Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.

CHAP. VI. Of Fortitude.

TO treat of the several Virtues in their Order, we ought, next to Prudence, to speak of For∣titude, which is as the first part of Honesty, as Tem∣perance is the Second. Not that other Virtues do not participate of Honesty, but because those who behave themselves according to the Rules of Forti∣tude and Temperance are principally and more espe∣cially said to act Honestly and Honourably. Now Fortitude, in the Sense that it is here taken, is not ill described by Cicero, viz. A considerable firmness and resolution of Mind, able to encounter Danger and submit to Labour. Because this Definition points at the two chief acts of Fortitude, the one undertakes, the other sustains and teaches to shun the two vici∣ous Extremeties, namely, Audacity and Timidity, into which we may run for want of a mature Consi∣deration. This Virtue seems also to be well defin'd by Aristotle, A Medium, or Mediocrity between Fear

and too great Confidence: And Seneca saith, It is the Knowledge how to repel, submit to and encounter Dan∣gers.

However, tho Fortitude as it is a particular Vir∣tue be such as we have represented it, yet sometimes Men give to it too large a Compass, sometimes too Narrow; too Large is allowed it, when they extend it as far as any Virtue reaches, as St. Ambrose doth, and before him St. Clement, when he saith, The Du∣ty of Fortitude is not only to bear patiently human Casual∣ties and Misfortunes, but also to resist Lust, Debauche∣ry, Pain and Wrath. They allow too narrow a Com∣pass, when they take it only for a Military Virtue, as if scarce any were to be allowed Valiant, but such as shew their Courage in War, or Dye Fighting, and by this means become Illustrious, and ob••••in ever∣lasting Renown: But we see those who express no less Fortitude and Courage, either under Distem∣pers, or in Dangers at Sea, and on other Occasions, and Dye with as much Resolution. However, Ari∣stotle will have him to be termed properly Coura∣geous, who sees with an undaunted Spirit, an honest Death, and the preparations to it, such as are prin∣cipally those that we meet with in War. This made Cicero say, That the great and noble Actions per∣formed in War have this belonging to them, that they are I know not how, more Praised and Extolled than others. Nevertheless, he proves at large, by many Ex∣amples, and without forgetting his own, That though Men put a higher esteem upon military Actions than up∣on Civil, yet we must except against this Opinion; for if we will Judge according to Truth, there are many civil Actions far greater and nobler than the Military: From whence we may conclude, that tho those who be∣have themselves with Courage in War may be esteem∣ed Brave and Excellent, yet this Virtue of Fortitude resides not in them alone, nor do they only deserve the Titles of Brave and Stout.

Now to treat of Fortitude contained within its just Limits, two Things seem generally requisit. The First, That it be an invincible strength of Mind, against all Things that may be difficult, that is to say, against such Evils as are difficult either to overcome or to undergo. The Second, That it be not rash or unadvised, that it tends to a good End, namely, to the support of Honesty and Equity.

In relation to the First, when I say that Fortitude is a certain strength of Mind; doubtless we ought not hereby to understand, that this Virtue consists, as some vulgar People may imagine, in the meer Strength and Vigour of Body; for a Man of a weak and infirm Body may deserve the name of Brave, if he designs the Justice of the Cause he undertakes, and continues resolute and unshaken in his purpose, not knowing how to yield; nay, tho he meet with ill Fortune, if his Courage never fails, but he proceeds on with the same Bravery and Resolution of Thought. Much less do we suppose it consistent with a boast∣ing and vain-glorious Humour, too much incident to some Persons; for if you remove this Ostenta∣tion which puts them in pursuit after a dim Light of Glory, you will find them Mean, Contemptible Cowards; nay, when it most concerns them to en∣counter with real Dangers, they'l draw back, their Courage failing 'em, and very often seek to save themselves by a shameful Flight.

Again, when I say, that it is a firm, inflexible re∣solution of Mind, I hereby observe that it ought to be such a firmness as ought never to yield, but to continue so, not only in respect of the greatness of the Labour and Danger, but also in respect of its long continuance and repeated Endeavours.

I say that this strength or firmness of Mind is to encounter all Evils; because this Virtue of its own Nature, is as a Bulwark against all that is or ap∣pears

to be Evil in our Life, and that it properly hath no other Post assign'd but this.

I say moreover, That the Evils that Fortitude de∣signs to overcome, are to be difficult; for tho this Virtue may extend to light, easy and common Ills, yet it is very profitable to accustom our selves to encounter 'em and support our selves under 'em, that we may thereby also the better begin to form an Habit; for just as the Virtue of Temperance is not required that one should abstain from doating on an old wither'd Hag, as it was objected to Cry∣sippus, so Fortitude appears not in little Evils, but only in great and difficult; such as is Death, Pain, Ignominy, the loss of Friends or of Children, Po∣verty, Imprisonment, Banishment, and others, that are able to terrify us at a distance, or ready to over∣whelm us when they draw near.

