Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.

Of Modesty and Humility.

WE shall next speak of Modesty, which tho' it is of a large extent, yet chiefly consists in moderating our Passions in the pursuit of Honour and Glory. Now 'tis manifest that this Virtue draws nearer to a defect than to an excess, in that Pride is rather opposite to it, than the contempt of Honour. I confess, Aristotle calls him Modest only who deserves but little, and in reality Fancies ac∣cording to his Deserts; but the name of Modest seems likewise applicable to him, who tho he may deserve much, nevertheless hath no overwean'd Opinion of himself, nor does he strictly exact all the Honour and Respect due to him; for knowing the weak∣ness of human Nature, and remembring his frail Condition, begins to suspect that the Opinion that

he entertains of his own Merit may deceive him. And truly that Magnanimity so much extoll'd by Aristotle, seems rather to consist in prompting us to aim at and attempt great Things, than believe that we merit or deserve 'em. Besides, it seems not to be puffed up nor boast of its deserts, by declining Honours, but at least admits and receives them with Modesty: In a Word, our expressing our Modesty in our Actions and Behaviour, is as the crowning and completion of our great and noble Deeds. There∣fore 'tis not without cause that the Antients have compared a Man of Merit and Virtue, to an Ear of Wheat, which the fuller it is, the more it stoops. And Demosthenes observes, That a Man who is so∣lidly learned, is so far from boasting of it, that he blushes when any one seems to Extol and Praise him.

But we must not therefore think that this Mode∣sty is the same which we call Pusillanimity, which he supposes to be when any one believes that he de∣serves less than really he doth; for this Pusillanimity or Bashfulness consists also in having rather an ap∣prehension and fear of undertaking great Things, than in believing that we deserve 'em. Now as in a Man of great worth, Ostentation lessens the Glory of his Merits, and darkens it very much; so 'tis an odious and vain-glorious Thing in a Man of no Merit to be puffed up with the over-wean'd con∣ceit of himself and his own Actions. Vain-Glory hath this Evil attending, that it is approved by none, but hated of all the World; whereas Modesty hath this advantage, that there is no Body but de∣lights in it and loves it.

From whence we may here observe, That this Modesty is not such a contempt of Honour, as if there were no difference between Things honorary and Things blame-worthy; but only a contempt of

Honour without Merit, or meerly in Affectation, and which differs much from that which is real in the Opinion of good Men, and which we duly obtain, when we are judged worthy of it; which seems to be so much the more agreeable with Truth, that it is manifest that an honest Man undertakes great Things to deserve this Opinion; neverthelss he ob∣serves the Rules of Modesty, to avoid the Shame and Disgrace that Vain-Glory draws upon us. So that we may truly say, That the less we seek after Honour, the easilier and the sooner we obtain it; it being more glorious, as an ancient Author observes, to ask why a Statue hath not been erected for such an one, than why it hath.

We may likewise understand, That Modesty hin∣ders not those who are advanced to a Dignity, to maintain the Honour of that Post; for it is the Inte∣rest of a Commonwealth or Kingdom, that those who Govern should be Honoured; for fear if Con∣tempt should creep in, the Government would suf∣fer by it, and that the preservation of the Honour of our Dignity is no vain Glory, but a real Act of Justice, as the neglect of it seems not so much to be a private Modesty, as a publick Injury.

Now all that has been spoken of Modesty, may be said of Humility, as it is a religious Virtue: For tho heathen Authors look upon it as proceeding from a mean abject Spirit, nevertheless, 'tis with great Reason that the Holy Pen-men look upon it as a very great degree of Modesty, and it is to be judg∣ed so much the more perfect, because it comes from a love of Piety, and supposing it be true and sincere, and not feigned nor hypocritical, it removes and banishes all Vain-Glory. For tho the Modesty of the Philosophers seems outwardly to despise Honour, yet it excludes not all the other Passions, but this Religious Humility ascribes to God all Honour and

Glory. I say upon condition that it be sincere, for there is sometimes Hypocrisy mingled with it. Therefore we need not wonder that some have ex∣claimed against Diogenes and some other of the Phi∣losophers, That they had conquer'd one kind of Vanity by exalting another.

