Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.

Of Sobriety and Chastity in general.

THese two Virtues seem to deserve a particular Tract at large, for they constitue two princi∣pal kinds of Temperance; but we can scarce add any thing to what hath been formerly said, when we have mentioned the great advantages of a sober Life, and when we have instanced that noble and celebrated Maxim of Epicurus, Sapientem non esse amaturum; nunquam prodesse venerea. Therefore I shall here only observe some things in general, and then more particularly. In general, that the Praise and Advantage of these two Virtues seem for the most part to consist not in the withdrawing our selves from living after the manner of Brutes, in respect of Lusts and Pleasure, but rather to ap∣proach nearer to 'em. This will not seem so great a Paradox, if we do but consider that we are very frequently more intemperate and worse than those Creatures that follow the meer dictates of Nature, whereas we debauch and abuse Nature. For there is no doubt but that that strong Inclination and De∣sire which we have for Eating and Drinking is na∣tural, seeing we find it equally in all Animals, and proceeds from the institution of Nature, who has ordain'd, that by Food the Life of every individual Creature might be preserved and lengthned, and by the use of venereal Acts every Species of Creatures might by a succession of Propagations be continued, and as it were eternised. Now this being certain, The Question is, Whether Men or other Animals, which of them contain themselves most within the bounds of Nature.

We see that the Beasts live upon very plain Food, provided for them by Nature; whereas the Drink

and Food of Men is changed, mingled and sophisti∣cated in divers manners. We see also that when the Beasts and other Animals are once satisfied, they neither Eat nor Drink any more, but stop till the next Hunger and Thirst invites 'em; whereas Men are not satisfied to have filled themselves with all the variety of Meats and Drinks, but still farther provoke their Appetites by pinant Sauses and relish∣ing Morsels, after Nature is satisfied. We find al∣so that other Animals have a set time for Copulati∣on, and after Conception they abstain; whereas Men have no time appointed for that purpose; nay after that the Female hath conceived they remain still in∣clinable to the same Act, and with as much heat as before. Besides, none but Men are guilty of the shameful and base abusing their own Sex against Na∣ture. Are not therefore Men in such Actions rather Brutes, and Brutes such as Men ought to be; and consequently are not Men, in respect of the desire of Eating and Drinking and of veneral Acts, to be sent to be instructed by the Brutes, that they might be taught to live Temperately? Truly if to live according to the Rules of Virtue, is to live ac∣cording to the dictates of Nature, no Man will say, that to live as Men do, is to live after the Rules of Virtue, but rather that we should imitate the Beasts and other Creatures. 'Tis therefore a high Dis∣grace, not that Men should be advised to live after the manner of Brutes, but when they live worse than they, that they must be sent to be instructed by their Examples.

But to not insist any longer upon this particular, we will proceed to examin that excellent Descrip∣tion of a temperate Man, recommended by Aristotle. After he had Taught, That Temperance is a Medi∣ocrity between Intemperance and the want of Sense or Stupidity, and had proved, that Intemperance

covets in such a manner the things that bring De∣light, that it suffers and is pained, not only when it cannot enjoy them, but also while it desires them, and that the insensible Person who is not moved with any Pleasure, is so far from all Humanity, that such an one is scarce to be found; He proceeds to tell us, The temperate Person keeps himself in a certain Me∣dium, for he is not delighted in such things wherein an intemperate Man places his Pleasure, but he is rather offended at and abominates 'em. He takes no delight in that which is not Honest and fit to be delighted in; and there is nothing that transports him so much, but if he be disappointed in obtaining it, doth any ways vex and torment him. He desires nothing after so absolute a Manner, but his Affections are moderate, never ex∣ceeding their just Bounds under all Circumstances. All that procures Pleasure, and which at the same time tends to the Health of the Body, he desires with Moderation, and as it is convenient; as also the other things that are grateful so far as they are no Impediment to what we have mentioned, nor are contrary to Honesty, nor above our Abilities: For he who is otherwise affected, and de∣sires these things with more earnestness than he ought, is not Temperate, but he who desires and seeks them ac∣cording to the Rules of Reason. In which Passage of Aristotle you see, the temperate Man is not he who abstains absolutely from all Pleasures, but from such as are not honestly to be attained; such as those are that are contrary to Nature, that are prohibited by the Laws, that prejudice Health, that blemish our Reputation or ruin our Family; but he scruples not to enjoy moderately the Pleasures that have none of these inconveniences attending. For in such there is nothing but what suits with his Humanity, and according to Nature, who hath not given us an Inclination to them in vain.

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This is the Picture that this Philosopher hath drawn us of a temperate Person. Therefore he re∣proves the Censoriousness of those who exclaim against the Pleasures with which themselves are taken; it seeming in it self a Contradiction; as if every one did not always carry his own Nature about with him, which by word he may seem to deny, but in effect cannot.

Likewise, saith he, for that reason 'tis no wonder, tho to live according to Nature be to live Virtuously, and notwithstanding 'tis so easy to follow Nature, there be nevertheless so few that pursue after Virtue, because the Virtue that they praise is rather against Nature, than agreable with its Rules. 'Tis not but that there is a Virtue to deny our selves and abstain from such Pleasures altogether, but this Virtue is not natural, but of another kind; it may, for Instance, belong to Religion, that commands Nature, and constrains it, being more excellent, and forces Nature to submit to it.