As to the Second thing requisite: Fortitude would not be a Virtue, if it were foolish and unconsiderate, but it would be Rashness, and as Aristotle terms it, a certain Brutality, or a brutish Effort, opposite to this Virtue which is call'd Heroick and Divine, which is nothing else but a kind of noble Courage and Bravery, which gave the very Name to Heroes, and caused their Deeds to be stiled Heroick. Such there∣fore ought not to be esteemed Brave or Courageous, who being carried by a blind Fury, and trusting chiefly to their bodily Strength, run head••ong up∣on any Undertaking, and as if they had bid defiance to Dangers, seem to fear nothing so much as to ap∣pear fearful of any thing. But those are truly Brave who understanding Dangers, neither loving them nor provoking them Indiscreetly, behave themselves nevertheless with Courage, as often as they ought, and in that manner that they ought; for Aristotle makes this Remark, That a stout and brave Man, is not he who fears nothing, or is resolved to

bear all Things, or to undertake all Things; but he who acts thus where he ought, for the end and pur∣pose that he ought, when he ought, and in that man∣ner that he ought. Qui quod oportet, & cujus causa, & quando, & quo modo oportet.

As therefore on the one Hand, he opposeth to a brave Spirit the timerous Soul, who for Fear under∣takes not the thing that he should; so on the other the Audacious and Rash, for want of Fear, or out of too much Confidence in himself, undertakes what he ought not. Not to say, that according to his Opi∣nion, such may be termed Fools and mad Men, who fear nothing, neither Earthquakes nor Storms, such as the Celtae were: For there are some Things that are truly to be feared; as Shame, and Infamy which at∣tends it; for as he saith, 'tis Impudence not to fear them, because Shame is an Evil. And as Seneca ob∣serves, Fortitude is no inconsiderate Rashness, nor a Love of Dangers, but it is the knowledge how to distinguish what is or what is not Evil. It is always Watchful, Constant, Patient, &c. Neither would it be a Virtue, as it is manifest, if it did not pro∣pose Honesty and Justice for its End: For that cause Aristotle will have a brave Man to be undaunted, but still with an honest Intent. And for the same Reason, after he hath condemned those for Cowards, and far from Brave, who destroy themselves for fear of Poverty, or for Love, or Grief; and after he hath declared that those may be esteemed Brave, who being tempted by Rewards, or frighted by Torments, yet behave themselves resolutely, (which in some respect may be said of Soldiers, who are reduced to the necessity of Fighting) he saith, That he who is truly Brave, ought not to be obliged by Necessity, but moved by Honesty.

We add particularly this word Equity, because those who are commonly reputed Brave, often abuse

their Strength against the dictates of Justice, and speak according this barbarous Dialect, Power is above all Things; the Right is in the Conqueror. Hence it is that Plato judges Fortitude to be a kind of a Flux or Torrent against the endeavours of Unjustice; and therefore blames Protagoras, who esteemed those Men brave, who were most Profane, most Unjust, most Intemperate, and the greatest Fools; because, saith he, we are not to judge of Fortitude by the Strength of the Body, but by the Constancy of the Mind, and by an end that is Honest and Praise∣worthy, in which Justice and Equity principally appear. 'Tis also to be observed, That the Heroes have always been the Protectors of the Innocent, and Enemies of the Wicked, of unjust Men and Ty∣rants. And Agesilaus well deserved Praise, when being asked, If Justice was better than Fortitude, answered, That if all Men were Just, there would be no need of Fortitude. And because it is An∣ger that commonly carries those who are thought to be Brave, to Unjustice, Aristotle advises us to stand upon our Guard, and to have an Eye to that Passion, for fear that what is as the Stone to sharpen Forti∣tude, should become as a Sword, to cut the knot of Justice. He saith moreover, That tho there is no greater Provocation and Encouragement to encounter Danger than Anger, yet there is no true Fortitude in it, unless it be directed by Counsel, and by the consideration of a just End. It was this that made Taurus say, in the Writings of Agellus, The brave Man is not he who out of a brutish Humour, Insensibility or Custom, Fights as a kind of Monster against Nature, and goes beyond his just Limits; such as was Caesar's Gladiator, who laughed at the Chirurgeons who cut his Wounds wi∣der; but true Fortitude or Bravery, is that which the Antients have duly styled the Knowledge of that which is, and of that which is not to be supported, which dis∣covers

to us, that there are certain things unsufferable, and which Men truly brave ought to abominate.

From all this, and what I have mentioned else∣where, we may observe that we have the Seeds of Fortitude truly springing in us; but that they may grow up and become Virtues, Exercise and Learn∣ing are absolutely necessary.

Of the several kinds of Fortitude.

