harbour in their Breasts against him, when he makes them sensible, and feel by his tyrannical Proceedings, that he va∣lues neither God, Nature, nor the safety of his Peo∣ple; for every one sees that he acts nothing but by Subtilty and Violence; that good Success renders him Insolent and Proud, as the Evil causeth him to be Cruel; that he is full of Injustice, Perfidiousness and Barbarity; that he hates good Men, that he fa∣vours Wicked, in short, That he is not the Father of his Country, but a publick Enemy; not a Shep∣herd, but a Wolf to his People. Therefore being feared and dreaded by all the World, he is himself in continual Fear and Dread, which suffer him at no time to be at rest. For he fears both Friends and Foes, and trembles at the shaking of a Leaf, yea, at his very Shadow. Therefore Cicero and Seneca have very well remarkt, according to Epicurus, that it must needs be, That he whom many fear, should stand in fear of many, which Seneca brings in Labe∣ricus thus expressing,

Necesse est multos timeat, quem multi timent.

Whether Monarchial Government is the best.

THe third thing that I have thought fit to ob∣serve, is, That of the several approved sorts of Government, the Monarchical seems to be the best: For tho' they have all of 'em their Incon∣veniences

and Advantages; yet the Advantages of the Monarchical are above the rest, and the Incon∣veniences fewer. For as in the Monarchical, all Or∣ders proceed from one Person, and relate to one; the state of Affairs is more settled and constant; the necessary Orders upon all occasions more easie to be given; the Resolutions more secret; the Exe∣cution quicker, and all opportunities of Factions and Seditions prevented. Liberty likewise and Security, which other Forms of Government pretend to, is greater and larger, and so of other Advantages which are very well known. This is sufficiently proved by the Government of a Family, which re∣quires but one Master or Father of the Family; or by that of an Army, which ought to have but one General; and by the Government of the World that acknowledgeth but one Sovereign Lord. Be∣sides, the Annals inform us, That when the Affairs of a Common-wealth have been reduced to the last Extremity, they have set up a Dictator as the only Remedy. And tho' Aristotle in his Politicks, seems to prefer Aristocracy before Monarchy, he desires that we would consult the Genius of the People; for some are more fit and inclinable to one Govern∣ment than to another; nevertheless, in his Meta∣physicks, he concludes without any Exception, That Government by many is inconvenient.

Of the Duties of a Monarch in General.

BUt as we should be too tedious, and it is not convenient to treat here, what belongs to the several Forms of Government, it shall suffice to mention something of the Monarchical, which may be applied to the rest. Now as the Duty of a So∣vereign hath chiefly respect to two times, viz. that

of War and that of Peace; there are certain things among others, which he ought principally to mind. First, To understand well, and to imprint in his Thoughts this Persuasion, That the Welfare, the Security and Advantage of his People; or as Cicero calls it, the Happiness of his Subjects, should be the great Design and End of his Government: That for this purpose he Rules, and upon this account it is that he is respected and obeyed. For as the Pilate, saith Cicero, designs a happy and safe Navigation, the Phy∣sician the Health of the Patient, the General of an Ar∣my Victory, so the Governour of a Common-wealth de∣signs the Happiness of his Subjects, which is secured by Riches, by Military Forces, by Glory, Virtue and Ho∣nesty.

Secondly, To propose to himself no other Re∣ward of his Cares and Labours, but the Glory of Governing well, the Gratitude, the Respect and Affections of his Subjects. How well was Trojan rewarded, when he heard the Applauses of all the People, who cried out with a loud Voice, May the Gods love thee as thou lovest us; for who can be happier than we, who need not wish that our Prince should love us, but only that the Gods should bear us equal Affection as our Prince doth? Timoleon also own'd himself suffi∣ciently requited, when walking abroad, he heard the like Acclamations of the People, full of Love and Veneration. Therefore Princes act with little wisdom, or rather very imprudently, who being desirous of Glory, endeavour to purchase it by any other Means than by doing good to their People, and by deserving their Affections: For the Ap∣plause gained by other Methods, is accompanied with Contempt, Hatred, and Execrations of the Common People, and deserves to be called Infamy. Excellent and Admirable was the Speech of Xunus Emperor of China to his Son Yaiis, who according

to the Relation of Martinius, lived Two Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Eight Years before the Birth of Christ. Take, said he, when he was dy∣ing, this Scepter due to your Virtue and Merits. Re∣member that you are the Father of your People, that you are to deal with them as with your Children, that the People are not born to serve you, but that you are born and designed to serve them; and that a King is alone raised up above all the rest, that he might alone be able to serve all. Seneca's Expression is likewise very admirable; The greatness of a Prince, saith he, is settled, firmly grounded and unshaken, when all the People understand that he is as much for them as he is above them; and find by experience that he watcheth daily, and takes care as well of the Welfare of every particular Person, as of the general Safety of the State▪ They look upon him then not as a wild and dangerous Beast that comes out of his Den, but as a beautiful Star full of Divine Influence; they all strive to turn towards him, ready to hazard themselves in a thousand Dan∣gers, and sacrifice their Lives to save his Life.

Thirdly, To excel all others in Virtue, as he excells them in Dignity: For doubtless, 'tis not without Reason, that Cyrus in Xenophon, judgeth, That it is not proper that he who is not more Virtuous than those over whom he is to Command, should have Power to Command them. Truly he is obliged to encourage Virtue for his Peoples sake, for it is cer∣tain that the Example of Kings is the Pattern and Rule of the whole Kingdom.

—Componitur Orbis, Regis ad exemplum.

And the Condition of Princes, in the Opinion of Quintilian, Seneca and Cicero, is such, that being in view of all the World, they can no more be

concealed than the Sun; they therefore, if they are vicious, expose their Vices to publick View, and do more Mischief by their Examples, than by their wicked Actions. Now as he is bound to en∣courage Virtue for his Peoples sake, so likewise for his own, that so he may gain the Esteem and Ve∣neration of the World, which he can never obtain if he be reputed Vicious: And among all the other Virtues, he ought chiefly to encourage Piety and Religion, as well that he may be blessed with Rewards from Heaven, and Abilities necessary to bear up the weight of so heavy a Burthen as the Go∣vernment of the State is, as also to make his Subjects the more Faithful, more Respectful and Obedient to him; for they believe that he whom they see addicted to Piety and Religion, is beloved and favoured of God; and that when they are govern'd by such a one who is beloved of God, they are go∣verned by the very Spirit of God.

He must also have a special regard to the exe∣cution of Justice, for this purpose, as it hath been observed since the days of Hesiod, Kings were first appointed; namely, for the Chastisement of the Wicked, and for the Rewarding of those who de∣serve it, and to end the Differences that arise among his Subjects, by causing every Man to re∣ceive his own. Therefore when a Prince devests himself of this Virtue, he seems to profane the true and natural Duty of a Prince; for of all the Titles of Honour, the most glorious and splendid doubt∣less is to be stiled Just.

There is also nothing that he ought more to heed than the keeping of his Word which he hath once given; and to observe punctually his Promises and the plighting of his Faith; for the violation of this is more unworthy in him, because he hath the Power in his own Hand, so that there is nothing

that can easily excuse his breach of Promise; nay further, he is obliged as far as in him lies, to hin∣der others from doing so. This quality is so much the more excellent, because it is rare among Men, and requires a firm Resolution, Constancy, and a greatness of Mind, chiefly when the Concerns are weighty and considerable; we shall pass over Dis∣simulation in silence, which is too common. I know some Politicians do permit of some kinds of De∣ceits in a Prince, if they tend to the Advancement of the Publick good. Plato, among others, main∣tains, That they who Rule, are often obliged to lie and deceive for the Advantage of their Subjects. But this is a difficult Question, which we shall examin here∣after.

Fortitude and Clemency are also Regal Virtues, and every one knows that a Prince cannot be ex∣cused from practising them; for as Fortitude is needful to strike an Awe and prevent any suddain Rebellion or Disturbance of the publick Peace: So Clemency is proper to beget in us a Love for the Prince, because of his Readiness to pardon Offen∣ders: This also creates an opinion of his Good∣ness in us, when we find him naturally inclinable to observe that excellent Rule which advises a Prince to be merciful to the Submissive, but to cor∣rect the Stubborn.

Parcere Subjectis & debellare superbos.

As to what relates to Modesty, it highly concerns him to know how to temper it with Majesty; for fear that forgetting his human Condition, and be∣ing puff'd up with Glory and Pride, he should be∣come Insolent, and should draw upon himself una∣voidably the hatred of his People; or on the con∣trary, by abasing himself below his Dignity, he should fall into Contempt.

There is no need that we should speak of Libe∣rality, every one knows that it is a Virtue which ought to be familiar to Princes, and the rather be∣cause there is nothing that procures more the good Will and Approbation of the World, than liberal and bountiful Actions. To this end the great abundance of Riches seems to arise from all Parts, and at last to Center in the Treasury of the Prince, and thence to issue forth again as from a plentiful Fountain. But these Liberalities are to be bestow∣ed prudently, with a regard to the Quality and Merit of the Persons whom he intends to gratify; and also to his own Treasure, lest by stirring up Emulation and Envy, he give too great opportunity to abusive Tongues. As for Continency, Sobriety, and other Virtues, the more he is endowed with them and practises 'em, the more glorious they will certainly render him.

The fourth particular that a Monarch ought to apply himself to, is to understand well the Nature and State of the Kingdom, if he comes to it by Ele∣ction or by Succession, if it be Ancient or Modern; what are the Fundamental Laws of the State, what Evils and Mischiefs have happened either from the Observance or not Observance of those Laws; what relation it hath with the Aristocratical or Demo∣cratical Governments; what Power the Grandees have; what is able to stir up or to move the com∣mon People, and consequently what are the Man∣ners and Customs of both. He ought not to be ig∣norant of the Extent of his Dominion, of its Con∣fines, Situation and Riches, and whether the Traf∣fick be within or without his Realm. He must al∣so know his Castles and Fortifications, and the Neighbours who are able to break in upon him, or incourage Factions. This will oblige him to be ac∣quainted with Chronology, with Geography, and

with History, which derives its Beauty and Perfe∣ction from the two former Sciences, and which is so needful to him, that without the Knowledge of this he can never expect to become a perfect and an accomplished Politician.

Fifthly, He must be always furnished with those things, without which a Kingdom cannot safely subsist; namely, a wise and prudent Counsel, that when he himself cannot well understand, fore-see and determin all things, he may make use of such Counsellors, whose Diligence, Experience, Wis∣dom, Integrity and Faithfulness have recommended 'em to him; for he must remember what Cicero saith according to Hesiod, That he is truly very wise who knows of himself what ought or what ought not to be done; but his Wisdom is next a kin, who knows how to make use of good Advice, and to submit to it. Sapientissimum esse dicunt eum cui quod opus sit veniat in mentem, proxime vero ac∣cedere illum qui alterius bene inventis obtemperet, which is comprehended in these two Verses,

Ille quidem eximius qui per se ipse omnia novit, Sed praestans etiam, qui paret recta monenti.

Therefore he ought always to keep himself in that disposition of Mind, that Truth may never of∣fend him; that loving Uprightness and Sincerity, he may hate all Flattery, which is the chief Plague and Bane of great Men; For fear, saith the same Author, that having tender Ears, he should be the last who should understand the dishonour of his Kingdom, and that his Ruin should befal him be∣fore he could become sensible of it.

He ought likewise to be furnished with worthy Of∣ficers; for as he alone is not able to do all things, the several Offices of State ought to be possess'd by such

as are able to support them; such are the Gover∣nours of Cities and Provinces, the Generals of Ar∣mies, the Captains, Judges, Magistrates, and such like, who are to be of Ability and known Inte∣grity, otherwise there will be a continual and un∣avoidable sequel of Mistakes, Wickedness and Mis∣chiefs that will attend.

There is no need to advise, that as Mony is the Strength of all Affairs, his Coffers ought never to be empty; that the Forces of the Kingdom may always continue on foot, and that when a War happens or some other Occasion of great Expences, he may not be obliged to levy suddain, violent and extraordinary Taxes. Neither is it needful to men∣tion the General Deficiences of the State, such as are the Fortresses and Castles, which ought to be well provided, especially on the Borders, and on that side which the Enemy is to be feared: The Military Forces ought to be in a constant readiness, that he may never be surprized, but always able to repel a Foreign Invasion, and pacify a home-bred Sedition: As to Alliances, and chiefly such as are made with those People, who, as Aristotle would have them, are Neighbours and Powerful, there ought to be frequent and true Intelligence of all Things that happen, and of all the Designs that are on foot among the Subjects, Neighbours or Ene∣mies; for fear of being ignorant herein, there might be some Contrivance against him unexpected, whereby he himself may be oppressed or ruined. This will cause him to venture something, as Plato saith, or rather, spare nothing for the Maintenance of Spies.

Of the great Concerns of Meum and Tuum, or of the Property of the Subject.

THe sixth Particular, which a long Experience in Travelling over Europe and Asia, hath dis∣covered to me, is of no mean importance to a So∣vereign Prince to cause his Kingdom to flourish, viz. Not to make himself absolute Lord or Pro∣prietor of all the Lands of his Realm, as the Grand Segnior, the King of Persia, the Great Mogul, are in the greatest part of their Dominions; but to establish a Propriety, not only as in Poland, among the Nobility, but generally among all his Subjects: For if we take away this great Foundation, we de∣prive every private Person from all hopes of ad∣vancing themselves, or of securing what at present they enjoy. In such a Case none is in a Condition to say, If I labour 'tis for my self and my Posterity; I shall be the Owner of this little Portion of Land that I intend to purchase; and I will leave it to my Children after me, whereby common People become so negligent and lazy, that they scarce la∣bour but by constraint; and they are so careless of Husbandry, that the best Lands are covered with Sand and Gravel, as in Egypt, by the over-flowing of the Nile; the most beautiful Hills are full of Brambles and Thistles, as in Palestine, and those admirable Vallies of Alexandretta and Antioch, which are become noisom Marshes and infectious Lakes; nay, all those excellent Plains, rare Portions of Land and fruitful Hills of Asia Minor, are become Places covered over with high and useless Grass and Woods; the wonderful Country of Mesopotamia, that true Land of Promise, lies unmanur'd and to∣tally forsaken: In short, all Turky, which is capa∣ble

of being made the most fertile Soil in the World, and stock'd with the greatest number of Inhabitants, at present lies desolate and neglect∣ed.

Besides, in a Government where Propriety is not regarded, there are no Ministers of Justice, of sufficient Power to redress the Grievances of the People at a distance from the Imperial Court, be∣cause all Governours in their Provinces have an absolute Power and Authority, which inclines them to Tyranny; and the more, because they are all Per∣sons who have risen from nothing, or miserable Slaves taken out of a Seraglio, and who have bor∣rowed from those who possess the Treasure of the Kingdom, as the Jews in Turky, vast Sums of Mony to purchase their Governments, not to mention the Presents they are obliged to make every Year to be continued in their Posts. So that all things being at the disposal of the Governours and Jews, there is no Country-man, Handycrafts-man nor Merchant, that can be secure, but lives in a continual dread and apprehension of some Mischief befalling him, by some pretended Quarrel or Design against him. From hence it is, that Arts which procure the Riches of a Kingdom, are slighted in those Countries; and Sciences, which are the Glory and Accomplish∣ment of a Nation, are totally banished: For no bo∣dy there hath either Courage or Hopes to rise to any thing considerable. Neither are there any Offi∣ces or Places that require Learning, nothing but some pitiful Towns, that is to say, certain Villages appointed for the Maintenance and Pension of Sol∣diers, who draw out of them all that they can, without expending any thing, either for the Re∣pair of the Dwellings, or for Cleansing and Drain∣ing of the Ditches, or for any other purpose; for they are never assured of any thing, and they know

not to Day, but that they may be absolutely dis∣possess'd to Morrow, or at least their Lands changed by their Masters.

For this Reason, I have sometimes given this De∣finition of a Turk; An Animal Born for the De∣struction of all that is Beautiful and Good in the World, and even of Human Race it self. Not but that the true Turks are often of a kind and good Disposition; but because their mistaken Policy, their Ignorance and Negligence tend to take away and banish all Property; from whence proceeds, as I have said, the Laziness of the People, the neglect of Husbandry, Tyranny, and the desolation of their Provinces. All this is a certain Truth, and not the Dreams of a fantastical Traveller, all those Countries not being now what they formerly were: Above half the Land lies Unmanured; a Man may often Travel a whole Day without meeting one Man; great Towns are generally half demolished and forsaken; nay, the best and most populous Cities, as Grand Cairo, Alexandria, Babilon, and several others, lie the third part at least in Ruins. And there is no doubt that those Princes, tho very considerable, be∣cause of the vast extent of their Dominions, are therefore the less Wealthy, and less Powerful, than they would be if it were otherwise; for they don't see, that in grasping at all, they have nothing, and by making themselves the only Proprietors of all the Lands of their Empire, they make them∣selves Kings of Wildernesses, of Beggars and de∣spicable Wretches. So that if they daily get Ground, and grow greater, 'tis through the Weak∣ness and Discord of their Neighbours; and because their Empire is, as I have said, of such a vast ex∣tent in comparison of others, and because the Tar∣tars (besides those who are taken from the Breasts of their Mothers) supply them with Slaves from se∣veral

Parts, as from Russia, Circassia, Mingrelia, Ar∣menia, and other Countries.

Of the Duties of a Sovereign in times of Peaee.

BUT to return to our Author, and to say some∣thing in a few Words, concerning that which in some respect relates chiefly to the times of Peace, and that kind of Prudence which the Latins named Togata.

The First and chief Duty is to have a Care that Religion and Piety towards God, be inviolably ob∣served in all parts of the Kingdom, that Heaven may be propitious to him, and that his Subjects be∣ing awed with the respect and dread of the Almigh∣ty Power of God, who is every where, and sees all Things, may more readily abstain from those Crimes which he cannot hinder by his Laws. Now the Ex∣perience of our latter Days hath sufficiently disco∣vered to us the Importance and Truth of that Coun∣sel that Mecaenas gave to Augustus, concerning Re∣ligion, and the Divine Worship. You are, said he, to oppose and never let go unpunished the Innovators and Authors of new Religions; not only because that the Gods will not permit such as despise them, to perform any great Actions, but because those who introduce some new Di∣vinity, generally persuade the People to alterations in Go∣vernment, from whence proceed Conspiracies, Seditions and secret Associations, which are doubtless very dange∣rous to a Monarchy.

Secondly, To have a care that Arts be en∣couraged; not only those that we term Liberal from which the Kingdom receives a particular Ac∣complishment, but also such as we call Mechanick, from which we reap great Advantage and Profit; chiefly to have a particular regard to Husbandry and

Navigation, because the First is to supply us plen∣tifully with the Necessities of Life, and the Second encourages Traffick, by which we communicate to Strangers the Things that they want, as they return to us the Things that we stand in need of.

Thirdly, To endeavour that the Kingdom may increase in Virtue and Riches, that is to say, in all Things needful to make our Lives Innocent and Happy. And as Debauchery does easily and insen∣sibly insinuate it self, he ought to give a Check to it by severe Edicts; and in the mean while, he ought to give order, that such as abound in Wealth, may not suffer the Poor at their Gates to pine away for Want: In short, he ought to provide in such a man∣ner, for the several Indigences of his Kingdom, that Happiness and Plenty may spread over all his Domi∣nions in every Corner.

Fourthly, He ought to provide for the security of the Peace, that the Happiness of the Kingdom, which ought to be the first and chief Aim of Kings and Governours, may be more fixt and permanent; to which purpose, the particulars, before mention'd, will contribute; namely, To take care to prevent all Invasions of Strangers, of home Factions and Se∣ditions of his Subjects; about making Alliances and Leagues, and to observe and preserve them as much as is possible; nevertheless, to make the Allies pri∣vately sensible, that it will be in vain for them to break them: For we must always suppose of Stran∣gers, that Force and Power is rather wanting to them, than a desire or a pretence to Invade our Realm, and Conquering of it either in part or all. Therefore he ought to keep his Garrisons well fur∣nished, and to be as careful of secret Ambuscades, and private Treacheries, as of open Assaults. He ought likewise in the same manner, to have a con∣venient Number of Troops and Soldiers ready in

Pay; and as for his Recruits and new raised Re∣giments, he ought to cause them to be trained up with care and exactness in all Military Exercises, that the old Soldiers teaching the new, they may be all ready to do Service when occasion requires.

The Fifth respects the Subjects, That is, to pre∣vent the Conspiraces and Factions of the Grandees, not only by a just and prudent Distribution of Offices, but also by particular Expressions of Kind∣ness, that they may have no cause to complain; nevertheless, he must make them know that he is their Lord and Master, and that he is quick-sight∣ed enough to see into their Designs and most secret Intentions: I shall not speak here of the Advice of Periander, who, as Aristotle relates, gave no An∣swer by word of Mouth to the Embassadors of Thra∣sibulus, but only by signs; for he cut off the Tops of the highest Poppies before their Faces.

Sixthly, He ought, as we have already hinted, to prevent the Mutinies and Seditions of the Peo∣ple, not only by respect and fear; for there is no∣thing that more inclines popular Spirits to Insolen∣cy, than when they see the Prince fallen into Con∣tempt, and that they are secure from all Punish∣ment, but also by an exact and regular Justice, which may free the weakest from the Oppression of the most Powerful, and by easing the People, either by reducing their Taxes to a small Propor∣tion, or by taking them quite away; for there is nothing that more stirs up the Peoples hatred, and makes them more impatient, than extraordinary Taxes. But if the pressing Necessities of the State obliges him to great Expences, and consequently to raise large Sums of Mony, he ought to let his Subjects understand that such Levies are for the ne∣cessary support of the publick Security. So that if they desire their own Welfare, saith Cicero, they

are to comply with Necessity: And besides, this is to be ordered with a great equality, and with a respect to the Condition and Abilities of every one. I shall not speak concerning that Advice, of sending abroad Colonies and Parties out of the Kingdom when the People grow too numerous; nor of that other Advice, of impoverishing the People, and making them grow lean, when there is danger, by too great a Plenty, of growing over-fat, and so are apt to become Insolent.

Seventhly, If there be any Factions begun, or any Seditions raised, he ought speedily to pacify them by the Mediation of some Persons, whose Virtue, Merit and Abilities have rendred them fa∣mous and acceptable: But if the Advices, Reproofs and Counsels of those Persons don't prevail, he must have recourse to Force and Arms, that he may extinguish an Evil in the beginning, which in time might gather Strength, and become at last remediless: He must not be unmindful in the mean while, if he hath not time to raise Forces, and that the Case seems dangerous, that it is the surest Method to yield and grant something of that which gave the occasion to the Sedition.

Eighthly, If the Evil cannot suddenly be stopp'd, neither by Wisdom nor by Arms; but if that pro∣ceeds to a Civil War, which is the great Plague of a Kingdom: Let him in such a Case make use of these Remedies, either to yield in some things, and to agree upon certain Terms, or to put an end to the War by Victory, if there be any hopes, taking a good Courage, and saying resolutely to himself in the Language of Aeneas, Nunc animis opus, Aenea, nunc pectore firmo. He must also remember, after he hath obtained Victory, or restored every thing by his Authority, to punish none but the chief Au∣thors of the Tumult, and the most seditious Per∣sons,

and to Pardon the rest of his Subjects; that in striking a Terror by Executions, he may prevent the like Disorders for the future, and by his Mild∣ness and Clemency, he may declare, That he acts as the Father of his Country.

But here may arise a Question; If a Person of Quality, in a Civil War, may withdraw himself, or keep himself private and retired, as we say, out of harms way, without declaring for either side; or if he ought, according to that Law of Solon, so remarkable in Aristotle, Plutarch and Agellus, de∣clare for one side or other. I answer, If he be a Per∣son of Note and Figure in the Realm, and if he be in some great Post, he ought not to leave his Station and stand idle, but as a wise Pilot, he should go∣vern the same Helm in the Storm which he held in the Calm. But if he be a private Person, who seldom medled with publick Affairs, he may seem to be excus'd from siding with any Party, but live quietly and retire at his own Home, without af∣fronting either Party. But if the Realm be threat∣ned with a Foreign War, he ought not to delibe∣rate, but declare for his Prince and Country.

Of the Offices of a Sovereign in times of War.

NOw that we may also speak as to what chief∣ly concerns the time of War, and conse∣quently of Military Prudence, which shews it self by undertaking, managing and finishing a War. A wise Prince will never take up Arms rashly, whe∣ther he acts as an Assailant or Defendant; but will first examin his own Forces, so that if he finds them not sufficient, he will never adventure to make an Assault, for fear of not being able to save himself upon this first Attempt; and to prevent drawing

all the Forces of the Enemy upon him, he will not expect their coming, but endeavour to prevent them by sending Embassadors of great worth, and by yield∣ing rather something of his own, than to draw upon himself so considerable a Detriment. But if nothing can prevail upon the Enemy, whom he finds too powerful, his only Remedy will be to gather toge∣ther his own Forces, and those of his Confederates; and placing his Confidence in the Divine Assistance, and in the Justice of his Cause, arm himself with Courage and resolve to undergo all Events, either stoutly to over-come with less Force, which often happens, or as we often say, sell his Destruction at a dear rate. Neither ought he to undertake any War but upon a just account, for a just and reasonable End; as for Example, To oppose the Enemy that would not fail to invade him; To re∣take something that the Enemy hath wrongfully usurped, and would never restore, tho' often soli∣cited; To succour his Allies unjustly oppressed, or to assist some other Nation, who being too weak and unjustly assaulted, have requested his Assistance. The War will also be deemed just, tho undertaken or maintained wrongfully, after that the Prince hath made reasonable Offers, and that the Enemy hath rejected them. In all Cases, he is to look up∣on War as a Sea of Calamity and Mischiefs, which is easily disturb'd but not so easily calm'd, because of many unexpected Accidents hapning; so that only Necessity can be a lawful Excuse or Pretence to cover and secure the Prince from those direful Imprecations which the People, oppressed by the Mischiefs of the War, are wont to Vomit out against the Authors of it.

