Three discourses of happiness, virtue, and liberty collected from the works of the learn'd Gassendi, by Monsieur Bernier ; translated out of French.

Of the Apathy, or the Insensibility of Stoicks.

NOW as the Stoicks differ from the Peripate∣ticks in particular, that the Stoicks in the first place would have a wise Man be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, with∣out Passion, whereas the Peripateticks distinguish the Passions or Affections into vain and useless, and into natural and necessary. They say well, that a wise Man ought to be free from the first sort, but that the latter should be kept in and bridled in such a manner, that we may observe a convenient Mean and a just Mediocrity. Secondly, whereas the Sto∣icks will never allow a wise Man either to complain or grieve, nay, in the midst of Pain he should keep up to such a severe and rigid Austerity as may be∣speak him almost insensible; but the Peripateticks think that this was spoken out of an Excess of Vani∣ty and Ambition, and that it is more convenient

to be moved with Tenderness, to let fall a few Tears, Sighs and Groans, than to be wise after such a man∣ner, to be inwardly tormented, as saith Crantor, by such a kind of Inhumanity and Insensibility. As there is this difference, I say between the Stoicks and the Peripateticks, let us examin in few Words what Cicero saith, who seems to be a Defender of this Insensibility in answer to the Peripateticks. After he had given such a description of a wise Man as we have already seen, thus he goes on. Therefore we ought to look upon the Judgment of the Peripateticks, as weak and contemptible, when they say, That it is necessa∣ry that the Minds of Men should be tossed up and down and disturbed; but yet they appoint a certain Moderation beyond which it is not lawful to pass: What, saith he, wilt thou assign a Moderation to Vice? Is it not Vice to disobey Reason? To desire any thing passionately, and after we have obtained it to behave our selves Proudly and Insolently; to be easily dejected, or for the very fear of Oppression to grow furious, and deprive our selves of the use of our Judgment? Is it not a great Fault and Error to be either too much Dejected or Exalted? Thus Cicero argues. But to speak the Truth, the Peripa∣teticks never had any such Fancy, that Vice ought to be moderated in such a manner that it should still remain in any respect a Vice; they held Vir∣tue to be a Medium, not that it was such as partici∣pating of the Extremes, as Lukewarm doth of Heat and Cold; but that it is between two Extremes, as the Center is between the extremities of a Diame∣ter, the strait Line between two crooked. Neither did they pretend that it was no Vice to disobey Rea∣son, for they would have Reason to prescribe a Moderation: Nor did they allow a too eager or passionate Desire of Things, or when obtained, to be too much exalted or puff'd up; for they were persuaded, that the power of Reason ought to give

a check to all Fury and Insolence, and to confine them within due Bounds: So that they denied not that it was evil to be too much Dejected and Affli∣cted, or for fear of being so, to fall into such De∣sparation and Fury, as to lose all, and be deprived of the use of their Judgment; for they still thought that we ought to rouse up our selves, and keep us free from Despair, and in a due and moderate Tem∣per. Neither did they believe that it was no Error in our Actions to express too much Grief or too much Joy; for they taught, That we ought so to correct our Error, that there might not appear either too much or too little in any thing.

He goes further on, and says, That he who seeks a Moderation in Vice, acts as he who casting himself down headlong from a steep Mountain, endeavours to stop himself in his Fall, but in vain; and to as little pur∣pose, as it is for a Man whose Thoughts are Distracted, and his Passions Predominant, on a suddain to appease 'em and make a Calm. But they will deny perhaps, that where Mediocrity or Moderation, in which Virtue consists, being observed, there should remain any thing of Vice; nor will they allow of that Com∣parison, that where a Man hath once cast himself down headlong, that its not in his Power to retrieve himself from Falling, to hold good in this Case; for he who is fallen into a Passion hath some Rea∣son in him still remaining, which is able to repress or check it, especially if he hath the fewest Grains of Wisdom remaining, or the least Inclination for Virtue, as such a one may have that we now instance in.