BY what has been here said, we may observe, that commonly Men do not reckon several kinds of Fortitude, because they make this Virtue to be employ'd about a very particular matter. But if it be true, that it respects all that may be judg∣ed Evil in this Life, how much rather should this matter be General, and why shall not we reckon as many sorts or kinds, as there are kinds of Evil in our Life? And as there are some who bear patient∣ly the loss of Riches, but not the loss of Honour; and who suffer death bravely in War, but not on a Bed of Sickness, and so of the like; why should it not be necessary for such diversity of things to form to our selves divers Habits, and so to distin∣guish several kinds of Fortitude?

For as to what concerns those which some would have to be sometimes Integral parts in difficult Mat∣ters, and sometimes Potential in less difficult, name∣ly, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Constancy and Pa∣tience; It is certain, first, for Magnificence, that it belongs not to this Virtue, but to Liberality; be∣cause as Aristotle tells us, it regulates the Expen∣ces of Mony, and chiefly the Expences needful in great things, as are the publick Shews and Stages, the building of Ships to defend the Common-wealth; and in short, all other things which have

something of Grandeur, and commonly strike the People with Admiration. And therefore agreably with this Opinion of Aristotle, Cicero recommends to us this excellent Definition, Magnificientia est rerum magnarum, & excelsarum cum animi ampla quadam, & splendida propositione, agitatio atque admi∣nistratio. We ought also to take notice, that as Magnificence is a Virtue and consequently a Medio∣crity, Aristotle names the two contrary Vices, viz. On the one hand, Proud, Extravagant and Super∣fluous Expences; and on the other, doing things niggardly and mean; parting with nothing but what is drawn from us by force, against our free Consent; always grudging and repining at what goes from us.

As for what concers Magnanimy, or as we term it Generosity, it is likewise manifest that it belongs not to this Virtue, or if it doth, 'tis nothing else but Fortitude it self under another Name. In∣deed, as Fortitude is properly concerned with dif∣ficult things, it is certain, that to undertake and endure such things, we must have a great and ge∣nerous Soul, or as Cicero saith, We must have a mind highly elevated and assured of it self, with a certain hope, having a regard to things good and honest. Be∣sides, when Aristotle saith, That Magnanimity or greatness of Mind consists in a Persuasion that we deserve much, when really our Merits answer our Persuasion; 'tis evident that this opinion of Honour that we deserve, relates to Justice, or to the con∣veniency of Temperance, and not to Fortitude, which consists in encountering Dangers, and cou∣rageously undergoing Labours.

As for Constancy, or as the Holy Scriptures stile it, long Forbearance or Longanimity, 'tis nothing else but Fortitude it self, when it discovers it self by a sequel of many repeated Acts, and by a long

continuance of Time. For a Man cannot be said to be brave, but rather weak and feeble, if he con∣tinues not resolute in what he hath undertaken, but after he hath a while supported himself, his Heart at last begins to faint and fail him. From hence it is, that Constancy and Perseverance being synonimous, Cicero tells us, That Perseverance con∣sists in a continuing resolute a long time, and constant in the things that we have proposed, after that we have maturely considered upon 'em.

Lastly, As for Patience, it seems to be scarce any thing else but Constancy, unless it be that it con∣sists in suffering, as the word imports, rather than in attacquing. Therefore Cicero saith, That it con∣sists in suffering willingly and a long time, difficult things, for the sake of Honesty or Profit.

Therefore not to insist any longer upon this Point, let us observe with Epicurus, That a mean Soul becomes insolent in Prosperity, and dejected in Ad∣versity. Let us then conclude from hence, by the Rule of Contraries, That it is the property of a no∣ble and generous Temper, not to be insolent, lifted up by good Success, nor to suffer it self to be aba∣sed in a low Estate, but to bear and suffer the good and evil Fortune with an equal Mind, and in the same manner. And because when all things pro∣sper, it plainly belongs to that part of Temperance which we name Moderation, to moderate and go∣vern our Thoughts, and to hinder 'em from rising too high; it follows, that when Crosses happen, it belongs to Fortitude, to keep our Minds in a con∣stant and even Temper. Now as Calamities are nothing else but external Evils, we must remem∣ber that they are not really Evils, but only as they are accompanied by Pain which they cause in the Body, or by Grief which they produce in the Mind by the means of Opinion; so that only this

Pain and this Grief are the real Evils: Now it be∣longs to Fortitude to hinder these from causing Pain, or at least obliges us to bear it patiently when it comes, and to hinder it from oppressing and over-whelming the Mind with a vain Grief; all which is to be effected by curing our Judgment of vulgar Opinions or false Persuasions, without which it would have little or no Power upon the Soul.

Whether Evils fore-seen make the least impression upon us.