Now that he may sufficiently and prudently car∣ry on the War, when it is once resolved and con∣cluded, he ought to take care that four things be

not wanting to him; Men fit and able for the Em∣ployment; convenient Arms; sufficient Provisions, and as much Mony as is requisite for his Men. It is certain also, that he ought first to make choice of good Officers, and chiefly of a General; and this General ought to be but one; for it hath been observed in all Ages, as Thucidides takes notice, That nothing is more pernicious than many Commanders in chief. He ought to be of a tried Experience and a sharp Understanding, that he may be able to resolve sud∣denly and with advantage; He ought to know the Situation of the Country where he makes War, be∣cause the Victory or the Loss of a Battel, often de∣pends upon a very trivial thing, upon a narrow Lane, a stream of Water, a Wood, or some rising Grounds, &c. Aristotle is of Opinion, That he ought to be an honest Man; but that more respect is to be had of his Ability than of his Manners. Besides, he must have Authority, and the Reputa∣tion of a great Warrier; and ought to be success∣ful, not only because that is a great Encouragement to an Army, but because that makes the Soldiers ready, bold and resolute, and strikes a Terror in∣to the Enemy. The Qualifications necessary for a General of an Army, which Cicero requires, speak∣ing of Pompey, are sufficiently known; He must be indefatigable in Labour, undaunted in Danger, indu∣strious in Re-encounters, quick in Execution, and a Man of an excellent Fore-sight, Laboris in ne∣gatio, fortitudinis in periculo, industriae in agendo, ce∣lertatis in conficiendo, concilij in providendo. A Prince must also look to his Soldiers, that they be of a competent Age, strong of Body, for they are design∣ed for Labour and Fatigue; That they be of the same Country, rather than Strangers, for such will be more faithful and less inclinable to Sedition; That they be well Exercised and Disciplined, for

otherwise they will stand in little stead: We all know what success a rigid Discipline, strictly ob∣served, had antiently among the Romans. Now tho' the Infantry and Cavalry be both needful, yet the Infantry are generally more useful in hilly Coun∣tries, and in besieging of Towns; and often so in Battels, when well instructed and disciplined: For Tacitus observes, That as the Horse fall on with speed, so they often as speedily surrender their Victory. As for their Weapons, every one knows that they must be fit and convenient both for Of∣fence and Defence; and as for their Ammunitions and Provisions, 'tis sufficiently known of what im∣portance they are, the want of which having caused many Armies to Perish, and their Fortifications to be surrendred up without a stroke. And lastly, as for Mony, 'tis plain, that as it is the Sinews of a State, so it is likewise of War; That Army that is not paid, becomes mutinous, and a company of Rob∣bers rather than Soldiers; That great things are accomplished by Mony as well as by Force and Counsel; and finally, that which Cicero relates of Philip is true, That there is no Fortitification impregna∣ble where a Horse loaden with Gold can enter.

But some may expect that we should here treat of several Accomplishments and Duties of a General, in marching of an Army, in Incamping, in Draw∣ing it up for Battel, in an Engagement, or in a Siege, or in the Defence of a City, &c. But this depends upon his Ability, Capacity, Presence of Mind, Time, Place, and many other Circumstan∣ces; that which may be said in general Terms is this, That there is nothing more useful and more important for a General of an Army, than to know well the Condition of his Enemy, to observe and understand perfectly how to prevent them, and never to lose the Opportunity of an Advantage.

We might also here speak of Stratagems, but it will be sufficient to say, That they have been approved of in all Ages, and judged to belong to War, and that they tend to preserve an Army, and that we are always in danger of being circumvented if we be not before-hand. Therefore Cyrus admired, among his Friends, at the strange Qualifications re∣quisite to make a compleat General; He ought to be Cunning, Subtil, a Dissembler, a Cheat, &c. Debere esse insidiatorem, dissimulatorem, dolosum, de∣ceptorem, furem, raptorem, ac omni in re hostibus prae∣valentem. But we may easily understand St. Austin's Opinion in the Case, who saith, That the Orders that God gave to Joshua to lay Ambushes, shews us that 'tis no Injustice to make use of them in a just War; That a righteous Prince ought principally to take heed that the War be not unjust, and if so, then it matters not whether we over-come by Subtilty or by plain Force and Fighting.

Let us add one thing more in relation to the End and Issue of the War. If the Prince becomes Victorious, he ought to neglect nothing, to hinder the Enemy from gathering together his Forces, and putting himself in a posture of doing farther Mis∣chief: But he ought not to insult over him and his Misfortune, for that is unworthy of a generous Soul; neither should he drive him to a Necessity, lest being reduced to despair, he should make an extraordinary Attempt and Ravish away the Vi∣ctory already obtained. But if there be no fear of Indulgence, it is certain that Moderation, Mercy, Kindness and Clemency to an Enemy, shall always be recommended and esteemed. But if he be so unhappy as to lose the Victory, it will be expe∣dient for him to bear his Loss courageously, and to look upon it as a Misfortune unto which our hu∣man Condition is subject: But in the mean while

he ought not to neglect his scattered Forces, but gather them together; and complying quietly with the Times, never to despair, but expect that Pro∣vidence at another time and in another juncture may become more favourable to him.

This Observation that I have mentioned before, That Conquerors ought not to insult over the Van∣quished, calls to mind the Reproaches that Bajazet offered to Tamerlan, when he visited him in his Chains, and began to Smile on him: Laugh not at my Calamity, said Bajazet to him, with a haughty Tone, insult not over my Misfortune; understand that God is the Lord, and the giver of the Empires of the World; and if now thou art raised up to the top Spoke of the Wheel, thou may'st be to morrow cast down to the bottom. I know, answer'd Tamerlan as well as thou dost, that God is the Lord, and giver of Crowns and Empires; if I laugh, 'tis not that I insult over thy Calamity, but when I consider that these great Empires of the World must be very mean things, and that this Sovereign Lord must esteem them of no great Value, seeing he hath given them to Persons so ill-favour'd; to a wicked and squint-ey'd Fellow as thou art, and to a wretched lame Person as I am. For Timur-leng, which by Corruption we call Tamerlan, signifies a lame Prince, and Bajazet was ugly in Face and squint-ey'd. But this by the by.

If a wise Man ought to intermeddle with publick Affairs.

IN this place we might answer several Objections which by means of this kind of Prudence, seem to make against those unto whom this Rule of Epi∣curus, (That a wise Man ought not to intermeddle with the Affairs of Government,) seems not un∣pleasing.

But we have already proved by the Te∣stimony of Seneca, that this is not to be understood absolutely without Exception, but only upon this Condition, If nothing happens that does oblige him. He designs to advise us plainly, that a wise Man ought to concern himself with the Affairs of Go∣vernment only when an occasion shall be offered, where his Wisdom and Counsil are required and needful, but otherwise he need not engage himself; and that Ambition, the desire of Riches, Offices and Dignities, should not draw him out of his private Station. And if Epicurus would never take up∣on him any publick Employ, doubtless, it was not out of the Persuasion of Theodorus, and some others, that Wisdom is too precious, and of too great a Value, to expose it self to Toils, Labours and Dan∣gers, for our Country sake, which commonly com∣prehends so many Fools and ungrateful Wretches; but it was out of pure Modesty, as Laertius hath observed, and because he thought it not just to thrust himself of his own accord into Business, unto which he knew that he was not called; or to follow the practice of the Ambitious, who at last under∣stand, too late, that which Theophrastus complain'd of in his latter Days, when he told his Disciples, That he had not any thing more to say to them, but only, That the Life of Man suffered foolishly many Pleasures to escape, through Vain-glory and Ambition. That as soon as we begin to Live, we begin to Die; and that there was nothing so inconvenient to Mankind, as Am∣bition, and the excessive desire of Glory. An excellent Doctrin! which may make us understand, that we ought not to defer the enjoyment of this happy Phi∣losophical Repose to a decrepit Age. We need but cast an Eye upon the Condition of Courtiers, or such as are raised to high Places and Dignities, and incumber'd with Business: There is scarce any but

is wearied with his manner of Living, and wishes for the quiet repose of those whom he sees escaping as it were from out of a troubled Sea, swelling with Storms and Tempests, to a secure and peaceable Haven. Who is there that don't often think of re∣treating from the hurry of Business, and endeavour to arrive to that retiredness from the World, where∣in he may compose his distracted Thoughts, and render the remainder of his Days easy and happy? Pray tell me, should not we act much more Pru∣dently, did we never hazzard our selves in this tem∣pestuous Sea of Business, but withdraw our selves as soon as we can from it, and begin to live happily from our very Youth forward? Were not this a much wiser Design, than to allot to our old Age, (the very Dregs of our Life, commonly accompanied with various Infirmities, and which oftentimes we never arrive to) the Pleasure of living Happily. Doubtless they are happy who have taken a firm Resolution to spend all their Life in such a quiet State, in which others esteem themselves happy if they can spend but a short, and the worst part of their Lives. Admirable was that Advice of Cy∣neas to Pyrrhus, and worthy to be written in Letters of Gold; who when he was designing to make War against the Romans: Well Sir, said Cyneas, And what shall we do when we have overcome the Romans, conquered Italy, Sicily, Lybia, Macedonia, and all the World besides? We will then live in Pleasure and Ease, answered Pyrrhus, We will Feast and Rejoyce, and spend the rest of our Days in Peace and Pleasure. But I beseech you great Sir, replyed Cyneas, What hin∣ders us at present, but that we may take the same Repose and Ease, Feast and enjoy our selves, and live with as much Content and Happiness? We are in present possessi∣on of what we could not otherwise attain, but by great Labour, Bloodshed and Rapine, besides a Thousand ways

of exposing our Selves and our People, to infinite Ha∣zards and Dangers.

I shall not here any longer insist upon this Sub∣ject, viz. The Advantage that a wise Man reaps from his Tranquility and Retirement, having been often mentioned already. I will only mention, that Damocles had good reason to say, That those who so earnestly seek after great Honors and Preferments, commonly mind nothing but the outward Splendor, which dazles the Eyes of the Vulgar, but never heed the griping Cares, I may say Furies, which torment those who are already exalted to those high Places. Aristotle cites the Verses of Euripides, in which he accuseth himself of Folly, because that when he was able to live happily as a private Man, indiscreetly made himself miserable by intangling and incumber∣ing himself with Business. Am I Wise, quoth he, to thrust my self upon Trouble, when I could have easily been without it? But the ordinary Labors that we com∣monly undergo in the management of our necessary Affairs, seem not worthy to be taken notice of, if compared with the continual dread and terror of Mind, which attends those who see themselves al∣ways walking upon Brinks and Precipices in continu∣al danger of falling so much the lower, by how much the higher they have raised themselves. Sejanus, saith the Satyr, knew not what he desired, when he greedily long'd for, and earnestly sought after the great Honors and boundless Riches, which at length he was possess'd of. For they were as so many De∣grees, by which he ascended to the top of that Pi∣nacle, from whence he was to be miserably cast down. What ruined Crassus and Pompey? Was it not that high Station for which they had so earnestly en∣deavour'd, that nothing of Labour or Difficulty could hinder them in their Attempt; Such earnest Peti∣tions as these the Gods grant us in their Wrath.

Ergo quid optandum foret ignorasse videris Sejanum? Nam qui nimios optabat honores, Et nimias poscebat opes, numerosa parabat, Excelsae Turris tabulata, unde altior esset Casus, & impulsae praeceps immane ruinae. Quid Crassos? Quid Pompeios evertit & illum Ad sua qui domitos deduxit flagra Quirites? Summus nempe locus nulla non arte petitus, Magna{que} Numinibus vota exaudita malignis.

CHAP. VI. Of Fortitude.

TO treat of the several Virtues in their Order, we ought, next to Prudence, to speak of For∣titude, which is as the first part of Honesty, as Tem∣perance is the Second. Not that other Virtues do not participate of Honesty, but because those who behave themselves according to the Rules of Forti∣tude and Temperance are principally and more espe∣cially said to act Honestly and Honourably. Now Fortitude, in the Sense that it is here taken, is not ill described by Cicero, viz. A considerable firmness and resolution of Mind, able to encounter Danger and submit to Labour. Because this Definition points at the two chief acts of Fortitude, the one undertakes, the other sustains and teaches to shun the two vici∣ous Extremeties, namely, Audacity and Timidity, into which we may run for want of a mature Consi∣deration. This Virtue seems also to be well defin'd by Aristotle, A Medium, or Mediocrity between Fear

and too great Confidence: And Seneca saith, It is the Knowledge how to repel, submit to and encounter Dan∣gers.

However, tho Fortitude as it is a particular Vir∣tue be such as we have represented it, yet sometimes Men give to it too large a Compass, sometimes too Narrow; too Large is allowed it, when they extend it as far as any Virtue reaches, as St. Ambrose doth, and before him St. Clement, when he saith, The Du∣ty of Fortitude is not only to bear patiently human Casual∣ties and Misfortunes, but also to resist Lust, Debauche∣ry, Pain and Wrath. They allow too narrow a Com∣pass, when they take it only for a Military Virtue, as if scarce any were to be allowed Valiant, but such as shew their Courage in War, or Dye Fighting, and by this means become Illustrious, and ob••••in ever∣lasting Renown: But we see those who express no less Fortitude and Courage, either under Distem∣pers, or in Dangers at Sea, and on other Occasions, and Dye with as much Resolution. However, Ari∣stotle will have him to be termed properly Coura∣geous, who sees with an undaunted Spirit, an honest Death, and the preparations to it, such as are prin∣cipally those that we meet with in War. This made Cicero say, That the great and noble Actions per∣formed in War have this belonging to them, that they are I know not how, more Praised and Extolled than others. Nevertheless, he proves at large, by many Ex∣amples, and without forgetting his own, That though Men put a higher esteem upon military Actions than up∣on Civil, yet we must except against this Opinion; for if we will Judge according to Truth, there are many civil Actions far greater and nobler than the Military: From whence we may conclude, that tho those who be∣have themselves with Courage in War may be esteem∣ed Brave and Excellent, yet this Virtue of Fortitude resides not in them alone, nor do they only deserve the Titles of Brave and Stout.

Now to treat of Fortitude contained within its just Limits, two Things seem generally requisit. The First, That it be an invincible strength of Mind, against all Things that may be difficult, that is to say, against such Evils as are difficult either to overcome or to undergo. The Second, That it be not rash or unadvised, that it tends to a good End, namely, to the support of Honesty and Equity.

In relation to the First, when I say that Fortitude is a certain strength of Mind; doubtless we ought not hereby to understand, that this Virtue consists, as some vulgar People may imagine, in the meer Strength and Vigour of Body; for a Man of a weak and infirm Body may deserve the name of Brave, if he designs the Justice of the Cause he undertakes, and continues resolute and unshaken in his purpose, not knowing how to yield; nay, tho he meet with ill Fortune, if his Courage never fails, but he proceeds on with the same Bravery and Resolution of Thought. Much less do we suppose it consistent with a boast∣ing and vain-glorious Humour, too much incident to some Persons; for if you remove this Ostenta∣tion which puts them in pursuit after a dim Light of Glory, you will find them Mean, Contemptible Cowards; nay, when it most concerns them to en∣counter with real Dangers, they'l draw back, their Courage failing 'em, and very often seek to save themselves by a shameful Flight.

Again, when I say, that it is a firm, inflexible re∣solution of Mind, I hereby observe that it ought to be such a firmness as ought never to yield, but to continue so, not only in respect of the greatness of the Labour and Danger, but also in respect of its long continuance and repeated Endeavours.

I say that this strength or firmness of Mind is to encounter all Evils; because this Virtue of its own Nature, is as a Bulwark against all that is or ap∣pears

to be Evil in our Life, and that it properly hath no other Post assign'd but this.

I say moreover, That the Evils that Fortitude de∣signs to overcome, are to be difficult; for tho this Virtue may extend to light, easy and common Ills, yet it is very profitable to accustom our selves to encounter 'em and support our selves under 'em, that we may thereby also the better begin to form an Habit; for just as the Virtue of Temperance is not required that one should abstain from doating on an old wither'd Hag, as it was objected to Cry∣sippus, so Fortitude appears not in little Evils, but only in great and difficult; such as is Death, Pain, Ignominy, the loss of Friends or of Children, Po∣verty, Imprisonment, Banishment, and others, that are able to terrify us at a distance, or ready to over∣whelm us when they draw near.

As to the Second thing requisite: Fortitude would not be a Virtue, if it were foolish and unconsiderate, but it would be Rashness, and as Aristotle terms it, a certain Brutality, or a brutish Effort, opposite to this Virtue which is call'd Heroick and Divine, which is nothing else but a kind of noble Courage and Bravery, which gave the very Name to Heroes, and caused their Deeds to be stiled Heroick. Such there∣fore ought not to be esteemed Brave or Courageous, who being carried by a blind Fury, and trusting chiefly to their bodily Strength, run head••ong up∣on any Undertaking, and as if they had bid defiance to Dangers, seem to fear nothing so much as to ap∣pear fearful of any thing. But those are truly Brave who understanding Dangers, neither loving them nor provoking them Indiscreetly, behave themselves nevertheless with Courage, as often as they ought, and in that manner that they ought; for Aristotle makes this Remark, That a stout and brave Man, is not he who fears nothing, or is resolved to

bear all Things, or to undertake all Things; but he who acts thus where he ought, for the end and pur∣pose that he ought, when he ought, and in that man∣ner that he ought. Qui quod oportet, & cujus causa, & quando, & quo modo oportet.

As therefore on the one Hand, he opposeth to a brave Spirit the timerous Soul, who for Fear under∣takes not the thing that he should; so on the other the Audacious and Rash, for want of Fear, or out of too much Confidence in himself, undertakes what he ought not. Not to say, that according to his Opi∣nion, such may be termed Fools and mad Men, who fear nothing, neither Earthquakes nor Storms, such as the Celtae were: For there are some Things that are truly to be feared; as Shame, and Infamy which at∣tends it; for as he saith, 'tis Impudence not to fear them, because Shame is an Evil. And as Seneca ob∣serves, Fortitude is no inconsiderate Rashness, nor a Love of Dangers, but it is the knowledge how to distinguish what is or what is not Evil. It is always Watchful, Constant, Patient, &c. Neither would it be a Virtue, as it is manifest, if it did not pro∣pose Honesty and Justice for its End: For that cause Aristotle will have a brave Man to be undaunted, but still with an honest Intent. And for the same Reason, after he hath condemned those for Cowards, and far from Brave, who destroy themselves for fear of Poverty, or for Love, or Grief; and after he hath declared that those may be esteemed Brave, who being tempted by Rewards, or frighted by Torments, yet behave themselves resolutely, (which in some respect may be said of Soldiers, who are reduced to the necessity of Fighting) he saith, That he who is truly Brave, ought not to be obliged by Necessity, but moved by Honesty.

We add particularly this word Equity, because those who are commonly reputed Brave, often abuse

their Strength against the dictates of Justice, and speak according this barbarous Dialect, Power is above all Things; the Right is in the Conqueror. Hence it is that Plato judges Fortitude to be a kind of a Flux or Torrent against the endeavours of Unjustice; and therefore blames Protagoras, who esteemed those Men brave, who were most Profane, most Unjust, most Intemperate, and the greatest Fools; because, saith he, we are not to judge of Fortitude by the Strength of the Body, but by the Constancy of the Mind, and by an end that is Honest and Praise∣worthy, in which Justice and Equity principally appear. 'Tis also to be observed, That the Heroes have always been the Protectors of the Innocent, and Enemies of the Wicked, of unjust Men and Ty∣rants. And Agesilaus well deserved Praise, when being asked, If Justice was better than Fortitude, answered, That if all Men were Just, there would be no need of Fortitude. And because it is An∣ger that commonly carries those who are thought to be Brave, to Unjustice, Aristotle advises us to stand upon our Guard, and to have an Eye to that Passion, for fear that what is as the Stone to sharpen Forti∣tude, should become as a Sword, to cut the knot of Justice. He saith moreover, That tho there is no greater Provocation and Encouragement to encounter Danger than Anger, yet there is no true Fortitude in it, unless it be directed by Counsel, and by the consideration of a just End. It was this that made Taurus say, in the Writings of Agellus, The brave Man is not he who out of a brutish Humour, Insensibility or Custom, Fights as a kind of Monster against Nature, and goes beyond his just Limits; such as was Caesar's Gladiator, who laughed at the Chirurgeons who cut his Wounds wi∣der; but true Fortitude or Bravery, is that which the Antients have duly styled the Knowledge of that which is, and of that which is not to be supported, which dis∣covers

to us, that there are certain things unsufferable, and which Men truly brave ought to abominate.

From all this, and what I have mentioned else∣where, we may observe that we have the Seeds of Fortitude truly springing in us; but that they may grow up and become Virtues, Exercise and Learn∣ing are absolutely necessary.

Of the several kinds of Fortitude.

BY what has been here said, we may observe, that commonly Men do not reckon several kinds of Fortitude, because they make this Virtue to be employ'd about a very particular matter. But if it be true, that it respects all that may be judg∣ed Evil in this Life, how much rather should this matter be General, and why shall not we reckon as many sorts or kinds, as there are kinds of Evil in our Life? And as there are some who bear patient∣ly the loss of Riches, but not the loss of Honour; and who suffer death bravely in War, but not on a Bed of Sickness, and so of the like; why should it not be necessary for such diversity of things to form to our selves divers Habits, and so to distin∣guish several kinds of Fortitude?

For as to what concerns those which some would have to be sometimes Integral parts in difficult Mat∣ters, and sometimes Potential in less difficult, name∣ly, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Constancy and Pa∣tience; It is certain, first, for Magnificence, that it belongs not to this Virtue, but to Liberality; be∣cause as Aristotle tells us, it regulates the Expen∣ces of Mony, and chiefly the Expences needful in great things, as are the publick Shews and Stages, the building of Ships to defend the Common-wealth; and in short, all other things which have

something of Grandeur, and commonly strike the People with Admiration. And therefore agreably with this Opinion of Aristotle, Cicero recommends to us this excellent Definition, Magnificientia est rerum magnarum, & excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam, & splendida propositione, agitatio atque admi∣nistratio. We ought also to take notice, that as Magnificence is a Virtue and consequently a Medio∣crity, Aristotle names the two contrary Vices, viz. On the one hand, Proud, Extravagant and Super∣fluous Expences; and on the other, doing things niggardly and mean; parting with nothing but what is drawn from us by force, against our free Consent; always grudging and repining at what goes from us.

As for what concers Magnanimy, or as we term it Generosity, it is likewise manifest that it belongs not to this Virtue, or if it doth, 'tis nothing else but Fortitude it self under another Name. In∣deed, as Fortitude is properly concerned with dif∣ficult things, it is certain, that to undertake and endure such things, we must have a great and ge∣nerous Soul, or as Cicero saith, We must have a mind highly elevated and assured of it self, with a certain hope, having a regard to things good and honest. Be∣sides, when Aristotle saith, That Magnanimity or greatness of Mind consists in a Persuasion that we deserve much, when really our Merits answer our Persuasion; 'tis evident that this opinion of Honour that we deserve, relates to Justice, or to the con∣veniency of Temperance, and not to Fortitude, which consists in encountering Dangers, and cou∣rageously undergoing Labours.

As for Constancy, or as the Holy Scriptures stile it, long Forbearance or Longanimity, 'tis nothing else but Fortitude it self, when it discovers it self by a sequel of many repeated Acts, and by a long

continuance of Time. For a Man cannot be said to be brave, but rather weak and feeble, if he con∣tinues not resolute in what he hath undertaken, but after he hath a while supported himself, his Heart at last begins to faint and fail him. From hence it is, that Constancy and Perseverance being synonimous, Cicero tells us, That Perseverance con∣sists in a continuing resolute a long time, and constant in the things that we have proposed, after that we have maturely considered upon 'em.

Lastly, As for Patience, it seems to be scarce any thing else but Constancy, unless it be that it con∣sists in suffering, as the word imports, rather than in attacquing. Therefore Cicero saith, That it con∣sists in suffering willingly and a long time, difficult things, for the sake of Honesty or Profit.

Therefore not to insist any longer upon this Point, let us observe with Epicurus, That a mean Soul becomes insolent in Prosperity, and dejected in Ad∣versity. Let us then conclude from hence, by the Rule of Contraries, That it is the property of a no∣ble and generous Temper, not to be insolent, lifted up by good Success, nor to suffer it self to be aba∣sed in a low Estate, but to bear and suffer the good and evil Fortune with an equal Mind, and in the same manner. And because when all things pro∣sper, it plainly belongs to that part of Temperance which we name Moderation, to moderate and go∣vern our Thoughts, and to hinder 'em from rising too high; it follows, that when Crosses happen, it belongs to Fortitude, to keep our Minds in a con∣stant and even Temper. Now as Calamities are nothing else but external Evils, we must remem∣ber that they are not really Evils, but only as they are accompanied by Pain which they cause in the Body, or by Grief which they produce in the Mind by the means of Opinion; so that only this

Pain and this Grief are the real Evils: Now it be∣longs to Fortitude to hinder these from causing Pain, or at least obliges us to bear it patiently when it comes, and to hinder it from oppressing and over-whelming the Mind with a vain Grief; all which is to be effected by curing our Judgment of vulgar Opinions or false Persuasions, without which it would have little or no Power upon the Soul.

Whether Evils fore-seen make the least impression upon us.