But 'tis not without ground what we said before, that this Modesty is of a large extent, because it ap∣pears in all the things which we desire to draw from Honour or Praise. And in Virtue it self, which doubtless can have no excess, and in which there is nothing that might make us ashamed: I say in Virtue it self this Modesty appears when there is no Ostentation of it, but we embrace and practise it si∣lently, without making it appear but when it is convenient, and always free from Pride. Which is also to be said proportionably of Science or Know∣ledg, unless it be that there is moreover a certain kind of Distemper, commonly called Curiosity, to desire to know those Things which are not lawfully to be pried into, or which are useless when known. This Modesty appears also in our Discourse in se∣veral respects; for First, as there is nothing so trou∣blesome as a pratling Loquacity, so there is no∣thing more commendable than a prudent Silence, or that Forbearance which makes us speak only to those to whom we ought, and of such Things and at such times as we ought. So that that Saying of Simonides is become a kind of Proverb; That no Man did ever repent of being Silent; but very often off too much Speaking. And Epaminondas, was commen∣ded because no Man knew more than he, and yet no Man Spoke less. Wherefore, as Speech hath been given to Man to unfold and express his Thoughts, it will suffice to take heed that this be not used in∣discreetly, as it happens, when any speaks out of Sea∣son, or without being required, or more than comes

to his share, uttering all that comes uppermost, and scarce permitting any Body else to put in a Word; when he Speaks, as we say, at random, and that he utters all that comes first; in short, when he hath such an impatience of Speaking, that when he is forc'd to hearken to others, it is very uneasy to him, never reflecting upon that wise Saying of Pythagoras, Either let your Discourse be more profitable than your Silence, or else hold your Peace. And as there are some who magnify Things too much, and others who too much lessen 'em, so there is nothing more commen∣dable than to speak plainly and sincerely: For you may observe with Aristotle, That there is often a great deal of Arrogancy and Vain-Glory in thinking too meanly of our selves; as well as in thinking too highly, and that we may hereby fall into a Folly like that of the Lacedemonians, who gloried in their Garments of a low and mean Price.

Lastly, as there are Two sorts of Jesting, accord∣ing to Cicero, the one Insolent, Sawcy and Malici∣ous; the other Civil, Ingenious and Pleasant: 'Tis known that this last hath been always as well ac∣cepted, and as he tells us, That it is becoming a Gentleman; whereas the other is very ill received, and not judged fit for any Man.

There are many other Things in which Modesty discovers it self, as in the decency and plainness of our Habits, in our Meen and Behaviour, &c. for in all these Things there is a certain Mediocrity to be observed. These are Cicero's own Words, Ad∣hibenda est praeterea mundities non odiosa, neque exqui∣sita nimis, tanquam quae fugiat agrestem & inhumanam negligentiam. Eadem ratio est habenda Vestitus, in quo sicut in pleris{que} rebus Mediocritas optmia est. Eadem gestus & gressus. Nam & palestrici motus saepe sunt odiosiores, & histrionum nonnulli gestus ineptiis non va∣••ant, & in utro{que} genere quae sunt recta & simplicia lau∣dantur.

I think Horace hath borrowed from this Passage what he saith of Tigellus, when he tells us, That he was a Man made up of Extremes; That some∣times one might see him running as if he had fled from an Enemy, and sometimes walking gravely and demurely, as if he were carrying the Image of Juno; one Day he would have two Hundred Ser∣vants attending him, the next Day scarce One; sometimes he would talk like a King uttering no∣thing but what savour'd of Greatness and Magnifi∣cence, at other times he would play the Philosopher and be contented with little.

Nil aequale homini fuit illi, &c.

Cicero says moreover, That Modesty is concern'd in the Ornament of a House and all its Furniture, and that where there is any Superfluity or Excess, it turns to the discredit of the Owner, because 'tis above his Ability; for 'tis not the House that ought to Grace the Master, but the Master ought to be an Or∣nament to his House. Eadem denique de ornatu domus totaque supellectile, in quo si quid modum excedat, dede∣cori est, quasi possessori incongruum; neque enim domo dominus, sed domino honestanda domus. Lastly, he will have Modesty concerned even with the Goods of Nature and Fortune, in the which 'tis very com∣mendable to observe a convenient Temper, so that they may be rather the Instruments of Virtue and Moderation, than of Debauchery, Pride and Arro∣gancy. Tractanda etiam in laudationibus haec sunt na∣turae, & fortunae bona, in quibus est summa laus non extulisse se in potestate, non fuisse insolentem in pecunia, non se praetulisse aliis propter abundantiam fortunae, ut opes, & copiae non superbiae videantur, ac libidini, sed boni∣tati, ac moderationi facultatem, & materiam dedisse.