FRom hence it is, that we must observe in the second place, that there are as it were two ge∣neral Bulwarks against these sorts of external Evils: The first is a good Conscience; for as Crantor saith, 'Tis a great support under Afflictions, to be free from Guilt: The second is to fore-see, and to lay before our Eyes the Mischiefs and Evils that may happen; for he who fore-sees the blow, and is prepared to receive it, is not so easily beaten down, as when he is struck unprovided; when he is armed with Resolution and Courage, as with a kind of Breast-plate, he is not so soon wounded as when he is naked and unguarded. Therefore a wise Man never trusts so much to his good For∣tune, but he thinks also upon his Evil; for Fortune hath nothing fix'd, neither is there any thing cer∣tain or of a long continuance in human Affairs: He always represents before his Eyes some Exam∣ples of the Vicissitudes of good and evil Things, and knows that there is no Mischief that happens to any Body but that the same may befal him. Therefore he don't wait till the time of War, then to furnish himself with Arms to support it, nor till a Storm happens, then to prepare to resist it.

If a wise Man begets a Son, saith Cicero, he knows that he hath begotten a Mortal, and brings him up in that Persuasion: If he sends him to Troy to de∣fend Greece, he knows that he don't send him to a Feast, but to a dangerous War. This Considera∣tion, saith he, and this Meditation upon the Evils to come, before they happen, qualifies and al∣lays the Mischiefs that befal afterwards. So that I think Theseus cannot be too much commended for saying in Euripides, I thought before upon the Ca∣lamities to come; upon Death, Banishment, &c. that I might be the better enabled to encounter with adverse Fortune.

'Tis an undoubted Truth, that the Evils that are not fore-seen, are much more grievous; and that the Fore-sight and Preparation of the Mind, hath a great Efficacy to lessen the Pain. Let Mankind set always before his Eyes the Casualties of the World; for this excellent and divine Wisdom consists in having a long while perfectly known and considered human Affairs, and meditated upon them; not wondering at any thing that happens, nor believe before a thing happens, that such a thing cannot come to pass. He afterwards commends the Advice of Terence, That a Man in Prosperity should think with himself how he should be able to endure Adversity, Dangers, Losses, and Banish∣ment, the Miscarriages of a Son, the Death of a Wife, the Sickness of a Daughter; that all these things are common; that they may happen so; that nothing new ought to surprise us; and what∣ever good befalls us beyond our Expectation, it should be look'd upon as so much Profit and pure Gain.

It was this kind of Meditation and Fore-sight that caused that Constancy of Mind in Socrates, ap∣pearing always with a serene and pleasant Coun∣tenance;

truly, how could his Looks be otherwise, seeing his Soul was never moved nor disturbed? Agrippinus proceeded yet farther, for he was wont to make a Panegyrick of all the Evils that befell him; of Diseases, when they seis'd upon him; of Infamy, when Men slander'd him; of Banishment, when he was driven away. And when at a certain time he was going to sit at Table, a Message was brought him from Nero, to command him imme∣diately to be gone and to depart; he answered no∣thing else but, Well, we shall then dine at the Town of Aricia. Ariciae ergo prandebimus.

How we ought to support external and publick Evils.

AS Evils are usually distinguished into pub∣lick, such as is War, Tyranny, the Ruin of our Country, Plague, Famine, and such like; and into private, as Banishment, Imprisonment, Slavery, Ignominy, &c. It is not needful to speak much of the publick Evils, because they don't real∣ly concern us so much as they are Publick, but as they are Private, and come home to us in Particu∣lars. 'Tis true, when Publick Calamities involve a great many Persons, this must needs create much Noise, and they are reckoned so much the more unsufferable, because our common Mother, namely, our Country is wrong'd and injur'd; but if we take more particular notice, we may perceive that the Evil concerns every one no otherwise than it strikes at them in particular.

And to demonstrate that this is no Paradox; That the Evil that is common to many, on whom we have Compassion, is not more uneasie to be born; it would be sufficient to instance in that

which is in the Mouth of every one, and what our Experience sufficiently verifies, That it is the com∣fort of the afflicted to have Fellow-Sufferers. But we need take notice but of one thing, and consider that when a Neighbour's House is on Fire, none but the Neighbours run to extinguish it; those who live in the same City, at a distance, are not at all concered at it; for tho' they be all Fellow-Citi∣zens, yet the Calamity don't touch them so much as it doth the others. So if the War be begun in Persia, or if the Plague be hot in India, and makes there a great destruction, that don't concern us, tho' they be Fellow-Citizens of the same World; because the Evil is too far off to injure us: And tho' it may infect the Borders of our Kingdom, ei∣ther it moves us not; or if it doth, 'tis by acci∣dent, in that it reaches as far as us, and makes us sensible of the Evil.