FRom hence it is, that we must observe in the second place, that there are as it were two ge∣neral Bulwarks against these sorts of external Evils: The first is a good Conscience; for as Crantor saith, 'Tis a great support under Afflictions, to be free from Guilt: The second is to fore-see, and to lay before our Eyes the Mischiefs and Evils that may happen; for he who fore-sees the blow, and is prepared to receive it, is not so easily beaten down, as when he is struck unprovided; when he is armed with Resolution and Courage, as with a kind of Breast-plate, he is not so soon wounded as when he is naked and unguarded. Therefore a wise Man never trusts so much to his good For∣tune, but he thinks also upon his Evil; for Fortune hath nothing fix'd, neither is there any thing cer∣tain or of a long continuance in human Affairs: He always represents before his Eyes some Exam∣ples of the Vicissitudes of good and evil Things, and knows that there is no Mischief that happens to any Body but that the same may befal him. Therefore he don't wait till the time of War, then to furnish himself with Arms to support it, nor till a Storm happens, then to prepare to resist it.

If a wise Man begets a Son, saith Cicero, he knows that he hath begotten a Mortal, and brings him up in that Persuasion: If he sends him to Troy to de∣fend Greece, he knows that he don't send him to a Feast, but to a dangerous War. This Considera∣tion, saith he, and this Meditation upon the Evils to come, before they happen, qualifies and al∣lays the Mischiefs that befal afterwards. So that I think Theseus cannot be too much commended for saying in Euripides, I thought before upon the Ca∣lamities to come; upon Death, Banishment, &c. that I might be the better enabled to encounter with adverse Fortune.

'Tis an undoubted Truth, that the Evils that are not fore-seen, are much more grievous; and that the Fore-sight and Preparation of the Mind, hath a great Efficacy to lessen the Pain. Let Mankind set always before his Eyes the Casualties of the World; for this excellent and divine Wisdom consists in having a long while perfectly known and considered human Affairs, and meditated upon them; not wondering at any thing that happens, nor believe before a thing happens, that such a thing cannot come to pass. He afterwards commends the Advice of Terence, That a Man in Prosperity should think with himself how he should be able to endure Adversity, Dangers, Losses, and Banish∣ment, the Miscarriages of a Son, the Death of a Wife, the Sickness of a Daughter; that all these things are common; that they may happen so; that nothing new ought to surprise us; and what∣ever good befalls us beyond our Expectation, it should be look'd upon as so much Profit and pure Gain.

It was this kind of Meditation and Fore-sight that caused that Constancy of Mind in Socrates, ap∣pearing always with a serene and pleasant Coun∣tenance;

truly, how could his Looks be otherwise, seeing his Soul was never moved nor disturbed? Agrippinus proceeded yet farther, for he was wont to make a Panegyrick of all the Evils that befell him; of Diseases, when they seis'd upon him; of Infamy, when Men slander'd him; of Banishment, when he was driven away. And when at a certain time he was going to sit at Table, a Message was brought him from Nero, to command him imme∣diately to be gone and to depart; he answered no∣thing else but, Well, we shall then dine at the Town of Aricia. Ariciae ergo prandebimus.

How we ought to support external and publick Evils.

AS Evils are usually distinguished into pub∣lick, such as is War, Tyranny, the Ruin of our Country, Plague, Famine, and such like; and into private, as Banishment, Imprisonment, Slavery, Ignominy, &c. It is not needful to speak much of the publick Evils, because they don't real∣ly concern us so much as they are Publick, but as they are Private, and come home to us in Particu∣lars. 'Tis true, when Publick Calamities involve a great many Persons, this must needs create much Noise, and they are reckoned so much the more unsufferable, because our common Mother, namely, our Country is wrong'd and injur'd; but if we take more particular notice, we may perceive that the Evil concerns every one no otherwise than it strikes at them in particular.

And to demonstrate that this is no Paradox; That the Evil that is common to many, on whom we have Compassion, is not more uneasie to be born; it would be sufficient to instance in that

which is in the Mouth of every one, and what our Experience sufficiently verifies, That it is the com∣fort of the afflicted to have Fellow-Sufferers. But we need take notice but of one thing, and consider that when a Neighbour's House is on Fire, none but the Neighbours run to extinguish it; those who live in the same City, at a distance, are not at all concered at it; for tho' they be all Fellow-Citi∣zens, yet the Calamity don't touch them so much as it doth the others. So if the War be begun in Persia, or if the Plague be hot in India, and makes there a great destruction, that don't concern us, tho' they be Fellow-Citizens of the same World; because the Evil is too far off to injure us: And tho' it may infect the Borders of our Kingdom, ei∣ther it moves us not; or if it doth, 'tis by acci∣dent, in that it reaches as far as us, and makes us sensible of the Evil.

But that I may not stop here: If it happens that we are involved in any common Calamity, there are two things chiefly to be weighed: First, That such is the Condition and natural Course of things which we cannot hinder; That 'tis the Sovereign Lord of the World who hath appointed such Alte∣rations and Changes, and he being most Wise, his Designs, tho' unknown to Men, may be, and are most excellent; That it belongs not to us to quar∣rel at, or alter that Order that he has establish'd, but that we ought willingly to yield and follow the Paths that his Providence hath prescribed to us; And that seeing 'tis not in our power to change Destinies, or rather the Decrees of the Divine Pro∣vidence, it would better become us to mitigate the Harshness and Trouble, by our own free Con∣sent, than to increase the Mischief by fruitless Op∣position; That Common-wealths have their na∣tural Revolutions, and that it is needful that some∣times

they should be govern'd by Princes, and become Monarchies, sometimes by the People, and devolve into Democracies, and sometimes by the Chieftains and principal Men, and be changed into Aristo∣cracies. This Cicero tells us, which he had taken out of Plato, unto which he adds this excellent Pas∣sage, which shews the Nobility of his Mind, and the extraordinary Greatness and Resolution of his Soul, when he describes the lamentable State of the Common-wealth; I have not hid my self, I have not cowardly forsaken, neither have I extraordi∣narily afflicted my self, I have not behaved my self like a Misanthropus, a Man provoked against the Times.

Secondly, If a wise Man escapes, with Health of Body and Mind, from a publick Calamity, he hath no cause to complain against the ill Usage of For∣tune, as if it had treated him amiss, and stript him of those things that really belong to him. The excellent Saying of Bias is well known; after a general Conflagration, he declared, That he car∣ried with him all the Goods that he ever possessed. And we may mention Stilpon, who having been driven away from his Country, lost his Wife, Children, and all his other Goods of Fortune, gave this answer to Demetrius, who had taken the City, and had asked him, If he had lost nothing? answer'd, All my Goods are with me. He under∣stood, saith Seneca, Justice, Virtue, Temperance, Prudence; and he reckoned not among his Goods, that which could be taken from him. The wise Man accustoms himself to the Evils to come by thinking upon them often, as others do by suffer∣ing them long. I knew not, says the Fool; that I had so many Troubles to undergo. The wise Man understands that all Evils remain yet behind, and saith, I knew before, all that has happen'd, and

was prepared and provided for all that is come to pass.

Of external and private Evils; and first of Ba∣nishment.

AS for what concerns particular and private Evils, we shall at present mention but few things, because we have spoken of them elsewhere: I shall only add that of Banishment, that 'tis no real but a fantastical Evil, that depends upon Opinion; for 'tis nothing else but a change of Place or Habi∣tation, which many of their own accord often desire and covet for their private Satisfaction. The wise Man carries with him into a Foreign Country all his real and substantial Goods, his Virtues, the Goods of his Mind, which he can always happily enjoy, and by which he may make to himself Friends instead of them whom he hath left behind in his own Coun∣try: He hath not so narrow a Soul as to fancy him∣self a Citizen of one single Town, or of one Re∣gion; he thinks himself rather to be a Citizen of all the World, and into what place soever he comes he thinks himself to be as well as in his own Country. A Man of Courage finds every where his Country, as a Fish in every part of the Sea, or a Beast in every corner of the Earth: He still beholds Nature every where in the same Dress, the same Majesty: He sees the same Sun, the same Moon, and the same number of Stars sparkling in the Heavens: He finds every where the same Face of Things, Mountains, Plains, Rivers, Trees, Towns, and all sorts of Animals, almost the same; and if perhaps he sometimes meets with any Va∣riety, 'tis not unpleasing to him, nor is he satis∣fied till he hath arrived to the full Knowledge of

it; and this is that which intices Travellers abroad, and gives them opportunity of much Knowledge and Experience. Nor is he to place this among his Misfortunes, that he is Banish'd by his Fellow-Citizens; for that has been the Case of many an honest and good Man, such as Aristides, Thucidides, Demosthenes, and an infinite Number besides, who may give the same answer as Diogenes did to one who reproached him, That the Inhabitants of Synope had condemned him to be banished. No, said he, you are mistaken, I have condemned them to remain and live for ever in the bottom of Pont Euxinus.

He might consider that Banishment hath been of∣ten the occasion of raising Men to an high Station of Honour, which caused that Expression of The∣mistocles to be so famous; I should have been un∣done if I had not been undone, perieram nisi periissem. He might likewise remember that sometimes upon better considering of things, an honest Man is cal∣led back from Exile with much Honour, as it hap∣pened to Evagoras, Pelopid••s, Alcibiades, Camillus, Cicero, and several others. And it often falls out that we live with more Content and Repose out of our Native Soil than we can in it. This caused Marcellus and Rutilius to say, That they ne∣ver lived really, but during the time of their Ba∣nishment out of their own Country. Finally, he will return Thanks to Providence, because his Con∣dition is become like that of Plato, Gallen, Zeno, Crantor, and divers other famous Travellers, who of their own accord had banished themselves a long time from their own Country, and yet never re∣pented of it; because by viewing other parts of the World, they had furnished themselves with the Knowledge of many things; and that by consider∣ing the differing Customs of Foreign Nations, they were freed from many Prejudices, and become

quite other Men than they should have been had they continually liv'd at Home.

Of Imprisonment.

IMprisonment looks like a thing more grievous; but a wise Man thinks it not so; for his Mind cannot be confined within any Walls, nor Bound with any Chains. How can a Soul, which is always at liberty, and always enjoys it self, be limited within a Prison, seeing it is not to be bounded by the limits of the World? It can run over the spa∣cious large compass of the Earth, and in it self ex∣amine the Passages of every Age, and by that means search into Eternity it self. His Body being con∣fined and at Rest, gives greater Liberty to his Thoughts, not being distracted with that variety of new Objects. 'Tis well known that Anaxagoras, while in Prison, writ a most excellent Treatise of the Quadrature of the Circle; That Socrates did not only act the Philosopher, while confin'd, but com∣posed also excellent Verses; that Boetius never writ with a stronger Stile, nor more Elegantly than when in Chains, for this requires a Mind free from Hur∣ry, Calm and Serene.

Moreover, some for the more exact composing of an excellent Treatise, have confin'd themselves to their Houses, from whence they could not easily be drawn out. A wise Man makes no great difference whether his Confinement be voluntary or compulsive. Do but consider the multitude of Artizans and Scribes, who are Daily confin'd to their Shops, and tied as it were to their Seats, seem not in the least troubled or concerned, because they look not upon the place where they are thus fixt as a Prison, but as their Dwelling and Abode. This Consideration

will cause a Man to undergo his Confinement more easily, because he will look upon the Prison as his Dwelling, and not as a Prison. Besides, when he reflects upon the many Religious who voluntarily confine themselves in a Cloister, and there spend their Days very pleasantly, he will begin to consi∣der that a Confinement in it self is not so unsup∣portable as we Fancy. And thus when he sees Men shut up in Prison against their Wills, who at first are full of Complaints, and ready to be drown'd with Tears, yet after a few Days rejoice and take delight, sporting with the rest of their Companions; he would think it very strange, that Wisdom should not have as great an influence on a Man of Under∣standing, as Custom hath over a Man of meaner Parts. I need not mention here, that it is no new or extraordinary thing for good Men to be clapt up in Prison; that there are many whose Virtue never appears more glorious than in Fetters and under Confinement, and when they are freed they return with so much Splendor and Advantage, that their very Confinement seems to be desired.

Of Slavery.

THE same may be said of Slavery. The Mind of a wise Man is too great to be brought un∣der the Dominion of a Master. His Body, the meanest part may indeed be enslaved, but for his Soul this noble and excellent part 'tis too much at liberty, and soars so high, that its out of the reach of any Fellow-Creature to catch at, to subject it to his Dominion. Every one knows how much Cou∣rage and Constancy of Mind Epictetus manifested, when he was obliged to be a Servant. And none can be Ignorant what answer Diogenes gave to those

who came to Buy him, and asked him what he could do? Said, That he knew how to command Men: And turning himself immediately to the Crier, he bid him cry out, If any would buy a Master: Afterwards, when he came to Xeniades, who was the Buyer, he spoke to him in this manner, Take heed what you do, for tho I am your Slave, you must hereafter obey me, as the Patient obeys the Physician, the Child its Go∣vernor; tho the Physician be Slave to the Patient, and the Governor to the Child.

Moreover, whereas the wise Man having long since considered and meditated upon the state of Human Affairs, finds that he has not the Command of For∣tune, but as Unhappiness befals others, it may also light upon him. He understands likewise, that being Born a Man, he is subject to ••ll Human Casualties, and therefore stands always ready and prepared to receive all the Shocks of Fortune, so that there is none but he can with Patience submit to, and there∣by render it not only tolerable, but in some measure Easy and Pleasant. If the Master commands, he obeys willingly; and as if he had undertaken the Task of his own accord, it is much at one to him if he does it by another's Command or out of his own Choice. He is glad he has Strength sufficient to undergo what is commanded him, and an Oppor∣tunity offered of exercising a Faculty, which other∣wise might become benumm'd and useless. He thinks himself happier than his Master, being only in sub∣jection to his Will, and having nothing else to do but obey his Commands; whereas his Master re∣mains under the Tyranny of many Masters, more Cruel and Troublesome, his Ambition, Envy, An∣ger and other Passions; so that in short, he must needs be much the happier, being freed from a thousand Cares and Distractions, which the other is daily liable to.

I shall not mention how many have met with ve∣ry good and favourable Masters, under whom at last they have not only obtain'd their Freedom, and got great Preferments, but have been made Heirs of their Estates; and how many having fallen into the Hands of Masters who were wise and learned Men, have had cause to desire their Slavery, as the Servant of Epicurus, named Mus, and Cicero's Slave, called Tyro, and several others.

Of Shame and Disgrace.

A Wise Man will still more willingly bear Shame and Disgrace, when it is thrown upon him, if he be satisfied of his own Innocence, and that he has no way justly deserv'd it. For whether it con∣sists in being depriv'd of some publick Office, Ho∣nour or Imployment, even for this he may congra∣tulate his good Fortune, in having an opportunity of retiring and leading a private and quiet Life, which otherwise he could not easily have obtain'd, tho perhaps he earnestly desir'd it. Or if it consists in the Whisperings and Reports that arise from among the People, he hath too great and noble a Soul to value such Rumours. He knows the Temper of the Populace to be very mutable, that they will this Day applaud, what they will to Morrow decry, be∣ing never long pleased, but as we say, more fickle and unconstant than the Moon. His Conscience stands him instead of a thousand Witnesses; his sa∣tisfaction is, that he cannot justly charge himself with any Crime, with any Guilt.

In short, if it consists in the Calumnies and Slan∣ders of envio•••• ••••d malicious Men, or in opprobri∣ous and injurious Language; he is not of so mean a Spirit, as to be cast down and discouraged; for

he does not take them as Injuries done to himself, but gives them only the hearing, as if they con∣cerned him not, as if they were related of some other, or of him who was the first Inventer. There∣fore he who first unjustly rais'd em, has more rea∣son to be concerned for falsly accusing the Innocent; nor will he be a little dissatisfied when he finds his mischievous Intention thus disappointed.

A wise Man further considers the great number of Fools there are in the World; and if he should once think himself offended hereat, he would be deemed one of that Number, which must in no small measure disturb the quiet of his Mind. Therefore he Arms himself before-hand, against all such kind of Affronts, by overlooking them; and thinks that he ought no more to be moved at the Revilings of evil Men, than the Moon is at the barking of the Dogs.

Of the loss of Children and Friends.

BUT what shall we say of the loss of Children and Friends, and in one Word, of all that is dear to us? A wise Man will the less afflict him∣self, because he knows that our Complaints, our Sighs, our Tears, and our Lamentations are use∣less; and that it is in vain to deal thus with Death, who is not to be prevailed upon, and never restores to us the Friends which it once snatches from us. Therefore he prepares himself early for such Acci∣dents which he knows may happen, that when they do, he may bear them with Courage, and not be afflicted in vain.

Besides, he observes, That when w•• are thus griev'd for the loss of our Children or Friends, 'tis not for their sakes, but for our own, that we thus lament

and are troubled: For to be grieved because they are safely arrived into the Haven, and are no more vexed with the Evils and Miseries, unto which this Life is subject, this savours of Envy and Cruelty; and to be troubled because they don't enjoy certain Pleasures of this Life, is Weak and Ridiculous, be∣cause they don't desire or stand in the least need of 'em, and therefore are not at all displeased, or so much as sensible, of being deprived of 'em. It makes therefore a very specious shew, but at the same time is but a feigned and dissembling sort of Pity, with which we adorn our Grief when we declare that we are grieved for their sakes, seeing that in reality 'tis for our own, because for the time to come we shall be deprived of their Company; because we shall receive no more kind Offices as formerly, no more Honour and Respect, but be deprived of every thing that might render them dear and acceptable unto us. Therefore a wise Man will think it unbecoming him to grieve in this manner for his own Interest, as if he would have had them live only for his pri∣vate Ends, and so long only as they might be use∣ful and serviceable to him; and not so long as the wise Disposer of all Things had thought good and convenient for them to be.

Besides, He may remember the time that he had no Children, and if it was not grievous then to be without them, so he ought not to think it so now he is deprived of 'em, seeing in respect of him, they are as when they were not. And if we grieve more for the privation of what we once possess'd, than to be without what we never had, this seems to sa∣vour a little of the Ingratitude of the Vulgar, who instead of being thankful for what they once enjoy∣ed, are still murmuring and repining because they can enjoy it no longer. And he whom Death de∣prives of his Son, may with more comfort support

it, considering that he hath not lost his Son, but yielded him back to the Author of Nature, who had lent him to him for a time and intrusted him with his Custody; not for ever, but for a limited time. And if it be a Father who is dead, a wise Son will consider, that he hath left him enough to make his Life easy, and preserve him from want, if he hath left him only a Soul that can be content with little. And if it be a Friend, he will suppose that he hath still so much Virtue as to procure ano∣ther; so that he may think that he hath not so much lost, as chang'd his Friend.

Of the loss of an Estate.

WHat shall we say likewise of the loss of Riches? A wise Man will certainly so much the less concern himself, for that he will consider, as we have elsewhere observed, That no Man becomes so Poor as to be deprived of the absolute Necessaries of Life, seeing Nature places them within our reach in all parts of the World; and certainly he were much to be blamed that should torment himself, for the loss of that which is not absolutely necessary to his well-being, and which he may live very well and happily without. Let what we have remaining be never so small, we may always find a great number of Persons, who have not so much, or perhaps no more, and yet without troubling themselves, lead more contented Lives than rich Men generally do. Let them be never so Poor they Laugh and Re∣joyce, and their Pleasure is so much the greater, in that they are freed from those Cares and Troubles which are inseparable from Riches.

But suppose a Man's Fortune be changed to the greatest disadvantage, so that instead of a Palace, there remains nothing to him but a Cottage; in∣stead

of a Silk Garment, one of Wool; instead of Partridges, nothing but black Bread; instead of Wine, cold Water; instead of a Coach or Sedan, a Traveller's Staff; instead of a Golden or Silver Cup, nothing but an Earthen Vessel, or the Palm of his Hand, and so of the rest. Suppose I say all this, how many Examples can we produce of those who have been satisfied with these mean Things, have laugh'd and despis'd that deceitful Splendor, and have spent their Days with more Pleasure and Con∣tent, than those who abounded with 'em?

And how many are there at present who live ve∣ry contentedly and happily, after such a change; nay, who willingly part with their Riches, to en∣joy a more retir'd and contented way of Life? We need not therefore here enumerate those primitive Philosophers, who out of an Affection to Learning, and the Pleasure of a free and contemplative Life, forsook their Riches, and embraced Poverty. For we have of late discovered whole Nations, who having no need of those Goods that we call Riches, lead an innocent Life, like to that of our first Fa∣thers, whose Times were stiled the Golden Age, and supposed to be the happiest of all Ages.

But if you Fancy that it is more grievous to fall from a great and high Fortune, than to have always remained in a low Condition, 'tis easy to perceive that this is nothing but an Opinion; for in respect of the thing it self, there is no difference if you have been Poor a long time, or if you are become so of late; unless perhaps you suppose that we are to think as Apicius did, who as Seneca reports, hav∣ing amass'd a vast Estate together, alotted some Thousands of Pounds for his Kitchen; but when upon making up his Accounts, he found that he had not above an Hundred thousand Pounds remaining, poyson'd himself to prevent Starving.

Of Pain and of Death.

IN the next Place let us treat about Pain and Death, those two Particulars, which in Cicero's Opinion, require an extraordinary courage of Mind to be able to overcome them. For Pain, as it is almost the sole and only substantial Evil, or which depends not as the rest, upon meer Fancy, no doubt there is much Fortitude and a Greatness of Soul re∣quired, patiently to undergo it. A wise Man there∣fore will here seriously consider, that he is born sub∣ject to many Inconveniences of Life, and among the rest to Pain; that it is the Property of Nature to be sensible of Evil, but it is the Property of Vir∣tue to bear it with Courage; and that when the Evil is not to be avoided, we ought rather to allay it, by a patient quiet submitting to it, than to ag∣gravate and incense it by uneasy and vain Struglings. Also that Pain is not a thing altogether intolerable, seeing so many famous Examples prove the contra∣ry, not only among great Hero's and Philosophers, such as Zeno and Anaxarches, but even among the very Slaves themselves, witness him whom the greatest Tortures could not hinder from expressing a joy upon his Countenance, for having reveng'd the Death of his Master, by killing Asdrubal, who had Murdered him. Nay, whole Nations can te∣stify the like, as for Instance, the Lacedemonians, whose Children were wont to whip one another al∣most to Death, and yet never shewed any sign of Pain either in their Countenance or Speech, that so they might be rendred more capable of undergoing any thing for their Countries sake. I shall not name that other Person, who knowing that it was reputed no Shame among his Country-men to Steal,

but to be caught in the Theft, suffered his Bowels to be devoured by a little Fox that he had Stole and hid in his Bosom, without expressing any sign of Pain, for fear of discovering the Theft.

He will also consider, That if the Pain be light, it is easy to be born; if great, that it is so much the more Glorious and Honourable to endure it with Courage, and that by frequent Custom it will be∣come more supportable, or that being of no long continuance, it will speedily put an end either to him or his Suffering. If it ceaseth, the Pleasure of being delivered from it, and the health of Body that suc∣ceeds, with a perfect Indolency, are so pleasing and delightsome, that we seem to be well satisfied with the Pain we have undergone, from the Pleasure we enjoy of being freed from it. And if it takes away the Sufferer, it brings him to the end of all Suffer∣ings. So that this Suffering brings at least this Ad∣vantage with it, that it makes our Life, which we must needs part with, less pleasing, and Death less terrible; wherefore many care not how soon they Dye, expecting thereby to be delivered from their Pains, so that every Day they talk after this man∣ner,

Nor is Death Grievous, whilst it ends my Pains.

Now as for Death, we have already alledged so many things to shew that we ought to expect it, and bear it patiently, that it is needless to insist any longer upon this Particular. Let us therefore con∣clude with that kind of general Consolation which Horace in few Words expresseth:

With equal Foot impartial Fate, Knocks at the Cottage and the Palace Gate.

And the French Poet Malherbius imitates him.

The Beggar in Straw, Keeps the general Law; And when Death gives the Word, must advance. And the Guards that each Hour, Take their Place at the Louvre, Can't defend the great Monarchs of France.

CHAP. VII. Of Temperance.

CIcero tells us, That Temperance makes up the second principal Part of Morality. The Greeks style it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is to say, the Prote∣ctrice of Prudence, or as Plato terms it, the safety of Prudence; from hence a temperate Man is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, one who preserves Wisdom, or one who keeps his Senses entire and sound; and herein he is opposed to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Imprudent Man, or a Fool; for he who is Intemperate seems to have lost all Prudence, to have no due use either of his Sense or his Reason. This Virtue also is sometimes taken in too large an extent, sometimes too narrow, and sometimes in a mediocrity; and in this last Sense we shall now treat of it. Now that it is taken some∣times in too large a Sense, as generally comprehend∣ing all Virtues, or for all that is excellent and com∣mendable in any other Virtue, even the Word it self seems to import, for Temperance expresseth a Mediocrity; and all Virtue is a Mediocrity. Be∣sides,

it is, as we have said, the Protectrice of Pru∣dence, without which no Virtue can subsist, and ac∣cording to the Opinion of Pythagoras, 'tis the Life and Vigour of the Soul: Socrates names it the Foun∣dation of Virtue; Plato the Ornament of all good Things; and Iamblicus the Breast-plate of all the most excellent Habits. That 'tis sometimes taken in too narrow a signification, may appear when 'tis understood only for that Virtue that gives a check to the Pleasures of Tasting and Feeling, and com∣prehends only Sobriety and Chastity.

Lastly, It seems to be taken in a moderate Lati∣tude and Extent, when we understand not only here∣by the regulation of the particular Appetites of Tasting and Feeling, &c. but likewise such as puff up the Mind, and carry it beyond the bounds of De∣cency and Honesty. So that we may say that a tem∣perate Man is not only such a one who lives Sober∣ly and Chastly, but he also who neither Speaks nor Acts any thing but agreeable with Justice and Mo∣deration, and which is accepted and approved of by all good and wise Men.

Of Modesty and Decency.