At last he concludes in this manner, Therefore if they approve of a Moderation in Trouble, 'tis the same as if they allowed of a Moderation in Injustice, a Mo∣deration in Cowardise, a Moderation in Intemperance; for to apportion a Moderation in Vice, is to approve of

some part of the Vice. But Cicero insists upon that which they will not allow; for he looks upon Vir∣tue not as a Medium between two Vices, but as a Vice moderated, which is quite contrary to the Judgment of Aristotle; for he saith, For to seek a Mediocrity in Adultery, or any such like Vice, 'tis the same as to admit of a Mediocrity, Excess, or a Defi∣ciency in Ʋnjustice, in Cowardise, and in Intempe∣rance.

Cicero afterwards more at large mentions the Reasonings and Arguments of the Peripateticks, with a design to oppose 'em, That according to their Judgment, the inward Disturbances and Passions are not only Natural, but that they have been allowed by Nature for good Ʋses; That they allow of Anger as a Whet-stone to Courage, because the Assault of an angry Person, against a publick Enemy, or a treache∣rous Subject, is more Powerful than if he opposed him in cold Blood; That severe Injunctions are not without a Mixture of Anger; That if an Orator is not angry, he ought at least to pretend to be so; That a Man is not a Man, if he cannot be angry, and that what Men call Calmness is a kind of stupid Insensibility; That it is impossible to perform any great thing without some Transport, witness Themistocles and Demosthenes; That without this Incentive, the great Philosophers had never made so large a Progress in the Sciences, and that without such an earnest desire, Pythagoras, De∣mocritus, and Plato had never travelled as they did about the World; That it is not without some great ad∣vantage that Nature hath appointed Displeasure and Grief, that Men might be vexed and grieved for their Crimes, and troubled for their Punishments, Reproofs, and Shame; That Mercy is useful to oblige us to assist the afflicted, and that to be emulous is not altogether useless; And lastly, That he who will take away Fear, takes away all Diligence, &c. He adds many other

Particulars which he seems to answer when he saith, Nevertheless, they confess when they Dispute of these Matters, that they ought to be cut off in part, but that they cannot, nor ought not to be totally rooted out. So that they esteem Mediocrity or Moderation to be requisite almost in every thing. And truly in rela∣tion to what he objects; for Example, That it be∣longs not to a stout and generous Spirit to be angry, but to a Fencer; that without this Anger of a Fencer, Ajax will encounter Hector, and that Torquatus Marcellus the African, was free from it, &c. They will answer, That it may be proper for a Fencer to be furiously angry and beyond Reason, but the Anger of a generous Person is more Temperate and hearkens to Reason.

And as to what he says concerning Mercy. Can∣not we be Liberal but we must be touched with Com∣passion and Pity? Seeing we ought not to afflict our selves for others, but to strive, if it be possible, to raise them out of their Afflictions. They will answer, That Mercy will cause us to be more inclined to Liberality; and that the wise Man suffers not him∣self to be vexed and afflicted for others, in such a manner as to be disturbed in himself, but it is a kind sense of Humanity that obliges him to lend Assistance to others.

In relation to Jealousie or Emulation, they will answer, That the Jealousie of a wise Man is no∣thing but a certain Motion or Desire that ingages him to strive to attain to a degree of Glory, equal or greater than that of another.

As to what concerns Fear, they will willingly agree, That Timerousness or too great Fear is to be condemned; and they will shew, that this Life cannot be without Fear, which causeth us to pro∣vide before-hand against several Casualties which we fore-see.

Finally, in relation to what he saith of Anger and Desire, they will prove that it is natural to be angry, and have an Ambition: But to be angry without measure, or to aim at any thing with too much eagerness, this proceeds from an Error that we ought to correct; so that when they advise us to avoid or abstain from all Excess, they advise us to extirpate and destroy whatsoever proceeds from Error, but not so that what is natural or naturally planted in us, either can or ought to be rooted out and totally defaced.