But that I may not stop here: If it happens that we are involved in any common Calamity, there are two things chiefly to be weighed: First, That such is the Condition and natural Course of things which we cannot hinder; That 'tis the Sovereign Lord of the World who hath appointed such Alte∣rations and Changes, and he being most Wise, his Designs, tho' unknown to Men, may be, and are most excellent; That it belongs not to us to quar∣rel at, or alter that Order that he has establish'd, but that we ought willingly to yield and follow the Paths that his Providence hath prescribed to us; And that seeing 'tis not in our power to change Destinies, or rather the Decrees of the Divine Pro∣vidence, it would better become us to mitigate the Harshness and Trouble, by our own free Con∣sent, than to increase the Mischief by fruitless Op∣position; That Common-wealths have their na∣tural Revolutions, and that it is needful that some∣times

they should be govern'd by Princes, and become Monarchies, sometimes by the People, and devolve into Democracies, and sometimes by the Chieftains and principal Men, and be changed into Aristo∣cracies. This Cicero tells us, which he had taken out of Plato, unto which he adds this excellent Pas∣sage, which shews the Nobility of his Mind, and the extraordinary Greatness and Resolution of his Soul, when he describes the lamentable State of the Common-wealth; I have not hid my self, I have not cowardly forsaken, neither have I extraordi∣narily afflicted my self, I have not behaved my self like a Misanthropus, a Man provoked against the Times.

Secondly, If a wise Man escapes, with Health of Body and Mind, from a publick Calamity, he hath no cause to complain against the ill Usage of For∣tune, as if it had treated him amiss, and stript him of those things that really belong to him. The excellent Saying of Bias is well known; after a general Conflagration, he declared, That he car∣ried with him all the Goods that he ever possessed. And we may mention Stilpon, who having been driven away from his Country, lost his Wife, Children, and all his other Goods of Fortune, gave this answer to Demetrius, who had taken the City, and had asked him, If he had lost nothing? answer'd, All my Goods are with me. He under∣stood, saith Seneca, Justice, Virtue, Temperance, Prudence; and he reckoned not among his Goods, that which could be taken from him. The wise Man accustoms himself to the Evils to come by thinking upon them often, as others do by suffer∣ing them long. I knew not, says the Fool; that I had so many Troubles to undergo. The wise Man understands that all Evils remain yet behind, and saith, I knew before, all that has happen'd, and

was prepared and provided for all that is come to pass.

Of external and private Evils; and first of Ba∣nishment.

AS for what concerns particular and private Evils, we shall at present mention but few things, because we have spoken of them elsewhere: I shall only add that of Banishment, that 'tis no real but a fantastical Evil, that depends upon Opinion; for 'tis nothing else but a change of Place or Habi∣tation, which many of their own accord often desire and covet for their private Satisfaction. The wise Man carries with him into a Foreign Country all his real and substantial Goods, his Virtues, the Goods of his Mind, which he can always happily enjoy, and by which he may make to himself Friends instead of them whom he hath left behind in his own Coun∣try: He hath not so narrow a Soul as to fancy him∣self a Citizen of one single Town, or of one Re∣gion; he thinks himself rather to be a Citizen of all the World, and into what place soever he comes he thinks himself to be as well as in his own Country. A Man of Courage finds every where his Country, as a Fish in every part of the Sea, or a Beast in every corner of the Earth: He still beholds Nature every where in the same Dress, the same Majesty: He sees the same Sun, the same Moon, and the same number of Stars sparkling in the Heavens: He finds every where the same Face of Things, Mountains, Plains, Rivers, Trees, Towns, and all sorts of Animals, almost the same; and if perhaps he sometimes meets with any Va∣riety, 'tis not unpleasing to him, nor is he satis∣fied till he hath arrived to the full Knowledge of

it; and this is that which intices Travellers abroad, and gives them opportunity of much Knowledge and Experience. Nor is he to place this among his Misfortunes, that he is Banish'd by his Fellow-Citizens; for that has been the Case of many an honest and good Man, such as Aristides, Thucidides, Demosthenes, and an infinite Number besides, who may give the same answer as Diogenes did to one who reproached him, That the Inhabitants of Synope had condemned him to be banished. No, said he, you are mistaken, I have condemned them to remain and live for ever in the bottom of Pont Euxinus.

He might consider that Banishment hath been of∣ten the occasion of raising Men to an high Station of Honour, which caused that Expression of The∣mistocles to be so famous; I should have been un∣done if I had not been undone, perieram nisi periissem. He might likewise remember that sometimes upon better considering of things, an honest Man is cal∣led back from Exile with much Honour, as it hap∣pened to Evagoras, Pelopid••s, Alcibiades, Camillus, Cicero, and several others. And it often falls out that we live with more Content and Repose out of our Native Soil than we can in it. This caused Marcellus and Rutilius to say, That they ne∣ver lived really, but during the time of their Ba∣nishment out of their own Country. Finally, he will return Thanks to Providence, because his Con∣dition is become like that of Plato, Gallen, Zeno, Crantor, and divers other famous Travellers, who of their own accord had banished themselves a long time from their own Country, and yet never re∣pented of it; because by viewing other parts of the World, they had furnished themselves with the Knowledge of many things; and that by consider∣ing the differing Customs of Foreign Nations, they were freed from many Prejudices, and become

quite other Men than they should have been had they continually liv'd at Home.

Of Imprisonment.