WHerefore among the several species of Tem∣perance, Sobriety and Chastity are not on∣ly to be reckoned, which we have before mentioned, but also many of those which we name Potential, as are Gentleness or Mildness, Clemency, Modesty, and some others. So that Modesty and Decency, which are said to be the integral Parts, are of a larger Signification, as being too general Means, the one to draw us from Intemperance, and the other to incline us to it: For Modesty, tho Aristotle pre∣tends that 'tis no Virtue, but rather a bashful di∣sturbance,

as being nothing else but a certain fear of Infamy; nevertheless, this disturbance tends to oppose that sort of Pleasure which we may take in too great Confidence, which produces a great Dis∣pleasure, namely, that which proceeds from Infa∣my and Disgrace. And Decency at least, as it is here taken, is nothing else but a certain Convenien∣cy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, approved of, which prevailing upon us by its Beauty, causeth us to give a check to that daring Impudence, so that thereby our good Reputation being preserved safe and sound, it pro∣cures a certain Pleasure, much greater and more sin∣cere.

Now tho it is commendable to shun Intemperance and to follow Temperance, because of Decency alone and good Manners, 'tis likewise commendable for Modesty's sake, or for fear of Shame, which would otherwise ensue. For as we cannot hate Darkness but we must love the Light, so we can∣not hate Shame and Dishonour, but we must have a love for a good Reputation, and for an honest Name. Therefore when Aristotle, in his Book to Nicomachus, seems to disallow Modesty, he does not mean that Shamefacedness which appears in the blushing Countenance of young Persons, who are apt to be too far transported by a juvenile Heat; but he allows it not in aged Persons, who ought ne∣ver to commit any thing whereof they may be ashamed; for elsewhere in his great Treatises of Mo∣rality, he placeth Modesty among the other Virtues, and gives to it this Definition, A Mediocrity between Impudence and Insensibility; as if he should say, That Modesty is a certain kind of Shame, occasioned not by the commission of any base and dishonest Action, but proceeds to advise and hinder us from the committing of it.

Of Sobriety and Chastity in general.

THese two Virtues seem to deserve a particular Tract at large, for they constitue two princi∣pal kinds of Temperance; but we can scarce add any thing to what hath been formerly said, when we have mentioned the great advantages of a sober Life, and when we have instanced that noble and celebrated Maxim of Epicurus, Sapientem non esse amaturum; nunquam prodesse venerea. Therefore I shall here only observe some things in general, and then more particularly. In general, that the Praise and Advantage of these two Virtues seem for the most part to consist not in the withdrawing our selves from living after the manner of Brutes, in respect of Lusts and Pleasure, but rather to ap∣proach nearer to 'em. This will not seem so great a Paradox, if we do but consider that we are very frequently more intemperate and worse than those Creatures that follow the meer dictates of Nature, whereas we debauch and abuse Nature. For there is no doubt but that that strong Inclination and De∣sire which we have for Eating and Drinking is na∣tural, seeing we find it equally in all Animals, and proceeds from the institution of Nature, who has ordain'd, that by Food the Life of every individual Creature might be preserved and lengthned, and by the use of venereal Acts every Species of Creatures might by a succession of Propagations be continued, and as it were eternised. Now this being certain, The Question is, Whether Men or other Animals, which of them contain themselves most within the bounds of Nature.

We see that the Beasts live upon very plain Food, provided for them by Nature; whereas the Drink

and Food of Men is changed, mingled and sophisti∣cated in divers manners. We see also that when the Beasts and other Animals are once satisfied, they neither Eat nor Drink any more, but stop till the next Hunger and Thirst invites 'em; whereas Men are not satisfied to have filled themselves with all the variety of Meats and Drinks, but still farther provoke their Appetites by pinant Sauses and relish∣ing Morsels, after Nature is satisfied. We find al∣so that other Animals have a set time for Copulati∣on, and after Conception they abstain; whereas Men have no time appointed for that purpose; nay after that the Female hath conceived they remain still in∣clinable to the same Act, and with as much heat as before. Besides, none but Men are guilty of the shameful and base abusing their own Sex against Na∣ture. Are not therefore Men in such Actions rather Brutes, and Brutes such as Men ought to be; and consequently are not Men, in respect of the desire of Eating and Drinking and of veneral Acts, to be sent to be instructed by the Brutes, that they might be taught to live Temperately? Truly if to live according to the Rules of Virtue, is to live ac∣cording to the dictates of Nature, no Man will say, that to live as Men do, is to live after the Rules of Virtue, but rather that we should imitate the Beasts and other Creatures. 'Tis therefore a high Dis∣grace, not that Men should be advised to live after the manner of Brutes, but when they live worse than they, that they must be sent to be instructed by their Examples.

But to not insist any longer upon this particular, we will proceed to examin that excellent Descrip∣tion of a temperate Man, recommended by Aristotle. After he had Taught, That Temperance is a Medi∣ocrity between Intemperance and the want of Sense or Stupidity, and had proved, that Intemperance

covets in such a manner the things that bring De∣light, that it suffers and is pained, not only when it cannot enjoy them, but also while it desires them, and that the insensible Person who is not moved with any Pleasure, is so far from all Humanity, that such an one is scarce to be found; He proceeds to tell us, The temperate Person keeps himself in a certain Me∣dium, for he is not delighted in such things wherein an intemperate Man places his Pleasure, but he is rather offended at and abominates 'em. He takes no delight in that which is not Honest and fit to be delighted in; and there is nothing that transports him so much, but if he be disappointed in obtaining it, doth any ways vex and torment him. He desires nothing after so absolute a Manner, but his Affections are moderate, never ex∣ceeding their just Bounds under all Circumstances. All that procures Pleasure, and which at the same time tends to the Health of the Body, he desires with Moderation, and as it is convenient; as also the other things that are grateful so far as they are no Impediment to what we have mentioned, nor are contrary to Honesty, nor above our Abilities: For he who is otherwise affected, and de∣sires these things with more earnestness than he ought, is not Temperate, but he who desires and seeks them ac∣cording to the Rules of Reason. In which Passage of Aristotle you see, the temperate Man is not he who abstains absolutely from all Pleasures, but from such as are not honestly to be attained; such as those are that are contrary to Nature, that are prohibited by the Laws, that prejudice Health, that blemish our Reputation or ruin our Family; but he scruples not to enjoy moderately the Pleasures that have none of these inconveniences attending. For in such there is nothing but what suits with his Humanity, and according to Nature, who hath not given us an Inclination to them in vain.

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This is the Picture that this Philosopher hath drawn us of a temperate Person. Therefore he re∣proves the Censoriousness of those who exclaim against the Pleasures with which themselves are taken; it seeming in it self a Contradiction; as if every one did not always carry his own Nature about with him, which by word he may seem to deny, but in effect cannot.

Likewise, saith he, for that reason 'tis no wonder, tho to live according to Nature be to live Virtuously, and notwithstanding 'tis so easy to follow Nature, there be nevertheless so few that pursue after Virtue, because the Virtue that they praise is rather against Nature, than agreable with its Rules. 'Tis not but that there is a Virtue to deny our selves and abstain from such Pleasures altogether, but this Virtue is not natural, but of another kind; it may, for Instance, belong to Religion, that commands Nature, and constrains it, being more excellent, and forces Nature to submit to it.

Of Sobriety in particular.

NOW to say something particularly of these two Virtues, Sobriety and Chastity, let us observe only this difference between them, That we may so order and govern our Life, that we may lessen the first Motives, and consequently may be less inclinable to those lustful Desires, and in this State we may spend our Life. But as it is not possi∣ble to hinder the natural Heat from consuming con∣tinually the radical Moisture, so we cannot live but we must from time to time recruit that loss by Eat∣ing and Drinking moderately. Now tho this Mo∣deration may have divers respects, for Example, in reference to the Age, to the state of Life, to the con∣••titution

of the Body, to the Manners of the Coun∣••ry, &c. Nevertheless it consists generally to have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 regard to our Health, and therefore in relation to Eating and Drinking, we must take care that we ••ransgress not either in the quantity, which often ••appens, when we eat and drink without Hunger ••nd Thirst, or in the Quality, which is when we ••ake any thing that either naturally or by art or mixture is too hot or too cold; and not being fit ••or Digestion becomes a kind of Poison, causeth Belchings, Winds and Collicks; makes the Head ••eavy, disturbs our Sleep, attended with many more ••uch inconveniences.

As to what relates to the Quantity in particular, we must take a special care that we do not exceed what our Hunger and Thirst prompt us to; for as Nature hath given us an Appetite of Eating and Drinking, it hath also given us Hunger and Thirst, as the measure of what is needful to be taken, and what to be refused. But because in the most part of the Meats, in Bread it self, and in Wine, there is something Artificial, from whence proceeds that which provokes Appetite, and makes it become greater than it would be naturally: Therefore wise Men have fancied that it makes for our Health to give a check to our Appetite, and stop betime. And because some might object that other Animals that follow Nature, and consequently never do ought in prejudice of their Health, Eat and Drink till they be fully satisfied; They answer, That the Animals live upon Food purely natural, and which never stirs up Hunger nor Thirst, as that doth which Men make use of. This is plain in Drink, the most na∣tural, which is Water, and that we drink with great Pleasure, but as soon as the Thirst is allayed we have no more Inclination to it. However, 'tis certain that no Person repents to have risen from

Table without being fully satisfied, but we have often been sorry to have filled our Stomachs so full, that we were able to eat no more. And doubtless it is not without Cause that Diogenes won∣ders that Men will eat for Pleasure, and that they will not forbear Eating for the same Reason, seeing there is so much Pleasure in being Healthy and free from Diseases, and by this means will be ready the sooner to repeat the same Pleasure with the more delight and Satisfaction.

In relation to the Quality, it seems also that then we have a regard to our Health, when we shall nourish our selves with plain Food, easy to be di∣gested, and which we know to be proper and con∣venient. For this reason we see some Country-people who live upon nothing but Bread, Fruits and Water, and yet enjoy a perfect Health, without any need of a Physitian: Whereas those who feed at plentiful Tables have but a weak Body, and are often forced to seek the assistance of the Physitian. Therefore there have always been some Sects of wise Men, such as Pythagoras, who abstained from Eating the Flesh of living Creatures, and contented themselves with the plain Products of Nature, and have spent their Life in Health and Pleasure. I shall not here repeat what we have said elsewhere, that Flesh seems to be no natural Food for Mankind, but as Custom hath made it so; we should consider at least that the use of Flesh is so much the more Healthy, the more plainly 'tis prepared. And that the Arts of Cooks, of Confectioners and others, who by their different Mixtures and Sauces do as it were change our very Food, seem to have been intended for the de∣struction of the Health of Mankind. Therefore we cannot but wonder why we should with so much earnestness prosecute such as Poison, and yet hire and entertain the Contrivers of our dainty Dishes,

who by a deceitful Art destroy no less their Life and Health. But how few are there that are not car∣ried away by the deceitful Charms of a liquorish Tast, and being bewitched with the present Plea∣sure, never take heed nor apprehend the Mischiefs that follow? What great Reason had Democritus to Laugh at those who make Vows to the Gods for their Health, and yet by their debaucht and disor∣derly living, undertake to ruin it daily? 'Tis a won∣derful thing, saith Diogenes, That Men have so much care to cause their Bodies to be Embalmed after their Death, and yet all their endeavours during Life is to be∣come rotten.

Of Chastity in particular.

FInally, in relation to Chastity, I will only ob∣serve, that whereas this Virtue is to struggle with the most violent of all the Passions, unto which there is scarce any Body but submits; I shall here mention Two or Three principal means that may serve as Bulworks to defend us from danger.

The First is a great Sobriety; for it will be in vain to attempt to give a check to this unruly and imperious Appetite, unless you carefully cherish this Virtue which tho encourged, it you will still have great difficulty to overcome this Lust. Long before Terence was heard of, it hath been said, That without Wine and good Cheer Love grows Cold. Which is easily to be made out; for that which encourages Love and stirs up Lust, is the increase of natural Seed, which swells and moves in the Vessels, excites Nature, and obliges it to free it self from that which is troublesome to it. Now as this increase pro∣ceeds from the quantity or quality of the Food, if any Person be very temperate in his living, and if

he takes care to use no Meats that are too hot, or fit to augment the Seed, he will take away the Few∣el and the Oil, as I may so say, which serves to in∣crease and add Flame to this Fire. Therefore those who profess a chast and continent Life, ought not ful∣ly to satisfy themselves, but as we have said before, retain always a Stomach for more, Citra satietatem vesci. Their Virtue will not want a sufficient Re∣ward, for they will become stronger and more lu∣sty, because the ejection of the Seed diminishes the Strength and Spirits, which is the cause why other Animals, and even the very Trees, the more fruit∣ful they are, the sooner they grow Old.

The Second Means is some honest Employ, which may entertain and spend some of the Spirits that make the Seed to boil up, and so give a diversion to the Thoughts: For the Imagination, which fixes up∣on the beloved Object, and is not otherwise divert∣ed, is easily heated, and from a little Spark kindles and becomes a great Flame. Therefore we ought to take a strong Resolution to resist all base and dishonest Thoughts, to avoid all occasions which might cause them to rise, whether by the Sight, or too intimate and private Discourses, or by Reading, or Touching, or otherwise; and if casu∣ally any doth arise, not to give it time to take any deep root, but to banish it at first; and in so doing we discover our Manhood; for the more you give way, the greater will be the difficulty to stop your self in so slippery a Path: So that there is no∣thing can be a greater Truth than what is common∣ly said, That it is a kind of Combat, where the Victory is not to be obtained, but by flying away.

The Third is the custom of resisting and overcom∣ing; for as we become so much the more inclinable to Love, the more easy and the more often we yield and submit to it, so we become so much the

more Continent, the more courageously we resist, and the less we are overcome by it.

I confess the violence of this Passion is great, but it often happens that the weakness of our Spirit is such, that at the first Assault we suffer our selves to be overcome. You yield upon the first Assault, with∣out making any effort, or exercising your Resolu∣tion in trying whether you might not have Strength enough to withstand the Temptation, and so no wonder that the Passion triumphs and gets the Vi∣ctory over your Reason. But perhaps you will say, I have already contracted an Habit. Well, Why don't you endeavour by forbearance to destroy this Habit, and to bring in a contrary? For the thing is not impossible, if you will strive with all your Courage. Learn by degrees to be Continent, and if you cannot abstain one Day of two, at least ab∣stain one in a Week; for by this means it will happen that in a little while you will attain three Days of Abstinence, afterwards Six, and after that you will be Conqueror during whole Weeks and Months. But above all things remember, that as it is almost impossible but that many things must in∣tervene, which may divert you from your Design, so you ought to keep steady and fixt to your Reso∣lution. You must break through all Obstacles; You must proceed still on, and be continually going for∣ward; You must consider with your self, that it is a great weakness to express so early a Repentance, and being a Man as you are, to shew nothing less than your Manhood. Consider what a satisfaction you will have when the Fatigue will be over, and that you shall find that you have got the Victory; whereas if you suffer your self to be meanly over∣come, a troublesome and uneasy Repentance will attend you; but otherwise you will applaud and ap∣prove of your Happiness when you shall have brave∣ly

obtained the Conquest. You will also from thence receive new Strength to help you to overcome again in a like Temptation, and if you continue, you will find that by degrees you will alter the evil Habit, that you will draw your self out of a cruel Bondage, deliver your self from a base Tyranny; and instead of a dark and clouded Spirit it will become clear and Serene; instead of a feeble and diseased Body it will become strong and vigorous; and instead of a languishing and short Life it will become healthy and long. Not to mention here the loss of Repu∣tation and Goods, neither shall I instance in those other odious Mischiefs which are known to all the World.

I shall not here trouble my self to inform you, That it is usual to subdivide these two kinds of Temperance each into two Parts; so that they assign four parts commonly subject to Temperance, where∣of Two of them relate to the Tast, namely, Absti∣nence and Sobriety; the First concerns our Eating, the Second our Drinking; and the other Two re∣late to Venery, namely, Chastity and Modesty: The First concerns the Act it self, and the Latter some Circumstances, such as are Kisses, Approaches, Em∣braces, Looks and Discourses, &c. I shall not insist here to prove that Modesty is either Chastity it self, and principally that of Virginity, which being once lost, as the Poet saith, can never be retrieved.

—Nulla reparabilis arte, Laesa Pudicitia est; deperit illa semel.

Or if it be understood for that Virtue that gives a check to the Circumstances that we have named, it ought not to be esteemed so much a part subject to Prudence, as a potential part of Chastity. I will only observe in relation to Modesty, (which is so

called from the word Modest, being a kind of a Guard to Chastity,) that tho Nature produces no∣thing whereof we ought to be ashamed as an obscene Thing; (and therefore among Nations who own no Obscenity, neither in the Members of the Body, nor in the Language or Names that are given to them; for as to this we are to refer our selves to common Usage,) nevertheless among those People who do own any such thing, we are to refrain from them, and we are not to banish Modesty, which obligeth us to forbear them; for let it be either Na∣ture, or Law, or Custom, which makes things to be esteemed Brave, Good or Honest, 'tis always Nature that commands them to be observed, which is to be obeyed for the common Good, in which the Happiness and Welfare of every private Per∣son, as due to him of common right, is comprised. Therefore Cicero discourses excellently well upon this Point. We are not to hearken to the Cynicks, who Laugh at us because we esteem things to be filthy and undecent in Words, which are not really so indeed; and on the contrary, Things that are really Wicked and Dishonest we don't stick to mention by their proper Names: As to Steal, to Cheat, to commit Whoredom, which indeed is Ʋnjust and Dishonest, and yet is spoken without any Ob∣scenity; To beget Children is an honest Act, but yet to use the proper Term is Obscene and Immodest. For our part let us follow the dictates of Nature, and let us ab∣stain from all that our Eyes or Ears cannot honestly en∣dure; let our Carriage, our Gate, our Sitting, our Lying down, our Countenance, our Eyes and our Hands, ob∣serve the Rules of Modesty. And hear what he says in another Place: After he had shewn that there is nothing more indecent and unbecoming, than in se∣rious and weighty Matters to mix loose and light Ex∣pressions; Says he, Thus Pericles treated the Poet So∣phocles very wisely, who while sitting upon the Bench

with him in open Court, espied a beautiful young Damsel pass by; and not being able to contain himself, cried out, What a Beauty is there before us! Pericles answered, O Sophocles, 'tis becoming a Judge upon the Bench to be Modest and Grave, not only in respect to his Hands, but in respect to his Eyes also.

Of Mildness and Gentleness.

WE shall now speak something as to the other parts of Temperance, which some name Subject Parts, others Potential. But Mildness seems truly to belong rather to Fortitude than to Temperance, in that it relates to Truth, which ariseth because of Pain, and because it resides in that part of the Appetite which derives its name from Wrath, namely, in the irascible part, there∣fore it seems to deserve to be plac'd under Forti∣tude: Nevertheless, as it is the property of Forti∣tude to raise and encourage; and of Temperance to check and depress; and that in respect of Wrath the Mind hath not so much need to be incited and stir'd up as to be curb'd and kept in, for this rea∣son it is commonly placed under Temperance. However, Aristotle teacheth, That Mildness or Gentleness ought to be reckoned among the Vir∣tues, because 'tis a Mediocrity or a Medium be∣tween two Extremes; the one a Temper inclina∣ble to Wrath, as when a Man is either sooner or in a higher degree enraged, than he ought against one who deserves it not, or for some frivolous Cau∣ses: The other a simple Meekness or want of Anger, as when a Man is not angry, when, and against whom, and for such Reasons as he ought to be angry; for he declares that under certain Cir∣cumstances,

'tis not only lawful, but also requisite and needful to be so, and that because Nature it seems hath not only given Man an Inclination to Anger, but also because that this Passion is as a Spur that stirs us up and encourages us to repel, not only private Injuries, but likewise puts us upon securing our selves against such publick Dangers and Cala∣mities as may affect our Country, Parents, Rela∣tions, &c. and all good Men. By this means our private and publick Welfare is secured and main∣tained, and a Way is open to great and generous Actions.

Nevertheless, the Stoicks, not without some Co∣lour of Reason, seem to require a total Suppression of Anger; and because 'tis impossible to be al∣together free from it, we shall therefore at least be so much the happier the less we are subject to this cruel and troublesome Passion: I say, if it be not possible to be altogether freed from it; for there is scarce any hopes that a wise Man should be altogether free from Anger, as Seneca very well observes by this discourse which he ascribes to So∣crates, who yet was esteem'd the wisest of Men: I would beat thee if I were not in Anger. And by another Saying which he assigns to Plato: Speu∣sippus, Chastise for me that Slave, for I am now angry. He tells us, That when Plato held up his Hand as if he were going to beat his Slave, and that his Friend ask'd him what he ailed, and what he was doing, Plato returned this excellent answer, Exigo poenas ab homine iracundo; I punish an angry Man. Now that there is nothing more desirable than to be seldom or never angry is plain and ma∣nifest, because there is no Passion that disturbs all parts of the Body more, the Blood, the Heart, the Eyes, the Mouth, &c. nor is the Mind less quiet. For that Reason Epicurus hath very well ex∣press'd

it, That an extraordinary Anger turns a Man into a Fool. And Seneca saith, That a short Anger is a short Madness. And Philemon, That we all play the Fool while we are angry, Desipimus omnes donec irati sumus. Therefore we cannot endeavour too much to root out this brutish Passion; which is not to be thought requisite to defend us from, and revenge Injuries, seeing that a calm and quiet Spirit may do it much better, and without fear of Repentance, were it only to keep Servants within the Bounds of their Duty; for in such a Case, a feigned and seeming Anger is sufficient either to Punish their Crimes or to Chastise their Failings; for we are not to be more angry than the Law it self; or than a Physician, who without any discom∣posure orders his Burnings and Incisions: We have already mentioned those excellent Verses of Clau∣dian, who requires a wise Man to be always Ma∣ster of himself, and to punish Offenders without Wrath.

But as the Fancy that we have of being offended, is that which stirs up Anger; we have already ob∣served, (speaking of Fortitude,) That a wise Man ought to be above all Affronts, and that he can∣not revenge himself more honourably than by de∣spising 'em. I will here only add, That we ought to moderate and over-come this eagerness of Re∣venge, and reduce it to a mild and meek Tem∣per, which of all other Virtues is most becoming a Man, and makes him beloved; for every one hath Affection for such as are naturally mild and full of Humanity, who are easily appeased, and apt and in∣clinable to forgive. We receive thereby a great Advantage; for by this means we free our selves from that Fretfulness which consumes a revenge∣ful Spirit, troubles our Mind, spends our Strength; and not being satisfied with the Evil already re∣ceived,

he draws often upon himself a greater Mis∣chief, by endeavouring to take Vengeance. Can there be a greater blindness or madness than that of some Men, who being affronted, challenge the Offender in Duel, where it often happens that he who suffered the former wrong, loseth also his Life, and sacrifices it, if I may so say, to him whose Affront he could not slight and pass by? Let us with due Thanks and Praises own the steddy and unshaken Justice of a neighbouring Prince, who by his severe Edicts hath freed his Nation from this barbarous and inhuman Custom.

Of Clemency.

AS for Clemency, it differs from Mildness, in that the latter relates generally to all Men; but Clemency only to Inferiours. Therefore Se∣neca saith, That it is not only a Moderation of Spirit in that Power that we leave to revenge our selves; but also a gentleness in a Superiour, in Punishing and Cha∣stising of Inferiours. It is likewise known, that as Meekness or Mildness leans and inclines rather to the defect than the excess of Anger, so also Clemen∣cy inclines more to the want than to the excess of Punishment: So that Indulgence is not so much opposite to it as Cruelty of Mind, or that kind of Inhumanity that appears in the extraordinary Pu∣nishment of Offenders. 'Tis not without Reason that this Virtue is esteem'd proper to generous and noble Minds. It becomes all Men in general, who have Authority over those who ask Pardon for their Faults; but 'tis more particularly the Orna∣ment and Glory of Kings and Princes. Therefore Cicero calls it a Royal Virtue: For as 'tis incident to a weak, cowardly, and savage Nature, to shew

Cruelty to those who are over-come, nay, tho' they have given no particular Provocation; so it be∣longs to a noble and generous Mind to express Cle∣mency to the Conquered. And as Cruelty renders Men hateful and odious, so Clemency, procures them love, affection, and respect; for as the same Author saith, As 'tis a brutish Inclination to de∣stroy by Cruelty, so 'tis a Divine Temper to save by Pardoning.. In some Cases indeed, we cannot well Pardon without bringing danger upon our selves, and this is more properly term'd Severity than Cru∣elty; but when there is no inconveniency to be feared, but on the contrary there appears a likeli∣hood of purchasing to our selves the Kindness of others, and to make them more subject and obe∣dient by the Sense of Gratitude, 'tis not only glo∣rious to save such as you may destroy, but profit∣able and pleasant to deserve or experience the Kindness, either of those who are obliged, or of others who will find by that means a disposition full of Goodness and Love. 'Tis strange to consider, how great Affection we have for those whom we read of in History to have shewn themselves very kind and merciful, and how we abominate those who have been barbarous and cruel. This shews sufficiently what great difference there is in the Reputation of those Princes who strive to de∣serve and purchase to themselves the glorious and august Title of Fathers of their Country, and of those who fancy this Motto which Seneca calls odi∣ous, Let 'em hate me so they fear me.

Of Mercy.

SEneca tells us, that after Clemency we ought to inquire what Mercy is, because this Virtue seems to be near a kin, and much resembles Cle∣mency; nay, is sometimes taken for Clemency it self: For tho' Mercy seems to be nothing else but a certain grief or concern that we have for ano∣thers Calamity; yet it resembles Clemency, be∣cause the Misery of him who is fallen, even forces it from us. Therefore sometimes it seems to be Clemency it self; and that in the Judgment of the sacred Writers, who highly recommended it, as also among the Philosophers; as Cicero, who making his Address to Caesar, tells him, Of all the Virtues that attend you, the most esteemed of Men, and the most admirable, is Mercy; for nothing makes us so like the Gods, as to give Life to Men: Your Fortune hath nothing greater than to be able, and your Soul and Dis∣position, nothing better than to be willing to preserve many. And tho' Seneca saith, That Mercy is the weakness of a mean Spirit, that 'tis common to the most wicked; and that we see none but old Women, and ge∣nerally the Female Sex who are moved, and pity the Tears of the greatest Villains, who if not strongly guard∣ed, would break their Prisons; Yet he confesseth, That many extol this Virtue, and name an honest Man a merciful Man. But he understands the matter as the Stoicks do, who pretend, That a wise Man is never moved with Compassion, nor Pardons any.

But tho' the Stoicks will have the Mind of a wise Man not subject to Displeasure, and consequently ought not to be moved with the Calamities of o∣thers; nevertheless, the Peripateticks and all o∣thers, maintan, That he may be moved moderate∣ly,

that so he may thereby be excited to succour and assist such as are in Misery. I confess it is no ad∣vantage to a Man in Misery, that others should be moved or afflicted for his Calamity, for that is only so far serviceable as to incline us to assist him, and therefore we are not to be blamed for keeping our selves from an affliction which is hurtful and brings no profit; however yet it tends to excite and fur∣ther our assistance. Moreover, 'tis also Hu∣man and Natural to be afflicted with those that suf∣fer; nay 'tis to be suspected that our assistance will be but slender and backward, if it be not encou∣raged by an inward Motion: For that Reason we are not altogether to condemn this inward Inclina∣tion, because we may have it in such a manner, as it may not be a torment to us, but rather the natu∣ral effect of a free and generous Propensity to acts of Humanity and Charity.

Of Modesty and Humility.

WE shall next speak of Modesty, which tho' it is of a large extent, yet chiefly consists in moderating our Passions in the pursuit of Honour and Glory. Now 'tis manifest that this Virtue draws nearer to a defect than to an excess, in that Pride is rather opposite to it, than the contempt of Honour. I confess, Aristotle calls him Modest only who deserves but little, and in reality Fancies ac∣cording to his Deserts; but the name of Modest seems likewise applicable to him, who tho he may deserve much, nevertheless hath no overwean'd Opinion of himself, nor does he strictly exact all the Honour and Respect due to him; for knowing the weak∣ness of human Nature, and remembring his frail Condition, begins to suspect that the Opinion that

he entertains of his own Merit may deceive him. And truly that Magnanimity so much extoll'd by Aristotle, seems rather to consist in prompting us to aim at and attempt great Things, than believe that we merit or deserve 'em. Besides, it seems not to be puffed up nor boast of its deserts, by declining Honours, but at least admits and receives them with Modesty: In a Word, our expressing our Modesty in our Actions and Behaviour, is as the crowning and completion of our great and noble Deeds. There∣fore 'tis not without cause that the Antients have compared a Man of Merit and Virtue, to an Ear of Wheat, which the fuller it is, the more it stoops. And Demosthenes observes, That a Man who is so∣lidly learned, is so far from boasting of it, that he blushes when any one seems to Extol and Praise him.

But we must not therefore think that this Mode∣sty is the same which we call Pusillanimity, which he supposes to be when any one believes that he de∣serves less than really he doth; for this Pusillanimity or Bashfulness consists also in having rather an ap∣prehension and fear of undertaking great Things, than in believing that we deserve 'em. Now as in a Man of great worth, Ostentation lessens the Glory of his Merits, and darkens it very much; so 'tis an odious and vain-glorious Thing in a Man of no Merit to be puffed up with the over-wean'd con∣ceit of himself and his own Actions. Vain-Glory hath this Evil attending, that it is approved by none, but hated of all the World; whereas Modesty hath this advantage, that there is no Body but de∣lights in it and loves it.

From whence we may here observe, That this Modesty is not such a contempt of Honour, as if there were no difference between Things honorary and Things blame-worthy; but only a contempt of

Honour without Merit, or meerly in Affectation, and which differs much from that which is real in the Opinion of good Men, and which we duly obtain, when we are judged worthy of it; which seems to be so much the more agreeable with Truth, that it is manifest that an honest Man undertakes great Things to deserve this Opinion; neverthelss he ob∣serves the Rules of Modesty, to avoid the Shame and Disgrace that Vain-Glory draws upon us. So that we may truly say, That the less we seek after Honour, the easilier and the sooner we obtain it; it being more glorious, as an ancient Author observes, to ask why a Statue hath not been erected for such an one, than why it hath.

We may likewise understand, That Modesty hin∣ders not those who are advanced to a Dignity, to maintain the Honour of that Post; for it is the Inte∣rest of a Commonwealth or Kingdom, that those who Govern should be Honoured; for fear if Con∣tempt should creep in, the Government would suf∣fer by it, and that the preservation of the Honour of our Dignity is no vain Glory, but a real Act of Justice, as the neglect of it seems not so much to be a private Modesty, as a publick Injury.

Now all that has been spoken of Modesty, may be said of Humility, as it is a religious Virtue: For tho heathen Authors look upon it as proceeding from a mean abject Spirit, nevertheless, 'tis with great Reason that the Holy Pen-men look upon it as a very great degree of Modesty, and it is to be judg∣ed so much the more perfect, because it comes from a love of Piety, and supposing it be true and sincere, and not feigned nor hypocritical, it removes and banishes all Vain-Glory. For tho the Modesty of the Philosophers seems outwardly to despise Honour, yet it excludes not all the other Passions, but this Religious Humility ascribes to God all Honour and

Glory. I say upon condition that it be sincere, for there is sometimes Hypocrisy mingled with it. Therefore we need not wonder that some have ex∣claimed against Diogenes and some other of the Phi∣losophers, That they had conquer'd one kind of Vanity by exalting another.

But 'tis not without ground what we said before, that this Modesty is of a large extent, because it ap∣pears in all the things which we desire to draw from Honour or Praise. And in Virtue it self, which doubtless can have no excess, and in which there is nothing that might make us ashamed: I say in Virtue it self this Modesty appears when there is no Ostentation of it, but we embrace and practise it si∣lently, without making it appear but when it is convenient, and always free from Pride. Which is also to be said proportionably of Science or Know∣ledg, unless it be that there is moreover a certain kind of Distemper, commonly called Curiosity, to desire to know those Things which are not lawfully to be pried into, or which are useless when known. This Modesty appears also in our Discourse in se∣veral respects; for First, as there is nothing so trou∣blesome as a pratling Loquacity, so there is no∣thing more commendable than a prudent Silence, or that Forbearance which makes us speak only to those to whom we ought, and of such Things and at such times as we ought. So that that Saying of Simonides is become a kind of Proverb; That no Man did ever repent of being Silent; but very often off too much Speaking. And Epaminondas, was commen∣ded because no Man knew more than he, and yet no Man Spoke less. Wherefore, as Speech hath been given to Man to unfold and express his Thoughts, it will suffice to take heed that this be not used in∣discreetly, as it happens, when any speaks out of Sea∣son, or without being required, or more than comes

to his share, uttering all that comes uppermost, and scarce permitting any Body else to put in a Word; when he Speaks, as we say, at random, and that he utters all that comes first; in short, when he hath such an impatience of Speaking, that when he is forc'd to hearken to others, it is very uneasy to him, never reflecting upon that wise Saying of Pythagoras, Either let your Discourse be more profitable than your Silence, or else hold your Peace. And as there are some who magnify Things too much, and others who too much lessen 'em, so there is nothing more commen∣dable than to speak plainly and sincerely: For you may observe with Aristotle, That there is often a great deal of Arrogancy and Vain-Glory in thinking too meanly of our selves; as well as in thinking too highly, and that we may hereby fall into a Folly like that of the Lacedemonians, who gloried in their Garments of a low and mean Price.

Lastly, as there are Two sorts of Jesting, accord∣ing to Cicero, the one Insolent, Sawcy and Malici∣ous; the other Civil, Ingenious and Pleasant: 'Tis known that this last hath been always as well ac∣cepted, and as he tells us, That it is becoming a Gentleman; whereas the other is very ill received, and not judged fit for any Man.

There are many other Things in which Modesty discovers it self, as in the decency and plainness of our Habits, in our Meen and Behaviour, &c. for in all these Things there is a certain Mediocrity to be observed. These are Cicero's own Words, Ad∣hibenda est praeterea mundities non odiosa, neque exqui∣sita nimis, tanquam quae fugiat agrestem & inhumanam negligentiam. Eadem ratio est habenda Vestitus, in quo sicut in pleris{que} rebus Mediocritas optmia est. Eadem gestus & gressus. Nam & palestrici motus saepe sunt odiosiores, & histrionum nonnulli gestus ineptiis non va∣••ant, & in utro{que} genere quae sunt recta & simplicia lau∣dantur.

I think Horace hath borrowed from this Passage what he saith of Tigellus, when he tells us, That he was a Man made up of Extremes; That some∣times one might see him running as if he had fled from an Enemy, and sometimes walking gravely and demurely, as if he were carrying the Image of Juno; one Day he would have two Hundred Ser∣vants attending him, the next Day scarce One; sometimes he would talk like a King uttering no∣thing but what savour'd of Greatness and Magnifi∣cence, at other times he would play the Philosopher and be contented with little.

Nil aequale homini fuit illi, &c.

Cicero says moreover, That Modesty is concern'd in the Ornament of a House and all its Furniture, and that where there is any Superfluity or Excess, it turns to the discredit of the Owner, because 'tis above his Ability; for 'tis not the House that ought to Grace the Master, but the Master ought to be an Or∣nament to his House. Eadem denique de ornatu domus totaque supellectile, in quo si quid modum excedat, dede∣cori est, quasi possessori incongruum; neque enim domo dominus, sed domino honestanda domus. Lastly, he will have Modesty concerned even with the Goods of Nature and Fortune, in the which 'tis very com∣mendable to observe a convenient Temper, so that they may be rather the Instruments of Virtue and Moderation, than of Debauchery, Pride and Arro∣gancy. Tractanda etiam in laudationibus haec sunt na∣turae, & fortunae bona, in quibus est summa laus non extulisse se in potestate, non fuisse insolentem in pecunia, non se praetulisse aliis propter abundantiam fortunae, ut opes, & copiae non superbiae videantur, ac libidini, sed boni∣tati, ac moderationi facultatem, & materiam dedisse.

CHAP. VIII. Of Justice, Equity and the Laws.

THere remains yet the fourth Virtue for us to Discourse of, namely Justice, which consists in rendring to every one that which belongs to him; therefore 'tis of a very large Extent, and esteemed as the source and root of all other Duties. 'Tis Justice, saith Cicero, which gives the name of Good as well as that of Just; for Justice is a kind of Good∣ness, or an Inclination full of Sincerity and Desire of doing right to all the World; for that reason there is nothing that Men respect, reverence and love more than Justice. Aristotle tells us in express Words, That Justice is the most excellent of all the Virtues, that it excels the Morning and the Evening Star in Glory. For this Cause Men have always gi∣ven to it the name of a most precious Possession, and in all times it is acknowledged to be the ligament of Societies, as Cicero calls it, that is to say, That Tie without which Society cannot possibly Sub∣sist; insomuch, saith he, that the very worst of Men, and they who delight in Wickedness cannot live without some kind of Justice; for if one Thief open∣ly Robs another, or privately Steals any thing from him, he is not suffered to continue in the Company of Thieves; or if a Captain of a Pyrate distributes not the Prey equally, his Companions will either kill him or forsake him.

But this Virtue is sometimes taken more general∣ly, sometimes more strictly; for there be many that look upon it as the Complexion of all the other Virtues, because there is no Virtue but Justice pre∣scribes

its Functions and Offices; as for Instance, in the practice of Fortitude, when we are in a Fight it orders us to keep our Rank, and forbids us to run away, or throw away our Weapons: In the practice of Temperance it prohibits Adultery; in that of Gentleness it Commands us to strike no Bo∣dy, nor so much as to speak Evil of 'em; and so of the rest.

But not to insist too long upon this; it is not to be question'd but that the two chief Offices or gene∣ral Duties of Justice consist in hurting or doing wrong to no Body, and in giving or rendring to every one that which he may lawfully claim, which is commonly expressed in Holy Writ by these Words, Declina a malo, & fac bonum, fly from E∣vil and do Good: This hath given occasion to the Lawyers to define Justice, A constant and perpetual Will or Resolution to give or restore to every one his Right; that is to say, what justly belongs to him. This Definition causeth us to make two Observati∣ons, First, That 'tis not without Reason that it is named a Will or Resolution; for tho this Word may signify the action of the Will or the Faculty it self; nevertheless, as they add further, that it ought to be a constant and perpetual Willingness, they hereby understand the Habit it self of Willing, which ex∣presseth the nature and true praise of Justice. For to deserve commendation for this Virtue, 'tis not sufficient to perform some just Acts, seeing that he who may do them without Knowledge, or for Fear, or for a Friends sake, or for Gain, or for some other such consideration, cannot therefore be Just, nor be said to do Justly, because the End ceasing, he would act otherwise; but to be Just he must pro∣ceed willingly of his own accord for the sake of Ju∣stice. Therefore Aristotle puts a difference between a just Action and an Action done Justly; because

'tis the Will alone that makes the Deed to be Just∣ly or Unjustly done, and that he who only does no Wrong is not esteemed Just, but he who notwith∣standing his Capacity to act unjustly, yet will by no means do it, as Philemon saith,

Sed qui facere licet potis, non vult tamen.

And he who aims at no private Glory, but de∣sires rather to be truly Just than to appear so.

Vult esse justus, quam viderier magis.

Secondly, That 'tis not also without Reason that they add, To render to every one his Right: Be∣cause these Words comprehend the Function and the proper Act of Justice; and besides, signify from whence this Mediocrity is to be taken, which Ari∣stotle requires, to place Justice in the Number of the Virtues. For Justice is not as the other Virtues, be∣tween two Opposite Vices, for there is but one only contrary to it, namely Injustice. But nevertheless 'tis employed in rendring that which is Right, which is to be reduc'd to a Mediocrity or Equality, upon which Aristotle observes in the first place,

Of Retaliation.

THat Retaliation, or as the Latins term it, Per∣pessio reciproca, a mutual Suffering, is no Right or Equity, simply so taken, whatever Pythagoras's Disciples pretend to, who seem to approve of the Justice that is ascribed to Radamanthus, Aequum jus fuerit, si quae egit, quis patiatur; To make a Man suffer the same Evil which he hath committed.

The Reason of this is, because Retaliation cannot be found in distributive Justice, where a respect is to be had to the Worth and to the Person. For Ex∣ample, if a Magistrate strikes any Body, he ought not therefore to be struck in the same manner; and it would not be sufficient that he who should give a box on the Ear to a Magistate should only receive such another for it, but he ought to be punished more severely. I shall not here mention that a re∣gard ought to be had chiefly to that which is done willingly, and that which is acted against our Will. Neither hath it any room in that part of Commuta∣tive Justice, which respects the Actions, and which is properly called Corrective; for if for a Tooth pull'd out we only pull out a Tooth, or an Eye for an Eye, we don't hereby do Right, because there is no amends made for the Injury or Wrong done; but we must as much as is possible recompense the mischief done, either by Mony, or some other ex∣pedient which the Judge shall think convenient. Therefore it may have place in the other part of Commutative Justice, which respects the Things, or the exchange made in recompence of it,

Aristotle observes in the second Place, That for this kind of Justice there is nothing could be invent∣ed more convenient than Gold, Silver, or some∣thing of like Value; for as human Society subsists by a necessary supply of one anothers Wants, we cannot otherwise redress this defect than by ex∣change or commutation, and that this is to be done by some equality that is to be found out. Now what equality can we find between two Things so diffe∣rent (for Example) as a Horse and Box on the Ear. As therefore we cannot find any equality as to the Thing, nevertheless, as by Custom we have made Mony an equivalent to every thing else, by

this as by a common Measure we may adjust to every Man his due Right.

Thirdly, A Judge ought sometimeis to do Right, not strictly as the Law prescribes, but as we usual∣ly say, according to Equity, Ex aequo & bono. For as the Law orders nothing but under general Terms, and that often there happens particular Ca∣ses, in which, because of certain Circumstances none can judge according to the strict Letter of the Law without great Unjustice; For that Reason, saith he, If a Legislator hath omitted or failed in any thing which he hath absolutely enjoyn'd, here we must supply what was defective in this Law-giver, and what he himself would have ordain'd by this Law if he had been now present, or had known of it before. Nay, the Interpreters of the Laws go yet farther, and say; If the Law had commanded that no Strangers should walk upon the Bulwarks, we must not therefore put to death one who is gone thither to defend the Town, and repulse the Enemy; for if the Law-giver had foreseen such a Case, he doubtless had made such an Exception. For this Reason 'tis commonly said, That under strict and severe Laws we ought to implore the Assistance of the Judge, to make a rea∣sonable and equitable Construction.

Judicis auxilium sub iniqua lege rogato: Ipsae etenim leges cupiunt ut jure regantur.

But to return to the Definition of Justice. As this part of the Definition, viz. To render to eve∣ry one his Right, obliges us to understand and seek more at large what this Right is, and from whence it derives its Original: Let us consider, first, that this word being taken in several senses, its primi∣tive Signification is, that Right is a Faculty to do something, to have something, to enjoy, and to do

ones self Right in something; from thence we say, to keep, to retain, to recover, to pursue ones Right, to yield, to abate and surrender ones Right, to enjoy ones Right, or to be at our own Com∣mand, Esse sui juris, &c. 'Tis also from hence that the Law, by a Metaphor, is called Right, be∣cause it declares and prescribes what belongs to every one as his Right, what Authority, Power and Command every one hath over any thing. And this by a like Metaphor, That we call Right the Court or Tribunal where Right is done; that is to say, where the Party injured hath his Right re∣stor'd or Justice done him.

Nay, we may go yet farther, and say, That Right seems by consequence to be originally more ancient than Justice; for as Justice is the same thing with that Affection or habitual Desire or In∣clination which we have to wrong no body, and that every one may enjoy their Right as we enjoy ours; 'tis certain, that this Justice supposeth that there is in other Men a Right, not depending upon it, and which nevertheless would be, tho' it self were not in Being. Therefore it seems in the first place, we ought to acknowledge the Right that every one hath, tho' it be different from what Na∣ture gives, or tho' it be by Contract or by Law. Secondly, That the Injury is nothing else but a Violation of this Right it self. Thirdly, Justice, or the Will to render unto every one his own, which repairs the Wrong, restores Right, and gives the Title of Just to him who possesseth it. Fourthly, The Proceedings or Work of Justice, or the Right restored, which is also called Just, or that which is Just; Justice giving it that Denomi∣nation. But because Epicurus, whom, both many of the ancient and modern Authors have follow∣ed, hath derived the very beginning of Right and

whatever is agreeable with Equity, from Utility or Profit; let us listen to what he says in the four fol∣lowing Paragraphs. 'Tis in this manner that he discourses of Justice in general Terms.

Of Justice in General, according to Epicurus.

AS Justice is a Virtue by which we render unto every one that which is his due, and by which we take heed not to wrong any body; 'tis certain, that in this respect it relates to, and respects other Men, and that it is convenient for Man as he is a Member, and lives in Society, it being the common Tie, without which 'tis im∣possible a Society should subsist.

It hath this also in common with other Vir∣tues, viz. Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude, that 'tis not to be separated from Pleasure; not only because it injures no body, but also because it settles the Mind at Rest, either by its own na∣tural Influence, or by the Assurance that nothing shall be wanting to us, which our Nature, not corrupted, can desire.

And as Rashness, Luxury and Cowardise di∣sturb and trouble the Mind, so from that very in∣stant that Injustice hath taken Possession of the Soul of a Man, he cannot be otherwise but troub∣led and uneasie: Insomuch, that if he hath under∣taken any evil Action, tho' he hath done it never so secretly, yet he can never be assured that it will always remain so. And if there be any who by reason of their great Riches, fancy themselves sufficiently secur'd from the Inquisition and Justice of Men, yet they are always afraid of a divine Vengeance; and they believe that this Uneasiness which Torments them Day and Night, is a Pu∣nishment

that proceeds from the Appointment of the immortal Gods, who are offended and dis∣pleased with them.

And afterwards, says he,

As to the Advantage which we receive from evil Actions, how inconsi∣derable are they to lessen our Griefs, or to sup∣port us under the Troubles of our Life? Do they not rather increase 'em by the remorse of Con∣science, by the fear of the Laws, and by the ha∣tred of our Neighbours? Nevertheless, some are unsatiable as to Mony, Honour, Authority, and prescribe no limits to their Luxury, Debauchery and other Extravagancies, which the ill-gotten Goods do augment and increase more and more, rather than lessen and appease. Therefore it seems that all Rules and Precepts are useless to such Men, and that there is nothing but Severity and Punishment that can restrain them.

Reason therefore invites them who are of sound Sense and Understanding, to the observation of Justice, Equity and Fidelity. Wicked Deeds are useful to no body, and Riches are convenient for none but for honest Men, and such as have a Mind tending to Liberality; for they know there∣by how to gain Mens Affections, and to make themselves beloved, which tends very much to the security and quiet of our Lives; besides, there is nothing that ought to oblige us to unjust Actions. The Desires that proceed from Nature are easily to be satisfied; and for such as are vain, foolish and needless, we should not obey 'em. These De∣sires procure nothing worthy of our Affections, and the Wrong done to others, causes more Mis∣chief than we obtain Advantage by doing that In∣jury. Therefore if Justice of it self, and by it self is not desirable, 'tis at least desirable for the sake of the great Pleasure and Satisfaction that it

procures; for there is nothing more Pleasant than to be beloved; because that makes up the Society, and consequently the Delights of Life. So that Wickedness is not only to be avoided, because of the Punishments and the Mischiefs that fall upon the Wicked; but chiefly also because it never suf∣fers our Minds to be at ease, but Poisons all our Delights, and renders our Life miserable. What I have here said, may seem to be sufficient; but I think I shall not do amiss to add something con∣cerning that which we call Right or Just, from whence Justice derives its Name, that we may the better discover what the Origin of Right is, among what Nations it hath been received, and what are the Advantages that proceed from thence.

Of Right or Just, from whence Justice derives its Name.

AS Justice hath been contrived and appoint∣ed for the Publick Good, it must needs follow that the Right and Equity which it chief∣ly respects, is Good for each individual Person that constitutes a Society: And because every one desires naturally that which is Good for himself, it must needs be, that what is Right or Just, is according to Nature, and by consequence must be stiled Natural.

Now 'tis not without Reason that I mention this, because it sometimes happens that in the Government of Societies, some things are order'd as Right and Just, which nevertheless are not Good, nor the true Interest of a Society; and consequently being not natural, but against Na∣ture, ought not to be reputed Just, but only nomi∣nally

so, or by mistake; that which is truly Right and naturally Just being such as 'tis ordained, that is to say, effectively Useful and Good. There∣fore to speak properly, Right or natural Equity is nothing else but what is mark'd out by Utility or Profit, or that Utility which, by common A∣greement, hath been appointed that Men might not injure one another, nor receive any wrong, but live in security, which is a real Good, and therefore naturally desired of every one.

I suppose therefore, that which is Profitable and that which is Good, to be but one and the same thing; and therefore to the making up of what is Just and Right, two things are prerequisite: The First, That it be Useful, or that it hath Use∣fulness on its side. The Second, That it be pre∣scribed and ordained by the common Consent of the Society; for there is nothing perfectly Just but what the Society by common Agreement or Approbation hath thought fit to be observed.

'Tis true, some are of Opinion, That what things are Just, are of their own Nature and un∣changably so; and that the Laws do not make 'em Just, but that they only declare 'em and or∣dain 'em to be according to what they were na∣turally before: Nevertheless 'tis not so, but here∣in 'tis as in other things which are useful, such as are those that concern our Health, and a great many more such like, wich are useful to some and hurtful to others, and consequently vary from the End both in general and particular. And truly, as every thing ought always every where, and to every one appear such as 'tis by Nature, because Nature never changes and is unalterable in all Occurrences; pray tell me if the things that some name Just, be every where, at all times and in respect of all Persons, really Just? Are

we not to consider that what is ordained and esta∣blished by Laws, and what is consequently Law∣ful and Just, is not ordained nor admitted among all Nations, but that some look upon 'em as indifferent, and others reject 'em as prejudicial and unjust? Are there not some who hold gene∣rally for useful that which nevertheless is not so; and thus receive things which are not generally convenient, only because that they seem so to them, or to their Society, and appear to have some general Utility or Advantage belonging to 'em?

We may then say, for the most part, that that is universally Just or agreeable with the Nature of Just, which is useful or conformable to the No∣tion of Just that we have now given. For to speak more particularly, as Utility is otherwise, and differing among the several Nations, so like∣wise what is Just differs in the same manner; so that what we fancy to be Just, others look up∣on it as Unjust. This being so, when we enquire whether Just and Right is the same among all Na∣tions, I answer, that universally 'tis so; that is, something that is useful in the mutual Society; but if we look to Particulars, and consider the several sorts of People, and the diversity of Cir∣cumstances, we shall find that 'tis not the same every where.

In a word, a thing is and ought to be reputed Just, or to have the Qualities of Just in a Society, if its Usefulness respects all the Individuals asso∣ciated; but if it be not so, 'tis not properly to be called Just, nor deserves to be so esteemed. So that if a Thing or an Action having been useful in a Society, if by any Accident or by any Altera∣tion this Usefulness begins to cease, that thing will also cease from being Just, it being no longer

so than only while it continues useful and profi∣table to Society. And thus I suppose every one will judge, who suffers not himself to be misled and blinded by vain and frivolous Discourses, but has a general Respect to all things.

Of the Origin of Right and of Justice.

BUt to begin the Matter a little higher, and trace it from its first Source. Right, Equity or Justice seem to be as ancient among Men, even as mutual Societies are.