IMprisonment looks like a thing more grievous; but a wise Man thinks it not so; for his Mind cannot be confined within any Walls, nor Bound with any Chains. How can a Soul, which is always at liberty, and always enjoys it self, be limited within a Prison, seeing it is not to be bounded by the limits of the World? It can run over the spa∣cious large compass of the Earth, and in it self ex∣amine the Passages of every Age, and by that means search into Eternity it self. His Body being con∣fined and at Rest, gives greater Liberty to his Thoughts, not being distracted with that variety of new Objects. 'Tis well known that Anaxagoras, while in Prison, writ a most excellent Treatise of the Quadrature of the Circle; That Socrates did not only act the Philosopher, while confin'd, but com∣posed also excellent Verses; that Boetius never writ with a stronger Stile, nor more Elegantly than when in Chains, for this requires a Mind free from Hur∣ry, Calm and Serene.

Moreover, some for the more exact composing of an excellent Treatise, have confin'd themselves to their Houses, from whence they could not easily be drawn out. A wise Man makes no great difference whether his Confinement be voluntary or compulsive. Do but consider the multitude of Artizans and Scribes, who are Daily confin'd to their Shops, and tied as it were to their Seats, seem not in the least troubled or concerned, because they look not upon the place where they are thus fixt as a Prison, but as their Dwelling and Abode. This Consideration

will cause a Man to undergo his Confinement more easily, because he will look upon the Prison as his Dwelling, and not as a Prison. Besides, when he reflects upon the many Religious who voluntarily confine themselves in a Cloister, and there spend their Days very pleasantly, he will begin to consi∣der that a Confinement in it self is not so unsup∣portable as we Fancy. And thus when he sees Men shut up in Prison against their Wills, who at first are full of Complaints, and ready to be drown'd with Tears, yet after a few Days rejoice and take delight, sporting with the rest of their Companions; he would think it very strange, that Wisdom should not have as great an influence on a Man of Under∣standing, as Custom hath over a Man of meaner Parts. I need not mention here, that it is no new or extraordinary thing for good Men to be clapt up in Prison; that there are many whose Virtue never appears more glorious than in Fetters and under Confinement, and when they are freed they return with so much Splendor and Advantage, that their very Confinement seems to be desired.

Of Slavery.

THE same may be said of Slavery. The Mind of a wise Man is too great to be brought un∣der the Dominion of a Master. His Body, the meanest part may indeed be enslaved, but for his Soul this noble and excellent part 'tis too much at liberty, and soars so high, that its out of the reach of any Fellow-Creature to catch at, to subject it to his Dominion. Every one knows how much Cou∣rage and Constancy of Mind Epictetus manifested, when he was obliged to be a Servant. And none can be Ignorant what answer Diogenes gave to those

who came to Buy him, and asked him what he could do? Said, That he knew how to command Men: And turning himself immediately to the Crier, he bid him cry out, If any would buy a Master: Afterwards, when he came to Xeniades, who was the Buyer, he spoke to him in this manner, Take heed what you do, for tho I am your Slave, you must hereafter obey me, as the Patient obeys the Physician, the Child its Go∣vernor; tho the Physician be Slave to the Patient, and the Governor to the Child.

Moreover, whereas the wise Man having long since considered and meditated upon the state of Human Affairs, finds that he has not the Command of For∣tune, but as Unhappiness befals others, it may also light upon him. He understands likewise, that being Born a Man, he is subject to ••ll Human Casualties, and therefore stands always ready and prepared to receive all the Shocks of Fortune, so that there is none but he can with Patience submit to, and there∣by render it not only tolerable, but in some measure Easy and Pleasant. If the Master commands, he obeys willingly; and as if he had undertaken the Task of his own accord, it is much at one to him if he does it by another's Command or out of his own Choice. He is glad he has Strength sufficient to undergo what is commanded him, and an Oppor∣tunity offered of exercising a Faculty, which other∣wise might become benumm'd and useless. He thinks himself happier than his Master, being only in sub∣jection to his Will, and having nothing else to do but obey his Commands; whereas his Master re∣mains under the Tyranny of many Masters, more Cruel and Troublesome, his Ambition, Envy, An∣ger and other Passions; so that in short, he must needs be much the happier, being freed from a thousand Cares and Distractions, which the other is daily liable to.

I shall not mention how many have met with ve∣ry good and favourable Masters, under whom at last they have not only obtain'd their Freedom, and got great Preferments, but have been made Heirs of their Estates; and how many having fallen into the Hands of Masters who were wise and learned Men, have had cause to desire their Slavery, as the Servant of Epicurus, named Mus, and Cicero's Slave, called Tyro, and several others.

Of Shame and Disgrace.