For in the beginning, when Men were Vaga∣bonds, wandering up and down like Brutes, and suffered many Inconveniences from those salvage Creatures, and the Rigour of the Seasons, some natural Inclination which they had for one ano∣ther, by reason of the similitude and mutual Re∣semblance of Bodies as well as Souls or Manners, inclined 'em to unite together in small Societies, the better to prevent in some measure such like Inconveniences, by Building Cottages, and so thereby strengthning themselves against the Cruelty of wild Beasts and the Severity of the Weather. But because every one more regarded his own private Benefit than that of another, this begot many Quarrels in reference to Eating and Drink∣ing, and upon the account of Women, and other Conveniences of Life, which they daily robb'd and forcibly depriv'd one another of, until such time as they began to consider that they could not subsist quietly, or live securely and conveniently, unless they made some Contracts, and agreed among themselves to do no Injury one to ano∣ther; so that if any wrong'd his Neighbours, the rest were to punish him for it.

This then was the first Knot or Tie of Socie∣ties, which as it supposed that every Person might have something belonging to him, or what he might call his own, either because he was the first pos∣sessor of it, or because it was given him, or because he had it by way of exchange, or because he ac∣quir'd it by his Industry; I say, this was the first Knot which confirmed to every private Person the possession of that which he thus challeng'd as his own. Now this Knot or Agreement was nothing else but a common Law which all were bound to observe, and which was to secure to every one his Right or Power to make use of that which thus ap∣pertained to him. And thus upon this account the Law became the common Right of Societies. I shall not here mention how a whole Society at length transfer'd their power of punishing to a certain se∣lect number of the wisest and honestest Men, or it may be to one Person, who was look'd upon as the wisest of all the rest. I shall observe only two or three Things. First, That such in the Society were esteemed Just or observers of Justice, who contenting themselves with their own Rights, ne∣ver invaded the Goods of others, and by this means wronged no Body. And such were deemed Unjust or doers of Wrong, who being not satisfied with what was their own, usurp'd the Rights of others, and thus wronged 'em either by Robbing of 'em, Beating, or by Killing 'em, or the like.

The Second relates to the preservation of Life, as the thing that was the dearest to 'em of all, and the strong confirmation of their Agreements, or of their common Laws; for the wise Legislators taking a particular Care of what best secur'd their Lives, and minding also what usually happen'd among Societies, declared, That it was an horrible and abominable Crime to kill a Man, and that a

Murderer should be look'd upon as a most infa∣mous Person, and be shamefully put to Death; for there was nothing more unreasonable than to kill his Fellow Creature; for which Act we ought to have the greatest aversion, and the rather, because thereby accrued no advantage to Life, and that this Deed could not proceed but from a Wickedness in Nature.

Thirdly, That those who at first took care to promote the Utility of the Laws, had truly no need of any other Ground but to hinder them from doing Evil, or from Transgressing: But those who had not so much Ingenuity as to take notice of the importance hereof, desisted from Murdering one another, meerly out of the fear and appre∣hension of the grievous Punishments to be inflicted on Offenders, which we see still at present to be our Case.

Between whom Right and Justice takes place.

AS after all that hath been said, it may be questioned among whom Right and the vi∣olation of Right, and consequently Justice and Injustice, which are Opposites, take place: This, in my Judgment, is to be understood by compa∣ring Men with other Animals.

Therefore as there is no kind of Right and In∣jury, of Just or Unjust between the rest of Ani∣mals, because it was not possible to make any agreement between them, that they should do no Mischief to one another: So there ought not to be between the Nations which could not or would not make any such Compact, to do no wrong one to another.

For Just or Right, the observance whereof is named Justice, is only in a mutual Society, there∣fore Justice is the Tie of that Society; so that every one of its Members might live in Security, and free from the apprehensions of Dangers and Disturbances that a continual fear of being Assault∣ed or recieving damage may raise in us. So that all Animals, whether Men or others, who can∣not or will not enter into a Society, and conse∣quently be concerned in such Agreements, are de∣prived of this advantage, and have not among them∣selves any obligation of Right and Justice, to make them live in Security. So that there remains to them no other means of Security than to prevent one another, and to treat them so hardly, that they may not have Power to do them any Mis∣chief.

For this Cause, as among those Animals that have agreed upon nothing among themselves, if it happens that one injures another, one may say that he who does the Evil to the other is Mischie∣vous, or hurts the other who is injured, but not that it is unjust in this respect, or that it does wrong, because there is no manner of Right, no Agreement, no Law precedent to restrain 'em from doing Mischief; so among Men who have made no Compact, nor are not enter'd into any Society, if any treats another rudely or barbarously, one may say that he doth him Damage, or doth him Mis∣chief, but not that he is unjust to him, or that he wrongs or injures him, because there is no Law to bind him to do no Mischief to such an one.

But between Men and other Animals can there be any Justice? None at all. 'Tis true, That if Men could with other Animals, as with Men, make Agreements and Contracts not to kill one another, we could then between them and us demand Ju∣stice,

for that would tend to a mutual Security; but because it cannot be, that Animals that are without Reason should be obliged or tied to us by any common Laws, therefore we cannot take any more security from the other Animals, than from the inanimate Creatures. So that to secure our selves, there remains for us no other means than to make use of that Power that we have, either to kill them, or to force them to obey us.

You may perhaps here by the by ask why we kill those Creatures also, which we have no rea∣son to fear? I confess we may do this sometimes through Intemperance and Cruelty, as by Inhu∣manity and Barbarity we often abuse such some∣times who are out of our Society, and of whom 'tis not possible that we should apprehend any dan∣ger of Evil. But 'tis one thing to offend against Temperance, or any of its Species, viz. such as Sobriety, Gentleness, or Humanity and a natural Goodness, and another to offend against Justice, which supposeth Agreements and Laws. Besides, of all Animals which are not injurious to humane Race, there is no kind but may be so if we suffer 'em to increase and multiply beyond measure.

As to what at present concerns the pretended savage Life of the first Men, 'tis not Epicurus who was the first Broacher of this Fancy, for the most ancient Poets make mention of it, and say, That it was Orpheus, that sacred Interpreter of the Gods, and Amphion, the Founder of the City of Thebes, who by their sage and eloquent Discourses, with∣drew those Men from their unsettled and wandring way of Living, changing their cruel and barbarous Customs and Manners.

Orpheus, inspir'd by more than Human Power, Did not (as Poets feign) tame savage Beasts; But Men as Lawless and as Wild as they, And first dissuaded them from Rage and Blood. Thus when Amphion Built the Theban Wall, They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute.

Cicero himself, as if having almost forgotten that he had so highly exalted the dignity of the human Nature, declaring it to be altogether Celestial and Divine, yet acknowledges, That there was a time when Men were wandring like Vagabonds about the Fields, in some manner resembling the Brutes; That nei∣ther Reason, Religion, Piety nor Humanity were then known among them; That they were Strangers to Wed∣lock and a lawful Issue; That they neither used natural nor civil Right; That they were in a gross Ignorance, and that their unbridled Lust put 'em upon exerting the Powers and Abilities of their Bodies, to satiate it self, every one possessing more or less, according as he was able to take away and keep from another. But, says he, afterward some Men were found to be of a better Tem∣per and more Judgment and Reason than the rest, who reflecting on this miserable way of Living, and withal considering the tractableness of Mankind, were resolved to represent to their Companions how advan∣tageous it would be to joyn together in Societies. And by this means, by degrees, they reclaimed them from their first barbarous manner of Living, and re∣duc'd them to a civil Behaviour; who inventing both divine and humane Rights, gathered Men into Com∣panies, erected Towns and Cities, made Laws, and af∣terwards constituted Kings and Governours to check the Insolent and to protect the Feeble and Week against the Stronger.

Others are of Opinion that the first Age began with the famous Golden Age, which was so happy, that Men were not then bound up by any Laws, nor frighted with the fear of Punishment, but lived to∣gether innocently, having regard to Piety, Justice and Equity.

—When Man yet new, No Rule, but uncorrupted Reason knew; And with a native bent did good pursue, Ʋnforc'd by Punishment, unaw'd by Fear, His Words were simple and his Soul sincere. No suppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd, No Court erected yet, no Cause was heard, But all was safe, for Conscience was their Guard.

Seneca renders it thus, according to Posidonius, They were not yet Corrupted nor Debauched in their Prin∣ciples, but followed the dictates of Nature, which di∣rected and awed them from doing ill. In the Choice of their Governour they neither respected his Strength nor outward appearance, but his Temper and Goodness. O happy Nations! where none but the honestest Man was to bear sway, for he can do what he pleaseth, who doth no∣thing but what he thinks he ought to do; 'Twas there∣fore in this Golden Age that the Government was com∣mitted to the Wisest. They prevented Quarrels, pro∣tected the Weak against the oppression of the Stronger; they advised, dissuaded and represented what was most useful, and what not. Their Prudence provided for the necessities of those who were under their Conduct, their Valour drove away all Dangers, and their good Deeds purchased daily new Subjects. To Command was more a Burden than a Profit, and the greatest threatning that a King could then offer to such as were not Obedient, was to forsake them and depart the Kingdom. But since Vice and Corruption had changed Rulers into Tyrants,

hence sprung the necessity of having Laws, and wise Men were the first contrivers of them.

But without standing to examin these several Opinions which Lactantius looks upon as frivolous. O ingenia hominum indigna quae has ineptias protulerunt! Miseros at{que} miserabiles, qui stultitiam suam literis me∣moriae{que} mandaverunt: Let us rather consider, That the Laws according to Epicurus's Judgment being established for the publick benefit of Mankind, that every one might enjoy his Right, might live peace∣ably and securely; and seeing there is nothing more agreable to Nature than this, I think none has reason to upbraid him, quod Leges & Jura a Natura sejunxerit, That he separated from Nature the Laws and Right, seeing that he had rather join'd them in∣separably together, by the Tie of common Interest, which is the firmest Bond, according to the Rules of Nature. Nor does there seem any reason to blame him because he hath rather derived the Laws and Right from Profit than from Nature, seeing he could never have derived them from Profit, but at the same time he must needs derive them from Na∣ture. Nay, let us go further, What cause have we to reprove him, seeing there is no Person but will allow that both the primitive and modern Legisla∣tors had always this thing of Profit or publick Ad∣vantage still in their Eye, and that no Laws can be just and useful but what tend to the publick Bene∣fit and Advantage? Civil Societies, saith Aristotle, seem to have not only their Rise, but their Continuance also, in this Foundation of Profit; the Law-givers still aimed at this End, and generally termed that Right, which was found to be useful. Cicero retain'd the same Opinion, We must, saith he, intend all our Laws for the publick Good, not interpreting them according to the strict Letter, but what suits best with the publick Good and common Benefit. For our Ancestors always

used this Wisdom and Prudence, that in making their Laws they still chiefly proposed to themselves nothing more than the Safety, Welfare and Advantage of the Pub∣lick. The Safety of the People, saith he in another Place, is the supreme Law, Salus populi suprema lex. He saith further, That all Magistrates and Rulers ought to stick close to these two Maxims of Plato; the First, To be so careful of the benefit of their Subjects, that they ought chiefly to aim at it in all their Proceedings, for∣getting even their own private Profit and Advantage, when it comes in Competition. Secondly, To take heed in their Governments, that they lose not one part, by en∣deavouring to preserve the other.

Truly Cujas acknowledges that the civil Right, or the Right of every particular Government, is de∣rived from the common Benefit; but he denies it to be so in relation to the Right of Nations, or of all Mankind in general, for he supposeth that pro∣ceeds from Nature. But since he owns that this Right, which is common to particular Places, pro∣ceeds from Interest, which also is common to them all, why may not he admit that the Right which is common to all Men, is derived also from that Pro∣fit which is common to all Men? So that natural Right is as it were the Genus Generalissimum, of which the Right of Nations or of Men is an inferior Species, and likewise this Right of Nations, as a Genus more contracted, whereof the civil Right or the Right of every City is a Species.

As to what Epicurus says, That a true Law supposeth a mutual Compact, or every Law is a kind of an Agree∣ment, 'tis no more than what Plato, Aristotle, De∣mosthenes, Aristides and several others assert. Nay, the divine Law it self (so far as it concerns our Fel∣low Subjects, may be reputed the noblest part of the civil Right) is nothing else but a Covenant be∣tween God and Man. There is nothing more com∣mon

in Holy Writ, than to hear them speak of the First and Second Law, both the Old and the New, as of a Covenant and an Agreement. There is no∣thing more frequent in the Holy Scriptures, than to read that God makes a Covenant, as with Noah, Abraham and Jacob, who likewise engage recipro∣cally to God who had made this Promise to him; I will be with thee and keep thee wheresoever thou goest, and I will bring thee back into thine own Country, &c. Unto which Jacob answered, If the Lord be with me, and will keep me in the way that I go, and will give me Bread to Eat, and Raiment to put on, so that I come again to my Father's House in Peace, then shall the Lord be my God, Erit mihi Dominus in Deum.

We need but mention the mutual Compact and Agreement between God and the People of Israel, when God was pleased by the Mediation of Moses, to proclaim the antient Law. Thus God speaks, If you hear my Voice and keep my Covenant, I will look upon you as my peculiar Treasure, and will have more care of you than of all other People. And the People answered, We will do all that the Lord hath command∣ed. In relation to the new Law, this is the Prophe∣sy of Jeremiah, The Days shall come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new Covenant with the House of Israel, and with the House of Judah; not according to the Co∣venant that I made with their Fathers, in the Day that I took them by the Hand to bring them out of the Land of Egypt, which my Covenant they brake, &c. But this shall be the Covenant that I will make with the House of Israel after those Days, saith the Lord, I will put my Law in their inward Parts, and write it in their Hearts, and will be their God, and they shall be my People. But not to insist longer on this, let us only observe, That tho from what hath been said we may conclude, that to speak properly, There is no Law of Nations, and consequently no Right of Nations, because there

never hath been any Covenant or Agreement be∣tween all Nations; nevertheless we may say that this common Precept, Thou shalt not do to another, what thou wilt not that another should do to thee, ought to be esteemed as the first natural Law, or accord∣ing to Nature; not only because there is nothing more Natural, or more according to Nature than Society, and Society being not able to subsist with∣out this Precept, it ought also to be esteemed Natural: But also because God seems to have imprinted it in the Hearts of all Men, and that this Law contains in such a full manner all the other Laws of Society, that no Man can invade the Right of another, but he must violate this Law; Therefore this Law alone ought to be look'd upon as the Rule of all our Actions that concern our Neighbour.

And truly as every one desires that his Right may be Religiously preserved to him, so that no Man may attempt upon it, he need but think the same thing of others, and to put himself in their Place and Condition, to understand what he ought or what he ought not to do.

Therefore as there is nothing nearer at Hand, and more ready nor more infallible than our own Con∣science, every one may consult himself, and he a∣lone may be his own proper and true Casuist. So that he who seeks for others, seems not so much dis∣posed to be willing to do to another, what he would not have done to himself, as to not dare to do it if he hath not some Body upon whom he may cast the Blame. And upon this Point Cicero treats very well in his Offices, That those who prohibit any thing to be done, whereof there is a Question whe∣ther it be Just or Unjust, cannot prescribe any Rule nor Precept more useful and reasonable, because Equity here appears and is plainly discoverable, and that our doubting is a sign that we think or design

to do Evil. Bene praecipiunt qui vetant quidquam agere quod dubites aequum sit an iniquum; aequitas enim lucet ip∣sa per se, dubitatio autem cogitationem significat injuriae. Upon this Subject I remember what Monsieur de la Moignon, first President of the Parliament of Paris, a wise and learned Judge, said to us one Day as we were walking in his shady Retirement, in the Wood de Baville, That that Maxim of Cicero, if it were du∣ly practis'd among Men, would be of a wonderful use, and that for what concerns those who have such sort of doubts, and trouble themselves to seek for Casuists to support them, he had read an excellent Saying in a Spa∣nish Author, That such Persons seek to pick a Quarrel or to play the Cheat with the Law of God. Quieren pley tear contra la lay de Dios.

Let us observe more-over that the Holy Scrip∣tures have said very well, That the Law was not made for the Just; because he who is truly Just observes it, not out of fear of the Punishments that the Law threatens, but out of a love for Ju∣stice it self, and out of a respect for it; so that if there were no Law nor Magistrates, he would not∣withstanding still live in Obedience to Law and Ju∣stice. Therefore that excellent Expression of Me∣nander is thought praise-worthy, If you be Just, your Manners will be to you instead of Laws. And the Answer of Aristotle is remarkable when he was questioned, what Profit he had found and received from the study of Philosophy? To do, said he, of my own accord and without constraint, what others do for fear of the Laws. This obliged Horace to say, That we ought not to do any thing for fear of Punish∣ment. Nihil esse faciendum formidine poenae. From whence we may remark, that Corrections and Punish∣ments are not only ordained for the Wicked and Criminals, that they may perish and be extinct, but that by their Destruction, they may also terrify

and restrain others, as Seneca observes; and accord∣ing to Lactantius, who brings in Plato, saying, That a wise and prudent Man punishes not because 'tis a Crime, for he cannot make that which is already done to be undone, but that others may not commit the same Crimes. But let us hearken to Epicurus, discoursing of the great Advantages that there are in observing Justice.

That there is great Reason to live up to Justice.

JƲstice having been established by a common Agree∣ment, every one ought to think that he is born and admitted into the Society whereof he is a Member, upon this Condition, either express or understood, That he shall do wrong to no Man, nor no Man to him; and thus we must either keep to this Agreement, or depart out of the Society, seeing that he is suffered there but upon the same Condition that he was admitted: From whence it follows, that as naturally he don't desire to be evilly dealt withal, he ought not to deal ill with others, nor do to others what he would not that others should do to him.

This being granted, we may say, that the Laws have been established in favour, and for the sake of wise Men, not to hinder them from committing Injustice, but to prevent others from doing them wrong; for of their own accord they are so inclined, that if there were no Laws they would injure no body; for they have limited their Desires, and confined them to the necessities of Nature; to supply which there is no need of doing In∣justice, for there is no Pleasure Nature allows of which will cause us to wrong any body; for those exor∣bitances and irregular Desires which proceed from our vain and unruly Passions and Lusts, are the only Causes of Mischief.

The Truth is, the Products of the Earth, such as Corn, Fruits, Water, &c. are to be obtain'd without any great difficulty, and the enjoyment of these as of∣ten as Hunger and Thirst excite us, afford us no small Pleasure and Satisfaction, without being hereby tempted to Riot and Excess, or to commit Robberies or other enormous Crimes upon our Neighbours, which Men are more apt to become liable to and guilty of, when they indulge their extravagant Lusts in living splendidly and sumptuously, and by unjustly heaping up of Riches to maintain such their Extravagances. Nor shall I here stand to take notice of Particulars, such who are not satisfied with decent Habits, with one Habitation, nor one Wife, and so of the like, who passing the Bounds that Nature hath appointed, are daily hurried away by their Passions and endless Desires beyond all Limits.

Moreover, as the wise Man acts all things for him∣self, and for his own Good and Satisfaction, there is nothing that will contribute more to this purpose than in carefully observing the Rules of Justice; for when he renders unto every one what belongs to him, and that he does wrong to no Man; he preserves and supports as much as in him lies the Society in which his own Safety is involved; he provokes no body to do him Injury, nei∣ther doth he fear the Penalties and Punishments which the Publick Laws threaten: So that his Conscience be∣ing free from Guilt, he is at quiet and ease within him∣self, without any private Checks or Gripes, which is one main design of Justice to procure, and the most excel∣lent and greatest Advantage that we can reap from it.

But we must not fancy that he who hath secretly bro∣ken the Laws, unknown to Men, may enjoy as much Peace and quiet of Mind as he who is truly Just. For, as I have already said, tho' he hath acted in the dark, yet he cannot be assured that the Fact shall always re∣main concealed. Tho' Crimes may indeed be done se∣cretly,

yet this is no Security; neither doth it advan∣tage a Man who commits a wicked Deed, to conceal him∣self, for tho' he has had the good fortune of keeping the Fact conceal'd hitherto, yet he hath no Assurance that it shall always so continue.

Tho' a wicked Act may at present seem to be quite forgot, and as it were buried out of sight; yet it is uncertain whether it will remain so till death; few Wick∣ednesses are so secretly acted, but they give some cause of Suspicion; for tho' at first they are only privately whisper'd, yet soon after they are publickly talk'd of, and then Fame spreads them, and then a Process is begun and the Sentence suddainly follows: Nay, many there have been who have discovered themselves, either in a Dream or in a Frenzy, or in Drink, or by letting fall an unadvised Word by the by. So that tho' a wicked Man deceives (as we say) both the Gods and Men, yet he must always remain uneasie and in a fear that his Wickednesses will at one time or another be detected.

From hence it is, that tho' Injustice of it self, and in its own Nature, be no Evil, because what is Just here is reputed Ʋnjust elsewhere; nevertheless, 'tis an Evil because of that Fear that it stirs up in us, which cau∣seth a wicked Man to be continually tormented with re∣morse of Conscience; so that he is still suspicious of something, and apprehensive that his Wickednesses will come to the Knowledge of those who are appointed to pu∣nish them. Wherefore there is nothing more conducive to our Security and our living Happily, than to live ho∣nestly and observe inviolably those Contracts which we have entred into for the Preservation of the publick Peace.

Therefore a just Man seems to stand in Opposition to an unjust; for as the one is free from Troubles and Apprehensions of Evils, so the other on the contrary is continually allarm'd by 'em. What is it therefore that can be more convenient and profitable to us than Justice,

and more hurtful than Injustice? Can constant Trou∣bles and perplexing Fears be pleasant and diverting to any Man?

Since therefore that Justice is so great a Good, and Injustice so great an Evil, let us sincerely love and em∣brace the former, and altogether abominate the latter. And if by chance our Mind should happen to be some∣times in an even Balance and doubtful what to do, let us have always before our Eyes, and in our Thoughts the Example of some good Man whom we may propose to imitate, as a Pattern, and so live as if he were a constant Inspector of our Actions, and Privy to our most intimate Designs.

This Advice will be of use to us, not only to keep us from committing Injustice, but also from doing any thing in secret inconsistent with honest Dealing. This just Man that we plac'd before us, will serve to keep us in some awe, and make us more watchful over our Actions; we shall continually have some regard to him, and say to our selves, I would not do so if he saw it, and why should I dare to do so in his absence; he would blame me for it as a wicked thing, why should I not fly from Evil of my own accord? Do then every thing as if some body still look'd upon you; for if you have this Venera∣tion for any Person else, you will quickly have it for your self.

Cicero treats excellently upon this Subject: If every one, saith he, for his own particular Advantage, should be always ready and prepared to intrench upon his Neighbour's Right, and strip him of his Goods, we should quickly perceive the ruin of human Society, which is so agreeable to Nature, just as if each particu∣lar Member should fancy that by attracting the Blood and Spirits from its Member, it would be the better able to support it self; but hereby we should find our selves much disappointed; for certainly this would at length much weaken and decay the whole Body. And

thus all Societies and Communities of Men must needs be destroyed, if every one, the better to support his own Interest, should violently take from, and strip his Neigh∣bour of what is his.

Indeed, this may be said to be lawful, and no ways to infringe the Bonds of Society, viz. to be more careful and industrious in acquiring the things necessary and useful for the conveniency of Life; but to use Fraud or Vio∣lence, to dispossess another, and endeavour to enrich our selves by our Neighbours miseries, is more contrary to the Laws of Nature, even than Death it self, than Poverty, than Pain, than all the most dreadful things that may befal us.

There is nothing truly useful but what is Just and Honest, and nothing Just and Honest but what is tru∣ly useful; these are reciprocal, and whosoever endea∣vours to separate 'em offers at the most pernicious thing that can befal human Life; for from thence spring Murders, false Witnesses, Thieveries, and innumerable other Mischiefs. They judge of the usefulness of things by a wrong Medium, and tho' they escape the Penalties of the Laws which they break, yet they escape not the Disgrace and Infamy which, to a generous Mind, is far more grievous and intolerable. They consider not that of all other worldly Goods, the most important and considerable is the Reputation of an honest, of a just and of a good Man, and that there is no Profit or Ad∣vantage that can recompence this loss.

The Life of an unjust Man is full of Troubles, Jea∣lousies and Fears, Gripings of Conscience and Anxiety of Mind; and what Good, what Profit can there be in such a Way, that if he were depriv'd of it, he would be honoured and respected by all the World? 'Tis therefore impossible that true and real Profit should be separated from Justice, and that it should accompany or be join∣ed to Injustice. Now as Justice and Injustice are con∣trary, the first being free from Trouble, the other al∣ways

encompass'd with it, what greater Advantage can an honest and good Man desire to attain to than that which Justice affords him? And what greater Mischiefs can a wicked Man dread than that which Injustice is attended with? For what Profit or Satisfaction is to be had from Cares, Fears and perpetual Inquietudes?

Whether we may wrong any Man without doing him an injury.

AS 'tis one thing to do an unjust Act, another to do an injury, seeing that a Man may do an unjust Act, and not believe it, or perhaps fancy∣ing it to be Just: So it is most certain, that we can do no injury but when we have a design to do it, and so he who doth it hurts wilfully; that is to say, knowing to whom, in what manner, and how he injures. From whence it follows, that because 'tis one thing to suffer an unjust Act, or to receive Damage, and another to suffer an injury, a Man may willingly suffer an unjust Act but not suffer an injury. For that Reason Aristotle observes that we define a Man who doth an injury; He who hurts, knowing to whom, in what manner, and how he hurts; yet that is not sufficient, but we must add this particular, Against the Will of him whom he hurts. This being supposed in the first place, 'tis impossi∣ble that we should do injury to our selves, or that a Man should receive an injury from himself; for a Man may do a damage to himself and act against his own advantage, but not do an injury, because the same Person is both Agent and Patient, he acts and suffers willingly. But we must nevertheless re∣member what we have already said, and shall have occasion to mention again hereafter, That he who wishes Evil to himself, as he who desires his own

death or kills himself, wishes for it not as an Evil; he desires not death, as it is the destruction of Life, but as it is some Advantage; that is to say, as 'tis the end of the Evils from which he desires to be delivered, and so he looks upon it as a considerable Benefit. It is likewise certain, according to that kind of Maxim, Volenti non fit injuria, that no in∣jury can be done to him who consents and approves of it. For as we have already said, no man can suffer an injury but against his Will, because as the injury is in it self an Evil, it cannot be look'd up∣on as Good or the cause of any Good. 'Tis true, it may be a Crime in him who takes the Goods of another, though this other by mistake may seem to be consenting to it; as for Example, If he be frightned into a Consent under some pretence, if he be deluded into it by fair Promises, if he be flat∣ter'd into it by Craft, if he works upon his Weak∣ness or the easiness of his Temper, or if he con∣ceals from him the true Value of the thing, with∣out afterward informing him of his Error, and so of the rest; but as for him who knowingly and wil∣lingly gives away his Goods, consents that they may be taken; this Man cannot be judged to receive an injury, but a damage.

But since both doing and suffering injury is an Evil, if you inquire which of the two is the worst, Aristotle will readily resolve you, that it is in do∣ing an injury, for that cannot be done without In∣justice. Therefore Plato gives us this Advice, That we should be more careful to avoid doing an injury than suffering it. Besides, tho' he who receives any damage, tho' he receives it not against his Will, he who doth the mischief or wrong, if he designs to do an injury, is not in such a case excusable, be∣cause it was not for want of his Will that the da∣mage did not prove an injury. Seneca explains

this matter very well:

It may happen, saith he, that a Man may offer me an injury, and that I may not receive it; as if any one should put in∣to my House what he had taken out of my Farm, he had been guilty of a Theft, and yet I may have lost nothing thereby. If any one lies with his own Wife, and believes her to be the Wife of another, he is an Adulterer though the Woman be not. Some body hath given me Poison, but as it happens to be mixed with other Ingredients, it hath lost its Operation; he who hath administred the Poison is a Murderer, though no mischief is done by it. All designed Crimes are in respect of the Sin, done and effected before the act is accomplished.

CHAP. IX. Of the Virtues which accompany Justice, namely, of Religion, of Piety, of Observance, Love, Bounty, Liberality, Gratitude: And first of Religion.

THere are two main Causes or Reasons why God ought to be Worship'd and Ador'd; the First is the supreme excellency of his Nature; the Second his Bounty to us: First, they who stile him most Good and most Great, Optimum, Maximum, had doubtless these two Reasons in view, because as he is most Good, he is the most liberal and sovereign Benefactor; and as he is most Great, he is supremly Excellent. So that we may very well approve of Epicurus's Maxim, and say, That God ought to be Ho∣noured purely for himself without any further Expectati∣on, but only because of his supreme Majesty, and of his sovereign Nature; for that that is most Excellent de∣serves to be Reverenced and Honoured. But yet with him to acknowledge no other Cause, and notwith∣standing to disown his Bounty, is what cannot be too much blamed; for as Seneca tells him very well,

Thou dost not acknowledge the Favours and Bles∣sings of God, but supposest that as it were at a far Distance and out of the noise of the Affairs of the World, he enjoys a profound Rest and interrupt∣ed Felicity, without being concerned for the good Deeds of Men any more than for the evil. He who teacheth this Doctrin, does not consider the Sighs and ardent Desires of those who pray from all parts of the World, and with Hands lifted up

towards Heaven, make Vows either publick or private, which certainly would not easily be, nor is it easily to be suppos'd, that the generality of Mankind would of their own accord fall into such a stupid Madness, as to address themselves to deaf and senseless Divinities, to no purpose. They ought to have understood that the Gods sometimes deny and sometimes grant our Requests out of their bountiful Goodness; and that often they as∣sist us so powerfully and so seasonably, that they divert the great Mischiefs and Calamities that threatned us: Where is that Man so miserable, so forsaken and under such unhappy Circumstances, who hath not at some time experienced this great Bounty and Liberality of the Gods? If you look upon them who lament and grieve for their ill Fortune, and tire themselves in complaining, you will meet with none but Heaven hath bestowed upon him some Favours, some Drops of that large Fountain of Goodness have fallen upon him. Ay but, God, saith he, does us no Good. From whence then comes all those things that thou possessest, that thou bestowest, that thou refusest, that thou keep∣est, and that thou receivest? From whence pro∣ceed that vast number of grateful Objects that de∣light thine Eyes, thine Ears, and thy Mind? He hath not only provided things needful, his Love hath proceeded farther, to furnish us with things Pleasant and Delightful; with many pleasant Fruits, wholesome Herbs and nourishing Meats for Food, which succeed one another, according to their Seasons. The most careless ever and anon stumble upon some of 'em, without labour or toil. 'Tis God who hath created for us all the several sorts of Creatures, either upon the Earth or in the Waters, or in the Air, that all parts of the Creation might yield and pay to us a Tribute.

'Tis by his Appointment that Rivers, like Ser∣pents, do sometimes wind and turn about the fruitful Vallies, for the more easie Transportation of things necessary for our Life; and that others, by an unaccountable wonder, swell suddenly, but regularly, in the height of Summer to water the Grounds, which otherwise would be subject to be parch'd up by the scorching Beams of the Sun. What shall we say of all those Medicinal Springs, both Hot and Cold, which issue from out of the Bowels of the Earth; in such a manner, that the Hot seem sometimes to proceed from the very Bo∣som of Coldness it self?

If any Friend should bestow upon you some Parcel of Land, or a Sum of Mony, you would presently call this a liberal Act, and think your self oblig'd; And cannot you acknowledge that these vast extents of Earth, and all the Mines of Gold and Silver, are also Liberalities and good Deeds? O ungrateful Wretch! From whence comes to thee this Air that thou breathest in, this Light which serves to guide thee, this Blood which runs in thy Veins and contains the vital and animal Spirits, these exquisite Favours, and this Rest, without which thou would'st perish? If thou had'st the least sense of Gratitude, would'st thou not say, That 'tis God who is the Author of this thy Rest and Ease?

—Deus nobis haec otia fecit.

We have within us the Seeds of all Ages, and of all Arts, and God the Sovereign Lord, draws them out secretly, and produceth them as he plea∣seth. You'll pretend 'tis Nature that gives you all these things; alas, don't you perceive that this is only changing of Names, viz. that of God in∣to

that of Nature. For what can you imagin this Nature to be, if not God himself, and the di∣vine Understanding which is infused and spread over all the World and in every Part? You may give him what other Name you please, Jupiter most Good, Jupiter most Great, Thundering, Lightning, &c. You may if you please give him the Name of Destiny or Fortune, seeing that De∣stiny is nothing else but a Concatenation of Cau∣ses that succeed one another, and that God is the first cause upon which all the other depend. You get nothing thefore by saying, That you are not indebted to God for any thing, but to Nature, seeing that Nature cannot be without God, nor God without Nature, and that God and Nature are the same thing, the very same Being; for these different Names are only different Titles of the same God, who exerts his Power after several manners.

But here let us leave Epicurus, and withal let us suppose the Existence of God, his Providence, and all his Attributes, which are the Foundation of the highest Acts of religious Worship; here it seems to be proper and seasonable to demonstrate, that the Holy Religion that we profess, is the only true and lawful Religion. But as this is a particular Subject which ought to be handled solidly and to the purpose, we shall leave it to the Divines, who are best able to manage it in its due Circumstances, suitable to the Dignity that it requires. It shall suffice here to mention only what the Light of Nature discovers:

God, saith Lactantius, hath made the Nature of Man to be such, that he hath an Inclination and a Love for two things, which are, Religion and Wisdom. But Men are deceiv'd, either because they embrace Religion, leaving Wisdom, or be∣cause they study Wisdom alone and leave Religion.

Whereas the one cannot be true without the o∣ther. They follow divers Religions, but which are false, because they have forsaken Wisdom, which might direct and teach them, that 'tis im∣possible that there should be many Gods; or they apply themselves to Wisdom, which is false and mistaken, because they have left the Religion of the Sovereign God, which would have instructed 'em in true Wisdom. Thus they who embrace one or t'other simply, err from the right way and run on in that which is full of grievous Errors, because the Duty of Man, and all Truth is inse∣parably shut up in these two Heads.

After that Lactantius hath thus explained himself, and after∣wards taught in what manner, and with what Sa∣crifices we must honour God; he continues to tell us,

This Holy and Sovereign Majesty requires from Man nothing else but Innocency; he who who presents it to God, offers a Sacrifice Pious and Religious enough.

And after he hath disap∣proved of divers superstitious Ceremonies, he adds,

The Celestial Religion consists not in things cor∣ruptible, but in the Virtues of the Mind, which proceed from Heaven. The true Worship is that in which a clean Soul, without blemish, offers it self in Sacrifice; whosoever is obedient to his hea∣venly Precepts, he honours God truly, whose Sa∣crifices are Meekness, Innocency and good Works: And as often as he does good and pious Acts, so often does he perform his Sacrifices to God; for God requires no Offerings of Beasts, their Death and Blood, but he will have the Heart and Life of Man for an Offering. This Sacrifice is to be performed without Herbs, without the Fat and Sinews of Beasts; vain and foolish things; but with Expressions that proceed from a sincere Heart. God's Altar is not to be adorn'd with

Man's Blood, but the Heart of Man is to be a∣dorned with Justice, Patience, Faith, Innocency, Chastity and Abstinence. This is the true Wor∣ship, this is the Law of God, as Cicero hath said, that excellent and divine Law which never Com∣mands any thing but Just and Honest, and Prohi∣bits what-ever is Wicked and Dishonest. The chief Worship of God is the Praise that is offered to him by the Mouth of a just Man; but that this Praise may be pleasing to him, it ought to be accompanied with Humility, with Fear and with a great Devotion, lest Man should rely upon his own Integrity and Innocency, and fall by that means into Vain-glory and Pride, and so lose the Reward of Virtue. If he will be favoured of God, he must have a Conscience clear from all Guilt, he must implore continually his Mercy, and must ask of him nothing but the pardon of his Sins. If any Good befals him, let him return God thanks; if any Evil, let him bear it patiently, acknow∣ledging that it happens because of his Sins. In Calamities let him not fail to be thankful, and in Prosperity humble and contented; that so he may have always the same settled and unshaken Mind. Neither is it sufficient to perform this in the Church, let him remember to do it in his House, in his Chamber, in his most secret Retirements. By this means he will always have God consecrat∣ed in his Heart, for he himself is the Temple of God. If in this manner he serves God, his Fa∣ther and Sovereign Lord constantly and devoutly, he will attain to an entire and compleat Perfe∣ction of Justice, for he who remains unshaken in Justice, hath obeyed God and followed the Rules of Religion and fulfilled his Duty.

Cicero also discourses admirably upon this subject, thus,

Right Reason doubtless is a true Law agree∣able

with Nature, and bestowed upon all Men; a constant, immutable, eternal Guide, inclining us by an inward impulse to our Duty, and by se∣cret Prohibitions turns us out of the way of that which is evil and deceitful. 'Tis a Law that needs not be proclaimed, nothing can be retrench'd from it, nor can it be abolished. Neither the Se∣nate nor the People can free us from our Obedi∣ence to this Law, nor need we any other Inter∣preter but our selves: It varies not at Rome from that at Athens, nor does it differ at present from that which shall be hereafter, but shall always be constantly and unchangably the same amongst all Nations and in all Times, and God alone shall be the common Lord and chief Commander of all Men: He is the Contriver and Maker of this Law, the Interpreter and Law-giver. He who will not be obedient to this Law, must act against him∣self, and despise the Nature of Man; and tho' he may escape outward Punishments, yet shall be grievously tormented inwardly.

Seneca speaks no less excellently well,

There is, saith he, something greater which we cannot con∣ceive. There is a Divinity that we acknowledge by our living; let us obey his Will and Command∣ments. A secret and reserv'd Conscience is of no use, all things are open before God. Will you, saith he afterwards, represent to your selves God great, as he is full of Majesty, and withal kind, tender and affectionate, and always ready to suc∣cour you? 'Tis not with the bloody Sacrifices of Beasts, and with the abundance of Blood that you must honour him, for what pleasure can there be in cutting the Throats of innocent Creatures? but by a pure Conscience, which hath always a respect to what is Good and Honest. The Sacrifice that every one performs in his Heart, is more accep∣table

to him than all these glorious Temples and large Edifices of Stones heaped one upon another.

After this manner he speaks in another place;

The first Worship of the Gods is to believe that they are, and that they have one Existence. We must next acknowledge their Sovereign Majesty, and ascribe unto them the Attribute of Goodness, without which there would be no Majesty: We must believe that they Govern the World, that by their Power they rule and dispose of all things; take care of Human Race; insomuch, that some∣times they concern themselves with the Affairs of particular Persons: That they do no Evil; that they have no Evil in them, but that they chastise and punish Mankind under an appearance of Good. Would you have the Gods propitious to you? study to be good: He honours them suffi∣ciently who imitates them.

As for what concerns Prayers, Seneca truly is not of the number of those who believe that we ought not to pray to God: But he will have us pray to him in such a manner, as if all the World heard what we said, and that no body but would approve of our Prayers;

Know, saith he, that you shall be free from all vain and idle Desires. When you shall come about this, ask nothing of God but what you may ask before all the World: This is what you ought to pray for, that he would bestow upon you the Health of the Mind with that of the Body.

To what does not the Fury and Folly of Men proceed! They secretly offer up to God such fil∣thy and corrupt Prayers, that if they should per∣ceive any to listen to, or understand 'em, they would stop and be silent, filled with Shame and Confusion. They have the impudence to ask of God, what they are asham'd that Men should know. Follow therefore this wholsome Advice,

Live with Men as if God saw you, and speak unto God as if Men understood you.

'Tis sufficiently known how Satyrically the Poets have expressed themselves against these Whisperers and secret De∣sirers of others harms.

In private thus he Prays,—When wilt thou Jove, My wealthy Ʋncle from this World remove? Or—O thou Thunderer's Son, great Hercules, That once thy bounteous Deity would please To guide my Rake upon that chinking Sound, Of some vast Treasure, hidden under Ground! O were my Pupil fairly knock'd 'oth' Head! I shou'd possess th' Estate if he were Dead.

The famous Satyrist of our time could not but mention them in that learned Epistle which he di∣rects to his spiritual Friend, Monsieur Guilleragues.

Que si cet hyver, un rhume salutaire, Guerissant de tans maux mon avare Beaupere, &c.

O would some Rhume from these kind Winter Rains, Cure my good Father-in-Law of all his Pains; Wrap him in Lead well shriev'd and full of Prayers, And grace the Miser's House with welcome Tears! How gladly my last Gifts would I bestow, Nor grudge the Charges of the pompous Wo! This some Months since was all the Talk and Care, Of the King's Farmer's honest, humble Heir; Who plagu'd with Hunger and unkind delay, Spent Forty wretched Years in hastning one good Day.

As concerning these unworthy and ridiculous Pray∣ers, the Answer that Socrates made when some in∣quired why the Oracle was more favourable to the Lacedemonians than to the Athenians, is not to be

omitted.

Because, said he, the Prayers of the Lace∣demonians are more pleasing to the Oracle than those of the Athenians; and they are more pleasing, be∣cause they desire nothing else from the Gods, nei∣ther in publick nor private, but that they would grant them what is Good, Honest and Just.

Last∣ly, 'tis well known what Epicurus said to this pur∣pose,

That If God granted all the Prayers that were made to him, Mankind would quickly Pe∣rish, because they are continually asking Things which are useful to some, but pernicious to others.

As for Superstition, Cicero adviseth us to distin∣guish it from true Religion.

For we must not, saith he, imagine that by taking away Superstiti∣on we take away Religion. It belongs to a wise Man to keep to the Institutions, to the Mysteries and Ceremonies of his Ancestors, and to acknow∣ledge this excellent, everlasting and wonderful Nature, which the beautiful Fabrick of the World, and the order and regulation of celestial Things force us to own. Therefore as we ought to en∣deavour to increase Religion, which is unseparable from the knowledge of Nature; so ought we to root out Superstition, and to cast away all its Re∣licks, for it followeth and pursues us every where, and to what side soever you turn, you will always meet with it; whether you hearken to a Diviner, or to a Discoverer of Things to come, or whether you sacrifice a Beast, or whether you observe the flying of a Bird, or whether you look upon a For∣tuneteller, a Chaldean, or those who Prophesy by the inspection of the Intrails of Animals, or whe∣ther it Lightens or Thunders, or the Thunderbolt falls from Heaven, or whether some Monstrous Creature is born, or whether some thing hath been done, or happned, which commonly and ne∣cessarily ought to come to pass. So that we can

never have our Mind well at Rest. Our very Sleep the usual retreat of all the Labours of the Mind, by its extravagant Visions and Dreams Frights us with terrible Apprehensions and Inquietudes.

What we have now mentioned of Superstition, minds me of a Scruple of some of the Antients, who blamed the old Philosophers of their time, who countenanced the superstitious Ceremonies of Reli∣gion, tho in their Heart and Mind they did not ap∣prove of them, which practice of theirs seems to be contrary to the sincerity and uprightness of the Pro∣fession of a Philosopher.

'Tis true, saith our Author, speaking of Epicurus, and endeavouring in some respect to excuse him upon that Account, That Sincerity in Actions as well as in Words is commendable; but what shall we say if we consider a Man out of the true Religion, in which we ought to have a perfect Conformity in Thoughts, Words and Deeds? At that time it seems to be the Duty of Wisdom and of Philosophy not to think as the common People, but yet to speak and act as they do.

Epicurus was present at the super∣stitious Ceremonies, because the civil Right and the publick Tranquility oblig'd him to it. He approved not of them, because there is nothing that can con∣strain the Mind of a wise Man to believe whatever the Vulgar believes. Inwardly he was free, but out∣wardly bound to the Laws of humane Society. By this means he acquitted himself at the same time of that Duty he owed to others, and of that which he owed to himself.

Of Piety.

WE must next speak of Piety, which relates to our Parents, as Religion relates to the worship of God: For as God is said to be the Father of all Things, because he hath made all Things, so Children ought to consider their Parents as the In∣struments of God to bring them into the World. And truly next to that Obligation that we owe to God, there can be none greater, or of more force, than that which unites us to our Parents: As to other Persons, we may be indebted to them for some sorts of Benefits, but to our Fathers and Mo∣thers we are indebted for our selves, and for what we are. And if it be so agreeable with Nature to love our selves, how agreeable ought it to be with the same Nature to love those by whom we, who thus love our selves, subsist, and from whom we have received that which we love, namely our selves? If it be suitable to the Rules of Nature to love those who love us, can there be a more fervent Love than that of Parents to their Children? And can pro∣voked Nature consequently produce a more abomi∣nable Monster, than a Son who loveth not his Fa∣ther or Mother, or is ungrateful to 'em? Truly, if such there be, what quiet of Conscience can they en∣joy? Nay they must certainly be very uneasy and tor∣ment themselves Day and Night for such a Crime. Whereas on the contrary, how much Satisfaction doth a dutiful and affectionate Child enjoy, who from his Heart sincerely Honours his Father and Mother, and is not transported with any thing so much as to shew to them his Gratitude, by all man∣ner of good Deeds, either by expressing to them his Respect, or by evidencing to them his Love,

and who enjoys no greater Content, than to give them some Satisfaction, and principally in this, to be glad of having begotten such a Son. O how De∣lightful and valuable was the Burthen of him, who in a publick Conflagration, despising all other Things in comparison of his Father's Life, carried him away safe and unhurt upon his Shoulders through all the Flames and Darts of the Enemy!

For Him a thousand Dangers have I sought, And rushing where the thickest Grecians fought, Safe on my Back the sacred Burthen brought.

Which the Poets have related of Aeneas. And Elian tells us of two Brothers of Catania, who in the furious Burning of Mount Aetna, saved their Fa∣ther from the scorching Flames, which casually, or by a divine Appointment, open'd a way, as they say, to let them pass through. 'Tis with great rea∣son that Solon judged Cleobis and Biton happy, not only because of the happy end of their Life, but chiefly because of that great Joy, that they felt when for want of Oxen they freely Yoak'd them∣selves, and drew the Chariot where their Mother was sitting.

I cannot but make here a little Digression, and wish with Martinus (who hath left us a rare and excellent History of the Kings of China) that the Piety of Christians to their Fathers and Mothers, were equal to that of the idolatrous Chineses to theirs.

This Piety, saith he, is yet observed among the Chineses with an incredible Respect, and most won∣derful Expressions of Grief. Three Years com∣pleat Children lament the Death of their Fathers. They first begin by retiring from those publick Employments which at other times they follow; they never go out of their Dwellings; they change

their Apartments, their Food and Furniture, to make use of some plainer; they never sit but upon some low Form; they drink no Wine, nor eat any delicious Meats, but confine themselves to feed upon certain Herbs; their Cloathing is very course, of some thin Linnen Cloath of a white Colour, (for that is the Colour they mourn in) their Bed is ve∣ry uneasy; nay they change their very Tone and manner of Speaking, the better expressing thereby their Grief and Affliction. He who thus Mourns takes no other name but wretched and ungrateful Son, as if he had neglected by his good Offices and Care to prolong the Life of his dear Father, or as if he had hasten'd his Departure by his negligent and undutiful Behaviour. If he writes 'tis only upon Yellew or Blew Paper, both which among them are Colours betokening Sadness. But this we cannot too much commend, that this wonderful Piety of the Chineses appears not only in their Mourning thus after the Decease of their Pa∣rents, but also in the Reverence, Obedience and good Deeds which they perform to them during their Lives. Insomuch that many seeing them de∣crepit with old Age, leave all to afford them their personal assistance; they resign their Employments to the Emperor; who seldom refuseth to accept of 'em, and grant them this Favour, for they know that in such a Piety there is nothing of Ambition, Pride or vain Glory.

But this by the by: Let us now return to our Author, and to the indispen∣sable Duties of Children to their Parents.

The First is to have not only a great esteem for them, and to look upon them as the Authors or Instruments of their Being, and supplying God's stead in relation to them; but also to shew that Esteem and inward Veneration which they have for them by outward signs of Honour and Respect, and

evidence to all the World that they really respect them, and consider them as infinitely above them. 'Tis in this manner that pious Cimon behaved him∣self, who, when he had not wherewithal to obtain leave to bury his Father, sold himself, purchasing that Liberty with the loss of his own.

The Second Duty is to comply with their Wills and be obedient to their Commands, for that is the chief part of the Respect and Reverence that we owe them; and on the contrary, to be Disobedient is a sign of Disrespect and Contempt. I confess, we are not bound to obey them when they command any thing against God, against the welfare of our Country, and contrary to Right and Justice; but 'tis very seldom that Fathers or Mothers lay any such Commands on their Children: Nor ought a Child rashly and inconsiderately to make an uncha∣ritable Construction of his Father's Commands; but if for plain and convincing Reasons he finds himself forced to disobey him, this ought to be done with such respect and Deference as becomes him. From hence it follows that Children should undertake no∣thing of moment against their Wills, but in all Mat∣ters of the greatest Concern, such as Matrimony, &c. they should be directed by 'em; for as it is supposed they best understand, so likewise they most desire their Childrens Welfare and Happiness. We must also conclude from hence, that if there be any thing in the Behaviour of Parents to their Children that savours of Austerity or hard Usage, they ought to undergo it patiently, and to be so far from aggra∣vating or complaining of it, as not to endure their Names to be reproached or ill spoken of by others.

The Third Duty is, to help them in all their Ne∣cessities, and to remember the Cares, Pains and Trouble which we gave them in our Infancy, and in the following course of our Life, and not to for∣get

that excellent Sentence of Aristotle, That there is more Honour and greatness of Mind to think upon the Authors of our Being, than upon our selves; and that we are bound to Honour them, as we do the immortal Gods. Let us remember the Divine Commandment, which promiseth a long and happy Life to Children who shall Honour their Fathers and Mothers. Ho∣nora Patrem & Matrem si vis esse longaevus super ter∣ram: Which we may call a Commandment, and a moral Precept proper to all Ages.

Senes Parentes nutriens diu vives.

'Tis not improper here to mention a Word of that Piety and Love we owe to our Country, which doubtless ought to be yet dearer to us than our Pa∣rents themselves: We cannot excuse our selves from speaking of it, and the rather, because we have al∣ready taken notice, that it is even lawful to accuse our Parents themselves, where they have been found guilty of betraying our Country, or endeavouring to invade it and become Conquerours of it; when all our Prayers and Intreaties to desist from such a wicked Purpose prove ineffectual, and we cannot persuade them to right Reason. 'Tis not without just Cause doubtless that we have mentioned and maintain this Opinion, for as the Love that we bear for our Country is named Piety, because our Coun∣try is as the common Mother that brings us forth, nourisheth and maintains us, 'tis plain that our Coun∣try, which is as the Parent of our Fathers and Mo∣thers, of all our Relations and Friends, ought to be dearer to us than all the rest. 'Tis what Cicero proves very well;

Can there be any Parentage nearer to us than our Country, in which all Pa∣rents are comprehended? If our Fathers, our Mo∣thers, our Children, our Relations and Friends

are dear to us, how much more should our Coun∣try be dearer, which contains them all? Is there any honest Man that ought not to venture his Life for his Country, if he can render to it thereby any Service? Is there any Evil more abominable than to destroy it, or to endeavour to ruin it, as some have attempted to do?

Of Observance, or Respect.