A Wise Man will still more willingly bear Shame and Disgrace, when it is thrown upon him, if he be satisfied of his own Innocence, and that he has no way justly deserv'd it. For whether it con∣sists in being depriv'd of some publick Office, Ho∣nour or Imployment, even for this he may congra∣tulate his good Fortune, in having an opportunity of retiring and leading a private and quiet Life, which otherwise he could not easily have obtain'd, tho perhaps he earnestly desir'd it. Or if it consists in the Whisperings and Reports that arise from among the People, he hath too great and noble a Soul to value such Rumours. He knows the Temper of the Populace to be very mutable, that they will this Day applaud, what they will to Morrow decry, be∣ing never long pleased, but as we say, more fickle and unconstant than the Moon. His Conscience stands him instead of a thousand Witnesses; his sa∣tisfaction is, that he cannot justly charge himself with any Crime, with any Guilt.

In short, if it consists in the Calumnies and Slan∣ders of envio•••• ••••d malicious Men, or in opprobri∣ous and injurious Language; he is not of so mean a Spirit, as to be cast down and discouraged; for

he does not take them as Injuries done to himself, but gives them only the hearing, as if they con∣cerned him not, as if they were related of some other, or of him who was the first Inventer. There∣fore he who first unjustly rais'd em, has more rea∣son to be concerned for falsly accusing the Innocent; nor will he be a little dissatisfied when he finds his mischievous Intention thus disappointed.

A wise Man further considers the great number of Fools there are in the World; and if he should once think himself offended hereat, he would be deemed one of that Number, which must in no small measure disturb the quiet of his Mind. Therefore he Arms himself before-hand, against all such kind of Affronts, by overlooking them; and thinks that he ought no more to be moved at the Revilings of evil Men, than the Moon is at the barking of the Dogs.

Of the loss of Children and Friends.

BUT what shall we say of the loss of Children and Friends, and in one Word, of all that is dear to us? A wise Man will the less afflict him∣self, because he knows that our Complaints, our Sighs, our Tears, and our Lamentations are use∣less; and that it is in vain to deal thus with Death, who is not to be prevailed upon, and never restores to us the Friends which it once snatches from us. Therefore he prepares himself early for such Acci∣dents which he knows may happen, that when they do, he may bear them with Courage, and not be afflicted in vain.

Besides, he observes, That when w•• are thus griev'd for the loss of our Children or Friends, 'tis not for their sakes, but for our own, that we thus lament

and are troubled: For to be grieved because they are safely arrived into the Haven, and are no more vexed with the Evils and Miseries, unto which this Life is subject, this savours of Envy and Cruelty; and to be troubled because they don't enjoy certain Pleasures of this Life, is Weak and Ridiculous, be∣cause they don't desire or stand in the least need of 'em, and therefore are not at all displeased, or so much as sensible, of being deprived of 'em. It makes therefore a very specious shew, but at the same time is but a feigned and dissembling sort of Pity, with which we adorn our Grief when we declare that we are grieved for their sakes, seeing that in reality 'tis for our own, because for the time to come we shall be deprived of their Company; because we shall receive no more kind Offices as formerly, no more Honour and Respect, but be deprived of every thing that might render them dear and acceptable unto us. Therefore a wise Man will think it unbecoming him to grieve in this manner for his own Interest, as if he would have had them live only for his pri∣vate Ends, and so long only as they might be use∣ful and serviceable to him; and not so long as the wise Disposer of all Things had thought good and convenient for them to be.

Besides, He may remember the time that he had no Children, and if it was not grievous then to be without them, so he ought not to think it so now he is deprived of 'em, seeing in respect of him, they are as when they were not. And if we grieve more for the privation of what we once possess'd, than to be without what we never had, this seems to sa∣vour a little of the Ingratitude of the Vulgar, who instead of being thankful for what they once enjoy∣ed, are still murmuring and repining because they can enjoy it no longer. And he whom Death de∣prives of his Son, may with more comfort support

it, considering that he hath not lost his Son, but yielded him back to the Author of Nature, who had lent him to him for a time and intrusted him with his Custody; not for ever, but for a limited time. And if it be a Father who is dead, a wise Son will consider, that he hath left him enough to make his Life easy, and preserve him from want, if he hath left him only a Soul that can be content with little. And if it be a Friend, he will suppose that he hath still so much Virtue as to procure ano∣ther; so that he may think that he hath not so much lost, as chang'd his Friend.

Of the loss of an Estate.

WHat shall we say likewise of the loss of Riches? A wise Man will certainly so much the less concern himself, for that he will consider, as we have elsewhere observed, That no Man becomes so Poor as to be deprived of the absolute Necessaries of Life, seeing Nature places them within our reach in all parts of the World; and certainly he were much to be blamed that should torment himself, for the loss of that which is not absolutely necessary to his well-being, and which he may live very well and happily without. Let what we have remaining be never so small, we may always find a great number of Persons, who have not so much, or perhaps no more, and yet without troubling themselves, lead more contented Lives than rich Men generally do. Let them be never so Poor they Laugh and Re∣joyce, and their Pleasure is so much the greater, in that they are freed from those Cares and Troubles which are inseparable from Riches.