THE Third Virtue that belongs to Justice, is that which Cicero calls Observance, by which we are inclined to reverence and respect those who are raised above us in Dignity, exceed us in Age, or excel us in Wisdom. For as Dignity or Bene∣ficence are the occasion of Reverence and Honour, and that those who are promoted to Dignities are deemed worthy, and seem as it were born and de∣signed for the publick Good, either by governing or conducting the People, or by composing their Differences and Sutes, or by defending them from the Enemy, or by procuring the publick Safety or Plenty; by this 'tis certain that we ought to Honour and Respect them, and the rather, because if this were not performed, there would be no body to take upon 'em the necessary Cares and Troubles of managing the publick Concerns, which would be at length the cause of confusion and disorder, which in this case by paying a due deference and respect, may in a great measure be prevented.

'Tis unquestionable also that old Age is of it self Venerable, because it hath the experience of Things, and consequently hath that Prudence, that it is able to advise young People, and direct 'em for their good. Young Folk, saith Sopater in Stobaeus, ought to Honour them who are their Elders, make choice of the

honestest and most experienced, follow their Counsel and rely upon their Authority. 'Tis for this Cause that the great Captain of the Greeks had always a greater re∣spect for Nestor than for the rest, and rather wish∣ed to find out Ten like Nestor than like Ajax. But old Age will be so much the more worthy of Ho∣nour and Veneration, when it shall not only be adorn'd with gray Hairs, but with Wisdom and Prudence; when it is able to afford good Advice, and that it is become commendable by its Virtues, and by its good Deeds.

Lastly, It is manifest that we ought to have Re∣spect and Veneration for those who are Wise or Virtuous, seeing that Wisdom or Virtue is the true and solid Foundation of all Honour that is render∣ed. Indeed Virtue alone, as they say, is its own sufficient Reward: But tho those who are Virtuous seek not to draw from thence Honour and Respect, yet they who know them to be such, are obliged to pay this Deference to 'em, otherwise they would not do Right and Justice to their Merits, and give a due estimate to that which of all Things in the World is the most valuable, Potior est illa Argento Auro{que} purissimo. This the wise Man ascribes to Vir∣tue; 'tis of more worth than Gold and the finest Silver; 'tis more precious than all the Pearls and Jew∣els; yea, than all that is desirable: There is nothing to be compared with it.

Of Friendship.

WE cannot but say something of Friendship, unto which such are obliged who are reci∣procally beloved. Of all the things, saith Cicero, ac∣cording to Epicurus, which tend toward the making our Lives happy, there is nothing more considerable and advantageous than Friendship: For indeed there is nothing in the Life of a wise Man more pleasing, than when, like a Philosopher, he may say to a Friend, of whose Sincerity he is fully persuaded, as Cicero in another case spoke one day to his Bro∣ther Quintius, We are alone; we may without Envy go on in pursuit of Truth: Or that which Lelius relates of the Friendship he enjoy'd with Scipio, Of all the things that Fortune or Nature hath bestowed upon me, I have nothing that I can compare with the Friendship of Scipio; we can freely unbosom to each other our most intimate Thoughts and secret Designs: I never offended him, that I know, in the least, neither did I ever hear him speak any thing to displease me; we lived un∣der the same Roof, we eat and drank together, and we enjoyed all the Sweets and Pleasures of Life: For what shall I say of that common Passion of always desiring to know and understand things? What shall I say of those retir'd Studies, where, at a distance from the troublesom Crowd, we spent many pleasant Hours in search after Truth? If the remembrance of all our Discoveries and Discourses had perish'd with him, I could not easily undergo the loss of so dear a Friend; but these things are so far from being dead, that on the contrary they revive and daily increase in my Mind.

Epicurus speaks excellently well to this Point, and I think none goes beyond him:

Friendship, saith he, is a very great Support, a secure Bul∣wark against Injuries and Affronts, and is that which gives the greatest Pleasure and Satisfaction of our Life; for as Hatred, Envy and Contempt are very Offensive, and interrupt the course of our Pleasures, so Friendship raises the Pleasures of Life, and causes us every day to find something new and pleasing. Indeed, Solitariness, or one who lives without Friends, is subject and exposed to a great many private and unforeseen Dangers, and is never free from Fears: Reason it self ad∣viseth us to procure such Friends as may settle our Mind, confirm our Hopes, banish from us all Fear, and establish in us Joy and Quiet.

And because some pretend that Friendships are contracted for the Advantages that we receive from them, as we usually sow the Ground in hopes of a Crop or Harvest; he therefore thus proceeds,

'Tis true, that the first beginnings of Friendships are made in consideration of the Advantage and Benefit that are expected from them; but after a long setled Acquaintance and Familiarity, there is nothing but Love that prompts us on; so that tho' there be no farther Advantage, Friends nevertheless still love one another for their own sakes. In truth, if we love and affect certain Pla∣ces, Temples, Towers, Colleges, a Country-House, Dogs, Horses, &c. For having been long acquainted with or accustomed to these things, how much more will this Use and Costom work upon us and prevail with us in relation to Man∣kind?

But, saith he, we ought to make a discreet and wise Choice of Friends; for according to the Proverb, We ought to take more care with

whom, than what we Eat: And tho' eating and filling our Paunch alone, is, if I may so say, to live like a Lion or a Wolf, or some other Beast of Prey; nevertheless, we ought not to yield or admit of the next that comes, but we ought to chuse such a Friend whose Discourse and Conver∣sation is pleasing; one, who esteems nothing more than Sincerity, Integrity and Fidelity; who is not of a morose and uneasie Temper, always full of Complaints, but such a one whose sweetness and easiness of Conversation, whose pleasant and agreeable Temper of Mind hightens our Expecta∣tions, and adds to the Pleasures of our Life.

Now tho' Friendship consists in a mutual Parti∣cipation of Pleasure, and of such Goods which we are permitted to enjoy while we live; neverthe∣less, it is requisite that the Riches of Friends should be deposited in Common, as he imagin'd who said,

That all the Goods of Friends are Common, be∣cause that excludes all Jealousie; for such as are Jealous can never be Friends; they ought there∣fore to have a confidence in each other, so that either may take what his Occasions require, being persuaded that what they have thus in Common, is not less theirs than if they were each in Posses∣sion of the whole.

I confess, that mean Souls are apt to wonder at this; but we must not trouble our selves with such, for there is neither Assurance nor Constan∣cy in the Friendship of this sort of People; they are not at all capable of these things, nor of any part of Wisdom which deserves Praise; they un∣derstand not what is useful either to themselves, in particular, or to the generality of Mankind; they cannot well distinguish between good and evil Actions: We here therefore speak only of wise and honest Men, among whom there is a

kind of an Agreement to love their Friends, no less than they themselves, which we know to be feasable and practicable in the course of our lives. So that it is plain, that if we intend to live plea∣santly, there is nothing more conducible to to it than this Union: We are therefore to conclude from hence, that not only Reason is not contra∣ry to Friendship, if we place the sovereign and chief Happiness in Pleasure, but that without Friendship it self this chief Happiness is not to be attained.

The reason of this is, that without Friendship we cannot at all times keep up a constant plea∣santness of Life, nor preserve Friendship if we love not our Friends as much as our selves: Friendship indeed is inseparable from Pleasure, and we rejoyce at the Welfare of our Friends as much as at our own, and are as much grieved at their Afflictions.

Therefore the wise Man will treat his Friend after the same manner as he would himself, and the Labours that he would undergo for his own Pleasure, he will undertake for the Pleasure of his Friend. And as when he is sick, he would be glad to have some body present to help him, and when in Prison or under Poverty, to have some good body to relieve and assist him; so he will re∣joyce when he hath some body that he may afford help to when sick, and relieve when cast into Pri∣son, or become indigent: Nay, he will go be∣yond all this, for he will be ready to endure very great Extremities, and perhaps Death it self, if occasion should require it.

And here we must observe, that 'tis not with∣out reason that Aristotle will have Friendship re∣late to Justice; for Friendship is a kind of Equality; for where there is a true Love and Friendship, can

there be a greater Equality, seeing that the Affe∣ctions of Friends are alike amongst themselves; and that Friendship, as Cicero saith, is a participa∣tion or Community of all things, of Counsels, Studies, Opinions, Wills, &c. 'Tis true, there are some Friendships, where one of the Friends may be of a higher Rank and Degree than the other; but either these are not true Friendships, or if they be, he who is above the other in Power and Dignity, will out of a generous and virtuous instinct humble himself to make some Equality. Scipio, in our time, saith Lelius, how high soever he was in Power and Authority, and exalted in Dignity, would never presume upon that account to take place above Philus, Raphilus, Mummius, and other his Friends of a meaner Degree. But as Aristotle ob∣serves, It is a rare thing to find such kind of Souls. Nevertheless, saith Cicero, we are to consider that as Superiors among real Friends ought to equalize themselves with their Inferiours; so Inferiours ought not to be troubled or concern'd that they are exceeded in Riches, Fortune, Wisdom or Dig∣nity by their Friends; I say, where there is a real Friendship; for there are certain false and deceit∣ful Friendships, or as Aristotle says, such as cannot properly be termed Friendships, but rather resem∣blances or likenesses of Friendship: For true Friend∣ship depends not upon a sordid Gain, or upon fil∣thy and dishonest Pleasures, but is grounded upon Justice and Virtue.

We must likewise observe, that Friendship be∣ing only truly found among virtuous Men, 'tis not without reason that Aristotle does hence infer, that the firmness and constancy of Friendship does con∣sist in this, That they never act nor desire any thing that may be prejudicial or inconvenient to each other, but on the contrary they prohibit and op∣pose

it; for it is the part of a truly honest and good Man not only to do no ill himself, but also not to suffer his Friend to do any. Let the first Rule of Friendship, saith Cicero, be to require nothing base nor dishonest from his Friend, and likewise never to perform any such thing if his Friend require it. The Second, To do for a Friend all that honesty can require, and not to stay till he be desired and intreated. The Third, That there be no Hypocrisie nor Dissimulation between Friends, because there is more ingenuity in an open hatred than in a feigned Friendship. The Fourth, That we should not only slight and reject all evil Reports of our Friends as false and malicious, but also should not fo much as entertain the least Suspicion of their being guilty of so much baseness and unworthiness. The Fifth is, That there be a moderation and sweetness of Temper among Friends, which does very much promote and encourage Friendship; and let all Sadness and Se∣verity be totally banished, The Sixth, That we take heed that there be not too much reservedness in our Friendship, for that is apt to hinder that freedom and pleasantness which is, as it were, the chief Tie. The Last is, That Friends may sometimes reprove one ano∣ther, and mutually bear with each others Reproof, be∣cause this proceeds only from a fervency of Affection. Nevertheless, we must take notice of what Cicero remarks upon this Saying of Terence,

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

That Complacency begets Friends, but Truth be∣gets Enemies.

Truth, saith he, is uneasie and displeasing; for from hence ariseth Hatred, which is the Poison of Friendship; but yet such Com∣placency, as by winking at his Friend's Faults, suffers him to fall into a Pit, is much more intollerable. Therefore in this case it behoves

us to behave our selves with a great deal of Can∣dour and Circumspection, and take care that our Advice be moderate and discreet, and that our Reproof be not too sharp and cholerick. As to what concerns Complacency in Friendship, there ought to be a goodness and sweetness of Temper, but no Flattery, which nourishes and encourages Vice; for we must not treat or deal with a Friend as with a Tyrant. But there is no longer any Hopes of him whose Ears are stop'd to Truth, when it proceeds from a true Friend.

Why might not we here make use of the Counsel that a famous Author among the Persians thought of great moment to preserve Friendship?

We are commonly, saith this Author, unjust to our Friends; we usually desire from a Friend more than, according to the Laws of Human Nature, we ought; we will have him in all things, at all times, and on all occasions, that he should be what we our selves are not; that he should be firm and faithful, and never alter in the least▪ as if we were not all naturally moulded up with Weak∣nesses and Imperfections, and equally subject to changes. There is no Diamond, saith he, with∣out its Flaws, and there is no Man but hath his Infirmities: Let us be indulgent and favourable to our Friends; in a word, let us purchase a Friend with all his Failings.

However, let us not here omit a Question which hath been much controvert∣ed among the Ancients.

The Philosophers have made it a doubt, whether in favour of a Friend, we may not sometimes for∣sake or recede from Right and Justice, and in what Cases, in what Circumstances, and how far? Cicero in his Offices, saith,

That if a mischance should happen, whereby we should be oblig'd to yield Assistance to the unjust Desires of a Friend, we

may in such a Case swerve from the Rules of Right, where a great Shame or Loss is like to ensue upon it; and this the Laws of Friendship ought to pardon.

But Agellius is of Opinion, that Cicero passeth over this Matter too hastily, and that Pericles speaks more fully and to the purpose; Who, when he was desired by a Friend to take a false Oath for his sake; he answered him, That he ought to serve his Friend as far as the Gods, or, as we say, as far as the Altars. Opitulari me Amicos oportet, sed ad usque Deos, sed usque ad Aras. He adds, that Theophrastus speaks plainer,

That we may in∣cur a high Shame or Infamy if any great Advan∣tage will thereby accrue to a Friend, because the inconsiderable Loss of the wronged Justice is recompenced by a greater and a more important Act of Justice, which is to give Assistance to a Friend. That when the Advantage of a Friend, and our Honesty and Justice stand upon a Level, in such and the like Cases, doubtless, Honesty and Justice ought to be preferr'd; but if the Ad∣vantage of a Friend be very great, and that which concerns our Honesty, be about a thing of small importance, that which is useful and advantageous to a Friend ought then to incline us.

There is another Question that is commonly pro∣posed, which Agellius saith is somewhat difficult. If new Friends, which are otherwise worthy of our Friendship, are sometimes to be preferr'd to our ancient Friends, as we prefer usually a young Horse before an old? Agellius answers in a word, That 'tis a scruple or a question unworthy of an honest Man. That we are not to be tired with Friendship as with other Things; for 'tis with Friendship as with Wine, the older the better: And tho' Novelties give fair Hopes of some Advantages, yet we ought not to slight our old Friends, but still respect 'em.

Of Beneficence and Liberality.

BEneficence is usually and generally taken for tha•• goodness of Nature which is employed in gi∣ving assistance to others, either by our Care, or by our particular good Offices, or by our Estate and Wealth; whereas Liberality is understood in a stricter Sense, and more especially for that which consists in bestowing particular Gifts of Goods and Mony. We have already seen before, that Aristotle understands Liberality in that Sense, and Cicero seems also to restrain it commonly to the free and liberal Gifts of Mony and Riches; but nevertheless he sometimes joins Beneficence and Liberality together, so that he takes them for one and the same thing, But, saith he, he who hath a double intent of assisting the Necessitous, either by good Offices or by Mony; the latter, saith he, is the easier for such as are Rich, but the first is more commendable, more glorious and worthy of a generous Mind. For tho in both there is a free and liberal Disposition to gratify or do good, neverthe∣less there is this difference, that the one is taken out of the Coffer, and the other proceeds from Virtue; that the Gifts that are made out of a private Estate, drains the very source or Fountain of Beneficence, so that the oftner we practise it, the less we are capable of continuing it. Whereas such as are liberal of their Cares, and do Ser∣vice by their Virtues and by their Industry, the more they bestow upon others, the more they have still in Stock. Besides, by often giving they get an Habit, and are more ready and prepared to oblige all the World.

Now Aristotle is of Opinion, That there is nothing to hinder us from taking Liberality to be a Medium between Covetousness and Prodigality, tho he sup∣poses Covetousness to be much more contrary to

Liberality than Prodigality. Therefore he Esteems a prodigal Person to be little better than a Cove∣tous one, not only because the Prodigal does good to many, and the Covetous to none, no, not to himself; but because the Prodigal may be easily persuaded to Reason, either by Age or Time that may cor∣rect him, or the necessity unto which he may be reduced may constrain him, whereas the Covetous is so far from being cured by Time, that with his Years his Distemper increases; like a Dropsy, which instead of extinguishing his Thirst, increaseth it. So that 'tis not without cause that Aristotle saith, That a covetous Man is Sordid, Base, &c. Parcus, Te∣nax, Sordidus, Turpis, Lucri Cupidus, Parvas impensas faciens, Deceptor, Depilator.

I shall not concern my self about what Aristotle holds, That the property of Virtue is rather to do good than to receive, and generally to do Things just and honest, than to avoid the doing Things vile and dishonest. I shall only take notice of the three Cau∣tions or Conditions which Cicero requires in Benefi∣cence and Liberality. The First is, That our Bene∣ficence be neither hurtful to those whom we seem to gratify, nor to any other: For to do a Pleasure which may be prejudicial to the Party, this belongs not to the part of a Man who really designs to do good, but rather of a dangerous Flatterer. And to hurt some to gratify others, which very often hap∣pens, that is as unjust as if you took another Man's Goods to appropriate them to your self. The Se∣cond is, That our Beneficence must not exceed our Abilities; for otherwise the Fountain of our Good∣ness may be soon exhausted; an Injury may be done to our Parents, whom we are rather bound by Ju∣stice to assist, or to whom we have a greater rea∣son to leave our Goods; and often Men are there∣by provoked to grasp at all Things by indirect

means, that they may have wherewith to supply and furnish their extraordinary Bounties. The Third is, That their good Deeds be according to Discre∣tion conferred on due Objects, for if they be bestow∣ed on the wicked and undeserving, then, that which Ennius said may here hold true, That good Deeds misplaced, will become evil Deeds, as he expresses it, Benefacta male locata, malefacta arbitror. And as 'tis better to do good to honest and good Men, who are under scanty Circumstances, than to those who have Plenty; Beneficence doubtless ought rather to look upon those who are in necessity, than those who do abound, and whose plenty has no need of a further supply. 'Tis chiefly the Duty a generous Per∣son, saith Cicero, to help him who stands most in need. Yet most Men act otherwise, for the more they expect from a Man the more they will endeavour to oblige him, and shew themselves most officious, tho he stands in no need. I will add what Seneca very judiciously expresseth, That there is a great difference between the matter of the good Deed, and the good Deed it self. For the good Deed is neither the Gold nor the Silver nor any such like Thing, but it consists in the Will of the Giver; for if any, as Aristotle ob∣serves, gives by chance, or by constraint, or in hopes of receiving thereby some advantage, or if he pre∣vents not the indigent, or if being desired he per∣forms not the Deed willingly, speedily and without hesitation, without Witnesses to report it abroad, which rather lessens than amplifies a good Deed; how can such a Man be said to be Bountiful, and a doer of Good?

We meet, saith Seneca, with a great many ungrateful Persons, and make many more, because we upraid and require back again our good Deeds in a rude manner; sometimes we are so inconsiderate, that we have no sooner done a good Act but we are ready to repent of it, and

sometimes we complain of, and exclaim against Things of the least Moment. So that we not on∣ly spoil all our Kindness in doing a good Deed, but likewise after it is done; for which of you, I be∣seech you, is satisfied by a slender or single intrea∣ty? Who is there, who when suspecting a Courtesy to be asked of him, hath not shewed a displeas'd Countenance, turned aside his Head, pretending some other weighty Business? Is it possible that you can be grateful to a Man who in a disdainful manner hath made you stoop to take up his Cour∣tesy, or colerickly thrown it at your Head; or who being tired by your Intreaties hath yeilded to your Importunities?

Of Gratitude.

NOW, let us say something in the last Place of Gratitude: 'Tis not without cause that Cicero insinuates, that it alone comprehends Religion, and the other Virtues that we have mentioned; for this Passage we read in his Oration for Plantius,

Truly, saith he, I would willingly be endowed with all the Virtues, but there is none that I would more earnestly desire than to be Thankful. This Vir∣tue is not only the principal, but also the Mother of all other Virtues; for what is Piety but a kind and grateful Inclination towards our Parents? Who are the good and generous Citizens, who in times of War and Peace offer themselves for their Country's sake, but they who are mindful of the Obligations they owe to their Country? Who are the true and real Saints, the observers of the Laws and Religion, but those who never forgetting

the favours of the immortal Gods, yeild to them the Worship and Honours due to 'em? What Pleasure can there be in Life when Friendship is banished, and what Friendship can there be among the Ungrateful?

This being granted, we must consequently suppose Gratitude to be our chief Duty: For tho he who gives pretends to nothing else than giving, nevertheless he seems to expect that he who is thereby obliged should acknowledge the Favour; and if he don't, he will be unjust. In Truth, tho the Donor expects no reward, yet he who receives the Kindness is not therefore free from the Ingagement that lies upon him to recompense his Benefactor by all good Offices. Certainly if He∣siod will have us return, as we say, with Usury, the Things that have only been lent us for a time,

With how much greater Reason, saith Cicero, ought we to be thankful when we have received more signal Obligations? Ought we not to imi∣tate those fruitful Fields, that return much more than they receive? And if we are Officious to them from whom we expect good Deeds, how much more ought we to be to them who have already been kind to us and obliged us? There are two sorts of Liberality, the one is to give, the other to restore; 'tis in our Power to give or not to give; but not to restore, is a thing not to be allowed of in an honest Man.

But suppose a Per∣son is incapable you'l say: Seneca answers,

That he who is willing to return a good Deed, does in effect do it, for his good Will is a sufficient dis∣charge of his Obligation. He saith moreover, That they who are obliged, may not only equal but also surpass in good Will and Generosity, those who give; we may reward also the greatest Princes, Lords and Kings; either by affording to them faithful Counsel, or by a constant attendance, and

by a pleasing Converse free from Flattery, and yet delightful, or by a serious Attention to what they propose when they consult about difficult Affairs, or by a constant Fidelity when they intrust any Secret. Propose the richest and the happi∣est Man in the World, I will tell you what he wants, viz. a cordial Friend to whom he may im∣part his most secret Thoughts. Don't you per∣ceive how great Men by confining the liberty of those who attend 'em, and limiting their Trust to certain slavish Offices, lose and cast themselves away, because no Body about 'em dares freely impart their Thoughts, either to incline them to what is for their advantage, or to persuade them from what tends to their hurt. There is no Mis∣chief nor Calamity but they are liable to, from the very Moment that they are barr'd from hear∣ing the Truth. You may ask, What good you can do to a prosperous Person? Persuade him not to trust to his Prosperity. Will it not be a good Office that you do him, when you shall cause him to quit this foolish Confidence, and let him see that this Power that he has, may not always continue the same. And that the Things that Fortune be∣stows are flitting and inconstant, oftner flying away faster than they come. You don't under∣stand the value and true worth of Friendship, if you don't perceive that in bestowing a Friend, you bestow the most excellent Gift the World can af∣ford, and who is never more useful and necessary than where all Things are in great plenty and abundance.

But not to insist longer upon this: Aristotle offers two or three Questions upon this Point. First, Whether Beneficence is to be esteemed or valued accord∣ing to the advantage of him who receives, or according to the Liberality of him who bestows it. He Answers,

That in the Kindnesses that are done for advantage, and which are grounded upon Profit, these are to be valued by the advantage of him who re∣ceives 'em, because he is in want, and he who does them performs 'em but upon Condition to have the same returned. But in Friendships and Kindnesses that are established upon Virtue, we must measure or compute the good Deed by the good Will of the Donor, because where Virtue is concerned, the intention is chiefly to be consider∣ed; therefore whether any gives much or little, the Gift or Kindness is to be esteem'd great, for the great Affection or extraordinary good Will of the Party giving.

The Second Question, Why those who give, have a greater affection for the Party they give to, than the other hath for the giver. To this he Answers, That the cause is not as some suppose, for that the Donor is as the Creditor, and the other as the Deb∣tor, and because the Debtor wishes for the Death of the Creditor, but the Creditor the Life and Health of the Debtor; but because the Benefactor is as the Artificer, who loves more his own Works than they should be otherwise beloved again if they were alive, which is to be seen among Poets, who love the Offspring of their Brain as tenderly as the Offspring of their Body. And they who receive a good Deed, are as it were, the handy Work of him who gives.

The Third, Why there is no Law to indite an un∣grateful Person? This Crime, says he, which is universal, is truly punished by none, tho disap∣proved by all. But as the valuation of an uncer∣tain Thing would be very difficult, we have only condemned it to an universal dislike and hatred,

leaving it among those Things which we have re∣ferred to the Justice and Vengeance of the Gods. Besides, 'tis not convenient that all ungrateful Per∣sons should be known, lest the vast number of those who are stained with this Vice, should lessen the Shame of the Crime; and lastly, 'tis no small Pu∣nishment, that an ungrateful Person dares not de∣sire a good turn from another whom he has diso∣bliged, and that he is taken notice of, and con∣demn'd by all the World.

As to what remains to be treated of here concern∣ing Affability, sweetness of Temper, Civility and such like Virtues, they may be sufficiently under∣stood by what hath been mentioned already about Gentleness and Mildness. We shall finish this Trea∣tise with a Passage out of Seneca, which contains the Sum of all moral Duties.

What do we do, saith he, what Precepts do we enjoyn? What a small matter is this, not to hurt him whom we ought to serve! This is a worthy business indeed, for a Man to be kind and loving to his Fellow-Creature! Shall we make Laws for a Man to hold out his helping Hand to one Shipwreckt and ready to sink; or to direct him that is wandring and hath lost his Way; or to divide our Bread to him that perisheth for Hunger? To what purpose is it to reckon at large what is to be done, seeing I can comprehend the whole Duties of Mankind in few Words? This great All which thou seest, and which contains all Things divine and human is but One; we are the Members of this great Bo∣dy. Nature hath made us all Related and a Kin, by bringing us forth from the same Principles and of the same Elements. 'Tis Nature hath given us a mutual Affection and Love, and for the same Ends. 'Tis Nature hath established what is right,

just and equitable to its Law. 'Tis a greater Evil to be the cause of Wrong than to suffer it. Na∣ture commands that our Hands should be always ready to afford assistance. Let this be always in our Heart, and at our Lips, Homo sum, huma∣ni nihil à me alienum puto. I am a Man, and think my self obliged to all the Duties of Hu∣manity