But suppose a Man's Fortune be changed to the greatest disadvantage, so that instead of a Palace, there remains nothing to him but a Cottage; in∣stead

of a Silk Garment, one of Wool; instead of Partridges, nothing but black Bread; instead of Wine, cold Water; instead of a Coach or Sedan, a Traveller's Staff; instead of a Golden or Silver Cup, nothing but an Earthen Vessel, or the Palm of his Hand, and so of the rest. Suppose I say all this, how many Examples can we produce of those who have been satisfied with these mean Things, have laugh'd and despis'd that deceitful Splendor, and have spent their Days with more Pleasure and Con∣tent, than those who abounded with 'em?

And how many are there at present who live ve∣ry contentedly and happily, after such a change; nay, who willingly part with their Riches, to en∣joy a more retir'd and contented way of Life? We need not therefore here enumerate those primitive Philosophers, who out of an Affection to Learning, and the Pleasure of a free and contemplative Life, forsook their Riches, and embraced Poverty. For we have of late discovered whole Nations, who having no need of those Goods that we call Riches, lead an innocent Life, like to that of our first Fa∣thers, whose Times were stiled the Golden Age, and supposed to be the happiest of all Ages.

But if you Fancy that it is more grievous to fall from a great and high Fortune, than to have always remained in a low Condition, 'tis easy to perceive that this is nothing but an Opinion; for in respect of the thing it self, there is no difference if you have been Poor a long time, or if you are become so of late; unless perhaps you suppose that we are to think as Apicius did, who as Seneca reports, hav∣ing amass'd a vast Estate together, alotted some Thousands of Pounds for his Kitchen; but when upon making up his Accounts, he found that he had not above an Hundred thousand Pounds remaining, poyson'd himself to prevent Starving.

Of Pain and of Death.

IN the next Place let us treat about Pain and Death, those two Particulars, which in Cicero's Opinion, require an extraordinary courage of Mind to be able to overcome them. For Pain, as it is almost the sole and only substantial Evil, or which depends not as the rest, upon meer Fancy, no doubt there is much Fortitude and a Greatness of Soul re∣quired, patiently to undergo it. A wise Man there∣fore will here seriously consider, that he is born sub∣ject to many Inconveniences of Life, and among the rest to Pain; that it is the Property of Nature to be sensible of Evil, but it is the Property of Vir∣tue to bear it with Courage; and that when the Evil is not to be avoided, we ought rather to allay it, by a patient quiet submitting to it, than to ag∣gravate and incense it by uneasy and vain Struglings. Also that Pain is not a thing altogether intolerable, seeing so many famous Examples prove the contra∣ry, not only among great Hero's and Philosophers, such as Zeno and Anaxarches, but even among the very Slaves themselves, witness him whom the greatest Tortures could not hinder from expressing a joy upon his Countenance, for having reveng'd the Death of his Master, by killing Asdrubal, who had Murdered him. Nay, whole Nations can te∣stify the like, as for Instance, the Lacedemonians, whose Children were wont to whip one another al∣most to Death, and yet never shewed any sign of Pain either in their Countenance or Speech, that so they might be rendred more capable of undergoing any thing for their Countries sake. I shall not name that other Person, who knowing that it was reputed no Shame among his Country-men to Steal,

but to be caught in the Theft, suffered his Bowels to be devoured by a little Fox that he had Stole and hid in his Bosom, without expressing any sign of Pain, for fear of discovering the Theft.

He will also consider, That if the Pain be light, it is easy to be born; if great, that it is so much the more Glorious and Honourable to endure it with Courage, and that by frequent Custom it will be∣come more supportable, or that being of no long continuance, it will speedily put an end either to him or his Suffering. If it ceaseth, the Pleasure of being delivered from it, and the health of Body that suc∣ceeds, with a perfect Indolency, are so pleasing and delightsome, that we seem to be well satisfied with the Pain we have undergone, from the Pleasure we enjoy of being freed from it. And if it takes away the Sufferer, it brings him to the end of all Suffer∣ings. So that this Suffering brings at least this Ad∣vantage with it, that it makes our Life, which we must needs part with, less pleasing, and Death less terrible; wherefore many care not how soon they Dye, expecting thereby to be delivered from their Pains, so that every Day they talk after this man∣ner,

Nor is Death Grievous, whilst it ends my Pains.

Now as for Death, we have already alledged so many things to shew that we ought to expect it, and bear it patiently, that it is needless to insist any longer upon this Particular. Let us therefore con∣clude with that kind of general Consolation which Horace in few Words expresseth:

With equal Foot impartial Fate, Knocks at the Cottage and the Palace Gate.

And the French Poet Malherbius imitates him.

The Beggar in Straw, Keeps the general Law; And when Death gives the Word, must advance. And the Guards that each Hour, Take their Place at the Louvre, Can't defend the great Monarchs of France.